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ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY AND THE HEGELIAN TURN

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THE BEGINNING OF THE NEW CENTURY provides a good time to reflect on the most influential philosophers of this period, or those most likely to survive, or again whom we should be reading in a hundred years. The answer one gives to this type of question obviously depends on what one thinks philosophy is about. I would like to suggest that at the beginning of the new century, at the start of the new millennium, the philosopher we will and should still be reading at the end of the new century is not one of the obvious candidates, like Russell, Wittgenstein, Quine, Heidegger, Peirce, or Dewey, Rorty's favorite, but the nineteenth century German thinker, G. W. F. Hegel.

Heidegger, who insists on the importance of coming to grips with Hegel but who did not know much about contemporary philosophy, seems not to understand the extent to which the discussion of his time was deeply dependent on Hegel.[1] Almost thirty years ago Richard Bernstein made a strong case for Hegel as the figure against whom the main contemporary philosophical movements react. Bernstein had in mind Hegel's influence on philosophies of action or activity, including the Marxist interest in practice (*praxis*).[2] A different way of making a

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[1]Heidegger, who was no fan of Hegel and whose nondialectical approach lies at the antipodes of Hegel's, declares in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* that if philosophy is to survive and prosper, it must come to grips with Hegel. See Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 178. His discussion of time in *Being and Time* is an effort to do so. See Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), §82, pp. 480–6. In sounding the call to return to Hegel, Heidegger is faintly echoing Otto Liebmann's famous neo-Kantian rallying cry to return to Kant. See Otto Liebmann, *Kant und die Epigonen: Eine kritische Abhandlung* (1865; reprint, Berlin: Reuther und Reichard, 1912). For discussion of neo-Kantianism, see Thomas E. Willey, *Back to Kant: The Revival of Kantianism in German Social and Historical Thought, 1860–1914* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1978).

[2]See Richard J. Bernstein, *Praxis and Action: Contemporary Philosophies of Human Activity* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971).

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similar claim would be through Hegel's influence on the three new philosophical movements which have emerged over the last century: American pragmatism, analytic philosophy, and what is misleadingly called the phenomenological movement.[3]

Each of these movements is built on a reaction to Hegel. Peirce, the founding figure of American pragmatism, was influenced by Hegel throughout his career, claiming finally that his own view is a non-standard form of Hegel's.[4] The phenomenological movement is based on Husserl's influence. Sartre even claims that Husserl invented phenomenology. Yet since Hegel was also a phenomenologist, at most Husserlian and post-Husserlian forms of phenomenology represent variations on a theme but not a wholly new type of philosophy.

In considering Hegel's relation to analytic philosophy, Bernstein mainly focuses on action, especially action theory. Although he points out the utter disdain which then existed for Hegel among analytic thinkers, he notes that for reasons concerned with the internal dialectic of the analytic discussion, the possibility of a *rapprochement* with Hegel now exists.[5]

I believe Bernstein was right but for reasons which a generation ago he did not fully grasp. He correctly picks up the hidden continuity between the founding fathers of analytic philosophy, Russell and Moore, and the idealism against which they rebelled.[6] He notes that analytic philosophers and Hegel share a concern to describe human action,[7] but he notes neither the distortion inherent in the analytic reaction to Hegel nor the way that analytic philosophy, even then, was already returning to Hegelian idealism.

On the Analytic Reaction to Hegel. Even among great philosophers, Hegel stands out as a widely misunderstood but equally influential writer. In claiming that Hegel is often misunderstood, I am not saying anything new about someone who, in the best of cases is an astonishingly difficult thinker.[8] It would hardly be surprising if analytic

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[3] See Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982).

[4] "My own philosophy resuscitates Hegel, though in a strange costume"; *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, ed. Charles Harteshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935), vol. 1, par. 42.

[5] See Bernstein, *Praxis and Action*, 233.

[6] See Bernstein, *Praxis and Action*, 232.

[7] See Bernstein, *Praxis and Action*, 317.

philosophers, who are generally uninterested in Hegel, who tend not to know the texts well, and who are more interested in problems than people, did any better in reading Hegel than his other students.

The relation of analytic philosophy to Hegel, on which I will be concentrating here, is largely unknown, even to historians of philosophy.[9] If I am right, Hegel turns out to be a key but mainly unacknowledged figure in analytic philosophy, from whom it departs and to which it is now returning, but which it has twice misunderstood. The first, highly productive misunderstanding was one ingredient in the rise of analytic philosophy. It remains to be seen whether the second misunderstanding, which is only now taking shape, will prove as productive in the further evolution of analytic philosophy.

This paper will study the two main phases of the reaction of analytic philosophy to Hegel. The first, a turn away from Hegel which for many analytic philosophers persists to this day, and which concerns the problem of the existence of the external world, was part of the process of working out the distinctive analytic position. The second, current turn is toward Hegel among selected analytic writers, concerned with the problem of knowledge after the analytic critique of classical empiricism. I will further be arguing that beyond the analytic misreadings of Hegel, we do well to turn toward him for what is

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[8] The Hegel discussion is littered with misunderstandings of his position, including its Marxist misreading as a pillar of reaction (This attitude is already present in Engels, the first Marxist. See Friedrich Engels, *Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy*, trans. C. P. Dutt [New York: International Publishers, 1941]), the right-wing religious misreading which still persists (See Cyril O'Regan, *The Heterodox Hegel* [Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994]) and the left-wing antireligious misreading as entirely secular (Kojève is only the best known example. See Alexandre Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, trans. James H. Nichols, Jr. [New York: Basic Books, 1969]).

[9] John Passmore, the best historian of English language philosophy, makes only a few perfunctory remarks about G. E. Moore's highly influential attack on idealism, which was and still is often taken as simply disposing of Hegel. Passmore notes that the former favors external relations against those who, influenced by Hegel, favor internal relations. See John Passmore, *A Hundred Years of English Philosophy* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966), 207–8. Yet he simply overlooks Moore's main objection, which concerns the existence of the mind-independent, real external world, whose affirmation is the central goal of Moore's attempted refutation. See Passmore, *A Hundred Years of English Philosophy*, for references to the immediate discussion surrounding Moore's article.

currently the best clue about how to continue the discussion of knowledge.

"Idealism"? The analytic turn away from Hegel early in the century was fueled by the conviction that he, like other idealists, wrongly denies the existence of the external world. In order to evaluate this complaint, it will be necessary to say something about "idealism," the form in which the objection is raised in analytic philosophy, and Hegel's position.

There is no natural way of using "idealism," which is always used normatively or stipulatively. Idealists do not often clarify the term, which their opponents typically employ very loosely to designate anything they reject. Idealism traditionally plays a prominent role not only in the analytic aversion to Hegel but in the Marxist critique of what they call bourgeois philosophy. It is generally understood by its proponents and its opponents in terms of a binary opposition, which is presumed to be exhaustive, and which opposes idealism to something else, such as materialism, realism, naturalism, or even empiricism.

"Idealism" is used to cover an implausibly broad variety of positions in reference to Plato, Berkeley, the German idealist tradition, British idealism, and so forth. As concerns Plato, this term alludes to the notorious theory of forms or ideas which is imputed to Plato, whose own position remains shrouded in mystery. Berkeley's antimaterialism leads to the famous slogan *esse est percipi*, which has apparently nothing other than the name in common with Plato. For German idealism, it is usual to distinguish at least four different subforms correlated with the four great names: Kant's critical idealism, Fichte's subjective idealism, Schelling's objective idealism, and Hegel's absolute idealism. Then there are further uses of the term among the British idealists, including Bradley, McTaggart, Bosanquet, and others.

Analytic philosophers, who are often not well versed in the history of philosophy, especially in idealism which they tend to reject, use the term "idealism" diffusely. Putnam typically rejects the view that "mind *makes up* the world" which he ascribes to Hegel.[10] Yet it is unclear what it would mean "to make up" the world, or what this verb

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[10] Hilary Putnam, *Reason, Truth and History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), xi.

is intended to mean, or even how Hegel could reasonably be held to illustrate this doctrine.

Moore and British Idealism. Moore's knowledge of Hegel, as opposed to the British Hegelians, is apparently indirect, certainly very sketchy. In *Principia Ethica* (1903) he mentions authors who employ such "Hegelian terms" as "organic whole," "organic unity," "organic relation"[11] and a metaphysical Hegelian approach to ethics.[12] In *Some Main Problems of Philosophy* (1928), which reproduces lectures given in 1910–1911, without referring to any specific text he depicts Hegel as holding, in violation of the law of excluded middle, that objects can simultaneously have contradictory properties, leading to a critique of relations.[13] In these and other writings he seems to be opposed less directly to Hegel than to his British disciples, such as McTaggart and above all Bradley.[14]

British Hegelianism developed on the heels of J. H. Stirling's famous book, *The Secret of Hegel* (1865).[15] Early on both Russell and Moore were loosely Hegelian. As an undergraduate, under McTaggart's influence, Russell considered the ontological argument to be sound and regarded himself as a Hegelian.[16] He notes that about the same time, but for a shorter period, Moore was also a Hegelian under McTaggart's influence.[17] Russell seems to have convinced Moore, who was skeptical, to attend McTaggart's Hegel lectures.[18] Moore, who later rejected McTaggart's ideas, was especially opposed to Bradley, the most original of the British Hegelians, who as late as

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[11] See G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1960), 30. See also p. 34.

[12] See G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica*, 110.

[13] See G. E. Moore, *Some Main Problems of Philosophy* (New York: Collier, 1962), 190–1.

[14] This doctrine was specifically developed in Bradley, who holds in the first book of *Appearance and Reality* that every existential claim falls into contradictions which concern no more than mere appearance. See F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality* (1893; reprint, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1916). See also chapter 3.

[15] J. H. Stirling, *The Secret of Hegel* (London: Longman, Roberts and Green, 1865).

[16] See B. A. W. Russell, *The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1967), 63.

[17] See Russell, *The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell*, 64.

[18] See Paul Levy, *Moore: G. E. Moore and the Cambridge Apostles* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 125, 148.

1924, decades after the publication of his main work, *Appearance and Reality* (1893), was still regarded as the most significant British philosopher.[19]

Analytic philosophers, who reject British idealism, are often relatively uninformed about it. Standard works on the history of analytic philosophy usually devote a few desultory pages to British idealism, described as a strange, mysterious doctrine which they profess not to understand, which can barely be stated, and in which no one endowed with a shred of common sense should believe.[20]

The British idealists thought well of Hegel. It is a stretch to say they were Hegelian in any deep way, although the belief that they were earned them the solid enmity of later analytic thinkers. Like other British Hegelians, Bradley stood for so-called Absolute Idealism, including metaphysical claims about reality, or the universe as a whole, as distinguished from mere appearance, as well as ultimate truths surpassing scientific claims. In style and in substance Bradley and the other British idealists were antithetical to traditional British empiricism, which they opposed, but which, in different ways, was reasserted against them by Moore and Russell. Traditional British empiricism supposed there was a real, mind-independent external world which is discovered but not constructed by the subject. It is diametrically opposed to Bradley's thesis, in his view the essential message of Hegel, that there is no extra-spiritual reality since everything lies within spirit.[21]

Moore's Critique of (British) Idealism. Early analytic philosophy tended to revive classical British empiricism in various forms. On the way to his later theory of knowledge by description, Russell initially held that meaning required a correlation between the words in a sentence and something outside it.[22] Moore's critique of idealism is

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[19] See J. H. Muirhead, *Contemporary British Philosophy* (1924; reprint, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1953), Preface, p. 11.

[20] Warnock seems to know almost nothing about British idealism, which he regards as difficult to describe. See G. J. Warnock, *English Philosophy Since 1900* (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), 2–10.

[21] See Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, 552.

[22] See Bertrand Russell, *Principles of Mathematics* (New York: Norton, 1964), chapter 4, pp. 42–52. For discussion, see D. F. Pears, *Bertrand Russell and the British Tradition in Philosophy* (New York: Vintage, 1967) chap. 1, pp. 13–25.

mainly directed against British idealism, against which he reaffirms a common sense form of classical empiricism.

Moore was interested in the problem of the existence of the external world, and in the refutation of idealism for allegedly denying it, over a long period of time stretching from his early "Refutation of Idealism" (1903) through "Is Existence a Predicate?" (1936) and "Proof of an External World" (1939). The problem was always the same. He was convinced that idealists asserted very queer claims about the world, basically unlike the rather ordinary view which he asserted against them.

Moore begins the "Refutation of Idealism" by claiming that for modern idealism the universe is spiritual.[23] This remarkable claim is doubly interesting. First, it indicates his awareness of a distinction between modern and other forms of idealism. Second, it simply ignores Hegel and other German idealists, none of whom holds this or an analogous view, and takes up English-language idealists like Berkeley and Bradley. Since the proposition he proposes to dispute is Berkeley's view that *esse* is *percipi*, it seems that for Moore, Berkeley represents modern idealism in general.[24] Against Berkeley, Moore maintains that to be is not to be perceived. He further denies, against Bradley, that what is experienced is identical with the experience.[25] On the contrary, sensation is always sensation of something.[26] We are then always already outside spirit since all sensation is sensation of something.[27]

Moore, Existence, and Later Analytic Philosophy. In maintaining that reality has nothing to do with sentience, Moore is close to realism, which is ordinarily understood as the idea there is a mind-independent world and that truth and knowledge in fact grasp it as it is. In

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[23] See "The Refutation of Idealism," in G. E. Moore, *Philosophical Studies* (1922; reprint, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958), 1. Bradley makes a similar claim. See Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, 552.

[24] See Moore, *Philosophical Studies*, 5. He also says he intends to refute idealism in the form it was recently stated by A. E. Taylor, the great Plato scholar. See Moore, Ibid., 8: "My paper will at least refute Mr. Taylor's idealism, if it refutes anything at all: for I shall undertake to *show* that what makes a thing real cannot be its presence as an inseparable aspect of a sentient experience."

[25] See Ibid., 19, 22.

[26] See Ibid., 24.

[27] See Ibid., 27.

a later article, Moore links his reassertion of realism against idealism to Kant. He recalls Kant's famous remark about the scandal that philosophy must take the existence of the external world on faith before remarking that it is by no means sure that Kant's own proof is successful.[28] Moore's proposed alternative consists in the reassertion of what he took to be common sense claims, such as "Here is one hand . . . and here is another."[29]

Moore's effort to refute idealism understood as denying the existence of the external world was influential in the later analytic debate. His commonsensism is consistent with traditional English empiricism but inconsistent with Kant, who affirms the existence of the external world but denies immediate knowledge. It is inconsistent as well with the widespread attack on empiricism later developed in analytic philosophy by such writers as Wittgenstein, Quine, Davidson, Sellars, Putnam, and Rorty.

Moore's claim for immediate knowledge was attacked by Wittgenstein in a manner influenced by Russell. The latter was concerned with definite reference, or denotation.[30] In contending that knowledge of physical objects is merely descriptive, he distinguishes sharply between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description.[31] In *On Certainty* Wittgenstein denies any claims for direct knowledge, what Russell calls knowledge by acquaintance. For Wittgenstein, Moore misuses the term "to know" in refuting idealism, which cannot be answered by claiming immediate knowledge at all.[32] He further maintains, in going beyond Moore and Russell, that claims to know are mediated by a frame of reference (*Bezugssystem*).[33] In both *Philosophical Investigations* and in *On Certainty*, he elaborates the frame of reference as a language game, in which words are meaningful in relation to their employment.[34]

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[28] "Proof of an External World," in G. E. Moore, *Philosophical Papers* (New York: Collier Books, 1962), 27.

[29] See Moore, *Philosophical Studies*, 144.

[30] See Russell, "On Denoting," in *Readings in Philosophical Analysis*, ed. Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949), 103–15.

[31] See "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description," in Bertrand Russell, *Mysticism and Logic* (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor, 1957), 202–24.

[32] See Ludwig Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), §§520–1.

[33] See Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, §403.

Wittgenstein's attack on Moore's rehabilitation of realism against idealism yields two suggestions. First, the problem of the existence of the external world is the kind of nonproblem which interests philosophers but could not be solved. Second, our knowledge claims cannot be justified through an appeal to experience but only against the background of a conceptual framework.

The former idea was later developed in physicalist form by Carnap. In *The Logical Structure of the World* (1928), he provides a rational reconstruction of knowledge through concepts which immediately refer to the empirical given. The type of physicalism Carnap professed in this book, which was shared by many other members of the Vienna Circle, with the important exception of Neurath,[35] comes down to an ontological claim about reality as ultimately physical. If reality is composed of physical entities, then everything that is real, hence meaningful, can be known empirically, or on an empirical basis; and since what cannot be known empirically is obviously not real, cognitive reference to it cannot be meaningful.

Carnap applied this latter idea to eliminate pseudoproblems, what Kant would call bad metaphysics, from epistemology, in an article published in the same year, "The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language."[36] Following the early Wittgenstein's view[37] that metaphysical sentences are unverifiable, hence meaningless, he argues that statements either asserting or denying the reality of the external world are mere pseudostatements.

The latter suggestion was taken up by Sellars who, in Wittgenstein's wake, makes a half-way turn toward Hegel, hence contributes to healing the breach between analytic philosophy and the latter opened by Moore and Russell. In "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," Sellars, like Wittgenstein, rejects the idea of direct givenness,

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[34] See Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1956), §§43, 197, 264, 340; see further Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, §§61, 65, 82, 560.

[35] In a famous paper, he decisively criticized the very idea of protocol sentences. See Otto Neurath, "Protocol Sentences," in *Logical Positivism*, ed. A. J. Ayer (New York: Free Press, 1959), 199–208.

[36] See Rudolf Carnap, "The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language," in *Logical Positivism*, 60–82.

[37] See Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1963), proposition 6.53.

which is basic to classical British empiricism, and restated in Moore, as no more than a myth.[38] His central point seems to be that we do not and cannot depend, as classical empiricists believe, for the justification of claims to know on immediate experience whose probative force is undermined by the rejection of the myth of the given.

Moore's Criticism of Idealism. Moore's attack on idealism, which was influential in creating the well-known analytic enmity against Hegel which persists to this day, is astonishingly imprecise. It is unclear whether he intends to criticize all modern forms of idealism, British idealism in general, Bradley, Berkeley, or perhaps only the Platonist A. E. Taylor.

Moore claims that idealism denies the existence of the real, mind-independent external world whose existence we can prove. The proposed refutation is inadequate in respect to idealism in general and to Kant and Hegel in particular. Moore cannot refute idealism in general since there is none; there are only idealists who hold different views. He does not establish a central theme common to all modern forms of idealism, even to Berkeley, Bradley, and British idealism, much less to Kant, Hegel, and German idealism. Since he does not show that Berkeley and the British idealists share the same or relevantly similar views, even if his arguments were valid against the former, it would not follow that they counted against the latter.

The term "idealist" seems to have been invented by Leibniz, who, responding to Bayle, objected to "those who like Epicurus and Hobbes, believe that that soul is material"and went on to add that in his own position "whatever of good there is in the hypotheses of Epicurus and Plato, of the great materialists and the great idealists, is combined here."[39] Moore's problematic view of idealism is close to an early usage of the term in Christian Wolff. According to the latter, who is thinking of Berkeley, idealists acknowledge only ideal objects existing in our minds but deny the independent reality of the world and the existence of material bodies.[40] Yet this view fails to characterize Kant. In the critical philosophy, where he elaborates "good idealism," Kant does not deny but rather affirms the existence of the external

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[38] See Wilfrid Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).

[39] G. W. F. Leibniz, *Philosophische Schriften*, ed. C. I. Gerhardt (Berlin: Weidmann, 1875–1890), 4:559–60.

world in criticizing the "bad" idealism he detects in Descartes and Berkeley.

Moore, who does not successfully criticize Kant's effort, provides a selective account of it.[41] This is not the place to enter into the details of Kant's argument. Suffice it to say that in invoking direct, unmediated, immediate knowledge, which Kant denies, Moore merely begs the question. His proposed solution bears approximately the same relation to Kant's difficulty as Dr. Johnson's reported refutation of Berkeley: both simply miss the point.

Hegel and the External World. Moore's attack on idealism for denying the existence of the external world is unfair to Hegel as well. It is still adversely affecting interpretations of Hegel decades after it was launched. An instance among many is Burnyeat's reading of idealism as the view that "all there is is mind and the contents of mind,"[42] leading to his mistaken suggestion that Plato's contention that there is something independent of thought falsifies Hegel's claim to see anticipations of his own position in Greek thought.[43] Yet Hegel begins from the assumption, which is common to all the main figures in German idealism, including Kant and all his idealist successors, that the problem of knowledge concerns mind-independent objects given in experience and knowledge.

Hegel, who scarcely helps his readers, says little directly about his position, but he gives us ample clues throughout his writings that he does not deny but rather affirms the mind-independent external

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[40] Christian Wolff, *Psychologia rationalis*, in *Gesammelte Werke*, ed. J. Ecole, J. E. Hofmann, M. Thomann, and H. W. Arndt (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1972), II. Abteilung. Lateinische Schriften, vol. 6, §36, p. 25.

[41] Any reasonably comprehensive account of Kant's view of this theme would need to consider at least his three main references to the problem in the *Critique of Pure Reason*: the remark in the B introduction about the scandal of philosophy (See Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996), 36; Bxxxxix) the discussion in the Fourth Paralogism concerning ideality in the A edition, in regard to outer relation (See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 400–9; A367–80) and the famous "Refutation of idealism" in the B edition (See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 288–98; B274–87).

[42] See M. F. Burnyeat, "Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed," *Philosophical Review* 41, no. 1 (January 1982): 8.

[43] See Burnyeat, "Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed," 22 n. 23.

world, hence that the analytic charge originated by Moore is simply false.

Here are three such clues. To begin with, in the so-called *Differenzschrift*, his first philosophical publication, he advances the view, which he never later renounces, that philosophy begins in (ontological) difference.[44] His position can be simply characterized through the complex assertion that epistemological unity depends on ontological disunity, or difference. In this connection, it is crucial to note the distinction, on which Hegel insists, between the opposition between subject and object, in which the latter is simply defined as negation of subjectivity, and claims to know mind-independent objects as they are, which Hegel simply rejects.[45] Second, in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel presents a phenomenology of the experience of consciousness. The stage-wise development of consciousness includes consciousness, self-consciousness, and reason, whose final phase is absolute knowing (*absolutes Wissen*), in which the subject is said to know and to know that it knows its relation to what is other than itself. Sense-certainty, the initial phase of consciousness, tells us that something is, or exists, hence acknowledges the existence of the external world but not what it is, which further requires perception. Third, the same basic position is further developed in the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* where Hegel provides an important account of the "Positions of Thought to Objectivity."[46]

It is incorrect to tax Hegel with denying the existence of the external world in any way, for instance, by reducing it to spirit. Moore thinks that either one denies the existence of the external world, or one must acknowledge its existence and be able to know it as it is. The third possibility, which he does not consider but which Hegel defends, is that the existence of the external world can be conceded, or at least not denied, although no claim is made to know it as it is. There is an enormous difference between the traditional realist claim to know the mind-independent external world[47] and the weaker, but

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[44] See G. W. F. Hegel, *The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy*, trans. by H. S. Harris and Walter Cerf (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977).

[45] At the beginning of the *Differenzschrift*, Hegel objects to Kant's supposed hypostasization of thing in itself as absolute objectivity, that is, as wholly independent of subjectivity. See Hegel, *The Difference*, 79–80.

[46] G. W. F. Hegel, *The Encyclopedia Logic*, trans. T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991), §§19–83, pp. 45–134.

more defensible acknowledgment that there is an external world, which provides empirical constraints on claims to know but which cannot itself be known as it is. Hegel acknowledges the existence of the external world, but he denies the further claim that we can know it as it is in holding that claims for truth and knowledge are limited wholly and solely to the contents of conscious experience. Since he acknowledges the role of the external world in knowledge, Hegel is an empiricist, although in a different way from either classical British empiricism or Kant.

Empiricism and Idealism. Following Moore, empiricism and idealism are often viewed as opposed. Yet empiricism and idealism are not incompatible but compatible. In the present context, it will be appropriate to distinguish three forms of empiricism, of which the second and third types are compatible with forms of German idealism.

Classical British empiricism, whether in Bacon's view that the mind is the mirror of nature or in Locke's view that complex ideas consist of simple ideas that cannot be wrong, claims to know the real external world as it is. This claim is denied in German idealism, which follows Kant's seminal suggestion that we can know only that we know what we in some sense construct, which is arguably the central insight in the critical philosophy. Unlike classical empiricists, such as Locke, who claim that complex ideas are constructed out of simple ideas which cannot be wrong, Kant never claims to know the mind-external world as it is but only to receive from it the sensory content out of which perceptual objects are constructed. Kant, who denies the classical empiricist claim for direct, immediate knowledge, offers a second type of empiricism on the basis of his famous assertion that all cognition begins in but is not limited to experience.[48] His a priori form of empiricism concerns the transcendental analysis of the conditions of the possibility of experience and knowledge of objects.

Hegel has often been seen as the paradigmatic anti-empiricist by analytic philosophers like Moore and his conceptual heirs; it is not often noticed that he favors a third form of empiricism. Hegel follows Kant in rejecting the very idea that we can consciously know

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[47] See Michael Devitt, *Realism and Truth* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).

[48] See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 43; B1.

mind-independent objects as they are but denies against Kant that we can specify the transcendental conditions of knowledge. He criticizes classical empiricism on the grounds that direct, immediate experience, which shows only that something is but not what it is, is not the richest but the poorest kind of knowledge.[49] He several times rejects the Kantian distinction between the general conditions of the possibility of knowledge whatsoever and the actual process of knowledge,[50] hence transcendental philosophy as Kant understands it. He describes the Kantian effort to clarify the conditions of knowledge prior to seeking knowledge as natural but not scientific on the grounds that pure reason cannot be understood either as an instrument or as a medium. Since what we perceive is altered by the way it is perceived, there is no way to sustain the distinction between the way the object is in itself, as a mere object of thought, and as it appears within experience.[51]

Hegel's conception of knowledge is a variant of Kantian "constructivism." This approach originates in a famous letter to Herz toward the start of the critical period, which prefigures the position Kant later works out. Kant formulates his concern as a question: "What is the ground of the relation of that in us which we call 'representation' [*Vorstellung*] to the object [*Gegenstand*]?"[52]

Kant's idea of the cognitive object can be understood in two main ways: as a mere object of thought,[53] and as a mind-independent object which "affects" the cognitive subject. Kant consistently inclines toward the second reading in various efforts to refute idealism understood as the denial of the reality of the external world. This suggests that he accepts the idea of a mind-independent world, which is prior to and independent of experience and knowledge of objects. A version of this reading is further adopted in Fichte's concern to provide an orthodox extension of the critical philosophy, for instance in his basic definition of experience as contents of consciousness accompanied by a feeling of necessity.[54]

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[49] See the analysis of "Sense-certainty" in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 104–38.

[50] See Hegel, *The Encyclopedia Logic*, §10, pp. 33–4.

[51] See G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), §73, p. 46.

[52] See Immanuel Kant, *Philosophical Correspondence, 1759–1799*, trans. Arnulf Zweig (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 71.

[53] See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 539; B566.

Kant's question concerns the problem of how a representation refers to (mind-independent) objects which do not affect it. In response, in the first *Critique* he famously claims that reason (*Vernunft*) knows only what it in some sense constructs (*hervorbringt*).[55] In short, knowledge cannot depend on knowing the mind-independent external world as it is since we can only know that we know what we in some sense construct.

Hegel holds that claims to know should not be understood as simply immediate, that is as a posteriori, or as a priori, namely, as the result of the theoretical analysis of the conditions of knowledge in general; they should rather be understood as the result of thinking through the successive levels of the experience of consciousness in the course of which truth and knowledge emerge. In criticizing Kant, Hegel abandons any version of the correspondence view of truth since the relation of the representation to the external object cannot be known. Knowledge requires an identity, or coincidence, between the view of the object and the object as given in experience. In place of Kant's a priori analysis of the conditions of any experience and knowledge of objects whatsoever, Hegel proposes a more pragmatic conception of knowledge according to which theories are tried out and evaluated in terms of practice.

Analytic Pragmatism. Moore's unjustified critique of Hegel is an influential factor in the analytic disinterest in idealism which persists to this day. The turn away from Hegel, which has been so productive in the development of a distinctive analytic philosophical approach, has recently been supplemented by a nascent, still very modest turn toward Hegel, which is embedded as it were in a wider analytic turn toward pragmatism.

We can distinguish between the general analytic turn toward pragmatism and the specific turn toward Hegel. The analytic turning to pragmatism has been underway for some time, since the early 1950s if it begins with Quine, since the early 1930s if it begins with Neurath. Recent analytic pragmatism is a distant consequence of the early Carnap's defeat at the hands of Neurath, as a result of which the idea of a

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[54] See "The First Introduction to the Science of Knowldedge," in J. G. Fichte, *The Science of Knowledge*, trans. Peter Heath and John Lachs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), §1, pp. 5–7.

[55] See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 19; Bxiii.

seamless foundationalist web between empiricism and science was abandoned.[56] A straight line leads from Neurath's criticism of protocol sentences to Quine's view of the underdetermination of theories, his related turn to pragmatism, and, beyond Quine, to Putnam. In different ways, Quine, Putnam, Rorty, and many others[57] are all party to this turning. Among the most important analytic philosophers at present, only Davidson remains a holdout. Rorty, the self-proclaimed heir to Dewey, whom he constantly but eccentrically invokes, seems in some ways as distant from pragmatism as Davidson, who never claims to be a pragmatist but whom Rorty has controversially tried to recruit for the cause.

Ironically, as concerns pragmatism Quine and Davidson represent the two analytic extremes.[58] This is ironic since Davidson, who is often thought of as Quine's strongest follower, is in fact one of his deepest critics. If we limit the discussion to Quine, Rorty, and Putnam, we have three different analytic forms of pragmatism.

Quine's influential view of pragmatism, like the rest of his position, is very spare. He had already stopped mentioning pragmatism when he composed *Word and Object* (1960). To the best of my knowledge, the term has not appeared in his writings for decades. His minimalist view of pragmatism can be inferred from a few remarks, primarily in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," but also in "Identity, Ostension and Hypostasis," a pair of essays written around 1950. In the former, he links his rejection of the analytic–synthetic distinction and reductionism to a shift toward pragmatism.[59] In the latter, he suggests that since claims to know depend on a prior conceptual scheme, which cannot be compared to reality, we should abandon the idea of a mirror of reality, or a realistic standard, in favor of a pragmatic standard.[60] In these and other writings, Quine refuses a priori claims to

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[56] See Otto Neurath, "Protocol Sentences," in *Logical Positivism*, 199–208.

[57] Other prominent examples, whom I will not discuss in this paper, include C. I. Lewis, Nicholas Rescher, and Joseph Margolis. Quine even includes Carnap among the pragmatists. See "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," in W. V. O. Quine, *From A Logical Point of View* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), 46.

[58] This is pointed out well by McDowell. See his discussion of "Davidson in Context," in *Mind and World*, 129–161.

[59] See *From A Logical Point of View*, 20.

[60] See Ibid., 79.

know of all kinds, as well as claims based on facts unrelated to a prior framework, since he denies there is any fact of the matter. Based on these indications, by inference for Quine "pragmatism" means that, as he explicitly says, claims to know must meet the test of experience as a whole, or as a corporate body.[61] In a word, pragmatism means epistemic holism and, conversely, epistemic holism means pragmatism.

For Quine, the shift to pragmatism follows from epistemic holism. Putnam has always been close to Quine, hence to pragmatism. Quine's holism calls attention to an explanatory gap between sensory information and theory. Putnam's internal realism draws the conclusion in pointing to plural interpretations of the single mind-independent real. Putnam has always also seen his interest in pluralism as close to James's commitment to pluralism in *A Pluralist Universe* and other writings.[62]

Putnam's pluralism, which survives his recent abandonment of internal realism, leads to an explicit commitment to a Jamesian form of pragmatism. Like Carnap, one of his early heroes, Putnam is always changing his mind. The history of Putnam's development reflects the formulation and later abandonment of a series of ideas, often while they are still influential, most recently in his decision to give up internal realism.[63] As stated in *Reason, Truth and History*, there is a contrast between external realism, a so-called God's eye view, or view without perspective, and internal realism, the view that there is more than one "'true' theory or description of the world."[64] Putnam was never too clear about what this view entails. In the initial formulation, he claims that internal realism concerns both the mind-independent world and the world as produced by our concepts.[65] These views are very different. Certainly, the latter smacks of idealism, which he is at

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[61] See *From A Logical Point of View*, 41.

[62] Putnam has often written on James in recent years. For Putnam's view of his relation to James's pluralism, see, for example, "James's Theory of Perception," in Hilary Putnam, *Realism with a Human Face*, ed. James Conant (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 36–8.

[63] See Hilary Putnam, "Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses: An Inquiry into the Powers of the Human Mind," *Journal of Philosophy* 91, no. 9 (September 1994): 445–517.

[64] See Hilary Putnam, "Two Philosophical Perspectives," in *Reason, Truth and History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 49.

[65] See Putnam, *Reason, Truth and History*, 54.

pains to avoid. He has recently abandoned this view, however construed, in a shift to natural realism, his new name for direct realism.[66] In so doing, he gives up sense data for the direct experience of external objects. Putnam, who notes that this view goes all the way back to Aristotle, claims it is first stated in nonmetaphysical fashion by William James. Although he rejects James's suggestion that the world is in part the product of our minds, he accepts the idea that normal veridical perception picks out external things.[67] He denies any interface between the mind and the external object of perception,[68] and he agrees with what he calls the great insight of pragmatism that what is important in our lives must be important in philosophy.[69] Hence, pragmatism for Putnam comes down to the view that claims to know rest on natural realism, or direct perception of the external world, which can be interpreted in different ways.

Rorty is the main figure in contemporary analytic philosophy most closely identified with pragmatism. In *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, he takes Quine's part in arguing it is meaningless to claim that our conceptual scheme mirrors reality.[70] His view of pragmatism closely follows Wittgenstein's influential shift from an early representationalist view to a later (social) contextualist theory of justification. His argument, which is skeptical in tone, rests on the claim that philosophy peaks in analytic philosophy. If analytic foundationalism fails, then philosophy in all its many forms fails. Since philosophy is concerned with knowledge, and since analytic foundationalism fails, there is nothing interesting to say about knowledge. For Rorty, as for Kant, the problem of knowledge is representational, and representations cannot be compared with what they represent as traditional empiricism requires. On this basis, he draws a sharp distinction between epistemology and hermeneutics in contending that the latter is not and cannot be another means to pursue epistemological concerns. In a later collection of essays, he suggests that the great pragmatists, by which he means James and Dewey (but strangely enough not Peirce), should not be seen as offering theories of knowledge, by which he seems to mean that they do not subscribe to the idea that to

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[66] See Putnam, "Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses."
[67] See Ibid., 454.
[68] Ibid., 488.
[69] Ibid., 517.
[70] See Quine, *From A Logical Point of View*, 79.

know means to get it right about the world, that is, to represent it accurately.[71] Epistemologists are concerned with theory, but pragmatists are concerned with practice, ultimately with helping us cope. He has further clarified his view in a more recent paper on "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth," where he develops the idea that pragmatism consists in giving up correspondence with reality.[72] Here he maintains—using James as his standard since he thinks Peirce does not go far enough—that Davidson's view that a theory of truth cannot compare sentences with objects[73] qualifies him as a pragmatist.

Three Analytic Forms of Pragmatism Compared. The disparities in these three analytic views of pragmatism are real and significant. Quine is concerned with how we can reasonably be said to know; Rorty, who is an epistemological skeptic, is concerned with why we can reasonably be said not to know; and Putnam is occupied with what and how we know. Quine, who refuses other standards, accepts a pragmatic measure as the only one meaningful for knowledge. Rorty takes the need to apply such a standard as tantamount to skepticism. In criticizing empiricism, in particular Carnap's Vienna Circle view, Quine follows Neurath in seeing pragmatism as the responsible alternative. By implication Rorty takes the failure of Vienna Circle reductionism, manifest in Neurath's successful critique of Carnap, as suggesting that no claim to truth is now meaningful.

The difference between Quine and Rorty turns on their respective attitudes toward the idea that knowledge depends on correspondence with reality. Quine, who is undismayed by the impossibility of showing that our conceptual scheme mirrors reality, adopts a weaker but acceptable claim in adapting Duhem's form of scientific holism. Rorty, who presupposes a sharp, perhaps overly sharp, distinction between theory and practice, contends that in theory we cannot know how our ideas match up with the independent world although in practice we cope by invoking social standards. Quine, who is opposed to

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[71] See "Pragmatism, Relativism and Irrationalism," in Richard Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 160–75.

[72] See Richard Rorty, *Philosophical Papers* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 1:126–50.

[73] See Donald Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," in *Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 307–19.

analytic foundationalism, and who opposes reductionism, sees an alternative to it in pragmatism. Rorty, who is committed to analytic foundationalism but disappointed that it fails, sees no reasonable alternative to it which will yield knowledge.

Quine's holism presupposes that claims to know cannot be judged through an appeal to facts. Since facts cannot be separated from perspectives, there is no fact of the matter. On the contrary, Putnam's natural realism commits him to the view that the independent world is given as it is, although he also maintains that different interpretations are possible.[74]

Pragmatism and Analytic Pragmatism. Analytic pragmatism is obviously very different in different writers. How does it relate to pragmatism? The answer is complicated, more so than one would think. Quine's approach to pragmatism runs through Duhem, whose relation to pragmatism is not obvious. Rorty comes to pragmatism mainly through the later Wittgenstein and Sellars, whose views he reads as continuous, less so through Heidegger or even Dewey, whom he ostensively champions. Putnam at least makes the turn to pragmatism on directly pragmatic grounds. This does not mean his theories are more pragmatic than the others, only that he is more interested in the texts. Rorty reads Wittgenstein (and Sellars) as supporting the social view of verification ingredient in his own turn to pragmatism. Putnam regards Wittgenstein as misread as a social verificationist in his own turn to pragmatism.

As a doctrine, pragmatism is at least as various as its analytic proponents by implication think it is. Pragmatism has never been a homogeneous movement. Peirce's annoyance at his (claimed) misreading at the hands of James is well known. Like analytic philosophy, pragmatism has become even less homogeneous as it has developed. James's opposition to monistic idealism is reflected in the title, *A Pluralistic Universe*, he gave to his last book.[75] If pragmatism eschews monism for pluralism, it is fitting that the pragmatist movement to which James belonged do so as well. In a well-known paper from 1908, ten years after the official inception of pragmatism, Lovejoy dis-

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[74] See Putnam, "Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses," 514.

[75] See William James, *A Pluralistic Universe* (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1912).

tinguished no less than thirteen varieties.[76] In "How To Make Our Ideas Clear," Peirce maintains that meaning is indissociable from future practical consequences.[77] More recently, Cornel West has suggested that pragmatism is a form of cultural criticism.[78]

Analytic Neo-Hegelianism. The very possibility of Moore's form of empiricism, which is based on direct knowledge, is undermined by the multifaceted critique of empiricism starting in the later Wittgenstein and continuing in Neurath, Quine, Sellars, Davidson, Rorty, and others. Following this critique, there are two very different schools of thought about justifying claims to know. One is to make a surreptitious return to empiricism. After the lengthy analytic critique of empiricism, Davidson and Putnam have lately been engaged in resurrecting a form of what they had earlier banished. A kind of empiricism is manifest in Davidson's attempted resurrection of the correspondence theory of truth and in Putnam's revival of direct realism. Both views depend on coming back in direct touch with the mind-independent external world, hence on falling back into what Rorty describes as a bad habit borrowed from Descartes.[79] The other option is to turn to Hegel.

The specifically Hegelian turn, which is still in its nascent stage, is mediated by several factors, including the effect of the later Wittgenstein on the subsequent debate, and increasing attention to Sellars, in-

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[76] See "The Thirteen Pragmatisms," in A. O. Lovejoy, *Thirteen Pragmatisms and Other Essays* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963), 1–29.

[77] "Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object"; C. S. Peirce, *The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings of Peirce*, ed. Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 1:132.

[78] "The fundamental argument in this book is that the evasion of epistemology-centered philosophy—from Emerson to Rorty—results in a conception of philosophy as a form of cultural criticism in which the meaning of America is put forward by intellectuals in response to distinct social and cultural crises"; Cornel West, *The American Evasion of Pragmatism* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), 5.

[79] This is an instance of what Rorty refers to as "the bad habit British empiricists took over from Descartes—the habit of asking whether mind ever succeeds in making unmediated contact with the world, and remaining skeptical about the status of knowledge-claims until such contact can be shown to exist"; Richard Rorty, "Introduction," in Wilfrid Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 9.

cluding Sellars's interest in Hegel. The later Wittgenstein directs attention to a contextualist view of knowledge sometimes referred to as linguistic idealism.[80] Wittgenstein's indirect rehabilitation of idealism calls attention to its general resources.

Wittgenstein's contextualism has been read as social and as asocial. These different readings of Wittgenstein's later contextualism lead to two different views of Hegel. There is a straight line running from a social reading of Wittgenstein, which can be illustrated by Kripke's well known interpretation,[81] through Sellars's flirtation with Hegel, to Brandom's still very recent and still very nascent explicit turn to Hegel.

Building on the later Wittgenstein, in "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" Sellars clearly signals his receptivity to Hegel in what he describes as *Méditations hégéliennes*[82] as well as in his frontal attack on classical empiricism, which he calls the myth of the given. Sellars's rejection of the latter builds on Hegel's famous critique of "sense certainty" at the beginning of the *Phenomenology of Spirit.* Hegel's target is immediate knowledge, which presupposes an epistemological given, in English empiricists such as Bacon and Locke, and in Kant's critical philosophy.[83] If the immediate given cannot be known, as Hegel contends, then empiricism as it has been understood in the English tradition and even in Kant is indefensible. In restating Hegel's argument in an analytical idiom, Sellars rejects the idea of direct givenness, in Hegelian terms immediacy, as no more than a myth in favor of the justification of claims to know within what he calls the logical space of reasons.[84]

In *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, in defending antirepresentationalism, Rorty takes over a form of Sellars's social justificationism.[85] In the introduction to the recent republication of Sellars's essay, he underscores its importance, which he compares to Wittgen-

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[80] See David Bloor, "The Question of Linguistic Idealism Revisited," in *Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein*, ed. Hans Sluga and David F. Sterne (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 354–82.

[81] See Saul A. Kripke, *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982).

[82] See Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, 148.

[83] For his later critique of empiricism, see Hegel, *The Encyclopedia Logic*, §§37–60, pp. 76–107.

[84] See Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, §36, p. 76.

[85] See Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 170.

stein's *Logical Investigations* and Quine's "Two Dogmas of Empiricism." With an eye to Sellars, he touts Brandom, his own former student, as making a bid to take analytic philosophy from its Kantian stage in Sellars (for Rorty's purposes Sellars is both a Kantian and a Hegelian!) to a new, Hegelian stage by replacing the old reliance on representation through a view of inference.[86]

In his recent book, *Making It Explicit*, Brandom develops Wittgenstein's, Sellars's, and Rorty's social justificationism. Although Rorty refers to Hegel, in discussing inference instead of representation, Brandom alludes primarily to Frege, Sellars, and Dummett.[87] His book peaks in the idea that claims to know are justified within the context of social self-consciousness.[88]

A rival and very different form of analytic Hegelianism is currently being developed by McDowell, who is critical of social justificationist readings of Wittgenstein and Sellars, assumed by Rorty, as well as his own colleague, Brandom. McDowell is as committed to Wittgenstein as Brandom but to a different Wittgenstein. The difference between McDowell and Brandom in this respect, which is major not minor, can be summarized in three points. To begin, McDowell rejects the social justificationist reading of Wittgenstein on which Brandom relies.[89] He further rejects the view that meaning is socially constituted, on which Brandom in part relies. He finally rejects the very idea that there is a problem about the norms of reason, the problem which is central to Brandom's recent work and which motivates his turn to a pragmatic Hegel.

McDowell's turn to pragmatism and to Hegel is recent; there is no direct trace of it in a collection of his papers over the past twenty years.[90] He admits that his own view might count as a form of pragma-

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[86] See Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, 8.

[87] See Robert Brandom, *Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing and Discursive Commitment* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), xvi.

[88] See Brandom, *Making It Explicit*, 643.

[89] In the early 1990s, he published two papers on what he sees as the misrepresentation of intentionality in the later Wittgenstein in Kripke's and Wright's versions of the familiar social justificationist interpretations. See "Meaning and Intentionality in Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy" and "Intentionality and Interiority in Wittgenstein," both reprinted in John McDowell, *Mind, Value, and Reality* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 263–78 and 297–324.

[90] See John McDowell, *Mind, Value and Reality* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).

tism as Rorty understands it but says little more about it.[91] McDowell, who sees Hegel as standing on Kant's shoulders[92] and acknowledges his influence on such writers as Marx and Gadamer,[93] regards him as correcting such Kantian ideas as the supersensible.[94] In recent lectures, McDowell criticizes Sellars for allegedly misreading Kant in a way which closes off access to Hegel as continuing and correcting Kant.

His critique of Sellars is related to his own effort to work out an updated version of Kantian intentionality. McDowell points out that Sellars proposes a Kantian approach to intentionality, understood as the relation of thought and language to the world in "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" and then in its sequel, *Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes*. He suggests that Sellars interprets Kant as claiming that sensibility is purely receptive in order to "avoid the dialectic which leads from Hegel's *Phenomenology* to nineteenth-century idealism."[95] Clearly McDowell, who is concerned to avoid any easy conflation of Hegel and Wittgenstein, is also not frightened by the perspective of idealism. In a defense of Hegel against Sellars, McDowell contends that Hegel's theory, which contains an internal constraint, does not require an external constraint.[96] He concludes, on this basis, that Sellars is correct that for Kant sensibility plays a transcendental role but that for Hegel the necessary empirical constraint is provided by the objects of perception. In this way, he implicitly acknowledges Hegel's often overlooked empiricism.

The Emerging Analytic Hegel. How does the pragmatic Hegel relate to Hegel? Since Moore, the analytic use of Hegel has often been very loose and only distantly related to the texts. Rorty typically sees Sellars and then Brandom as moving toward Hegel. He does not notice even the most obvious differences between the latter and Hegel,

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[91] See Ibid., 155.
[92] See Ibid., 111.
[93] See Ibid., 117 n. 8.
[94] See Ibid., 83.
[95] Sellars, *Science and Metaphysics*, 16; cited in McDowell, "Having the World in View: Sellars, Kant, and Intentionality," 466.
[96] "Hegelian Reason does not need to be constrained from outside, precisely because it includes as a moment within itself the receptivity that Kant attributes to sensibility"; McDowell, "Having the World in View: Sellars, Kant, and Intentionality," 466.

or even between himself and Sellars.[97] In adopting the logical space of reasons Sellars, who disqualifies so-called folk epistemology, borders on scientism,[98] which is clearly alien to Hegel's concept of spirit.

The nascent approaches to Hegel in Brandom and McDowell are both more dependent on the reading of Kant, the later Wittgenstein, and Sellars than on the interpretation of Hegel. At stake is how to read Wittgenstein, hence how to relate a prior commitment to him to a further commitment to Hegel. For Brandom, through the turn to social justification Wittgenstein and Sellars provide a corrective to Kant, whose views are continued in Hegel. For McDowell, this is a misreading of Wittgenstein, which Sellars had a hand in perpetrating. In the latter case, Sellars prevents us from seeing the interest of Hegel in correcting Kant.

My doubts about Brandom's reading of Hegel derive from a certain insensitivity to basic differences between such main analytic stalwarts as Sellars and Quine on the one hand and Hegel on the other. It is proper to distinguish epistemic holism, or the Quinean view that theories meet their fate as a whole; the allegedly Wittgensteinian "social" justification of claims to know in relation to a form of life; and the Hegelian idea that claims to know are indexed to the historical moment. Quine would be the first to be surprised to be compared to Hegel. The justification of claims to know through epistemic holism is very different from the social justificationism that Brandom and others attribute to Wittgenstein. There is not only a social but above all a crucial historical dimension to Hegel's concept of spirit (*Geist*). Even if it is social, a neo-Wittgensteinian perspective is not historical; it is, hence, incompatible with Hegel.

McDowell sees Hegel not as simply in opposition to, or as merely rejecting, but rather as attempting to complete Kant's theories. Although he has not yet worked it out in his writings, he seems to glimpse the historical dimension in Hegel. As examples I cite two remarks: his claim against Davidson that givenness is not unrevisable

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[97] Rorty conflates Sellars's view of justification through the space of reasons with epistemological behaviorism, or the view that rationality depends on what society lets us say, which he attributes to Wittgenstein and Dewey. See Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, 174.

[98] For Sellars's well-known scientism, see "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man," in Wilfrid Sellars, *Science, Perception and Reality* (Atascadero: Ridgeview, 1991), 1–41.

but only appears so if we abstract from mediation;[99] and his remark, against Sellars, that subjectivity and objectivity emerge together out of the space of reasons.[100] Both points amount to the insight that what Sellars influentially calls the space of reasons is not ahistorical but historical. To use other language, which brings together McDowell's readings of Hegel and Wittgenstein, there is nothing outside the conceptual realm which stops nowhere short of the fact by which it is constrained.[101]

None of the main pragmatists of the golden age or the more recent analytic pragmatists is a clearly historical thinker. In at least glimpsing the historical dimension in Hegel, McDowell points the way to a Hegel who, although supposedly pragmatic, rather lies beyond pragmatism and whose full range of resources remains to be appropriated by analytic writers.

Hegel, Pragmatism, and Analytic Philosophy. It is not surprising, since both pragmatists and idealists have been unclear about the relation between pragmatism and Hegel, that analytic philosophers tend to conflate them. Hegel influenced various pragmatists, but it is a stretch to believe, as is sometimes claimed by pragmatists and Hegel scholars, that there is a basic similarity in the various positions. Peirce, the founder of American pragmatism, later claimed that his view was a strange form of pragmatism.[102] Similarly Royce, a very good student of German idealism, later took to calling himself a pragmatist. [103]

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[99] See McDowell, *Mind and World*, 186.

[100] See Ibid., 186.

[101] See Ibid., 44–5.

[102] "The truth is that pragmaticism is closely allied to the Hegelian absolute idealism, from which, however, it is sundered by its vigorous denial that the third category (which Hegel degrades to a mere stage of thinking) suffices to make the world, or is even so much as self-sufficient"; Peirce, *Collected Papers*, vol. 5, par. 436. For a study of Peirce's knowledge of Hegel, see "Hegel and Peirce," in *Peirce, Semiotic, and Pragmatism: Essays by Max H. Fisch*, ed. Kenneith Laine Ketner and Christian J. W. Kloesel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 261–82.

[103] In his later years, Royce, who was a leading American authority on German idealism as well as an original thinker, who defended a form of idealism, took to calling himself a pragmatist and an absolutist. See Josiah Royce, *Lectures on Modern Idealism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), 258.

It would be a mistake to conflate the genesis of pragmatism, which is clearly influenced by Hegel, with the resultant positions which only overlap up to a point. Hegel and pragmatism share the concern with knowledge after foundationalism. Like the analytic thinkers who turned to pragmatism, Hegel and the pragmatists, including Dewey,[104] are all contextualists. In refusing a correspondence view of truth, all deny that we can know the mind-independent external world as it is in adopting an antirepresentationalist approach to cognition. The crucial difference lies in their respective views of the relation of truth, knowledge, and history.

There is a distinction between historical knowledge, which pragmatists, particularly Dewey, were very interested in, and the claim for the historical character of knowledge which separates Hegel from most prior philosophers, from all the pragmatists and, with the possible exception of McDowell, a very careful reader of texts, from analytic neopragmatists. The pragmatists and their analytic allies concede Hegel's point that claims to know are justified contextually, or in relation to the background. As I see it, the difference lies in the particular view of contextualism and in its possible link with history.

Unlike the pragmatists, unlike the analytic philosophers, indeed unlike anyone earlier and like few later writers, Hegel is a deeply historical thinker. As concerns theory of knowledge, most philosophy is ahistorical; it prefers to concentrate on claims to know which are either independent of time and place—as in the frequent description of knowledge as entailing the grasp of the mind-independent real as it is, say, through accurate representation—or "indexed" to the context. At a minimum, "contextualism" means that knowledge claims are justified in terms of the prevailing context.

The idea that contexts might change is sometimes mentioned, as in Peirce's idea that claims to know are justified by their acceptance by the group of qualified scientific observers, or Wittgenstein's suggestion that concepts and the meanings of words, which depend on language-games, change as language-games change.[105] This suggests, but does not work out, the further idea that context is related to history. Hegel's merit is to see clearly, perhaps for the first time, that

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[104] Dewey, who typically denies there is a general problem of knowledge, points out that we accept different views as a function of their social utility. See John Dewey, *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (New York: H. Holt, 1938), 8.

[105] See Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, §65.

contextualism is inseparable from historicism, from a historical comprehension of claims to know.

Hegel on Spirit, Knowledge, and History. Hegel's view of knowledge as historical depends on spirit (*Geist*), his main but, in view of the huge Hegel literature, surprisingly much neglected philosophical discovery.[106] Hegel's conception of spirit is loosely based on the third person of the Trinity, its least developed aspect, as well as on such secular sources as Rousseau, Herder, Montesquieu, Fichte, and others. Hegel transforms what in thinkers such as Montesquieu is a claim about the spirit of a people, according to Fichte a people such as the Germans, and in Herder a claim about the perspectival nature of claims to know, into a justification of cognitive objectivity.

In contemporary jargon, one can say that Hegel denies that claims for truth and knowledge depend on grasping facts in independence of a conceptual framework, perspective, point of view, or conceptual scheme. He further denies that knowledge claims can be defended apart from and prior to experience. Knowledge claims are based on spirit, that is, on impure, or social, reason, namely, on the standards, norms, or values adopted by a particular society in various cognitive and other domains in a given historical moment. In a word, particular constative or evaluative claims can only be accepted or rejected in terms of the wider set of views prevailing in a given historical time and place.

The idea that first-order claims are accepted or rejected as a function of their relation to second-order, or background, claims is obvious enough. All cognitive disciplines consider new views on the basis of what is regarded as present orthodoxy. Contemporary physical science is heavily influenced by quantum theory and relativity theory, which together provide the dual scientific background within which contemporary scientific claims are accepted or rejected.

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[106] Most accounts of Hegel do not say much about spirit. For the only full-length treatment of which I am aware in the literature, see Alan Olson, *Hegel and the Spirit: Philosophy as Pneumatology* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). For a rare application of spirit to knowledge, see Terry Pinkard, *Hegel's Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Surprisingly, Forster's recent study of Hegel's *Phenomenology* offers no detailed treatment of his view of spirit. See Michael N. Forster, *Hegel's Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

In the main, claims to know are justified in terms of their fit within a more general series of ideas which dominate the debate in a historical moment. New claims, which require the rejection, not only of single theories, but of the general theoretical matrix in which they are embedded, naturally require a higher standard of proof. It would be very difficult, although not unprecedented, certainly not impossible, for a theory to be accepted at present which claimed, say, that a particle moved faster than the speed of light. Its acceptance would mandate the rejection of the theory of relativity, as the acceptance of the theory of relativity early in the twentieth century required the rejection of Newtonian mechanics. Unlike Kant and other foundationalists, for Hegel, who rejects epistemological foundationalism of any kind, we cannot knowingly formulate claims to know which are true now and forever, hence beyond time and place. At best we can only formulate claims to know which are accepted or rejected on the basis of their relation to a shared conceptual framework which can never be isolated from the wider community and which is always potentially subject to further change. This is the meaning of Hegel's famous suggestion that claims to know are indexed to the historical moment.[107]

Among contemporary writers, this idea has arguably been best understood by Kuhn, as well as Fleck and Collingwood. Like Fleck, Kuhn sees that what we call facts are social constructs, which are not found but made.[108] Like Collingwood, he understands that our views are indexed to larger conceptual formations which hold sway for a time before passing into history.[109] He refuses the idea that science is getting closer to knowing the way the world is, even to a final theory, which is sometimes identified as the aim of science,[110] while maintaining a conception of cognitive objectivity. Unlike Hegel, who understands the intrinsic historicity of claims to know and of the knowing process as it evolved, Kuhn lacks the further, crucial insight

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[107] See G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, trans. T. M. Knox (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 11.

[108] See Ludwik Fleck, *Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact*, trans. Ted Bradley and Thaddeus J. Trenn (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979).

[109] See R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of Nature* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965).

[110] See Steven Weinberg, "The Revolution That Didn't Happen," in *The New York Review of Books* 45, no. 15 (October 1998): 48–52. See further, Steven Weinberg, *Dreams of a Final Theory* (New York: Vintage, 1993).

concerning the link between the social and the historical. He understands that claims to know are indexed to the social context, but he does not grasp that they are also indexed to the historical moment.

Conclusion: Analytic Philosophy and the Hegelian Turn. This paper has discussed the massive analytic turning away from Hegel almost a century ago and the recent, more modest, incipient turn, or return as an offshoot of the turn to pragmatism in the wake of the analytic critique of classical empiricism. I have argued that analytic philosophy has misunderstood Hegel on both occasions. Moore's classic refutation of idealism, which brought about the enduring analytic disaffection with, indeed scorn for, idealism is not decisive against any form of idealism, least of all Hegel's. It is obvious that the recent analytic attention to Hegel is largely misconceived. With the possible exception of McDowell, analytic philosophers one and all, empiricists, realists, neopragmatists, and contextualists alike, understand knowledge as ahistorical, in the latter case as indexed to context. Hegel, however, clearly understands claims for truth and knowledge as thoroughly historical, as indexed not only to context but also to the historical moment.

The recent opening of analytic philosophy to extra-analytic doctrines can be read in different ways. One is to imagine that it is merely a passing fancy, a transitory stage, which is unimportant in the grand scheme of things, insignificant for philosophy and even for analytic philosophy. Another is to imagine that this new situation is significant for analytic philosophy which, as it matures, will prove more accepting of other views. Whether or not the analytic reading of Hegel is correct is perhaps less important than the implicit acknowledgment that at this point in time even for analytic philosophy it is important to exploit resources outside the analytic debate however conceived.

This angle of vision suggests that in some not too distant future, perhaps not immediately or even in our lifetime, we can expect that the differences between the analytic way of doing things and other approaches will finally have been overcome. If this were true, one might anticipate that a single overall philosophical movement would arise in which, shoulder to shoulder as it were, like workers in the vineyard of truth and knowledge, all parties will be striving together toward the common philosophical goal. Something like this idea of a radiant philosophical future is suggested in Rorty's claim, which is overly en-

thusiastic but I believe wildly mistaken, that through their "proto-Hegelianism" Sellars and Brandon overcome the split between analytic and continental philosophy.[111]

My own view of things lies somewhere between these two extremes. I am neither overly emboldened by the recent analytic interest in other types of philosophy nor unwilling to acknowledge its importance. Certainly, in taking other ideas seriously analytic philosophy is changing and departing from its less tolerant past. Yet euphoria is out of the question. Even real enthusiasm seems misplaced. In all likelihood, and despite appearances, the different philosophical movements are not about to join forces in one happy conceptual circle since deep issues which divided them many years ago still separate them and will, I venture to guess, continue to do so in the foreseeable future. In my view, any predictions that in the near or even distant future we will all have our shoulders to the same philosophical wheel, or even that we are likely to agree on anything approaching a common view of the tasks at hand, appear unjustified. Philosophy has been divided among proponents of different points of view virtually since the beginning, and that seems unlikely to change whatever happens in analytic philosophy.

In the wake of Hegel's passing his closest followers thought that he had brought philosophy to a high point and to an end.[112] Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, and Marx were each critical of Hegel for different reasons, reluctant to identify with him, and reluctant even to identify with philosophy.[113] The general turn away from Hegel after his death, the return to Kant after the middle of the nineteenth century, and the rise of analytic philosophy nearly a hundred years ago have all tended to cover up the link between Hegel's discovery of spirit and a view of knowledge as through and through historical. This insight has further been missed in the rise of American pragmatism, which is not historically minded, and in the analytic turns away from and most recently toward Hegel.

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[111] The text says "prope-Hegelianism," which looks like a misprint. See Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, 11.

[112] See Heinrich Heine, *Religion and Philosophy in Germany*, trans. John Snodgrass (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 152.

[113] See Karl Löwith, *From Hegel to Nietzsche*, trans. David E. Green (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor, 1967).

I will close with a remark about knowledge and history in order to resist the idea, implicit in conceptual pluralism, in the idea of philosophical tolerance that in the grand scheme of things theoretical differences do not matter since all views are worthy of respect. On the contrary, such differences do matter since there are indeed fundamental disagreements about which conceptions correctly, or at least more properly than other alternatives, depict the epistemological problem. One such difference is the very idea that knowledge is historical. I believe that claims to know are not only social but historical as well and that the work of the new century will consist in rethinking knowledge on a historical basis, hence in developing Hegel's deepest insight.

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