CONTENTS

List of Contributors xi

1. Introduction: Rethinking Knowledge, Power, and Social Change
   Rawwida Baksh and Wendy Harcourt 1

SECTION 1  KNOWLEDGE,
THEORY, AND PRAXIS

   Introduction
   Wendy Harcourt 51

   2. Transnational Feminist Activism and Movement Building
      Valentine M. Moghadam 53

   3. Mapping Transnational Feminist Engagements: Neoliberalism
      and the Politics of Solidarity
      Linda E. Carty and Chandra T. Mohanty 82

   4. Critical Cartography, Theories, and Praxis of Transnational
      Feminisms
      Manisha Desai 116

SECTION 2  ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE

   Introduction
   Rawwida Baksh 133

   5. The Camel’s Nose: Women Infiltrate the Development Project
      Irene Tinker 136

   6. DAWN, the Third World Feminist Network: Upturning
      Hierarchies
      Peggy Antrobus 159
7. The “Warriors Within”: How Feminists Change Bureaucracies and Bureaucracies Change Feminists  
   JOANNE SANDLER  
   188

8. International Trends in Women’s Political Participation and Representation  
   ANITA VANDENBELD  
   215

SECTION 3  BODY POLITICS, HEALTH AND WELLBEING

Introduction  
   WENDY HARCOURT  
   249

9. Owning and Disowning the Body: A Reflection  
   ROSALIND P. PETCHESKY  
   252

10. Moving Toward Sexual and Reproductive Justice: A Transnational and Multigenerational Feminist Remix  
    ALEXANDRA GARITA  
    271

11. Human Trafficking, Globalization, and Transnational Feminist Responses  
    THANH-DAM TRUONG  
    295

12. Masculinities, “Profeminism,” and Feminism in Latin America  
    JOSE F. SERRANO-AMAYA AND SALVADOR VIDAL-ORTIZ  
    321

SECTION 4  HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN SECURITY

Introduction  
   RAWWIDA BAKSH  
   343

    VIVIENE TAYLOR  
    346

14. CEDAW, Gender and Culture  
    M. SHANTHI DAIRIAM  
    367
15. Feminist Strategies to End Violence Against Women  
**Rebecca J. Hall**

**SECTION 5  ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL JUSTICE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Introduction</th>
<th>Wendy Harcourt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17. Feminist Transnational Organizing on Gender and Trade: The Work of IGTN</td>
<td>Mariama Williams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Gender-responsive Budgeting</td>
<td>Zohra Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Transformative Feminism in Tanzania: Animation and Grassroots Women’s Struggles for Land and Livelihoods</td>
<td>Marjorie Mbilinyi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SECTION 6  CITIZENSHIP AND STATE-BUILDING**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Introduction</th>
<th>Rawwida Baksh</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20. Feminism and Democratic Struggles in Latin America</td>
<td>Virginia Vargas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Forging a New Political Imaginary: Transnational Southasian Feminisms</td>
<td>Amrita Chhachhi and Sunila Abeysekera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. From Chinese State Capitalism to Women’s Activism: The Implications of Economic Reforms for Women and the Evolution of Feminist Organizing</td>
<td>Lanyan Chen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Maitrayee Mukhopadhyay

SECTION 7 MILITARISM AND RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISMS

Introduction  
Rawwida Baksh

24. Feminist Perspectives on Militarism and War: Critiques, Contradictions, and Collusions  
Maryam Khalid

25. From Secular Reductionism to Religious Essentialism: Implications for the Gender Agenda  
Mariz Tadros

26. South Asia’s Gendered “wars on terror”  
Seema Kazi

SECTION 8 PEACE MOVEMENTS, UNSCR 1325 AND POSTCONFLICT RE-BUILDING

Introduction  
Rawwida Baksh

27. Demilitarizing the Global: Women’s Peace Movements and Transnational Networks  
Linda Etchart

28. UN Security Council Resolution 1325: A Feminist Transformative Agenda?  
Jennifer F. Klot

29. Women in Postconflict Decision-making: Change for the Better?  
Sherrill Whittington

30. Feminist Perspectives on State-building or Rebuilding in Crisis Contexts  
Helen O’Connell
## SECTION 9  FEMINIST POLITICAL ECOLOGY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wendy Harcourt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. Feminist Political Ecologies: Grounded, Networked and Rooted on Earth</td>
<td>793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diane Rocheleau and Padini Nirmal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Climate Justice and Women’s Agency: Voicing Other Ways of Doing Things</td>
<td>815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ana Agostino</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. Women’s Transformative Organizing for Sustainable Livelihoods: Learning from Indian Experiences</td>
<td>837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumi Krishna</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## SECTION 10  DIGITAL AGE TRANSFORMATIONS AND FUTURE TRAJECTORIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wendy Harcourt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. Digital Transformations of Transnational Feminism in Theory and Practice</td>
<td>857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gillian Youngs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. The Dialectics of Power and Powerlessness in Transnational Feminist Networks: Online Struggles Around Gender-based Violence</td>
<td>871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priya A. Kurian, Debashish Munshi and Anuradha Mundkur</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36. Because I Am a Girl: The Emergence of Girls in Development</td>
<td>895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarah Hendricks and Keshet Bachan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Index | 919 |
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Introduction

While attending a Latin American feminist conference in Buenos Aires in 2010, we were struck by the speakers’ and participants’ depth of knowledge of feminist history and the contributions to development policy and praxis being expressed. The thematic panels comprised feminist philosophers and researchers, “femocrats” (feminist bureaucrats) based in governmental and intergovernmental agencies, and activists from feminist organizations and networks, speaking from diverse standpoints. We observed that the profound contribution transnational feminist movements have made to the international development discourse is often not recognized.

We began to discuss the idea of putting together a publication that would record the wealth of histories and narratives of transnational feminist movements and reflect critically on their global contribution to development knowledge, policy and social change. As we put our plan into action, we recognized that our individual networks were both overlapping and different, reflecting our Southern and Northern origins and moorings and our personal histories of involvement in feminist movements, knowledge production, policy and praxis since the mid-1980s. We have worked in national feminist organizations, regional and global feminist networks, academia and the secretariats of international development policy institutions.

We decided to publish this collection in 2015, the forty-year anniversary of the United Nations International Women’s Year, the thirtieth anniversary of the Third World Conference in Nairobi, the twentieth anniversary of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, and the fifteenth anniversary of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) on “women, peace and security.” The United Nations has provided important spaces for the diverse positioning of transnational feminist movements. Looking back, it
may now seem that feminists’ expectations of what could be achieved through these events were somewhat naive, as becomes evident in the reflections of various contributors. But the UN world conferences on women (1975–1995) and the global conferences of the 1990s allowed feminists from far-flung corners of the South and North to meet and debate face-to-face, and to articulate an expanding global vision of women’s rights and gender equality that takes diversity into account. These global conferences enabled transnational feminist movements to emerge as a force, both within and outside the UN global governance institutions, in ways that continue to inform feminist organizing forty years later. We hoped that the Handbook could provide a vehicle for critical reflection on both how much has been achieved and what more needs to be done.

The collection is an exercise in feminist epistemology and ontology—analysis by doing—tracing and mapping the contributions of transnational feminist movements in specific contexts. The analysis comes from the ground up, reflecting the feminist commitment to self-awareness and reflexivity, generating new knowledge, building organizations and movements, and transforming society and the world, with all the individual and collective emotion and passion this implies. The richness of the collection comes from the feminist methodology of grappling with how the “private” is connected to the “public” (as reflected in feminist slogans such as “the personal is political,” “women’s rights as human rights,” and “democracy in the country and in the home”), and how individual and collective experience, knowledge and action lead to changes in policy, institutions and peoples’ lives (“sisterhood is global” and “think globally, act locally”).

The thirty-five chapters in this volume reflect the contributors’ critical analysis of their engagement in transnational feminist movements in ten thematic areas: knowledge, theory and praxis; organizing for change; body politics, health and wellbeing; human rights and human security; economic and social justice; citizenship and state-building; militarism and religious fundamentalisms; peace movements, UNSCR 1325 and postconflict rebuilding; feminist political ecology; and digital-age transformations and future trajectories. The contributors speak from a broad platform of individual and institutional locations in the global South and North: feminist organizations and networks at all levels (local, national, regional, global and “glocal”); wider civil society organizations and networks; governmental and multilateral agencies; and academic and research institutions, among others.

The contributors elaborate a complex array of feminist theories and practices, critically analyzing both the successes achieved and challenges faced by transnational feminist movements in different contexts. It is important to underline that the Handbook aims not to close but to open up questions about different experiences and types of knowledge.

We pose a number of questions and reflect candidly on what we have learned about transnational feminist movements. What do we understand about their contribution to knowledge, power and social change globally over the past half century? What are
the different spaces from which transnational feminisms have operated and in what ways? To what extent have they destabilized or transformed the global hegemonic systems that constitute patriarchy? We also explore the tensions with which these movements grapple, politically and organizationally, and synthesize some ideas for the way forward.

Like the contributors, we are acutely conscious that while transnational feminist movements have contributed to transforming inequalities between men and women, there are continuing and increasing gender differentials within and across countries in both the global South and North. Women still have unequal access to fundamental human rights, such as food and shelter. Their bodily integrity and sexual and reproductive rights are deeply contested. Women in both the South and North perform the lion’s share of care and social reproduction, are segregated into low-paying occupations, and earn less than men for work of equal value. They have unequal access to and control over economic resources, such as land, property and credit. Gender gaps are evident in such areas as health, education, employment, poverty, entrepreneurship, decision-making, and the impact of environmental degradation. Violence against women in its many manifestations continues in epidemic proportions in the global South and North.

As these examples of gender differentials indicate, women’s rights and gender equality are the core concerns of transnational feminist movements and are linked in complex ways to wider global, regional, national, local and glocal struggles for social transformation. The chapters examine transnational feminist movements’ challenge to hegemonic discourses and systems that have oppressed huge numbers of women and men because of their gender, geographic location, race, ethnicity, indigeneity, class, caste, religion, age, ability and sexuality, among other reasons. Specific chapters explore the contributions of transnational feminist movements to the unraveling of old political orders, during conflicts and crises, and to new forms of organizing in the continuing search for just, equitable, inclusive, democratic and peaceful societies. The strength of the Handbook is that while it chronicles what has been achieved, it also provides a framework for analyzing what has happened and what still needs to be changed.

This introduction can only offer a partial sense of the richness of the collection. It has frankly been difficult for us to summarize all that these remarkable narratives say about the contribution of transnational feminist movements to knowledge, power, and social change. In what follows, we synthesize several major aspects of the Handbook. These include definitions and genealogies, theory and praxis, and the current context in which transnational feminist movements are situated; their different levels of engagement at the global, institutional and glocal levels, including in knowledge creation, advocacy, networking and alliance building; the tensions, fragmentations and diverse standpoints within transnational feminist movements; and whether and how they have transformed patriarchy, looking at the role of men and moving beyond gender binaries. We conclude by looking forward, synthesizing the strategies for the future proposed by contributors.
Definitions

The contributors to this volume explore their own understandings of transnational feminist movements, presenting the complexities and nuances of the historical, political, economic and social contexts in which transnational feminist movements have emerged and evolved. Given the diverse locations, interests and perspectives of the contributors, several understandings of transnational feminist movements are discussed.

Transnational feminist movements are understood as the fluid coalescence of organizations, networks, coalitions, campaigns, analysis, advocacy and actions that politicize women’s rights and gender equality issues beyond the nation-state, particularly from the 1990s, when deepening globalization and new communications and information technologies (ICTs) enabled feminists to connect readily with and interrogate their localities and cross-border relations. The *Handbook* critically explores the historical, political, economic and social contexts in which transnational feminist movements have emerged and evolved. Several definitions of transnational feminist movements are considered and debated.

Transnational feminist movements operate on many levels: the intergovernmental policy level that is linked to the UN world conferences on women (1975–1995) and the global conferences of the 1990s and their follow-up processes; networking within and across national, regional and international borders in support of specific grassroots struggles to achieve feminist goals; and intersectional networking and movement building with other global movements that are organizing for human rights and political and economic transformation. These movements are made up of actors working across local and global contexts who are generally committed to shared values and solidarity across differences, developing a common discourse through dialogue and action, and changing the structural inequalities and the deepening impact of globalization on gender, class, race and ethnic relations. The *Handbook* highlights the contributions transnational feminist movements are making in a multiplicity of spaces: intergovernmental and governmental agencies, nongovernmental organizations, communities, and academe, and in change processes in such areas as human rights, sexual and reproductive health and rights, citizenship struggles, social justice, religious fundamentalisms, gender-based violence, land and environmental struggles, peace and antimilitarism, and feminist economics.

Moghadam (see chapter 2) points to the long history of women’s rights activism and the different definitions and types of women’s movements, noting that in some countries or historical periods, women’s rights groups may “eschew the label feminist…. because it is associated with Western culture, suggests an antimale stance or is politically unwise.” Moghadam contends that while there are different frames, priorities and strategies, there are many “similarities…. in the ways women’s rights activists frame their grievances and demands, form networks and organizations and engage with state and governmental institutions.”
In an earlier work, Moghadam (2005) defined “transnational feminist networks” as “mobilizations that advocate for women’s participation and rights while also engaging critically with policy and legal issues and with states, international organizations, and institutions of global governance.” In her chapter in the *Handbook*, she states that “a transnational feminist network brings together women from three or more countries around a specific set of grievances and goals, such as women’s human rights, health or economic justice. Fluid and nonhierarchical structures that span local and global spaces, such networks are connected to globalization processes and engage extensively in cyberactivism.” She categorizes four types of contemporary transnational feminist networks: “those that target the neoliberal economic policy agenda; those that focus on the danger of fundamentalisms and insist on women’s human rights, especially in the Muslim world; women’s peace groups that target conflict, war, and empire; and networks engaged in feminist humanitarianism and international solidarity.” The *Handbook* explores examples of all four types, and adds others, such as body politics, citizenship and state-building, political ecology, and digital-age transformation.

**Genealogies**

The chapters draw on a long tradition of theorizing on transnational feminist movements. Moghadam refers to several sets of writing that define different types and forms of women’s mobilizations. Beckwith (2000); Ferree and Hess (1995); Ferree and Mueller (2003); and Sperling, Ferree, and Risman (2001) define feminist movements as a subset of broader women’s movements. They view movements as being “feminist” when the participants explicitly challenge patriarchy and gender inequality, and seek to reverse the gender hierarchy and improve women’s social, economic and political status.

Moghadam points to another set of literature that defines feminist mobilizing as a global social movement because “despite different cultural framings, country specificities, and organizational priorities, there are observed similarities in the ways women’s rights activists frame their grievances and demands, form networks and organizations, and engage with state and intergovernmental institutions (Antrobus 2004; Ferree and Tripp 2006; Moghadam 2005, 2013; Naples and Desai 2002; Stienstra 1994, 2000; Wichterich 1999).” For example, in the post-9/11 era (following the September 2001 Al-Qaeda attacks on the United States), transnational feminists came together to organize for women’s human rights against fundamentalist discourses and agendas that define women’s roles and aim to control women’s bodies and mobility (Afkhami 1995; Di Marco and Tabbush 2011; Moghadam 2005, 2013).

Moghadam refers to other key writers who contribute to the genealogy of transnational feminist movements. Sylvia Walby (2009) theorizes transnational feminist movements as part of the “modernization of gender relations.” Mary Hawkesworth (2006) offers a definition of “global feminist activism” as international feminist mobilizations involving women in more than one country or region, “who seek to forge a collective identity among women and to improve the condition of women.” And another set of
writers examine how transnational feminist networks have contributed to “global civil society” (Alvarez 2000; Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor 2001).

Other chapters in the Handbook offer short histories of transnational feminist movements with a specific focus on advocacy. Linda Etchart’s overview of women’s peace movements (see chapter 27) shows that women have worked together across borders for equal political, economic and social rights and for peace and antimilitarism since the first wave of the feminist movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The first half of the twentieth century saw feminist movements in Europe and North America focusing on postwar, antimilitarist, and postimperialist issues. At the same time, feminists in the global South were engaged in liberation wars and struggles and positioning women’s interests in the emerging postcolonial states and societies. During the second wave of feminist movements in the 1960s and 1970s, feminists aligned themselves with liberal, radical, Marxist and socialist ideologies that proposed different analyses of women’s oppression and strategies for their liberation. Etchart explores the theoretical and political complexities of the antiwar, antimilitarist, and anti-imperialist positions taken by first wave feminists and states that “divisions among women along lines of race and class, as well as political ideology and nationalism, were at times fractious in Europe during the first half of the twentieth century; the two world wars both divided and united women across borders. Yet women’s transnational and local peace movements arose with each new conflict on all continents in struggles for a just peace and for disarmament. Their actions. . . . resulted in changes to state policy and practice at national and global levels.” She further asserts that their ideas have endured, and they suffice second and third wave feminisms.

Manisha Desai (see chapter 4) offers a postcolonial perspective on transnational feminist theorizing. She reviews three sets of writing: the first, from the US academy; the second, a reworking of the Cold War metageography of the First World–Third World; and the third, the literature questioning the self-determination of the liberal nation-state. She points out that the “canonical” study by Alexander and Mohanty (1997) that articulates the tensions between native and immigrant women of color in the United States and helps to map out the “complex racial territory” of the US academy, . . . continues to inform transnational feminist movements’ exclusions and erasure even as we weave solidarities across racial borders. Desai contends that the reconceptualization of First World–Third World by Grewal and Kaplan (1995, 2001) redefines the “postcolonial” and “transnational,” and provides an important framework for moving beyond center-periphery models. Feminists from the former Soviet bloc have added to these First World–Third World debates with perspectives on the Second World (Suchland 2011). Finally, Desai discusses how transnational feminism has called into question the boundaries of the nation-state under the conditions of late capitalism (Alexander and Mohanty 1997; Fernandes 2013; Masson 2010); highlighted the intersectional nature of gender (Alexander and Mohanty 1997; Chan-Tiberghien 2004; Grewal and Kaplan 1995); and affirmed differences among women based on their racial and other locations (Chowdhury 2009; Desai 2008; Fernandes 2013; Lawrence 2005; Salime 2011).

Irene Tinker (see chapter 5) adds to our understanding of the history of transnational feminist organizing in relation to the UN’s framing of the international development discourse. She posits that the emergence of the “women in development” (WID)
approach was a response to the 1950s post-World War II promotion of economic development “based on modernization theory, with its base in capitalism.” The second wave feminist movement in the United States in the 1960s was “ignited” by “the US government’s manipulation of women’s expected roles after World War II.” The movement, with its focus on women’s equal right to education, employment, and equal pay for equal work, and on sexual and reproductive rights, contributed to the emergence of the WID critique of international development in the early 1970s. Drawing on Ester Boserup’s book, Woman’s Role in Economic Development (1970), US feminist advocates in international development recognized that the same gender biases that American feminists were struggling against were being recreated in the global South.

Tinker also points to a little-known dimension of transnational feminist movement building: the link between the Cold War and the capitalist and communist models promoted by the United States and Soviet bloc countries. She mentions the world congress for International Women's Year convened by the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF) in East Berlin in October 1975 following the first world conference on women held in Mexico. “Participants included many Asian and African women and men who had attended workshops in the socialist countries that had promoted integrating women into revolutionary causes, as opposed to the WID model designed to incorporate women into the capitalist economy.” The conference “celebrated the success of communist countries in facilitating women’s organizing in developing countries as one of several mass organizations. For example, the Women’s Union in Vietnam and Laos, and the Women’s Federation in China are mass organizations that function as vehicles for the communist party to educate village women.”

According to Antrobus (see chapter 6), DAWN, the Third World feminist network, emerged in the mid-1980s from a multifaceted context that included women’s activism in the anticolonial and liberation struggles of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, from which women emerged “with a heightened awareness of their gender-based marginalization within these larger struggles” (e.g., peasants, workers, ethnic minorities, among others); the expansion of UN membership to the newly independent states of the South which created “an arena for challenging domination by the industrialized countries of the North and raising the concerns of the millions emerging from colonialism in the South to claim better living conditions,” a space women entered, occupied and used to “advance their own claims for agency”; and the UN’s designation of International Women’s Year (1975) and the Decade for Women (1976–1985), framed by three UN world conferences on women—in Mexico (1975), Copenhagen (1980) and Nairobi (1985)—“which provided the critical space for the emergence of women’s voices internationally.”

Antrobus contends that “before the emergence of DAWN as a Third World network, the international feminist discourse was dominated by liberal feminists from the North.” Although Marxist-socialist feminists and feminist anthropologists contributed “an important critique of mainstream development,” Antrobus argues that their analysis lacked a number of elements that were crucial to understanding the structural factors that marginalized the majority of women globally: the context of imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism, which have had a profound impact on the international political economy, development agendas and women’s lives; the interconnections
between women’s lived realities and the larger political, economic, and social relations of race, ethnicity, class and gender embedded in the power structures and policy frameworks that have determined women’s access to resources and to the opportunities necessary for their wellbeing and advancement; and the “structural roots of poverty across nations and regions,” which were located, “not in insufficient economic growth, but in unequal control over production and access to resources, finance and trade.” Antrobus concludes that DAWN’s “identification and analysis of the ‘reproductive crisis’ which arose from economic policies that separated economic production/growth from social reproduction/human development, broke new ground in the WID discourse” in “defining and reinforcing the gender division of labor, roles, and power.” Thus, “DAWN’s ‘manifesto’ was a combination of political analysis and practical advice for women’s organizations seeking change at the local, national and international levels.”

In addition to concerns about economic and social justice, violence against women and gender-based violence has an important genealogy within transnational feminist movements. Rebecca J. Hall’s discussion of North American theory and praxis on violence against women (see chapter 15) argues that “in the global North, feminist movements’ advocacy on battered women of the 1970s and 1980s was dominated by white middle- and upper-class women and tended to focus on patriarchy as the root—and often the sole—cause of violence against women.” She offers an understanding of the bridge-building role played by African American feminists, indigenous feminists, and women of color based in the North, as feminists from the global South critiqued North American and European radical and liberal feminist analyses and strategies for change. She argues that African American women, indigenous women, and women of color challenged the singular focus on patriarchy, and re-examined the public-private dichotomy that informs radical and liberal feminist theory on violence against women. For example, bell hooks, in 1984 (about the same time DAWN was being conceived, prior to the 1985 Nairobi conference), wrote that “violence acted upon poor black women and men in the so-called public realm—through discrimination, harassment, exploitation, threats of violence and actual violence experienced in places of work, schools and the streets—is inextricably linked to violence in the home.” She formulated “key epistemological and political challenges for feminists organizing to end violence against women,” demanding that “feminist efforts to end male violence against women must be expanded into a movement to end all forms of violence” (hooks 1984, 130–131). This critique is borne out by the testimonies of women of color in the chapter by Linda E. Carty and Chandra T. Mohanty (see chapter 3) and in the experiences of state intervention into Aboriginal communities and communities of color discussed by Hall, and Carty and Mohanty.

**The Current Context**

Given the complexity of these histories, it is important to locate the *Handbook* in the current context. Moghadam describes the global environment in which transnational feminist movements are now operating as being “characterized by neoliberal capitalism,
militarism, and patriarchy,” and notes that the “sheer scale of the problems in those countries which reflect the profound contradictions of international relations as well as the persistence of patriarchy, would seem to surpass the capacity of transnational feminism activism.” So, as the chapters show, even though contemporary globalization has created “unprecedented opportunities for organizing and mobilizing across borders,” there is much more to do if feminists are to transform power relations in unjust and inequitable global, regional, and national systems.

Several chapters highlight that ongoing hegemonic power threatens to hinder the more progressive work being undertaken by global governance institutions where transnational feminist movements have had some influence. Viviene Taylor (see chapter 13) makes the point that “governance is increasingly about managing a global market economy to secure the interests of global capital, and in such processes, women’s rights and security tend to fall off the agenda.” She notes that “this is especially so when we examine decisions made in the United Nations system, the multilateral institutions of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization.” In the post-9/11 era, the response of the United States and other dominant powers, such as the United Kingdom, “served to eclipse the significance of the emerging and fragile movements on human rights and ethical globalization. Coalitions and partnerships among governments to conduct the global “wars on terror” led to opportunistic diplomacy that overlooked domestic oppression and human rights violations, in exchange for cooperation in pursuing ‘terrorists.’”

Carty and Mohanty state that “more and more of the gains in women’s rights are being seriously threatened as neoliberal states appropriate gender discourses in their attempts to explain away or justify the erasure of women’s rights.” As a counter to neoliberalism, they sketch a map of transnational feminist engagements and possibilities of “an ethical and just solidarity across borders based on attentiveness to power and historical specificities and differences.”

The Handbook is therefore written at a time when transnational feminist movements recognize and question unequal power relations based on gender, race and class (among others), and challenge essentialism, Eurocentrism, and the cultural dimensions of power. It illustrates that, despite differences, transnational feminisms organize through a sense of shared struggle against all forms of patriarchal power and control, violence, and exploitation as they are manifested in neoliberalism, militarism, and religious fundamentalisms across North–South divides and state borders.

Feminist Theory and Praxis

Lastly, we discuss feminist theory and praxis. It is vital to underline that transnational feminist movements have produced a wealth of knowledge and an understanding of how power operates in complex ways on many levels and through social change processes. As all the chapters in this volume show—and indeed, the Handbook is itself part of this process—feminist theory on knowledge, power, and social change has evolved out of
the praxis of feminist engagement. Feminist perspectives and reflections on fundamental issues such as peace, development, politics, economics, health, the environment, and communications, are at the core of feminist praxis. Desai views feminist praxis as “based on reflexive, transversal solidarities as both means to and goals of women’s emancipation,” and argues that “reflexivity…. is central to transnational feminism in theory and praxis.” This dynamic process of self-reflection and active engagement on the strategies and methods used and the knowledge accumulated in feminist practice is elaborated throughout the *Handbook*. It also highlights the dialectical processes through which transnational feminist movements engage with, draw from, and build on each other’s theorizing, methodologies, experiments, and lessons learned.

We offer a few examples here, but there are many more to be found throughout the *Handbook*. The chapter by Carty and Mohanty is based on fascinating in-depth interviews with feminists located in the South and North. They view feminist knowledge production as closely connected to the “place-based realities of feminist praxis,” as feminists have been “confronting a series of neoliberal policies by states in both the global North and South that have been wreaking havoc on women’s lives across race, class, sexuality, and ethnic divides.” Carty and Mohanty argue that transnational feminist theorizing is “directly linked to and often emerges from community engagement” and they focus on “knowledges produced by transnational feminists that engage globalization and neoliberalism as factors that have impacted women’s lives in tangible ways and have pushed them into deeper organizing for change.” They map out the similarities and differences in transnational feminist collective thinking and praxis, looking at feminist engagement in more loosely connected alliances that challenge colonial, imperial, racial, and heteronormative gender power inequalities and asymmetries. They raise questions about the “transnationalizing” of feminism that deflects from local class, race, ethnic, environmental, and sexual formations. They argue that it is not possible to separate global and local struggles, and use Nawal El Saadawi’s term “glocal” to describe where global and local struggles converge.

Carty and Mohanty play close attention to understanding how transnational feminist collaborations in relation to place and time bring out the political, racial and cultural diversity and complexity of alliances and solidarities across activist, academic, and institutional North–South divides. They underline the importance of intersectional gendered perspectives in feminist struggles, not only in communities but also in the human rights, environment, population, and sustainable-development discourses in and around the UN.

Tinker also explores the ongoing interplay between feminist research and analysis as she discusses the framing of UN agendas related to women’s rights and gender equality—WID, women and development [WAD], gender and development [GAD], and gender mainstreaming. She looks at the four UN world conferences on women and the preparatory meetings to set the agenda, along with the decisions made by multilateral, bilateral, and other donor agencies on funding women’s organizing in the developing South. She shows how these agendas have evolved in response to critiques centered on their impacts on Southern women’s lives.
M. Shanthi Dairiam (see chapter 14) further illustrates the evolution of feminist theory and praxis in her discussion of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). The UN Commission on the Status of Women (CSW), established in 1946, pressed for the convention and was tasked with its preparation. Dairiam points out that neither the Universal Declaration on Human Rights nor the legally binding treaties adopted prior to CEDAW had advanced the human rights of women. They did not “reflect the specific conditions that women experience,” and the “neutrality” of their provisions “had the effect of privileging a male model of existence.”

Dairiam explains that transnational feminist advocacy for the convention included the CSW’s mobilization of the UN system, which pushed the General Assembly to declare 1975 as International Women’s Year, and 1976–1985 as the Decade for Women. The CSW’s 1973 working paper “argued for a single, comprehensive convention that would legally bind states to eliminate discriminatory laws, as well as de facto discrimination.” The World Plan of Action agreed at the UN First World Conference on Women in Mexico in 1975 “gave high priority” to the adoption of CEDAW. The framing of the convention drew on contemporary feminist scholarship, knowledge, and theory from the global North and South (in the areas of political and public life, education, employment, health, rural women, law, marriage and family life, etc.) to establish “normative legal standards for equality that are substantive in nature, attributing equal value to women and men,” provide “a unique definition of ‘discrimination,’ recognizing the gendered pattern of the lives of women and men that disadvantages women,” and task states with the responsibility to “take positive steps to redistribute resources, power and opportunities…. to enable [women] to overcome the effects of past discrimination.” CEDAW was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1979 and entered into force in 1981 after twenty ratifications by member states, and “today, with 187 states parties, it is one of the most highly ratified international human rights treaties.”

**Different Levels of Engagement of Transnational Feminist Movements**

As mentioned earlier, the chapters explore various complementary levels at which transnational feminist movements engage in social change processes often intersecting with one another. Some transnational feminist networks engage with powerful hegemonic institutions such as the UN, within a global development policy framework. Others operate in national or regional activist movement settings using postcolonial, political economy, poststructuralist, and decolonial analytical frameworks, and participating in wider social justice movements. Still others work within institutions at the international, regional, national, and local levels. Alliance building is discussed here as a key aspect of transnational feminist praxis.
We use the term “glocal” to describe how transnational feminist movements often work simultaneously at the global and local levels, where global solidarity informs and contributes to local possibilities for social change. In a discussion of the “glocal” approach, Desai argues that feminism operates in “a geography of historically specific relational processes across borders, as opposed to the ahistorical and bounded notions of local, national, global.” In this approach to understanding transnational feminism, the concept of “place” is key. She explains that place can be understood as “a product of social relations, practices, and processes and as a site of operation of power and hence dynamic and conflictual. It is also an expression of historical sedimentation and of factors and processes beyond place.” From this understanding of place, transnational feminism has deeply questioned old divides and contributed to “a reworking of the Cold War metageography of First World–Third World; and... a questioning of the sovereignty and self-determination of the liberal nation-state.”

Maitrayee Mukhopadhyay (see chapter 23) interrogates these different framings in her profound critique of the current trajectories of transnational feminist movements. She argues that “the successful installation of feminist knowledge and ideas in policy-making institutions is reversing the basic tenets of transnational feminist movements, which sought to decompose the production of the Third World woman.” Instead, “there is increasing homogenization of the histories, needs, and interests of the vastly different experiences of women around the world and the construction of the implicitly consensual priority issues around which all women are apparently expected to organize.” As a consequence, “the power to define women's needs and interests [is] increasingly shifting to global policy arenas,” and “there is both derecognition of the local and context-specific struggles around women's rights and erasure of the structural and redistributional issues that lead to the denial of rights.” She challenges transnational feminist movements to find “new bases for solidarity other than the insertion of gender in international agendas,” and to resist assimilation in global agendas through “a re-energized politics of recognition and redistribution.” The chapter is an important critical and cautionary response to what may be viewed as the triumphalism of transnational feminist organizing in global conferences and processes, and the “homogenization” of the needs and interests of women in postcolonial societies as well as poor, ethnic minority, and other marginalized women in developed countries.

Global Policy Change Arenas

Transnational feminist movements have coalesced around strategic global policy change arenas. Antrobus describes the UN Decade for Women as “life-changing for many, and a watermark in public policies and programs that would transform male-female relations everywhere.” It brought about “laws against discrimination against women; “changes in men’s role in domestic life and increasing responsibility for housework and child care; “the increase in women’s access to a range of academic and professional fields previously closed to them; “the introduction of women’s studies and other
programs at universities;” the linking of “academics and researchers, bureaucrats and activists in processes of policy-making that would change women’s lives in countries across the global South and industrialized North;” and “in the academy, it produced new understandings, knowledge, and theories that would challenge conventional wisdom.”

Various chapters examine the four UN world conferences on women to show how transnational feminist organizing provided the catalyst for the conferences, a process that was enabled by “femocrats” (feminists who represented governments on the CSW and by feminist staff at the UN and other multilateral and bilateral agencies). The four world conferences on women and the reviews of the Beijing conference (Beijing +5, Beijing +10 and Beijing +15), with their accompanying NGO forums and funding, provided the impetus for transnational feminist organizing and politics. As we can personally attest, the engagement of transnational feminist movements was significantly wider than in the conferences on women, and feminists were active in all the UN global conferences held in the 1990s (including the environment, Rio de Janeiro, 1992; human rights, Vienna, 1993; population, Cairo, 1994; social summit, Copenhagen, 1995; habitat, Istanbul, 1996; and food summit, Rome, 1996). As discussed by Antrobus, feminists developed South–North women’s alliances and caucuses. Moreover, they challenged the patriarchal international development paradigm constructed by the UN’s founding fathers and “development decades” of the post–World War II era, and contributed to its reenvisioning.

The visibility and strength of transnational feminist organizing in the 1990s was also a reflection of feminist activism within intergovernmental and governmental institutions. Joanne Sandler (see chapter 7) makes the point that since its establishment in 1945, the UN has been a key site of engagement for “independent and fierce-minded women’s rights advocates” in “transnational feminist movements working within and outside mainstream organizations,” starting with the establishment of the CSW in 1946. She posits that “the results of this engagement are more than paper tigers,” and that women’s rights organizations and movements at the national, regional, and global levels and national women’s/gender machineries working within governments, were able to pressure states into passing laws and policies that aligned with their ratification of CEDAW. But “beyond the domestication of international policy agreements. . . . the intergovernmental processes leading to these achievements have helped to expand women’s networks and movements within and between countries and regions and to deepen partnerships between them that have endured and matured over decades.”

Sandler specifies that these interventions manifested at the national and local levels as women’s rights in numerous national constitutions; domestic laws, policies, and programs on a range of issues, including criminalizing domestic violence; and quotas for women’s representation in parliaments and local governments have contributed to “chipping away at the stronghold that men have had on powerful public roles.” As discussed in the chapters, over eighty countries worldwide use various forms of gender-responsive budgeting and planning that address gender inequalities in such areas as poverty, health, education, and agriculture. UN peacekeeping and political missions in conflict situations have shown measurable change as a result of UN security council
resolutions on “women, peace and security,” in areas including women’s participation in postconflict elections and disarmament programs, and protection practices to prevent sexual and gender-based violence.

As mentioned earlier, Dairiam demonstrates the success of transnational feminist movements in the functioning of CEDAW as a global peer review mechanism and its relevance to all the 187 member state signatories. She underlines that, unlike many other international human rights/development instruments, CEDAW monitors gender equality in both the global North and South. She discusses in detail the CEDAW Committee’s reviews of high-ranking European countries (in the Global Gender Gap Index), which, despite high levels of educational achievement, show the impact of gender stereotyping and inequality on women and girls in occupational segregation; high rates of women in part-time employment because of their responsibility for care and social reproduction; wage gaps (with women earning between 66% and 84% less than men for work of equal value); lower pension contributions and entitlements than men receive because of their part-time employment and taking career breaks for child care; unequal access to leadership and decision-making; and the over-sexualized depictions of women and girls in the media and advertising, reinforcing women-as-sex object stereotypes and contributing to girls’ low self-esteem.

**Working with(in) Institutions**

Key to the success of transnational feminist movements has been the strategy of working simultaneously inside and outside institutions. Transnational feminist movements have targeted both global governance institutions and the nation-state and have contributed to the establishment of national women’s/gender machineries, appointment of women at high levels in government and the UN, and funding of gender-equality programs. Thus, on the one hand, transnational feminist movements can claim many successes in “mainstreaming” gender through engaging in direct political struggles with mainstream (“malestream”) institutions, such as the UN, governments, legislatures, the military, media, religion, and family. On the other hand, as the critical reflections in the *Handbook* reveal, there are difficult and awkward contradictions, collusions, and co-optations in working with and within UN global institutions and governments.

Jennifer F. Klot (see chapter 28) contributes to a lively debate on the role of “feminist norm/organizational entrepreneurs” (also referred to as “femocrats” and “warriors within” by Sandler and others) in challenging patriarchy within international development institutions. On the adoption of UNSCR 1325, she notes, “It had taken the UN Security Council over fifty years to recognize the relevance of women’s rights and gender equality to the maintenance of international peace and security.” And she quotes Cox, who made the point that “international institutions universalize the norms proper to a structure of world power…. but international institutions may also become vehicles for the articulation of a coherent counter-hegemonic set of values. In this way, they may become mediators between one world order and another,” an idea that may be extended
to the role played by femocrats, warriors within, and feminist norm/organizational entrepreneurs in articulating a counter-hegemonic set of values within patriarchal bureaucracies at the multilateral and governmental levels.

Sandler shares her experience and understanding of transnational feminist movements’ engagement with and impact on the UN system. She attests that the process of challenging patriarchal power included calling for quotas for women in public office; the appointment of women’s rights and gender advisers; the creation of gender units, equal opportunity offices, government ministries of women’s rights or gender equality, women’s/gender studies centers, and professional development programs; the designation of special rapporteurs on human rights and other issues; and the increasing demand for specialized gender expertise in a wide range of fields.

Sandler uses the term “warriors within” to explore the experiences of femocrats within the UN system, and the processes and dynamics of shifting and destabilizing, if not yet transforming, institutional power and the deep institutional structures, cultures, rules, and practices that hold gender inequality in place. She makes the point that “it is crucial to avoid conflating feminist and gender expert. Many gender experts are not feminists, and many feminists are not employed as gender experts.” She uses “a generous definition of the terms feminist, and feminist bureaucrat or (femocrat). . . . [to] include individuals who are committed to radically transforming the unequal gender relations, misogyny, and patriarchy—including instances of their appearances among women—that continue to be rooted in the dominant cultures and priorities of many organizations.”

Anita Vandenbeld (see chapter 8) examines the focus of transnational feminist movements on advancing women’s political power through national parliaments. The statistics she cites provide a telling picture of the relative success of transnational feminist organizing. In 1945, there were fewer than 2% of women in democratically elected legislatures globally. By 1975, women accounted for 10.9% of parliamentarians globally. The global average rose to 13.5% in 2000, 18.8% in 2010, and 20.4% in 2013. Women have not achieved 30% (or a “critical mass”) of the elected seats in any region of the world: the Nordic countries (not defined as a region) lead at 42%, followed by the Americas at 24.8%; Europe (excluding the Nordic countries) at 22.7%; Africa at 21.9% (above the global average). Asia (19.1%), the Arab States (17.8%), and the Pacific (12.8%) fall below the global average.

Vandenbeld brings together transnational feminist debates on women’s political representation and social change. She debunks key assumptions about women’s political representation: that it is increasing and will continue to do so; that the more democratic a country, the more women will be elected to public office; and that increased numbers of women in elected office leads to greater economic development. She interrogates the arguments made for targeting women’s political representation, and asks whether women politicians represent “women’s interests” and if women’s political representation correlates with women’s economic and social development. She also questions the essentialist argument that women bring a “distinct leadership style” to and have a “civilizing effect” on politics.
Vandenbeld also points to the vital role played by feminist movements transnationally and nationally in opening up political space for women, including advocacy at the global and regional levels resulting in international conventions and agreements that provide the basis for women's political participation; establishing feminist political parties; and providing leadership training, funding, and other forms of support to women candidates. Spaces for the advancement of women's political representation include “temporary special measures,” such as quotas, reserved seats, and appointments; civil society and local government as “entry points” into politics; the link between family and kinship relations and politics in many societies; situations of crisis, conflict, and change; and transnational networking. However, she also points to the numerous challenges faced by women in politics: family and domestic responsibilities, social and cultural stereotypes, women's own “internalized” stereotypes, unequal access to education and political knowledge, lack of access to campaign financing, political party gatekeepers (“old boys’ networks”), personal safety, and the “double bias” against women from marginalized groups. Continuing institutional barriers include electoral systems, parliaments, and political parties.

Sherrill Whittington (see chapter 29) explores situations in conflict and examines “how women's active participation during the brief window of opportunity provided by the transition from ceasefire to the negotiation of peace agreements and development of international peacebuilding mandates,” is crucial to ensuring a critical mass of women represented in national legislatures, which opens the door to redressing “gender-based discrimination in social, economic, political, security, and governance arenas.” She quotes global statistics from postconflict states where women's representation in the legislature has exceeded a critical mass; for example, in Rwanda (64%); South Africa (42.3%), Mozambique (39.2%), Timor-Leste (38.5%) and Burundi (32.1%) (IPU, http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.htm). She underlines the importance of including CEDAW and UNSCR 1325 in the mandates of UN (and other) peacekeeping and transitional structures, which provide the framework for supporting women's efforts in fragile post-conflict states. She compares the different experiences of three Asia-Pacific states currently engaged in postconflict reconstruction: Timor-Leste, Bougainville, and Solomon Islands.

Whittington discusses the presence of such support in Timor-Leste to the achievement of a critical mass of women parliamentarians and their impact on constitution-building, legislative reform, political and socioeconomic development, gender-responsive budgeting, and other postconflict state-building processes. In comparison, despite women's active role as peacemakers during the conflicts in Bougainville and Solomon Islands, their absence or low participation in the peace negotiations, and the resulting lack of articulation of their priorities in the mandates of the international peacekeeping and transitional structures, are linked to low levels of women in decision-making, inadequate international support and funding to promote women's rights and gender equality, and “many lost opportunities for women's voices and concerns to shape peacebuilding and postconflict reconstruction.”
In exploring the extent to which transnational feminist movements have been able to bring gender equality into state-building, Helen O’Connell (see chapter 30) makes the link between African and European countries experiencing conflict and financial crises, and the opportunities presented for building new gender-responsive political settlements. She interrogates concepts of “political settlement,” “legitimacy,” “accountability,” “responsiveness” and “transparency” from a feminist perspective. And she envisions how to advance gender and social justice in the process of state-building and rebuilding in conflict and crisis contexts through, for example, writing or amending constitutions, law reform, and political participation, among other possibilities. O’Connell proposes the following definition of state-building: “actions by internal actors (with or without external support) to develop inclusive political processes and the capacity and institutions of the state to fulfill its roles as duty bearer by respecting the human rights of all women, men, girls, and boys (of all sexual orientations) and transsexual and intersex people, by meeting at least the minimum expectations of all persons for security, access to justice, public services, and economic opportunity, and by enabling the growth of a vibrant, independent civil society and media.”

Alliance Building

In reflecting on the key strategies of transnational feminist movements, the contributors repeatedly discuss the importance of alliance building in feminist advocacy and in political engagement at all levels. Many of the chapters describe in detail how transnational feminist movements have been building networks and alliances across borders of activism, academe, state and policy, making them significant actors in advocating for change. Etchart, for example, states that, “by definition, transnational feminist peace networks are means by which women extend the hand of solidarity across borders and across conflict lines in order to achieve just outcomes or compromises among leaders and their constituencies without resorting to violence.” Women’s old and new antiwar organizations are currently engaged in such activities as theorizing in the academy, acting locally in conjunction with other women’s organizations, joining forces with the Occupy and global civil society movements, and communicating globally.6

Antrobus discusses DAWN’s leadership and cooperation in forging alliances with North-based transnational feminist networks to advance women’s concerns globally at the UN world conferences of the 1990s.7 These were “key forums where (global) challenges were addressed and where new directions for bridging gender justice and economic justice began to take shape” (Sen and Madunagu 2001) and “they were also the first significant occasions when ‘women’s issues’ came forward from the margins of women-only conferences into the mainstream global agenda.”8 This was a momentous process of building global feminist solidarity across differences to advance women’s interests by challenging neoliberalism from a feminist perspective and helping to shape a new international development paradigm. It must be borne in mind that less than a decade earlier, DAWN had challenged Northern feminisms in its South-based critical

Dianne Rocheleau and Padini Nirmal (see chapter 31) explore how feminists have built bridges between thinking and action on ecology and development, working together with the indigenous-inspired social movements and development alternatives. They look at how feminists in academe and social movements have collaborated on environmental issues related to peasant struggles, food sovereignty, indigenous rights, and climate change, creating the stream of thought and action defined as feminist political ecology (FPE). They describe the emergence of FPE through various transnational feminist processes and the contributions of women in the broader environmental and social justice movements. Through this alliance building, they created a space that recognizes the “complex interactions among class, race, gender, ethnicity, sexuality, and the environment in terms of rights, responsibilities, knowledges and social movements.”

In the economic arena, Mariama Williams (see chapter 17) discusses transnational feminist alliance building and mobilizing around global and regional trade and investment policies. She illustrates how the International Gender and Trade Network (IGTN), comprising women’s organizations operating at local and global levels, formed a complex conduit to bring a feminist analysis on gender and the economy into the global policy arena. Working across academic, activist, and policy arenas, IGTN helped to shift the debate on macroeconomic and financial policies. Williams underlines that the success of IGTN was the result of its ability to operate on different levels, working as a loose alliance and network with a clear advocacy focus and as a “strong feedback bridge between academic thinking and social activism, stimulating policy-oriented research within academia as well as enhancing the policy work of international organizations.”

Gender-responsive budgeting is another result of successful alliance building among feminist academics, activists, and policymakers at the international, national, and local levels. Zohra Khan (see chapter 18) looks at how feminist practice and analysis pushing for gender-responsive budgeting has helped shape national fiscal policies. She documents the ways in which feminist activists working with academics and femocrats in government have brought a gender perspective into governmental planning and budgeting, resulting in the earmarking of resources for programs that address women’s empowerment and gender inequality. Working from the feminist political imperative to transform economic and social inequality, feminist economists (in academe, intergovernmental and governmental institutions, and feminist movements) have collaborated to challenge mainstream neoliberal economic theory and practice that had been the framework for formulating development policies and programs. As Khan comments, alliance building offered a “practical approach for assessing a government’s commitment to realizing women’s rights.” Working inside and outside government processes, feminist alliances on gender-responsive budgeting achieved “strong normative frameworks for gender equality and women’s rights articulated in national constitutions, bills of rights, and domestic legislation on a range of issues, including violence, pay parity, and other anti-discrimination legislation.”
Similarly, Shahrashoub Razavi (see chapter 16) shows how feminist economists in advocacy organizations and femocrats in government brought the subject of care work into economic and social policy by forming alliances with such institutions as the UN Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD). She underlines the importance of the bridge-building between these arenas, reflecting on the ways in which women’s movements have been able to position themselves, whether on their own or in alliance with other actors (inside or outside the state), to shape social policies and to monitor their ‘on-the-ground’ implementation. Razavi understands the importance of feminist advocates, policymakers, and researchers joining forces with economically marginalized women, who have the most to gain from the equitable reduction and redistribution of care work. As have other contributors to the Handbook, she raises important points about how feminist ideas and research on care have found their way into policy deliberations and public action in the “process of diffusion… through different channels and modalities, including donor circuits and intergovernmental organizations, as well as in more diffuse forms through national, regional, and transnational ‘epistemic communities.’”

This caution that feminist ideas are often “lost in translation” through engagement with “malestream” international, governmental, and NGO institutions resounds throughout the Handbook, particularly in relation to processes of gender mainstreaming.

“Glocal” Engagements

The term “glocal” is useful for analyzing how transnational feminist movements work outside institutions, creating more fluid kinds of engagement. Sumi Krishna (see chapter 33) describes it as the “side stream.” The concept of glocality reflects the positioning of the contributors (and transnational feminist networks and movements) in diverse places, contexts, experiences and knowledges, where local contexts are a manifestation of transnational feminisms. At the glocal level, “global” transnational feminist movements are connected to and inform local struggles through shared feminist identities; a canonical body of knowledge, methodologies, strategies such as alliance building, and so on. It is important to underline that the local dialectically contributes new knowledge and analyses, methodologies, and strategies for change to the global movement. While not all the contributors used the term “glocal,” as editors we take the liberty to frame the contexts discussed in this way.

Virginia Vargas (see chapter 20) explores Latin American feminisms’ challenge to democratization processes in the region, and brings home the importance of place and context. She connects feminist struggles in Latin America to the first, second, and third waves of transnational feminist visions and agendas. Feminists across the continent contributed new ways of thinking about democracy as they built their distinct identities, theories, and paradigms from different streams: feminists on the left of the political spectrum campaigned against women’s exclusion from and subordination in the public and private spheres; urban women from the shanty towns confronted women’s traditional roles and the public-private divide; and women in
political parties and trade unions questioned “the democratic dynamics inside these traditional spaces of male legitimacy.” Feminists politicized the private sphere, causing “a series of epistemological [and, we would add, ontological] ruptures,” which offered new pathways to interpreting reality. These ruptures included women bringing their “private” grief for their “disappeared children” into the public sphere and challenging patriarchal and authoritarian regimes; feminists making visible “what until then had remained nameless: domestic violence, sexual harassment, rape in marriage, and the feminization of poverty”; and Chilean feminists, in their fight against the Pinochet dictatorship, extended the concept of democracy—politically and theoretically—with their slogan “democracy in the country and in the home.” In the 1990s, and continuing into the twenty-first century, Latin American feminists responded to multicultural and multi-ethnic realities, “challenging the myth of the unitary nation on which the imagery of the state had been built.” According to Alvarez and colleagues, the Latin American and Caribbean feminist encuentros (encounters), first held in Bogotá, Colombia in 1981, have served as “critical transnational sites in which local activists have refashioned and renegotiated identities, discourses, and practices distinctive of the region’s feminisms.”

Amrita Chhachhi and Sunila Abeysekera (see chapter 21) contest the narrow understanding of transnational feminist movements as being only about the global arena and North–South relations, and focus on South Asian regional transnational feminisms and knowledge production. They trace the organic process through which South Asian women claimed feminism and created a movement. The chapter makes linkages between the “subjective” life histories of individual feminists and key political events in the region, for example, the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947 into two nation-states based on religious identity, the war between East and West Pakistan in 1971 that led to the creation of the new nation-state of Bangladesh, and the Sri Lankan civil war from 1983 to 2009, based on ethnic identity and grievances. “We realized that the ‘imagined communities’ of ‘Indian,’ ‘Pakistani; ‘Sri Lankan’ that had been clumsily crafted together through the symbols of ‘statehood,’ such as national constitutions, flags, and anthems, were not representative of the diverse religious, ethnic and linguistic groups and indigenous and tribal communities living within their territorial borders. Nor did the nation-states offer the promise of equal citizenship to many. […] Such political positioning located South Asian feminists outside any comfortable zone of belonging (nation, community, or liberation movement) and had immediate consequences of solidarity across borders.” The chapter resonates with Vargas’ reflections on the epistemological and political contributions of Latin American feminisms to a new “radical democracy,” while focusing on the South Asian context, which includes “the multidimensional and interconnected impact of patriarchies, globalization, religious fundamentalisms and militarization.” However, Chhachhi and Abeysekera are also open-eyed about the complexities and contradictions of building a “Southasian feminist identity” in the context of the region’s “deep structures of nationalism” and “external geopolitical dynamics.”

O’Connell European feminist realities through her examination of the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis in European countries, which, we note, are similar to the “structural adjustment policies” (SAPs) that have been imposed on indebted Third
World governments by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund since the 1990s. O’Connell describes how “families and households on no, low, or modest incomes in European countries, such as the United Kingdom and Ireland (Irish Republic), are hit hardest by the austerity or fiscal stringency measures adopted by governments to cut budgetary deficits…. They are worst affected by rising food and energy costs, wage freezes, job insecurity, and unemployment or underemployment. Women…. are bearing a disproportionate…. burden, through public sector job losses and cuts in essential public social services.” Agencies within national gender machineries have either been closed or faced significant budget cuts. The response of transnational feminist movements, particularly in southern Europe, has been to take to the streets in protest, calling on solidarity with feminists in the Nordic countries. Via the Internet, mobile communications, and social media, women's rights activists are coming together to draw attention to the deep gender gaps and biases within European institutions.

Lanyan Chen (see chapter 22) offers a fascinating insight into the dynamics of feminist engagement in what we define as the glocality of China. She traces the evolution of Chinese women’s struggles against the Government’s move from the planned socialist economy (of the 1950s through the 1970s) to a market-based state capitalist economy (from the 1980s to the present). She argues that this transition has been guided by a neoliberal growth-oriented agenda that emphasizes the use of state power to protect capital over the rights of labor as well as people based on their gender, class, ethnic, migration status, and sexual orientation. Chen examines the emergence of Chinese women’s awareness of women’s rights since the Government’s ratification of CEDAW in 1981 and, more importantly, through the preparations for the Beijing conference in 1995, when the Chinese government declared that “Equality between Men and Women” was a “principal state policy.” She argues, however, that “while women in other countries have made advances in economic and political participation and protection of their rights to dignity, health, and access to services, due in part to the outcomes of the UN world conferences on women, China, the host of UN Fourth World Conference, continues to systematically reverse the gains enjoyed by women in the pre-reform periods [1950s–1970s].”

Chen probes the Chinese Government’s adoption of neoliberal policies and the institutionalization of values, rules, and norms by which the rights of all women, industrial women workers, migrant women workers, and rural women have been systematically subjugated to the “growth-oriented agenda,” “assaulted,” and eroded. She points to the burgeoning of grassroots women’s movements, leading to increasing awareness, coalition building (among themselves, with other disadvantaged groups, based on class, ethnicity, migration status, sexual orientation, and so on, as well as with progressive men); use of social media; and demands for their rights, including economic and political rights, the right to protection against discrimination, sexism and all forms of violence, sexual and reproductive health rights, and the right to dignity.

Grassroots engagement in transnational feminist processes at the glocal level are taken up particularly in the chapters that look at feminist organizing around livelihoods and environmental issues. Marjorie Mbilinyi (see chapter 19) illustrates how transnational feminist movements operated to support local women’s land rights and alternative
economies, building from economically poor women's struggles through glocal organizing. She analyzes the different strategies that engage rural community women's political processes with internationally connected networks in “transformational” feminist processes to resist multinational corporations engaged in mining, tourism, horticulture, and large-scale agriculture. She suggests that the key to successful social change is listening to grassroots activists’ own knowledge, recognizing the “enormous potential of transformative feminist movement building” when it is “grounded locally with grassroots women activists.”

Sumi Krishna (see chapter 33) examines economically marginal rural women’s struggles for sustainable livelihoods in India. She contributes an interesting reflection on the Chipko movement, which gained international attention through the writing of ecofeminist Vandana Shiva, a narrative to which Rocheleau and Nirmal also refer. Although the story of “tree hugging women” has deeply informed the transnational feminist discourse on the environment, Krishna argues that it did not improve women’s ecological resource base or change oppressive traditional patriarchal structures. Krishna proposes that this failure, despite its championing in the literature, happened because transnational feminist movements did not recognize the multiple oppressions (class, caste, and race) informing local “side stream” political struggles. Like Mbilinyi, she suggests that to address grassroots women’s realities, transnational feminism needs to learn from and build theory and practice from these realities. She concludes that “the side streams do not have all the answers but they do point to ways in which we can begin to build productive and equitable relations between feminists across cultural contexts, nations, and regions.”

Ana Agostino (see chapter 32) illustrates how this has been achieved by economically marginal women affected by climate change. These women have engaged in demands for climate justice through creative ways of participating in transnational processes that build glocal connectivity. She gives examples of transnational feminist movements working to “restore justice” by acknowledging the “epistemic violence” of current development regimes and demanding systemic change, “repairing the harm done to individuals, to communities at large, to ecosystems, and to nature.” She describes the organization of feminist climate tribunals held around the world where women speak about their place-based knowledge and understanding of the economy, ecology, and community; challenge the paradigms of production and efficiency; provide knowledge and understanding of how to repair the harm done; and propose other ways of doing things.

TENSIONS WITHIN TRANSNATIONAL FEMINIST MOVEMENTS

As outlined earlier, praxis is key to transnational feminist theory and knowledge building. One of the cornerstones of feminist praxis is reflexivity—speaking, learning, and engaging in critical reflection; creating new knowledge; and working towards change
from the standpoint of personal and collective experiences. Given the different position-
alities, experiences, and forms of knowledge that our discussion of the chapters suggests
so far, it is not surprising that there are internal tensions within transnational feminist
movements, particularly in relation to the challenges of building solidarity across dif-
f erences. Indeed, it is hoped that the Handbook will contribute to raising issues of dif-
f erence around the sometimes troubled dynamics of gender, race, ethnicity, class, and
generation, and power and knowledge systems within and outside feminist movements.
As editors working across difference ourselves, we recognize the familiar tensions
(between and within the global North and South and among policymakers, academics,
and practitioners, for example), and efforts to close the gap between the grassroots and
the international elite. In this section we explore some of these fragmentations and divi-
sions, diverse standpoints, and what we term “unruly feminist politics,” as well as differ-
ent generational experiences of power.

Fragmentations and Divisions

The divides between Northern and Southern feminisms are well known and not sur-
prising, given the different geopolitical, economic and socio-cultural contexts in
which feminists operate. As the genealogies and histories we have been describing sug-
gest, these divides are not straightforward. On the one hand, many of the contributors
acknowledge that Southern feminists (most notably the DAWN network) have often led
transnational feminist debates since the mid-1980s. On the other hand, Northern femi-
nists have had greater access to jobs, funds, publishing houses, and so on. The situation
is made more complex by feminists located in the global North who identify as indig-
 enous, of African origin, “women of color,” or “mixed race,” among other identities, and
who have built a powerful identity, presence, voice, and influence (with the caveat that
it is not monolithic) in Northern and global academe. Southern feminists may have to
t ravel to Northern institutions to pursue academic qualifications and positions in inter-
national institutions, escape wars and conflicts, and seek citizenship and employment.
And Northern-born feminists who live most of their working lives in the global South
often have an ambiguous identity and position in feminist movements. The Handbook
suggests that while there has been significant bridge-building and healing across the tra-
ditional North–South divide, particularly since the 1990s, there remains a need to rec-
go nize and work on continuing fragmentation and divisions.
Carty and Mohanty quote from their interview with Avtar Brah, who comments on
the North–South divide:

Transnational feminism needs to revisit the old debates about the specificity of
patriarchal and capitalist gender systems that prevail in different parts of the
world. Politics of solidarity. . . . need to emerge from such appreciation of “dif-
f erence” and analysis of global modes of exploitation and patriarchal inequalities.
For us in the North, we have to have a deep acknowledgement of the intersectional
modalities of power—around racism, class, gender, ethnicity, religion, sexuality—between us and women in the South. From our previous experience we know that it is not easy to win solidarity without taking account of our differential locations and positionalities vis-à-vis one another. We have to have respect for other ways of life—other than those in the West—without succumbing to patriarchal imperatives. A vibrant transnational feminist movement can only thrive if there is mutual respect.

In another interview by Carty and Mohanty, Richa Nagar, from northern India, speaks of the differences within the global South, offering a provocative analysis of working as a feminist with marginalized, economically dispossessed communities:

First, the violence perpetrated by many mainstream projects that invoke the label of “feminism” or “gender” has made many people distance themselves from things that make claims and articulate project goals and ideas in the name of feminism. Two, the kind of praxis that has inspired me and my grassroots activist colleagues in rural North India over the years is being lived and created by many people (academics, movement-based intellectuals, artists, peasants) who do not speak the language of feminism. I have, therefore, found it necessary to grapple with ways in which ideas that some of us might see as feminist, can actually grow in conversation with efforts of nonfeminists who are integrating theoretical and grounded knowledges and practices in creative and committed ways.

Diverse Standpoints

The Handbook thus reflects a diversity of standpoints as well as creative tensions. Tinker writes from the standpoint of an American feminist scholar-activist who contributed to framing the WID agenda. Her chapter implies American and European feminist leadership in defining the WID framework, challenging the impact of the 1950s international development paradigm based on the prevailing post–World War II liberal-based economic model promoted by American economists, and establishing key networks that supported women’s organizing in developing countries (such as Isis International and the International Women’s Tribune Center, set up in New York City in 1975).

Tinker reflects on the critiques of the early WID approach and the ideological assumptions underlying liberal economic theory. She discusses how WID sought to integrate women into economic development, arguing that “projects would be more efficient if they took into account women’s economic contributions.” WID aimed to validate women’s work through time-use studies that led to appropriate technology projects and income-generating projects for women, which were often culturally inappropriate and seldom resulted in income for women commensurate with their time spent. She accepts the critique that WID did not challenge the capitalist system and that its emphasis on women ignored class, religion and ethnicity. Tinker concludes, however, that “sex identity—not gender—remains the most defining characteristic globally.”
Antrobus’ chapter on DAWN acts as a counterpoint to Tinker’s by identifying and locating Southern feminist voices, perspectives, and organizing within global transnational feminist movements. DAWN’s book, *Development Crises and Alternative Visions*, written by Gita Sen and Caren Grown and launched at the Nairobi conference in 1985, “challenged Northern definitions of feminism and the notion that feminism was irrelevant to poor women from the South,” and “destabilized the Northern moorings of the feminist movement and gave voice to Southern feminist perspectives.”

Hall presents another standpoint with her implied understanding of the bridge-building role played by African American feminists, Indigenous feminists, women of color, and others, with feminists from the global South in challenging American and European radical and liberal feminist analyses and strategies for change. Like many interviewees in Carty’s and Mohanty’s chapter, she argues that African American women, indigenous women, and women of color have contested the singular focus on patriarchy, and re-examined the public-private dichotomy that informs radical and liberal feminist theory on violence against women. Hall also issues a challenge to transnational feminist movements: “As neoliberal retrenchment has snatched back many of the social gains made by feminists in the 1970s and 1980s, the response must not be one of defense. Instead, reflecting on the limitations of antiviolence work that lacks an analysis of imperialism, racism, homophobia, and capitalism, and in rising to face new forms of sexism, austerity, conservatism, and xenophobia, feminist challenges to violence must expand, not contract.”

Klot’s chapter questions mainstream understandings of the genesis of UNSCR 1325 in feminist and women’s organizations, and offers “an alternative analysis of the political opportunity structures that were most significant” in bringing it about. She critiques feminist scholarly debates on the discursive terrain of UNSCR 1325, and points to the resolution’s origins in the UN discourse on peacebuilding and the Responsibility to Protect. The chapter makes visible the cadre of “feminist norm/organizational entrepreneurs” within the UN system and in the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security (a core group of peace, humanitarian, and development organizations) who worked in collaboration with influential male and female “door openers” within “the very institutions that 1325 sought to transform.” And it “addresses the primordial feminist dilemma of reconciling antimilitarist and pacifist ideals with 1325’s legitimization of humanitarian intervention when threats to women constitute threats to international peace and security.” While we recognize Klot’s important contribution to the discourse on the emergence of UNSCR 1325, we note that the resolution is imbricated within the current boundaries of the UN system and Security Council. Thus UNSCR 1325 does not challenge militarism as an ideology and system or the hegemonic, Western-dominated, realist and neorealist international relations agenda of the Security Council. It may therefore be viewed as an approach in which transnational feminist movements “pick up the pieces” after “the boys have gone to war.”

Desai, a scholar-activist positioned in the high politics of US academe, discusses the difficulty of practicing solidarity across differences and inequalities that exist within transnational feminism. She raises questions about transnational feminist activism
around the UN, which she depicts as privileging the “transnational activist class,” who, “whether from the global North or South,” enjoy well-paid jobs and positions, “opportunities for travel and interaction with other feminist activists,” a process that has “alienated some activists who cannot travel and in many instances has focused time and energy away from community-based struggles.”

Sandler, from her previous position at UNIFEM (now UN Women), acknowledges the privileged position of femocrats in international governance institutions such as the UN, and also offers an insider’s view of the many “warriors within” “who work on gender equality in mainstream organizations [and] are acutely aware of their privilege and positions.” She quotes a former UNIFEM regional director, Nyaradzai Gumbonzvanda, who observed that:

> Working in the UN system forced me to be clear. Growing up in rural Zimbabwe during the war in my country, being raised by my mother who was a widow for 28 years, being the first in my family to go to university, and then being a regional director at UNIFEM, I realized that I had a responsibility to tell girls in rural communities or with disadvantaged families, “You can be who you want to be. Never let anyone hold you back.” When you have that opportunity, you need to deliver with connectedness. You need to be clear on the transformation that you seek to bring into this space. It's more than a job. It's a calling.

### Unruly Feminist Politics

As many of the chapters illustrate, transnational feminist movements operate not only in formal UN (and other) intergovernmental and governmental spaces but also in diverse academic and community spaces, from which they may move in and out of formal spaces or choose to remain “on the margins.” There is often an edginess among the contributors as they describe their involvement in different strategies and actions, and reluctance to be labeled as any particular “type” of feminist. A familiar metaphor is that feminists wear many hats, and depending on the occasion, they might identify as an activist, academic, a professional or community worker. Similarly, transnational feminist movements are not regimented. Desai explores how specific cartographies inform the fluid complexity of transnational feminist movements as a whole. They are not neatly divided silos of engagement—the local, national, regional, and global—just as social change does not happen in neat steps from community to national to international spaces. The process is much messier, often contradictory, and far from predictable. The chapters that focus on these “messy” processes in which transnational feminist movements engage, speak to the troubled dynamics of gender, class, race, ethnicity, and sexual power systems.

Thanh-Dam Truong (see chapter 11) looks at the gendered political economy of trafficking and the responses of different transnational feminist movements to the governance and regulation of the sex industry. She raises issues about patriarchal capitalist borders and sites of control around the transnational sex trade in her observations about
the glocal sociocultural and economic relations involved in sex trafficking. Her analysis points to the deep intrusion of commercial interests in the market for sexual services and the human body, and the difficulties faced by transnational feminist movements that engage in the rapidly growing sites of exploitation. She points to how these new forms of commoditization of the human body require new questions for feminist analysis and organizing. She suggests that it is important to reframe “transnationally organized forms of sexual or reproductive labor” in relation to the “globalization of reproduction as a macrosocial phenomenon in order to reveal the technologies of political power wielded over the workers involved.” Truong underlines that the “sexuality and reproductive capacity” of the female body carries the “legal and social brunt” of the changing global order, and calls for “newly formed transnational feminist knowledge” to “build bridges between different epistemological positions to deepen understanding about the emerging structural contradictions in the human trafficking business.”

Rosalind P. Petchesky (see chapter 9) also raises the complexities of biopolitics and new technologies in her discussion of contemporary body politics. She shows how transnational feminist movements have expanded the concept of bodily integrity from the “right to choose” (e.g., sexual partners, abortion, or number of children) to include issues of gender identity, organ selling, and disability as well as the right to wellbeing, security, and safety. Bodies, in her analysis, are part of “unruly” politics used to resist established power. She traces the struggles around the body as feminists work together with allies, such as disabled people, trans* persons, and queer movements. Through new forms of activism around the body, security, and rights, the field of body politics is increasingly linking claims about reproduction, sexuality, and gender identity to those related to food security, housing, health care, livelihoods, ending war, systemic violence, racism, poverty, and environmental degradation.

Petchesky argues that there has been a “disastrous fragmenting of transnational movements around body politics into . . . different strands,” replacing the word “body” with “person” in UN documents, thus “dematerializing the subject of rights, removing her from her physicality and ‘sexualness.’” Petchesky is critical of the way some feminist and mainstream reproductive health advocates have buried “the sexual,” “folding it discreetly into marital/heterosexual and childbearing relations.” At the same time she raises questions around the disciplining of the modern body, for example, public health systems for tracking modes and patterns of HIV transmission that “become by definition mechanisms of judgment, categorization, and surveillance. Similarly, childbearing has become medicalized and commoditized with insurance and aid practices leading to “considerable risk of C-section to ‘protect’ the fetus, regardless of the pregnant woman’s desires.”

Priya A. Kurian, Debashish Munshi, and Anuradha Mundkur (see chapter 35) critically interrogate ICTs in relation to violence against women. Along with other contributors, they scrutinize the impact of the digital age and social media on transnational feminist movements in recent years. They examine the impact of information and communications technologies on feminist organizing as feminists use cyberspace to build awareness, facilitate discussions, and create transnational networks for global action on
violence against women. In probing the potential, in the digital age, to organize global protests against violence against women and generate empowerment and change, they raise important questions about the potential difficulties and pitfalls of acting in solidarity around violence against women. They suggest that even if online activism has the power to cross generations, class, and race within and outside the feminist movement, such networking has not always been inclusive. They point out that there are complex issues around the universality of women’s rights versus the particularities of religion, culture, and tradition that can lead to conflict and misunderstanding as women from outside the localities where the violence occurs try to act in solidarity with women within those localities. As “women across the boundaries of states, class, ethnicity, sexuality, and race have always faced the reality of culture and national identity being written on their bodies often in the form of practices that limit, in fundamental ways, their ability to exercise autonomy and protect bodily integrity.”

Thus, while ICTs can provide a useful platform for the local articulation of issues, particularly through debates and discussions, even as women activists gain power in some contexts, they may be rendered powerless in others “amid the tensions between the global and the local, access and exclusion, and the competing dynamics of caste, class, and race.”

### Generational Tensions

The *Handbook* also provides a platform for the articulation of tensions among generations of feminists. Alexandra Garita (see chapter 10) raises issues about young feminists’ inclusion and exclusion in the processes around sexual and reproductive health and rights. She analyzes the “backroom politics” of establishing global policy norms for sexual rights and reproductive health over the last two decades. Her chapter points to a generational shift currently taking place among feminists working on body politics, as the “post-Cairo generation” has started to claim its space, voice, and vision. She makes an important point about the difficulty of passing on organizational knowledge, history, and positional leadership to younger women in reproductive rights feminist movements, and notes that feminist leaders from the 1990s failed to “invest in a younger generation of feminists to take the work forward. The consequence of this lack of investment is palpable. . . . younger generations of feminists entering transnational movements. . . . question whether there is a shared feminist understanding of power within.”

She quotes a study by the Association for Women’s Rights in Development (AWID), which concludes that “the power dynamics between and across women of different ages within our own movements have generated unnecessary suspicions, negative stereotypes and competition, as well as false dichotomies across generations that can cause deep fragmentation. The unwillingness to share power is something younger feminists have identified throughout every region, attributing this dynamic to environments where trust is weak, and where the contributions made by different generations are overlooked.”
Sarah Hendricks and Keshet Bachan (see chapter 36) continue this line of inquiry by examining how girls and young women have engaged in networking and coalition-building on- and offline around various feminist issues, carving their own space, particularly online. They argue that the proliferation of ICTs and the rise of social media have been at the heart of online girl-led activism that has also translated into offline activism. They illustrate Gillian Youngs’ observations (see chapter 34) that the digitally networked world has substantially changed the historical terms and conditions of gendered power as ICTs extend the scope of feminist connections and possibilities. Youngs describes how the “new networked world of ICTs disrupted historical masculinist constraints on women’s political presence and engagement and opened up possibilities in these areas, accessible to growing numbers of individuals and groups.”

Hendricks and Bachan provide recent examples of these new openings and changes in the way young feminists are creating knowledge and activism online. Young women bloggers were at the head of the protest in the early days of the Arab Spring. In Kenya, Akirachix, a grassroots movement led by young women web developers, entrepreneurs, and engineers mentored young women to join the information technology sector. The US-based online network Girls Who Code (www.girlswhocode.com) has encouraged thousands of girls to enter the computer science field. They also point to the numerous websites (e.g., Tumblr), blogs, and hubsites, where girls and young women write about feminist issues as promising spaces for future activism.

**HAVE TRANSGENDER FEMINIST MOVEMENTS TRANSFORMED PATRIARCHY?**

Underlying much of the commitment and passionate engagement of transnational feminist movements, indeed what brings feminists together, is the imperative of transforming patriarchal institutions in all their manifestations—from violations of intimate relations to the discriminatory and inequitable gender norms of political, economic, social, and cultural institutions. In this section we look at the contributors’ reflections on the ways in which transnational feminist movements have engaged in transforming patriarchy. Some contributors seek to answer the question of whether transnational feminist movements have destabilized patriarchal systems, such as neoliberalism, militarism, democracy, and religious fundamentalism, which underpin global political economy, security and governance and affect every aspect of our lives. We also raise questions about co-optation and collusion, working with men, and going beyond gender binaries.

Sandler states optimistically that “patriarchy may be at its tipping point, and it will take determined partnerships across many sectors, countries, and cultures to push it over the edge and eliminate its deleterious practices.”
Vargas introduces the wonderful Latin American term, “depatriarchalization,”11 arguing that feminist political theory and epistemology have contributed to radicalizing democracy, giving meaning to the new conceptualization of democracy as a way of life and not only a form of government, and unpacking “the asymmetrical construction of democracy” that has been “normalized under the abstract veil of universality.” Feminist movements have introduced new conceptualizations of democracy, citizenship, and “the right to have rights” that take into account multiethnicty, multiculturalism, intersectionality, multiple knowledges, colonialism, decolonization, depatriarchalization, and the body as a territory that carries rights, which has contributed to the deconstruction of homogeneous visions around nation, women, citizenship and cultures. We suggest that there is an important role for women in parliaments and other decision-making arenas in advocating for the adoption of these principles and practices, but also note Vandenbeld’s caveats about the current situation of women’s political representation globally. Transnational feminist movements therefore still have a long way to go in circulating these new conceptions of democracy.

From another arena of struggle, Mariz Tadros (see chapter 25) examines the complex and changing dynamics of feminist engagement with patriarchal religions. Focusing on religious forces (including governments, sociopolitical movements, faith-based organizations, and transnational networks and coalitions) that “play an intrinsically political role rather than on spirituality as a body of beliefs,” she explores the diverse platforms of feminist scholarship and activism in countering and engaging with religious fundamentalisms. She refers to a survey of 1,600 women’s rights activists from 160 countries conducted by the Association for Women’s Rights in Development (AWID) in 2007. Eighty percent of those surveyed responded that religious fundamentalisms have had a negative impact on women’s rights. AWID has published the findings of the survey as well as feminist experiences and strategies of “resisting and challenging fundamentalisms” to highlight ways in which feminist movements can counter the influence of religious fundamentalisms.

A number of contributors reflect on transnational feminist movements’ engagement with neoliberalism. Taylor makes the point that “governance is increasingly about managing a global market economy to secure the interests of global capital, and in such processes, women’s rights and human security tend to fall off the agenda. This is especially so when we examine decisions made in the UN system, the multilateral institutions of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization.” Moghadam describes the global environment in which transnational feminist movements are now operating as being “characterized by neoliberal capitalism, militarism, and patriarchy…. [and where] the sheer scale of the problems in those countries, which reflect the profound contradictions of international relations as well as the persistence of patriarchy, would seem to surpass the capacity of transnational feminism activism.” Carty’s and Mohanty’s exploration of “the anatomies of dispossession and violence in the age of neoliberalism” provides an important analysis of the “ongoing women-and-feminist-led social movements” confronting patriarchal “gender injustice and neoliberal practices.” They map out feminist responses to neoliberalism, including the threat
that “neoliberal states appropriate gender discourses in their attempts to explain away or justify the erasure of women’s rights.” They argue that transnational solidarities among feminists are being forged as they recognize the ways in which patriarchal globalization/neoliberalism have “impacted women’s lives in tangible ways and have pushed them into deeper organizing for change,” inspiring the “transnational solidarities” that are “key to antiracist and anticapitalist feminist struggle” today.

Taylor’s discussion of the “gains and reversals” in women’s human rights and human security exposes transnational feminism’s unfinished business with patriarchy. She points out that “research in regions of the global South reveals that patriarchy has an adaptive character within modern state systems, and intersects with other forms of inequalities to limit women’s citizenship and identities.” And while women have been visible in “mobilizing and proposing changes affecting security at the global level, it is particularly at the national and regional levels that systems of inequality and repression remain intact and women’s voices are absent.” With regard to processes of globalization and governance, she states that feminists are still trying to make sense of the ways in which “economic globalization intersects with new forms of colonialism, patriarchy, racism, ethnocentrism, sexism, fundamentalism, and narrow nationalism and how all of these undermine advances in women’s rights.”

Antrobus (2014), reflecting on the twentieth anniversary of the Beijing conference in 2015, writes:

Today’s political economy is one in which the increasing power of multinational corporations threatens a new type of neocolonialism that determines the policy framework of governance in international institutions from the WTO to the World Bank and the UN itself to states, from the most powerful to the “least developed.”… The globalization of this neoliberal policy framework has increasingly compromised the ability of states to protect the majority of people and the environment, leading to increasing inequality between and especially within countries.

We note that transnational feminist engagement with the global financial crisis, the multilateral trading system, the care economy, gender-responsive budgeting, and poverty eradication, among other economic arenas, is still viewed as peripheral (an “add-on”) to mainstream neoliberal economic theory and practice at the global, regional, and national levels. So, while, as the chapters show, contemporary globalization has created unprecedented opportunities for organizing and mobilizing across borders, there is much more to do if transnational feminist movements are to transform political and economic relations in an unjust and inequitable system.

Contradictions, Collusions and Co-optations

As the Handbook shows and this introduction reflects, the genealogy, evolution and history of transnational feminist movements have been dispersed, fluid, flexible, creative, dialogical, and therefore, not surprisingly, untidy processes. There are no “central” institutions that hold this “longest revolution” together. On the one hand, its organic
evolution has enabled inclusiveness, diversity, the building of women’s power, and the articulation of feminist agendas in many spaces, including mainstream governmental, intergovernmental, and other institutions. On the other hand, the chapters also expose the contradictions, compromises, collusions, co-optations, and strategic errors of transnational feminist movements as they engage with mainstream institutions and seek to change systemic power from within and without.

In her chapter on feminist engagement with the UN, Sandler discusses how “feminist knowledge can be distorted to support technocratic administration”; for example, the training for peacekeepers on gender-based violence essentializes women as victims. She refers to Mukhopadhyay, who notes that “the courses we developed on gender and development in the 1980s took off around the world. They went from three weeks of learning and inquiry to a technical fix for bureaucrats who will not invest the time, now watered down and distorted to a one-day briefing session,” referred to by Menon as “gender appreciation courses.”

Sandler explores “the… struggles…. [and how the “warriors within”] internalize at the personal level, as they balance feminist ‘ends’ with bureaucratic ‘means,’ and walk a tightrope between cooperation and co-optation.” However, referring to Caglar, Prugl, and Zwingel (2013), she makes the point that “even though the motivations fail to align precisely with feminist principles or challenge gender power relations, the focus on women’s empowerment and rights may further evolve over time, building on the imperfect footholds that feminists have gained in these spaces.” She concludes that, “it is perhaps inevitable that contestation and distortions emerge when feminist theory and analysis intersect with bureaucratic…. regimes.”

Hall discusses the complexities of feminist engagement with state institutions in relation to the professionalization and depoliticization of antiviolence work in North America. She argues that feminist theoretical and strategic debates to “yield state responses,” while they “may have expedited short-term gains,” have “ultimately undermined transformative organizing around violence against women and inhibited grassroots alliance building within and across borders.” Hall describes the processes, starting in the 1970s and 1980s, by which white middle- and upper-class feminist understandings of patriarchy as being the root (and often sole) cause of violence against women and liberal feminist conceptions of the public-private dichotomy led to the creation of particular state responses to violence against women. These state responses have often undermined the safety and security of indigenous, African American, South Asian, and Arab women, women of color, and poor women.

Hall makes a key link between the contradictions and co-optations of feminist movements’ engagement with state agencies and their dependence on state funding: “This move toward depoliticized antiviolence work cannot be understood outside the shifting political economy, and, in particular, the increasingly punitive austerity of neoliberalism.” State-funded feminist organizations “are often restricted by state funding regulations that demand limited or no ‘political content’ or ‘advocacy.’” In addition, the funding of many feminist organizations for work on violence against women has been eliminated under “austerity [measures]…. coupled with an
increasingly punitive response to violence against women” by the current neoliberal Canadian Government.

This issue of feminist organizations’ dependence on and collusion with the state has been debated for decades, particularly with regard to “state feminism” or “national women’s and gender machineries”—that is, the structures and mechanisms established by governments across the world to promote women’s rights and gender equality since they were recommended at the 1975 Mexico conference. It is not surprising that women from the ruling elite who tend to occupy these spaces act in conformity with the political, economic, social, and cultural ideologies and values eschewed by their governments. This often results in a lack of responsiveness to the needs and interests of women and girls from politically, economically, and socially marginalized groups.

Chen critically interrogates the co-optation and collusion of the “national women’s machinery” and “state feminism” in China. She points out that the Chinese Communist Party exerts firm control over the All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF), resulting in the ACWF being more supportive of the government’s policies and cooperating less with grassroots women’s groups. As the “state feminist” approach does not fundamentally challenge the capitalist economic system and the existing state apparatus, there has been a resulting failure to uphold women’s substantive social citizenship through the protection of entitlements guaranteed by the state, and “systemic gender biases manifested in state-led policies and policy implementation…. have prevented women’s advancement despite gender-specific action plans and programs.” Thus the attainment of “equality between women and men in China is far from being achieved.” Chen also exposes the painful irony that “despite their responsibility for advancing women’s rights, the ACWF is tasked with the surveillance of women in villages and urban neighborhoods to ensure the successful execution” of the Government’s “one-child policy.” This state policing and management of women’s fertility and pregnancies has led to their loss of dignity, humiliation and vulnerability as they are frequently checked by family planning officers, fined or forced to undergo abortions.

The chapters on militarism, war, peacebuilding, and postconflict rebuilding expose profound contradictions, collusions, and co-optations between transnational feminist movements and patriarchy. A number of contributors present hard-hitting analyses of the collusion and co-optation of Western feminism in supporting and condoning the US-led “wars on terror” in Afghanistan and Iraq. They point to the arena in which transnational feminist movements still have a long way to go in challenging patriarchy.

Maryam Khalid (see chapter 24) explores feminist approaches to unmasking militarism (viewed as an ideology that includes the military complex; security; war; other state-led military interventions; and indirect interventions, such as the proxy wars of the Cold War era, international violence, and terrorism). Feminist perspectives illuminate that militarism is constructed “through gendered understandings of the world,” gendered assumptions about men and women, masculinity and femininity; the privileging of masculinity over femininity; and the promotion of military values, such as aggression, violence, and unquestioning loyalty. Militarism underpins the construction of the patriarchal state, the national interest, and the state’s engagement in international relations. It functions
to “normalize a view of the world… as marked by war, violence, and aggression,” and it makes acceptable the violence of militarism through a process of sanitization (e.g., employing euphemistic terms such as “clean bombs,” “collateral damage,” and “peace-keeping missiles”). Feminist perspectives also point to militarism’s gendered effects, not only in the context of war (e.g., the different effects of war and armed conflict on men and women, women’s experience of rape and sexual torture), but its “all-embracing reach in… societies in which it is a dominant paradigm.” Khalid makes the point that “the increasing number of women in the military has not led to a rejection of key assumptions or characteristics of masculine militarism. Rather, women’s roles in the military are still linked to the ‘feminine’ and function to support the masculinity of the state and its militarism.”

Hall locates the discussion within the “culture versus rights” debate, which is borne out in the experience of South Asian Muslim and Arab communities in North America with regard to “crimes of honor” and “honor killings.” She argues that it frames “Muslim women as victims of their culture, in its reliance on a dichotomy between culture and nonculture (i.e., Western culture), but it also creates an assumption of Western society [as] free from gendered and family violence.” It further reflects the “hegemonic ordering of a secular West over a ‘backward’ Other,” that ascribes “an inherent violence to certain non-Western cultures, and places these in opposition to ostensibly noncultural, universal human rights.” Hall juxtaposes this feminist debate in North America with the US military’s justification(s) of its post-9/11 “wars on terror” in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Khalid argues further that the US administration of George W. Bush created a post-9/11 gendered, racist, and Orientalist “wars on terror” discourse based on a set of binaries about us/self (the US state and its people) and them/other (Al Qaeda, the countries that harbor them, the East, Arabs, and Muslims), which “legitimized” the US-led military invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003, respectively. Critical to Khalid’s argument is that American feminist concerns and language were co-opted in the discourse that “constructed other women as voiceless victims of a barbaric (other, male) enemy,” and that some American feminist organizations supported the US-led “wars on terror”.

Tadros argues that “the West’s engagement with ‘the Muslim world’ after 9/11 represents a shift from being blind to religious forces (secular reductionism) to working through a narrow ‘religious prism’ in engaging with highly diverse social, political, and economic phenomena (religious essentialism), that has a highly detrimental impact on women’s rights.” She contends that the post-9/11 context has been characterized by a two-pronged attack by the West: fighting “terrorism” through security, and targeting “Muslim communities” through sociocultural interventions. Tadros (referring to Kandiyoti 2011) makes the point that the debate between American liberal feminists who condoned the US-led military intervention in Afghanistan in response to the Taliban’s violations of women’s rights and the radical feminists who condemned the intervention as a form of “cultural imperialism,” served to essentialize Afghan women.

Seema Kazi (see chapter 26) takes this argument further, in tracing the contemporary history of war in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Sri Lanka. Quoting Richard Falk (2012), the chapter defines “terror” as “political violence that targets civilians, independent of whether the actor is a non-state movement or a sovereign state.” She examines in
detail the horrific gendered impacts of the US-led “wars on terror” and domestic “wars of terror” waged by the postcolonial states within their national borders. Kazi makes the point that:

Prior to 9/11 the situation of Afghan women had not been part of the global discourse on the war in Afghanistan. Indeed, throughout the 1990s, there was little international concern or sympathy for the suffering of Afghan women inflicted by two decades of war. It was only in the wake of the 9/11 tragedy, and the retaliatory US-led Operation Enduring Freedom military offensive against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, that Afghan women appeared in the US foreign policy discourse and the international public imagination.

The stated justification for the US counteroffensive was democracy, human rights, and the rights of Afghan women. Operation Enduring Freedom was constructed as a moral mission to rescue Afghan women from Taliban tyranny.

Sandler’s chapter encourages us to ask whether transnational feminist movements’ engagement with the UN system, as well as increased numbers of women staff and diplomats operating at senior levels in the UN, have transformed patriarchal power with regard to global imperatives such as peace/militarism/war/conflict or the redistribution of wealth/elimination of poverty. We pose the question of whether, in focusing on transforming the “interstitial” spaces within the UN, including the framing of UNSCR 1325 and other resolutions on “women, peace and security,” have the “warriors within” lost sight of the bigger picture?

We recall the 2003 annual meeting of the CSW, which comprised hundreds of representatives of transnational feminist movements, including femocrats from the UN and other multilateral and bilateral agencies, government diplomats and feminist activists. It took place in the basement of the UN’s headquarters in New York in the immediate run-up to the US-led military invasion of Iraq. Despite the vociferous antiwar debates taking place simultaneously in the global media and massive demonstrations in various capital cities around the world, the CSW failed to raise the issue or challenge “the boys” upstairs in the UN Security Council, who met shortly after to debate the military intervention. We also note that feminists in the US and UK parliaments (as well as other NATO countries) either colluded with, failed to engage in the debate or were unable to win the argument against the military invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Claire Short, UK Secretary of State for International Development (1997–2003) stands out as the lone feminist voice in the UK parliament and Cabinet against the military invasions.

Tadros quotes Kandiyoti (2011), who raises concerns about UN-led gender mainstreaming programs in the postconflict reconstruction process in Afghanistan:

The workings of global governance institutions (United Nations agencies in particular) in the service of a gender equality agenda in Afghanistan instituted a form of donor-driven gender activism that could not reach beyond the ministries in Kabul in a country where the writ of the Government barely extended outside the capital. This made the technocratic formula of ‘gender mainstreaming’ politically hollow and ushered in another layer of instrumentalism—this time in the service of development and post-conflict reconstruction.”
This discussion raises the need for further research on the role of femocrats within the UN’s “gender architecture” as well as transnational feminist movements on the outside in the “wars on terror” in Afghanistan and Iraq. Their/our loud silence during the post-9/11 debates in the UN Security Council bears some interrogation. As does the implicit support of the US-led military invasions by femocrats in the UN and other multilateral and bilateral agencies who have been engaged in gender-responsive humanitarian and development programming in Afghanistan and Iraq, an approach which may also be read as “picking up the pieces” through the entry point of UNSCR 1325.

Working with Men

Although the Handbook focuses on the diversity, divisions, and challenges within transnational feminist movements, the role of men is somewhat muted. The question of the inclusion of men as part of the feminist movement is not raised directly, except in the chapter by Jose F. Serrano-Amaya and Salvador Vidal-Ortiz on “profeminism.” They use this term to describe men’s movements working alongside women’s on feminist issues. The contributors define themselves as “profeminist” and analyze how men’s groups in the Americas engage in the fight against patriarchy and work to transform hegemonic masculinity.

They speak to the complexity of alliances and solidarity among profeminist and feminist groups, as male and female feminists have sought to tackle structural sexism. While their chapter aims to show how Latin America has developed an interesting model for profeminist engagement, particularly in ending gender-based violence, the silence and non-engagement around the question of men (despite the focus on gender power relations) in the Handbook raises interesting questions that reflect Serrano-Amaya’s and Vidal-Ortiz’s concluding questions about what kinds of alliances men and women can form to end gender injustice. Can profeminist men’s groups claim to be feminist?

Working beyond Gender Binaries

Another issue that the Handbook addresses is how transnational feminist movements are exploring the need to go beyond gender binaries. Vargas, Carty and Mohanty, Desai, and Petchesky speak to the trans* engagement and the space for different genders as well as sexual identities’ organizing and engaging in feminist spaces. These are discussed theoretically, particularly in relation to US, European, and Latin American feminisms; however, the discussion also suggests that going beyond gender binaries is a much contextualized debate—and in some arenas a generational and contested issue.

For example, in her discussion on radical democracy in Latin America, Vargas poses the question of how to avoid the “androcentric dualism” that defines gender equality from a masculine paradigm. She argues that it is important for transnational feminist
movements to move beyond seeing women’s experience in opposition to masculinity. Garita positions this debate as generational—she mentions that sexual identity and going beyond gender binaries is a key issue for the younger “post-Cairo” feminists. Certainly, the silences and assumptions around gender norms are a troubling issue for transnational feminist movements. Petchesky raises the question of trans* persons’ rights and positioning in feminist analysis and feminist movements when she questions the feminist groups across the globe that privilege the “fight against sexual abuse and violence against women…. as the highest expression of feminist activism.” This reinforces the neocolonial discourse of the ‘victim subject’ countering and contradicting other feminist understandings of how neoliberal power operates. She suggests that it would be “almost unimaginable” that the same crowds would “march in the streets to demand justice for a trans* sex worker or a poor Dalit woman who had been raped and beaten to death.” And she points to the silence around the “dozens of trans* women and men (most of them poor and dark-skinned) [who] have been brutally murdered.” The issue of gender identity and heteronormative politics in the transnational feminist movement continues to be one of the more complex issues to be tackled in the future.

**Conclusion: Ways Forward**

Although the *Handbook* sets out clearly what has been achieved by transnational feminist movements—putting women’s rights and gender equality on the international and national development agendas, bringing to world attention the importance of ending violence against women, developing new frameworks in which women’s productive and reproductive work count in economic development planning, opening the way to ensuring sexual and reproductive rights and health, recognizing women’s contribution to agriculture and environmental sustainability, underscoring the need for women’s political leadership, highlighting gender bias in all areas of policymaking, working to transform women’s citizenship in processes of state-building, and engaging in peace-building and postconflict rebuilding—it is also written at a moment of self-reckoning and questioning about the work that still needs to be done.

The contributors offer a many-layered approach as they look forward. Some argue for new imaginaries and feminist visions, along with the need for fundamental structural changes through resistance and transformation. Others emphasize the need for different forms of alliance building and a strengthening of strategic coalitions, and still others present pragmatic and strategic directions for institutional engagement in the light of the post-2015 sustainable development agenda. In conclusion, we bring together some of the suggestions proposed by the contributors in order to show the creative variety and diversity of ideas that will no doubt inform the work of transnational feminist movements in the future: in terms of defining the challenges ahead, ways of working within institutions, building alliances and glocal strategies.
Challenges Ahead

Overall, the contributors see major challenges ahead. As Hall stated, neoliberalism “has snatched back” the gains made by feminists in the 1970s and 1980s. The response, however, cannot be defensive. Rather, feminism needs to expand to reflect on and analyze the complex interlinkages among “imperialism, racism, homophobia and capitalism” and the new forms of “sexism, austerity, conservatism and xenophobia”.

Tadros concludes that transnational feminist movements seeking to address religious fundamentalisms’ threat to women’s rights, face challenges on a number of levels: Globally, they “cannot ignore the power and influence of a securitized Western policy agenda, and how it shapes development policy more generally and gendered policies considered of strategic importance or of security risk more specifically.” As power configurations at the global, regional and national levels shift, transnational feminist movements will need to be responsive to their implications for the gender equality agenda, while being sensitive to the historical, political and economic contexts in which it is being negotiated.

Kazi, in pointing the way forward for transnational feminist movements in South Asia, indicates that there exists “a broad regional/transnational feminist political opposition to war and militarization.” She states further that this is reflected in a growing body of feminist scholarly literature “which has the potential to develop into a more substantive transnational alliance in the region.” However, she acknowledges that the “security-centric discourse privileging the nation-state conflates criticism with treason and support for ‘the enemy,’ making it much more difficult for women to challenge the ‘nationalist’ paradigm and widen the analytic frame.”

Klot concludes that “the achievements associated with UNSCR 1325 outside of the UN system, especially in the context of informal peace processes, reflect a failure to influence how UN peacebuilding operations interpret, shape, and respond to women’s security risks and needs. Ultimately,… 1325’s emancipatory potential…. rests with its ability to enable feminist transformative agendas within the context of UN peacebuilding as well as outside it.”

Strategic Engagement with Institutions

In considering the way forward, Sandler suggests that the UN, with all its imperfections, must continue to be an important site for transnational feminist activism. However, she makes the critical point that there are limits to the extent to which women’s rights and gender equality can be advanced through the UN unless national and local feminist movements have more influence on national politics and foreign policies in the majority of UN member states. She also states that international reform at the UN is crucial, including reform of the structure and methods of the UN Security Council. As the Pathways to Women’s Empowerment study notes, “deeper-rooted structural constraints that perpetuate inequality must be tackled in all contexts, including in the formal institutions that produce the rules and services upon which citizens depend.” And “feminists and those charged with advancing women’s rights through bureaucracies need to
reimagine themselves as part of a movement, linking with each other within and across institutional locations and levels, and with transnational feminist networks and movements outside, to form a wall of resistance to sexism and misogyny, within the UN—in its policies, programs and budgets—and at the national level in each of its Member States.”

Contributors currently working within UN institutions are aware of how strategies need to adapt and change to ensure that feminism advances both structural and systemic change.

Khan, in considering ways forward for gender-responsive budgeting (GRB), suggests that on the one hand, GRB can support “the democratization of institutions by integrating the voices of women into government planning and budgeting.” But at the same time, she notes the danger of GRB as a mainstreaming strategy. In her years of engagement as both a feminist advocate and femocrat, she has noted that GRB has lost its political impact “as it becomes fully enmeshed in government systems.” Rather than it being a powerful strategy, it has in some places become co-opted by government and donors who have “depoliticized the agenda making it a purely technical exercise with endless toolkits and checklists.” Khan notes that GRB is too slow to bring about the fundamental economic and social change that is necessary for women and girls to realize their rights. She underlines that GRB is not about transforming macroeconomic structures but about “shedding light on inefficiencies in public spending and redirecting resources to achieve social development outcomes.”

Razavi, like Khan, raises questions about the need to change macroeconomic thinking around care, asking feminists to “scrutinize how the provision and receipt of care is impacted by the broader structures and patterns of development,” as they pave the way forward. In proposing a future for care she asks that transnational feminists, both scholars and practitioners, “capitalize on the rich array of research and policy analysis that has taken place over the past decade or so, to advance the policy agenda on care beyond what was enshrined in the Beijing Platform for Action.” She underlines the political importance of redistributing care work from families to the public sector through public financing, although she recognizes that translating feminist research and policy analysis into global intergovernmental commitments will be an uphill battle.

Whittington concludes that “ensuring women a critical role in postconflict governance should be accorded the highest priority in all peacekeeping mandates, donor conferences, priorities, and agendas of the international community. There must be a focus on enabling women to capitalize on their engagement in the peace process and gains made in postconflict elections, in order to transform the political, economic, and social conditions of women [and men] in the country.”

**Building New Alliances**

In addressing the questions around building just and ethical futures, the contributors underscore how transnational feminist movements need to continue strong alliance and coalition-building.
Chen presents a number of recommendations based on the experience of China. She suggests that acknowledging the failure of “state feminism” to advance women’s rights and gender equality in China has the potential to lead to a re-evaluation of its gender analysis and strategies, and the building of alliances with grassroots women’s movements in order to change gender and other forms of discrimination and oppression in the society. She notes that in recent years, the coordinated struggles for gender and social justice by grassroots women has led to a broader recognition of women’s rights as human rights in China. She therefore sees the need to tackle social exclusion and deprivation through feminists networking with disadvantaged groups and building coalitions with other progressive forces “around a discourse of social citizenship, equality and justice.”

Desai underlines the need to continue to build solidarity based on mutual recognition, support, affinity, and complementarity through the daily political work in organizations, through networks, at events and by movements. Garita points to the importance of coalition-building if the transnational feminist movement is to secure sexual and reproductive rights and health in UN global and regional policymaking processes. She suggests that these coalitions have led to a normative global policy agenda around numerous issues from adolescent sexuality to agreements to end all forms of stigma, including on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. But she points to the setbacks due to conservative forces that undermine women’s human rights, erotic justice and diversity. In looking forward she sees a key strategy as being the need for “generations of older, younger, and middle feminists to come together and develop shared knowledge, analysis, and strategy through processes of accompaniment based on principles of solidarity, cooperation, mutual respect, generosity, and nonviolence.”

Serrano-Amaya and Vidal-Ortiz underline the need for men’s groups to form alliances with feminist groups, specifically learning from the experience of Latin America where there have been significant developments in the study of men and masculinities and success in tackling structural sexism and other women’s and feminist issues.

Krishna speaks of the need to build an inclusive “shared” platform in order to ensure collective emancipation from patriarchy. Ways forward require that transnational feminism confronts the deep structural injustices of “everyday patriarchy.” She suggests the need to lessen the ever-widening chasm between feminism of the privileged and that of the less privileged. This means the urban/rural divide has to be broached as middle class urban feminists concerned with identity and violence issues reach out and work with oppressed rural women concerned with livelihood sustainability. She also concludes that the tensions between funded NGOs and non-funded movements need to be bridged.

**Working Glocally**

In considering the contributors’ reflections on the future, we found “glocal” to be a useful concept in understanding how transnational feminist movements navigate between the grounded knowledge of everyday local resistance and struggles and the global
hegemonies that must continually be traversed. Krishna argues that transnational feminist movements in the future must engage with the “myriad and dynamic new political spaces created by people’s movements at the grassroots, in the local side streams of national and global development. It is in these side streams…. that we can begin to understand the politics of transformative organizing.”

Mbilinyi suggests that in rethinking how to recognize the care economy as part of economic livelihoods concerns and struggles for land, it is important that grassroots women are able to organize themselves, analyze, and make change happen. Although, as mentioned earlier, she speaks of the “enormous potential of transformative feminist movement building which is grounded locally with grassroots women activists,” she warns that “this is not necessarily a ‘win win’ situation in which all women come out sisters. Powerful women (and men) benefit from the existing power structures, and will resist all efforts to deprive them of their privilege and power.”

Running somewhat counter to the suspicions about the power of the market and the actors in the private sector expressed by many contributors, Hendricks and Bachan make the case for working with the private sector when speaking about the future of girls in development. Funding for popular campaigns that can open up new policy spaces in which to discuss human rights violations of girls “in the new and compelling context of girls’ empowerment,” can lead to developments at the international level supported by grassroots mobilization led by young people. These, too, are glocal engagements, when they argue that “girls today recognize, in a way that was less cogent to previous generations, that the interconnectedness of global issues carries implications for their own lives in an immediate way that requires their mobilization.”

New Feminist Knowledge

Several contributors see new forms of knowledge as being necessary for moving forward. Truong states that “newly formed transnational feminist knowledge must build bridges between different epistemological positions to deepen understanding about the emerging structural contradictions in the human trafficking business.” She calls for a deconstructing of the “apparatus of knowledge” on sexuality and the family, validating gender and family diversity, and sexual pluralism. In the current era of globalization, “redirecting emancipatory social action. . . . must go hand in hand with setting new limits on markets to redress the collusion between diverse forms of power (state, capital, technology) and. . . . a reconstruction of the values that protect human dignity within the multiple layers of transnational commerce involving the human body.”

When considering the new areas of focus required, Youngs argues in a similar vein that it is important that transnational feminists champion women in science and technology in order to help form new cultures of innovation engaging women in ICTs and knowledge and skills associated with them. As she states, “the demand for new feminist theory and imaginings to fit the new circumstances and potential has not diminished as the digital age has developed and incorporated growing numbers of people, societies,
and economies.” Even if the digital age has represented a sea change in its knowledge building, power, and potential to affect social change, she is concerned that digital transformations have reinforced the gender inequality already embedded in industrial modernity—the relative lack of presence of women in arenas that determine technological change.

Rocheleau and Nirmal call for new approaches to science(s) and knowledge(s) that would counter the challenges to techno-fix responses to climate change and other ecological crises, as well as undermine the apocalyptic environmental crisis scenarios as preludes to reactionary/fundamentalist politics and oppression of vulnerable groups (women, ethnic, sexual and racial “minorities,” and migrants among others). They also propose the application of feminist perspectives to bio-political debates on bodies and ecologies and an extension of FPE insights on gendered territories, resources, rights, land use, and resource management regimes.

**Envisioning Alternative Feminist Imaginaries**

Several chapters articulate a vision of alternatives to global capitalism as the way forward. Mbilinyi starts from the vision of a people-centered participatory development “whereby women and men all benefit equally from development and participate equally in control over resource mobilization and allocation.”

Agostino propose that transnational feminists need to engage with resilience and innovative practices toward a different development model as they move away from an economistic-centered vision to one based on sufficiency, mutual responsibility, equity, care and justice. She argues that there are alternatives to the “productivist logic” for which growth is the only answer, and feminists need to join in building counter-narratives to the dominant views of what constitutes a “good life,” by practicing “transformative justice”:

> Humanity as a whole, men and women, need to find new ways of living in our common planet and to introduce changes in our relationships to others, to nature and to our own imaginaries of a good life. Care and mutuality and the connection between self and others and nature, which tend to be associated exclusively with the feminine, acquire in the process a whole new meaning for human beings in general as essential threads for moving toward more sustainable societies.

Rocheleau and Nirmal also call for a decolonial “turn” to “open up new categories of identity, affinity, and difference and new ways of understanding and engaging in relationships in space(s) and place(s).” They “envision alternative ecologies and economies that protect the rights of people and the health of the earth or posit social and political alternatives that hold science accountable to do no harm (precautionary principle) and serve the common good.” They see these visions as nourishing feminist struggle, “moving it in new directions, with different rhythms, colors, and patterns of relation” that reflect “a diversity of people in everyday ecologies.” In seeking these new visions,
feminists are contributing to the “crucial work of making new worlds on the ground, and bringing to life a larger world in which many worlds can live and thrive.”

Desai, in her quest for a feminist imaginary, is somewhat more pragmatic when she says, “Transnational feminist movements continue to chart new courses and terrains in our quest for other possible worlds even as we are limited by the concepts and practices of our current world.”

Blowing Away the Cobwebs

As we state in the opening of this introduction, the Handbook is timed to contribute to the post-2015 sustainable development agenda. In bringing together such diverse voices and perspectives, it underlines the importance of open engagement with transnational processes, such as the post-2015 agenda. Although UN processes are not the only spaces in which transnational feminist movements are actively involved, they continue to be important agenda-setting moments. Learning from the vast experiences, analyses, and ideas presented in the Handbook, we, as the editors, would like to conclude with some ideas for the future that we see as emerging these discussions.

Any future agenda being developed needs to be embedded within a strong human rights framework, in which women’s rights and gender equality are clear goals, along with the elimination of all forms of gender-based discrimination, including sexual and other forms of gender-based violence against lesbian, bisexual, and transgender people. Such an agenda needs to address systemic and structural issues of power that inform the profound atrocities, injustices, and inequalities of patriarchal neoliberal capitalism, militarism, and religious fundamentalism(s).

Transnational feminist movements need to take advantage of this pivotal moment to regroup globally, in concert with progressive people of all genders, to challenge the institutions (such as the Bretton Woods institutions and the UN system, including the Security Council) to rethink a coherent political-economic paradigm based on peace and security for all, equitable economic distribution and social protection, respect for the limits of the planet’s carrying capacity, and limits on corporate control and commodity speculation. Such a framework would acknowledge the crucial role of women in the formal and care economy and in rural livelihoods, and include comprehensive sexual and reproductive health services. In forging such an agenda, transnational feminist movements will have an important role to play in ensuring that governments and intergovernmental organizations undertake the systemic transformations needed for gender, political, economic, social, and ecological justice.

From a position of fifty years of knowledge production, activism, working with institutions, and critical reflection, it is now time to blow away the cobwebs and recognize that transnational feminist movements form a key epistemic community that can inspire and provide leadership in transforming international political economy, development and peace processes. As editors, we see transnational feminist movements as needing to continue to shape political spaces and institutions at all levels and to recognize the myriad
formal and informal ways in which gendered power relations define and inform every-day life. Building on their histories, knowledge, and deep understanding of political and social transformation, transnational feminist movements have much to offer as we face the tough challenges ahead.

Notes

1. The term “glocal” (global + local) recognizes that global forces are constructed and played out in localities that are linked by networks as people connect, communicate, organize, build alliances, and mobilize for change.

2. Examples of transnational feminist networks organized around particular theme(s) or regions include Association of African Women for Research and Development (AAWORD), African Feminist Forum (AFF), Asia-Pacific Resource and Research Centre for Women (ARROW), Association for Women’s Rights in Development (AWID), Caribbean Association for Feminist Research and Action (CAFRA), Center for Women’s Global Leadership (CWGL), Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN), International Gender and Trade Network (IGTN), International Women’s Health Coalition (IWHC), Isis International, Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA), Women and Development Network, Society for International Development (SID/WID), Women’s Environment and Development Organization (WEDO), Women in Development Europe (WIDE), Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO), and Women Living under Muslim Laws (WLUM), to name a few.


4. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), all adopted by the UN in 1966.

5. For elaboration on the decolonial approach, see the chapters by Desai, Rocheleau and Nirmal, and Vargas, which look at how indigenous and other feminists groups decenter hegemonic Western scientific knowledge and history.

6. Women’s old and new antiwar organizations include Code Pink, Fight Imperialism Stand Together (FIST), Global Women’s Strike, Gold Star Families for Peace, International Action Center, Raging Grannies, School of the Americas Watch, Syracuse Peace Council, United for Peace and Justice, Veterans for Peace, Women in Black, Women in Conflict Zones Network (WICZNet), Women’s Fightback Network, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), and Women Waging Peace.

7. For example, UNCED, Rio de Janeiro 1992; ICPD, Cairo 1994; and WSSD, Copenhagen 1995.
8. The North-based transnational feminist networks included the Association for Women's Rights and Development (AWID), Center for Women's Global Leadership (CWGL), International Women's Health Coalition (IWHC), Women and Development Network, Society for International Development (SID/WID), Women, Environment and Development Organization (WEDO), and Women in Development Europe (WIDE), among others.


11. The word originates in Bolivia, where the Office of Depatriarchalization is located within the Vice-Ministry of Decolonization. Vargas notes that the creation of this office was the result of the pressure generated by a very persuasive campaign by feminist groups, who launched the slogan “without depatriarchalization there is no decolonization.”

12. Maitrayee Mukhopadhyay and Pramada Menon, at a Gender at Work meeting held in Delhi, India, February 2013. See Sandler, chap. 7.

13. For example, ministries, divisions, departments, units, gender focal points, and national gender commissions.

14. These binaries included West vs. East/Arab/Muslim; self vs. Other; us vs. them; civilized vs. barbaric; rational vs. irrational; progressive vs. backward/stagnant; democratic vs. despotic; developed vs. underdeveloped; Western masculinity as moral, rational, autonomous, competitive, “the liberator,” needs to bring progress to “them” vs. Eastern masculinity as barbaric, irrational, threatening, dangerous, violent, aggressive, “the oppressor”; and Western femininity as liberated, nurturing and supportive, needs protection from “barbaric” men vs. Eastern femininity as passive, victim, oppressed, voiceless, lacking agency, needs rescuing.”

15. The themes of the 47th Session of CSW held in 2003 were (1) participation and women’s access to the media, and information and communication technologies; and (2) women’s human rights and elimination of all forms of violence against women and girls. See http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/47sess.htm.

References


SECTION 1

KNOWLEDGE, THEORY, AND PRAXIS
This section sets out the theory and practice of transnational feminist movements as they have challenged the deep gender inequalities that mark neoliberal globalization. The three chapters, by Valentine M. Moghadam, Linda E. Carty, and Chandra T. Mohanty and Manisha Desai, explore different understandings of power and solidarity across various divides within feminist practice, movement-building processes, and strategies.

Valentine M. Moghadam’s chapter, “Transnational Feminist Activism and Movement Building,” contributes to the analytical scholarship on transnational feminist movements with a detailed examination of transnational feminist contributions to the United Nations and other global spaces. The chapter provides an overview of the types of transnational feminist activism and some of the key transnational feminist networks, presenting a typology of campaigns, coalitions, and strategies that have contributed to movement building and to policy achievements at the global, regional, and local levels. Moghadam argues that the scale and scope of transnational feminist activism since 1995 has been a product of globalization shaped by technological advances in information and communication technologies. She depicts transnational feminist networks as “fluid and non-hierarchical structures that span local and global spaces,” contributing to “global civil society” with a mix of utopian and pragmatic approaches and orientations. She describes four types of contemporary transnational feminist networks: those that target the neoliberal economic policy agenda; those that focus on the danger of fundamentalism and insist on women’s human rights, especially in the Muslim world; those that target conflict, war, and empire; and those that engage in feminist humanitarianism and international solidarity. Moghadam’s documentation of the activities of transnational feminist movements has importance for women’s history, comparative women and politics, and global social movements.

Linda E. Carty and Chandra T. Mohanty’s chapter, “Mapping Transnational Feminist Engagements: Neoliberalism and the Politics of Solidarity,” presents the histories of key transnational feminists of different generations, in a dialogue format based on a survey of thirty-three feminist scholar-activists, aged between forty and eighty, from Asia,
South America, the Caribbean, North Africa, Europe, and North America. The chapter foregrounds the similarities and the differences in transnational feminist collective thinking and praxis as it has evolved over the decades. The chapter maps out a critical feminist geography of knowledge production, organizing, and solidarity building across multiple layers of difference in the current neoliberal context, noting the politics of difference, the coloniality of North-South divides, and the need to build solidarities across multiple borders. The chapter sets out the voices, theorizations, and multiple genealogies of these interlocutors, looking at “how far women have come in creating a better world for themselves in this phase of capitalism” and giving a sense of what “feminists across the globe are thinking about the challenges we face at this historical juncture.” The respondents’ narratives are based on answers to four questions: (1) how have feminists on the ground worked through the intersections of race, class, gender, and sexuality, (2) what is the relevance of feminism as a praxis for economically marginalized women or women of color, (3) what are the challenges ahead in relation to neoliberalism and the obstacle it presents to solidarity, and (4) what are the effective responses of feminism to the North-South divide in this era of extreme conservatism in neoliberalism?

Manisha Desai’s chapter, “Transnational feminist Contributions to Theory and Praxis,” looks at different sets of theorizing in transnational feminism in the acade and in global activism. The chapter sets out how specific cartographies of transnational feminisms contribute to different kinds of theory and praxis and how that has shaped transnational feminism as a whole. The first part of the chapter looks at how transnational feminism challenged the framing of economic and cultural boundaries across nations and added a new boundary of global/local. Desai emphasizes the contribution of women of color, the development of a radical politics of solidarity, and the growing critiques of first-, second-, and third-world divides within feminism. She then examines the “reflexive traversal solidarities,” presenting the critical debates about building solidarity and connections across academic-activist and north-south divides. She describes “the gender regime” in the UN and international development spaces and notes that as networking across places increases, so does the focus on the importance of solidarity across differences that is based on mutual recognition, support, affinity, and complementarity. Desai concludes with the possibilities for transnational feminism as ideas flow among feminists positioned in diverse academic, policy, international, national, and local community places.
Chapter 2

Transnational Feminist Activism and Movement Building

Valentine M. Moghadam

Introduction

The era of globalization is characterized by at least two divergent trends. One is the expansion of neoliberal economic policies, including integrated financial markets, an increased role for the Bretton Woods institutions and the World Trade Organization (WTO), and a transnational capitalist class. Scholar-activists have referred to this as “globalization-from-above.” The other trend is transnational activism in response to, and rejection of, neoliberalism. In particular, transnational feminist activism is one of the distinguishing features of globalization-from-below, which has challenged the masculinized hegemony of business and political elites. Transnational feminist activism takes place on a number of levels (global, regional, local); addresses political, policy, and normative issues within global and local spaces; involves a variety of strategies (protests, petitions, conferences, coalition building); and mobilizes women from three or more countries around a number of priority issues (neoliberal economic policy, women’s health and reproductive rights, sexual rights, conflict and peacebuilding, antifundamentalism, and women’s human rights). The organized expression of such transnational feminist activism is what I have called the transnational feminist network (TFN) and what others refer to as a women’s international nongovernmental organization (WINGO). This chapter provides an overview of types of transnational feminist activism and some key TFNs, along with campaigns, examples of movement building, and policy achievements.
The literature on women’s movements references various types and forms of women’s mobilization. Guida West and Rhoda Brumberg (1990) identified women’s mobilization around welfare and economic wellbeing, ethnic and nationalist struggles, social-nurturing/humanistic protests (including environmental protection and peace), and women’s rights. Scholars have distinguished women’s rights or feminist movements from other types of women’s mobilizations, asserting that feminist movements or campaigns are a subset of women’s movements or women-led campaigns and are distinguished by their challenge to patriarchy and gender inequality (Beckwith 2000; see also Ferree and Mueller 2003). Myra Marx Ferree and Beth Hess (1995, 32–33) identified the following as feminist principles that animate women’s rights movements: there is recognition of and dissatisfaction with living in a man’s world; women are a special category of people with certain characteristics in common, whether owing to biology or socialization; only women should define what is feminine; and there is a goal to end men’s unjust power and claim for women what is rightfully theirs. Valerie Sperling, Myra Marx Ferree, and Barbara Risman (2001, 1157) suggest that “feminist action” is an appropriate term to define “that in which the participants explicitly place value on challenging gender hierarchy and changing women’s social status, whether they adopt or reject the feminist label.” Thus feminism as a set of ideas and a movement is distinguished from other women-led movements, in that it is premised on a critique of women’s subordination to men and a call for societal change toward equality.

In some countries or in some periods, women’s rights groups may eschew the label “feminist,” because it is associated with Western culture, suggests an antimale stance, or is politically unwise. For example, in some countries in the Middle East and in Eastern Europe, women’s rights groups may frame their struggle as one for civil society, democracy, or national development as well as for women’s rights. The term “feminist” is generally not used openly in Jordan and Egypt, though even there the critiques, aspirations, and activities of women’s rights groups may be deemed at least de facto feminist. Iranian women’s rights activists, however, defiantly call themselves feminists, and secular feminists, even though this puts them at risk from the Islamic authorities. The feminist label is also used by the Association Tunisienne des femmes démocrates and several Algerian women’s rights groups.

At the same time, feminist movements may themselves evince differences in frames, priorities, and strategies. They may be focused on a single issue (abortion rights, family law reform, criminalizing domestic violence, the right to vote and enter politics, sexual/gay rights) or a multi-issue platform (sweeping legal and policy reforms for women’s equality). They may focus exclusively on women as a social category or on broad societal change for both social justice and gender equality. Feminist campaigns may be directed at a national audience exclusively, building consensus by seeking elite allies or coalition
partners, or they may look outward and assume a more transnational focus, especially in a repressive or uninterested national political context.

Though not all feminists agree on the matter, many argue that the movement for women's rights is a global social movement and that, despite different cultural framings, country specificities, and organizational priorities, there are observed similarities in the ways women's rights activists frame their grievances and demands, form networks and organizations, and engage with state and intergovernmental institutions (Antrobus 1996; Stienstra 1994, 2000; Lycklama, Vargas, Wieringa 1998; Naples and Desai 2002; Moghadam 2005, 2013). These similarities include, among others, adoption of discourses on women's human rights and gender equality; references to international agreements such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Beijing Platform for Action, and Security Council Resolution 1325; campaigns for legal and policy reforms to ensure women's civil, political, and social rights; solidarity and networking across borders; and coalitions with other civil society groups. Another observation is that women's rights activists—whether in South Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, or North Africa—are opposed to “fundamentalist” discourses and agendas that define women's roles and aim to control women's bodies and mobility (Afkhami 1995; Di Marco and Tabbush 2011; Helie-Lucas 1993; Moghadam 2005, 2013). Women's rights or feminist movements seek the full and expansive citizenship that Ruth Lister (1997) has discussed, and the “modernization of gender relations” that Sylvia Walby (2009, chs. 7, 9, 10) has theorized. Many of them are linked to—or indeed have helped to form—transnational networks.

Women's rights activism has a long history, and feminists have worked together across borders since at least the mid-1800s. In the early twentieth century the movements for women's suffrage, socialism, and peace were transnational in nature, and the period was marked by the formation of such organizations as the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), the International Alliance of Women, the International Alliance for Women's Suffrage, and the Inter-American Commission on Women. After the rise of the League of Nations, such women's organizations worked with intergovernmental bodies, notably the International Labour Organization, to advance claims for women's participation and rights (Stienstra 1994; Rupp 1998; Berkovitch 1999). International women's organizations, along with nationally based “official” women's organizations that emerged in postcolonial or modernizing countries, may have helped bridge feminism's first wave with the second wave, and then with the UN Decade for Women (1976–1985). Subsequently, the four UN conferences on women that took place between 1975 and 1995 helped establish a global women's rights agenda, which in turn created a global opportunity structure for the growth and expansion of transnational women's activism. Mary Hawkesworth (2008, 27) defines “global feminist activism” as international feminist mobilizations involving women in more than one country or region “who seek to forge a collective identity among women and to improve the condition of women.” I have identified such mobilizations as TFNs that advocate for women's participation and rights while also engaging critically with policy and legal issues and with states, international organizations, and institutions of global governance.
The scale and scope of transnational feminist activism since 1995 has been a product of globalization. A complex, multidimensional process whereby the mobility of capital, peoples, discourses, products, and organizations takes on an increasingly transnational or global character, globalization has economic, political, cultural, technological, and geographic aspects.

Free market capitalism (“neoliberalism”), the power of institutions of global governance, widening inequalities, gender injustices, and persistent poverty are among the features of globalization-from-above. In response, civil society groups and networks working at the transnational level to bring about global or societal change—including TFNs—are representatives of globalization-from-above, or indeed global civil society. Another feature consists of technological advances such as information and communication technologies (ICTs), and especially social networking media, which facilitate connections, collaborations, and mobilizations. Thus, a transnational feminist network brings together women from three or more countries around a specific set of grievances and goals, such as women’s human rights, health, or economic justice. Fluid and non-hierarchical structures that span local and global spaces, such networks are connected to globalization processes and engage extensively in cyberactivism. TFNs have contributed to the making of what some have called “global civil society” (Anheier, Glasius, and Kaldor 2001); they participate in global mobilizations such as the World Social Forum (WSF) and have established an impressive organizational infrastructure. Like many social movement organizations, they evince both utopian and pragmatic approaches and orientations.

In her analysis of transnational organizing and the impact on local feminist actors in Latin America, Sonia Alvarez (2000, 31, 60) outlines three reasons why local actors may pursue transnational linkages: to reaffirm or construct marginalized identities and establish strategic bonds of solidarity; to work across borders to expand formal rights and impact public policy debates; and because they share a common legal or cultural fate across borders. This is certainly pertinent to the feminist encuentros or gatherings that began in Latin America in the mid-1980s, and it may be applied to the formation of the Collectif 95 Maghreb Egalité, which brings together women’s rights activists from Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. These motives have helped to form TFNs such as Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN), Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUM), and Women in Development Europe (WIDE). But Alvarez also identifies two “logics” of transnational feminist organizing: an internationalist identity-solidarity logic characterized largely by intraregional activism (e.g., the encuentros); and a transnational IGO-advocacy logic characterized by regionwide and global activism, such as the global organizing related to the UN world conferences and the associated regional preparatory conferences. This distinction has come to be known as “NGO-ization” versus “grassroots” women’s organizing (e.g., Jad 2004), leading some scholars to differentiate professionalized women’s lobbying groups or women’s international NGOs (WINGOs) from “grassroots” women’s groups. The former are sometimes described as elitist or “top-down” groups in which those in charge are separate from the broad base of women, while the latter tend to be seen as more local, community based,
movement oriented, and more centered around feminist principles of collaboration and power-sharing. This may be an arbitrary distinction, however, because many of the professionalized TFNs are led and staffed by feminist activists with strong commitments to gender equality, women’s empowerment, and social transformation. It is more useful to see the international women’s rights movement as diffuse and diverse, with different types of mobilizing structures, discourses, and action repertoires. The overarching frame is that of achieving gender equality and human rights for women and girls. How that is achieved varies among the different forms of groups. Changes or reforms sought by movements may occur through direct action, grassroots organizing, research and analysis, lobbying efforts, coalition building, or humanitarian action, as well as any combination of strategies and activities.

Global Restructuring and Feminist Responses

As noted, women have worked together across borders for women’s rights since at least the era of first wave feminism—a struggle for political and social rights and for peace and antimilitarism—which united women around the world into the early decades of the twentieth century. The post–World War II division of the globe into the capitalist First World, the communist Second World, and the developing Third World included a parallel division among the world’s women. Some of the older women’s organizations remained, but the new women’s groups of the 1960s and 1970s aligned themselves with various ideological currents and emphasized different priorities. Women’s groups encompassed liberal, radical, Marxist, and socialist ideologies that provided different analyses of women’s oppression and suggested varied strategies for women’s liberation. Such ideological divergences constituted one form of division within Western feminism. Another division played out as First World versus Third World feminism. These different feminisms had disparate priorities: many First World feminists saw legal equality and reproductive rights as key feminist demands and goals, whereas Third World activists emphasized underdevelopment, colonialism, and imperialism as obstacles to women’s advancement. Disagreements between First and Third World feminisms came to the fore at the beginning of the UN Decade for Women, which sought to address the low status of women worldwide, and especially at the first and second world conferences on women, which took place in Mexico City in 1975 and in Copenhagen in 1980, respectively. Such disagreements were exacerbated by international development projects that focused on population control while ignoring the basic needs and aspirations of local women. Many development projects excluded local communities from development planning and did not take into account women’s productive roles and their reproductive responsibilities and needs. When the debt crisis emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s, structural adjustment policies were imposed
on the Third World by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the US government. Social development actually came to a halt, as countries were made to implement drastic austerity measures to repay their loans to First World banks while also accelerating the prescribed denationalization and privatization plans. Third World feminists and those involved in women-and-development research in the First World produced cogent critiques of capitalist development, whereas many Western and especially liberal feminists ignored the asymmetric relations between North and South and focused on the lack of women’s legal rights and equality in the South, as well as sometimes in their own countries.

A shift in the nature and orientation of international feminism began to take place in the mid-1980s during preparations for the UN’s Third World Conference on Women, held in Nairobi, Kenya, in 1985. The shift took the form of bridge building and consensus making across regional and ideological divides and was made possible by three critical economic and political developments within states and regions and at the level of the world system. The first was the transition from Keynesian economic policies (with their emphasis on government intervention for full employment and citizen welfare) to the neoliberal economic framework (with its emphasis on free markets, privatization, and trade and financial liberalization), along with a new international division of labor that relied heavily on (cheap) female labor. Second was the slow decline of the welfare state in First World countries and the persistence of poverty and underdevelopment in many Third World countries, both of which placed a heavy burden on women’s reproductive and domestic roles. Third, the emergence of various forms of fundamentalist and right-wing religious movements threatened women’s autonomy and human rights and was met by organized feminist responses.

The economic and political realities of these global changes attenuated the divergences that had existed and led to a convergence of feminist perspectives; many feminists in the North found themselves focused on economic issues at the same time that feminists in Africa, Asia, and Latin America were directing their attention to women’s legal status, autonomy, and political rights. This encouraged the formation of a number of alliances that brought together women from both developed and developing countries to respond to economic pressures and patriarchal movements. Out of these alliances, transnational feminist networks were born. Such networks included DAWN, MADRE, WIDE, the Women’s Environment and Development Organization (WEDO), WLUMIL, and the Sisterhood Is Global Institute (SIGI). By the 1990s TFNs were engaged in policy-oriented research, advocacy, and lobbying around issues pertaining to women/gender and development and women’s human rights. Many of the women who formed or joined TFNs were scholar-activists who had been—and in some cases, continue to be—in involved in the gender-and-development research community and in related professional associations such as the Association for Women in Development (AWID) and the International Association for Feminist Economics (IAFE).

The TFNs that proliferated in the 1990s transcended the earlier political and ideological differences through the adoption of a broader feminist agenda that included a
critique of neoliberalism as well as an insistence on women’s full citizenship, reproductive rights, bodily integrity, and autonomy for all women worldwide. The earlier divisions also were blurred in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Eventually that common agenda took the form of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, which resulted from the Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1995. Invoked by many women’s rights activists across the world, the Beijing Platform for Action is a clarion call for women’s autonomy, economic and political empowerment, human rights, and capacity to effect social change. It was in part the product of alliances between feminists within bureaucratic and international organizations and those active in women’s civil society groups and feminist networks; its adoption resulted from coalitions among women’s rights activists, feminist-scholars, and officials within state bureaucracies and women’s policy agencies.

Along the way to Beijing, however, the UN world conferences on women of the 1990s provided a platform for issues pertaining to gender justice. These included the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED), held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992; the Human Rights Conference in Vienna in 1993; the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), held in Cairo in 1994; and the World Summit for Social Development (known as the Social Summit), which took place in Copenhagen in March 1995. At these conferences women declared that environmental issues were women’s issues, that women’s rights were human rights, that governments were expected to guarantee women’s reproductive health and rights, and that women’s access to productive employment and social protection needed to be expanded. Slowly new themes emerged that resonated globally and came to be adopted by women’s groups throughout the world: women’s human rights, gender justice, gender equality, ending the feminization of poverty, and ending violence against women. The themes came to be adopted by many international organizations and international NGOs as well as nationally based civil society groups and NGOs.

**Types of TFNs, Activities, and Achievements**

This section describes the types of transnational feminist activism and provides examples of campaigns, coalitions, and strategies that have contributed to movement building and to policy achievements at global, regional, and local levels. Four types of contemporary TFNs are discussed: those that target the neoliberal economic policy agenda; those that focus on the danger of fundamentalisms and insist on women’s human rights, especially in the Muslim world; women’s peace groups that target conflict, war, and empire; and networks engaging in feminist humanitarianism and international solidarity. As noted, contemporary TFNs came about with shifts in the global political economy in the late twentieth century and benefited from organizing and financial allocations in
Table 2.1  Types of Transnational Feminist Networks

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(continued)
connection with the UN’s Fourth World Conference on Women. At this writing (2013), not all TFNs that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s are as active as they once were, and several have had to reduce or suspend operations as a result of membership decline or external funding shortfalls. Nonetheless, the classification remains salient, and documentation of the activities of TFNs past and present is important for the study of women’s history, comparative women and politics, and global social movements. (See Table 2.1 for a summary illustration.)

### Feminism against Neoliberalism

In the 1980s feminist scholar-activists began to pen cogent critiques of structural adjustment policies (Bakker 1994; Sparr 1994). In the latter part of the 1990s, alarmed by the global reach of neoliberalism, they began addressing issues of globalization and the new global trade agenda. TFNs such as DAWN, WIDE, WEDO, and the Marche Mondiale participated in the critique of neoliberalism, arguing that new rules of global free trade undermined national laws protecting workers and the environment. Transnational feminists also argued that employment losses and dislocations brought about by new international trade agreements would be disproportionately borne by women.

### Feminism against Fundamentalisms

When Islamist movements demanded stricter application of Islamic laws and norms, the implications for women were especially significant: women would be veiled in public, and in the family they would be placed under the authority of male kin or husbands. In response, antifundamentalist feminist networks were formed by expatriate Iranian, Arab, and South Asian women residing in Europe and the United States. These included WLUMIL (established in 1984), SIGI, and the Women’s Learning Partnership for Rights, Development, and Peace. In the early 1990s feminists in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia formed the Collectif 95 Maghreb Egalité.
Feminism against War and Imperialism

One of the world’s oldest peace organizations, and indeed the oldest TFN, is the WILPF, founded in 1915 by thirteen hundred women activists from Europe and North America opposed to what became known as World War I (Enloe 2007). Late twentieth-century globalization was accompanied by a new wave of conflicts in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Central Africa involving serious human rights violations against women. Women’s groups responded by forming new networks such as Women in Black, Medica Mondiale, Women Waging Peace, and Women for Women International. They underscored the specific vulnerability of women and girls during wartime, the pervasive nature of sexual abuse, and the need to include women’s voices in peace negotiations. They also produced research to show that women’s groups had been effective in peacebuilding in Northern Ireland as well as in Bosnia and Central Africa.

In the new century, wars in Afghanistan and Iraq galvanized women across the globe to support existing peace organizations and/or build new ones. In 2002 another group to emerge from this context was the US-based Code Pink: Women for Peace. Its mission statement identifies it as “a women-initiated grassroots peace and social justice movement working to end the war in Iraq, stop new wars, and redirect our resources into healthcare, education and other life-affirming activities.” In 2007 six women Nobel Peace Prize winners formed the Nobel Women’s Initiative, with a view toward ending militarism and conflicts and bringing about peace and stability in the Middle East and elsewhere.

Feminist Humanitarianism

Although almost all TFNs may be regarded as internationalist and solidaristic, inasmuch as they are concerned about the plight of “sisters” across borders and boundaries of nationality, religion, and class, not all engage in humanitarianism as operational work. Feminist humanitarianism consists of moral support and material assistance for those in conflict zones or repressive states and is characteristic of MADRE, Medica Mondiale Kosovo, Women for Women International, and Code Pink. During a 2004 visit to Iraq, for example, Code Pink took $650,000 in medical supplies and other aid for the Fallujah refugees who were forced from their homes when US troops destroyed their city. Though ignored by the US media, the mission garnered enormous attention from Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiyya, and Dubai and Iranian television, which witnessed an example of American compassion.

MADRE began its work in the early 1980s during the war in Nicaragua, when the United States sponsored the right-wing Contra rebels. Partnering with sister organizations in Cuba, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Palestine, Sudan, Iraq, and Haiti, among other countries, MADRE consistently provided aid for women and children. Working in partnership to provide emergency aid to displaced women and families in Darfur, it sent
about half a million US dollars’ worth of clothing and bedding to small refugee camps in 2005. Following the invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003, MADRE worked with an Iraqi feminist partner, the Organization of Women’s Freedom in Iraq (OWFI), to address the problem of “honor killings,” which spiked after the war. It supported the creation of women’s shelters for victims of domestic and community violence in Baghdad, Kirkuk, Erbil, and Nasariyeh, run largely by OWFI volunteers. (See Table 2.2)

What are some of the strategies that TFNs employ to achieve their goals? First, like other transnational social movements, they create, activate, or join global networks in their struggle for gender justice by mobilizing pressure against forces that seek to undermine women’s status. In the 1990s TFNs built or took part in coalitions such as Jubilee

**Table 2.2 Feminist Humanitarianism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feminist Humanitarianism: Networks, Core Goals &amp; Activities</th>
<th>Country Projects</th>
<th>$ Disbursed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MADRE (1983) United States</td>
<td>Gender, economic, and environmental justice; programs in peacebuilding; women’s health and freedom from violence; mobilizes resources for partner organizations to meet immediate needs of women and their families and develop long-term solutions to the crises they face. <a href="http://www.madre.org/">www.madre.org/</a></td>
<td>Sudan, Iraq, Nicaragua, Cuba, Haiti, Guatemala, Kenya, Peru, Colombia, Panama, Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women for Women International (1993) United States</td>
<td>Addressing the needs of women in conflict and postconflict environments; helping to effect transition from victims to active citizens; provides microcredits and business services. <a href="http://www.womenforwomen.org/">http://www.womenforwomen.org/</a></td>
<td>Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq, Kosovo, of 2006 Sudan, Nigeria, Rwanda, DR Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WLP (2000) USA</td>
<td>Women’s human rights and leadership, especially in Muslim-majority countries. <a href="http://www.lerningpartnership.org">http://www.lerningpartnership.org</a></td>
<td>Afghanistan, Bahrain, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Morocco, Nigeria, Nicaragua, Zimbabwe, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2000, the Coalition to End the Third World Debt, Women’s International Coalition for Economic Justice, the Women and Trade Network, Women’s Eyes on the Bank, and United for Peace and Justice. After “the Battle of Seattle” in November 1999—when the WTO convened a ministerial conference marred by power brokering on the part of First World governments, disagreements over agendas, and large street protests—and with the emergence of an antiglobalization/alternative globalization movement, transnational feminists became active players. TFNs have taken part in the WSF since its inception. In addition, although women’s groups have long been identified with peace movements, the new conflicts associated with globalization and US militarism led to the creation of the new transnational feminist peace networks discussed previously. Working alone or in coalitions, TFNs mobilize pressure outside states via e-petitions, action alerts, and appeals and through direct actions that may include public protest and acts of civil disobedience.

Second, TFNs participate in multilateral and intergovernmental political arenas. They observe and address UN departments such as the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which facilitates international cooperation on standards making and problem solving in economic and social issues (and especially with its Commission on the Status of Women [CSW]) through lobbying delegates to raise awareness and cultivate supporters. They also consult with UN agencies and regional commissions and attend meetings with international intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). By preparing background papers, briefing papers, and reports, and by submitting these documents to IGOs, TFNs increase their expertise and influence on a range of issues. Their purpose is to raise new issues—such as gender and trade, women’s human rights, and violence against women in war zones—with a view toward influencing policy.

Third, TFNs act and agitate within borders and across nation-states to enhance public awareness and encourage public participation. They mobilize and recruit supporters and raise members’ expertise through economic literacy workshops or other training programs. TFNs work with labor and progressive religious groups, media, and human rights groups on social policies as well as on humanitarian, development, and militarization issues. They link with local partners, participate in local coalitions, and provoke or take part in public protests.

Fourth, TFNs network with each other in a sustained process of inter-networking and Internet working, sharing information, planning and coordinating activities, taking part in the global feminist dialogues at the WSF, and otherwise engaging in movement building. In all these ways, their activism spans local, national, regional, and transnational terrains. The Internet—the “gift” of globalization—has allowed them to transcend borders, boundaries, and barriers in their collective action against forces that seek to keep women oppressed or excluded. (See Table 2.3 for a summary of TFN strategies.)

Policy achievements have followed from TFNs’ activism. Their lobbying led to the insertion of important items in the final Vienna Declaration of the 1993 Conference on Human Rights, such as the assertion that violence against women was an abuse of human rights and an objection to the harmful effects of certain traditional or customary
practices, cultural prejudice, and religious extremism. The declaration also stated that human rights abuses of women in situations of armed conflict—including systematic rape, sexual slavery, and forced pregnancy—were violations of the fundamental principles of international human rights and humanitarian law. TFNs working on conflict and peace also inspired UN work on women, peace, and security. In October 2000 the UN Security Council issued Resolution 1325 on Gender, Peace, and Security, calling on governments, as well as the UN Security Council itself, to include women in negotiations and settlements with respect to conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Indeed, it was collaboration between UNIFEM gender experts and feminist networks leading to informal meetings with the Security Council that facilitated the adoption of SCR 1325 (Hill et al. 2003; Spees 2003). At the same time the Rome Statute, which established the International Criminal Court (ICC), was influenced by the lobbying efforts of the Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice (Cohn 2008). The statute governs administration of the ICC, including the gender-balanced recruitment of judges, and mandates appointment of gender specialists, including those with expertise on violence against women and children.

Regional transnational feminist activism should also be noted. In North Africa policy successes were achieved in the new century when the Collectif 95 Maghreb-Egalité lobbied governments in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia for laws against sexual harassment,
the repeal of discriminatory family law provisions, and parliamentary quotas to enhance women’s political presence.

TFN advocacy has influenced intergovernmental organizations, various UN agencies, and the World Bank. Gender budgets, gender audits, gender mainstreaming, and gender equality are mechanisms and frames promoted by TFNs that now have been adopted by multilateral agencies, international NGOs, and even governments. The Millennium Development Goals include Goal 3, to end literacy gaps and enhance gender equality through increases in women’s political representation. In July 2010 a new UN entity for women’s rights and gender equality was formed, called UN Women and led by former Chilean president Michelle Bachelet, with considerably more funding than previous such entities had enjoyed. (In late 2013 Bachelet was back in Chile running for the office of president again.) As such, TFNs have both contributed to, and benefited from, the global women’s rights agenda.

Transnational Feminism and the World Social Forum

TFNs’ participation in the WSF has extended to inclusion on the coordinating body, the International Council. Their presence and influence, however, have been the subject of debate and analysis; there has been criticism of the preeminence of the WSF’s “Founding Fathers” and the near-invisibility of feminism despite the large numbers of women participants. Catherine Eschle and Bice Maicuashca (2010) have described the evolution of women and feminism from a marginal position in commentaries/analyses and in the WSF plenaries, to visibility, voice, and influence. They have also discussed the ways that TFNs have engaged in what they call feminist antiglobalization activism, which they rightly see as lying at the intersection of the feminist movement and the global justice movement.

Global feminism shares with the global justice movement a common opposition to neoliberalism and militarism, but also emphasizes an antifundamentalist action frame. In some years several transnational feminist groups were alarmed by what they perceived to be a sympathetic stance toward Islamists on the part of some antiglobalization activists, on the basis of a common opposition to empire and to military occupation in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Palestine. For example, in an appeal issued in February 2005 that was prepared for the WSF in Porto Alegre and discussed at the Feminist Dialogues that immediately preceded the forum, WLUML decried what it saw as the beginning of an “unholy alliance between a growing number of anti-globalization activists, human rights activists and progressive people in the West in general with Muslim fundamentalists, and the gradual abandonment of progressive democratic forces from within Muslim countries and communities” (cited in Moghadam 2013, 165–166).

At the first WSF in 2001, women made up 54 percent of participants but less than 15 percent of the most important panelists in the official forum program. The entry of
the francophone Marche Mondiale des Femmes (the World March of Women) onto the WSF International Council began to change feminist invisibility, and its slogan, “The world will not change without feminism, and feminists cannot change women’s lives unless we change the world,” was met with roars of approval at the closing ceremonies at the 2002 WSF. By the third forum, in 2003, the Marche Mondiale and another major feminist group, Latin America’s Mercosur Feminist Articulation, were responsible for two of the five thematic areas. At the fourth WSF in Mumbai, India, feminists were placed in charge of the development of several of the self-organized panels, and in 2005 more than six thousand women’s groups participated in the WSF. Indeed, Eschle and Maicuashca consider the Mumbai WSF to be a turning point in feminist presence and voice. Jane Conway (2007) also points to the Americas Social Forum in Quito as helping to make the forums feminist, but the Mumbai WSF was distinctive, she writes, in that its political vocabulary was expanded to include struggles against patriarchy, militarism and war, racism, casteism, and religious communalism alongside neoliberalism. At the fifth WSF the feminist dialogues focused on three key problems: neoliberal globalization, militarism and war, and fundamentalisms. The feminists’ strategy was a dual one of integration and forging of autonomous feminist spaces, and in that they succeeded.3 In its April 2011 newsletter WIDE reported that the WSF in Dakar showed that “another world is possible with women’s rights and gender justice at its core.” WIDE was pleased to see that representatives of the Marche Mondiale, the Feminist Dialoguers, and La Via Campesina led many of the women’s assemblies, and that the Marche Mondiale international coordinator, Miriam Nobre, served as co-coordinator in the Assembly of Social Movements, with the plenary bringing together about three thousand people. This was an important acknowledgment, the WIDE report continued, of women’s struggles as common social struggles (cited in Moghadam 2013, 163).

The dual strategy mentioned above, as well as the pervasive presence of women, were evident at the 2013 World Social Forum, which convened in Tunis. Nearly 10 percent of the workshops pertained to feminist or gender issues; the Forum’s opening assembly focused on poverty, patriarchal capitalism, and women’s rights after the Arab Spring; and a march for women’s rights led in part by the widow of a recently assassinated left-wing political leader received considerable media attention.4

Transnational feminism draws on a feminist structuralist critique of three intersecting or interlocking systems of oppression: patriarchy, racism, and neoliberal globalization. Feminist activities and objectives revolve around both basic and immediate needs and longer-term, strategic, and transformative goals. Eschle and Maicuashca counterpose the problems and solutions as shown in Table 2.4.

Differences within transnational feminism should be acknowledged, however. Eschle and Maicuashca describe contestation over identity categories—woman, women, feminist, feminine, women’s rights activist—and the question of how to create solidarities and a “cultural system of meaning” for movement activists. They provide a pertinent description of a dispute over the hijab (Islamic covering for women), which took place in London in October 2004 (Eschle and Maicuashca 2000, 48–49; see also Moghadam
Isabella Dufour and Giroud (2007) have discussed tensions within the Marche Mondiale over sexual rights and abortion.

**Table 2.4 Transnational Feminist Critiques and Desired Alternatives**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Patriarchy, racism, neoliberal globalization as root causes of</th>
<th>Five ethical goals of transnational feminist activism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic inequality</td>
<td>Economic equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusion from decision making</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecological degradation</td>
<td>Respect for the environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bodily “nautonomy”</td>
<td>Bodily integrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>Peace</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Adapted from Eschle and Maicuashca (2010, chs. 5 and 6).*

2013, 164). Isabella Dufour and Giroud (2007) have discussed tensions within the Marche Mondiale over sexual rights and abortion.

**Case Study of Movement Building: The Women’s Learning Partnership**

The Women’s Learning Partnership for Rights, Development, and Peace (WLP) was formed in 2000 by veteran Iran-born women’s rights activist Mahnaz Afkhami. Dedicated to women’s leadership and empowerment, WLP defines itself as “a builder of networks, working with eighteen autonomous and independent partner organizations in the Global South, particularly in Muslim-majority societies, to empower women to transform their families, communities, and societies.” Its goals are to “improve the effectiveness of feminist movements in Muslim-majority societies and globally” and to help women secure human rights, contribute to the development of their communities, and “ultimately create a more peaceful world.” WLP emphasizes women’s leadership in an explicit and systematic manner, principally through the production and circulation of curricular and training manuals. The promotion of women’s human rights and the creation of egalitarian democratic societies through women’s leadership are central objectives, which the WLP seeks to achieve in part through the use of its signature publication *Leading to Choices* and other manuals and through the training of trainers in what is said to be a long-term, bottom-up, participatory process. The materials have been developed in a protracted and deliberative process, with consultation and testing across the partnership. In this way, WLP evinces the kind of democratic practices and internal democratic culture emphasized by many feminist organizations and transnational feminist networks.

Although there are non-Muslim partners in the organization, the WLP is focused on Muslim-majority countries, and it engages in an array of activities in connection with
its goals and long-term objectives for women’s leadership, human rights, and strong
civil societies in those countries. The coordinating work is chiefly carried out by the
Bethesda, Maryland–based secretariat, known as WLP-I, which is also responsible for
maintaining regular contact with the partners and updating the Web site. Its partnership
model involves a shared mission, capacity building of the partner organizations, respect
for and encouragement of autonomous development, South–South collaboration, and a
collective identity fostered by computer technology as well as workshops, institutes and
partner meetings. (See tables 2.5 and 2.6) Capacity building of its partners and strength-
ing of the partnership model is a major objective, achieved in part through the sharing
of various resources, including multimedia materials, manuals, and other publications
in various languages, as well as through technical assistance with Web development and
grant writing, financing of partner activities, training workshops, and moral/political
support and solidarity.

Virtual activism and communication are other key features. For WLP, the goals of
building capacity (strengthening women’s organizations) and building democracy
(strengthening civil society and the public sphere) are carried out in both virtual and
physical spaces. Through its own Web site and links to partner Web sites, and using blogs
and e-communications, WLP creates a virtual community for women’s human rights
and a transnational and collective identity. As an exceptionally tech-savvy TFN, WLP-I
has set up such Internet-related features as Facebook, Twitter, Flickr, and YouTube
accounts; the Our Vision & Our Voices blog; and an information technology manual
titled Making IT Our Own. During the period 2010–2012, its blog spot covered the main
WLP campaigns and the latest developments concerning those campaigns: CEDAW,
Claiming Equal Citizenship, One Million Signatures, Family Reform Law, and Equality
without Reservation. Further, it addressed challenges and major troubles in various
partner countries. The majority of the articles were authored by WLP-I staff members or
various partners; however, some were essay finalists and individuals who shared a nar-
native of their challenges and/or successes.

WLP’s blog exemplifies one goal pertaining to the use of advanced technology for
information dissemination, advocacy for change, and empowering women by giving
them voice. Further, this type of advanced social networking allows partners to con-
nect and share information on challenges, campaigns, and successes; participating in
the blog helps provide agency and a sense of empowerment. For example, a blog post
in November 2012 by “Layla” describes a session hosted by Peru’s officials of the new
Ministry of Development and Social Inclusion, whose inaugural theme was “the role of
women.” Layla was in Lima for a WLP Transnational Partners Meeting that coincided
with the annual meetings of the World Movement for Democracy. In her blog she writes
that the Peruvian ministry has programs targeting poverty, gender inequality, hunger
and malnutrition, and goals to achieve women’s empowerment and maternal and child
health. In the context of Peru’s stark social inequalities, she writes, such an approach
explicitly tying economic development to social inclusion, including the enhancement
of women’s participation and rights, could be a model for other countries. In this way
blogging becomes both a political act and a form of leadership training. At the same time,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core Institutional Goals and Long-term Objectives</th>
<th>Strategies/Activities/Campaigns</th>
<th>Outcomes; Policy and Practice Changes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To increase the number of women taking on leadership and decision-making roles at family, community, and national levels; promoting change in the leadership practices and goals toward democratic practices, ethical principles, and cultural values that enhance women’s human rights</td>
<td>Leadership training workshops and regional institutes</td>
<td>Organizational changes and approaches to leadership; more effective application of leadership skills; more women trained in ICT competence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National advocacy campaigns</td>
<td>More women in parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transnational partner meetings</td>
<td>Nigeria: Ekiti Women Politicians for Change (2011 elections)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To improve the effectiveness of civil society, especially in Muslim-majority societies, by enhancing the capacity of WLP partner organizations and by creating and strengthening networks that bolster the women’s movement</td>
<td>Creating and participating in transnational networks</td>
<td>Stronger partner organizations with regional and cross-regional ties; mutual support and solidarity, and effective response to crises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leadership &amp; ICT workshops; training of trainers institutes for civil society members</td>
<td>Coalition building in Nigeria and Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transnational partner meetings</td>
<td>More allies within civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peer-to-peer mentoring and hub model</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To help create societies governed by gender equitable norms and policies</td>
<td>Key advocacy campaigns</td>
<td>More women empowered to advocate for legislative change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong, progressive civil societies, with women exercising influence in key decision-making positions</td>
<td>Leadership and ICT trainings</td>
<td>Normative changes among young men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Youth festivals and workshops</td>
<td>Creating or joining coalitions (e.g., Spring of Dignity, Morocco)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strategic discussions at transnational partner meetings</td>
<td>Lobbying government for equal nationality rights; In Dec. 2012, CRTD-A invited by Lebanon’s Ministerial Committee to make its case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To help shape public opinion and amplify strong, moderate, and secular voices grounded in human rights</td>
<td>Key advocacy campaigns</td>
<td>Training of women and of women trainers in ICT competence and women’s human rights: changing occupational sex-typing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communication strategies including Web site development, contacts with media, ties to policy agencies and think tanks</td>
<td>Partners with national and regional prominence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support for women’s human rights across partner countries</td>
<td>WLP present in over 200 media reports (esp. WLP-I, Nigeria, Lebanon, Jordan)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: WLP-I Web site and linked Web sites: www.learningpartnership.org
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partnership</th>
<th>Member Since</th>
<th>Peer-to-peer With</th>
<th>Issues/Priorities/Campaigns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan-AIL</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td></td>
<td>Health and education needs of Afghan women, children, and communities; political awareness of Afghan women; equal rights for Afghan women.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain Women Association for Human Development</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Oman, Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Equal nationality rights for women (Claiming Equal Citizenship: The Campaign for Arab Women’s Right to Nationality)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil-Cepia</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td></td>
<td>Human rights; equal citizenship rights; sexual and reproductive health and rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon-CEDS</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>Advocacy campaign against forced early marriage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt-FWID</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine</td>
<td>Women’s legal rights; ending gender violence; implementation of CEDAW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India-CORE</td>
<td>2002–2005</td>
<td></td>
<td>Human rights; ending violence against women; economic freedom in the northeast region of India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia-Indonesia NGO</td>
<td>2004–2005</td>
<td></td>
<td>Women’s rights; ending human trafficking; rural women’s empowerment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran-various women activists</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>One Million Signatures Campaign for equal rights; ending violence against women; equal nationality rights for women; adopt CEDAW; family law reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan-SIGI/J</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Bahrain, Palestine, Egypt, Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Equal nationality rights for women; lifting of CEDAW reservations; increasing women's political participation (e.g., raising the quota, committing political parties to minimum 2 women candidates endorsed by women's NGOs); ending violence and &quot;honor crimes&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan-SWRC</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Combat human trafficking and violence; help the &quot;vulnerable layers of society&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan-CAC</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Women’s human rights; increasing women in parliament; family law reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon/CRTD-A</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Bahrain, Egypt, Nigeria, Morocco</td>
<td>Women’s rights, Claiming Equal Citizenship: The Campaign for Arab Women’s Right to Nationality; women’s economic empowerment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partnership</th>
<th>Member Since</th>
<th>Peer-to-peer With</th>
<th>Issues/Priorities/Campaigns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia-WDC</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>Ending violence against women; <em>Women's Candidacy Initiative</em> to improve women’s political participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania-AFCF</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Lift CEDAW reservations; equal nationality rights for women; women’s human rights; increasing women’s political power; women’s literacy; ending FGM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco/ADFM</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Malaysia, Mauritania, Algeria, Lebanon, Nicaragua</td>
<td>Lift CEDAW reservations; formed “Spring of Dignity” coalition of 30 associations for penal code reform (e.g., address marital rape; reform abortion ban); consolidating democracy; empowering rural women; inheritance law reform; compensation rights to collective lands; citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua-FODEM</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Brazil, Morocco</td>
<td>Women’s economic security; political empowerment; reproductive health and rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria-BAOBAB</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Cameroon, Zimbabwe, Sierra Leone, Togo</td>
<td>CEDAW, violence against women; women-friendly political candidates (registered as an election monitor in 15–16 states for 2011 elections); media gender sensitization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan-Aurat Foundation</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
<td>Violence against women and women’s political participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine—WATC</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>SIGI—Jordan</td>
<td>Violence against women; CEDAW; women’s participation in peace and security; support for SCR 1325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey/Foundation for Support of Women’s Work</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>Empowering low-income women and their cooperatives; women’s human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan-TWRC</td>
<td>2001–05</td>
<td>Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Women’s human rights and development—organization closed down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe-W.S.P.M</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>DRC, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia</td>
<td>Women’s human rights; women’s economic empowerment; education; constitutional reform</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources:* WLP-I Web site and linked Web sites: www.learningpartnership.org; author’s notes from discussions at the Transnational Partners Meeting, Jakarta, April 2010; various internal documents.
face-to-face meetings are needed to enhance such community, identity, and solidarity; WLP creates a more personalized climate of shared identity and purpose at annual meetings, trainings, and regional institutes. But WLP has harnessed the opportunities afforded by the new information and communication technologies for rapid communication and mobilization regarding Muslim women’s human rights. Since 2007–2008, for example, WLP has been active in mobilizing international support for Iranian feminists subjected to harassment, imprisonment, or prosecution by the authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran during the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

As noted, the WLP strategy of curriculum development and training has been one of its defining features. Between 2008 and 2010 the WLP carried out numerous trainings (approximately 130) throughout the partnership, from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe, and outside the partnership, in Algeria and Saudi Arabia. It also organized a large number of related activities, including an Arabic edition of the signature leadership manual Leading to Choices, as well as the ICT manual Making IT Our Own; the testing, use, and translation of Leading to Action: A Handbook for Political Activists and Organizers; three Central Asian regional workshops convened by the Kazakhstan partner; two national ICT training of trainers institutes in Jordan and Lebanon; an institute for women’s political partnership in Sierra Leone; and the testing of its manuals for youth. As reported by a Lebanese partner who had recently met with a women’s rights activist from Mongolia, the leadership manual was being used there to train young women and men. A staff member of BAOBAB, another partner that is also part of WLUMIL, noted in connection with the curriculum development activity: “With WLP we train; the model is different [from that of WLUMIL]. The manual is more hands on, and we teach the women about leadership, how to value themselves. There is a place for both [models] but I get more satisfaction from the work that I do with the manuals. They help us learn and teach about how to be citizens and what the rights are. WLP has made BAOBAB a more rounded organization.”

Through the application of its curricular materials in leadership and training workshops, the WLP seeks to encourage changes in attitudes toward, and practices of, leadership and authority; to build skills and help create a new set of women leaders; and to empower youth in a democratic, egalitarian, and ethical direction. As Ngozi Nwosu-Juba remarked during a July 2010 leadership training workshop for female undergraduates in Nigeria’s Abia state, “Seminars such as this are meant to question the kinds of inequalities and leadership in place, and to empower young women to take their rightful place as political leaders. We also have to overcome the divisions among women, to aspire to be leaders and to help move our country forward.”

The July 2010 BAOBAB workshop included individual and group exercises offering participants the opportunity to reflect on examples of participatory leadership. Learning is established using case studies of women’s leadership from around the world, through dialogue, and through application of the textual examples to local examples. What is more, an open, inclusive, and participatory learning environment is created. Many participants in the leadership training workshops would agree with a Palestinian who was quoted as saying that with the training, her understanding of leadership had
changed from “head of group” to someone who is “giving to others,” from “imposing one’s viewpoint” to communicating. Such trainings contribute to capacity building of partner organizations as well as other nationally located groups whose representatives may be in attendance at the workshops.

The Egyptian partner said of the partnership model: “The collaboration through WLP has been incredibly important. Asma [Khader, of WLP Jordan] will be coming to Egypt to help with the strategic plan and Leading to Choices workshop. Two of our facilitators went to Jordan. So the relationship is mutual.”¹¹ The representative of the Zimbabwe partner organization explained that as a result of a regional training workshop, the Zimbabwe organization adopted one of BAOBAB’s stickers: “He is an educated man, pillar of his community. . . and he beats his wife.”¹² As former WLP Executive Director Rakhee Goyal explained: “We encourage South-South help with preparation of strategic plans or addressing specific problems and challenges. So, for example, Moroccans are helping to write the draft family law in Mauritania. A Spanish-speaking Moroccan goes to Central America—that’s another example of peer-to-peer and experience-sharing. We might have a partner from the Middle East go to Central Asia, where Islamic radicalism is on the rise.”¹³ Peer mentoring, South-South ties, and participation in other networks strengthen movement building across WLP but also in the other networks where partners are active. Partners may be involved in other TFNs. For example, WLP Lebanon CRDT-A is part of WIDE and AWID, the Egyptian partner works with Marche Mondiale, and BAOBAB is active within WLUML as well as WLP. Partners may also serve on boards, such as that of the Global Fund. Thus, while partners have developed a collective identity and affinity with WLP, autonomy is respected and encouraged as a form of movement building.

**Advocacy and Movement Building**

The major WLP partner campaigns are women’s human rights; CEDAW without reservation; family law reform; and Claiming Equal Citizenship: The Campaign for Arab Women’s Right to Nationality. Other advocacy campaigns across the partnership pertain to adolescent marriage or pregnancy, forced marriage, domestic violence against women, economic rights and empowerment, Security Council Resolution 1325, solidarity with women’s rights activists in Iran facing state repression, and political participation and power. Working across the partnership, with other feminist or human rights networks and with supportive international organizations, advocacy campaigns create visibility for partner organizations while also mobilizing supporters and recruiting new activists. The advocacy campaigns also reflect local priorities. For example, abortion and sexual rights may be taken up by one partner organization but not others. Some prioritize economic rights and empowerment more than others; they decide on priorities and how to devise strategies to avoid backlash. Most of the partners, however, reside in
countries that have experienced conflict, and thus peacebuilding, human security, and women’s security are shared concerns and objectives. As recently as March 2013, and in concert with the annual meetings of the UN’s Commission on the Status of Women, WLP organized a roundtable discussion on “human security as the missing link between women’s rights, conflict, and peace.”

The advocacy campaigns have led to a number of policy changes. (See Table 2.6) For example, in Bahrain a new law was introduced to eliminate fees for health and education services for non-nationals. In Morocco Soulaliyatyes women won the right to benefit from collective lands. In Mauritania women’s groups are promoting a new bill to end violence against women in all its forms. An intensive media campaign was launched by WLP-I to support Iranian feminists facing harassment and repression by the states and to support Iranian activists during the postelection violence, and solidarity rallies were held in Kyrgyzstan. Progress has been made in countries of the Middle East and North Africa on the campaign to lift all reservations to CEDAW; indeed, the relevant partners agreed that the MENA campaign for CEDAW ratification would be a good model for the United States. In Lebanon the equal nationality campaign continues, using Leading to Choices to help women become campaigners. According to the Lebanese partner, extensive use has been made of the media—CNN, BBC, Fox News, CBC [Canadian], al-Jazeera—“we have been effective in that respect. But in terms of impact, politically it has not been successful. This raises questions about how to measure impact: social/public or in terms of government action. We certainly have succeeded in raising awareness and visibility.”

Another promising example of change in practice comes from the WLP Afghan partner. Sakeena Yacoobi, director of the Afghanistan Institute of Learning, said: “Participatory methodology teaches you critical thinking; you ask questions and you are also organized. When you go through this methodology it changes you and your way of thinking; you look at things differently; you communicate differently; you socialize differently. It has helped my organization to be stronger, better, and so on. You feel self-confident; and we feel we are better and have a lot to offer.” She added that hundreds of women have been trained in democracy and women’s rights. “We took about 26 young women and men to a workshop in India about human rights and human dignity. They came back excited and mobilized dozens of other youth. We are trying to raise people’s understanding of issues of governance as well as rights. How to vote for the right leader; what to expect of a political leader; how to exercise leadership at various levels.”

Policy changes in the Islamic Republic of Iran have been stymied by a recalcitrant state, but there have been normative and practical changes in organizational dynamics. Speaking about the changes that the women’s rights movement in Iran experienced in this decade, feminist leader Mahboubeh Abbasgholizadeh (now in exile in the United States) said:

Around 2002 we began to get interested in the transnational feminist movement. We were inspired by WLUMUL, then by WLP. We tried the Paolo Friere method of critical pedagogy but it did not work in the field. The WLP approach was much more
effective. How to reach people better was what the WLP manuals taught us. At one time I was a professional trainer; WLP methodology was great. The AWID meeting in Bangkok [2005] was transformative; it created an earthquake, because the participants came back and said “you are dictatorial!” There was a revolt and explosion after they came back. But I liked it; I think the young generation really changed us.19

The BAOBAB, Afghan, and Iranian examples point to another promising trend in practice or normative change that is promoted by WLP: working with youth. The work with youth is in one sense a cross-cutting approach in the curriculum development and training, capacity-building, and advocacy strategies. In another sense, however, it is key to the successful realization of some goals and long-term objectives: increasing the number of women taking on leadership and decision-making roles at family, community, and national levels; promoting a qualitative change in the practice of leadership and the nature of leadership goals that support democratic practices, ethical principles, and cultural values that enhance women’s human rights; improving the effectiveness of civil society; achieving societies governed by gender-equitable norms and policies; shaping public opinion; and amplifying strong, moderate, and secular voices grounded in human rights. The work with youth also is necessary for generational continuity and leadership succession. A Youth Tech Festival took place in early June 2009 in Amman, Jordan, with the participation of some fifty-six young women and thirty-six young men who learned and shared strategies for using technology to advance human rights campaigns. The manual for adolescents in Arabic and English, Yes... I Can, was tested in workshops in the Middle East with hundreds of participants. It reflects the WLP philosophy that leadership is not just about power and money; it should be primarily about “respect, belief in one’s ability, motivation to change, appreciation for small steps, learning from sharing, respecting different viewpoints, finding commonalities and building on them” (WLP 2011, xv).

In all these ways, WLP exemplifies the kinds of activities and strategies of TFNs delineated in this chapter: creating, activating, or joining global networks in their struggle for gender justice by mobilizing pressure against social forces that undermine women’s status; participating in multilateral and intergovernmental political arenas; acting and agitating across borders to enhance public awareness and encourage public participation; and networking with each other. The partnership model and the activities of TFNs in general arguably demonstrate that in the new century, the balance of conceptual and political feminist power has shifted from North to South.

Conclusions

According to Karen Beckwith (2000, 437–438), “Feminist movements share a gendered power analysis of women’s subordination and contest political, social, and other power arrangements of domination and subordination on the basis of gender. Note that this definition is silent on other power inequalities, leaving open the conceptual possibility
of feminist movements that are highly class-constrained, racist, or nationalist. The extent to which feminist movements challenge inequalities and powerlessness of other subordinated groups is an empirical question. Though it is true that many (though certainly not all) nationally based feminist movements have been myopic about women's oppression rooted in class, racial, ethnic, or religious inequalities, the preceding analysis and the case study demonstrate that transnational feminist activism, and especially the TFNs that have formed since the 1980s, are almost by definition internationalist and thus tend to challenge such inequalities and powerlessness affecting various categories of women or women in different countries.

Transnational feminism is characterized by a critique of social and gender inequalities and a set of strategies to enhance women's rights within the family and society. The strategies involve networks engaged in research, lobbying, and advocacy—as well as public protest and cross-border humanitarianism and solidarity—for women's human rights and gender equality. The Internet has facilitated feminist advocacy and solidarity campaigns, helping women connect and share information, plan and coordinate activities more rapidly, and mobilize effectively and extensively. Transnational feminist activism is also distinguished by nonviolence, democratic practices, and internationalism.

How has transnational feminist activism affected global knowledge, power, and social change? To the extent that TFNs include educators, journalists, and bloggers, the critiques, values, and goals of transnational feminism have been diffused across the globe and as such have contributed to global knowledge. Transnational feminist activism also has transformed the WSF, in that many more workshops are devoted to women's rights issues than was the case in its early years, and women are arguably the majority of participants. As noted, TFNs have had policy successes in some areas, influencing UN programming and by extension certain national policies. And throughout the world, women have achieved some of the key goals of the global women's rights agenda: closing the gender gap in educational attainment, obtaining quotas for greater access to political power and other forms of decision making, and pushing through laws to punish violence against women.

And yet TFNs exist in a global environment still characterized by neoliberal capitalism, militarism, and patriarchy. The lobbying and direct action of groups such as Code Pink and MADRE have not affected the astronomical military spending of the United States, nor to mention US drone strikes against “terrorists” in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen, which have frequently killed women and children. SCR 1325 has not been applied in the conflict situations of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Israel and Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan; the sheer scale of the problems in those countries, which reflect the profound contradictions of international relations as well as the persistence of patriarchy, would seem to surpass the capacity of transnational feminism activism. Across the world women, including self-described feminists, have taken part in Occupy movements and in numerous anti-austerity protests, but have not been able to change power relations in what remains an unequal and unjust world system. Contemporary globalization may have created unprecedented opportunities for organizing and mobilizing across borders, but the persistence of the interstate system, led by a hegemonic power,
hinders the more progressive work of those institutions of global governance within which transnational feminists have had some influence. Nonetheless, as a concerted set of ideas and a movement that it is premised on a critique of women’s subordination to men and a call for equality and societal transformation, transnational feminism doubtless will continue activism on local, national, and global levels, deploying the strategies of nonviolence, democratic deliberation, and coalition building.

Notes

1. Scholars have debated globalization’s origins and periodization, with some arguing that earlier historical versions included ancient empires, and others identifying its origins with the emergence of the capitalist world system in the late fifteenth century, the European “great transformation” of the mid-eighteenth century, and the colonial period up to World War I. Others, however, situate it more recently, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, with the expansion of neoliberal economic ideology and policy. This post-Keynesian, postsocialist era is marked by privatization, price and trade liberalization, flexibility of labor markets and attendant decline of labor unions, and the prominence of financial capital—all of which have been accelerated by the new computer technologies (see summary in Moghadam 2005, 21–23; Steger 2009; Steger and Roy 2010). In my view, distinctive features of contemporary globalization are both the unprecedented global spread of capitalist relations of production and the geographic scope of responses by transnational social movements. That is, in earlier periods of globalization, a single economic system did not encompass the globe as it does today, as there were many modes of production and types of social formations; although transnational networks did exist, such as those for women’s rights or abolition, they were more limited in scope and were based primarily in Europe and North America. Only the socialist/communist movement, which began in the mid-1800s, can be said to have had the global reach of contemporary transnational networks and social movements.

2. Such divisions could be found in developing countries, too, although a socialist orientation within the women’s rights movement was arguably more dominant in Third World countries than was the case in, for example, the United States.

3. For a good description of the Feminist Encounters/Dialogues at the WSF, see Eschle and Maicuashca (2010), especially ch. 3.

4. Author’s observations; calculations from the Tunis WSF program

5. This discussion is based in part on the author’s 2010 evaluation of WLP-I and subsequent research through December 2012.


17. Focus group interview (Afghanistan, Iran, Malaysia), Jakarta, April 12, 2010.
19. Focus group interview (Afghanistan, Iran, Malaysia), Jakarta, April 12, 2010.
20. The World Social Forum of March 2013, which took place in Tunis, was launched by a Women’s Assembly and a march for women’s rights (author’s observations).
21. Focus on single women, single mothers, widows, the poor, and the unemployed, as well as on women invalids, women in need of retraining, and youth without professional education.

References


A transnational feminist movement needs to be led by women from the South, and to be aware of and concerned about the negative impacts of neo-liberalism.

(Peggy Antrobus, Barbados)

The major difficulty is to create transnationalism that is not just at the top, so to speak. Beyond this, there needs to be much more work—theoretical and organizational—on how women can actually support each other’s movements in an effective way that does not play into colonialism.

(Linda Martin Alcoff, United States)

Precisely because the divide is expanding, it is imperative that the feminist movement at least retain solidarities, that it give up forever the notion of a so called first world and a so called second or third world. . . . My sense is that feminism needs to be alive to that crucial thing, difference, and it needs to battle against all kinds of hierarchies, it needs to build solidarities where they are necessary, and to continue to work separately where that is important.

(Urvashi Butalia, India)

Possibly, one of the ways to generate transnational solidarity within feminism is to take advantage of the internal fissures of neoliberalism in order to erode its foundations, that is, its way of administering politics and economy by constructing fragmented global markets. The possibility of transforming these failures into strengths for an active global society can be an opportunity for feminists of color.

(Mara Viveros-Vigoya, Colombia)
Mapping transnational feminist engagements

Introduction

As antiracist, anticapitalist feminists from the global South, now living in the United States and committed to the politics of solidarity and radical antiracist, feminist knowledge production, we embarked on this ambitious project wanting to map transnational feminist engagements by talking with key feminist scholar-activists with decades of political/intellectual involvement in feminist movements and knowledge production. While we knew this could be only a particular (and partial) story, we were interested in a generative dialogue and wanted to map a critical feminist geography of knowledge production, organizing, and solidarity building across multiple layers of difference in the current neoliberal context. The quotes at the outset of the chapter encapsulate some of the themes and dilemmas that emerged in our survey of a small number of feminist scholar-activists: the importance and difficulties of transnational feminist praxis in the context of neoliberalism; the politics of difference; and the coloniality of North–South divides and the radical necessity of building solidarities across multiple borders. There is a vast literature on feminist movements and on feminist knowledge production in different sites (Alvarez 2000; Brenner 2003; Compt et al 2008; Mama 2004; McClennen 2008–2009); however, we were especially interested in how our respondents crafted and reflected on feminist realities on the ground—basically mapping how feminist knowledge production over the last few decades is connected to the place-based lived realities of feminist praxis.

To this end, we surveyed thirty-three feminist scholar-activists from Asia, South America, the Caribbean, North Africa, Europe, and North America. Most of our respondents have histories of organizing and scholarship that date back to the 1970s—and each and every one continues to be committed to the urgencies of feminist politics in the contemporary context of neoliberalism and increasing impoverishment and violence against women around the globe. Some, like Nawal el Saadawi and Angela Davis, have been involved in radical anticapitalist, feminist social movements since the 1960s, while others, like Himani Bannerji, Islah Jad, Zillah Eisenstein, Teresa Cordova, and Honor Ford-Smith, describe their feminist genealogies in the context of organizing in location-specific feminist struggles of the 1970s and 1980s. Our respondents include women in their forties to eighties in age. Like the two of us, many of our respondents are anticapitalist, antiracist feminists with a history of organizing across racial, sexual, national, and religious divides. Since this group of scholar-activists is based within our own interconnected transnational feminist communities, we cannot claim that this is a representative sample of any sort. For instance, while we have a broad representation of feminists from the Caribbean, South Asia, United States, and Canada, we have only a couple from North Africa. While antiracist white feminists (Eisenstein, Pratt, and Peake) are key participants here, the generational specificity of this collective has as much to do with our own networks as with the significance of the historical transformations in feminist struggle (from the 1960s to the present) that many of our respondents participated in and indeed led.
In this chapter we honor the voices, theorizations, and multiple genealogies of our feminist interlocutors, constructing a dialogue that foregrounds the similarities and the differences in our collective thinking and praxis as it has evolved over the decades. We were interested in a collective mapping rather than a comprehensive review of feminist genealogies so we could understand how far women have come in creating a better world for themselves in this phase of capitalism and so that we can get a sense of what feminists across the globe are thinking about the challenges we face at this historical juncture. We thus asked our respondents four questions designed to understand how they view the last thirty to forty years of this collective feminist activism and how they see the knowledge that it has produced as influencing their thinking and current work.

We posed deliberate questions about neoliberalism and the future of feminist activism:

1. When we talk of the production of feminist knowledge, we understand that it includes the notion of working through the intersections of race, class, gender, and sexuality to configure a different kind of feminist praxis that is more relevant to women’s lives globally. From your knowledge of the communities in which you’ve worked, what is your assessment of how this has worked on the ground?

2. In reflecting on your work as a feminist over the last two or three decades, how would you say your thinking has evolved on the relevance of feminism as praxis in economically marginalized or communities of color?

3. What do you see as the challenges ahead in relation to neoliberalism and the obstacle it poses to solidarity among feminists of color on a global scale?

4. Considering the North–South divide that seems to be expanding, what do you imagine a transnational feminist movement needs to look like in this era of extreme conservatism in neoliberalism to be effective?

Needless to say, our survey elicited deep, complex, thoughtful, and challenging responses to the questions. And while it is impossible to construct a single map or story of our collective feminist genealogies, it is in fact possible to identify important, parallel narratives of feminist activism. Rather than focus on each of these four questions, we have chosen to explicate one particular thread that runs through all responses: the anatomies of dispossession and violence in the age of neoliberalism and the particular, connected challenges this poses to feminists located in various geopolitical sites around the globe. It is this particular contemporary context that illustrates most clearly the sociopolitical analyses and feminist knowledge production mirrored in different corners of the globe and allows us to sketch a materialist map of transnational feminist engagements and possibilities of an ethical and just solidarity across borders based on attentiveness to power and historical specificities and differences.

The chapter is divided into two large sections, with a concluding discussion that focuses on two site-specific radical social movements that emerged around the same time in late 2012. The first section discusses how feminists across geopolitical sites confront the growth and consolidation of neoliberal states and transnational processes of exploitation. The key question it addresses is how feminists understand, engage, and
resist the multiple violences of neoliberal cultures in their own place-based struggles for gender justice.

The second section looks at how various scholar-activists define feminism for themselves and in their own locations; their thoughts on the significance of difference and power; and the North–South divide and their reflections on building and sustaining solidarities across colonial, racial, sexual, class, and national borders. Throughout the chapter, rather than summarize or edit responses, we have chosen to quote at length from our respondents. The text we want to create is one where the dialogue between us all as feminist scholar-activists is primary, not the Carty–Mohanty interpretation of the responses of our sisters and comrades. Given the key historical and current role of many of our respondents in local and transnational social movements and knowledge production, we honor their voices in their entirety, creating not a seamless third-person narrative but a capacious, conversational text that moves between geopolitical spaces and different voices, between histories and cultures of feminist organizing.

The chapter’s conclusion focuses on two recent site-specific social movements that emerged in late 2012 in India and Canada (Bekhauf Azadi and Idle No More, respectively). An analysis is offered of these ongoing women-and-feminist led social movements as exemplary movements confronting gender injustice and neoliberal practices, inspiring the transnational solidarities that are key to antiracist and anticapitalist feminist struggle at the present time.

For the last four decades, feminists have been confronting a series of neoliberal policies by states in both the global North and South that have been wreaking havoc on women’s lives across race, class, sexuality, and ethnic divides. Neoliberalism—an ideology and a political and economic practice—is marked by an increased concentration of international finance capital, the so-called liberation of capital markets that turned over every aspect of the economy to free-market operations, the widening of free-trade policies that benefit only the (already privileged in the already) wealthy countries, and the celebration of individual entrepreneurial freedoms that ultimately lead to the strengthening of private property rights. It is more or less a celebration of capital markets being left on their own to function without government regulation. It gained traction in the mid- to late 1970s with a tightening of the reins on liberal democracies in the North, specifically their social programs and the loosening of regulations on their capital markets. This occurred simultaneously with the (often violent, forced) dissolution of socialist states in the global South, specifically in Chile, Tanzania, Argentina, Nicaragua, and even smaller countries like Jamaica and Grenada in the Caribbean. The rise of these socialist states was attributed to Keynesian economics and political policies that encouraged too much government regulation in the market and allowed too much power to organized labor and social movements such as antipoverty struggles, women’s rights, civil rights, and Black Power both in the North and South.

In the global South, they followed on the heels of anticolonial struggles and created nervous tension in the US government and particularly in capital markets in the North. The demise of these social movements came with the rise of neoliberalism as a doctrine that was embraced and run by the Ronald Reagan regime in Washington, D.C., and the
Margaret Thatcher regime in London. Both the United States and Britain implemented policies that saw the state embark on a new mission to enshrine the security and longevity of neoliberalism. Unlike the state in more liberal phases of capitalism, the neoliberal state bears no commitment to be even present as partially socially responsible for its citizenry. Rather, the belief is that individuals must be allowed and encouraged to market their entrepreneurial skills in an environment that is marked by free markets, free trade, and strong property rights that will encourage further growth and accumulation of capital. In this environment the role of the state is to protect and guarantee the value of money, property, and markets, not the wellbeing of individuals or individual rights (Harvey 2005).

This is the environment in which feminists in both the North and the South have been functioning over the last thirty to forty years as we have watched all areas of life and the resources for human wellbeing fall under the control of the market. Market principles govern women’s existence even though so much of women’s lives cannot be packaged neatly for the market. Most of women’s necessary labor, though commodified as part of the reproduction in social production, is not as easily quantifiable because it takes place in the family that private institution that fuels capitalism. It is feminists’ assessment of and responses to these forced neoliberal market changes onto women’s lives that we seek to address in this chapter. Across the globe the gains that women have made have been championed by feminists who have been at the forefront of women’s struggles and mobilization demanding those gains. Of course we have been there as well when states introduced neoliberal policies that have been hacking away at those rights.

We have been witnessing conservative extremists capturing control of more and more states in the global North, just as we have seen capital markets collapsing as a result of policies that extremist state managers have put in place. It means that many of the experiences that were once known only to the poorest populations in the South are now visible in the North as well Sassen (1998). A climate has developed whereby more and more of the gains in women’s rights are being seriously threatened as neoliberal states appropriate gender discourses in their attempts to explain away or justify the erasure of women’s rights. In this hostile environment, we find women of color creating deeper solidarities across borders and at the intersections of color, class, and ethnicity to more effectively forge a battle against the attack of neoliberalism.

Much of the transnational feminist knowledge production and on-the-ground organizing by women of color critiques the feminist and other social movements. These critiques have impacted and changed the larger sociopolitical landscape as well as intellectual contexts and have thereby transformed the feminist movement itself. Indeed, the questions being asked today reflect transnational feminist theorizing that is directly

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1 We refer to the State as an institutional apparatus that includes the government, the judiciary, and the bureaucracy (the civil service). The state elite is the body made up of the directorships of all these institutions. We are used to assuming that society is controlled and run by the government but that role is actually carried out by the state. Much of the state's desires however, are carried out by the government, thus the government is often seen as the most crucial institution of the state.
linked to and often emerges from community engagement. This essay focuses on the knowledges produced by transnational feminists that engage globalization and neoliberalism as factors that have impacted women’s lives in tangible ways and have pushed them into deeper organizing for change.

**Confronting Neoliberal Culture and State Practices**

Feminist scholars have produced a great deal of knowledge that engages neoliberalism as another phase of capital concentration within the ever-transmutable production system of capitalism. The exception at this particular moment in history is the intensification and expanding role of the market in all aspects of social life and how so much of it impacts women’s lives most severely for all the obvious reasons. That scholarship exposes the neoliberal state both in the North and the South as most pernicious for women’s organizing because it is so adept at appropriating the discursive elements of those struggles and undermining the actual attempts to forge a politics of change.\(^6\) It means that women must engage these challenges in their different locales understanding that their sociality is not predicated on what comes out of Washington or London, for example, but by holding their nation states more accountable for the conditions and quality of life in their countries. This requires creating solidarity across difference and national boundaries to have an effective transnational impact. Solidarity in this sense requires an understanding of the fact that neoliberal culture in the North can have a very different meaning than it does in the global South. Too often in the global North we can lose sight of what women are enduring in the South and get caught up in a discourse of the North advocating unworkable solutions for the South. On this question of challenges that neoliberalism poses for feminists of color globally, Sara Ahmed draws attention to differential effects of neoliberalism:

> I think one of the main challenges is to dispel the myth of the West as liberator. . . . I think our task in creating solidarity is to open our ears rather than our mouths. Whilst I think privatization and atomization are major problems, I also think “neoliberalism” is often used too quickly in the West to diagnose everything. I think we need to become aware that how our own diagnostic languages might be part of the problem. One of my interests, for instance, is in how individualism is often identified as a conservative ideology; sure it can be but so too can community (defined as the restriction of sympathy to our kind; class loyalty, patriotism; even multiculturalism can all be understood in these terms). I think it can even be a Western idea that the individual is a Western idea. So while I am for a defense of the public, of the commons, for instance, I think this has become too easy and too glib within the Western academy. When you have been owned, being your own can be radical. I think feminism of color is more attuned to this radical history of own-ness than others.
This provocative idea speaks forthrightly to what for many may be a discomforting truth in feminism—that historical differences across class, like race but more so than sexuality, engender privileges of which feminists must remain cognizant. It is this awareness of the multiple negative roles of neoliberalism and feminist commitment to engage in a praxis of counter vigilance that will create solidarity among feminists across these divides. Linda Peake, a white antiracist feminist who has worked for over two decades with the women’s organization Red Thread in Guyana and who understands these struggles all too well, expresses a statement of solidarity with Ahmed as manifested outside the academy:

Neoliberalism has also reinforced divides outside the academy through the deepening of access, or not, to liberties and privileges. Many feminist activists in the Caribbean have been forced, for economic survival reasons, to become increasingly engaged in the [nongovernmental organization] NGO-ization of development. As an example I again quote from the chapter by Karen (de Souza) and myself [Peake and de Souza 2010, p. 112]: “Feminist academics in the North have privileges; even when they are not equally distributed they are likely to be available in greater supply in a country such as Canada relative to those for feminists of all classes in a country such as Guyana. These privileges come from political liberties that include the freedom of speech and freedom from persecution; from economic liberties that include freedom from hunger, homelessness and poverty; and from social liberties that include access to facilities, education and training, as well as access to information, and often access to monies. In addition to these privileges, it has also been argued that the increasing institutionalization of feminist academic research in departments of Women’s Studies has resulted in a situation which serves to profit individual women’s careers rather than promoting social change. The academic feminist label, for many activist organisations, now has the baggage of careerism, of maintaining the status quo, and of rising to the top rather than aiming for transformation.”

Failure to recognize these differences between women as feminists can be the real hair in the eyeball so to speak of any attempt at true global feminist solidarity. Indeed, it can serve to create divides among women in the same country and for sure across national boundary lines.

Caribbean scholar Rhoda Reddock speaks of the need for a feminist political economy critique in understanding the impact of neoliberalism on economies of the global South:

In my opinion, this approach which was foisted on the South through structural adjustment policies and [the World Treaty Organization] WTO and [the General Agreement on Trade in Services] GATS has now backfired, so we will see how this will unfold in the future. A transnational feminist movement would have to be reactivated that once more incorporates feminist political economy into its analysis. This approach must also raise questions about the continuous overconsumption on which these economies are based and the impact through the criminalization and destruction of communities, which is certainly the case in many parts
of the English-speaking Caribbean and Latin America. The impact of these developments on women, men, and social and gender relations in our societies have been devastating.

In response to the same question on the impact of the neoliberal culture on organizing and solidarity work by feminists of color, Beverly Bain, speaking of the Canadian context, writes:

The neoliberal agenda continues to have severe economic, social, and political impacts on the lives of women of color globally. The restructuring of capital has meant that women of color have seen gains and losses. Women have gained access to jobs that are unionized in the service sector such as teaching and nursing. However, with job restructuring and downsizing, women are facing the wrath of governments that are intent on breaking the backs of those unions. Women—in this case marginalized women of color—are forced to take jobs that involve long working hours that are part time and irregular without benefits or the possibility of a pension.

The Federal government under [Stephen] Harper in Canada has introduced severe cuts to the Women's Program, which provides funding to women's groups. One of the major contradictory effects of the neoliberal agenda to feminism and feminist and women of color organizing is the incorporation of our activism into state institutions. Here I want to talk a bit about working in the violence against women's movement for the past thirty years. As part of a group of feminists of color working on the ground to end violence against women, we were struggling simultaneously inside the black and color patriarchal communities to recognize gender and in the white feminist movement to recognize the intersections of gender and race. As black women and women of color, in struggle we have always occupied the insider-outsider position in the Canadian women's movement and in the nation. This position has been placed upon us but is often embraced as a way to mediate the deleterious effects of black and other forms of nationalism, racism, patriarchy, and sexism.

In the struggle to make known the differing impacts of sexual and physical violence in the lives of women of color, we saw these experiences culturalized in institutions and treated as extraneous to the experiences of violence and sexual assault of white women. In fact, while we as black women and women of color were successful in bringing an intersectional analysis based on gender, race, and class to the antiviolence movement, the discourse of the black, brown, and native rapists continue to drive the antiviolence agenda within the women's movement and institutionally.

Speaking in a similar vein and most cogently about the seductiveness of neoliberal culture in undermining the feminist agenda, Urvashi Butalia shows how the practices manifest in a similar way in the South:

Neoliberalism is very seductive and all pervasive. One of the challenges is its emphasis on the individual and on individual achievement. For feminists and women in our parts of the world it also offers access—through the media and in other ways—to a dream world of consumer goods where access to these often becomes a symbol of empowerment and consumer access changes and often replaces the language of human rights. Suddenly, human rights becomes passé.
Himani Bannerji follows up with the incisive cautionary note that we should be mindful of the destructive features and challenges of neoliberalism:

The challenges ahead in relation to neoliberalism must be taken up without being lost in the discourses of freedom, democracy and difference at a superficial level. It is assumed, for instance, that pleasure and self-fulfillment, dreams and desires, might be acquired through the market without admitting that the very form of the market destroys the quality of our pleasures and fulfillment.

Two other challenges that neoliberalism presents us with are war and dispossession or “primitive accumulation.” Both involve vast numbers of people, a substantial portion being women and children. Militarization is the coercive violent dimension of neoliberalism, where any barrier to corporate markets must be mercilessly crushed. We see examples of this in the cases of Iraq, Afghanistan, and different countries in Africa. How are we to deal with these situations as feminists? The issue of primitive accumulation or dispossession of millions over the world as a result of encroachment by giant capitalist enterprises is also a gift of neoliberalism, since the state’s responsibility for the citizens is continuously erased in favor of private enterprise, causing loss of lives and livelihoods of small producers, poor workers, and landless people in the agricultural sector... Is the anti-state approach of Northern feminism, which recommends the growth of the private sector or inserts itself as organizers and service providers for people who are victims of land grabs and other disposessions, an adequate response to all this? To create solidarity among feminists requires an understanding of and agreement among feminists of both North and South regarding capitalism and neoliberalism. With respect to the role of the state we need to see in what way it can empower the people as opposed to empowering capital. Feminists need to ponder their attitude to social and state formations.

In this current phase of capitalism we witness the state facilitating transnational neoliberal agendas both in the global North and South with policies that seek to undo all of the feminists’ gains of the last four decades. Feminists are aware of this and understand how these actions make the North–South divide so much less significant today than it has ever been. We understand that solidarity across this divide is crucial. Therefore, in their articulations of organizing and struggle to combat the state’s agenda to undermine their activities through the likes of, for example, hiring feminists to advance its own goals, feminists ponder mechanisms to get the focus back on questions and issues of social justice. Teresa Cordova captures this well as she speaks to how much the state’s actions threaten solidarity:

The challenges ahead involve, first, the realization that the neoliberal push is a powerful one. The logic of capital accumulation, the privatization of governments, and trade liberalization are, by their very nature, exclusive. Pushing people out of the formal labor force while concurrently destroying their subsistence and localized economies exemplifies this

The biggest challenges: How do we push against these powerful forces? How do we survive in the face of those forces? Most especially, how do we create alternatives that push against the logic of those dominant forces? How do we ensure that those
alternatives are based in values of community, love, and the collective? From those values will stem justice and wellbeing.

A threat to our solidarity is that if we fail to understand the logic and dynamics of domination and how they get played out, we are more likely to perpetuate it, even among ourselves. An even bigger threat to our solidarity is if we forget to love one another.

Angela Davis directs us to some of the more sinister though astute actions of the state in both the North and South that can seriously threaten global feminist solidarity and organizing, if feminists fail to recognize that the neoliberal state can be very seductive in its pernicious activities to quash imagined enemies. In the structuring of an antiracist and anticapitalist feminist engagement, feminists cannot afford to lose sight of the fact that the state is the real enemy here:

Liberal feminism—in the twenty-first century we can say neoliberal feminism—has always coexisted with variants of feminism that have been more critical of capitalism and of the state on which capitalism depends. In this century, we have witnessed unabashed manifestations of what we might call imperial feminism. The US wars on Iraq and Afghanistan were in part justified by the putative need to protect women from cultures that supposedly thrived on the oppression of women. [This of course led to] imperialist wars to save women from their oppressors. The state of Israel has gone so far as to engage in public relations campaigns that portray Israel as the most democratic country in the region because it respects women’s equality and because it is a safe haven for [lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender] LGBT communities. Palestinian Queers for BDS [Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions] have spoken back with their critiques of this process of “pinkwashing,” which reveals the shallowness of the democracy Israel purports to represent and the neoliberal appropriation and domestication of feminist social movements. The feminist dictum that “the personal is political” acquires new meaning under the dominance of neoliberalism and global solidarities among feminist movements that are determined to resist the seductions of neoliberalism will have to be cautiously constructed.

Joan French speaks specifically to actions of the state that underscore regional and class differences in the very diverse feminist movement. She argues that these can obscure women’s view of the need for global feminist solidarity across differences and across the North–South divide:

Because of the diversity of the feminist movement, there is divergence and contention, and huge differences will exist. There is little common ground between the woman struggling to join the army to go to Iraq, whatever her color, even if she considers this a feminist action, and the women in Pakistan joining their efforts in support of a transgender candidate whom they assess will represent their interests as small agricultural producers as well as women—though the latter may empathize with the former’s income-earning motives. At the same time, the alienation and marginalization of communities (in particular the youth and women within them)—a result of neoliberal structural adjustment and related economic reorientation policies—has affected all countries to differing degrees. The counterstruggle is on
everywhere, and it includes the women of the feminist movement in processes that are often complex and riddled with contradictions and ebbs and flows of consensual action, as in Egypt. The parallels in consequence, despite the difference in geographical location, allow for common cause if the origin of the problem is adequately identified and if the basic principles of an alternative founded in equal rights and equity are clear and the specific insertion of each country or area into the global economy is analyzed from these perspectives and guides the continuing struggle. The differences cannot be avoided—struggle inevitably involves some confrontation and evolution in the interplay of differences. The important thing to note is that so far feminists have not, like men, sought to kill each other to dominate, with the exception of those who join the armies of destruction. Feminists generally have developed the use of other methods, often still necessarily confrontational but more humane . . . and in my view more likely in the long run to create a ubiquitous and more effective movement for change. In this area of strategies of feminism, little has been produced for the Caribbean, with the possible exception of the work of Rhoda Reddock, a foundation member of the Caribbean movement. This remains an area for more specific knowledge production in terms of strategies, their successes and failures, and the lessons learned.

The negative impact of state policies on women’s lives in particular, specifically in the creation and sustenance of war and the knowledge production and organizing that feminists continue to mount in the face of the challenges of annihilation, cannot be overstated. In speaking to this, Aida Hernandez points out:

I think that besides the economic and political impact that neoliberal globalization is having in the global South, and more specifically in the lives of poor women and children, we are also currently subjected to the hegemony of military powers that have not only massacred hundreds of children, women, and elderly but are also endangering the survival of humanity by provoking an arms escalation in the name of disarmament, by violating all forms of international legality in the name of democracy, and by legitimizing the use of violence in the name of peace. (See the military intervention in Afghanistan, Palestine, and the narcotics war in Latin America).

While looking at the need for global solidarity among feminists including those of color and the challenges being posed to the latter by neoliberalism around the globe and while being mindful of hierarchies within difference that feminists must address as obstacles to solidarity, Zillah Eisenstein states:

The challenges of neoliberalism to women of color across the globe are part of the privatized depoliticized struggles of the moment. Women of all colors, including white women, are becoming poorer while a few women from each color also are becoming more privileged and wealthy. I think the greatest challenges stem from the complex differentiated experiences of women of all colors and the new class inequities and alliances that are developing within any category of womanhood. Allies need more critique and recognition of the new differences being created among women across the globe. And this happens despite geographical divisions. I am not sure North–South holds as a helpful organizing tool today in the way it did earlier.
Reflecting on the differences among feminists that we can agree stand in some ways to aid the neoliberal state in coopting feminist struggles thwarting solidarity among feminists who seek to challenge neoliberalism, Honor Ford Smith posits some possibility in answer to the question. She suggests that feminists begin:

Building and articulating visions, analyses and narratives of struggle, justice, hope and possibility that folks can support BROADLY through alliances and supportive networking as communities of interest while remaining attentive to hierarchies of difference and differences in needs locally and globally and in all ways.

[It is necessary also to] identify and work toward specific struggles on issues that folks can support from a variety of sites without fragmenting into isolated pockets. . . .

She continues that we can forge solidarities among feminists globally by

Keeping questions of redistribution of wealth and alternative economies central to social movements and integrating these with other concerns—especially in North America where identity politics seems to be a privileged ingredient for progressive mobilization and where the notion of alternatives to capitalism seem to be extremely marginal.

Leila Farah also points to issues of difference among feminists that need to be engaged to challenge neoliberalism. She notes some resistance to this challenge and the implications:

Building global solidarity for feminists is challenged by the separation between those who cannot, will not, or don't know how to undo their own privilege and relocating what is considered knowledge and resistance outside of academe and US-based activist circles. Since all institutions are complicit with the neoliberal project in many ways, those who straddle academic lives and employ feminist praxis within communities outside of the hallowed halls often are positioned to act as intermediaries, breaking the age binaries of formal and informal education and knowledge production bearing a great burden in repositioning and reconciling these multiple spaces. Unfortunately, that increasingly seems to be women of color who are non–US-based originally, who are fighting to deepen US theorizing intersectionality beyond the demographical categories promulgated in US feminist spaces [witness the discussions at the 2012 National Women's Studies Association Annual Conference for example].

There are many levels on which neoliberal culture is being crafted and utilized by the state, sometimes with the unintentional complicity of feminists, who serve to undermine and in some cases chip away at long-standing antiracist principles and insurgent knowledges that feminists of color developed. Indeed, as we observe the neoliberal state in the North implement severe cutbacks in public education, social services, health care, and other programs that benefit the poor and women and children most, we have seen a changing landscape that threatens to render feminist organizing as ineffective. The material conditions of women's lives are being transformed by the neoliberal culture and state. Also, the ideological underpinnings of the insurgent knowledges legitimizing
challenges that brought about improvements in those conditions are being changed as well in ways that threaten the very foundation of radical feminist organizing. The impact of neoliberalism on social movements is as destructive as feminists have long feared. In recent times, we have witnessed the state either co-opting some of the organizing feminist struggles against it or entirely appropriating the language of resistance to many of its policies and practices that have been intensifying the hardships of the poor, especially among women, while simultaneously increasing poverty.

At the same time, in some regions of the North, as feminist activists have found funding for their organizations drying up, the state in these regions has taken to the practice of employing feminist activists in their capacity as organizers but has managed in the process to neutralize their agenda. Beverly Bain notes the poignancy of this in the case of Canada as she writes about the obstacles and challenges neoliberalism poses to feminist organizing. She describes the difficulty of feminist of color organizing under neoliberalism with loss of funding and the suspicion that feminists from Arab and South Asian descent are potential terrorists:

The usurpation of feminist language such as “empowerment” and “change the shift from anti-racism discourse to diversity discourse” have created tensions and made the work of color among feminists of color working inside state institutions and those in feminist of color communities extremely difficult... The persistent gender essentialism on the part of white feminists in the North toward women in the South and in particular Arab Muslim women continues to be a source of tension between many feminist of color and white feminists in the North.

She speaks of:

The ascendancy of whiteness that pervades discourses of race, gender, and sexuality that privileges whiteness over all else in this current global context of its ongoing wars on terror has become even more pervasive. This heteronormative, racist, and colonial discourse that exists in the West has served to further privilege white middle-class feminists and LGBT groups treating them as exceptional citizens.

Speaking to the issue of how neoliberal governments have become adept at appropriating different kinds of discourses of struggle and rights, Aida Hernandez points to the importance of feminists using their knowledge to counter this:

Cultural criticism provides us with tools for confronting the “collateral damage to language” that John Berger describes as one of the consequences of military aggression. The discourses on absolute freedom, infinite justice, long-lasting freedom, and axes of evil were taking the meaning out of concepts and affecting the possibility of imagining. These collateral damages are also affecting the capacity to imagine other possible futures. Something similar has taken place with the way neoliberal governments have appropriated discourses on cultural rights. In the case of Mexico, we have seen new government rhetoric emerge in recent years that has appropriated and conceptually limited terms such as culture and gender in response to pressure from the national indigenous movement, and under the influence of a broader international movement in favor of indigenous rights and gender rights. For example, the Mexican
government used a Zapatista phrase, to promised “Never again, Mexico without you” in his National Program for the Development of Indigenous Peoples for 2001–2006. The concepts of cultural rights, multiculturalism, gender, women’s rights and equality are now an essential part of the rhetoric of power, emptying them of the transgressor meaning they could have had as the causes for which social movements are fighting. Deconstructing these discourses, revealing the strategies of power of which they are a part, and recovering the profound meaning of these concepts are tasks that can be fulfilled by socially committed feminist social scientists. Grass-roots globalization is already a reality, and it is the only international force that seems to be decisively opposing the hegemony of the militarist US government. As social scientists, we have a great deal to contribute to this process of grass-roots globalization.

In some instances, though, the neoliberal state appears to find some groups’ protest language more “acceptable” than that of others. The predominantly white and male LGBTQ activists, for example, who have been for the last few years waging a battle with the U.S. State to grant them the right to marry. Much of their language of gay rights, including the right to marry as equality under the law, has been appropriated by the state. While the long-standing homophobic U.S. State has now acceded to the demand, this action begs the question: What exactly is its acquiescence to this otherwise unacceptable group and its demand that is so acutely incongruous with the puritanical religious principles on which it is based? Is it true that the group’s class and gender are of greater value to the state than that of its working-class peers and may have been responsible for the group’s sexual orientation being of secondary concern? Indeed, more than a few managers and corporate executives have emerged from this group in recent times. It can be argued, therefore, that despite the deeply entrenched homophobia within the United States, the LGBTQ rights social movement continues to advance seemingly unimpeded. That this is a predominantly white movement underscores the fact that class and gender always being mediated by race makes the movement, although critical of the state, more acceptable to that neoliberal institution. However, the LGBTQ movements that focus on economic and social justice for queers of color are clearly unacceptable and criminalized by the state as in the instance of the struggle around Cece McDonald, a Black queer transgender activist, who was the focus of a large anti-racist mobilization (See discussion by Minnie Bruce Pratt, p. 41). Indeed, much of the language of the state on the crucial debate of LGBTQ people for equal rights and privileges have been developed by the movement and were either adopted or appropriated by the state.

**Feminist Praxis and the Prospects for Solidarity**

One of the points of agreement among the scholar-activists interviewed for this study is thus the need both to rethink and complicate the North–South divide and to be attentive to the neoliberal state and transnational practices that are organized along this
divide—in other words, to analyze and challenge what the divide reveals at this time. Feminists must understand how globalization of capital further globalizes poverty (A. Davis); deep class divides and alliances and the creation of new differences among women (Z. Eisenstein, and B. Guy-Sheftall); new and continuing wars, incarceration, surveillance, and warehousing as new colonial state practices (I. Jad, J. Oparah, and A. Hernandez); a growing gap between countries in the South (U. Butalia, A. Trotz & Andaiye, and M. Okazawa-Rey); and the creation of new spaces for feminist struggle in the context of the consolidation of neoliberalism within and across North–South divides (M. Viveros, P. Antrobus, Richa Nagar, and M. Okazawa-Rey). Each one of our interlocutors affirmed the significance of place-based and cross-border feminist praxis. Honor Ford-Smith, reflecting on her decades of feminist engagement, described herself as a situational feminist—that is, as a feminist in some settings, but not in others. This “situational” positionality has to do with the meanings and broad usage of the term feminist in certain settings, the way the term gets taken up, battles won and lost in the past and present and by whom. It also has to do with what strategies might work in given situations and whose alliances might bring about particular changes. . . . I have reached the realization that we continue to fight, that there is unlikely ever to be one great big hallelujah rupture, and that all struggles are long, with imperfect and incomplete victories that are conditional—this is what living means.

A number of feminists around the globe describe their feminism as a doing (B. Bain), as a praxisizing feminism (M. Okazawa-Rey), as relational and dialogic (S. Ahmed, A. Davis, H. Ford-Smith, L. Farah, J. French, T. Cordova, and I. Jad), as intersectional (G. Wekker, E. Crespo-Kebler and Ana Irma Rivera Lassen, F. Sadiqi, S. Ahmed, U. Butalia, and A. Hernandez), and as rooted in a place-based, contextual analysis that is anchored in overarching feminist principles (J. Wedderburn and M. Okazawa-Rey). Avtar Brah says:

In the context of the North–South divide, transnational feminism needs to revisit the old debates about the specificity of patriarchal and capitalist gender systems that prevail in different parts of the world. Politics of solidarity would need to emerge from such appreciation of “difference” and analysis of global modes of exploitation and patriarchal inequalities. For those of us in the North, we have to have a deep acknowledgment of the intersectional modalities of power—around racism, class, gender, ethnicity, religion, sexuality—between us and women in the South. From our previous experience we know that it is not easy to win solidarity without taking account of our differential locations and positionalities vis à vis one another. We have to have respect for other ways of life—other than those in the West—without succumbing to patriarchal imperatives. A vibrant transnational feminist movement can thrive only if there is mutual respect. I remain positively optimistic.

Lee Maracle offers a unique and important critique of the North–South divide from the location of indigenous communities:

There is no North–South divide if you are indigenous. Canada’s north is essentially indigenous, as is Russia’s and America’s. The middle is where privilege is. There is a
Maracle’s claim shows the profound connections between geopolitical location, historical and cultural lifeways, and the epistemological privilege of indigenous scholars engaging in a critique of power and inequity. It illustrates the politics of knowledge embedded within geographies of power relations and challenges many of us to think carefully about the privilege of the middle. Maracle goes on to talk about the environmental movement as “the first totally global movement in the world, and it is humanizing human thought and changing how people see one another, respect for Earth and women. I’m not sure if this is a new feminist praxis, but it is also a return to indigenous beliefs among 350 million people on the globe that is influencing the beliefs of others.”

Himani Bannerji, situated in both India and Canada, defines her socialist feminist politics and site of knowledge production in different, albeit connected, ways to Maracle:

I’ve tried to make my feminist politics and ideas by understanding the processes of emergence not only of socially marginalized but also of exploited and excluded “communities” who in actuality form the majority of the people on Earth. This understanding cannot but come from an analytical grasp of capitalist development both in its continuance as capitalism, with the same labor-capital relations, and in the special characteristics that modify it through the role played by finance capital in its present stage and modern capitalism’s ability to annex all areas of life, the whole human body and mind, in new forms of slavery and commodity. . . . All socioeconomic and political projects that we undertake for the economically marginalized or exploited must be conceived through a feminism that takes into account race, class, caste, ethnicity, and other powered forms of difference. This calls for politics makes our project specific and concrete, suitable to the time and space.

Urvashi Butalia reflects on this idea of a feminist politics that impacts marginalized communities:

What I have found over the years is that while it is difficult to name feminism as having a direct influence or impact on praxis among marginalized communities, there is little doubt that its influence and spread is both wide and deep. How wide and how deep is difficult to measure because clearly its progress, its history, is not and can never be linear. For one step forward you take two back so that a constant zigzagging becomes the very stuff of feminism.

Richa Nagar, on the other hand, offers a provocative analysis of working as a feminist with marginalized, economically dispossessed communities, drawing attention to the need for cross-border praxis to be attentive to languages of the vernacular:

My investment in attaching the term “praxis” with “feminism” has decreased over the years, especially as I have witnessed—and participated in—the processes by which the collective of nine Sangtin writers (who authored Sangtin Yatra and Playing with Fire) transitioned into a movement of six thousand peasants and laborers in the villages of Sitapur. While we have learned important things in, from, and through
feminist understandings, there are two things that often work against feminism in the kind of communities I work with.

First, the violence perpetrated by many mainstream projects that invoke the label of “feminism” or “gender” has made many people distance themselves from things that make claims and articulate project goals and ideas in the name of feminism.

Two, the kind of praxis that has inspired me and my grass-roots activist colleagues in rural North India over the years is being lived and created by many people (academics, movement-based intellectuals, artists, peasants) who do not speak the language of feminism. I have therefore found it necessary to grapple with ways ideas that some of us might see as feminist can actually grow in conversation with efforts of nonfeminists who are integrating theoretical and grounded knowledges and practices in creative and committed ways.

Julia Oparah also complicates our understandings of feminist praxis reflecting on her own activist genealogy and claiming of transnational feminist politics:

When I entered activism, I, alongside many black women in Britain, rejected the term “feminism” in favor of “womanism” for black women activists, because of our perception that (white) feminists had colonized that term and produced a feminist praxis with little relevance for women of color. This shifted when I entered the academy in the United States and began to work alongside feminist activist scholars. I started to label myself a transnational feminist/transnational black feminist and to be more critical of the ways that womanism can elide questions of anticapitalism and sexual orientation. I developed the (un)field of transnational feminist antiprison studies as a way of putting feminist questions and a critical analysis of global capital at the center of antiprison praxis here in the United States as well as elsewhere. More recently I have begun to explore the intervention of transfeminisms and to examine critically the places where transnational feminists and antiprison feminist abolitionists have been complicit with the violence and policing of the gender binary.

Alissa Trotz and Andaiye point out some of the challenges they encounter in working through feminist praxis with women in Guyana:

In our part of the region, there is not a lot of experience to draw on of feminists “working through the intersections of race, class, gender and sexuality on the ground.” For example, in the ongoing discussions about how other women should relate to the women prime ministers of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, there’s an assumption that women, as women, are, or ought to be, on the same side. Our organizing experience is with Red Thread in Guyana. (Andaiye is a founding member and now international coordinator, Alissa as an overseas member.) We share the position of the global women’s strike, of which Red Thread is a member: we begin with the needs, interests, and demands of women who are poorest; we recognize that the divides, the power relations, among us (of, e.g., race, sexuality, age, nationality, disability, immigration status) frame our lives and relationships; and we believe that to cross those divides, each sector of women through its autonomous struggle brings its demands to the table, enabling us to work out how collectively we fight to win both their demands and ours. If we don’t do this, then the sectors with the least power inevitably lose out, having to fight harder all the sectors with more power.
Inside every “democratic” organization—whether of women or men or both—this process is what is happening.

Laila Farah reads up the power structure, drawing attention to power differences among feminists and the need to continually engage in unlearning privilege:

My vision of a transnational feminist movement requires that emissaries from multiple spaces, many of whom do not identify as feminist per se, should have more access to one another to continue the work of undoing privilege, of unlearning the confines of formal knowledges, of shattering completely the differentials and valuation of formal and informal knowledge, and of being willing to share resources more concretely. Focusing on the south and east first in terms of the varied and effective forms of resistance and strategies for creating change should hold primacy in these endeavors. Exchanging or utilizing privilege for solidarity on the ground might stand a much better chance of taking root and having more long-term alliance building leading to a more realistic socially just movement.

Margo Okazawa-Rey asks the same question: can we create spaces where feminists in the North examine and figure out what to do about the asymmetrical power relations between us and feminists in the South? She goes on to challenge us all when she poses larger questions of values and principles that are attentive to the politics of identity while moving away from a narrow identity politics:

There need to be more complex understandings of North and South including one inside the other and the various kinds of divides. I think one of the questions is who is divided and who is connected, and on what bases is each happening? Another extremely important question I see playing out in various locations I operate—the United States, East Asia, Palestine, and English-speaking West Africa—what organizing principles besides identify politics should frame our movement? Are there generative principles and values that can lead rather than identify categories, while simultaneously taking full account of the politics of identities?

Teresa Cordova speaks of the need to create an “alternative vision” for feminism, while Himani Bannerji, Avtar Brah, Rhoda Reddock, and Angela Davis speak of the need for an explicitly socialist, internationalist, and anticapitalist feminism. Cordova says, “The movement of capital crosses borders in complex networked systems. So too, must we build transnational networks of resistance, solidarity and alternatives.” Beverly Bain agrees, framing her thoughts this way: “I live a life that has always prioritized ending oppression against women in all its forms. I have never viewed feminism as separate from colonialism, racism, imperialism and class oppression. . . . To do away with feminism is to do away with strategies and approaches that can help to make visible how the discourses of race, nationalism, citizenship, colonialism, queerness, economics, culture, are invested in whiteness, masculinity, class privilege, and homonormativity.”

Given the ubiquity of neoliberal cultures and global capitalist and imperialist/militarist national and transnational adventures globally, what are the prospects for feminist solidarity across borders? A number of the feminist scholar activists we surveyed were wary of assuming solidarity too quickly. Almost everyone pointed to the challenges of
acknowledging differences in power and access while building alliances and solidarities across North–South and historical–cultural divides. Judith Wedderburn encapsulates comments from a number of respondents:

The main challenges will lie in addressing the imbalances (in access to resources) not only between feminists of the global North and South but also between feminists of the global South. Quite often the sharing of experiences and lessons learnt (taking account of, e.g., cultural and social differences) can lay the basis for building of solidarity among feminists, but lack of knowledge that this information even exists is a problem. This will call for more use of technology to build personal and organizational relationships—given that travel is often not possible.

Islah Jad echoes this sentiment: “The real challenge is how to rebuild women’s solidarity on the basis of deep understanding of our differences and our different locations, our different realities, and our different needs and aspiration. The real challenge is also to show the false promises of neoliberalism.” Joan French has a response to Jad’s challenge: “Because of the diversity of the feminist movement, there is divergence and contention and huge differences will exist. . . . The counterstruggle is on everywhere, and it includes the women of the feminist movement in processes that are often complex and riddled with contradictions and ebbs and flows of consensual action, as in Egypt. The parallels in consequence despite the difference in geographical location allow for common cause if the origin of the problem is adequately identified and if the basic principles of an alternative founded in equal rights and equity are clear and the specific insertion of each country or area into the global economy is analyzed from these perspectives and guides the continuing struggle. The differences cannot be avoided—struggle inevitably involves some confrontation and evolution in the interplay of differences.” And Julia Oparah suggests we need “to be explicit about making coalitions between movements—antiprison, no borders, queer and trans—and to recognize that transnational feminists are part of all these movements. We shouldn’t limit our conversation to ‘women’s groups’ . . . to generate a complex understanding of the term ‘woman’ that recognizes the different pathways into and out of that identity and includes trans women and gender-nonconforming folks.”

One of our questions asked respondents to comment on the prospects for solidarity and for transnational feminist movements at the present time. Beverly Guy-Sheftall speaks eloquently of the challenges posed to transnational feminist movement but also identifies issues that provide common ground for solidarity:

The idea of a transnational feminist movement is provocative but may be even more daunting given the deepening North–South divide, wealth disparities around the globe, extreme conservatism and religious fundamentalisms (e.g., Christianity, Islam), antifeminist (including among women) and war on women discourse, race and gender fatigue (lack of urgency about the plight of people of color and women and girls), burnout among feminist activists around the globe, difficulty of reaching consensus about what a transnational feminist movement might look like, especially since the rise of women leaders around the globe (may give impression that women are OK), extreme individualism and materialism among younger generation
in the United States (and perhaps elsewhere), impact of popular media with respect
to knowledge production, and demise of print culture and reliance on popular media
for “information.” Having said this, I do think that the issue of violence against
women (and hegemonic masculinities) and poverty still resonates with feminists of
color (and others) around the globe.

Similarly, Fatima Sadiqi reflects on divides and possibilities:

The divides are real (see the case of Egypt). I think that just as Islamist organizations
are getting support from Saudi Arabia and Qatar, liberal forces need to get support
from elsewhere. The appropriate channels need to be created. . . . This being said,
I am a staunch believer in keeping an eye on the two extremes: the root context and
the transnational interaction . . . national movement that leaves ample space for local
specificities and also try to “mainstream” them would be ideal . . . to keep up hope.

Asha Hans identifies “issues that cut across the rich and poor divide (patriarchy),
issues that bind women of all classes and races (LGBT, disability), and issues where
women’s solidarity is visible and working well” as the basis for a renewed transnational
feminist movement. A number of feminists identify movements that have global–trans-
national dimensions as models or potential allies in developing transnational feminist
solidarities. Angela Davis points to the transnational organizing in the prison aboli-
tion movement (which also has a distinctly feminist bent), Mara Viveros-Vigoya, Aida
Hernandez, and Lee Maracle speak of indigenous movements; Margo Okazawa-Rey,
Aida Hernandez, and Julia Oparah discuss the success of human rights movements
across national borders; and Linda Alcoff asks how the labor movement could provide a
model for feminist organizing:

The labor movement is developing some models here when there is a strike in one
country against a company that also operates in other countries. Then in the latter
countries workers can have temporary work stoppages in solidarity. And help publi-
cize the conditions. In this case, the multinational corporation provides the structure
for transnational labor solidarity. This works better with workers on both sides than
workers on one side and consumers on the other. So how could such practices be
replicated for feminists?

And then there are some concrete examples of transnational feminist movements and
the politics of solidarity working on the ground. Minnie Bruce Pratt provides the most
extended example of this in her analysis of the Free Cece movement—a movement that
began in the United States and succeeded in making important transnational links and
alliances:

Chrishaun “CeCe” McDonald, a twenty-four-year-old African American transgen-
der woman from Minneapolis, was sentenced June 4, 2012, to forty-one months in
prison for defending herself against a brutal attack by neofascists who verbally and
physically assaulted McDonald and her friends outside a bar in June 2011. McDonald,
who courageously defended herself and her friends against antitrans, antiwoman,
racist slurs and violence, was the only one arrested, charged, and jailed at the time.”9
The campaign to Free CeCe began locally in Minneapolis with secondhand sales and dance parties to raise money for her defense. Creative organizing extended the reach of the organizing to political marches, rallies, and events throughout the world, with Free CeCe signs being carried at International Women’s Day events, LGBT pride marches, prison-industrial complex protests, Occupy banner drops, May Day protests, and Transgender Day of Remembrance events on the steps of city hall throughout the United States and in France, Scotland, Germany, Italy, and India.

See Leslie Feinberg’s photographs on Flickr in the album “This Is What Solidarity Looks Like” for documentation of the campaign in the United States and internationally. See my story on the passing of the Syracuse transgender rights bill for an example of a local Free CeCe organizing moment.

What Pratt illustrates is the deep and abiding connection between the analysis of intersecting oppressions, local struggles on the ground (Minneapolis and Syracuse), and transnational struggles around women’s and trans liberation; antiracist, antifascist organizing; and the right to self-defense. Pratt further reflects on how “issues of women’s health constantly bridge national and regional, race, and class boundaries and how right-wing neoliberal agendas attack women’s health at a number of points—through immigrant scapegoating, through antiwomen initiatives, through antiworker attacks.” Coalitions and solidarity among a wide range of people and organizations supporting reproductive freedom thus illustrate the possibilities of feminist organizing on the ground. We conclude by providing a narrative of two ongoing social movements that connect to Pratt’s narrative of transnational feminist struggles making local and cross-border connections in the present.

**Just Futures: Transnational Feminist Engagements in Neoliberal Times**

In the collective dialogue based on the reflections of our interlocutors we have followed some key analytic stands about neoliberalism, the state, and the creativity and urgency of feminist engagements at the present time. We conclude this chapter by offering a brief analysis and reflection of two specific social movements anchored in each of our home or adopted home spaces: India and Canada. Both movements arose in late 2012 in response to specific injustices, and each ongoing movement illuminates the different and similar struggles by women against neoliberal states and capitalist interests, formulates and frames gender-based struggles in the global South and North in useful and interconnected ways, and illustrates the challenges and possibilities of contemporary feminist engagements on the ground. We have chosen to focus on these movements not only because they are examples of women’s place-based organizing that have now grown into social movements with solidarity links with feminists and feminist organizations
across the globe but also because they underscore the theoretical and activist dialogues we engage here. The movements we refer to are the extraordinary mobilization against sexual violence; patriarchal and misogynist state and cultural practices in India that occurred after the gang rape and murder of Jyoti Singh Pandey (or Nirbhaya as she is often referred to) in December 2012; and the Idle No More Movement founded in November 2012 by indigenous women challenging Canada’s curtailing of environmental protections, thus infringing on indigenous sovereignty.\textsuperscript{12}

Both struggles indicate the difficulties and the visionary potential of solidarity across communities and nations, leading to widespread consciousness about and mobilization against neoliberal state collusion in patriarchal and misogynist cultures in the case of India and to the recognition of the significance of anticolonial women-led indigenous struggles for sovereignty and environmental justice in the neoliberal spaces of Canada and the extraction–assimilation system of the global North. Both movements are anchored in notions of freedom from injustice and colonization, and both offer strategies for feminist engagements in social justice struggles in the twenty-first century. While social movements anchored in liberal understandings of equal rights have made inroads into and are perhaps more acceptable to the neoliberal state (e.g., LGBT rights and gay marriage struggles in the global North), movements anchored in anticapitalist, anticolonial struggles for “freedom” from patriarchal practices and gender-based violence and indigenous sovereignty and freedom (not equal rights) pose a fundamental challenge that cannot be easily contained by neoliberal states. These two site-based struggles thus offer new and promising visions for challenging the paternalism of neoliberal states in these times.

\section*{India: Bekaouf Azadi (Freedom Without Fear) for Women}

“The global upswing in gender violence (including sexual violence and domestic violence) and misogynistic rape culture ought then to be traced at least in part to the imperatives of global capitalism and imperialism and their local agents to justify an increased burden of social reproduction for women, the availability of women from the former colonies as pliant labor, and rape as a weapon against people’s movements resisting primitive accumulation.\ldots It is no coincidence that perpetrators of gender violence find powerful advocates (not just in India but across the world) in the misogynistic and rape culture statements by the custodians of the political, religious, and law-and-order institutions.” Nivedita Menon\textsuperscript{13}

The horrific gang rape of December 16 sparked off a massive movement that brought us all on the streets to say enough is enough and to demand action to ensure women’s freedom from sexual violence and gender discrimination.\ldots instead of implementing the Justice Verma Report, the government has instead chosen to pass an ordinance that completely subverts the substance and spirit of the Verma recommendations! (Shuddhabrata Sengupta)\textsuperscript{14}
These opening quotes encapsulate important responses to the December 16, 2012, gang rape on a Delhi bus, which has been described as the seed of the Arab Spring for South Asian women. The rape and its aftermath tipped the region into unprecedented large-scale protests against sexual violence and forced the Indian State to set up the Justice Verma Commission (JVC) and subsequently enact new violence against women laws. As Nivedita Menon suggests, the rise of gender violence around the world is inextricably linked to the “imperatives of imperialism and global capitalism.” And as the Bekhauf Azadi (Freedom Without Fear) campaign says, the state ignored the recommendations of the path-breaking JVC report to pass an ordinance that was in fact a containment and subversion of peoples struggles and nationwide mobilizations against the culture and practices of sexual violence. As feminist and social justice activists around the world recognized, the scale of the protests in India was unprecedented globally. And the fact that women and men, girls and boys, across religions, classes, and regional divides took to the streets to protest the rape of Jyoti Singh Pandey and that the protests morphed into a larger critique of misogyny, rape culture, and institutionalized patriarchy was a major achievement of feminist, left, antifascist, and peasant grassroots movements in India (Liang 2013; Whimsy-mimsy 2013).

In this particular case, the transformation of the movement into a platform that says, “No: this is what freedom really means,” to confront patriarchy, the system, and government more broadly illustrates that the struggle is not just about rape or even violence against women but instead about redefining relations between men and women, people and government, freedom and constraint, safety, and culture. While the remarkable mobilization of women and men of all ages, especially the youth around the question of women’s azadi (freedom) and against the death penalty suggests the success of feminist, youth, and Left movements, State responses to the protests indicate the responses of neoliberal, masculinist state managers moving to repress, contain, and rewrite Indian patriarchal practices, completely gutting the JMC report of its radical antisexist spirit (Liang 2013, Shah 2013).15

While women’s movement activists mobilized street actions, political education teach-ins, and advocacy efforts with various state agencies and tirelessly engaged the media and the state on antiquated and sexist attitudes and policies under the banner of Bekhauf Azadi for women in Indian streets, homes, and workspaces, the government responded in predictable ways to suppress the protests. State responses to the mass protests ran the gamut from violent suppression and lathi charges (pushing back against protesters with sticks and batons) to shutting down ten key metro stations in Delhi the day of the mass protest, thus controlling who could afford to join the protest (clearly limiting the class diversity since many could not afford to make their was to the site of the protest).16 Eventually, the state gutted and reframed the recommendations of the Verma Commission Report, touted as one of the most groundbreaking, radical, progressive documents addressing violence against women and centering the discourse on the integrity and autonomy of women’s bodies (Zitzewitz, 2013).17

There is much to be said about this mobilization and its ongoing transformative impact on the Indian state and on ideologies of masculinity–femininity, patriarchal
practices, and the demand of *bekhauf azadi* for women. Given our task in this essay, however, we want to focus on the transnational reach of the struggle and on the politics of solidarity it engendered. The movement in India actively took on the Eve Ensler–initiated One Billion Rising campaign, which called for one billion women around the world to rise together to dance in a show of collective strength on February 14, 2013. Protests demanding freedom from fear and violence against women spread around South Asia, as Shuddhabrata Sengupta describes, from Delhi to Djakarta. In the United Kingdom, the Freedom Without Fear Platform emerged in solidarity with the Indian feminist mobilization. Amrit Wilson describes how the solidarity meeting organized by a large number of Black, South Asian, and minority ethnic women’s organizations at the London School of Economics led to discussion about the ways neoliberal corporate culture and often to increased sexual violence against women since it proliferates sexualized images of women in the cities of Britain and India and also in the villages of India. Wilson describes the genesis of the Freedom Without Fear Platform:

> Out of these discussions a new organization has emerged: the Freedom Without Fear Platform (FWFP), a loose coalition of women’s organizations and individual women, unfunded by governments, nongovernmental organizations, or foundations, which takes its name from one of the slogans of the antirape movement in India, *Bekhauf Azadi*. Its aim is to build solidarity not only with the movement against sexual violence in India but also with movements and grass-roots struggles elsewhere in the global South and to give a platform to black, South Asian, and minority ethnic women to discuss and make visible the violence against women and girls in Britain. It seeks “to counter the imperialist racist discourse that UK mainstream media continuously bombards us with and to highlight the cynical co-opting of violence against women and girls’ issues ([http://www.justwestyorkshire.info/?p=1342](http://www.justwestyorkshire.info/?p=1342)) by various groups in the United Kingdom who are seeking to further their own racist and anti-immigration Islamophobic agendas.”

**Canada: Idle No More**

The Idle No More (INM) movement seeks to make Canada accountable for five centuries of abuse and exploitation of First Nations peoples in Canada and for denial of their nations’ sovereignty. Four indigenous and nonindigenous women—Jessica Gordon, Sylvia McAdam, Sheelah McLean, and Nina Wilson, all from Saskatchewan—founded the grassroots protest organization in October 2012 (Hodge, 2013). It was a response to the Canadian state which developed a plan for extracting $650 billion worth of natural resources, primarily oil, water, and natural gas from First Nations’ peoples lands to sell and trade in the open market without consultation with the owners of those lands. In short, the organizers mobilized to “foster resistance to the federal Conservative Government’s omnibus Bill C 45 (2012). This ‘unilateral and paternalistic’ (1) piece of legislation seriously threatens Canadian environmental protections and Indigenous control of reserve lands, in effect a direct violation of Treaty agreements that are the legal and moral foundation for the Canadian state. By passing Bill C-45, as well as seven
other pieces of legislation, without proper consultation with Indigenous peoples, the Conservative Party (with a mandate from less than 40% of voters in the last federal election) violated Articles 18, 19 and 20 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.”

By December 2012, with the help of social media, INM was known worldwide and garnered solidarity from many other grassroots organizations as far away as Australia and New Zealand and across the United States. The movement is focused on three core issues: First Nations sovereignty; the state’s recognition of the legitimacy of treaties between Canada and the First Nations; and grassroots democracy, on which it hinges its challenges to the Canadian state. While Canada’s initial response was to ignore the movement, after a strong showing of support for it by many national and international social justice organizations, including Lawyers Rights Watch Canada, the Native Women’s Association of Canada, and Amnesty International, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper agreed to meet with the organization. In other words, the state was not allowed to continue its idle practice but instead was forced by grassroots organizing pressure to address the social justice issues INM raises.

While First Nations peoples have endured centuries of exploitation by the Canadian state and have historically mounted many objections and protests to this, what is different about Idle No More is its deep grassroots structure, its leadership by women, its affiliation with feminists and feminist inspired engagements, and the respect and support it has attracted because of these marked differences. Indeed, this has sometimes put the movement at odds with indigenous organizations that have historically been the voice of the First Nations, such as the primarily male-led and some would argue male-defined Assembly of First Nations.

Similar to the Occupy movement, INM has used social media to keep the question of social justice at the forefront of its struggle. Though the movement is rapidly changing, its core principles and concerns remain the same. “Idle No More’s call for decolonization puts it in direct conflict with the neoliberal political agenda embodied in Bill C-45 with its prioritization of global resource exploitation, indifference to environmental degradation, willful disregard for founding Treaty relations and denigration of local democracy.”

While Bill C-45 passed without amendment, INM has continued to grow. Its leaders acknowledge that it was always about more than Bill C-45: it has been about the First Nations’ relationship with Canada. It is a relationship that the former see as historically abusive by the latter.22 It is a relationship that was born of violence by the colonial state and continues to exist through sustained episodes of violence such as Bill C-45 by the neoliberal state.

The Idle No More movement positions its environmental justice concerns as applicable to all Canadians and the threat to First Nations sovereignty as a danger to Canada as a whole. As such, in the face of INM’s calls on the state, it is no longer able to promote itself as a harbinger of social justice now that its continued pattern of institutional practices of injustice against the First Nations peoples has been made public.
Today, in the spirit of and in solidarity with the Occupy movement, which invokes the call for social justice for the 99 percent that neoliberalism exploits, Idle No More identifies as a peaceful revolution. INM calls on all concerned to join the fight against the injustices of neoliberalism on First Nations peoples and, in fact, to craft an alternative to neoliberalism. It is now spreading across North America and has engendered global feminist solidarity. It can safely be said that Idle No More is a new women's movement, that is, a movement organized and led by women. This may not be in the sense of what non-Indigenous feminists want to define as a women's movement. Yet, as Andrea Smith argues, First Nations' women have always mobilized and configured their collective action, thus presenting internal challenges to the patriarchal leadership of both the chiefs of First Nations organizations as well as that of the Canadian state. While identifying with the feminist label has not been a focus of the movement, there are certainly numerous avowed feminists aligned with the movement. What these women share is an anticapitalist resistance to the state and a commitment to social justice that threatens neoliberalism. As such, this is a force represented by women that calls every action of the neoliberal state into question as it constantly reinvents itself and reinscribes its legitimacy based on the market driven principles of neoliberalism.

Summary

These two movements are not directly connected, yet we see a somewhat similar strategy by women to speak directly and forcefully to the state. They are sending a message that the violences of neoliberalism—gender, class, or indigeneity—will no longer remain uncontested. In spite of the historical, geopolitical, and contextual differences between the Idle No More and the Bekhauq Azadi movements, we believe that each showcases the different and connected ways that women confront injustice. The inequalities both of these movements address have generated a transnational following and solidarity, driven largely by social media. These movements show that there is a distinct connection across the globe among those who feel the heavy-handedness of the neoliberal state (i.e., the 99 percent) as their perpetual oppressor. Whether it is in the state’s refusal to address issues of violence against women or in its relentless attempt to trample a people it has historically disrespected and deems powerless, there is an unspoken understanding of a link between both populations across two nation-states stretching from north to south. These movements’ strategies of transnational solidarity therefore can suggest a template for how to successfully move a transnational feminist agenda against the neoliberal state forward. We end with Nawal el Saadawi’s words urging us to build transnational feminist movements inspired by the example of Egyptian women’s revolutionary struggles:

We need a transnational feminist movement, to fight not only against neoliberalism but also against religious fundamentalisms, which are supported by colonial global powers, capitalism, and imperialism. In fact, we cannot separate the global from the
local struggle. We now use the word “glocal.” The Egyptian revolution inspired other revolutions in Arab countries and even in the United States. The demonstrators in the Occupy Wall Street movement were carrying Egyptian revolution slogans the same as in other countries all over the world.

A luta continua!

APPENDIX A

Sara Ahmed, Australia/U.K., is professor of media and communications and director of the Centre for Feminist Research at Goldsmiths University. She is associate editor of *International Journal of Cultural Studies* and is also on the editorial boards of sixteen other academic journals and book series, including *New Formations, European Journal of Women's Studies, GLQ, and Sexualities*.

Linda Martín Alcoff, Panama/USA, is professor of philosophy at Hunter College and the City University New York Graduate Center. She works on feminist epistemology, intersectional identities, and sexual violence. Her most recent book is *Visible Identities: Race, Gender and the Self. Her activist work currently focuses on issues related to Occupy Wall Street*. For more information see [http://www.alcoff.com](http://www.alcoff.com).

Andaiye, Guyana, is cofounder and international coordinator of Red Thread in Guyana. She is the author of several key papers and Caribbean coordinator of women of color in the Global Women's Strike. In 1979, she was a founding member and leader of the Working People's Alliance of Guyana along with historian Walter Rodney, author of *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, who was assassinated in 1980.

Peggy Antrobus, Barbados, is from the Caribbean. She was a founding member of DAWN (Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era) and the network's general coordinator (1990–1996). Her feminist activism evolved through the programs and activities with which she has been involved over the years, at all levels and in diverse spaces. She is author of *The Global Women's Movement: Origins, Issues and Strategies* (2004).

Beverly Bain, Trinidad and Tobago/Canada, has been an activist in the feminist antiviolence movement for thirty years, running shelters for women of color, as well as in leadership with the National Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC), Women Against Racist Policing in Toronto, and Women’s Action Group of Toronto. She is a member of Womana, which focuses on sharing information on the effects of gender, race, class, homophobia, globalization, and the neoliberal agenda on the lives of Caribbean women of color in the diaspora. She teaches women and gender studies at Laurentian University and the University of Toronto–Mississauga.

Himani Bannerji, India/Canada, is professor of sociology at York University, Canada. Her research areas are in the interrelation of Marxism, feminism, and antiracist critical epistemology. She is active in two organizations, Faculty for Palestine (York University) and Sachetana, a feminist activist and research organization in Kolkata, India.

Avtar Brah, Uganda/U.K., is professor emeritus of sociology at Birkbeck College, University of London. Her interest is the postcolonial intersections of gender, ethnicity, racism, and class.
She is a founding member of Southall Black Sisters, which was established in 1979 and is still going strong. She also worked with Asian Women’s Network and is a member of the editorial collective of *Feminist Review* (UK).

**Urvashi Butalia, India,** is a feminist publisher and writer based in India. She is director of the independent feminist press Zubaan and author of *The Other Side of Silence: Voices from the Partition of India* (2000).

**Teresa Cordova, USA,** is professor of urban planning and policy at the University of Illinois–Chicago, where she is also director of the Great Cities Institute. She is a longtime feminist scholar-activist and former elected official on the Bernalillo County (New Mexico) Board of Commissioners. Cordova is currently president of the board of directors of the Praxis Project, a national, nonprofit organization that provides research, technical assistance, and financial support to tackle issues impacting the wellbeing of communities.

**Angela Y. Davis, USA,** is known internationally for her ongoing work to combat all forms of oppression in the United States and abroad. She is author of eight groundbreaking books and an advocate of prison abolition and is a founding member of Critical Resistance, a national organization dedicated to the dismantling of the prison-industrial complex. Internationally, she is affiliated with Sisters Inside. She is distinguished professor emerita at the University of California–Santa Cruz.

**Joan French, Jamaica,** has been a feminist activist in the Caribbean since the late 1960s. She was a leading member of several independent organizations formed in the 1970s, Sistren Theatre Collective and the network CAFRA, (Caribbean Association for Feminist Research and Action) that focused on feminist issues and history in the Caribbean.

**Zillah Eisenstein, USA,** has written feminist theory in North America for the past thirty years. She has written twelve books on feminism and is activist and distinguished scholar of antiracist feminist political theory at Ithaca College, New York. For more see http://zillaheisenstein.wordpress.com.

**Laila Farah, Lebanon/USA,** is a Lebanese American feminist performer-scholar in the Department of Women’s and Gender Studies at DePaul University. She is active in a variety of organizations, including the National Women’s Studies Association, the Arab-American Action Network, and the International Oral History Organization.

**Asha Hans, India,** is founder and director of the School of Women’s Studies at Utkal University, India. She is director of Sansrstri, an organization in Orissa that supports women in their efforts for organizing and collaborating to produce quality research based on critical analyses and women’s voices.

**R. Aida Hernandez Castillo, Mexico,** is researcher-professor in the Center for Advanced Studies in Social Anthropology (CIESES), Mexico City. One of her projects involves exploring the experience of indigenous women with customary law and national law. She has worked extensively in the past on exploring plural identities in Chiapas as well as the human rights of Guatemalan refugees in Mexico.

**Islah Jad, Palestine,** is one of the founders and director of the Women’s Studies Institute at Birzeit University and of the Women’s Affairs Technical Committee (WATC), a national coalition for women. She is senior researcher on gender issues in the Arab region and Palestine and
is associate professor in the cultural studies department and master of arts program on gender and development at the Institute of the Women’s Studies, Birzeit.

Elizabeth Crespo-Kebler, Puerto Rico, conducts research, writes, and teaches on gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, and feminism in Latin America and the Caribbean. She is professor of sociology at the University of Puerto Rico–Bayamón and chair of her department and coordinator for the flagship federal program on the Prevention of Violence against Women (Programa de Prevención de la Violencia Hacia la Mujer).

Ana Irma Rivera-Lassén, Puerto Rico, is a feminist activist, lawyer, and defender of human rights, particularly of women, people of African descent, and LGBT-identified people. She cofounded several important organizations in Puerto Rico on these issues and is internationally recognized as a specialist on these topics. She is a professor, essayist, teller of short stories, and a poet. She is the president of the Puerto Rico Bar Association for 2012–2014.

Lee Maracle, Canada, is the first indigenous woman to publish a feminist text, *I Am Woman* (1988), and has continued to be an active member of the global feminist movement. She consults on First Nations self-government and has given hundreds of speeches, presentations, and workshops around the world. She currently lives in Toronto and teaches at the University of Toronto First Nations House.

Richa Nagar, India/USA, is professor of gender, women’s, and sexuality studies at the University of Minnesota. She has worked closely with Sangtin Kisaan Mazdoor Sangathan (Sangtin Peasants and Workers Organization) in Sitapur District of India and with several other organizations since the early 1990s, including Mahila Samakhya, Vanangana, Uttarakhand Mahila Manch, and Popular Education and Collective Action (PEACE) in India and the Anti-War Committee and AFSCME union in Minneapolis.

Margo Okazawa-Rey, USA, has been working for nearly twenty years with feminist grass-roots activists in the Republic of Korea addressing the issue of US militarism and violence against women by military personnel. More recently, she also has been engaged in various capacities with feminists at the Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counseling, Ramallah, Palestine. She is professor emerita at San Francisco State University.

Julia Chinyere Oparah, U.K./USA, is activist-scholar, social justice educator, and experienced community organizer who is dedicated to producing critical scholarship in the service of progressive social movements. She is cofounder of Critical Resistance, Prisoner Justice Action Committee–Toronto, and Adopted and Fostered Adults of the African Diaspora. She also works with a variety of other organizations including Black Women Birthing Justice and Incite! Women of Color Against Violence. She is professor and chair of the ethnic studies department at Mills College.

Linda Peake, Canada, has been engaged long-term with the Guyanese women’s organization Red Thread. She is also academic geographer and director of the City Institute at York University, Toronto.

Minnie Bruce Pratt, USA, has written on the intersectionalities of identities, oppressions, and resistances as well as creative nonfiction on gender-boundary crossing. Her organizing for women’s liberation began in North Carolina in the 1970s with the Women’s Caucus of the English Department at University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill; *Feminary/The Newsletter*, a collectively edited community publication; and community activists in Fayetteville,
North Carolina. With others in Washington, D.C., in the 1980s she began LIPS, a lesbian, direct-action multi-issue group. Most recently her organizing work has been with the Women’s Fightback Network of the International Action Center and with Workers World Party. She is professor of women’s and gender studies, writing, and rhetoric at Syracuse University.

**Rhoda Reddock, Trinidad & Tobago,** is professor of gender, social change, and development at the University of the West Indies and former head of the Centre (now Institute) for Gender and Development Studies. She is an activist in the Caribbean Women’s movement and founding member and first chair of the Caribbean Association or Feminist Research and Action (CAFRA) and early member of Women Working for Social Progress in Trinidad and Tobago. An advisor to the Global Fund for Women and a member of the Regional Advisory Committee of the Global Coalition on Women, Girls and AIDS, she is also a founding member of the Caribbean Network on Studies of Masculinity.

**Nawal el Saadawi, Egypt,** is an internationally renowned Egyptian feminist writer and novelist. She is a medical doctor, the founder of the Egyptian Women’s Union, founder and president of the Arab Women’s Solidarity Association (AWSA), and founder of *Noon Magazine* and *Health Magazine*.

**Fatima Sadiqi, Morocco,** is a Moroccan feminist scholar and activist. She has published widely on North African women’s issues and earned several Fulbright research grants and a Harvard fellowship. She is the current president of the National Union of Women’s Organizations in Morocco.

**Beverly Guy-Sheftall, USA,** is founding director of the Women’s Research and Resource Center and the Anna Julia Cooper Professor of Women’s Studies at Spelman College. She has been involved with the national women’s studies movement since its inception and has provided leadership for the establishment of the first women’s studies major at a historically black college. Beyond the academy, she has been involved in a number of advocacy organizations, including the National Black Women’s Health Project, National Council for Research on Women, and National Coalition of 100 Black Women, on whose boards she serves.

**Honor Ford-Smith, Jamaica/Canada,** is associate professor in community and environmental arts at the Faculty of Environmental Studies at York University. She was active in the Caribbean women’s movement for many years. As founding artistic director of the Sistren Theatre Collective and founding member of the Caribbean Association for Feminist Research and Action, she produced several plays with Sistren and coauthored and edited *Lionheart Gal: Lifestories of Jamaican Women* (1986).

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Notes

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2. In this essay we draw on responses from the following: Sara Ahmed, Linda Martin Alcoff, Peggy Antrobus, Beverly Bain, Himani Bannerji, Avtar Brah, Urvashi Butalia, Teresa Cordova, Elizabeth Crespo-Kebler and Ana Irma Rivera Lassen, Angela Davis, Zillah Eisenstein, Laila Farah, Joan French, Honor Ford-Smith, Beverly Guy-Sheftall, Asha Hans, Aida Hernandez, Linda Peake, Islah Jad, Lee Maracle, Margo Okazawa-Rey, Richa Nagar, Julia Oparah, Minne Bruce Pratt, Nawal el-Sadaawi, Rhoda Reddock, Fatima Sadiqi, Alissa Trotz and Andaiye, Mara Viveros-Vigoya, Judith Wedderburn, and Gloria Wekker. See Appendix A for brief biographies.

3. We did not hear back from a number of feminist scholar-activists, and we especially regret not including more African and transgender feminists in this cartography. We believe there are perhaps important gaps in our dialogue as a result of these absences and want to acknowledge them explicitly.

4. Needless to say, we quote extensively from our interlocutors because their reflections are theoretical, analytic, and historically specific—not merely descriptive. We have chosen to create a theoretical quilt rather than use their voices to support our own story.

5. Sassen examines the globalization of labor and how capital’s search for cheap labor has created the globalized city. She observes the conditions of labor in both the North and the South as being determined by the same neoliberal market principles that have created marked similarities for workers in both regions.

6. See Talpade Mohanty (2013), Manisha Desai (2002) and Angela Davis in Joy James (1998), for insight into how the state appropriates feminist language and struggles, uses prisons to incarcerate radical activists, and severely cuts support of social programs, all of which helps it to successfully curtail feminist organizing to counter its neoliberal strategies of domination and social control.

7. See Talpade Mohanty (2013) for the most recent discussion of this incisive critique.

8. See discussions of this point in Colorlines (2012–13).
12. Our analysis of these movements is based entirely on Internet sources that provide the most current and up-to-date analysis and documentation of ongoing struggles.
15. As Arvind Narrian argues, “The Verma Committee Report most fundamentally alters the public discourse on crimes against women by placing these crimes within the framework of the Indian Constitution and treating these offences as nothing less than an egregious violation of the right to live with dignity of all women. What is particularly moving and inspiring about the Report is that it does so by placing the autonomy and indeed the sexual autonomy of women at the very centre of its discourse.” See http://kafila.org/2013/01/25/the-verma-committee-alchemizing-anger-to-hope-arvind-narain/ (last accessed 3 November 2013).
16. For a sharp critique of how government actions deliberately target collective action see http://kafila.org/2013/01/11/15292/ (last accessed 3 November 2013). Vivek Vellanki argues here that “the closing down of the metro stations had a significant impact on the nature of the protests. It brought with it a collective that was ‘cleansed’ of divergent voices and identities. I am quite certain that the protest was definitely limited from what could have been a democratic collective of people involved in a democratic process.”
http://kractivist.wordpress.com/2013/02/04/why-the-govts-ordnance-is-an-eyewash-and-a-mockery-of-the-justice-verma-recommendations/ (last accessed 3 November 2013);
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yveWgEB18tM (last accessed 3 November 2013).
25. See Smith (2006), in which she argues that First Nations women have always been feminists but resist the label due to its imperial import and inability to capture their reality.

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http://womensuffrage.org/?p=20906

CHAPTER 4

CRITICAL CARTOGRAPHY, THEORIES, AND PRAXIS OF TRANSNATIONAL FEMINISMS

MANISHA DESAI

Locating transnational feminisms

Since its articulation in the mid-1990s in the United States, primarily by academics of color, the term transnational feminism has become ubiquitous not just in the US academy but also in academic discourses around the world. As a result, how the term circulates in feminist writings, what it signifies, and what it obscures is being debated widely particularly in North American academies (Alexander and Mohanty 2010; Chowdhury 2007; Desai et al. 2010; Dufour et al. 2010; Fernandes 2013; Grewal 2001; Lawrence 2005; Patil 2011; Sampaio 2004; Suchland 2011). Given my own location in academe, it becomes my point of departure and informs my analysis in this chapter.

These debates highlight the importance of understanding transnational feminism as cartography, theory, and practice in its various iterations, which I argue is a key contribution of the contemporary transnational feminist movements. It introduced a radical geography of historically specific relational processes across borders as opposed to the ahistorical and bounded notions of local, national, global; a theoretical framework that decentered gender in feminist theorizing even as it centered it in postmodern social theory; and a praxis based on reflexive, transversal solidarities as both means to and goals of women’s emancipation. These contributions have not translated easily into feminist goals either in the academy or in the three sites that are the focus of this volume. But the reflexivity that is central to transnational feminism in theory and praxis indicates possibilities even if it has not lived up to its promises.
Critical cartographies of transnational feminisms

Transnational feminism was articulated in the early 1990s within the interdisciplinary spaces of the US academy. It emerged out of its authors’ engagement with the particular terrain of race, gender, and class in the United States. Attributed to the work of Alexander and Mohanty (1997) and Grewal and Kaplan (1994), it has become ubiquitous in English language feminist writings in academia and has been appropriated, to some extent, in the three sites discussed in this volume. This response was formulated of the historical junctures of postcolonial women in the global South and women of color in the global North critiquing a universalizing white, Western feminism; of market, military, and religious fundamentalisms holding sway in many more parts of the world; and of the growing influence of postmodern social and cultural theories in the US academy.

In this section, I focus on the critical cartography of transnational feminism that challenged the “world is flat” deterritorial emphasis of much of the popular and academic globalization discourse of the time (e.g., Freidman 2005; Giddens 1999; Sklair 2002). These scholars not only emphasized the breaking of economic and cultural boundaries across nations but also added a new binary of global/local, which reproduced earlier hierarchical relations between the West and the rest. As Escobar (2008, 30) notes, “... The global is equated with space, capital, and the capacity to transform while the local is associated with place, labor, tradition, and hence with what will inevitably give way to more powerful forces.” Yet “place continues to be important in the lives of most people, if by place we mean the engagement with and experience of a particular location with some measure of groundedness (however unstable), boundaries (however permeable), and connections to everyday life, even if its identity is constructed and never fixed” (Escobar 2008, 30).

Hence, place was important to transnational feminist scholars. Their understanding of place is parallel to developments in radical and feminist geography (e.g., Harcourt and Escobar 2005; Massey 1994; Routledge 1997), where place is not a pre-existing and defined entity but a product of social relations, practices, and processes. There are no unitary, unproblematic understandings of place. Rather, place is a site of operation of power and hence dynamic and conflictual. It is also an expression of historical sedimentation and of factors and processes beyond place. Based on this understanding, transnational feminism articulated three critical geographies: one specific to the racial cartography of the US academy, highlighted in Alexander and Mohanty’s work; second a reworking of the Cold War meta geography of First World–Third World; and third a questioning of the sovereignty and self-determination of the liberal nation-state.

nationalities met then with the aim of collaborating to transform the liberal feminist politics that they encountered in US women's studies. As black and brown women from countries where the revolutionary promise of decolonization still held sway and where education was seen as a political practice of service to the community and the nation, the US academy felt alienating in many respects but particularly in terms of its racial politics. As Alexander and Mohanty note, “We were not born women of color, but became women of color here” (xix).

In particular, they had to grapple with two aspects of racial politics in the United States: (1) the racial fragmentation stemming from the different experiences of African American women, Chicana, Asian/Pacific, and Native women; and (2) the ways racial segmentation worked to separate US women of color from immigrant women of color. As they point out, “Our national and cultural genealogies—being black and brown women—and our statuses as immigrants were constantly being used to position us as foreign, thus muting the legitimacy of our claims to the different experiences of racisms” (p. xv).

In response, they articulated a racial geography of solidarity that grappled with the “differences between oppositional and relational consciousness.” Such racial solidarities had been conceptualized by women of color in the United States in, for example, the Combahee River Collective (1982), and This Bridge Called My Back (Moraga and Anzaldua 1983). And while women of color in the United States had also conceptualized the Third World to extend this solidarity to women of color outside their country, what Alexander and Mohanty articulated were the tensions between native and immigrant women of color in the United States. “Working in solidarity with different women of color was at times insufficient to entirely subvert acts of racial fragmentation aimed at separating women of color from each other. We remained (differently) less threatening than African American women to white women, who often preferred our ‘foreignness’ rather than our racialization in the US” (xv). Working through such tensions remains a challenge, but articulating this complex racial territory of the US academy has gone a long way in making it visible and remaining vigilant to exclusions and erasure even as we weave solidarities across racial borders.

A similar reworking of the meta-geography of First World–Third World is also explicitly addressed in transnational feminisms. Grewal and Kaplan approach it via the post-modern critique of modernity, including its core-periphery or First World–Third World cartography. Primarily, they argue, that this conceptualization renders both groups as monolithic rather than multiply constituted and that in most cases gender is left out completely. “Models predicated upon binary oppositions cannot move us out of the paradigms of colonial discourse, nor can they provide us with accurate maps of social relations in postmodernity. Examining the key terms ‘postcolonial’ and ‘transnational’ provides a framework for moving beyond center-periphery models in the postmodern critique of modernity” (Grewal and Kaplan 1994, 9).

They also critique the modernist cartography for being unidirectional, in that the “West” is the origin of all social relations that the “rest” accept passively. Not only are such binaries historically inaccurate, but they also reproduce false understanding of contemporary realities. Furthermore, such formulations leave out subaltern groups and
Critical cartography, theories, and praxis

the power dynamics within each side of the binary as well as between the binaries. By contrast, they argue that under conditions of late capitalism, local–global, and West–rest infuse each other thoroughly and cannot be separated. Thus, transnational is used to problematize locational politics of local–global and center-periphery in favor of lines that cut across them.

But unlike certain forms of hybridity celebrated in postmodern cultural analysis, the transnational feminist cartography recognizes the structural asymmetries of such border crossings as well as the historical specificities of groups and subjectivities not captured in the universal categories of modernity. In so doing, it echoed the works of, among others, Anzaldúa (2012), who theorized La Frontera/Borderlands as those in between spaces, which produce asymmetries but also open up new possibilities for action.

Feminists from the erstwhile Soviet bloc countries have, however, called into question the place of Second world in this critical cartography. In the “Statement from the Non-Region” at the Beijing Conference in 1995, these feminists protested the rigidity of the Cold War influenced meta-geographies of First World–Third world from which feminist perspectives of the Second World were missing. Suchland (2011) argues that given the intellectual history of transnational feminist thinking, that is, a US response to the racialized binaries of West–non-West and First World–Third World, it too has internalized the three world meta-geography in which global = Third World = location of transnational feminist analysis. As a result, she points out, “. . . There may be a double essentialism at play here: an essentializing of women of color representing women outside the U.S. context and an essentializing of the second world as a place without racial and ethnic difference (852). For a critical transnational feminism that can be relevant to a post–Cold War feminist analysis, she argues that it is important to engage postsocialism.

Rather than categorize the former Second World as just a derivative of the postcolonial or of neoliberalism, a territorial understanding of Eurasia emphasizes the point that postsocialism is a unique place and experience. This concept of Eurasia can be disengaged from a Soviet–Cold War temporality and thus invite new cross-world dialogues (Suchland 2011, 855–56). “Like the concept of the postcolonial, Eurasia need not refer to a specific place. But, unlike the concepts of the postcolonial or the postsocialist, Eurasia is not bound to a teleological understanding of location. Nor is Eurasia simply a synonym for postsocialist . . . not eternally set as a referent to state socialism” (857). Thus, the critical geography across borders articulated by transnational feminism allows for further rearticulations as feminists from other locations make visible its limitations.

Finally, transnational feminism also called into question the boundaries of the nation-state under conditions of late capitalism. Prior to the articulation of transnational feminism in the mid-1990s, international and global feminisms were used, often interchangeably, to describe the worldwide emergence of women’s movements and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) following the 1975 UN International Women’s Year. The term international reflected the nation-state cartography that dominated both the UN system as well as social theory. This cartography was based on national
sovereignty of bounded territories and self-determination that shaped the international political system after WWII. In this conception, “we are already provided with a scalar vocabulary from the smallest to the largest scales—from local to the national, the regional, and the transnational or global. In this prevalent conception, scales are like Russian dolls: pre-given, fixed, nested, and empty containers for social processes in which they play no real part” (Masson 2010, 38).

Transnational feminists argue that, given both the colonial legacy and the contemporary global political economy, nation-states never were and are not now bounded territories. Although following national liberation struggles, some states in Africa and Asia emphasized self-determination and followed dirigiste development, neocolonial policies and politics soon belied this sense of autonomy. First through structural adjustment programs and later through neoliberal policies, the regulatory frameworks of the state are no longer fully in the hands of national politicians. Thus, transnational feminism involves “shifting the unit of analysis from local, regional, and national culture to relations and processes across cultures” (Alexander and Mohanty 1997, xix).

This has not meant ignoring the specificities of the nation-state and privileging flows and circuits, as some critics of transnational feminisms have claimed (see, e.g., Fernandes 2013). On the contrary, the ways nation-states, both in the North and the South, continue to regulate and frame gender and sexuality among other social relations continues to be important to the transnational feminist analytic. But as Griffin (2012, 14–15) reminds us, for many First World feminists, “Transnationalism could figure as an affective relief mechanism against the indictments of nation-based globalizing forms of oppression.” And since states continue to regulate the affective, Griffin suggests a need to make a stronger reference to the state as opposed to the nation, a trans-state as well as a transnational feminism. Thus, transnational feminism drew a critical geography of relational, albeit unequal, sociality. Beyond this, it also redefined the role of gender in feminism.

### Decentering gender in feminism

Both canonical texts of transnational feminisms (i.e., Alexander and Mohanty 1997; Grewal and Kaplan 1994) sought to highlight the intersectional nature of gender. Both involved critiquing a homogenized conception of gender in feminist theory. But each attended to this task in slightly different ways. Grewal and Kaplan problematize gender by engaging with postmodern theory. They posit that theories in the United States and the West more generally were unable to deal with alterity in any meaningful way. Modern theories tended to homogenize social relations under Western categories masquerading as universal. Postmodern theories, by contrast, tended to deal with difference through a relativizing move. “Refusing either of those two moves, we would like to explore how we come to do feminist work across cultural divides. For we are committed to feminism and to seeing possibilities for political work within postmodern cultures
that encompass, though very differently, contemporary global relations” (Grewal and Kaplan 1994, 2).

Grewal and Kaplan do this in two ways: decentering gender in feminist theorizing; and centering gender in postmodern theory. Women of color in the United States had already begun the task of decentering gender in feminist theory by highlighting the intersectionality of race, class, and gender (e.g., hooks 1999; Hull, Scott, and Smith 1993), while Third World women had been challenging feminist theory to go beyond the trinity of race, class, and gender and to include other structures of power such as nationalisms, religion, and development that impacted their daily lives (e.g., Kaplan, Alarcon, and Moallem 1999; Visvanathan et al. 1997). As part of such ongoing critiques, Grewal and Kaplan articulate and foreground scattered hegemonies:

We need to articulate the relationship of gender to scattered hegemonies such as global economic structures, patriarchal nationalisms, “authentic” forms of tradition, local structures of domination and legal-juridical oppression on multiple levels. Transnational feminist practices require this kind of comparative work rather than the relativistic linking of “differences” undertaken by proponents of “global feminism”; that is, to compare multiple, overlapping, and discrete oppressions rather than to construct a theory of hegemonic oppression under a unified category of gender.

(Grewal and Kaplan 1994, 17–18)

For Grewal and Kaplan (1994), the task was also to center gender in postmodern theories. Writing when feminists in the US academy were ambivalent and, in some cases, suspicious of the postmodern critique of the Western, liberal subject and meta narratives of emancipation (e.g., Nicholson 1990), Grewal and Kaplan argue for working with postmodern critiques of modernity and modern institutions as these supported subaltern emancipatory projects. Thus, “in theorizing transnational feminist practices we are suggesting not only that communities are much more multiply organized than the conventional usages of these terms have implied, but that gender is crucially linked to the primary terms and concepts that structure and inform the economic and cultural theories of postmodernity” (16–17).

Alexander and Mohanty (1997) come to decentering gender slightly differently. They begin with the work of women of color, which they argued is appropriated and included but not taken seriously enough to rethink the whole cannon of white women’s studies in the United States. They argue that theories articulated by women of color are seen in US women’s studies as able to address their specific experiences but not to become the basis from which to question the whole feminist enterprise. But in so doing, unlike Grewal and Kaplan (1994), they eschew postmodern theories because, they say, postmodern discourses move beyond essentialism by pluralizing and dissolving the stability and analytic utility of race, gender, and sexuality, making it difficult to recuperate them for analysis of processes of domination and subordination. In their later work they recognize that emphasizing the diversity of expressions of race, gender, and sexualities in late capitalism does not mean giving up on those concepts analytically.
Alexander and Mohanty’s (1997) main thrust is to prevent “absorption and silencing of the theorizing of women of color . . . . This is why Genealogies aims to provide a comparative, relational and historically based conceptions of feminism, one that differs markedly from the liberalist pluralist understanding of feminism, an inheritance of the predominantly liberal roots of American feminist praxis” (xvi). Like the concept of scattered hegemonies, they highlight processes of recolonization, the continuities and discontinuities between colonial and contemporary practices of state and capitalist formations, and the location of contemporary feminist struggles in the context of the counterhegemonic histories that inform them. Recently, they too have expressed wariness of the work that transnational feminism performs in the US and Canadian academies to normalize rather than radically decolonize feminism (Alexander and Mohanty 2010).

This decentering of gender in feminist theorizing continues in contemporary iterations of transnational feminisms. As Chan-Tiberghien (2004, 455) notes, “The strategic use of non-essentialism by transnational feminists through the concept of ‘gender as intersectionality’ opens up ‘gender’ beyond the traditional monolithic signifier ‘women’ as equal to or different from men, to affirm differences among women, depending on their racial and other locations” (emphasis in original). Among the differences that are being addressed is the role of religion. In the United States in particular, the anti-Muslim sentiments following 9/11 have led many transnational feminists to examine the relationship between feminism and Islam (e.g., Moghadam 2013 Salime 2011).

Lawrence (2005), however, critiques transnational feminism for not adequately addressing issues of indigeneity or of people who are still colonized. She argues that theorizing recolonization or neocolonization does not do justice to those native communities whose survival as a state and nation is still at stake and whose challenges to settler nations such as Canada and the United States, which are taken as historical givens, are criminalized.

Desai et al. (2010) are troubled by the ways transnational feminism in most writings yokes together anticapitalist, multicultural, globalist, postcolonial, and anti-imperialist critiques. The problem, they note, is not the elasticity of the term as much as the interchangeability of each of these critiques and transnational feminism’s ability to reconcile them all. Fernandes (2013), in response, asks whether feminists are rejecting ontology to pursue epistemology. In some ways this hand wringing reflects the racial cartography of US women’s studies and its political culture, where as Chowdhury (2009) shows “global”/transnational feminisms are used to reproduce a hegemonic feminism that obscures multiple feminisms both within and outside the United States. This is evident in Davis’s (2007) comment that transnational feminism is preoccupied with a critique of white, Western feminism rather addressing male domination or women’s discrimination globally, as though the two are separate projects.

But Sinha (2012, 357) provides another direction for transnational feminist theorizing:

While we certainly have a great deal of scholarship on women’s and gender history in global contexts, we have not learned sufficiently from these contexts to begin to open up the concept of gender itself to different meanings. We must distinguish between merely
exporting gender as an analytical category to different parts of the world and rethinking the category itself in the light of those different locations. In other words, what do these different global locations contribute to the meaning of gender theoretically?

Furthermore, Sinha argues that the call for an open understanding of gender is driven not by

... evidence of the exotic, if by-now-familiar, existence of multiple genders and of multiple sexes. Nor does it derive merely from a theoretical commitment to post-structuralist deconstruction of that staple of second-wave feminist theorizing: the sex-gender system. Instead it is rather precisely in the nonexotic ordinary character of the daily practices of gender, the “range of subject positions taken up by women and men in everyday life,” that the implications of this scholarship are potentially so devastating to a unitary (and modern European) understanding of gender as part of a sex-gender schema.

(Sinha 2012, 359–60)

This is a challenge that transnational feminists have still to engage fully even as they have elaborated nuanced practices of transnational feminisms.

**Reflexive, transversal solidarities**

Given the contentious histories in the United States of what constitutes feminism and who is a feminist as well as the contentious histories of the UN Women’s world conferences in Mexico City in 1975 and Copenhagen in 1980, transnational feminist praxis was marked by important departures. One, it did not have an a priori conception of what constitutes feminist practice. Grewal and Kaplan (1994) discuss that “conventionally, ‘global feminism’ has stood for a kind of Western cultural imperialism. The term ‘global feminism’ has elided the diversity of women’s agency in favor of a universalized Western model of women’s liberation that celebrates individuality and modernity. Anti-imperialist movements have legitimately decried this form of ‘feminist’ globalizing (albeit often for a continuation of their own agendas)” (17). For them transnational feminism was made up of “the practices that different women use in various locations to counter the scattered hegemonies that affect their lives” (17). This did not mean, however, that they saw no relationships among these diverse feminisms. Their aim was to connect diverse feminisms without equating them or producing a master theory.

While they eschew any a priori definition of feminist practice, Grewal (2005) falls into the trap of a priori postmodern ontology, “that any articulation of abstract universals always entails erasure of difference and as such is inevitably an oppressive act” (Reilly 2011, 66). Reilly argues that this is the basis of Grewal’s characterization of transnational feminist activism around human rights, as exemplified by the Global Campaign for Women’s Human Rights, as neo-imperialist feminism. She notes that Grewal’s assertion is based not on analyzing the actual counterhegemonic practices of the campaign (e.g.,
the popular tribunals that highlighted specific local struggles) but more on the basis of “ontological assertion that human rights feminism is a form of governmentality” (66). In such a view any claims of commonality foreclose difference.

By contrast, Alexander and Mohanty (1997, xix) see within transnational feminist praxis a basis for strategic claims of commonality that do not erase difference. Thus, while they begin with particular local struggles, they seek to connect these varied struggles not in a relativist fashion but on the basis of “responsibility, accountability, engagement, and solidarity.” They go further, however, in giving shape to transnational feminist praxis through their concept of feminist democracy. “The issues of feminist democracy—decolonization as central to self and collective transformation; the fundamentally pedagogic character of feminist praxis; the profoundly anti-capitalist, socialist imperative in imagining and enacting global feminist struggles—constitute the fabric of our action, reflection, and vision of the future” (xlii).

Yet transnational solidarities are hard to build—not only because of political, cultural, and linguistic diversity, economic barriers, physical distance, and local political contexts (Young 1992) but also because of issues of power and voice (e.g., Dufour et al. 2010). Who speaks, where, how often, on whose behalf, for what purpose, and whose voice is heard—issues that feminists have grappled with for decades—continue to be germane to transnational feminist praxis. Moreover, an important consequence of transnational feminist praxis has been a reification of solidarities or collaborations particularly between academic–activist and North–South divides.

In response, Swarr and Nagar (2010, 12) note, “We suggest that (a) transnational feminist collaborations must be critically interrogated as we simultaneously work to define it as a set of slippery and contingent terms, and (b) that this should be done not with the primary purpose of generating new debates in narrowly defined academic circles, but to forge connections.” Desai et al. (2010) similarly caution us against seeing collaboration as a panacea and to question the work that it does in US–Canadian academies as they become global. Are transnational feminist collaborations yet another site for furthering the neoliberalization–corporatization of the academy? They suggest that no one model or practice can be idealized as important to feminist goals. Each has to be scrutinized for its particular space, time, and project. Not all collaborations have to involve closeness, proximity, and intimacy with the other. As Sampaio (2004) questions, Whence and why this desire for intimacy with the other?

**THE POSSIBILITIES OF TRANSNATIONAL FEMINIST MOVEMENTS**

Much critical work on transnational feminism has been about its institutionalization in North American academies. As Swarr and Nagar (2010) discuss, “… The transnational is in danger of becoming an empty metaphor for academic feminist
Critical cartography, theories, and praxis

theories—signifying everything and nothing” (207). What does it signify outside the academy? Or as Chan-Tiberghien (2004) asks, how does the gender skepticism within the academy meld with the gender boom in transnational feminism? As noted by the editors of this volume, transnational feminist movements are “understood as the mobilizing of organizations, networks, coalitions, campaigns and actions to advance women’s rights and gender equality” (Concept note, 1). They operate at multiple levels: the intergovernmental policy level linked to the UN global conferences; networking across national and regional borders in solidarity with and support of specific grassroots struggles working for feminist goals; and intersectional networking and movement building with other global movements organizing for human rights and political and economic transformation.

As such, outside the academy transnational feminism has signified women’s activism across borders. At the United Nations, transnational feminism has contributed to the shift in the representation of women from invisible equality (1945–75) to visible equality (1975–93) and difference from men (1993 onward) to differences among women (2001 onward) (Chan-Tiberghien 2004). Put differently, the terms of debate and policy have shifted from women to gender as binary to gender as intersectional (Chan-Tiberghien 2004; Falcon 2012; Reilly 2011). Most importantly, these intersectional gendered perspectives have also become central to human rights, environment, population, and sustainable development discourses in and around the United Nations.

These shifts resulted from women organizing during the International Women’s Decade from 1975 to 1985 and, following that, the various UN world conferences in the 1990s. As feminists from around the world encountered each other at global gatherings as well as preparatory national and regional meetings, initial contentious encounters morphed to understandings of difference and building solidarities across those differences (e.g., Antrobus 2004; Bunch and Reilly 1994; Desai 1999; Moghadam 2005). Such transnational encounters together with more ongoing engagement with feminists across borders, resulting from the emergence and rapid proliferation of information and communication technologies further contributed to transnational feminist activism across borders. But transnational feminist praxis did not necessarily involve cross-border activism (Desai 2005). Rather, it also included modes of organizing locally, regionally, and nationally that borrow from and in turn produce transnational feminist frames.

Among the achievements of the four decades of transnational feminist activism around the United Nations has been the emergence of a global gender equality regime (Kardam 2004). The regime consists of norms, conventions, declarations, and legal mechanisms for gender equality, supported by the nearly 200 member nations of the United Nations. The Convention on Ending All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, signed in 1977 and ratified by over 155 nations—the United States has still to ratify this convention—and the Beijing Platform for Action are two important documents that set out the commitments of member states. Many countries have enacted legislation, instituted women’s commissions and ministries, and made headway in addressing gender inequality.
Another significant achievement of women’s transnational activism has been the emergence of *gender mainstreaming*, that is, the ensuring of gender parity and a gender lens as the dominant policy framework for governments, UN agencies, and other multilateral organizations such as the World Bank. Gender mainstreaming, however, could more accurately be called mainstreaming women and women’s perspectives. For gender mainstreaming has been translated often to mean hiring more women and trying to analyze the impact of policies and programs on women. Gender mainstreaming has not focused on how existing structures and policies are gendered male. Men’s gender, and how it frames politics and policies, still remains invisible for the most part.

Activism around the United Nations has also privileged the transnational activist class (Desai 2008). Even as community-based and grassroots movements around feminist goals have expanded this class to include subaltern activists who are not formally lettered, most members of this class, whether from the global North or South, are urban women who are educated in European languages and able to traverse the sites easily. It has provided many educated women with good employment opportunities in NGOs, UN agencies, and government bureaucracies; opportunities for travel and interaction with other feminist activists; and opportunities for framing transnational feminist activism, all of which are worthwhile. At the same time it has also alienated some activists who cannot travel and in many instances has focused time and energy away from community-based struggles.

Most importantly, the implementation of this regime is uneven, not only around the world but also within the United Nations itself (http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/index.html).

The ten-year evaluation of the Beijing Platform for Action noted significant symbolic gains in terms of the visibility of women’s rights but a lag in substantive achievements. Thus, increase in girls education and women’s political representation were offset by continuing violence both structural and personal. Furthermore, many transnational feminists working around the United Nations have been frustrated as the promise of the 1990s and its accompanying world conferences seem to be marginalized in the aftermath of postsocialism as neoliberal regimes spread not only to national economies but also within the United Nations. At the 2013 CSW meetings in New York City many feminists bemoaned the shrinking of spaces that were open to NGOs.

Similar contradictions are also evident in transnational feminist organizing across borders in support of community-based struggles. On the positive side are studies showing that participating in transnational organizing enhances local feminist organizing in instrumental ways through the boomerang effect, by garnering funding and other resources, visibility at home and abroad, as well as through political learning of how discourses and practices from elsewhere can be deployed locally (e.g., Alvarez 2000; Thayer 2000; Snyder 2006). On the critical side, analysts have shown how it undermines local feminist organizing by shift in focus and resources from the local to the transnational (e.g., Mendoza 2002), reproducing inequalities of power and privilege among feminists from the North and South (e.g., Basu 2000; Hawkesworth 2006; Desai 2008; Dufour
et al. 2010; Patil 2011), perpetuating epistemic violence and disciplining the transnational with US nationalism (e.g., Conway 2013; Fernandes 2013).

Given these realities of transnational feminist activism, there has been increasing focus on the importance of identity and solidarity for mutual recognition, support, affinity, and complementarity through the daily political work in organizations, networks, events, and movements (Dufour et al. 2010, 3). Many feminists, even within local contexts, have begun to pay attention to differences among women in feminist organizations and actively engage ways to acknowledge these differences and address them in creative and innovative ways. “For white, Western feminists or elite women in other world locations, such questions demand an examination of the links between daily life and academic work and an acknowledgement that one’s privileges in the world-system are linked to another women’s oppression or exploitation” (Grewal and Kaplan 1994, 19).

Transnational feminists have also taken these insights into their work in the global justice movements. Yet even in these movements, particularly at global events such as the World Social Forum, feminists are both visible and marginal at the same time. As Conway (2013) notes, transnational feminists have been at the leading edges of the World Social Forum (WSF) because of their intersectional analysis of neoliberalism, focus on embodied issues such as reproductive rights and sexuality, transversal practices of solidarity and coalition building, and understanding of knowledge as praxis. Yet she notes, feminists often operate in their silos, privilege gender over other axes of oppression, reproduce inequalities and operate within “acceptable bounds of difference,” thus avoiding issues of religion and spirituality (Conway 2013). Furthermore, Conway argues that the culture of the WSF reflects practices of hegemonic Latin American masculinities, captured by the concept of the Porto Alegre Men.

Such contradiction raise questions such as, Did we embark on the age of global justice? Or did the era of neoliberal globalization reassert itself? (Moghadam 2013, 216). History will answer that question. In the meantime, following the contributions of transnational feminist movements, we continue to chart new courses and terrains in our quest for other possible worlds even as we are limited by the concepts and practices of our current world.

References


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SECTION 2

ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE
This section comprises four chapters that explore diverse perspectives on transnational feminist movements’ organizing for change. Irene Tinker discusses the emergence of the women in development (WID) approach in the mid-1970s and its evolution in subsequent decades. Peggy Antrobus traces the conception of DAWN, the Third World feminist network established in the mid-1980s, and its challenge to dominant Northern feminism(s). Joanne Sandler offers an insider’s view of feminist “warriors within” the UN system, and the complexities of contesting patriarchy in international development institutions. Finally, Anita Vandenbeld provides a comprehensive overview of feminist arguments and strategies to advance women’s political representation in national parliaments.

Irene Tinker’s chapter, “The Camel’s Nose: Women Infiltrate the Development Project,” uses the metaphor of the camel putting its nose into the development tent, to explore the emergence of the WID agenda in international development. She explores feminist questioning of the UN economic development paradigm that promised progress for all, rooted in US post–World War II “conceit that [its] political and economic systems. . . . had proved their superiority in winning the war.” The development paradigm was embraced by many newly independent states. However, WID advocates produced research in the 1970s (e.g., Boserup 1970) demonstrating that it promoted male privilege and that programs implemented by aid agencies often had adverse impacts on women. WID advocates demanded that some funding should be focused on “women’s concerns.” The chapter provides examples of the changes fought for in many countries. Laws and regulations were put in place that improved women’s status and expanded their rights, taking precedence over customary law and increasing gender equity, including with respect to marriage and inheritance. Women’s political participation was felt to be necessary in promoting gender equity in decisionmaking and equitable outcomes for women. Tinker also acknowledges the critiques of the WID approach. Its income-generating projects for women were often culturally inappropriate and seldom resulted in income for women commensurate with the time spent. Its ideological assumptions were based on liberal economic theory and did not challenge the capitalist
system, and its emphasis on women ignored class, religion, and ethnicity. Tinker concludes, however, that “gender encompasses all these attributes” and “globally, sex is the key defining factor.”

**Peggy Antrobus’s chapter,** “DAWN, the Third World Feminist Network: Upturning Hierarchies,” foregrounds DAWN’s leadership in mobilizing Southern feminist scholar-activists, organizations, institutions, and networks and developing a Southern feminist analysis and praxis. The chapter acts as a counterpoint to Tinker’s in locating Southern feminist voices, perspectives, and movements within global transnational feminist organizing. Antrobus argues that “DAWN’s chief significance is that it was the first South-based, international network of feminist scholar-activists, emerging at the end of the UN Decade for Women (1976–1985), at a time when feminism was largely associated with white, middle-class women from Europe and North America.” DAWN emerged from a multifaceted context that included women’s activism in the anticolonial and liberation struggles of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and “a heightened awareness of their gender-based marginalization within these larger struggles” (e.g., peasants, workers, ethnic minorities, among others); the expansion of UN membership by the entry of newly independent Southern states, “creating an arena for challenging the domination by the industrialized countries of the North and raising the concerns of the millions emerging from colonialism in the South to claim better living conditions,” a space that women entered and occupied and used to “advance their own claims for agency”; and the UN decade and world conferences on women, “which provided the critical space for the emergence of women’s voices internationally.” The chapter makes visible DAWN’s challenge to Northern feminism(s) at the UN Third World Conference on Women held in Nairobi in 1985, as well as points to DAWN’s leadership and cooperation in forging alliances and partnerships with Northern-based transnational feminist networks to advance women’s concerns at the UN world conferences of the 1990s. These were “key forums where (global) challenges were addressed and where new directions for bridging gender justice and economic justice began to take shape,” and “the first significant occasions when ‘women’s issues’ came forward from the margins of women-only conferences into the mainstream global agenda.”

**Joanne Sandler’s chapter,** “The ‘Warriors Within’: How Feminists Change Bureaucracies and Bureaucracies Change Feminists,” advances our understanding of the complexities of feminist engagement with institutions. She interrogates whether and how feminist “warriors within” the UN system have been able to shift/destabilize/transform patriarchal power and the deep institutional structures, cultures, rules, and practices holding gender inequality in place. Since its establishment in 1945, the UN has been a key site of engagement for “independent and fierce-minded women’s rights advocates” in transnational feminist movements working within and outside mainstream organizations, beginning with the establishment of the UN Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) in 1946. Sandler argues that “the results of this engagement are more than paper tigers,” Visible outcomes include the articulation of women’s rights in national constitutions; development of a wide range of domestic laws, policies, and programs; and use of gender-responsive budgeting to address gender inequalities in key sectors. In addition,
“the intergovernmental processes leading to these achievements have helped to expand women’s networks and movements within and between countries and regions, and to deepen partnerships between them that have endured and matured over decades.” Most interestingly, Sandler examines the exponential growth of feminist warriors within the UN system and the processes and dynamics of shifting and destabilizing, if not yet transforming, patriarchal institutional power. She identifies their personal struggles and angst as “they balance feminist ends with bureaucratic means and walk a tightrope between cooperation and co-optation.” She states that “it is perhaps inevitable that contestation and distortions emerge when feminist theory and analysis intersect with bureaucratic and gender regimes.” The chapter concludes, optimistically, that “patriarchy may be at its tipping point, and it will take determined partnerships across many sectors, countries, and cultures to push it over the edge and eliminate its deleterious practices.”

Anita Vandenbeld’s chapter, “International Trends in Women’s Political Participation and Representation,” explores transnational feminist movements’ challenge to the arena of political power and decisionmaking. The statistics presented of women’s representation in national parliaments from 1945 to 1913 are telling Vandenbeld debunks key assumptions about women’s political representation and interrogates the arguments made for targeting women’s political representation. She examines the numerous challenges faced by women in politics, and explores the vital role played by feminist movements at the global, regional, and national levels in opening up political space for women.
Chapter 5

The Camel’s Nose

Women Infiltrate the Development Project

Irene Tinker

Introduction

After World War II, ascendant America undertook to assist the newly independent countries around the world in developing their economies. The impetus came from the conceit that the political and economic systems in the United States had proved their superiority in winning the war. But the drive was also rooted in the Cold War competition between capitalism and communism. The argument that capitalism could be achieved through defined stages was presented as a “non-communist manifesto” to counter the dialectic of Marxism (Rostow 1960).

Economists who designed development theory were rooted in the 1950s culture that sent Rosie the Riveter to the suburbs after the war and assigned her the role of dutiful wife, serving martinis to her hard-working husband. Oblivious of cultural influences and perceiving economics as a science, these academics promoted a construct they assumed would be applicable globally, a sort of tent that could be erected anywhere, a tent without women.

The American culture of progress and prosperity was pervasive. Leaders in underdeveloped countries embraced it. During the first three of my lengthy research trips to India (in 1951 and 1965) and Indonesia (1957), so did I. My studies focused on the postindependence transition to democracy at both the national and local levels. Women were not the subject of my research.¹

The Impact of Societal Expectations on Identity

The second wave of the women’s movement in the United States was just taking off when I moved to Washington, D.C., in 1960, where discrimination against women
was palpable. Despite having earned a PhD, published a coedited book on India, and won a postdoctoral fellowship, I was told by the personnel officer at the Brookings Institution: “We hire Radcliffe girls as secretaries and Harvard men as researchers.” Eventually I found a job at Howard University, the federally chartered university set up after the Civil War to educate African Americans; even its pay scales privileged white men, then black men, white women, and finally black women.

In the 1960s D.C. was a maelstrom, churning with many groups seeking to change the status quo. President John F. Kennedy nominated the first national Women’s Commission, which proposed such then-radical ideas as equal pay for women! This commission spawned state commissions on women, expanding women’s demands throughout the country. We women marched on the mall to support the Equal Rights Amendment. I took my two young daughters to join supporters outside the Capitol. I also joined the 1963 March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, pushing a baby carriage along the mall to hear Martin Luther King Jr. make his stirring “I Have a Dream” speech.

My participations in the women’s and civil rights movements reinforced each other: I joined activists in organizing meetings, registering black voters in D.C. as well as Mississippi, and marched in protest rallies. I even ran for Maryland’s legislature. Academy was rife with discrimination; graduate students led the way to protest male dominance in universities and agitate for women’s presence on panels at annual professional meetings. I helped organize women’s groups in political science, Asian studies, and population associations. But I had not connected women to international development.

All this changed when I returned to Indonesia in 1972. Because of my involvement in the US women’s movement, I was invited by the US embassy to lecture on women’s issues and goals in the United States. To make my talk vivid for the audience, I needed to compare Indonesian women’s rights and roles with those at home. Realizing how little I knew about Indonesian women outside their professional roles, I began exploring their lives and civil rights, as well as how independence was changing them. Far from achieving progress, economic development was having an adverse impact on women. Economic development assistance programs of both bilateral and multilateral agencies were re-creating the same barriers for Indonesian women that activists in the United States were fighting to remove.

**Organizing to Change Development Policy**

Back in Washington, D.C., I spoke with other women researchers and heard the same story. A few of us were members of the Society for International Development (SID), but others found the lectures too rarified and the membership fee too high to join. As an alternative we formed an independent caucus of women interested in women in international
development (WID) to collect data and articles about how development programs were affecting women. Reading Ester Boserup’s (then) recently available book *Woman’s Role in Economic Development* (1970) provided an authoritative voice for our own conclusions.

The next SID international conference was scheduled for April 1973 in Costa Rica. Too late to register for regular daytime sessions, we persuaded the organizers to arrange two evening panels for WID presentations. SID conferences are quite sociable, and evening sessions are few. Much to everyone’s surprise, the rooms were packed with men as well as women. Participants recounted many similar stories about how development was undermining women’s traditional roles and ignoring their economic contributions. Clearly this was a global issue that needed greater recognition.

Events moved quickly. I testified at a US State Department briefing on the 1975 UN International Women’s Year conference. Because the US Senate was then debating revisions to the Foreign Assistance Act, it was still possible to insert this issue into that legislation. Using the UN phrasing, an amendment was drafted declaring that, “women should be integrated into development.” Senator Charles Percy was persuaded to introduce this amendment in the Senate as a courtesy, and it was approved without discussion as a sort of “feel good” idea. In fact, the amendment would have been discarded by the Congressional Conference Committee, except for the barrage of telegrams and phone calls from women’s groups, from the traditional to radical. I spent days on the phone with women staffers explaining the importance of the amendment and emphasizing that no new funds were required (Tinker 1983, 1990, 2004b).

Appointed as an advisor to the US delegation to the UN Commission on the Status of Women in January 1974, I was able to brief participants about the negative effects development programs were having on women in the global South and to urge a refocus of development policy to recognize women’s economic contributions, especially in agriculture. The implications for UN agencies were obvious; within a year women in those agencies had introduced resolutions requiring women to be included in development.

My participation in the United Nations was encouraged by Margaret Mead, then the president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), where I had recently been appointed director of international science. In June 1974 I accompanied her to the UN Conference on Population in Bucharest to help distribute *Cultural and Population Change*, a book produced by the AASS that summarized current research on population programs. Margaret Mead spoke on panels at both the governmental and NGO meetings. Her ability to influence participants with this research convinced me to try a similar strategy the following year at the UN World Conference on Women.

**The UN First World Conference on Women**

Under the aegis of the AAAS and with Margaret Mead’s potent support, I convened a seminar in Mexico City in 1975 just prior to the UN First World Conference on Women. Having the backing of well-regarded scientific institutions from both the United States and Mexico gave tremendous legitimacy to the seminar. Advice and support from
women and men in several UN agencies in New York helped frame the agenda. Nearly a hundred women and men from fifty-five countries attended. Each of the five workshops—on food production, health, education, work, and women's organizations—produced a report identifying problems and suggested actions. These ideas were widely discussed at the NGO Tribune; several were added as amendments to the plan of action being debated at the UN governmental conference by seminar participants who were part of their country's delegations and who were able to insert many ideas from the seminar into the plan of action (Tinker and Bo Bramsen 1976).

Seminar participants emphasized the need for women to organize in every country around local priorities: access to health and education, civil rights, and the recognition of women's economic contributions to national development. Over the following decade, the UN Decade for Women (1976–1985), the proliferation of civil society organizations addressing these issues was exponential. Widespread support for these groups came from development agencies, foundations, humanitarian organizations, and churches. Taken together, these groups began to form a global network that was increasingly able to influence economic development policies.2

Deconstructing Women’s Work

Because economic theory as then practiced was promulgated by men living in the developed world, it was influenced by the prevailing worldview that women did not “work.” A new definition of “work” was therefore required in order to question this approach to economic development. Most of women’s economic activities were then based on the traditional sexual division of labor and continued to be uncompensated. The International Labour Organization (ILO) had defined formal work in terms of income, thus effectively excluding all household and subsistence activity. Yet time allocation studies showed that women in subsistence societies spent many more hours than men in such survival tasks as growing, harvesting, processing, and preparing food, as well as carrying water and fuelwood. Child or elder care seldom appeared as a separate activity, because women carried the babies on their backs, older siblings looked after young ones, and life expectancy was low. None of these activities was counted as “work.”

Projects designed to deliver water to a village in Kenya or provide new sources of burnable material in Nepal worked well for women, because they reduced drudgery. In contrast, projects requiring more effort from women, such as cutting wood for the “more efficient” cook stoves, faced women's resistance. Midday literacy classes were poorly attended because women were working in the fields. Indoor latrines, which required women to carry extra water to flush them, remained unused. Synthesizing this research, I produced several papers for workshops held in preparation for the 1979 UN Conference on Science and Technology for Development in Vienna and the 1981 Conference on New and Renewable Energy for Development in Nairobi. Challenging existing policies underlying rural projects for women because they failed to recognize
the long hours women were engaged in essential survival activities, these papers were published in a wide variety of newsletters and journals; an expanded version was published as “The Real Rural Energy Crisis: Women’s Time” (1987).

Projects aimed at men also needed to be reconfigured. Ester Boserup (1970) documented how introducing cash crops to men in subsistence economies in Africa had increased women’s work, by requiring their labor for those crops, which produced income, while still growing food for the family, which did not. Further, the influx of cash allowed men to migrate to urban areas for higher paying jobs, where they often acquired second wives, leaving their rural wives to labor in the fields. Polygyny is related to women’s economic worth: statistics show that rates are higher in West Africa than in Islamic countries (Antoine & Nanitelamio 1996).

Informal Sector

Women’s work in the informal sector was also discounted under the ILO’s definition: an enterprise employed five or more people. Individual and family enterprises were not included. Both neoclassical and Marxist theory expected these microenterprises to disappear with the advent of urbanization and modernization. In practice, monetization forced the poor to earn money for their daily needs. Well-intentioned efforts, by both local and international NGOs, to teach women to knit and sew in countries where women were farmers and men the tailors failed dismally.

In Ahmedabad, India, Ela Bhatt decided to organize a union among women working as head-loaders, vegetable sellers, and mattress-stuffers, among other occupations. She founded the Self Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) in 1972. Her first project was to form a bank; credit allowed the women workers to avoid the usurious rates of money lenders and so increase their earnings. SEWA also required its members to become literate, encouraging many workers to become part of the leadership.

In contrast, the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh was run by men at all but the village level. Members of this social movement, who could not have access to more than half a hectare, were expected to follow the “16 Decisions”: actions aimed at improving nutrition and health, which included limiting family size and reducing expenditure on such customary practices as dowry and family rituals. Women were organized into small groups, whose members stood surety for loans granted to others in the group to start small income-generating projects. Because few village women had any entrepreneurial experience, many enterprises lost money or failed. However, the availability of low cost credit still improved overall family welfare by providing families with needed cash; as a result, women’s status generally improved. Some women earned enough to buy land in the name of their daughters, thus avoiding limitations on landholding and assuring the daughter a good marriage. Better prospects for young women led members to send their daughters to school (see Tinker 2004b for a survey of opinions on various credit programs).

A comparison of these two credit programs shows how the different paths eventually led to empowerment. SEWA, run by women from top to bottom, encouraged members
to learn, rise in the organization, and invest in tangible assets. The Grameen Bank illustrates the idea that “the patriarch knows best.” Empowerment came slowly to women members who flouted the rules to buy land. Daughters were the real beneficiaries.

Street Foods

Looking for a microenterprise in which women actually made money, I initiated the Street Food Project at the Equity Policy Center (EPOC) soon after founding the think tank in 1979, with the object of using research to transform the programs studied. We recruited women researchers in nine countries to follow all food vendors in their cities for a year, identifying who made, sold, and ate food on the street. Findings showed that although only one widow was a vendor in Bangladesh, women were involved in food preparation and cleaning of the stalls in 37 percent of the enterprises operated by their husbands. In contrast, 94 percent of Nigerian vendors were women selling food, with help from female relatives. In the Philippines and Indonesia, couples often ran the activity together. Clearly, cultural attitudes and the status of women affected the number of women street food entrepreneurs. Income from the trade varied both within and among the countries. Where buying street food is a daily occurrence, as in Thailand or Nigeria, many women made more money than university professors or midlevel bureaucrats. But seasonal peanut vendors in Senegal barely covered their expenses. In all countries women, often heads of households, worked to provide sustenance for their families. Only in Nigeria, with its tradition of polygamous unions and separate budgets, did women not share their income with their husbands; rather, they supported their children and kin (Tinker 1997).

The Street Food Project not only illuminated the wide range of gender relations affecting women’s income and its use, it also influenced policies at local, national, and international levels. Many cities “cleaned the streets” periodically, destroying stalls and carts and dumping the food. Although vendors returned the next day, they seldom improved their stalls. Once the municipal authorities realized the economic value of vending, they began to help the vendors improve health standards by providing a water source for washing hands and dishes, the major source of contamination. They often designated areas where vendors could safely cluster. Countries adjusted laws affecting street food preparation. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) helped organize vendors in many counties, which facilitated their access to training classes. Such changed policies helped increase income for all vendors, allowing many to send their children to school. Vendor associations also empowered members. For example, in Ibadan, Nigeria, food courts were set up for university students. In Iloilo, the Philippines, food courts with water were developed. And in Minia, Egypt, the association began to buy ingredients for the vendors at reduced prices.

Home-based Work

Working from home allowed women to combine their household responsibilities with a way to earn income. Treating what these women earned as “egg money,” economists
ignored home-based production until the 1980s, when industries began to “informalize” their workforces in response to globalization. In order to cut labor costs, industries making clothing contracted with local factories abroad, which in turn contracted both the assembly and sewing to women at home. Writing about this new form of subordination in Mexico City, Beneria and Roldan titled their book The Crossroads of Class and Gender (1987). argued called this the crossroads of class and gender. This vertical hierarchy for producing garments was largely unregulated, leaving these industrial home and factory workers, predominantly women, open to exploitation. Contradicting assumptions by both neoclassical and Marxist theoreticians, this emergent economic form suggested that labor would not eventually be absorbed into the formal economy (Portes et al. 1989). This provides additional evidence that modernization, far from freeing women from drudgery, simply opened new avenues for their exploitation.

The assumption that work must be compensated through formal institutions effectively excluded the bulk of women’s economic activities, whether within the household or in the informal sector. Research underscoring the economic benefits of the care economy, as well as the critical role played in household survival by income from microenterprise and home-based work, persuaded economists to grudgingly include these activities as “work.” The camel’s nose was pushing further into the tent.

**Women in the Household**

Among the many questionable assumptions of economic theory is the idea that the household functions as a single unit, a “black box,” overseen by a benevolent patriarch. Such a construct obscured women’s economic value and undercut women’s influence as the subsistence economy was increasingly monetized (Folbre 1988). Once women began to earn money, they were seldom able to control its use. Research into entitlements, especially for food or education, underscored women’s low status (Papanek 1990; Sen 1981). Game theory showed that women’s bargaining position within the family was constrained due to their desire to stay married (Sen 1990).

Many women, by choice or desertion, became heads of households. Realizing that women-headed households were the poorest of the poor, WID focused early on this trend. Data were sparse, so our group at AAAS decided to estimate the percentage of women-headed households overall. At the time, the World Bank had declared that developing countries were better off as soon as per capita income reached USD$100. When we quizzed the authors of that report, they admitted this figure was an educated guess. So we did our own educated guessing, estimating that one-third of all households in developing countries were headed by women. That figure became the standard reference and has proved surprisingly robust. Percentages vary depending on the definition of female headship; nonetheless, the clarity of our declaration helped focus the development agencies on this issue at the time (Buvinic and Youssef 1978), although current research contests the term “feminization of poverty” as well as the indicators that are used to define poverty (Chant 1997, Razavi 2000).
Most customary law gives the male overriding power in the household; women must constantly negotiate their position as modernization proceeds. Some WID projects were so focused on increasing women's income that they threatened male power; in retaliation, enterprises were taken over, fields destroyed, and project staff endangered. Increasingly, WID proponents urged consideration of other family members when designing projects for women. This pragmatic approach was not followed by all development agencies. For example, in Bangladesh, a Swedish group refused loans to a woman who wished to buy a pedicab for her son, who would then earn money for the household.

Reproduction and Women's Health

Women's power within the family was particularly limited regarding reproductive decisions. In the 1970s Western development agencies promoted population programs because they argued that economic gains were being negated by rapid population growth. Within the women's movement, family planning programs as then practiced were challenged both for their coercive aspects and racist implications. Some WID proponents at USAID opposed funding population projects for fear that the focus on women as mothers would dilute the argument for recognizing their importance as economic actors. As many population programs began to advocate for increasing women's control over their own reproduction, they also began to offer income-generating projects to their clients as a way of providing women with an alternative form of social security (Dixon-Meuller 1993).

The SID/WID group echoed concerns about women's health that were simultaneously angering women in the United States. Male gynecologists, when examining women, treated them with disrespect. Research on critical issues such as breast cancer was conducted on male college students. Population programs in developing countries embodied the same disregard for women. Organizations were formed to challenge the implementation of population programs and began to urge a focus on women's health by promoting birth spacing and improved prenatal care and checkups for pregnant women. In preparation for the UN Second World Conference on Women, held in Copenhagen in 1980, EPOC convened a global seminar on women's health issues not connected to reproduction and held panels in Copenhagen calling for greater emphasis on women's nutritional needs and testing for sexually transmitted diseases (Blair 1980). Both the Centers for Disease Control and the World Health Organization have set up programs focusing on these issues.

Questioning Patriarchy and Customary Rights

If economic programs tended to be top-down and based on theoretical constructs, the groundswell of women's groups challenging their subordination rolled in from village and town. Indeed, development agencies avoided programs that might seem to the
recipient countries an attempt to destabilize the patriarchal order. But the removal of even a pebble from the power structure often had amazing consequences.

An early example comes from the government of South Korea soon after the fighting ended in July 1953, when the armistice was signed with North Korea. Ruined houses sat on hills bereft of trees; the economy was in tatters. The government launched programs to accelerate economic development, coupled with efforts to reduce rapid population growth. To reach women in rural areas, who traditionally spent their lives within their husbands’ compounds, the government set up family planning programs in villages. Women were required to attend these programs once a month, where they received contraceptive pills from an educated woman who also schooled the women on health issues and the importance of educating their daughters. These young educated women also talked about the rapidly changing attitudes in the cities. Once they were organized, the government decided to utilize these women’s groups to plant seedlings for the reforestation projects. Money earned from selling the saplings back to the government was used by the women to travel to nearby religious sites. Thus the women’s worldviews were expanded from a narrow focus on the household as they were exposed to new ideas and places.

Global Social Activists

From 1902, when the International Alliance of Women was founded to promote women’s suffrage, European women helped organize women globally to reduce poverty and encourage education. These groups became leaders in the UN Commission on the Status of Women, which was formed in 1946. Several other sensitive topics were on the agenda of the First International Feminist Conference, held in Frankfurt in 1974, which advocated greatly increased surveillance over international prostitution rings. Feminists also called for a ban on female circumcision in Africa. Fran Hosken became a crusader for the ban and founded the Women’s International Network, a quarterly journal that distributed information about female genital mutilation and other feminist topics that the US media seldom covered. Because the journal was an amalgam of articles printed elsewhere rather than a channel for women activists, it did not survive its founder’s death.

Feminists in Europe were appalled by the lack of media coverage of the 1974 conference and determined to form an alternative communications and documentation center to provide information about women’s activities, especially those in the global South. Marilee Karl in Rome and Jane Cottingham in Geneva started Isis that year and began collecting everything they could find about women’s organizing. To share this information, they soon began to publish the Women’s International Bulletin, which focused on grassroots women’s experiences, detailing their efforts at social change. Realizing the need for a Spanish-speaking office, the organization set up the Isis International Foundation in Santiago in 1984 to provide resources and communications throughout Central and South America. The center also houses the Latin American and Caribbean
Network for a Life without Violence against Women (Portugal 2004). In 1991 the Rome office moved to Manila, where they set up the Isis International Activist School to train women how to use social media and other forms of communication to support campaigns for social change and women's rights. To consolidate these efforts, the center also publishes *Women in Action*. In 1994 the Geneva office moved to Kampala and established the Isis Women's International Cross Cultural Exchange. This Isis center focuses on African women's issues, particularly violence against women in the home and in areas of conflict. These three Isis centers are rooted in and reflect the particular concerns of the women in their regions.

Another important communications network, the International Women's Tribune Centre (IWTC), was set up in New York City in 1975 as a documentation and media organization to support women who had attended the NGO conference—termed the Tribune—during the UN First Conference on Women held in Mexico City. Headed by Anne Walker, an Australian who had been working with women's groups in Fiji Islands, the organization believed that change can only happen at the ground level. IWTC focused on getting information, technical assistance, and training to women's groups in all world regions; its easy-to-read training manuals were published in English, French, and Spanish. Located across from the UN headquarters, the center provided a meeting place for women attending UN meetings. Its clearinghouse provided UN documents for NGOs, and Women's Ink made available books written about the burgeoning women's movement printed by obscure presses (Walker 2004). Through its international contacts, IWTC encouraged donors to fund regional groups directly. After thirty-five years of activities and outreach that reached some twenty-five thousand women's groups worldwide, IWTC closed in June 2010. Yet the networking has not stopped; constant requests for referrals, information, and contacts arrive via e-mail and Facebook. IWTC slide-tape sets of the four UN World Conferences and NGO Forums are now available on a women's history Web site set up by SUNY and Smith College (Walker 2013).

**Challenging the Capitalist Model**

Shortly after the Mexico City conference, a World Congress for International Women's Year (IWY) was convened in East Berlin, in October 1975. Organized by the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF) to celebrate its thirtieth anniversary, the meeting was planned with the support of the United Nations and attended by UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, who thanked the WIDF for first suggesting the idea to celebrate IWY. Participants included many Asian and African women and men who had attended workshops in the socialist countries that had promoted integrating women into revolutionary causes, as opposed to the WID model, designed to incorporate women into the capitalist economy (Ghodsee 2012).

The two European conferences in 1974 and 1975 put forward distinct views about women's concerns. The feminist conference focused on international prostitution and female genital mutilation, but also provided a forum for information exchange about the tentative
efforts of women to organize, especially in developing countries. This need for better communication led to the formation of three new feminist networks (discussed below), conceived to assist women in asserting their customary and civil rights. In contrast, the Berlin conference celebrated the success of communist countries in facilitating women’s organizing in developing countries as one of several mass organizations. For example, the Women’s Union in Vietnam and Laos and the Women’s Federation in China are mass organizations that function as vehicles for the communist party to educate village women. Increased development assistance aimed at women has resulted in training the cadres to implement new programs that allow some space for village women to be heard. Still, this top-down approach has tended to promote dependency on the state (Tinker 2004a).

**Expansion of Civil Society Organizations**

The exponential growth of women’s organizations after the Mexico City conference, particularly in the developing countries, was made possible by the flow of funds from the UN, bilateral and multilateral agencies, foundations, and charitable organizations. Most promoted organizing women at the village level, but their approaches were influenced by the political and administrative systems in the recipient countries. In the former French colonies, for example, the provincial organization of government services, like that in communist countries, did not encourage local initiatives. Where new governments utilized the list system of voting, changing policy required women to join political parties to instigate new ideas. The most robust growth of women’s organizations occurred in countries using a single constituency system, in which members of the legislature could be influenced by local activists. An analysis of domestic violence legislation illustrates this point (see Tinker 2009).

Funding for women’s organizations was sparse before WID. Most were elite organizations whose middle-class members had time and money for charitable endeavors. Community groups might form over a crisis such as a flood or earthquake, but women found it difficult to justify devoting time to non-survival activities. Development funding helped to change that. Agricultural projects, for example, required women to be organized in order to teach them about new approaches to farming. These groups then became a conduit for information about health and family planning. Most critical, however, were the women hired to organize these groups: educated urban women who were paid. These urban women soon realized that many of the problems experienced by village women stemming from customary practices concerning marriage, inheritance, and domestic violence were their problems as well. Soon urban women were organizing at the city and country levels and meeting women from around the world at the UN women’s conferences and other global and regional fora. In many ways, then, development assistance was crucial to the growth of the transnational women’s movement.
I summarized this unanticipated result of development funding in a chapter in *Women and Gender Equity in Development Theory and Practice* (Tinker 2006).

**Critics of the WID Approach**

Critics of the women in development approach fall into two distinct categories: one questions the types of programs advocated, and the other critiques the ideological assumptions underlying liberal economic theory. Both groups misunderstand or misinterpret the original pragmatic focus used by WID advocates to bolster their arguments for change. Importantly, their critiques reflect unrealistic assumptions about the ease of changing either bureaucratic culture or power relationships within the family.

**Putting Women into Development Projects**

Since economic development was the goal of agency programming, WID advocates argued that projects would be more efficient if they took into account women’s economic contributions. Time use studies underscored the manifold activities of a woman’s day. One result was a flurry of appropriate technology projects designed to reduce women’s survival tasks. Another was the introduction of “income-producing” projects for women. Although some projects were culturally inappropriate and seldom resulted in income for women commensurate with their time spent, microcredit and microenterprise programs have generally improved women’s status, if not their income.

The comparison also underscores the difficulty of categorizing programs as either “practical” or “strategic.”

Despite the growing body of data on women’s work, WID supporters underestimated bureaucratic resistance to changing project design, which was based more on economic constructs than on an understanding of women’s economic and reproductive roles. Historically, planners understood that the introduction of cash crops in Africa meant increased work by women but nonetheless privileged cash over women’s welfare; it is no surprise that food production fell as women worked longer hours on less desirable land. Today the debate focuses on land grabbing by foreign corporations that will provide increased agricultural production for the country; the impact on women is unclear and widely discounted.

**Power in the Family**

WID proponents also underestimated the persistence of power relationships within families and households. As more women earned cash from jobs in the formal or informal sectors, their income was often appropriated by their husbands or partners. Even
when women invested in jewelry, men might take their gold rings or chains. When an enterprise employing women to dry fruit for sale became too successful in El Salvador, it was taken over by men. In Nicaragua, women were uninterested in microenterprises: any income they might earn would just reduce the household funds customarily given to them by their husbands (Molyneux 1985).

In countries where men paid bride price, any income or goods women might have accrued became the property of the man’s family. Women in such countries were cognizant of male power and often found ways to circumvent tradition. To prevent losing their possessions to extended family members upon the death of their husbands, market women in Dar-es-Salaam bought a house in the municipality where women could own property; when family members tried to claim a TV or refrigerator, the women said it belonged to someone else. In Kenya, women’s groups pooled their funds and bought plates and tables, which members could borrow for their individual celebrations.

These examples illustrate both the tenacity of customary law and how income could empower women. They also underscore the importance of cultural variation and the necessity to adjust programs to local circumstances.

**Patriarchy in Customary Law**

The notion that the patriarch knows best for all family or household members has been discredited. Amartya Sen investigated starvation and found that those with few entitlements, namely women, had the least claim on food. Yet Sen also questioned the utility of game theory to explain family dynamics, because neither party wished to disband the marriage (Sen 1990). The issue for women within the family or household was how to make power more equitable.

DAWN stressed the importance of placing women within their family context and criticized WID for emphasizing the needs and rights of individual women. The focus on individualism in the global North was criticized by women from the South (Jain 2004). Clearly, development projects face the dilemma of how to respond to family considerations without reinforcing women’s subordination. Since WID programs did focus on reducing the time women spent on survival activities, critics such as Caroline Moser termed such projects “practical,” as opposed to projects that confront women’s inequality, which she labeled “strategic” (1993). Such distinctions may be useful for planning purposes; actual implementation of projects muddied such divisions as unexpected outcomes often empowered women while not directly confronting family or state power. Just organizing women proved to be amazingly liberating; as women’s worldview expanded, they rapidly identified the sources of their oppression. The fact is that as women demanded more civil as well as economic rights, aid agencies continued to fund the women’s movement (Tinker 2006).

In retrospect, although the WID approach, with its premise that offering the benefits of development to women as well as men would eventually empower women, was too optimistic and seriously underestimated resistance by bureaucrats and patriarchs, its impact cannot be denied. The many efforts initiated to address agency constraints on implementation and to confront male bastions of continued oppression are well documented in this volume.
Ideological Critiques

Economic development was based on modernization theory, with its base in capitalism. WID did not contest this theoretical base, because its goal was to ensure women's concerns were an integral part of all development programs; funding for projects was offered within this parameter.

Still, there were critics. Lucille Mair, while recognizing that WID put women into the development project, argued in 1986 for reconsideration of the WID approach of integrating women into development, asking, “into what?” Peace advocate Elise Boulding cautioned that integration into the present world order would only increase women's dependency. She proposed a “strategic separatism that frees up the potentials of women for economic and social experiments on a small scale, outside the patriarchal social order” (1991, 23).

Marxist feminists articulated many problems with the “women and development” (WAD) approach to development during a 1978 workshop, “The Continuing Subordination of Women in the Development Process.” They noted that this literature was primarily empirical rather than theoretical, ignoring examples of how the capitalist system both fostered inequalities and was “equivocal in its identification and analysis of women’s subordination.” In addition, projects using this approach tended to “isolate women as a separate and homogenous category” (Young et al. 1981, ix–xix). Arguing that class was a more potent classifier of women's subordination than biological identification, the participants called for a gendered analysis. Since an individual’s gender reflects a kaleidoscope of her characteristics, the question arises as to what should be considered the predominant attribute. Transnational feminist scholars add another dimension to an analysis women's subordination: “hegemonic imperialism” that describes the present capitalistic system (Mohanty p. 20, 2003).

Research now shows that women of all classes and ethnicities are subject to male dominance; thus women organizing women as women has given strength and reach to the global women's movement. The importance of class and ethnicity has not disappeared, of course, as other chapters in this volume illustrate; but sex identity—not gender—remains the most defining characteristic.

Gender and Development

The impact of substituting gender for women differs substantially between the academy and development programs. The speed with which this change was embraced by international agencies in the early 1980s reflected the disillusionment among some women in the bureaucracies, who expected more rapid implementation of women's projects and began to question the premise of the programs. The switch also reflected the growing power of the women's movement, which was challenging patriarchy on many fronts; the use of gender was less threatening to men. Clearly, there will never be a gender movement.

Marxist feminists at the 1978 workshop also argued that by treating women as a distinct and isolated category, WID ignored gender relationships both within the household and in the labor force. Academically, the introduction of gender complexity and
gender relationships has provided a powerful analytical tool for the study of transformative social change. Yet even at universities that have changed terminology from women’s studies to gender studies, the campus community still tends to conflate the two words, obliterating the nuances inherent in *gender*. Using “women and gender studies” has clarified this issue in several instances.

The confusion about the meaning of *gender* in agency programs has been much more problematic. First, the term is almost impossible to translate into local languages. In Vietnam, two practitioners assigned to lecture about gender in projects were puzzled about the laughter until they realized that all five of the Vietnamese words they were using to approximate *gender* in effect referred to having sex. Despite such workshops to clarify the term, most practitioners still assumed that the programs were intended for women. In contrast, when the Ford Foundation representative in Vietnam interpreted gender to encompass men as well as women for a project funding three-month scholarships for foreign study, all the awardees were men, who were more readily able than women to leave their family responsibilities to others.

**Gender Mainstreaming**

Women in the development agencies argued that a reason for the slow adoption of programs to aid women was the “silo effect,” which separated projects by field. By abolishing the silos and agitating for the inclusion of gender in all policies and programs throughout the organization, advocates of *gender mainstreaming* hoped for improved outcomes. Feminists challenged the efficacy of this approach (Jahan 1995) while later case studies of UNDP, the World Bank, and ILO indicate how, “to a surprising degree,” these multilateral agencies have subverted the indent by incorporating mainstreaming into their practices. In keeping with their organizational goals, gender equity has become only one of their policy objectives. Prugl and Lustgarten argue that the result has been that the adoption of gender mainstreaming by the United Nations “turned a radical movement idea into strategy of public administration” (2006, 55, 68–69).

Ultimately, feminists recognized that constant pressure is necessary to ensure that women’s issues are not sidelined. Clearly, to affect institutional change, putting gender into all policies and programs must be accompanied by a “gender focal point” that lobbies for funding and monitors progress. As chair of women’s studies at UC Berkeley in the 1990s, I observed the critical role the department played in supporting courses throughout the curriculum that included women’s issues. Losing the WID/GAD offices in development agencies meant losing a focal point of lobbying for programs reflecting women’s priorities.

**Motherist and Difference Identities**

Gender is the sum of an individual’s characteristics. WID emphasized women’s economic value as salient rather than women’s reproductive or sexual roles. When women as mothers became a focal point for action, many feminists felt this reinforced patriarchal control. Thus in Argentina, when the Madres de la Plaza became the primary
resistance to the military government, accusing it of being antifamily and demanding that it account for the disappeared, feminists became uneasy. In both Chile and Peru, women’s groups confronted those authoritarian regimes by organizing communal kitchens to help the women affected by arrests and killings.

Elsewhere, the rise of Islamist parties has injected religious tenets into government policies. In Indonesia, where government policies privilege motherhood, formerly robust women’s organizations are being steered away from development projects. However, Islamist parties have not been as successful in Bangladesh, with its plethora of women’s organizations and other NGOs running projects for women. The relationship of motherhood to identity politics, especially in Muslim-dominant countries, is illuminated in Valentine Moghadam’s *Identity Politics and Women* (1994).

A distinct argument has arisen in Europe in which feminists reject the idea that women and men are the same; they also reject the thought that men are superior to women. Rather, both have views and experiences that need to be included in setting government priorities. This “difference feminism” has been particularly strong in France. Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland echoed this view when she included an equal number of women in her cabinet during her three terms in office: 1981, 1986–1989, and 1990–1996.

**Conundrum: Are Women the Same or Different?**

At first, most WID proponents felt that because men controlled the levels of power, we had to imitate them to demand more equal treatment for women. Like many others, I started wearing pantsuits and left my earrings at home. Others smoked cigarillos, although I never saw a woman with a pipe. I was aghast when a colleague brought her knitting to an important meeting. Wary of using man as a measure, I often noted in my talks that as long as man was the measure, women would always be second class. My action-research center, founded in 1979, was called the Equity Policy Center. I wanted justice, not sameness. This is a slippery slope, demanding equal treatment that is different.

**Justice: Equality, Merit, and Need**

At the height of the suffrage movement, many men argued that giving women the vote would sully their moral precepts, thus using the concept of difference to deny women their political rights. Suffragists argued for justice in educational and employment opportunities as well. Jane Jaquette suggests that three competing ideas of *justice* frame the modern debate and are based on the fairness of resource distribution. *Equality*
implies that each person has a right to similar resources, whether food or income or the vote. Equality is enforced by law. Challenges to this approach come from the difference argument, which purports that distinct attributes of women, such as childbearing, make equality as sameness irrelevant.

_Merit_ is justice earned. Access to material goods and other resources is linked to earning power. This is just because the marketplace is assumed to be just. That women have household responsibilities is irrelevant, because it is the individual justice that is earned, not social justice for family or community. In developing countries, the sexual division of labor distributed tasks; social conventions and harvest celebrations redistributed food. The introduction of new technologies and cash brought about the reordering of a more equitable social system toward one that privileged men. It was the unfairness of this impact of economic development on women that stoked demands for a new paradigm. In the modern context, merit implies equality of opportunity, but not equality of outcome. People who work harder receive just rewards.

Finally, _need_ is the moral imperative for altruism, for social justice. Religious traditions preach the moral value of providing resources for the poor. Governments extend support to victims of disaster in addition to programs for families living in poverty. Too often these recipients of charity are not perceived as equal, either by themselves or by society. The concept of justice as merit clouds the belief in equality (Jaquette 1990).

_Justice_ for women must be rethought and reconfigured to include both sameness and difference. Finding a path through the brambles should be a major priority for global feminism.

_Feminist Conflicts in the United States_

Efforts to address this issue must come from both academics and practitioners. Yet there is remarkably little interchange between women’s studies and women in international development. In the United States, women’s studies was spearheaded by graduate students reacting to the cavalier treatment women received during protests against the Vietnam War and the sexist attitudes of male civil rights activists. Patriarchy became a salient academic issue and humanities their base. Their antigovernment stance collided with women concerned with the impact of development abroad, who sought funds from government and foundations to study overseas. To those in women's studies, “Third World women” were members of US minorities. When USAID brought nearly forty women leaders from developing countries to take part in the National Women’s Studies Association (NWSA) conference held in Kansas in 1979, other participants vociferously objected to the presence of any US government agency, viewing government policy as monolithic. Some women disrupted talks by African and Asian women and spoke of trashing the materials about women and development programs. Instead, the association decided to pass a resolution prohibiting USAID from ever attending the NWSA conference again.

The ethnocentrism of women’s studies in the United States was still an issue when I was chair of the Women’s Studies Department at Berkeley from 1991 to 1993. I introduced several new courses and encouraged my colleagues to include non-US examples
in their teaching. A major grant from the Ford Foundation to thirteen universities in the United States was predicated on including international topics in women’s studies or putting women’s issues into international relations courses. Only one other university attempted the latter initiative, in which we were moderately successful. But I was astounded at a conference of these thirteen university teams when one participant exclaimed, after a year of cooperating with a university in Prague, that the US women had concluded that patriarchy was different in Europe. This example of limited knowledge about the rest of the world among academics in the United States is unfortunately not limited to women’s studies. Overseas, most university systems are less flexible than in the United States and seldom have programs to study about women. As a result, most studies about women take place in research centers that are concerned with how immense socioeconomic transitions are affecting them.

**Seeking Power in Government**

One of the bases for arguing for more women in decision-making positions in government is that women have different views of society, which should be reflected in policies and legislation. Putting women into development programs meant lobbying legislatures, cajoling bureaucrats, and initiating training programs. The creation of WID focal points within the bureaucracy encouraged more women to enter government service. Follow-up research critiqued projects helping improve women’s livelihood, health, and civil rights. All this activity propelled the global women’s movement. But what is granted by government can also be taken away, should politics change.

To protect the expansion of their rights and opportunities, women needed to embrace political participation. Doing so required a shift in the mind-set of many feminists, particularly where oppositional NGOs that had been funded by international donors challenged autocratic rule. This hesitation has been largely overcome since the Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1995, demanded special provisions to enable women to be elected or appointed to high-level decision-making positions and promoted the idea that 30 percent of membership is necessary to provide a “critical mass” that would enable the introduction of gender-sensitive policies and procedures. Proponents of quotas assert that “women leaders better represent the interests of women citizens, will introduce women’s perspectives into policymaking and implementation, and help expand women’s opportunities in society at large” (Htun 1998, 15).

This global rush by governments to set up quotas for women in elective bodies is widely supported and little examined. Do increased numbers of women in legislatures in fact translate into power to implement a feminist agenda? Or is the purpose of more women in elective offices to offer exposure of more citizens to the reality of compromise and governance? In other words, is this an effort to inculcate women into the male agenda, or is it an effort to change the agenda? Are women perceived as the same as men
or different? To illuminate this issue, I analyzed the impact of numbers on the two widely used electoral systems: proportionate representation and single constituency. Because women in PR systems are beholden to the party if they are selected as candidates, their ability to alter male priorities is limited. Further, activist women tend to focus on party politics rather than seek change through women's organizations. In contrast, candidates in single constituencies are reelected by those where they live.

Women's groups have a greater opportunity to influence candidates, and women candidates can push for feminist goals without necessarily going through the party. In 2008 I analyzed the fate of legislation to address domestic violence to illustrate this fact: neither France nor Sweden was able to pass this legislation, and Rwanda, with the highest percentage of women in the legislature, was able to pass it but unable to persuade its autocratic president to sign it into law. These three countries have variations of PR. Only India, with its single constituency system and robust women's organizations, succeeded in passing such legislation (Tinker 2004c, 2009).

**Women and Development in the Twenty-first Century**

The persistent inequities that women face globally are rooted in patriarchal customary law, which has frequently been embedded in new constitutions that proclaim women's civil equality. Such constitutions create a tension between traditional law and civil law; courts must decide which law is granted precedence. Critical issues revolve around women in the family: marriage, reproduction, inheritance, and legal subordination. A second set of issues reflects women's changing roles in the face of rapid socioeconomic transitions, from subsistence to monetization, from defined sexual division of labor to increased work for women (including their unpaid work in the reproductive sphere and waged work in the formal and informal economy). Finally, the conspicuous imbalance of political power slows women's quest for justice. WID proponents have addressed all these issues, as I summarize below.

Many of the WID projections of equity have yet to be realized; even the definition of *equity* has been challenged, as discussed previously. The overriding task for feminists is to agree on the outlines of the world system we seek. A debate on such a future involves applying philosophical precepts and moral reasoning to policies and projects that range from maternity leave and child care to women's ownership of assets.

**Customary Practices in a Changing World**

The US government's manipulation of women's expected roles after World War II ignited the second wave of the women's movement in the 1960s. Educated women sought jobs,
and working women demanded equal pay. Income was believed to be the first step toward greater equality. For women concerned with development practice, recognizing women’s economic worth seemed like the camel’s nose: challenging the sexual division of labor embedded in the underlying economic paradigm. And so it proved to be, as recounted in this chapter.

As development programs facilitated women’s organizing, women chafed at traditional practices regarding marriage; inheritance; and their ability to make decisions about their fertility and activity outside the home involving work, education, or joining organizations. In many cases the only path to greater independence from the family was to eschew marriage altogether and assume household headship. Soon women were demanding greater access to such newly available opportunities as education, property ownership, and credit. But the contradictions between earning an income and raising a family alone meant that women not only still worked the double day, but also had limited time to work outside the house and so earned less.

Justice for Women in the Twenty-first Century

Few women aspire to be a single mother, but persistent gender stereotypes seem to become stronger once a child is added to the working couple. Debates over women’s work in the home and outside escalated, especially as extended families typical in developing countries began to fragment. Home-based work was adopted by many women as a way to combine their myriad responsibilities. In industrialized countries, many governments and some industries provide child care. Elsewhere, women make choices among paying for often expensive child care, finding local women who provide care in their homes, re-creating extended family arrangements, or staying home.

What do women want today? How do we reconcile women’s distinct role in reproduction with equal opportunity in the workplace? If the tent of patriarchal privilege has been flattened, what sort of family or household structure should be erected? Designing a just and equitable dwelling for the family in a community that allows choice and difference has become the challenge for women today.

Notes

1. From August 1951 to March 1953, I followed the first post-independence Indian General Elections and the proceedings of the first Parliament, interviewing party leaders throughout India for my PhD dissertation, “Representation and Representative Government in the Indian Republic.” My 1965 research studies in India focused on how states were implementing recommendations of the Balwantrai Mehta Commission, accepted by the National Development Council in 1958, which gave local councils or panchayats more input into community development schemes. Deficient in funds and authority, panchayats languished until the passage of the 73rd Amendment to the Indian Constitution in 1972, which mandated the establishment of panchayati raj throughout the country. I have also
written about the implementation of this constitutional provision, which requires that one-third of all seats be filled by women.

In Indonesia from 1957 to 1959, my research focused on the first post-independence Indonesian national elections and the functioning of the newly elected legislative assemblies at all levels of government. I researched urban governance in Indonesia in 1972, the influence of nongovernmental organizations in 1996, and the attempts to increase women’s representation in Parliament in 2008 through the electoral laws.

2. See Winslow for descriptions of all the UN Conference for Women 1995.
3. Personal communication with the Swedish project managers, August 2013.
4. This tenacity of tradition is evident in the Communist countries of China, Vietnam, and Laos. Confucian authority patterns trumpeted the equality ideals of Communism as these countries began to experiment with more open economic systems. (Tinker & Summerfield 1999).

References


This chapter focuses on Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN), a network of feminist scholars, researchers, and activists from the global South. Founded in 1984 during the preparations for the UN’s Third World Conference on Women, held in Nairobi in 1985, DAWN has been working for economic and gender justice and sustainable and democratic development, as well as providing a forum for feminist research, analysis, and advocacy on global issues (economic, social, and political) affecting the livelihoods, living standards, rights, and development prospects of women, especially poor and marginalized women in regions of the global South.

DAWN’s chief significance is that it was the first South-based, international network of feminist scholar-activists that emerged at the end of the UN Decade for Women (1976–1985), at a time when feminism was largely associated with white, middle-class women from Europe and North America. As a South-based network, its perspective differs from that of North-based networks—even those that are international in orientation. This “Southern” perspective acknowledges the colonial roots in which the specific experiences of Southern women are embedded, which reflect the racism of Eurocentrism as well as the structured marginalization and disempowerment that anti-colonial struggles have sought to resist and overturn.

As a network of scholar-activists, DAWN developed a methodology that drew directly on the experiences of women living in the South, focusing on the lived realities of poor women; validating knowledge produced through dialogue and debate; reflecting Southern women’s diversity based on ethnicity, culture, and class, among other
differences; and negotiating differences to produce an analysis that is holistic and political. DAWN is rare in combining analysis, advocacy, and action for gender, economic, and ecological justice.

The Context in Which DAWN Emerged

DAWN emerged from a multifaceted context that included the following:

- Historical moments and movements of countries and regions of the global South: women’s activism in the anticolonial struggles of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the emergence of women’s leadership from these struggles, as well as new opportunities for women to access the education and training necessary for entry into “nation-building” professions that were opening up for women as part of newly independent nation states: teaching, nursing, social welfare, economics, and law.

- The UN’s designation of 1975 as International Women’s Year and 1976–1985 as the Decade for Women, which provided the critical space for the emergence of women’s voices internationally.

- Feminist scholarship, especially that of Marxist and socialist feminists on political economy, history, and anthropology.

Women’s Activism in the Anticolonial Struggles of the Late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries

The first half of the twentieth century was a period of liberation for colonial territories, all of which were on the continents of the South. They achieved emancipation from various oppression in different spaces and contexts and an affirmation of “selves” across geographical as well as social categories. Within these colonial contexts were various forms of organized anticolonial protest—peasants, workers, and ethnic minorities, among others—in which women were heavily engaged. Women often emerged from these experiences with a heightened awareness of their gender-based marginalization within these larger struggles.

Groups of former colonies were also mobilizing into international and regional political formations. One such group of nation-states formed the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), proclaiming new identities—neither West (seen as capitalist) nor East (seen as communist). The struggles of Southern women to upturn gender hierarchies were part of this narrative.

The expansion of UN membership by the entry of the newly independent nation-states of the South transformed the space for international discourse, creating an
arena for challenging domination by the industrialized countries of the North and raising the concerns of the millions emerging from colonialism in the South to claim better living conditions. It is not surprising that women entered and occupied this space, using it to advance their own claims for agency.

Women contributed ideas on agendas and language at crucial moments. For example, at the birth of the United Nations, during the conference to draft the UN Charter, a woman from the Dominican Republic in the Caribbean, Minerva Bernardino, one of the signatories, along with her feminist sisters, ensured that the document read “equal rights among men and women” instead of “equal rights among men.” Similarly, an Indian woman, Hansa Mehta, a member of the UN Commission on the Status of Women who was involved in drafting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, protested the unthinking exclusion of women in the original draft and successfully urged changing the text from “all men” to “all human beings.”

Unquestionably, this emerging presence of women at the UN led to the launch of women as a political constituency, within which women of the South became a distinct political voice, at the UN First World Conference of Women, held in Mexico City in 1975, and subsequently during the UN Decade for Women.

The UN Decade for Women (1976–1985)

*The Decade nurtured a social movement which was to address every aspect of life—from the personal to the political, from the domestic to the public, from the deepest levels of women's consciousness to the most outward expressions of women's agency.*

(Antrobus 2004, 62)

*It also provided the experience of learning from women coming from all around the world; of finding extraordinary similarities of not only gendered living but ideas; of bonds that never broke—arguing, negotiating, loving, merging identities . . . affirming difference—it was the most enabling space for organizing selves, in the many ways . . . necessary.*

(Personal communication)

It is difficult to find words to describe the impact of the UN Decade for Women on women around the world. It was life-changing for many and a watermark in public policies and programs that would transform male-female relations everywhere, even though most people may not be aware of the context in which these changes took place: from laws against discrimination against women to changes in men’s roles in domestic life and increasing responsibility for housework and child care, and from the introduction of women’s studies and other programs at universities to the increase in women’s access to a range of academic and professional fields previously closed to them. The UN Decade linked academics and researchers, bureaucrats and activists in processes of
policymaking that would change women's lives in countries across the global South and industrialized North. In the academy, it produced new understanding, knowledge, and theories that challenged conventional wisdom.

The UN Decade was framed by the convening of three UN World Conferences on Women: the first in Mexico City (1975), the second (mid-decade) in Copenhagen (1980), and the third in Nairobi (1985). Its impact in the global South may be traced through the emergence of Southern women's voices as a powerful force, reflected in the exponential increase in the numbers of Southern participants representing governments and women's organizations. At the Mexico City conference, Southern governments first challenged US hegemony by including on the agenda calls for a new international economic order (NIEO) and by presenting a political declaration linking racism and Zionism. At the mid-Decade Conference held in Copenhagen, the Secretary-General, Ambassador Lucille Mair of Jamaica, allowed the NIEO and the plight of Palestinian women to be included on the agenda. The culmination of this growth in strength was most apparent at the NGO Forum and Conference in Nairobi in 1985. The NGO Forum was headed by Nita Barrow of Barbados, a well-known leader in international circles, while Secretary-General Gertrude Mongella of Tanzania presided over the governmental conference. At both events there were overwhelming numbers of women participants from the global South. Thousands of Kenyan women walked for miles from towns and villages across the country to Nairobi to participate in the NGO Forum.

**Feminist Scholarship**

Feminist scholarship played an important role in raising awareness of the conditions of women around the world. Ester Boserup's groundbreaking book, *Woman's Role in Economic Development*, had drawn attention to the vital role of women in agriculture. There was also significant work by Marxist and socialist feminists on political economy, history, sociology, and anthropology, whose research and writing sought to bring a gender perspective to various fields and laid the basis for pioneering work on reproduction and the care economy. Women's studies centers in universities in both the North and South were bringing women together to share their particular views on various issues, including religion, and in the process unpacking theories, challenging given knowledge, and rewriting his/her story.

UN agencies such as the International Labour Organization (ILO) and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) were also collecting and analyzing data on women's roles in economic development. A regional conference, “Women in the Labour Force in Latin America,” which brought together feminist demographers and other scholars, was held at the Instituto Universitario de Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro (IUPERJ), Brazil, in 1980. Its purpose was to improve the understanding of and collection and analysis of data on women's roles in the labor force, but it was located within the broader political economy of patriarchy and the sexual division of labor.
This conference was a turning point in building intercontinental connections. The Latin Americans had been encouraged by the New York–based donor agency to invite one representative each from Africa and Asia. Chosen were Marie-Angelique Savane (Senegal), president of the Association of African Women for Research and Development (AAWORD), the first pan-African association of women, and Devaki Jain (India), director of the Institute of Social Studies Trust (ISSST), a women’s research center based in Bangalore. This led to the convening of similar meetings in Asia and Africa, funded by the ILO.

The Founding of DAWN

DAWN was conceived during the preparatory period for the UN Third World Conference on Women, held in Nairobi in 1985. Devaki Jain, the “founding mother” of DAWN, reflects on her experience of this process in the following sections.

The Emergence of DAWN

At the UN Second World Conference on Women, held in Copenhagen in 1980, women began to see the “differences” in perspectives between feminists from the North and South. For example, the Secretary-General of the conference, Dr. Lucille Mair of Jamaica, an experienced academic and stateswoman, spoke about the NIEO, of initiatives to settle the Palestine issue peacefully, and so forth. But our Scandinavian hosts saw this as “politicizing” the women’s movement and splintering the solidarity with “traditional international divides.” In the unofficial spaces, the “differences” were expressed in other ways. Women from the South were uncomfortable with the patronizing assumptions of their Northern sisters, expressed in the latter’s research, analyses, and conclusions regarding the “South.” We appeared to be poor and illiterate, trapped in archaic cultures and conventions, needing to be rescued by modern systems. Southern women objected to the incompleteness and inappropriateness of this analysis and its implied claim of cultural and political superiority. There was also a certain inequality in the descriptions, because from the perspective of women from the South, Northern women appeared economically marginalized and socially trivialized in their own societies.

In preparation for the Third World Conference on Women (Nairobi, 1985), the UN and other multilateral agencies were looking for ideas to incorporate into the conference documents that would reflect Third World women’s experience-based critique of UN development cooperation. The Women in Development (WID) group of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) commissioned a review of more than forty-eight evaluations conducted by the UN and donor agencies of development projects that had been targeted to the poor and women in the South, as a basis for their contribution to the Nairobi
conference. The review was discussed at the OECD/DAC/WID pre-Nairobi meeting, held in Paris in 1983. It revealed, as other national studies had done,\textsuperscript{12} that in addition to not relieving the burdens of hunger and poverty, development cooperation projects in Third World countries were often worsening the economic, social, and political situation of women, especially poor women.

I presented a lecture at the Paris meeting, which analyzed 111 reports\textsuperscript{13} of North-South transfers of funds for WID projects, showing that almost all had had a negative impact on poor women because their roles had not been accurately identified.\textsuperscript{14} I subsequently circulated this lecture to a selection of women whom I had met in my travels or with whose work I was familiar, from each continent of the South. In Africa, they were Fatima Mernissi (Morocco) and Marie-Angelique Savane (Senegal); in Asia, Hameeda Hossain (Bangladesh), Noeleen Heyzer (Malaysia), and Gita Sen (India); in Latin America and the Caribbean, Neuma Aguiar (Brazil), Peggy Antrobus (Caribbean), and Lourdes Arizpe and Carmen Barroso (Mexico); and in the Pacific, Claire Slatter (Fiji Islands).

**The Bangalore Meeting**

My findings resonated with all of these women, and I organized a meeting in Bangalore in August 1984 to discuss and debate our “alternative.” The meeting was hosted by the ISST,\textsuperscript{15} the research center of which I was director. It was funded by the Ford Foundation and received institutional support from the Christian Michelsen Institute (CMI, Norway) and the Institute of Social Studies (ISS, The Netherlands). The meeting was also attended by supportive Northern colleagues from these institutions.\textsuperscript{16}

To assist countries in their preparations for the Nairobi conference, the UN had sent out a questionnaire to measure the disparities between men and women in a selection of indicators such as health, education, and employment. The questionnaire’s linear framework did not make the connections between women’s social and economic status and macro policies or identify the impacts of macro forces on women’s lives and realities on the ground.

In three unforgettable days, the Bangalore group critiqued and transformed the UN’s framework for the Nairobi conference. In reflecting on our experiences of development during the Decade for Women, we identified the major “crisis” facing each of our regions. Starting with Africa, the flash point was hunger, a food crisis. In Latin America, it was the debt crisis; South Asia was experiencing crises of poverty and religious fundamentalism; and in the Pacific Islands militarism was the major preoccupation. Poor women in these regions were not only engaged in and contributing to their national economies, but were both suffering from and responding creatively to these macroeconomic policies and political onslaughts. A new framework emerged that linked poor women’s situations, both negative and positive, to the macroeconomic and political framework of their countries and regions, specifically to the food, energy, and debt crises, along with militarism and religious fundamentalism.
We then began to explore how this framework could be captured in panels at the NGO Forum in Nairobi and in a document for the conference. We chose a title for our project, Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN), which symbolized a new start, a new path, and a new era.

The follow-up mobilization process for the Nairobi conference was located at the ISST, which raised funds for the consultations to inform the document as well as for the conference panels. Support came from the Ford Foundation, the Population Council (NY), NORAD, and FINNIDA.

DAWN’s Book—Development Crises and Alternative Visions: Third World Women’s Perspectives

Gita Sen reflects on the writing of DAWN’s first platform document:

\begin{quote}
The writing of Development Crises and Alternative Visions: Third World Women’s Perspectives, was a major undertaking. The analysis that had emerged from the meeting in Bangalore was, of course, incomplete and inchoate (as is to be expected of any unstructured conversation held over a couple of days). It had not only to be synthesized but put into a cogent framework.

That framework was informed by a critique of the political economy of development combined with a fleshing out of the meaning of women’s rights and struggles, including the struggle for bodily autonomy. It drew on many sources, including the work of Marxist and socialist feminists, political economists, historians and anthropologists, and the work being done in the UK on production and reproduction—later referred to as the ‘care’ economy. It included a critique of imperialism as well as of traditional socialism, without ever using those terms or getting caught up in the jargon. It created a common framework that feminists in both the South and North could use.

There were many consultations held and written responses received. The Bangalore group was a very important reference point and interlocutor for the analysis, and the draft had to be written and then finalized through a herculean effort within a very short space of time. Without all of this, the book could never have become what it did.\end{quote}

The first draft of Development Crises and Alternative Visions was taken to a follow-up meeting hosted by CMI in Bergen, where detailed comments and suggestions were provided by the Bangalore group, as well as Zene Tadesse and Zubeida Ahmed from the ILO. The book was then completed by Gita Sen and Caren Grown and published in time for the Nairobi conference.

DAWN’s analysis in Development Crises and Alternative Visions pointed out that only a few countries that had pursued export-led strategies for economic growth had achieved comparable gains in social wellbeing. In fact, countries that had experienced economic booms had a record of increasing class and gender inequalities. The book located the structural roots of poverty across nations and regions not in insufficient economic growth, but in unequal control over production and access to resources, finance, and trade. DAWN’s philosophy was that development planning needed to change so
that meeting the needs of the poor became the central goal. If this happened, the work of poor women would become essential to the conceptualization and implementation of development programs. DAWN’s approach also called for a worldwide reduction in military spending and control over the activities of multinational corporations.¹⁹

Because the network saw the solutions to the problems of poor women as being political, it called on women’s organizations to form coalitions with workers’ organizations and across political affiliations to “build a broad-based local and national movement.” DAWN’s “manifesto” was a combination of political analysis and practical advice for women’s organizations seeking change at the local, national, and international levels.²⁰

DAWN gave Southern women a powerful voice internationally in UN fora, academic circles, and advocacy in general. Before the emergence of DAWN as a Third World network, women’s advocacy had tended to be Eurocentric and narrowly defined. For example, advocacy on economic issues focused on affirmative action and “equal pay for work of equal value,” a demand based on the assumption that women who worked operated in the formal labor force, and indeed, that there were jobs to be had. Little attention was paid to the fact that many women worked in the informal sector, or to the factors other than patriarchy that made it difficult for women to find work outside the home.²¹ There was little appreciation of the interconnections between women’s lived realities and the larger political, economic, and social relations of class, race/ethnicity, and gender, embedded in the power structures and policy frameworks that determined women’s access to resources and opportunities necessary for their wellbeing and advancement. DAWN’s identification and analysis of the “reproductive crisis,” which arose from economic policies that separated economic production/growth from social reproduction/human development, broke new ground in the WID discourse. The analysis of gender and colonialism also highlighted the significance of unequal gender relations and women’s labor to processes of colonial exploitation.

Indeed, DAWN’s conceptualization of the reproductive crisis encompasses three other crises that had not been linked previously in the discourse. First was the debt crisis, with its structural adjustment policy (SAP) framework that cut public services, thereby reducing women’s access to health, education, and welfare (services essential to social reproduction) and to work (those employed in the services cut were disproportionately female), even as these cuts increased the burden on women’s time as they were required to fill these gaps.²² Second was the environmental crisis, which had led to the food and energy crises, as well as birth defects and other illnesses related to the fallout from nuclear tests in the Pacific.²³ Finally, the crisis in governance, brought about by the framework of the Washington Consensus, redefined the role of the state to privilege the market over civil society.²⁴

In short, DAWN’s analysis of the colonial roots of Southern women’s subordination, and the systemic links among macroeconomic policies, the debt crisis, depleted social services, environmental degradation, food security, militarism, religious fundamentalism and political conservatism, and social and cultural practices, opened up a whole new way of understanding the factors that constrained women’s lives. DAWN thus
provided a powerful and holistic analytical framework for advocacy aimed at improving the lives of women in the global South.

DAWN’s book and panels had a massive impact on the Nairobi conference, not least because they challenged Northern definitions of feminism and the notion that feminism was irrelevant to poor women from the South. Its analysis and advocacy at the Nairobi conference destabilized the Northern moorings of the feminist movement and gave voice to Southern feminist perspectives. The decision of DAWN’s founding members to continue the work of the network was reinforced, if not determined, by this impact.

The Evolution of DAWN’s Program and Structure

In 2004 DAWN celebrated its twentieth anniversary, in Cape Town, South Africa. In its first twenty years, a number of strategic decisions had been taken in building the network’s programs and organizational structure.

The 1990s: DAWN’s Influence on the Global Development Agenda

DAWN’s contribution to building the global women’s movement was most evident in the context of the UN World Conferences of the 1990s, which were open to nongovernmental organization (NGO) participation as never before. Gita Sen and Bene Madunagu of DAWN summarize this contribution:

*The conferences of the 1990s were key forums where (global) challenges were addressed and where new directions for bridging gender justice and economic justice began to take shape. They were also the first significant occasions when “women’s issues” came forward from the margins of women-only conferences into the mainstream global agenda. The Cairo Consensus of 1994 represented a major paradigm shift in this regard with respect to the population debate and related policies. But agreements reached in Cairo with respect to gender and reproductive rights were built upon agreements on women’s human rights that had been previously reached at the UN Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna in 1993. Following this progression, the commitments to gender equality and reproductive health that were reached at the World Summit on Social Development (WSSD) in Copenhagen in 1995 were fundamentally based on the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) definitions, while the Beijing Platform for Action (BPfA) of the Fourth World Conference on Women expanded on all three—the Vienna agreements on women’s human rights, the Cairo recommendations on reproductive health and rights, and the WSSD macroeconomic agenda.*

With the analysis, skills, and confidence developed during the previous decade, women who had worked with each other in a variety of projects, programs, consultations, and negotiations since the mid-1970s came together through alliances and coalitions to participate in the international, regional, and other fora of the 1990s. Methodologically grounded in the lived experiences of women in the global South; sensitive to regional differences; and holistic in its consideration of political, economic, social, and cultural factors, DAWN contributed to the formulation and negotiation
of common/global positions articulated by women engaged in these conferences. Following are some examples of the outcomes resulting from DAWN’s engagement in the global mobilization of women in the 1990s:

At the NGO Forum of the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992, DAWN’s platform document, “Environment and Development: Grassroots Women’s Perspectives” exploded a fundamental misconception about women and the environment, that environmental degradation was caused by over-population, lack of knowledge and poverty. DAWN members had previously made the link between the environment and trade in a number of international fora. They had argued that trade liberalization would limit the ability of governments to protect the environment, and that it was essential to take account of the long-term needs of people and the environment in growth indicators. In particular, they pointed to the consumption patterns of the wealthy (in both the North and South), and proposed substituting “sustaining the livelihoods of the poor” as an alternative to the approach that would (continue to) use technology and pricing to “sustain the livelihoods of the rich.”26 The network also participated in drafting the Earth Charter, which was led by the Interfaith community. In addition, DAWN partnered with individual women and women’s networks in the North and was a member of the International Planning Action Committee chaired by Bella Abzug that organized the World’s Women Congress for a Healthy Planet. The Women’s Action Agenda 21 was the outcome that fed into Global Agenda 21.

The UN World Conference on Human Rights (WCHR), held in Vienna in 1993, had not been targeted by DAWN for its program of advocacy in this period. However, international feminist mobilization for the conference, including a series of tribunals organized by the Centre for Women’s Global Leadership (CWGL),27 in which women articulated their experiences of discrimination, marginalization, and abuse within a human rights framework, contributed to DAWN’s preparatory work for the UN International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), held in Cairo in 1994.

DAWN played a key role in the processes leading up to ICPD. The network was part of a broad coalition of Southern and Northern advocates who succeeded in shifting the agenda of population policies away from demographically driven approaches toward policies grounded in concerns for human rights, social wellbeing, and gender equality, with particular emphasis on reproductive health and rights.28 This advocacy thus resulted in the formulation of a new framework that linked reproductive health and rights to women’s empowerment and agreed on state accountability for providing the resources to guarantee the provision of services—that is, the implementation of the ICPD program of action.

The DAWN platform document *Challenging the Given*, prepared for the UN World Summit on Social Development (WSSD), held in Copenhagen in 1995, focused on the prevailing socioeconomic and political structures that aggravated problems of poverty and unemployment, the themes of the summit, and called on women to challenge them.
At the summit, DAWN was part of the Women’s Alliance for Economic Alternatives, comprising feminist networks from the South and North, which drew heavily on DAWN’s analysis of the impact of structural adjustment policies on the poor, especially poor women.

Another DAWN platform document *Markers on the Way: The DAWN Debates on Alternative Development*, prepared for the UN Fourth World Conference on Women (FWCW), held in Beijing in 1995, made the following statement linking production and reproduction, which has since been widely quoted:

> Women stand at the crossroads between production and reproduction, between economic activity and the care of human beings, and therefore between economic growth and human development. They are the workers in both spheres—those most responsible, and therefore with most at stake, those who suffer the most when the two work at cross-purposes, and those most sensitive to the need for better integration between the two.

The *Markers* document also called for a three-pronged approach: (1) “challenging globalization”; (2) “transforming the state” (“to make . . . it more transparent, open, and participatory [and hence] more accountable [thereby strengthening] countervailing institutions to executive power); and (3) “strengthening civil society” to “function as watchdogs over the state.”

DAWN’s experience of mobilizing for ICPD perhaps highlights most clearly the significance of the network’s contribution to global feminist struggles and to transforming the agenda and outcomes. A full understanding needs to start with the context in which the text of the plan of action was drafted and adopted in Cairo. Population policy has always been contentious. Clashes between perspectives and points of view had occurred at both previous World Population Conferences, in Bucharest (1974) and Mexico City (1984). Never before Cairo, however, had so many actors discussed population policy in the international arena.

The context for the debate at ICPD was the “alarming spread of fundamentalism”:

> a political phenomenon with impacts at national and international levels (Reproductive Health and Justice, International Women’s Conference for Cairo ’94). At the national level, fundamentalist discourse manipulates religious, communal, racial, ethnic and nationalist loyalties as a source of cultural legitimacy while defusing the energy of political movements away from basic needs and development. At the international level, fundamentalism has particularly interfered with the reproductive rights debate.

This political understanding was pivotal to devising strategies and mobilizing support for a broad debate that sought to redefine the ICPD agenda from a narrow focus on birth control to one on women’s sexual and reproductive health and rights.

A major actor was the population establishment. At the time demographically driven approaches dominated the field. In many countries of both the South and North, family planning programs were equated with birth control and with practices that focused on
“targeting women,” particularly poor and ethnic minority women, to accept contraceptives regardless of health considerations.

The Vatican was a major antagonist. As far back as the NGO Forum in Nairobi in 1985, it was clear that the Vatican would seek to form strategic alliances with women’s organizations from the South that had legitimate concerns about the harmful effects of reproductive technologies on women’s health. At UNCED the Vatican had attempted to promote its legitimacy by standing with progressive women’s networks that rejected the Malthusian argument that overpopulation was the cause of environmental degradation. In the lead-up to ICPD, the Vatican also formed alliances with several Islamic states, seeking to strengthen the influence it already had at the UN through its relationships with states in which the Christian Right wielded a strong influence. This coalition of forces sought to characterize ICPD as being about “abortion and same sex marriage”—hot button issues that were intended to derail feminist advocacy at the conference.

Some feminist advocates remained strongly opposed to contraceptive technologies pushed by birth-control-oriented family planning programs that could compromise women’s health. The question was how to address these concerns while securing women’s right to access safe and affordable contraceptives. DAWN also had to navigate the tension between African advocates’ focus on women’s health and Latin American feminists’ prioritization of women’s rights. DAWN’s tried and tested strategy of taking account of regional differences made this easier than it might have been, and a clear link was made between women’s reproductive health and rights.

The negotiations were made even more complex by the issue of G-77 solidarity. As a Southern network, DAWN was sensitive to the fact that the political support of G-77 countries could not be assumed. Indeed, those with a strong allegiance to the Vatican and Islam would have to be counted among the strongly opposed. The ability to negotiate the ICPD program of action in such a situation would be a major test for the political skills of the network.

Following UNCED, DAWN had worked to build a South-based consensus on the linkages among population, development, and reproductive health and rights. Guided by the process and methodology of regional consultations and a concept paper prepared by Sonia Correa, DAWN’s research coordinator on the theme, DAWN mobilized debates and analyses that led to the publication in 1994 of Population and Reproductive Health: Feminist Perspectives from the South.

Feminist achievements at the UN World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna, 1993) had laid the foundations for strong advocacy on reproductive rights, and DAWN was able to build alliances with a range of women’s rights advocates and organizations that had been working to advance the issue. Continued efforts to engage and integrate complexities and to negotiate language that could be presented in the draft program of action presented at the conference culminated in the Reproductive Health and Justice, International Women’s Conference for Cairo ’94, held in Rio de Janeiro in early 1994.

Above all, DAWN partnered with other international networks and organizations, including the International Women’s Health Coalition (IWHC), Women, Environment
and Development Organization (WEDO), Association for Women’s Rights and Development (AWID), and Center for Women’s Global Leadership (CWGL), to strategize and carry out the advocacy required for the successes that were achieved.

The New Millennium

In the new millennium, right-wing forces worked relentlessly to reverse the advances in women’s rights achieved at the world conferences of the 1990s. DAWN found itself working with its partners in the various UN five-year and ten-year review conferences and their preparatory processes to defend the gains that had been won.

During this period DAWN also began to focus on the linkages between what had by then become its four research themes: “political economy of globalization”; “sexual and reproductive health and rights” (SRHR); “political restructuring and social transformation” (PRST); and “sustainable livelihoods,” subsequently renamed “political ecology and sustainability.”

In 2000, following an intensive interregional research process coordinated by Viviene Taylor of South Africa, DAWN’s research coordinator on the PRST theme, DAWN published a third platform document, *Marketisation of Governance: Critical Feminist Perspectives from the South.* This work challenged the neoliberal ideas of political reform that had emerged with economic restructuring; critiqued, while reclaiming, the state; and offered a Southern feminist vision of genuine political restructuring to realize the kind of social transformation necessary to achieve equitable, gender-just, democratic, and environmentally sustainable development. The book was launched during the five-year review of the WSSD, and research papers commissioned for the project were published regionally.

Perhaps the most significant new development in the network’s program in the new millennium was the 2003 launch of the DAWN Training Institutes (DTI) on feminist advocacy for young women, an intensive, three-week training program focused on the transfer of DAWN’s analysis and experience in global negotiations for gender and economic justice to young feminists from the South. In each DTI, thirty young women (under the age of thirty-five) were selected from applicants from women’s organizations and networks in the South or from promising individual applicants engaged in relevant research or activism on women’s rights. Since 2003 DAWN has conducted four DTIs.

At the recommendation of participants in the first DTI, DAWN also organized several Regional Training Institutes (RTIs), which allowed the network to engage in follow-up work with DTI alumnae in their own regions, consolidating the learning while increasing the outreach to a new generation of feminist scholars, researchers, and activists. Several DTI/RTI alumnae have subsequently engaged in DAWN’s global advocacy work. The DTI program has also helped to build networks of young feminists within and across regions.

In recent years DAWN’s work in the various regions of the South has been undertaken within the framework of gender, ecology and economic justice (GEEJ), which emphasizes the linkages among these three areas in advocacy. In launching the
GEEJ project, DAWN organized a series of regional consultations and training institutes, titled “Strengthening Policy Analysis and Advocacy on Gender, Economic and Ecological Justice,” in three regions—the South Pacific, Africa, and Latin America—in 2010 and 2011. Participants included “researchers and analysts from academia and civil society [and] policy makers from government, inter-governmental and regional institutions . . . along with young and local women activists,” all of whom worked in the areas of gender, economic, and ecological justice.

The training institutes and consultations aim to (1) provide venues for sharing information on a range of global and regional responses to the world’s multiple crises, including new initiatives that challenge hegemonic thinking and systems in finance, trade, monetary, and environmental policymaking; (2) map current measures, mechanisms, and programs at national and regional levels; and (3) discuss possibilities, constraints, and contradictions. This approach forms the basis for DAWN’s current/ongoing advocacy work, especially in relation to the reviews of the conferences of the 1990s, namely Rio (UNCED), Cairo (ICPD), and Beijing (FWCW).

Structure and Transitions

The Bangalore meeting in 1984 may be said to represent the conception of DAWN. The idea and name of DAWN, the founding members, the first platform document, and the advocacy for the Nairobi conference were discussed intensely at that meeting. In retrospect, we tend to regard the network’s founding process as having lasted from Bangalore ’84 to Nairobi ’85, and the gestation period from Nairobi ’85 to Rio ’92. It was only toward the end of the NGO Forum in Nairobi, recognizing the impact of our message, that we discussed the creation of a network to continue and sustain the work. Following the panels, a meeting was held at which Neuma Aguiar was nominated to carry forward the work.

Neuma Aguiar convened a follow-up meeting in 1986 at the Instituto Universitario de Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro (IUPERJ), her organizational base, which determined the program and structure for the next few years. The most important outcomes of the meeting were as follows:

- A program of research was launched, focused on the two themes, “Women’s Movements and Visions” and the “Debt, Fuel and Energy Crisis.”
- The DAWN Constitution was adopted.
- The first DAWN Steering Committee was named, comprising a general coordinator and regional coordinators, each responsible for a program area: research, training, publications, communications, and advocacy.
- Neuma Aguiar was confirmed as the first general coordinator.
- It was agreed that the Secretariat should rotate regionally, starting with its location in Rio de Janeiro.
A challenging issue that emerged at the meeting was whether to include women living in North as members of the network. After a vigorous discussion, it was agreed that for strategic reasons, DAWN’s membership should be limited to women living in the South. The imbalances in terms of access and resources between feminists located in the North and South were acknowledged, and it was felt that a network of South-based feminists would add something different and enrich the analysis and advocacy necessary for a truly international feminist movement. However, in so doing, DAWN both validated the support that the network had received for its work from Northern individual feminists and institutions and committed itself to actively building alliances and coalitions with Northern feminist networks and organizations (see the ICPD case study discussed previously).

The general coordinator traveled extensively over the next four years, sharing DAWN’s analysis at numerous international meetings and visiting the regions to organize the research on the two major themes selected in 1986. Other founding members were also engaged in this process. A newsletter, DAWN Informs, was produced. In 1990 two volumes, Alternatives, were published on the research themes “Women’s Movements and Visions” and the “Debt, Fuel and Energy Crisis.” The authors and content of these publications give a sense of the scholars and the scope of their work at the time. However, there were many gaps, and as valuable as they were in terms of scholarly work, the publications did not provide the kind of analysis on which advocacy could be based, nor did they break new ground—the hallmark of the first publication, Development Crises and Alternative Visions.

In these years DAWN’s ideas made their way into important Southern coalitions. Two DAWN founding members were invited to join the South Commission: Devaki Jain (ISST, India) and Marie Angélique Savane (AAWORD). Such linkages facilitated cross-fertilization between G-77 approaches and Southern women’s experiences of and demands for development. DAWN’s outline was used in drafting the NAM Women and Development Conference Declaration (New Delhi, 1985). DAWN’s strategic association with these powerful Southern formations was critical for its legitimacy, and it facilitated relations with G-77 members in the negotiation processes at the UN World Conferences of the 1990s.

Meeting again at IUPERJ in Rio de Janeiro in 1990, the DAWN Steering Committee, after reviewing the work of the network over the previous four years, agreed that the original structure was not realistic. It was decided that the role of regional coordinator should be that of regional focal point, linking DAWN’s work to the research and advocacy being undertaken in each region, and that there should be a research coordinator for each theme—someone knowledgeable on the subject and with a critical feminist perspective. Peggy Antrobus was appointed as the new general coordinator, and the Secretariat moved to the Caribbean.

What can we learn from DAWN’s three decades of experience in terms of its organizational structure, program focus, and contribution to building a South-based feminist movement? DAWN’s strengths, which contributed to its survival, include its leaders’ political commitment to a Southern feminist agenda, their flexibility in making strategic decisions about the network’s structure and programs, the evolution and deepening of the network’s analysis, and its contribution to global feminist advocacy.

**DAWN’s Structure**

DAWN’s structure evolved based on insights gained from experience, in response to changes in context and advances in information and communications technologies. The organization’s capacity for adaptability is one of the strengths of the network and a lesson to be learned by other networks.

*The Secretariat*

At the outset, it was agreed that the Secretariat should rotate regionally, every two years. However, the first relocation (from Rio de Janeiro to Barbados) took place after nearly five years, and the next (from Barbados to Fiji Islands) after eight. It became clear that two years was unrealistic for a Secretariat that was working to a program cycle of five years (the span of the international conferences/reviews in which DAWN had decided to participate). With the move to Fiji Islands and the upgrading of the Secretariat with a full staff and established systems, it was even more difficult to contemplate frequent rotations. The move to Nigeria highlighted the issues of disrupting systems, appointing new staff, and grappling with local challenges. The Secretariat has now been in the Philippines for nearly six years, and the move to another location will likely pose similar difficulties. Whatever the arguments for a rotating Secretariat, there is no doubt that a network like DAWN requires a measure of stability and a location that has the technical and professional capacity for efficient and effective communications.

*Management*

Governance is a major issue for activist, movement-building women’s networks; bureaucratization is an ever-present threat. The challenge is to find the right balance between a management structure that is efficient and accountable and the flexibility needed to take advantage of emerging opportunities for activism and advocacy. DAWN has evolved from a simple structure of a (part-time) general coordinator with minimal staff and a steering committee, whose members were paid a very modest honorarium, to an executive committee (comprising paid, half-time coordinators), a full-time staff,
and an (unpaid) board of trustees with responsibility for oversight accountability. This seems to work; no one can claim that DAWN has become a bureaucracy.

Regionalization

DAWN’s experience of regionalization has been mixed. In 1995 the organization made a strategic decision to strengthen its outreach work at the regional level, primarily by working in partnership with existing regional networks and raising funds to support regional coordinators. However, experiences varied, from regions like Latin America and the Caribbean, where the regional coordinators belonged to established regional networks with the capacity not only to provide an institutional base for DAWN, but also to integrate its work into their ongoing programs in training, communication, and advocacy, to South Asia, where the coordinators not only lacked an institutional base, but were unable to serve the world’s largest region. In 2009, based on this experience, DAWN decided to discontinue having regional coordinators expected to function as a “presence” in each region and instead to build/strengthen regional alliances and partnerships around common agendas through the GEEJ project.

DAWN’s Program

DAWN’s programmatic evolution coincided (generally) with the various relocations of the Secretariat. The focus of the second period—the move to the Caribbean (1990–1998)—represented DAWN’s participation in the UN World Conferences of the 1990s. In this period DAWN’s program of activities included numerous meetings at the regional level as research coordinators worked to incorporate regional inputs into the global platform documents for the world conferences, as well as to build alliances and coalitions with other networks for advocacy related to the issues of concern. During this period DAWN acquired a high profile and became a major player in the emerging global women’s movement.

When DAWN moved to Fiji Islands following the Beijing conference (1998–2004), it established a well-staffed and highly skilled Secretariat, capitalizing on advances in Internet technology to communicate more effectively with an expanding program of work at the regional level. In this period regular newsletters and “discussion papers” were produced in three languages (English, Spanish, and French), a Web site was established, DAWN’s Statutes were revised to reflect its reality, and alliances with other South-based NGO networks were built and strengthened. In this period DAWN began what it referred to as its “interlinkages” work.

The relocation of the Secretariat to Nigeria (2004–2008) provided the network with another opportunity to rethink its strategies and to reorganize to meet the challenges of the new millennium. DAWN entered a period of major restructuring, reviewing its work at the regional level, taking account of the emerging relationships with a new generation of feminists (participants of the DTIs and RTIs), and building a dynamic team
of researchers/analysts/ advocates/ trainers who could commit to working part time for DAWN on various themes.

This work came into full realization with the Secretariat’s move to the Philippines (2008 to the present). The newsletter DAWN Informs was redesigned to be a better advocacy tool. New and sophisticated ICTs have allowed the network to strengthen and expand its global communications outreach, including through e-publications, podcasts, and social media.

DAWN’s Strategic Role in Building a Southern Feminist Movement

There is little doubt about DAWN’s strategic role and importance in building a Southern transnational feminist movement. African women, through their pathbreaking regional network, AAWORD, were among the earliest feminist associations based in the South to articulate a definably Southern position. However, DAWN was the first network to link the regions of the developing South; formulate a South-based global conceptual framework that was to change the discourse on women, gender, and development; put forward an alternative perspective on the situation of Southern women; and articulate a new vision for transformation.

Before DAWN’s emergence, the international feminist discourse was dominated by liberal feminists from the North, although an important critique of mainstream development by Marxist-socialist feminists and feminist anthropologists in particular has been acknowledged (see above). However, their analysis lacked at least three important elements crucial for an understanding of the structural factors that marginalized the majority of women worldwide. First was an analysis of the legacy of colonialism, the emergence of neocolonialism, and their impact on international political economy, development agendas, and women’s lives. Second was DAWN’s critique of the growth-oriented development model and policy framework, as a significant factor in understanding women’s lack of access to resources crucial for the support of their role in social reproduction—specifically the provision of public services in areas including health and education. The third critical element was the importance of reproduction (biological and generational, labor force, and social) in defining and reinforcing the gender division of labor, roles, and power.

DAWN’s Contribution to Building the Global Feminist Movement

In the process of building a strong South-based feminist movement, DAWN has also contributed to the emergence and growth of the global feminist movement. The distinction between international (or transnational) and global movements has been
problematic in the discourse. The “global” as an analytical concept is derived from actual experience, an attempt to theorize the practice of women's organizing for participation in global conferences on global issues and their ability to formulate and agree upon common (“global”) perspectives/positions, which has in turn strengthened their advocacy. In the international movement nurtured by the UN Decade for Women, it was possible to discern regional and national specificities in discussions among women of the various regions and countries. In the global conferences of the 1990s, because of the colossal macroeconomic restructuring of global trade accomplished through the new world order of neoliberalism, women were able to formulate common positions that took account of their differences to produce a more complex and powerful advocacy. The ability to negotiate common positions is essential for the strengthening of global advocacy. DAWN's analytical contributions and regional/international partnerships continue to facilitate this development.

The global movement is made up of women from local movements as well as individuals who come together for an international event, such as a conference, a meeting of the WTO, or a meeting of the UN Commission on the Status of Women (CSW), which takes place each year in early March. At the end of these events women return to their local movements, while those in international institutions or networks (e.g., CWGL, DAWN, IWHC, and WEDO) continue the work of monitoring and analyzing global events and trends, ready to share their knowledge and analyses with the women arriving for the next set of negotiations.

A good example of the operation of a global women's movement could be seen at the 2013 meeting of the CSW, where women from around the world arrived in New York, often without preparation or briefing on the latest political trends and negotiations in relation to the women's rights agenda and inexperienced in the processes of UN negotiations. Although DAWN's training institutes have helped to prepare more young women for feminist advocacy in these settings, their presence is not guaranteed, nor are they often accredited to the government delegations that engage in the negotiations. In this situation, the work of DAWN and its partners is critical for the protection of hard-won gains from the relentless maneuvers of the organized, well-funded forces of religious fundamentalism—of all faith traditions, particularly the Christian Right and Islamists—intent on reversing the advances in women's rights achieved through the conferences of the 1990s, in particular those on sexual and reproductive rights and violence against women achieved in Vienna (at the Human Rights Conference), Cairo (at ICPD), and Beijing (at FWCW).

To prevail against these forces, women must act strategically to mobilize support from feminist allies in the capitals of UN member countries, as well as among the diversity of women attending the sessions. When this strategy works, none can doubt the existence of a global women's movement! DAWN's contribution to this activism comes from its work with the DTIs and RTIs, and especially from the analysis emerging from its GEEJ project, as well as from the close partnerships it has developed with other international networks and institutions.
The Way Forward

How has the context changed—for feminist advocacy and activism—from a “world of opportunities” to a “fierce new world?” And how has DAWN adapted to these changes? What are the challenges for feminist organizing globally? What accounts for DAWN’s continued relevance?

Over the past roughly forty years (since the 1970s), two trajectories relative to women and development have emerged, indicating oppositional trends. The first is a strong political presence of the global women’s movement at UN and other international meetings. There is now a widespread consciousness of the necessity of engaging in gender analysis that recognizes both inequality and difference and the implications for setting the development agenda and programming. The other trajectory reveals that the situation on the ground for many women, especially those living in poverty and zones of armed and other forms of conflict, seems to have worsened, despite the fact that it has been addressed programmatically and in the development discourse by the UN and other agencies.

The question that then arises is why this disjuncture exists after more than four decades of what appears to be a vibrant and ostensibly effective partnership between the UN and the global women’s movement. How much of these oppositional trajectories can be attributed to the external atmospherics of global power politics and its attendant economics? How much can be attributed to other factors, such as the style of functioning and priorities of the global women’s movement? Clearly we need to recognize the differences between local and global trends and cannot assess the situation of women in isolation from the larger policy and geopolitical framework. In the context of today’s global economic and financial crisis, coupled with the strengthening of patriarchal politics, we should not be surprised to find that the condition of women has deteriorated in many countries.

Globalization has led to major changes in international politics since the 1980s. DAWN’s work on the theme of “political restructuring and social transformation,” which began in 1998 and assumed priority in 1999/2000, provides a detailed analysis of the new world order that emerged in the 1990s. Marketisation of Governance: Critical Feminist Perspectives from the South, DAWN’s third platform document, prepared by Viviene Taylor (2000a), is a Southern feminist analysis of the changing character of state systems, social movements, and multilateralism in the context of an emerging global governance complex during the era of economic globalization.

Based on the findings of commissioned regional research and consultations, the analysis strongly critiques global financial and trade liberalization, a process that has resulted in the erosion of the state’s capacity to meet national social development needs. The analysis highlights the challenges and dilemmas for social movements pursuing economic and gender justice in the era of globalization and lays down a number of fundamentals that cannot be compromised. The increase in conflicts resulting from the
fragmentation of states, global power shifts, and persistent imbalances has become a focus of DAWN’s research efforts in this area.\textsuperscript{61}

The DAWN Development Debates (DDD) of 2010 updated this analysis with an in-depth and far-reaching consideration of the challenges faced by women in this “fierce new world.” DAWN organized an event, held in Mauritius at the beginning of 2010,\textsuperscript{62} to mark “the end of the first decade of the 21st century with its creation of a new site for conversations on global development that was to be placed solidly on south feminist grounds.” In an interesting break with “tradition,” DAWN invited a few women from the North as well as male colleagues from the South to make presentations at the event. These were all colleagues with whom DAWN had collaborated in many spaces over the years.\textsuperscript{63}

The concept paper highlights two unprecedented, critical events that occurred in the first decade of the new century: the “wars on terror” and the global financial crisis, recognizing that

\begin{quote}
[externally generated crises in varied forms and the resolutions to crises in all their complexities have come to preoccupy all sovereign nations and the peoples they govern. At the same time, these national and peoples’ struggles to uphold values associated with sustainable livelihoods, poverty eradication, human rights, freedom of expression and mobility, respect for identity and sexuality … a fierce new world had already been born—a world that is full of shaken premises, complicated contradictions, serious fractures, severe backlash, broken promises, for the world’s women and especially women from the economic South.\textsuperscript{64}
\end{quote}

Though many phenomena characterize this “new world order,” most striking is the extraordinary increase in inequalities between and within nations. Another is the shift in economic energy from the North to the South—specifically to the emerging economies of the South: Brazil, India, China, and South Africa. And yet in these countries also, growth rates are slowing. More importantly, the inequality that seems to accompany high growth rates is evident in most countries\textsuperscript{65} and again conceals gross inequality, for example, in per capita income as well as the percentage of people living in poverty between the North and the South.

\textbf{Effectiveness of the Responses of the Global Women’s Movement}

The question of the effectiveness of the responses by the global women’s movement is more difficult to answer. Are there new areas on which Southern feminists could generate a Southern feminist perspective? What forms should these initiatives take? Globalization has led to fundamental changes in women’s organizing:

\begin{quote}
There is now an entirely new set of social movements, networks and organizations that are engaging at the transnational level … (not) something called global civil society. Rather, there is a global civic space forming as part of . . . globalization.\textsuperscript{66}
\end{quote}
Srilatha Batliwala lists the catalysts for this transnational engagement:

- The “Conference Decade” of the 1990s, which affirmed the right of civil society or NGOs to participate in shaping national and global policies on Environment, Human rights, Population, Economic Development, and Women;
- The growth of global markets [that] fuelled a further expansion, as global civil society tried to hold global institutions accountable to citizens; and
- New ICTs, allowing networks and organizations to exchange information, create transnational alliances, and respond to the new challenges with great ease.67

Batliwala also identifies a new kind of “grassroots” organization that is no longer limited to small local communities, but now includes locally grounded movements engaging transnationally in promoting social justice. Examples of these are the antiglobalization movement and, more recently, the Occupy movements.

On the other hand, VeneKlassen asks:

"How is it that the whole world is mobilizing against inequality and injustice at the same time that the global consensus on women's equality is cracking and a steady rollback of women's rights is underway? Behold the Arab Spring: despite their role as organizers and activists on the frontlines, women are now struggling for basic legal rights let alone a voice in the transition. Beyond the excitement of digital activism, one can't fail to notice the scarcity of women and dominance of dudes among the techies, or the alarming statistics that demonstrate how women are the losers in the digital divide. . . . It's not as if women and feminists aren't organizing and mobilizing—they're lending their support to all justice issues while fighting women's rights issues all by themselves, and often against extraordinary levels of normalized and sexual violence.68"

Are there new forms that these initiatives should take? Effective advocacy requires a combination of many different forms of organizing, from the small, intimate circles of consciousness-raising to the campaigns that involve people who may submerge their particular issues to end a war, or end rape, or challenge unjust systems. Experience since the 1970s suggests that linking the global and the local is essential for advocacy related to global trends that so heavily impact the lives of women at local levels.

The Continuing Relevance of DAWN

In some ways DAWN’s journey after 1995 illustrates the nature of the change that has taken place. The network has become more structured, an organization with rules and accountability systems. At the same time, DAWN’s analyses, linking gender and economic justice, have continued to provide women's movements, along with other social movements, with examination of this “fierce new world” from the perspective of Southern feminists, which enables them to understand the forces that must be engaged in order to bring about the vision of a more equitable, sustainable, and secure future for
DAWN, the Third World Feminist Network

all. Because DAWN is feminist and South based, it is able to produce a unique analysis that understands that justice for women (gender justice) cannot be separated from economic justice. Advocacy on behalf of women today must therefore address economic as well as religious fundamentalism, and no group understands this better than a South-based network of feminists like DAWN. DAWN’s leadership is therefore crucial not only for its unique perspective on women, but also because it links analysis of economic issues with that of political, social, and cultural issues.

DAWN has enhanced the capacity of a new generation of activists to bring a Southern feminist perspective to regional and global processes. Its upgraded Web site and use of new technologies provide a powerful means of disseminating this analysis and advocacy.

Conclusion

Feminists of my generation may continue to dream of a world of democracy, justice, security, and sustainability, but we no longer think we can change the world! In any event,

there [is] no point at which a decisive victory could be claimed. It [is] a futile exercise to say that restructuring in the political arena and social transformation was going to lead to some Utopia. The process itself is what . . . women needed to focus on; and how that process could be informed by a politics, an ethics and a vision that women could all share.

The battle is continuous, and each generation must define its own struggle and make it their own. Gains achieved at one moment can be reversed in the next, as those who applauded the new framework of HERA in Cairo in 1994 can attest, as they have spent the last twenty years defending those gains. However, new technologies have given powerful tools to this generation of activists, and they are using these with great imagination and creativity to connect, mobilize, and organize to reshape their world. The resources of past generations of activists are accessible at the click of a mouse, and feminist activists today have leadership opportunities that were undreamed of before the advent of the Internet. The struggles of the Arab Spring and the Occupy movements inspire, but they also show, as struggles of earlier eras have done, that feminist gains are easily reversed.

Yet this generation of activists, drawing on these lessons from the past, has greater clarity about the linkages among economic, political, social, and cultural factors and knows that struggles for women’s rights must always proceed on two levels: the larger context and women’s local specificities.

Along with the opportunities created by the new technologies, women’s movements today have a number of advantages over those of the “second wave” (and even the “third wave”) of feminism. These include the acceptance of feminism and feminist politics as legitimate for the advancement of women’s practical needs and strategic gender interests
worldwide (not just in the North!); the existence of a number of “centers” and focal points for ongoing monitoring, research, analysis, and advocacy on women’s rights and development;71 and opportunities for meeting in spaces outside the confines of the UN.72 Most important, there is a new openness about issues of sexuality and spirituality that offers new sources of empowerment for women. This includes closer links between the larger women’s movement and lesbian and transgender women, as well as with male allies in LGBT networks and with men who are now actively working to challenge gender-based violence and violence against women.

Facing the new challenges of globalization in all its manifestations—both negative and positive—women’s movements have new opportunities to create a world of their imagination. Those of a previous generation must seek, where possible, to share their experiences, knowledge, and insights—but this is all they can do. Ultimately, it is for younger generations to decide what is useful and to build on this past, shaping it to their purposes.

**Postscript: I Had a Dream Recently**

As I look along the way ahead, I see a landscape. It is full of activity: in the villages, towns, and cities, and in the mountains and valleys there are women of all ages and walks of life engaged in activism and advocacy around issues that are important to them at any particular moment. They are organizing around violence against women and children, wars, and conflict; poverty and loss of livelihood caused by the opening up of markets to cheaper goods from other countries; the loss of access to reproductive health services; and the lack of schools for children and shelter. From time to time there are events—celebrations, marches, conferences—that bring women together to affirm their gender identity or a common humanity.

Across the landscape, women are in constant communication with each other using all the new Internet technologies: sharing information, creating new knowledge, organizing meetings and activities, building networks, and expressing solidarity. The communications feed into the river shaping the flow and the contours and draw from it the material needed to proceed.

A river runs through this landscape. It flows steadily: monitoring trends in women’s rights; implementing projects that benefit women and training programs that enhance their skills in activism and advocacy; and carrying out research and doing analyses that highlight the linkages among the social, economic, political, and environmental factors that affect women’s lives.

DAWN is a strong current in the river.

The river flows steadily whatever the weather or the conditions on the shorelines it passes or those within its banks. It flows because it cannot be stopped, as it carries with it the triumphs of past struggles to encourage further efforts today and in the future.
Notes

1. While I take full responsibility for the analysis presented and opinions expressed in this chapter, I would like to acknowledge the contributions of Devaki Jain, Gita Sen, and Claire Slatter (DAWN founding members); Rawwida Baksh (DAWN Steering Committee member 1990–1995, on behalf of CAFRA, the Caribbean Association for Feminist Research and Action); and Sonia Correa (DAWN research coordinator on sexual and reproductive health and rights, who contributed to the section on ICPD).


3. New nation-states that emerged from colonization in the twentieth century include, among others, Cuba (1902), South Africa (1931), Korea (1945), India and Pakistan (1947), Sri Lanka (1948), Sudan (1956), Ghana and Malaysia (1957), Nigeria (1960), Sierra Leone (1961), and Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago (1962). Leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi, Kwame Nkrumah, Alexander Bustamante, and Eric Williams led their countries to independence.


6. Jain (2005, 12). “A fact of somewhat extraordinary significance, providing many leads to the rest of this story, is that there were just four women among the 160 signatories to its Charter at the UN Charter Conference at San Francisco in 1945. Three of them were from ‘developing countries’ or the Third World: Minerva Bernardino (Dominican Republic), Bertha Lutz (Brazil), and Wu Yi-Fang (China). The fourth was Virginia Gildersleeve (United States).”

7. The Declaration failed to get US support and has been largely forgotten.

8. Nita Barrow, a nurse by profession, had been president of the World YWCA and a member of the World Health Organization’s Commission on Public Health.

9. They included Eleanor Leacock, Rayna Reiter, Michelle Rosaldo, and Gayle Rubin, to name a few.


13. These included the forty-eight evaluations from the ILO study in addition to a further sixty-three reports.


16. They were Katherine McKee (Ford Foundation, New York), Ragnhild Lund and Tone Bleie (CMI, Bergen, Norway), and Geertje Lycklama (ISS, The Hague, The Netherlands).


18. Gita Sen, personal communication with author, June 2013.

20. *Development, Crises, and Alternative Visions* has been widely used by international development agencies and universities globally.

21. The work of Ester Boserup had been a major influence since 1970 in reshaping thinking about women in development processes. The critique of Boserup by Marxist-socialist feminist economists Lourdes Beneria and Gita Sen (1981, 279–98) was an important precursor to the DAWN analysis.

22. An example of triple jeopardy.

23. Claire Slatter (Fiji Islands) provided a good example of how colonialism affected the lives of women when she spoke about the power of France to exclude the issue of its nuclear testing in the South Pacific from regional intergovernmental meetings.

24. It is interesting to see how these crises have not only continued, but have spread to Europe and the United States in the context of the current “global” economic crisis.


26. These DAWN arguments were articulated at the World’s Women Congress for a Healthy Planet and contributed to the text of the Women’s Action Agenda 21 for a peaceful and healthy planet. See www.wedo.org for the text of the Women’s Action Agenda 21.


29. The networks included (in alphabetical order): AltWID (Alternative Women and Development, a US network that drew on DAWN’s framework for analyzing “Reagonomics”); CRIAW (Canadian Research Institute for the Advancement of Women); CWGL (Center for Women’s Global Leadership, Rutgers University, USA); DAWN; NAC (National Action Committee on the Status of Women, Canada); SID/WID (Women and Development network, Society for International Development, Rome); WEDO (Women, Environment and Development); and WIDE (Women in Development, Europe). The emergence of this coalition of South-North women’s networks was deeply informed by DAWN’s analysis.


32. DAWN’s newsletter, *DAWN Informs*, provides a wealth of material on the debates describing and analyzing the processes and outcomes. There is also material related to the “anniversary” conferences. See www.dawnnet.org.


37. The Group of 77 (or G-77) had been established by 77 developing states in 1967, at the end of the first session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) held in Geneva. Although the group currently numbers 131 countries, it retains the original name. It is “the largest intergovernmental organization of developing countries in the UN which provides the means for the countries of the South to articulate and promote their collective economic interests and enhance their joint negotiating capacity on all major international economic issues within the United Nations system, and promote South-South cooperation for development.” See www.g77.org.

38. Religious fundamentalists within the Roman Catholic Church and Islam were not the only opponents of women’s reproductive rights. They also included those in Protestant denominations, particularly the Evangelical churches.
39. Formerly of the Brazilian NGO SOS Corpo.
40. These essentially comprise the Vatican and its allies among the Christian Right and Islamic states, as discussed previously. The precise configuration changes at each forum, but at its core is the opposition to women’s rights and gender equality, particularly in areas of sexual and reproductive health and rights and violence against women.
41. As the strongest opposition is to sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR), a key partner has been the International Women’s Health Coalition (IWHC), whose location in New York places it in a strategic position to monitor UN meetings.
42. See www.dawnnet.org.
43. See www.dawnnet.org.
44. These include the fifth, tenth, fifteenth, and twentieth anniversaries of UNCED, ICPD, and FW CW.
45. These included (in alphabetical order): Neuma Aguiar (Brazil), Peggy Antrobus (Caribbean), Lourdes Arizpe (Mexico), Bolanle Awe (Nigeria), Carmen Barroso (Mexico), Hameeda Hossain (Bangladesh), Devaki Jain (India), Rounaq Jahan (Bangladesh), Fatima Mernissi (Morocco), Marie-Angelique Savane (Senegal), Gita Sen (India), and Claire Slatter (Fiji Islands).
46. The publications were compiled and edited by Neuma Aguiar and Thais Corral at IUPERJ, Rio de Janeiro.
47. Despite active Caribbean feminist research and publishing during this period, the region was not represented in either publication. Volume I covered mostly Latin America, with only two case studies from Africa, and Volume II contained five case studies from Latin America, five from Asia, and one from Africa.
51. Peggy Antrobus was director of the Women and Development Unit (WAND), of the (then) Extra-Mural Department, University of the West Indies (UWI), Cave Hill Campus, Barbados.
52. Claire Slatter, University of the South Pacific, served as general coordinator from 1997 to 2000, although the Secretariat did not actually move to Fiji Islands until 1998.
53. Bene Madunagu, University of Calabar, Nigeria, served as general coordinator during this period.
54. Josepha Gigi Francisco, Miriam College, the Philippines, is the current general coordinator.
55. Although Claire Slatter took over as general coordinator in 1996, the Secretariat did not actually move to Fiji Islands until 1998.
56. In the Caribbean, CAFRA (the Caribbean Association for Feminist Research and Action) was DAWN’s regional focal point, while in Latin America, SOS Corpo, a Brazilian-based network of activists working on issues of reproductive rights and health, served as the focal point until its role was taken over by the Uruguay-based Regional Secretariat of the International Council for Adult Education (ICAE).
57. First Hameeda Hossain of Bangladesh, followed by Vanita Mukherjee of India.
58. AAWORD was launched in Dakar, Senegal, in 1977, in part as a response to the indignation of female African researchers at the co-optation of their voice by US researchers (www.afard.org).
60. ISST (2002).
61. See www.dawnnet.org for a wealth of written and audio presentations from this event.
62. This was a new development for DAWN, and it highlighted the network’s standing with scholars and activists in the global movement. *DAWN Informs* (June 2010): 4–5 includes some reflections.
63. The men included Aldo Caliari (Argentina), Center of Concern, Washington, D.C.; Yao Graham (Ghana), Third World Network; and Roberto Bissio (Uruguay), Social Watch.
64. DDD concept paper. See www.dawnnet.org for written and audio presentations of the wealth of material from this event.
65. Brazil and Venezuela seem to have actually reduced inequality in recent years.
69. The new Pope, Francis, is being urged to concentrate on economic justice and back away from the Church’s current preoccupation with reversing women’s rights. However, as DAWN has shown, the separation of economic from gender justice does not save poor women from gender-based violence that could threaten economic security, nor from the risks to health and wellbeing from frequent pregnancies or large families. Similarly, to concentrate on gender justice at the expense of economic justice does not protect poor women from hunger and other kinds of material deprivation, nor from the violence associated with poverty.
70. Taylor (2000).
71. There is a useful distinction to be made between “mobilization” (showing up) for protests and “organizing” for the long haul. Struggles for women’s rights require organizing for the long haul. The struggle is continuous and specific. DAWN is one of those focal points accessible to all who wish to draw on resources from a Southern feminist perspective.
72. AWID’s Forums, which are convened every four years, are a good example of these opportunities for “movement-building” at the international level. The Feminist Dialogues linked to the World Social Forums are another.

References


DAWN. www.dawnnet.org.


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CHAPTER 7

THE “WARRIORS WITHIN”

How Feminists Change Bureaucracies and Bureaucracies Change Feminists

JOANNE SANDLER

INTRODUCTION

“Your silence will not protect you.”
Audre Lorde

Beate Sirota Gordon died in the United States at age eighty-nine on December 30, 2012. In her obituary, she was credited with “almost single-handedly” writing women’s rights into the Japanese Constitution (Fox 2013). In 1946, she had secured a staff job with the US government, accompanying General Douglas MacArthur on his mission to Japan after the end of the Second World War. Her intention in part was to find her parents. One of MacArthur’s priorities was drafting a postwar constitution for US-occupied Japan, a top-secret assignment that had to be completed in seven days. As the only woman assigned to the subcommittee working on civil rights, along with two dozen men, Gordon was deputized to compose the section on women’s rights. As was observed in her obituary, “Ms. Gordon, neither lawyer nor constitutional scholar, was an unlikely candidate for the task.” Nevertheless, the language she drafted to expand Japanese women’s legal rights pertaining to marriage, divorce, property, and inheritance had an enduring effect.

The serendipitous nature of how change sometimes happens to advance women’s rights and gender equality in bureaucracies is encapsulated in this story. For years, “the woman in the room”—often by virtue of her link to a colonial power, her class, or her sex—was designated to speak for all women.

Today, more than sixty years later, the possibility that the task of writing women’s rights into the constitution of a newly independent or postconflict state would be left to the accidental woman in the room is far less likely. For over forty years, and especially since the
UN Decade for Women (1976–1985), independent and fierce-minded women's rights advocates have joined together in calling for global and regional agreements on, for example, establishing quotas for women in public office, appointments of women's rights and gender advisors, creation of gender and equal opportunity offices, and designation of special rapporteurs on human rights issues and other internal mechanisms—precisely so that women's empowerment and gender equality are mainstreamed and routine and are not dependent on the happenstance of a gender equality advocate being at the right place at the right time.

The global, regional, and national plans of action and strategies that resulted from these calls have spawned a wide range of jobs, professional development programs, academic programs, and learning communities that comprise what is generically referred to as gender expertise. The gender units, gender advisors, government ministries of women's rights or gender equality, women's and gender studies programs, and other structures that have emerged in many sectors have, in turn, contributed to a demand for even more specialized expertise on sexual violence, gender and climate change, women's political representation, women and conflict resolution, girls' education, women's health, gender and macroeconomic policy, and many other fields. In fact, international organizations often note that their demand for gender expertise far outstrips the supply.

Advocacy for policies to increase the numbers of women in leadership and to create gender specialist positions have become standard demands from transnational feminist movements working within and outside mainstream organizations. The starting points were pathetically low. The status of women in the United Nations in the 1970s, for example, reflected the dearth of women in leadership positions generally. In 1973–1974, women staff at professional (P) levels and above amounted to 16 percent in the UN system as a whole, and most were at low levels (P-1–P-3). There were no female heads of agency. The UN appointed Helvi Sipila from Finland as the first woman assistant secretary-general, in connection with International Women's Year in 1975 (Skard 2009).

In 1995, the Beijing Platform for Action called on the United Nations to implement employment policies that would enable women to hold 50 percent of managerial and decision-making posts in the organization by 2000 (United Nations 2010, 122). This target was not met, but some notable strides have been made. There has been progress at the most senior levels (e.g., D-1 and D-2 posts, senior director-level positions), with women's share of D-2 posts increasing from 18.2 percent in 2000 to 27.4 percent in 2011 and from 21.4 percent to 30.2 percent at the D-1 level. At even higher levels (assistant secretaries-general and under secretaries-general), there was an increase from 17.4 percent in 2000 to 29.2 percent in 2011 (United Nations 2012, 10).

At the same time, calls for the creation of more gender specialist positions within organizations have yielded greater numbers as well. There is no global count or estimate of the numbers of individuals that occupy professional posts focused on women's rights and gender equality policies and programs. But consider this recent data: a 2003 survey revealed that across the UN system alone gender equality was included in the job descriptions of approximately 1,200 individuals (although, for approximately 900 of these, it was a part-time responsibility). Ten years later in 2013, that number has risen to
over 3,000 individuals, representing a 150 percent increase. While the trend continues, it needs to be said that the quality and sustainability of these jobs vary widely—with the majority being junior and part-time posts. However, it is noteworthy that the total numbers are increasing.

Fulfillment of these demands has resulted in “an international cadre of gender experts who play a key role in translating feminist knowledge into policy applications . . . [where] gender experts and gender training [become] instruments in the government of gender” (Prügl 2010, 1–5).

As we approach the twenty-year review of the Beijing Platform for Action in 2015, and in the context of evolving transnational, regional, national, and local feminist movements worldwide, does this demand for higher numbers of women in decision making and more gender specialist positions, as a pathway toward achieving women's rights and gender equality, deserve a review? Are these gender units and advisors catalyzing change that chips away at the deep institutional cultures that hold gender inequality in place? Is this “government of gender” delivering in line with the expectations of its cadres of architects?

**Introducing the “warriors within”**

Feminists enter mainstream organizations to fill these specialized positions as “warriors within.” While there is no existing literature referring specifically to the tactics that feminists in bureaucracies are often required to use as being warrior-like, the term evolved in response to interviews with those on the inside who described the ongoing internal and external struggles in which they were engaged. Like Maxine Hong Kingston (1976) and others, this chapter appropriates the male connotations of the “warrior” for both female and male feminists who are internal change agents.

It is crucial to avoid conflating feminist and gender expert. Many gender experts are not feminists, and many feminists are not employed as gender experts. Given the dynamic nature of feminism and the discourse on women’s rights, this chapter uses a generous definition of the terms feminist and feminist bureaucrat or (femocrat). They include individuals who are committed to radically transforming the unequal gender relations, misogyny, and patriarchy—including instances of their appearance among women—that continue to be rooted in the dominant cultures and priorities of many organizations. It aligns with Walby’s view that new forms of feminism exist within institutions of power. They have become less visible, particularly as they move from “the politics of recognition” to “the politics of redistribution” and when feminism acts in alliance with other movements (2011, 2). It acknowledges that there are multiple feminisms, with internal contradictions, related to those who self-define as feminist but may act in ways that are contrary to their proclamations and those who disavow the terminology but in actuality fight for and practice feminist principles.
This chapter focuses on women and men who self-identify as feminists and explores their warrior within at two levels. First, they are warriors in their own institutions, most effective when they are able to shift the very institutional cultures, rules, and practices that created their jobs. Second, it explores the identities and struggles they internalize at a personal level, as they balance feminist ends with bureaucratic means and walk a tightrope between cooperation and cooptation. The chapter advocates for greater collective action, inclusion, and accountability among feminists working inside and outside these bureaucratic spaces. And while the focus is largely on femocrats within the UN system, the dynamics described are familiar in many bureaucratic settings, whether in governments, multilateral or bilateral agencies, or international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

Four streams of thinking and writing have influenced this chapter. Gender at Work—a global learning collaborative of individuals who combine experience in women’s rights and gender equality and organizational change and learning strategies—has been working with an analytical framework (Rao and Kelleher 2005) that offers an alternative and complement to more standard technocratic approaches to gender analysis and mainstreaming. This analytical framework is the basis for much of the thinking presented in this chapter.

The work of Rosalind Eyben (2010, 2012) in applying innovative methods to engage feminist bureaucrats in reflecting on and writing about their experiences has been influential as well. Eyben—herself a former femocrat—highlights that “the micro-political strategies of feminist bureaucrats” (2012, 6) have received little attention in the wider literature about what makes change happen in global policy spaces (Tickner 2001; Hafner-Burton and Pollack 2002; True 2003; Molyneux and Razavi 2005).

This chapter is also influenced by the Feminist Institutionalist International Network, which brings together feminist political scientists and new institutionalists who are centrally concerned with explaining patterns of institutional creation, continuity, and change and the scope for agency within institutional constraints. As Krook and McKay (2011, 6) note, “The basic premise of ‘new institutionalism’ is that institutions matter,” and “if institutions are gendered, the potential exists for them to be ‘regendered’ including in ways that might promote gender equality. Feminist institutionalists are delving into the variety of ways that institutions intertwine constructions of masculinity and femininity in their daily culture or ‘logic,’ rather than existing out in society or fixed in individuals.”

Finally, the chapter builds on a number of interviews conducted by the author with female and male feminist bureaucrats, exploring their strategies for changing institutional policies and practices, rules, and procedures. Importantly, the interviews have also focused on the ways their work in large bureaucracies has changed them. Their experiences affirm their potential to be key partners in transforming institutional policies, norms, cultures, and rules that perpetuate gender discrimination, but they need far more internal and external support to be able to respond to the personal and professional demands of this Sisyphean task.
Feminist engagement with the United Nations: A superhighway to women’s rights or a slow boat to irrelevance?

Since its establishment in 1945, the United Nations has been a key site of engagement for women’s rights advocates and transnational feminist movements. Feminist victories secured through advocacy in the political processes of the United Nations as well as with operational agencies on the ground have contributed to concrete gains and advances for women and girls in countries worldwide. These gains are far too numerous to name but include such achievements as the establishment of the UN Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) in 1946; the adoption of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1979, affirmed as the international bill of rights for women; the consensus of all Member States on the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action in 1995, viewed as the international road map for women’s rights; and the incursion of feminists into the UN Security Council to secure resolutions recognizing that threats to women’s rights in situations of armed conflict are threats to national and international peace and security. Gains have been the result of active pressure from outside and inside as well as of effective alliances between insiders (women and men) and women’s organizations and transnational feminist networks worldwide.

The results of this engagement are more than paper tigers. Member states’ agreement to these and many other resolutions have resulted in visible outcomes at national and local levels. Domestic laws, policies, and programs have been put in place on a range of issues, from criminalizing domestic violence to establishing quotas for women’s representation in parliament and local government. This is often due to pressure by women’s rights organizations and movements at national, regional, and global levels and because of national women’s and gender machineries working within governments to implement laws and policies that align with their ratification of CEDAW. Over eighty countries worldwide currently use various forms of gender-responsive budgeting and planning, which have (sometimes) contributed to national and sector plans and budgets that address gender inequality and discrimination, for example, in health, education, and agriculture. UN Security Council mandates for UN peacekeeping and political missions in conflict-affected contexts have shown measurable change in response to UN Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace, and Security. Mandates outlining the objectives and remits of particular UN missions now, for example, include instructions to promote women’s participation in postconflict elections, disarmament programs, and all protection practices to prevent sexual and gender-based violence.

Beyond the domestication of international policy agreements, other results have emerged. The intergovernmental processes leading to these achievements have helped to expand women’s networks and movements within and between countries and regions.
and to deepen partnerships between them that have endured and matured over decades. As new forms of connection emerge through advances in information and communications technology, women’s organizations and networks across the globe have strengthened their online organizing, alliances, and constituencies. Engagement in these processes has enabled women’s organizations and movements to involve themselves in global geopolitical debates that, in turn, inform their national-level activism. Perhaps most importantly, gender truths have been told along the way, leading to a global naming and reframing of patriarchal ideas from the concept of gender itself as an analytical category to the recognition of domestic violence as a public policy issue. As Anne-Marie Goetz, senior advisor at UN Women, notes, advocacy by feminists within and outside of the system has generated "a radical change in the way that the Member States and the UN understand sexual violence, from being an inevitable fallout of fighting to an organized tactic of warfare. To the extent that anything is organized, it can be stopped. If it’s subject to command, it can be sanctioned and deterred. And this has led to a complete change in active peacekeeping, military and justice mechanisms."

Despite such achievements, there is a rich debate about whether feminist engagement with the United Nations and other multilateral institutions is still effective. The critiques are threefold and reflect the extent to which neoliberal and capitalist agendas have rooted themselves in the DNA of the United Nations and have sometimes contributed to its being perceived as irrelevant and weak.

One line of critique points to the significant policy gains secured through the global conferences of the 1990s, including the UN Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995), the International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo, 1994), and the World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna, 1993). This critique urges feminists to now focus on change at the national and local levels and emphasizes that the slow pace of implementation of already agreed visionary policies requires razor-sharp focus at a country level and not participation in expensive global gabfests and networking events. As Devaki Jain notes:

Conceptual advances—such as recognition of women’s rights as human rights, reproductive health and rights, or rape as a war crime—are gains in changing international mindsets or laws and do push the women’s rights agenda forward. However, while the advances in rhetoric and public recognition of women’s rights are high this has not been borne out in reality, in changes in the lives of women—especially poor women . . . [There is a] growing disjunction between what is most widely stated and accepted as progress for women’s rights by NGOs or feminist analysts and what constitutes the lived reality for the majority of the world’s women—unchanging patriarchal oppression and widespread poverty.

(Jain 2007, 30–31)

Another line of critique calls attention to the growing engagement of right-wing and conservative forces in UN intergovernmental processes and urges disengagement of feminists as a tactic to avoid push-back on already agreed on norms and standards. Jain observes that the convergence of militarization, globalization, and conservatism...
has dealt a blow to the UN’s progress on the social justice front (2007, 15). Continuing
to invest huge financial and human resources on UN intergovernmental meetings to
debate, yet again, policy proposals—for example, on women’s reproductive rights or on
women’s human rights—that have been settled on previously, only risks backpedalling
and backlash.

Finally, another argument supporting disengagement is the extent to which partici-
pation in UN processes—from the Rio+20 conference on environment and develop-
ment to the debates on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)—mires women’s
movements in compromising our principles, whether in relation to major world con-
flicts (e.g., the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict), the
geopolitics of poverty, or other critical issues. The question Diane Otto poses captures
this view: “Is it possible to work for progressive outcomes for women, while also being
deply critical of the same institutions, laws and policies that we expect to produce those
outcomes?” (2010, 97).

A FUNNY THING HAPPENED ON THE WAY
TO THE GENDER UNIT

The increasing organization of everything is the central issue of our time.
(Ferguson 1984, xii)

From the International Women’s Year Tribune in Mexico City in 1975 to the fifteen-
year review of the Beijing Platform for Action and the establishment of UN Women
in 2010, calls for more equitable representation of women and for institutionalizing
units, divisions, and professional jobs focused on women’s rights and gender equality
in mainstream institutions have been a constant. At least at the level of official inter-
governmental resolutions, the content of these demands has evolved only slightly over
the thirty years, often focusing on locations and resources for specialized organizations
or departments and units. Advocates’ demands range from the establishment of equal
opportunity offices to the appointment of more women as managers or executives.
For example, the calls at the UN Second World Conference on Women (Copenhagen
1980) for increased financial resources to appoint more senior women program offi-
cers evolved into a recognition in the Beijing Platform for Action (1995) that “women/
gender units are important. . . [and] strategies must be further developed to prevent
inadvertent marginalization” to slightly more nuanced calls from 2007 onward for
gender advisors, units, and higher-level specialists to have clear mandates, adequate
training, resources, and strategic locations in the bureaucracy as well as better coordina-
tion between this evolving array of mechanisms.

A complex gender architecture in the UN system evolved in response to this
long-standing advocacy of women’s rights organizations and networks. At the UN First
World Conference on Women (Mexico City, 1975), women called for the establishment of the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW) and the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM). These two organizations would serve as the United Nation’s institutional mechanisms for research, training, and operational activities in the area of women and development. In 1995, women’s rights advocates’ calls led to the establishment of the post of special advisor on gender equality and women’s issues (OSAGI) at the assistant secretary-general level, the first permanent assistant secretary-general position on gender equality in the UN Secretariat. The establishment of the post of special representative of the secretary-general on sexual violence in conflict situations in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the UN special rapporteur on ending violence against women in the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights responded to the demands of women’s rights networks. And a significant mobilization of women’s and feminist organizations worldwide led to the establishment of UN Women—bringing into one organization the previously under-resourced and inadequately positioned entities of INSTRAW, UNIFEM, OSAGI, and the Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW)—headed by an under-secretary general.

If we take 1975, the UN First World Conference on Women, as a major starting point for intensified global activism for women’s leadership in UN organizations, we can mark that it took thirty-five years to give an official charged with gender equality and women’s empowerment a seat in the secretary-general’s Senior Management Team and Policy Committee—in effect, his Cabinet.

This complex gender architecture within the United Nations—and in the government and development assistance organizations that have adapted this architecture within their own bureaucratic systems—is what Maitrayee Mukhopadhyay refers to as a “governmentality of gender,” with remarkable similarities across the world and across sectors. While these gender advisor positions or divisions have uneven track records, most international and regional development organizations today have gender units at headquarters, gender experts and advisors in sectoral divisions, and gender focal points—people often deputized to pay special attention to gender issues, along with their mainstream nongender job responsibilities—in almost every office or major department. In many organizations, these units and advisors have formed networks that attempt to take on cross-cutting, institution-wide issues, such as the UN’s Inter-Agency Network on Women and Gender, which—with UN Women’s leadership—successfully advocated for the heads of all UN organizations to approve a UN system-wide Action Plan on Gender Equality with minimum standards for each agency. Or the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee Network on Gender Equality, which brings together heads of gender units from OECD bilateral donor agencies to build capacity and advocacy strategies collectively, recently focused on mainstreaming gender equality in the high-level international conferences on aid effectiveness held in Accra and Busan.

Given that the creation of many of these units and experts has been based on the same agreements (e.g., the Beijing Platform for Action, successive intergovernmental
resolutions emerging from UN processes, and related intergovernmental agreements by regional institutions, from the African Union to CARICOM), there is also a significant globalization—some may say hegemony—of the nomenclature and strategies that these internal units and experts spearhead. Most support their institutions to develop gender policies, gender strategies, and action plans, articulating what the organization is accountable for delivering. Most develop and deliver gender sensitization and gender training to build the capacity of their colleagues to understand the gender dimensions, impacts, and potentials of their policies and programs. Most are tasked with advising, catalyzing, and inspiring others and are largely judged on the basis of their expertise and influence. As such, they are sometimes set up to fail, especially when mired in an ongoing struggle for minimal authority and budgets, with organizational leaders and donors claiming that influence requires strategic thinking and practice rather than resources.

It is perhaps inevitable that contestation and distortions emerge when feminist theory and analysis intersect with bureaucratic and gender regimes. This is exemplified in the response to calls from feminists for security sector reform—resulting in groundbreaking UN Security Council Resolutions focused on Women, Peace, and Security. A new generation of advisors and experts has emerged to build knowledge on the gendered dimensions of mediation, peace accords and agreements, peacekeeping, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, postconflict reconstruction, peacebuilding, and other security sector issues. The United Nations and other international organizations have developed a slew of gender training programs for personnel to build their understanding and capacity on such topics as sexual violence, with divergent views on the long-term changes that are catalyzed by these trends.

Caglar, Prügl, and Zwingel note that a power analysis of gender training in the peace and security sector reveals both opportunities and dangers, as gender expertise is strategically deployed. Feminist knowledge can be distorted to support technocratic administration—most visible currently in training on gender-based violence—and to essentialize women as victims or in traditional roles. At the same time, the conversion of feminist knowledge into gender expertise is not necessarily a sign of a failed feminist revolution. Rather, it constitutes a process whereby feminist knowledge gains authority while also battling mechanisms of power and disempowerment (2013, 20). So, for example, the takeaway message for peacekeepers who attend training on gender-based violence may be that women are victims—even though this was not the intention of those who designed the training. This, in turn, may stimulate peacekeepers to take action to protect more women. And, as Caglar et al. point out, in the longer term, even though the motivations fail to align precisely with feminist principles or challenge gender power relations, the focus on women's empowerment and rights may further evolve over time, building on the imperfect footholds that feminists have gained in these spaces.

Feminists who were at the forefront in the 1980s of naming and designing the kinds of knowledge that could transform institutions to become more gender equal are distinctly aware of the unintended results. Mukhopadhyay notes, “The courses we developed on gender and development in the 1980s took off around the world. They went from three weeks of learning and enquiry to a technical fix for bureaucrats who will not
invest the time, now watered down and distorted to a one-day briefing session.” Another long-time expert, Pramada Menon, calls them gender appreciation courses.17

Yet where numbers of people have converged with some type of mandate for supporting cultures of equality, the possibility should exist to fortify their work with the same spirit that put them there—that is, feminist organizing. As Everjoice Win, a feminist who has worked within and outside bureaucracies, notes, “Gender equality experts now come a dime a dozen. We are getting better and better at very sharp, well researched and well written policy analysis and our organizations are getting more and more specialized. We produce fabulous publications. . . . None of this however can take the place of real-world, ‘under the tree’ organizing. That hard, slow, painstaking work of talking with and as women, together. The vital work of building strong organisations and movements” (quoted in Batliwala 2012, 8).

What would happen if the feminist bureaucrats in the United Nations and other mainstream institutions functioned as a movement across organizations and within the larger feminist transnational movement and placed themselves under those trees? Or do they already?

**The Making of a Feminist Bureaucrat**

“Feminist theorists and activists have long known that what actually gets done in the name of feminist activism varies widely by institutional context and contextual gender politics.”

(Rao 2012, 22)

The proliferation of jobs for gender experts has contributed, in turn, to changing notions of what the term femocrat signifies. Gaining popularity in the 1980s in Australia, it originally signaled a contraction of the words feminist and bureaucrat, as a new generation of hundreds of feminist policymakers within the state sought to address such issues as pay equity, violence against women, and sexual harassment. Today, while many feminists in bureaucracies still fit that description, there are wide-ranging variations. For instance, O’Brien suggests that the contraction of terms is between femocrats, bureaucrats, and aristocrats, while others have replaced feminist with female (2009, 324).

Many individuals who work on gender equality in mainstream organizations are acutely aware of their privilege and positions. A former UNIFEM regional director, Nyaradzai Gumbonzvanda, now general secretary of the World YWCA, observed:

Working in the UN system forced me to be clear. Growing up in rural Zimbabwe during the war in my country, being raised by my mother who was a widow for twenty-eight years, being the first in my family to go to university, and then being a regional director at UNIFEM, I realized that I had a responsibility to tell girls in rural communities or with disadvantaged families, “You can be who you want to be. Never let anyone hold you back.” When you have that opportunity, you need to deliver with
connectedness. You need to be clear on the transformation that you seek to bring into this space. It’s more than a job. It’s a calling.\(^{18}\)

At the same time, the proliferation of jobs on gender equality has ushered in individuals with diverse backgrounds. An often heard narrative within multilateral organizations, for example, goes something like this: “The director-general called me into his office to say he needed a strong head of the gender unit who really knows this agency. I was hoping to become the chief legal advisor. I could not hide my surprise and horror. I asked him to give me several days to think about it. I did not want to get siloed into the gender thing. But it was a promotion.”

Stories like that are frequently followed by, “Make no mistake—I’m no feminist.” What distinguishes the “I’m not a feminist” gender advisor from the femocrat is the understanding of bureaucracy as the scientific organization of inequality that serves as a filter for other forms of domination, projecting them into an institutional arena that both rationalizes and maintains them (Ferguson 1984, 8). To be effective, femocrats must apply Connell’s theory that each institution has a gender regime and map the specific gender division of labor, power structure, and gendered pattern of emotions—each the sum of gender contestation (cited in Krook and McKay 2011, 132)—that characterize their unique context. In the words of Nisreen Alami, a former UN Women staff member and gender-responsive budget expert, “We resist the word ‘bureaucrat’ because it suggests someone who doesn’t have an agenda and who wants to maintain the status quo. Being a femocrat means that you have a feminist agenda and that you are working within the bureaucracy to achieve transformation toward that agenda. Whether you succeed or not, that vision drives you.”\(^{19}\)

There are divergent understandings about what leverage points exist for transforming gender regimes among those who advocate for greater numbers of gender experts in organizations and the individuals who occupy those positions. The analytical matrix (Figure 7.1) developed by Aruna Rao and David Kelleher, co-founders of Gender at Work, assists in deepening our understanding.

The matrix uses a four-quadrant model based on Ken Wilber’s integral model, which enables a quick assessment of where organizations invest attention and energy (Wilber 1996; Hochachka 2009; Kelleher 2009). It distinguishes two polarities: (1) individual and systemic change; and (2) formal (visible) and informal (hidden) experience. Many proposed solutions to gender inequality focus on only one quadrant or perhaps two. Gender at Work’s hypothesis is that interventions will be more comprehensive, effective, and sustainable when change efforts focus on all four quadrants and consciously confront gendered power relations.

The two quadrants on the right-hand side of the matrix relate to what is visible and therefore trackable in terms of change. These are the dimensions that appear in the Terms of Reference of gender experts in bureaucracies.

The *Formal/Systems* quadrant concerns institutional arrangements, including laws, policies, and strategies. The efforts that gender experts in multilateral organizations invest to gain high-level consensus on gender equality policies and strategies or in
lobbying intergovernmental processes often fall into this quadrant. These range from securing UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security to advocating for paternity leave as a means of challenging the gendered division of labor in the private sphere. Further examples include efforts to lobby for quotas related to women in leadership positions or to institutionalizing gender-responsive budgeting.

The Formal/Individual quadrant is the external view, what we can see and measure with regard to women’s access to resources such as health, education, or leadership positions. In this quadrant, we sometimes see the results of changes when more women actually occupy positions of power or larger amounts of resources for reproductive and maternal health actually flow to the most excluded women as a result of gender-responsive budgeting. The changes in this quadrant can range from the extent to which maternal mortality is reduced to the percentage of women and girls that now have access to education, health care, or decision-making power.

Feminists committed to transformation often highlight the two quadrants at the left, which are focused on invisible aspects of change. They are hard to quantify and expensive to measure, which contributes to deprioritizing them in the preponderant results-based management regimes. These aspects are rarely cited as specific areas of concern in the remits of gender experts in multilateral organizations but are critical to the ultimate sustainability of the change processes in which they are engaged.

The Informal/Individual quadrant is concerned with the interior and consciousness aspects of change. It focuses on women’s and men’s knowledge of, willingness and commitment to advocate for and take action to advance women’s rights and gender justice. In the multilateral system, this quadrant contains very few examples of systematically tracking changes, although there is anecdotal and empirical evidence of change, such as greater action over the past ten years by organizational leaders—from the secretary-general to the heads of UN organizations—speaking out, for example, on men’s responsibility for ending violence against women.

**FIGURE 7.1. Gender at Work Analytical Matrix.**

The Informal/Systems quadrant relates to collective experience. It focuses on informal traditions, norms, and practices that shape how gender hierarchies are established—including among women, men, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) communities—and how gender discrimination and patriarchy are perpetuated, even when constitutions or institutional policies mandate equality and equity (Gordezky and Friedman 2011, 12). Changes in this quadrant will serve to sustain victories achieved in the other three quadrants. There is scant evidence that change in this quadrant is occurring in multilateral or other formal systems. For example, securing agreement for the gender equality goal as part of the MDGs or investing resources in the World Bank’s Gender Action Plan has had little visible effect on chipping away at the patriarchal structures of institutions and may even serve to fortify them.

Theorizing, documenting, and securing change in the informal quadrants within the United Nations and other mainstream organizations remain a largely uncharted and ongoing agenda for femocrats and women’s rights networks and movements. This is not surprising given that these types of changes are not part of the “official” remits of gender experts, and thus there is no accountability for tracking them. How can transnational feminist movements join forces with femocrats to amplify calls for more explicit focus and accountability on these hidden and constantly shifting deep structures of gender discrimination and inequity, as patriarchy continues to reinvent itself in these institutions? What changes are required to create a more conducive environment for femocrats to catalyze the kinds of systemic transformations that were envisioned by delegates to world conferences on women when calling for these posts to be created?

**Strategies of femocrats: Inside the bureaucratic machine**

The principles, guidelines, and checklists that have resulted from bureaucratic simplification of feminist theory often obscure underlying issues of power imbalances and gender hierarchies. There is a sense that they have curtailed opportunities for transformation and restricted political space and funds for feminist organizing. Eyben suggests, however, examining outcomes through a different lens, focusing on how gender mainstreaming can be effective when it is both about working within and changing existing paradigms at one and the same time:

Through their everyday experience of successes, failures and compromise as they navigate complex arenas of power, politically astute feminist bureaucrats have learnt to be effective strategists. If we want to understand better how gender mainstreaming works in practice we need to pay closer attention to analyzing what they do and how they do it.

(Eyben 2012, 7)
Three types of transformations that are relevant to the micro- and macropolitical strategies of many femocrats and essential for overall emancipatory transformation—that is, what it would take to create social institutions that are free of oppression and a reawakening of the optimism that is essential for the world to be transformed—are encapsulated in Erik Olin Wright’s (2010) book *Envisioning Real Utopias*.

**Symbiotic transformations** take place when change happens that extends and deepens the empowerment of previously marginalized individuals and groups while simultaneously helping solve certain practical problems faced by dominant classes and elites. Symbiotic transformations have a contradictory character to them, both expanding social power and strengthening aspects of the existing system. Much of the work on advocating for women’s rights and gender equitable policies or resources in mainstream institutions—for example, in macroeconomic agendas or security sector reform—fall into this category. Thus, when women’s rights and economic justice movements secure agreement from garment assembly companies to women’s empowerment principles or to offering human rights training to their employees, this is a symbiotic strategy. It represents an incremental step forward for gender justice while generating advantages for the reputation of private sector partners without asking them to change the foundations of their corporate culture.

**Interstitial transformations** build empowerment in the niches, spaces, and margins of society or institutions, often where it does not seem to pose any immediate threat to dominant classes and elites. Cumulatively, interstitial strategies can constitute a powerful way to enlarge the transformative scope for gender equality and social empowerment efforts in society as a whole. The feminist claim for creating organizations, units, and jobs for gender experts in the United Nations, for example, aims at interstitial transformation.

**Ruptural transformations** occur when existing institutions are destroyed and new ones are built in a fairly rapid way. Smash first, build second. As Krook and McKay note, “Gender regimes change when contradictions develop among the substructures or with related institutions” (2011, 132). Rupturing the existing gender architecture in the UN system through the creation of UN Women relied on global advocacy for this change.

Mapping the Gender at Work matrix onto Wright’s three strategies shows that femocratic approaches and bureaucratic change converge most visibly on the formal side of the Gender at Work matrix—using, primarily, a combination of symbiotic and interstitial strategies. The entry points, however, are often through opportunities on the informal side, related to individual attitudes and circumstantial changes in institutional norms and rules.

Efforts to understand the ways changes on the formal side of the Gender at Work matrix are influenced by and influence changes on the informal side were the focus of interviews conducted by the author with ten femocrats, particularly those working in the areas of peace and security, economic governance, and UN reform. These interviews continue the work of others (including Razavi and Miller 1998; Eyben 2010, 2012)—to create spaces for femocrats to share their stories of change.
The following story is a composite narrative, drawn from interviews with senior UN advisors focused on addressing accountability by the UN Security Council for women's human rights and leadership. In 2008, these advisors worked on the inside to play key behind-the-scenes roles in building the case for the UN Security Council to agree to Resolutions 1820 and, in 2009, Resolutions 1888 and 1889. They work with a wide range of women's rights organizations, UN agencies, and member states and with their teams and many partners, who are also engaged in ongoing work with UN organizations and programs on the ground on the implementation of these resolutions. Their narrative shows how an interstitial strategy of placing feminists in strategic places—in this case, as senior-level experts on peace and security—leads to their use of a symbiotic strategy to achieve changes in the formal norms and practices of the military. A direct result is the potential to save many thousands of women from rape and violence in situations of war and conflict. At the same time, it clearly demonstrates the kinds of trade-offs that feminists often make, fully cognizant that they may be compromising some basic principles of their feminist convictions and practice.

Feminist Engagement with the UN Security Council

The radical change that we achieved was in the way that the United Nations thinks about and acts against sexual violence. There has been a transformation in thinking about sexual violence as an inevitable fallout of fighting to something that can now be understood as an organized tactic of warfare. We achieved this by shifting from human rights to humanitarian law.

When we started working on this issue in 2006, there were many feminist groups invoking international human rights law as the means of securing UN Security Council action on women, peace and security. Framing the issue as a matter of international commitments and obligations makes sense. However, it does not speak to the incentives and instructions under which security sector actors operate. In contrast, international humanitarian law is the law of war, including the Geneva Conventions. Inserting the sexual violence discussion into that context and explaining sexual violence as something subject to command authority gave us language that resonated with the UN Security Council.

Of course, the shift in focus from international human rights to international humanitarian law was a shift that feminist pacifists were uncomfortable with, because it requires you to make the morally indefensible argument that sometimes war is justified, and some forms of violence are legally acceptable in international conventions. We made that argument because we had to speak a language that the UN Security Council understood. We knew that the correct position would be to remain steadfast and pacifist, but we also needed urgently to galvanize international responses to the extreme violence against women in war.

We did not initially develop a strategy aimed at bringing the military onboard, but we changed our strategy when we realized how responsive they would be. Lisa Jackson's
The "warriors within"

film *The Greatest Silence*, which is about rape in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Jeffrey Gettleman’s reporting for the *New York Times* were influential. Jackson's film included a force commander talking about rescuing women and girls from mass rape. The force commander’s story was filled with a profound sense of his own trauma. And in Gettleman's reporting, he described the military driving into jungle areas in the Eastern Congo during the night where the Mai-Mai were operating. The military would blare their horns and lights, and villagers would come to sleep around the truck seeking shelter and protection from rape. This was the first time we had seen a military tactical deterrent response. It showed us that violence against women by fighters is not inevitable. Based on good enough intelligence, it could be predicted and therefore prevented. For example, you can change physical patterns of peacekeeping so that they are patrolling the paths between the village and the water point at 5 a.m., when women are attacked as they collect water or in the evening when they return from their fields. This is gender-responsive peacekeeping—more effective in preventing violence against women civilians than operating checkpoints on major roads at 2 o'clock in the afternoon.

The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations had not taken a systematic approach to planning these gender-responsive adjustments to local security needs and did not necessarily agree that addressing violence against women was a military—as opposed to a policing—issue. But in 2008 they did agree to convene a high-level meeting with us, sponsored by the UK government. And then another unanticipated development occurred.

In early 2008, the wife of one of the Permanent Five members of the Security Council began to take a visible interest in conflict-related sexual violence and organized a series of informal gatherings at her apartment with high-level women in the UN system to brainstorm what more we could do in response to the horrifying media reports of mass rape in the Democratic Republic of Congo. She would say, “So ladies, this is on your watch.” These were awkward moments with nobody rising to her challenge. When we organized the May 2008 high-level meeting, she helped us to secure the support of her husband by encouraging him to watch *The Greatest Silence* (which allegedly so horrified him that he couldn’t finish), and the next day he accepted our invitation to the Wilton Park conference on sexual violence. This one small act generated a slew of acceptances from other ambassadors.

At the Wilton Park meeting, UN Security Council leaders were brought together with force commanders and police commissioners from UN peacekeeping missions, and women's rights activists from contexts with high levels of war-related sexual violence. Together they agreed there had to be a more systematic way of addressing this violence. Three weeks after the meeting, UN Security Council Resolution 1820 was passed unanimously, requiring both security and political responses to sexual violence. And over the next two years, two further resolutions were passed (1888 and 1889), generating more commitments to the women, peace, and security agenda.

As feminist activists, our instinct is to always be critical and expose failures in policy response. But that doesn’t work with deep resisters. What worked was something that came to us through the Gettleman article. When we saw an example of an improvised
response to the attacks, we came up with an inventory of good practices by the military. The result of taking a positive approach and saying, “Can we give you more tools?” built a constructive relationship with the military where they saw the partnership with us as a benefit to them. Any psychologist would say it’s obvious that when you want to get someone onboard, you don’t attack. You help them. We gave them tools that enabled them to do their job better.

If we have any strategy for institutional change, it’s to find a way to make something a rule. The military has very clear rules. Once you change the rules of engagement, it’s an order. When the job is to protect civilians, women are half of civilians. If they face different protection problems than men or children, the military has to respond. There was not enough experience or knowledge within the military to come up with the response on their own, but they welcomed our engagement eventually. Not to say there isn’t resistance, but once there’s a change it filters down and there are consequences for noncompliance. This is very different from other areas of work on women’s rights.

That’s one of the reasons we’ve had such a failure with getting more women appointed as mediators, which is another provision of UN Security Council resolutions 1325 and 1820. There has been no change at all in the representation of women in UN-sponsored peace talks since the signing of 1325. The global average of women on formal delegations to peace talks is still less than 10 percent. Two talks currently under way—for Colombia and Cyprus—have no women on the negotiating teams. With mediators, there are no rules. They often have no specific training, and there’s no required background except that you have to be someone important like a president or general with experience in complex political situations. It is mostly men who therefore hold the visible qualifications for these positions. As one mediator said, “I don’t care who started it. I’m here to stop it. I’m going to put them all in a room, take their guns away, lock them up, and keep them there until they agree to stop fighting.”

What has been gained for women? The women, peace, and security issue now has the same accountability mechanisms in the UN Security Council as the issue of children and armed conflict. The accountability measures are not good enough, but they are the strongest the council currently has: to name and shame and to sanction perpetrators of sexual violence, methods that do work to some extent. Now, one-third of peacekeeping patrols in Darfur, Sudan, are to protect women when they go to the market or collect water or fuel. There’s much better intelligence about who is perpetrating sexual violence and with what intent. There is an investment in local translators and in getting more women involved in peacekeeping, signaling an important intention to improve interactions with women civilians. It is not the full political response we hoped for, but it is a significant and tangible change.

Of course, there are still huge problems. The UN Security Council finds this easy to act on because it identifies women as victims, not as leaders, as agents, or the authors of their own solutions. On the ground, mass rape still happens. In Walikale in 2010, in Fizi in 2011, and in Minova in 2013 (Democratic Republic of Congo), hundreds of women, men, and children were raped, sometimes with UN peacekeepers in the vicinity. This
was three years after UNSCR 1820 was passed. We haven’t cracked the problem of deterrence or early warning.

We still have problems with the position that we took (in using humanitarian law and working within the framework of the rules of war) on moral grounds. But on pragmatic grounds, it worked.

The extent to which effective femocrats use strategies of reframing—for example, strategically identifying humanitarian law instead of human rights law to build a case and changing the formal rules in rule-based systems—was threaded throughout the interviews and through the growing literature on strategies of internal change agents (Razavi and Miller; Jain; Eyben; Caglar et al.). What is less clear is how feminists’ ability to reframe leads to deep-seated changes in the cultures that perpetuate gender discrimination—values that are deeply hidden in the collective consciousness of patriarchal, elitist, and hierarchical bureaucracies. The personal and professional costs to the femocrats who engage with these systems and the question of how and under what circumstances their strategies chip away at dominant power regimes remain elusive.

What also emerges is that one of Wright’s strategies—the smash first and build later approach—is generally counterproductive for femocrats in bureaucracies, especially when it touches the upper right-hand quadrant of the Gender at Work matrix (formal resources) or the lower left-hand quadrant (questioning the dominant culture). Overall, efforts to expose sexual harassment or sexual trafficking in the United Nations are poorly documented, but a number of emerging stories—the exposure of sexual trafficking among UN peacekeepers in Bosnia and the sexual harassment of women staff at the UN office in Pakistan (Saeed 2012)—have demonstrated that head-on efforts to confront the deep-seated patriarchy in the system often result in the dismissal or isolation of those who make discrimination and abuse visible and, to date, have failed to catalyze a profound transformation.

While acknowledging that their strategies could have some transformative effects to enable changes in laws and policies, most of the femocrats interviewed were also deeply aware of the limits of their efforts. As Anne-Marie Goetz notes:

What blocks deep cultural change is the institutional structure of international peace and security? As long as the interests of individual powerful member states govern everything that is decided, decisions will never be made on their merits but rather on what benefits the powerful members. There are limits in the extent to which women’s rights can be advanced through the United Nations unless domestic women’s movements have more influence on national politics and foreign policies in the majority of UN member states. Institutional reform at the UN itself is also crucial—including reform in the structure and methods of the Security Council.22

In addition, the establishment of UN Women may have something to teach us about the use of a “smash” strategy by outsider and insider feminists. UN Women resulted, in part, from a significant mobilization of transnational feminist networks in response to a larger UN reform process launched by Secretary-General Kofi Annan (United Nations 2006). Feminist calls for reorganization of the United Nation’s gender architecture was
coordinated by the Gender Equality Architecture campaign that represented 300 women's rights and social justice organizations and networks, calling for the merger of the four separate entities tasked to advance different aspects of gender equality in the UN system (UNIFEM, INSTRAW, OSAGI, and DAW) into a single more powerful institution. While the four UN entities had different mandates—with OSAGI as a special advisory and coordinating office for the secretary-general; DAW as the Secretariat for normative intergovernmental processes (including the UN World Conferences on Women and the Commission on the Status of Women); UNIFEM as an operational, field-based agency; and INSTRAW as a research and training institute—their low-level of leadership compared with other UN organizations, the mismatch between their modest budgets and expansive mandates, and the tensions that sabotaged greater collaboration between them generated ample impetus for a reorganization.

The creation of UN Women demonstrates the power of outsider–insider strategies, with transnational feminist movements working with sympathetic member states and gender advocates within the UN system (e.g., those who were deployed as part of an interstitial strategy) to challenge the formal rules that kept so-called normative and operational aspects of the UN system separate and often at odds with each other, to the detriment of advancing women's rights and gender equality in the policies and programs of the UN system. It shows the power of feminists joining together across different organizational and geographic contexts to lobby for change. And it shows the growing sophistication of a transnational feminist movement in formulating calls for changes in policies—including high-ranking positions mandated to speak for women's rights within the UN system—that have greater access to power and influence than previous change agendas demanded.

Three years after the establishment of UN Women, debates continue about whether a combination of intergovernmental deal making and bureaucratic in-fighting have inserted themselves into the details of UN Women's creation in a way that scuttles a feminist vision for this entity. The hope for a governance structure that enables women's rights networks to have a voice in decision making about the institution's programs and priorities never made it into the final resolution. UN Women ended up with an executive board that structurally replicates those of other UN organizations, but with an even larger membership that turns UN member states with a progressive women's rights agenda into a minority. The new leadership has placed a priority on recruiting new staff with bureaucratic experience rather than personnel with links to feminist networks and activism. The determination of other UN organizations to ensure that UN Women remains a relatively small organization that is unable to compete with them for dwindling development cooperation funds creates ongoing struggles that could distract UN Women from its overarching purpose. At the same time, the entrée that UN Women now has to high-level decision-making venues within the United Nations and its deliberate outreach to women's networks through its Civil Society Advisory Groups and other mechanisms remain important factors that could enable it to become a new laboratory for helping us to understand how to foment collective
action across sectors that challenges the deep structures of institutionalized gender discrimination.

**The War Within the Warrior**

The femocrats interviewed for this chapter recognize both the privilege and pain of their position. They have relatively high salaries (compared with women’s rights advocates working in developing country governments, NGOs, academia, and other spaces), and secure jobs focused on women’s human rights. That possibility was unimaginable forty years ago during the 1976–1985 UN Decade for Women.

At the same time, there is acknowledgment of the constant struggle and compromise embedded in these jobs. As Goetz describes it:

> Femocrats both face serious criticism from their feminist sisters and live in an environment of toxic hostility from colleagues in their institutions. They navigate between a rock and a hard place in their inability to satisfy any constituency. We ask ourselves: are we pursuing a defensible feminist goal, are we overinstrumentalizing women to serve another goal, are we sellouts? We’re all troubled by this.\(^{26}\)

The tensions among femocrats are yet another stumbling block. More time and resources need to be devoted to exploring the source of these tensions and constructive ways of resolving them. Nisreen Alami, describing the struggle to secure agreements between gender equality and women’s rights experts on a collective demand for a gender indicator to be included in the global monitoring framework following the Busan High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness,\(^{27}\) observed:

> This is the pain of femocrats living in small worlds and having no power or access to information and influence within their own agencies. Feminist coalitions . . . become spaces for contestation because the wider spaces that shape the aid agenda are not easily accessible. It’s easier for femocrats to disagree on which feminist tactics or language should be used than to acknowledge to each other the limitations they face within their organizations. Such interactions create an environment of distrust rather than an investment in a constructive consensus building through sharing information and exchanging expertise.\(^{28}\)

While acknowledging the internal struggles that are omnipresent in their work, femocrats often refer to the discussions they have among themselves about the unique positions they occupy. They speak of privilege, pragmatism, and a deep belief that bureaucracies matter. Alami notes:

> Bureaucracies have an impact on the people that come face to face with them. Having invested many years of my professional career trying to influence bureaucratic systems and tools like planning, budgeting, and government accountability mechanisms, I truly believe that bureaucracies do matter. If I did not believe
that one can change things about how bureaucracies function, then working on gender-responsive budgeting and public sector reform does not make sense.29

Both feminist women and men interviewed reflected on the impact that their personal histories have had on their choices. While it’s changing slowly, the entry of more men into UN jobs that are mandated to advance women’s rights is an important aspect of how change at the individual level can foster broader social changes. Maxime Huainato, deputy director of a UN Women regional office in West Africa, explains:

I once lived two houses away from a police station in Benin, my home country. Only then did I realize that atrocities were happening that I never knew were taking place in my own city. That is also my experience of working in UNIFEM. Before I started doing this work on women’s rights, I based my understanding on my own family experience. Doing this work means getting to know, as a man, what women live every day, that I wasn’t aware of. You can’t understand from reading about it. You have to live it.30

Hearkening back to Everjoice Win’s invocation of the importance of organizing under the trees, there is both a recognition and an evolution in the way that femocrats cope with these internal contradictions. Numbers make a difference. As Anne-Marie Goetz posits, “There are a growing number of feminists in these institutions who understand these trade-offs. It does make life easier to have people to reflect with and contact. You feel less alone.”31

**Conclusion**

We are at an important gender moment worldwide. The success of transnational and national feminist movements has been profound, from articulating women’s rights in numerous national constitutions to securing significantly greater (albeit still inadequate) public resources for basic needs like maternal health or addressing domestic violence to chipping away at the stronghold that men have had on powerful public roles. The power of the information and communications technologies and media to support transnational organizing and catalyze seismic changes in attitudes have been seized by many feminist networks, to good effect. At the same time, this success has generated a new set of challenges shaped by different contexts: from the backlash focused on reversing legal advances to violent efforts to prevent girls from going to school or women from participating in public life to new types of abuse like cyber-stalking and to the emerging recognition that shifting gender roles and the narrowing of political and economic options also contributes to a crisis of masculinity. Patriarchy may be at a tipping point, and it will take determined partnerships across many sectors, countries, and cultures to push it over the edge and eliminate its deleterious practices.
The United Nations must continue to be an important site for transnational feminist activism. Twenty-first-century threats—from the devastating effects of climate change to cross-border and regional conflicts, the concentrations of wealth and growing inequalities between countries and communities, or the scourge of health pandemics like HIV and AIDS or criminal networks engaged in sex trafficking—cannot be resolved, solely, through local or national level efforts. Local and national strategies and innovations are critical, but these are regional and global problems requiring regional and global solutions and political spaces that espouse the values of equality, peace, and human rights that have been agreed on by all member states in the United Nation’s founding charter. The United Nations is an imperfect space with questionable relevance in many instances, but at the same time it is important to acknowledge how hard-won norms agreed to on women’s rights, gender equality, and other social justice issues have been advanced through engagement in that imperfect terrain.

Processes such as global negotiations around the twenty-year review of the Beijing Platform for Action or agreement to a post-2015 development agenda are opportunities that transnational feminist movements—often in alliance with other social justice movements that are calling for sustainable, inclusive, and rights-based approaches to global threats—are using to ensure that old and new challenges to gender justice continue to be addressed. These opportunities for global, regional, and national analyses, debates, and negotiations are also venues in which we can build accountability of the internal mechanisms—including the gender architecture that our movements have demanded.

This chapter began with the questions: Have the gender architectures in mainstream institutions (i.e., the networks of gender equality and women’s rights specialists, units, and organizations) delivered in line with our expectations? Have our demands to hire more women in leadership positions and more specialists experienced in gender equality and women’s rights policies and programs made a difference? Growing numbers of femocrats represent a still inadequate, although not inconsequential, foothold in mainstream institutions, from governments to the private sector. The calls of transnational feminist movements to create these positions must now evolve in response to what has been learned. The experience of femocrats has demonstrated how the use of symbiotic and interstitial approaches can transform formal rules and, at times, catalyze bureaucracies and social institutions to create new resources and opportunities to advance women’s rights and gender equality.

So what do we still need to demand? As one of the key findings from the six-year Pathways to Women’s Empowerment study notes, change in gendered power relations requires more than giving individual women economic or political opportunities. Deeper-rooted structural constraints that perpetuate inequality must be tackled in all contexts, including in the formal institutions that produce the rules and services upon which citizens depend (Cornwall 2011). A powerful alliance between feminist activist and advocacy networks and the growing cadres of feminists located in formal institutions—whether governments, bilateral or multilateral organizations, or the private sector—are
It will be important to formulate demands that enable femocrats to more effectively catalyze efforts to transform the deep-seated informal cultures and norms of inequality that maintain gender discrimination in society at large and their own bureaucracies in particular, including by making this an explicit part of their remits. We need to support new forms of accountability by calling for more qualitative tracking of the ways that institutional cultures, values, and norms—the bottom left-hand quadrant of the Gender at Work matrix—are becoming more inclusive and gender equitable. The frontline femocrats whose jobs we lobbied for are an integral but differently located part of our movements. They need to expand the political space for other feminists and for a feminist agenda, while we support them to deploy the micropolitical strategies that work in their institutions.

At the same time, we need to encourage femocrats and those charged with advancing women’s rights through bureaucracies to reimagine themselves as part of a movement, linking with each other within and across institutional locations and levels and with transnational feminist networks and movements outside to form a wall of resistance to sexism and misogyny within the United Nations—in its policies, programs, and budgets—and at the national level of each of its member states. We need to demand that the institutions they are part of guarantee that the authority, status, and budgets their units and programs are accorded are commensurate with those of other organizations and experts.

Over the past forty years since the 1976–1985 UN Decade for Women, bureaucracies have perhaps changed individual feminists more than feminists changed bureaucracies. But there is far more scope than we have exploited to leverage the power of the collective. The opportunity is for growing numbers of feminists to interstitially find the nooks and crannies of change within entrenched bureaucracies and social institutions and to bring solidarity and strategy to their work with feminist sisters and brothers in all parts of society. As Gumbonzvanda urges:

I would encourage my colleagues . . . to maximize their space and speak with confidence. You carry a responsibility. Be clear that this is a space that came through struggles over many decades. You owe your jobs to nobody other than the women you represent.32
Jane Summer, Kristin Timothy, and Anne S. Walker. Special thanks are offered to Rawwida Baksh for insightful editorial suggestions, and appreciation to Sarah Rubin and Aicha Cooper, who helped enormously with the background research.

Notes

3. It is impossible to name here the numerous plans and programs of action that call for gender expertise. These range from key global gender equality plans—such as the Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women (1985) to the Beijing Platform for Action (1995)—to regional and subregional plans of action usually coordinated by regional or subregional bodies such as the African Union, the Caribbean Community, and the South Pacific Commission.
4. Personal communication, based on a study undertaken by the UN Inter-agency Network on Women and Gender Equality, August 2013.
5. Progress in implementing the Beijing Platform for Action, agreed unanimously by UN Member States at the Fourth World Conference on Women (1995), undergoes a major review every ten years by the UN Commission on the Status of Women. There has been significant debate about whether there should be a twenty-year review in 2015 or, instead, a UN Fifth World Conference on Women. See http://awid.org/News-Analysis/Friday-Files/A-Fifth-UN-World-Conference-on-Women-in-2015-Learn-More-and-Share-your-Opinion.
6. There are also more feminists joining these institutions in roles that are not specifically focused on gender equality. This chapter will refer to, although not fully explore, the strategies and impact of feminists filling other expert and management roles in bureaucracies.
8. A series of UN Security Council Resolutions have been agreed since the turn of the twenty-first century on Women, Peace, and Security to strengthen protection for and leadership of women in situations of war and armed conflict. These include UNSCRs 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 and 1889 (2009), and 1960 (2010).
9. The experience with women's national machineries or bureaus has been uneven. In a number of countries, they may be political appointees or members of political parties and often serve to maintain the status quo. However, in many countries, they are public servants who work in collaboration with women's organizations and movements to advance a gender equality agenda through putting in place gender-responsive legislation, national gender policies, and programs and projects that promote women's rights and gender equality.
14. Both UNIFEM and INSTRAW were established in 1976. UNIFEM was called the Voluntary Fund for the UN Decade for Women until 1984, when UNGA Resolution 39/125 renamed it UNIFEM.
15. “Gender Knowledge in Development” (2011), South Asia Workshop, Kathmandu, Nepal. Please note that the original concept of governmentality was developed by French philosopher Michel Foucault.

16. For a summary of this work and the background documents, see http://www.oecd.org/dac/gender-development/developmenteffectivenessgenderequalityandwomensempowerment.htm.

17. Maitrayee Mukhopadhyay and Pramada Menon, at a Gender at Work meeting held in Delhi, India, February 2013.


19. Personal communication, January 2013.


24. As an example, the executive directors of UNIFEM and DAW were at director (D-2) levels, while deputy directors and heads of divisions in other UN organizations such as UNDP or UNFPA were at the assistant secretary-general (ASG) level.


27. Gender equality is covered in one of ten indicators of the Global Framework for Monitoring Progress in Implementing Busan Commitments. The discussion among gender advocates was on whether to demand a performance indicator that commits governments and donors to improve their systems to tracking financing for gender equality or one that is related to an outcome indicator and improving sex-disaggregated data. See http://www.effectivecooperation.org/files/20130701%20Busan%20Global%20Monitoring%20Guidance_ENG_FINAL.pdf.


29. Personal communication, January 2013.

30. Personal communication, March 2013.


32. Personal communication, May 2013.

References


Chapter 8

International Trends in Women’s Political Participation and Representation

Anita Vandenbeld

Introduction

Since the 1990s, enhancing women’s political participation has increasingly become a core objective of international institutions, governments, and civil society organizations. It is now commonplace to refer to a 30 percent “critical mass” of women required in a legislative body before there will be transformative change for women. United Nations agencies routinely refer to women’s political participation as a prerequisite for democracy, economic development, and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Given that prior to the 1970s, less than one in ten women was elected to national parliaments (International IDEA 2005), feminists applaud the increase in women’s presence in national legislatures, executive offices, and local governments, while at the same time expressing criticism that the change is not happening quickly enough. Many women’s rights advocates extrapolate the number of years it would take to achieve parity at the current rate of change. Increasing the number of elected women has been used as a panacea for everything from war to poverty to corruption. There is a growing recognition that—while acknowledging the diversity of social, geographic, religious, and cultural environments—women face common barriers in achieving political power. Transnational women’s networks thus use new political spaces, such as the Internet, to share experiences and strategies across national, regional, linguistic, ethnic, religious, and other boundaries.

This chapter focuses primarily on the lived experiences of women in politics, including the common barriers and entry points, the international mechanisms and tools...
through which we have been sharing our knowledge, and some common entry points for women. It discusses the ways that transnational feminist movements have been advancing women’s political representation through generating new knowledge and supporting the day-to-day activities of female politicians.

**Assumptions**

Despite a significant body of scholarly work on women’s political representation, the area is underpinned by sometimes faulty assumptions and fraught with contradictions that have yet to be examined thoroughly.

First is the assumption that women’s political participation and representation is increasing and will continue to do so, with the only unknown being the pace. One may argue that the high point for transnational advocacy on women’s political participation was in the 1990s, culminating with the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action and the introduction of women’s quotas in many countries, leading to significant increases after 2000. Since then the increasing focus on a post-9/11 security framework for international relations, as opposed to a rights or development framework, combined with the resurgence of patriarchal and religious fundamentalist forces in the politics of many countries, has led to regression in some areas. In fact, even in countries where women are making significant gains in other areas—such as education and professional life—the numbers of women entering politics are stagnating. The fact that women have not yet achieved 30 percent of elected positions in any region of the world (UN Women 2011, 108), including in industrialized countries where women have had formal democratic rights (i.e., the right to vote) for almost a century, suggests that it is too soon to become complacent about the inevitability of progress.

Second, there is an assumption that the more democratic a country is, the more women will be elected there. Yet the erosion of closed and authoritarian regimes—especially in postcommunist countries—has led, at least during the transition period, to the return of many women to the private sphere after decades of high labor force participation and involvement in public life (which was central to communist ideology). Similarly, there is an assumption that increased numbers of women in parliaments will “naturally” lead to more inclusive democratic structures and processes, which does not always hold true.

Finally, the assumption that increased numbers of women in elected office lead to greater economic development is questionable, because the correlation between increased numbers of elected women and industrialization simply does not stand up to empirical scrutiny. Many developing or transitional democracies have more women in their national legislatures than countries in Europe and North America (with the notable exception of the Nordic countries).

Any study of women’s political participation and representation thus needs to address these apparent contradictions.
Why Elect Women?

While feminists generally accept equal representation of women in politics as a desirable goal, the reasons and justifications for electing more women vary greatly. Some have used essentialist arguments about women’s “caring nature” as the justification for having increased numbers of women in politics. Religious women have used theology as a basis for their political activism. For some, women’s political representation is an end in itself, regardless of what political positions women advocate once in power. To others, the election of more women is a means to an end; if women do not represent “women’s interests” or pursue a feminist agenda, then there is no point in electing them. In recent decades the World Bank and other institutions have made economic arguments for the involvement of more women in public life, positing that countries that involve more women in decision making will see an increase in their gross domestic product (GDP). Melanne Verveer, the American ambassador for global women’s issues, has referred to it as a “strategic interest” that is essential for global peace and security (Armstrong 2013, 191). Others have said that women’s presence in politics will lead to an opening of democratic processes to other marginalized groups and thus make politics more inclusive.

Defining “Women’s Interests”

Several advocates for increasing women’s political participation use the argument that women politicians will represent “women’s interests.” This implies a static and essentialist view of women’s interests as “soft” issues such as “children, families, education, health care, the environment, and diplomacy” (Kunin 2008, 158). Karen Celis points out that transnational feminist movements are global in scope and that this “results from [the] diversified life experience of different groups of women. Women’s interests then are a priori undefined, context-related, and subject to evolution” (Celis 2008, 1691–1702). With the introduction of “gender mainstreaming” into UN practice, the focus has shifted to “gendering” (i.e., bringing a gender equality perspective to) all issues rather than separating out specific areas as inherently “women’s” or “men’s.”

Women and Development

United Nations frameworks for gender equality often correlate enhanced women’s political participation with economic and human development, and in particular with improvement in women’s material conditions. The Human Development Report 2011 states:

[New] analysis shows how power imbalances and gender inequalities at the national level are linked to reduced access to clean water and improved sanitation, land
Anita Vandenbeld

Degradation, and deaths due to indoor and outdoor air pollution, thus amplifying the effects associated with income disparities.

(UNDP 2011)

One difficulty with this is that the term “development” itself is contested. Since the 1970s feminists in the global South have criticized development indicators such as GDP, per capita income, and investment for ignoring women’s participation in the informal economy and making women invisible (Staudt 2008, 2986–3000). Because of this, the language refers increasingly to “human development,” which is more inclusive and uses basic human needs as indicators.

Another problem is that there is no empirical evidence that there is necessarily a correlation between women’s representation in national legislatures and either economic or human development. Some countries have seen substantial growth in per capita GDP, girls’ education, women’s labor force participation, and life expectancy, but there has been no corresponding increase in women’s political participation. For example, in 2011 Japan ranked 106th in women’s representation, while Afghanistan ranked 30th (UNDP 2012, 6).

There is therefore need for caution in drawing a direct causal link between women’s participation in politics and greater economic and human development. If legislatures increase the number of women represented but do not subsequently see an increase in material wellbeing, that could lead to a backlash against the “failure” of women to live up to their promise. Many other factors may limit women’s capacity to achieve these goals, including how they were (s)elected; to whom they are beholden; how much real influence they have; the political and economic context; and their individual life experiences, social status, and ideology.

Women’s “Leadership Style”

One of the most frequently cited arguments in favor of increasing the number of women elected to public office is that they have a distinct “leadership style” that is different from men’s. Reference is made to the so-called civilizing effect of women. Harvard psychologist Steven Pinker goes so far as to state: “Over the long sweep of history women have been and will be a pacifying force. Traditional war is a man’s game. Tribal women never band together to raid neighbouring villages” (Armstrong 2013, 7). While such an essentialist view of women is debatable, it is true that women have often taken the lead in movements for peace. In 2003 in Liberia, women linked arms and surrounded the building in which the men were conducting the peace negotiations, refusing to let them out until there was a peace accord.

Often women themselves invoke their distinctive traits to promote their political objectives. In Iran Dr. Zahra Rahnavard campaigned for her husband, stating: “A regime that does not have women’s leadership will undoubtedly become a violent regime. . . . Women’s presence in positions of power and leadership makes for a healthy society. It will create equality. It will create a gentle society” (Coleman 2013, 81).
Others use the same argument in a less essentialist way, pointing to women's different life experiences and socialization as the basis for their different approach to politics. Iris Marion Young suggests that women have a different perspective because they interpret things from within their structural social situation (in Celis 2008, 1691–1702). The fact that women are often coming from outside the political establishment means that they do not have access to the money and power networks that underlie much corruption and nepotism. Anne Phillips puts forward a “politics of presence” theory, arguing that “when a group is systematically present in the process of working out alternatives, it is capable of formulating new subjects and challenging dominant conventions,” and “transformation” is enabled (quoted in Celis 2008, 1709–1718). This is similar to the concept of “critical mass”—often cited by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UN Women, and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—which states that the presence of 30 percent female members in a legislative body results in transformative change (Dahlerup 1988, 275–276). When taken beyond a focus on sheer numbers and broadened to inclusive processes, this argument provides the basis for much current democratic discourse on the concept of “inclusive participation.”

James MacGregor Burns defines two styles of leadership. The first is transactional, which is hierarchical and results-driven, requires “the ability to control through structures and processes,” and is more often associated with masculinity. The second is transformational, often seen as more feminine, which engages followers in “such a way that both parties are raised to higher levels of motivation and morality with a common purpose” (quoted in Kunin 2008, 1234–1243).

The challenge for women is that if they display the essentialist characteristics generally ascribed to female leaders, they could be perceived as being too soft or kind for politics. If they try to behave like men, they are accused of “overcompensating” and are often disliked, because they do not meet expectations for female behavior (Kunin 2008, 1256–1265). According to prominent American businesswoman Sheryl Sandberg, success and likeability are negatively correlated for women (2013: 40). Rainbow Murray refers to this as a “double bind” for women; “in order to be seen as competent or credible, women have to be masculine. However, in order to avoid being punished for subverting gender norms, women also have to be feminine” (2010, 279–283).

Another double bind for women in politics is motherhood. If women have children, they are accused of neglecting them while pursuing their political ambitions. If they do not have children, they are regarded with suspicion. In the 2006 Peruvian presidential elections, Martha Chavez criticized her rival, Lourdes Flores, for not being a mother (Murray 2010, 257–261). A female member of parliament in Vietnam cited motherhood as a reason that she did not run for reelection: “I wanted another child, and had already put it off for five years. There are not many young women with children in parliament” (Vandenbeld and Ly 2012, 11). Yet in one study of American women from a variety of fields, when describing what makes a good leader, almost 40 percent spontaneously spoke about motherhood (Kunin 2008, 1587–1595).

Melinda Vandenbeld Giles explains this seeming contradiction from the perspective of how society distinguishes between mothers as “economic agents” in the workforce
and mothers as performing “mothering”: “The ‘working mother’ becomes de-gendered within a framework of ‘equality’ while the mythical Intensive Mother becomes fixed within biological gendered assumptions . . . [thus] creating a ‘feminist’ contradictory narrative of emancipation through ‘choice’” (2014).

Where masculine ideals of political leadership conflict with stereotypical expectations of women’s behavior, many elected women find themselves “degendered.” This perpetuation of the dichotomy between the public and private spheres, by denying the femininity of women who enter public life (even if they are also mothers), is evident in a recent American study of public perceptions of the characteristics of “women” versus “female politicians”: 97.8 percent of respondents used “caring” to describe women, but only 27.5 percent applied the same term to female politicians. Similarly, for “motherly” there was a gap of 95.7 to 25.5 percent, with similar wide discrepancies for the words “compassionate,” “sensitive,” and “pretty”:

> We can see that female politicians are defined more by their deficits than their strengths. In addition to failing to possess the strengths associated with being women (e.g., sensitive or compassionate), female politicians [are seen to] lack leadership, competence, and masculine traits in comparison to male politicians.

(Resnick 2013)

Much attention has been paid to whether women have a distinct style of leadership and how it impacts their chances of being elected. While some women have used the stereotypes to their advantage, the preceding analysis suggests that regardless of whether women try to be like men and subvert stereotypical gender norms, or promote themselves as more feminine, motherly, and “civilizing,” as long as political leadership is associated with masculine traits, it is disadvantageous for women. The only way to remedy this is to have more female leaders and therefore change social norms that define “good leadership” to encompass both perceived “masculine” and “feminine” traits.

**Different Approaches to Women’s Political Participation**

Women’s political participation and representation, as articulated through UN World Conferences and other global forums, has been understood through two different approaches. The core question is whether increasing the number and influence of women in politics is an end in itself or a means to an end. The former evolves from a rights-based approach and is sometimes referred to as “symbolic representation.” It argues that women should have parity of representation because it is their fundamental right and a necessary prerequisite for the legitimacy of representative institutions. The latter emerges from a gender and development approach and is sometimes referred to as “substantive representation.” This approach argues that women’s political representation
can only be truly equal if it results in improvements in the material wellbeing and actual equality of women. These approaches are not mutually exclusive. In fact, international organizations, national women’s groups, and female politicians frequently advocate both simultaneously. They argue that women have the fundamental democratic right to participate equally in politics whether they are feminists or not, and that the very presence of more women in decision-making processes will lead to material improvements in the lives of women around the world.

These approaches both tend to focus on the numbers of women who achieve positions of political leadership. This is partly because it is easier to find quantitative data and also because it avoids a discussion on the controversial or even partisan issue of elected women’s commitment to women’s rights and gender equality, both as individuals and collectively. It is easier to talk about “female” leaders than about “feminist” leaders. While there are attempts to find substantive indicators—such as how many bills a woman sponsors or how often she refers to women’s equality in her speeches—this is much more subjective and difficult to measure.

Similarly, it is difficult to find qualitative data about the diversity or representativeness of elected women. What is the average age of women parliamentarians? How many ethnic or religious minorities are represented? What are the socioeconomic backgrounds or occupations of female MPs? It is difficult to determine whether elected women come from within the existing political establishment or from activist groups. But the qualitative indicators can often tell more about the representativeness of elected women than the numbers alone. For example, in Iraq after the 2005 elections, in which 31 percent women were elected, some Western commentators viewed this as an indication that the new parliament would be progressive on women’s rights, but they did not take into account that half of the women elected belonged to a conservative religious party (Coleman 2013, 259). On the other hand, it is misleading to make assumptions about women’s commitment to transformational change on the basis of even qualitative indicators such as religion or family status.

**The Numbers**

According to the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU 2013), the average percentage of women in national parliaments globally is 20.4 percent. There are large discrepancies between regions, and mature democracies do not necessarily do better than emerging democracies. In fact, the country with the highest percentage of women’s representation in parliament is postconflict Rwanda, at 56.3 percent. The Nordic countries continue to lead by a large margin, at 42 percent. The Americas are next, at 24.8 percent. Europe (excluding the Nordic countries) is not far behind, at 22.7 percent. Africa is above the global average at 21.9 percent, while Asia (19.1 percent), the Arab States (17.8 percent), and the Pacific (12.8 percent) are all currently below the global average.
At the executive level the story is not much different, despite several high-profile female presidents and prime ministers. In 2013, out of 195 countries, only 21 had a female head of state or government. Globally, only 16.7 percent of government ministers are women. In developed countries, women hold 30 percent of ministerial positions (UN Women 2011, 108). In Latin America, 25 percent of ministers are women (Hinojosa 2012, 1348), compared to 10 percent in Asia-Pacific (UNDP 2012, 6). Only three African countries have achieved the 30 percent target of women in ministerial positions, with the other African countries having between 10 and 20 percent.

In terms of trends over time, in 1945 democratically elected legislatures had fewer than 2 percent women (Thames and Williams 2013, 393), with a slow increase of 1 to 2 percent each decade until 2000, when there was a sudden increase (UNDP 2012, 17). In 1975 women accounted for 10.9 percent of parliamentarians (IPU 2009, 5), with less than a 1 percent increase by 1997 (11.7 percent). Between 2000 and 2010 the numbers increased from 13.5 to 18.8 percent. However, this is not the full picture. In many countries in Western Europe and North America, the spike occurred earlier—during the 1970s and 1980s—and has almost reached a plateau since then. In Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region, women’s representation has decreased since the communist transition in the early 1990s. In the Arab States there has also been regression in real influence of women in some countries (UNDP 2008), despite a marked regional increase of 8.6 percent over the past decade. The impact of the recent “Arab Spring” remains to be seen, although initially women appear to be losing political space.

Thus, while there is some cause for optimism, the increase in women’s political representation is slow, and there are significant variations among countries and regions, as well as within countries. The existence of long periods of stagnation or even regression in certain countries and regions suggests that there are no assurances that the numbers will continue to increase at the current pace, let alone achieve another spike.

**Beyond Numbers**

The way to move past a simplistic “30 percent critical mass” argument and a single-minded focus on the numbers of women elected is to turn our focus toward inclusive processes. What mechanisms are there for women to put forward initiatives within the legislature? What are the internal decision-making processes of political parties? To what extent does parliamentary debate or committee work result in amendments to legislation? What are the mechanisms that political parties use to recruit candidates? Making these processes more inclusive of women provides a stronger basis for the election of women, who not only bring a diversity of life experiences and perspectives but also have the opportunity to make a difference once they get into office.
The Role of Feminist Movements

Women's organizations, networks, and movements have always played a vital role in opening up political space for women. They advocate for increased women's political representation and on public policy issues related to women's rights and gender equality. They provide tangible support to women, including leadership training and network building, to enable them to make the jump into active involvement in electoral politics, as well as to their political campaigns. In many parts of the world, especially Africa and Latin America, the pool of female political candidates comes disproportionately from women's organizations. The Inter-Parliamentary Union's 2008 survey of parliamentarians from 110 countries reveals that nearly twice as many women (20 percent) as men (11 percent) cite participation in civil society organizations as an important channel for their entry into politics (Ballington 2008).

In some cases women's organizations have even provided safe avenues for female candidates to overcome patriarchal structures by establishing parallel paths to achieving power. In the Philippines the national women's movement has formed an all-women political party, the Gabriela Women's Party, which has two seats in the congress (iKNOWPolitics 2010a). In Somaliland, where political power was traditionally divided among five clans, Dr. Asha Elmi Haji created a “sixth clan” comprised of women (iKNOWPolitics 2008).

A “sandwich” strategy was used in Eastern Europe when many countries went through the process of acceding to the European Union. The strategy combined advocacy by local women's groups from the bottom with pressure by international organizations from the top, in order to “sandwich” the governance structures into increasing women's representation (iKNOW Politics 2008). This joining of transnational and national feminist movements has been most effective in postconflict or transition countries with a large presence of international organizations assisting in the democratization process. In fact this is one possible explanation for why many postconflict countries have leap-frogged more mature democracies in increasing women's presence in parliaments.

However, it should be noted that female politicians and women's civil society groups sometimes have a strained relationship where it is perceived that elected women are “selling out” or not sufficiently representing women's rights and gender equality issues. While feminist organizations have the mandate to represent women's interests unwaveringly, once women are elected they often find themselves accountable not only to women but to their political party, geographical constituency, and a range of national issues. Thus, the very success of women as political leaders carries with it the seeds of rejection by some feminists, who feel that these elected women are no longer representing them.

This becomes a double bind for many elected women, whose influence within their respective political parties often depends on the perception that they speak for a powerful constituency of women. As soon as women's groups withdraw their support,
these elected women lose the leverage they might have had to push for feminist policies within their parties or the national legislature, thus further distancing them from the women’s movements that may have initially brought them to power. Frank Thames and Margaret Williams discuss the strength of party discipline in many countries, stating that “the ability of women to represent women’s interests directly is dependent on the context in which they operate” (2013, 459–466). Strategies to counteract this include greater communication between feminist organizations and women in parliament and the movement of women representatives between civil society and partisan politics and back again, to enhance understanding of the differing roles and mandates as well as the limitations on their scope of action.

INTERNATIONAL TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, AND TOOLS

A number of international conventions and agreements provide the basis for women’s equal participation in political decision making. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) enshrine “the equal rights of men and women.” In 1979 the UN General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which mandates equality between men and women in political and public life, including the use of “temporary special measures.” This has been used by many women’s groups to push for electoral quotas for women.

One of the greatest success stories of transnational feminist organizing is the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, signed unanimously by 189 countries. Emerging out of the UN Fourth World Conference on Women, the Beijing Platform for Action built on previous UN conferences on women in Mexico (1975), Copenhagen (1980), and Nairobi (1985). It calls for governments to take measures to ensure women’s equal participation in decision making and power structures. According to Kathleen Staudt, who writes on gendering development, “gender would be invisible without the rise of the global women’s movement and its connection to the United Nations-sponsored conferences” (2008, 3170–3176). Mona Lee Krook credits the adoption of quotas for women within electoral systems in many countries to the influence of transnational women’s movements and the Beijing Declaration. She points out that in the 1980s there were only twenty-two countries with gender quotas, followed by fifty more in the 1990s and another forty since 2000 (Krook 2009, 68–71). The UN Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) has responsibility for the follow-up to the conferences, including five-year periodic reviews of implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action. The process leading to the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action included the formal participation of women’s organizations and transnational
networks and resulted in increased funding for research and for international and national women's NGOs.

In 2000 the United Nations adopted the Millennium Declaration, in which countries committed to achieving eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015. MDG 3 commits member states to promote gender equality and empower women. It includes a specific target of increasing the number of women in parliaments. In the same year the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1325, which calls for women's participation in peace and security, including peace negotiations and postconflict reconstruction.

Together these international conventions and agreements provide transnational feminist movements with vital tools with which to apply pressure and influence national governments to increase the level of participation of women in democratic leadership.

**Challenges Faced by Women in Politics**

Since the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, numerous transnational conferences and meetings have been held to discuss the issue of women's low levels of political participation. Many of these have been hosted by UN agencies (e.g., CSW, UNDP, UNIFEM, and UN Women), international NGOs and research institutes (e.g., International IDEA, IPU, International Development Research Centre, Association for Women's Rights in Development (AWID), and National Endowment for Democracy (NED), and former and current female presidents and prime ministers (e.g., Club de Madrid, the Liberia women's colloquium in 2009, and "Women Leaders as Agents of Change" in 2011). Bringing together female politicians and women's rights activists from around the world, the single striking feature of these meetings is the commonality of the barriers cited by women to their entry into politics. While there are significant differences in degree—for example, culture and stereotyping may be more obvious in traditional patriarchal societies—the reports from these global and regional conferences consistently identify similar issues faced by women entering politics.

**Family and Domestic Responsibilities**

Even in countries where women have achieved significant milestones related to gender equality, they continue to bear greater responsibilities for reproductive and domestic work. Many women, when asked about a political career, throw up their hands and say, "When would I find the time?" Particularly in countries with a high labor force participation of women, politics would be a third job—after their career and domestic work. In Vietnam some former women members of parliament said that when they first ran for office, their own mothers were out campaigning against them, asking people to spare them the additional work (Vandenbeld and Ly 2012, 11).
Politics frequently requires long hours, late-night meetings, and frequent travel. For many women this is simply incompatible with their family responsibilities. An American study of eligible candidates’ family status showed that nearly twice as many women (15 percent) as men (8 percent) were single. Female political candidates were also less likely to have children (66 percent, compared to 84 percent of men) (Lawless and Fox 2010, 1732–1735). Women who have children often wait until they are grown before entering politics (Lawless and Fox 2010, 1895–1902), especially in countries where there is a lack of publicly funded child care. This means that women political candidates are often older than men when they run for the first time and therefore do not have as many years to gain experience and seniority or to run multiple times.

Lack of Access to Money Networks

Women in politics often cite raising money as the single most difficult task. In much of the world, women’s work is unpaid. Even when women participate in the paid workforce, they are disproportionately located in the informal economy or in temporary or part-time jobs. In some countries women do not yet have the legal right to own property. Women have less access to capital and are often financially dependent on the male members of their families. Even in industrialized countries, women continue to earn less than men and are underrepresented on corporate boards and as senior executives. Among Fortune 500 companies, only 21 have a female CEO, and only 14 percent of executive officers and 17 percent of board members are women (Sandberg 2013, 5).

Money is crucial to political success. Campaign expenses for signs, brochures, travel, staff, data management, publicity, and campaign offices are only the tip of the iceberg. In many countries political parties deliberately seek out wealthy candidates and require them to contribute significant sums of money to the national campaign in exchange for the party nomination. In parts of the world, especially in developing countries, a culture of political patronage exists wherein candidates are expected to personally provide basic social services and patronage appointments to their constituents. In much of the world, handing out meals and T-shirts and providing basic charity places a significant financial burden on political candidates:

[I]n local elections in Sierra Leone, and in many other countries, constituents do not expect to give money to the campaign of the candidate. Rather, constituents (and chiefs and local businesses and clubs, etc.) expect to RECEIVE money from the candidate. In Sierra Leone, this practice is called “shake hands” and it is particularly cumbersome for the women candidates who traditionally have even less campaign money to spend than their male counterparts.

(Nelson 2010)

Political financing legislation, such as limits on campaign spending and donors, transparency and disclosure requirements, and public financing of political campaigns,
can help to level the playing field, but these require electoral commissions and auditors who have the capacity to enforce the laws.

Even in countries where women have greater access to money networks and where there are strong election financing laws, women can be at a disadvantage due to socialization. Women are often more reluctant than men to ask outright for money. Often they have fewer links to corporate donors and do not have fund-raising experience. A number of organizations, both national (e.g., EMILY’s List in the United States) and international (e.g., National Democratic Institute), provide training to women on how to fund-raise successfully. A number of political parties also have separate funds to support women candidates directly (e.g., Judy Lamarsh Fund in the Liberal Party of Canada).

Social and Cultural Stereotypes

A previous section discussed the ways in which stereotypes about women as motherly or civilizing have influenced public perceptions about female styles of leadership. Many female politicians claim that cultural beliefs and stereotypes (including religious and customary laws) that limit women’s role (whether overt, subtle, or internalized by women themselves) are the most significant barrier to their equal participation in elections.

In some countries women’s roles are so prescribed as to make entry into public life almost impossible, at least without the “permission” of a male family member. In many societies women who attend late-night campaign rallies or go to hotels unaccompanied in order to participate in political meetings are regarded as sexually suspect and often face intimidation and violence. In areas where women’s mobility is restricted, yet there is a high level of technological access and knowledge, women have used the Internet to campaign for office without ever having to leave their homes. In other situations, women have used religious spaces or other “respectable” public domains to build support for their political campaigns.

Even in countries where women do not face overt restrictions on their public activities, they continue to be limited by social expectations of women’s behavior. Women are still often typecast as “mother, wife, caregiver or temptress” (Armstrong 2013, 10). In her analysis of media framing of female presidential candidates, Rainbow Murray states:

There is evidence that media coverage of candidates focuses on the traits and issues presumed to correspond to the candidate’s gender, even if a candidate has actually tried quite hard to promote herself in non-stereotypical ways, thus reinforcing stereotypes and preventing candidates from breaking the mold.

(2010, 209–212)

Media commentators are more likely to note women’s appearance, emotional state, or family status (i.e., “wife of . . .”). Female candidates are also more likely to be referred to as “new” and to represent change—which can sometimes be used to their advantage, but
often connotes inexperience (Murray 2013, 209–212). Women also tend to be referred to by their first names or are made “invisible” by not being covered by the media at all.

**Internalizing Stereotypes**

The socialization of girls in their “appropriate” gender roles can lead to an internalization of social norms and expectations that causes girls and women to not even consider politics as a possibility. Early socialization within the family has much to do with later interest in politics. In a US study, women were 20 percent less likely than men to have had their fathers talk to them about politics (Lawless and Fox 2010, 1624–1633).

One of the most obvious manifestations of this is recent research regarding a “political ambition gap.” A study of thirty-eight hundred women in the United States shows that women are still 15.6 percent less likely than men to consider running for office (Lawless and Fox 2010, 1340–1349). The difference begins early in life, with 15 percent of men and only 9 percent of women saying that they first thought of running before they had graduated from high school (Lawless and Fox 2010, 1639). A similar 2013 study of American boys and girls found that when asked the question, “Have you thought you might run for office when you are older?” 57 percent of boys and only 37 percent of girls responded in the affirmative (Lawless and Fox 2013, 2). According to Cynthia Enloe in her discussion on patriarchy, women are likely to overlook their own marginalization from the public sphere and feel “secure, protected [and] valued” by patriarchal systems, therefore ensuring that politics “does not even appear on the radar screen for many women” (quoted in Lawless and Fox 2010, 444–450).

Men are more likely to think about their external qualifications, while women are more likely to think about their “personality attributes,” such as temperament, when deciding to run. For example, many women will say, “I don’t have a thick enough skin,” or argue that they don’t want to compromise their convictions (Lawless and Fox 2010, 2949–2976). Women are more likely to express self-doubt and to underestimate their own abilities. In another survey, female potential candidates were 60 percent less likely than men to say they thought of themselves as “very qualified” to run for office (Sandberg 2013, 29).

Having more female role models and encouraging young girls to think about politics is therefore vital to counter the impact of gender role stereotypes, even in societies where overt gender bias is no longer socially acceptable.

**Education and Knowledge**

Girls around the world are less likely than boys to have access to formal education. According to the World Bank, there was a 5.1 percent difference between male and female youth literacy rates in the period 2005 and 2010. Even in societies where women have equal access to formal education, there continues to be a gender gap in political knowledge. A recent British report found that women were less informed about politics and
current affairs than men in all parts of the world. In fact, the higher the general political knowledge in a country, the greater the gender gap. According to the report: “The fact that political knowledge gender gaps have not shrunk in advanced industrial nations, despite women’s progress in areas such as education and work, presents a grim prospect for many developing countries” (Brean 2013).

In some countries, such as Afghanistan, the electoral commission provides voter education through the radio in order to reach illiterate voters (iKNOW Politics 2010b). In addition, many political parties, NGOs, and international organizations conduct capacity-building programs for women as voters and candidates, including campaign colleges for women.

Thus, while education is a precondition for women’s equal participation in electoral politics, it is not sufficient. There needs to be more research into the reasons for the gender gap in news consumption between men and women, even where educational levels are high.

Political Party Gatekeepers: “Old Boys’ Networks”

The informal networks that exist among men within political parties present another barrier to women’s engagement in politics. Many processes and “rules of the game” within political parties are unwritten and are known only to those who are already on the inside. Whereas women often view political space as limited, men do not. While women who achieve success within political parties may view other women as rivals, men will try to “bring along” other men to shore up their allies within the party. In this way, women’s party branches that function as forums for networking and mentoring of new women can be very important. Also, younger women who become involved in a political party are not perceived as an electoral threat and are more likely to be invited to “learn the ropes,” so the encouragement of girls’ political activity becomes doubly important.

Personal Safety

Violence against women in politics is one of the first issues raised by female candidates from developing countries and fragile states in interviews and at international conferences. However, it is one of the issues least written about. In interviews with female politicians, the tales of verbal and physical violence, sexual assault, abduction, mob violence, and threats against family members are shockingly frequent. According to a UNDP study, violence is used especially against women who pursue transformative political agendas. For example, women in the Balkans who organized behind a peace agenda were treated as traitors by ultranationalist leaders during the war in the former Yugoslavia (UNDP 2010, 29). Flora Terah, who was abducted and tortured and whose only son was murdered when she ran for parliament in Kenya, began an international network of women against violence in politics called “Terah against Terror.”

18
In Latin America several countries have made violence against women in politics a punishable offence.

In 2012 Bolivia passed a law against “Harassment and Political Violence against Women” that includes prison sentences for gender-based political violence and provisions to prevent women from resigning their positions under duress.\(^{19}\) The law defines political violence as “actions, conduct or assault causing bodily harm, psychological or sexual abuse against a woman or her family aimed at preventing her from or restricting her in exercising her duties or causing her to take decisions against her will, principles or the law” (Carrillo 2009). The passage of this law was the result of years of advocacy by Bolivian women’s organizations, funded by UNIFEM, and is an example of the “sandwich” strategy of bottom-up and top-down pressure by national and international women’s movements, leading to legal precedents that can be adopted by other countries.

**“Double Bias” against Women of Other Marginalized Groups**

Women who belong to racial, ethnic, or religious minorities, or a lower class/caste, or rural communities, are often the subject of “double bias.” Women can also be doubly discriminated against for reasons of age, disability, or sexual orientation. At the same time, since women are not actually a minority, political processes that open up space for women can have a “wedge” effect and serve to make politics more accessible to other marginalized groups. Sometimes cross-national sharing of experiences—for example, among indigenous women in the Americas—can help to build the kinds of support networks and resources that may be absent at the local or national levels. One example is the challenge to a constitutional provision in Mexico that banned indigenous women from standing for office. Eufrosina Cruz Mendoza gained international attention and the support of women’s organizations locally in her battle for the legal right to run for mayor of her town.\(^{20}\)

While there are differences among women across national boundaries, women within countries are also heterogeneous. For example, a wealthy, educated urban woman in Bangladesh may have more in common with her counterparts in New York than with lower-class rural women in her own country. Most often the women represented in national parliaments and participating in international forums and networks belong to the more privileged groups within a society.

**Structural Barriers: Institutions**

Much has been written about the institutional limitations on women’s political participation, in particular different electoral systems. The UNDP defines institutions as “the constitution, laws, and formal regulations which govern processes of candidate
nomination, appointment and election to decision-making bodies” (2012, 17). Joni Lovenduski broadens this definition in her discussion of the “new institutionalism” to include “norms, values and ideas, incentive systems, and ability to explain persistence of social structures” (2011, 107–114). According to Thames and Williams, such institutional rules are “contagious” and have influence within and across national boundaries (2013, 2269–2276). At the same time Magda Hinojosa, writing about Latin America, insists that institutional approaches are limited. They do not explain change across time in countries where there is a consistency in institutional frameworks (Hinojosa 2012, 127–130).

The most common institutions that impact women’s political representation are electoral systems, political parties, and parliaments.

**Electoral Systems**

Empirical evidence shows that proportional representation systems lead to more women being elected than single-member constituency, “first-past-the-post” (FPTP), or “winner-take-all” systems. This is largely attributed to the ways in which political parties choose candidates. In multimember constituencies with party lists, the objective of the party is to put forward a list of candidates who represent as many sectoral interests as possible in order to gain votes. They can also ensure a “zipper” system, meaning that every second candidate on the list must be a woman. In an FPTP system, each local constituency selects a single candidate whom it believes will be most electable by the majority of voters. Since in the past winning candidates have usually been men, political parties tend to define electability in this way. It is also much harder (but not impossible) for a national political party to impose a quota of women candidates when each constituency independently chooses someone from its district. IPU’s annual review of elections for 2012 revealed that “proportional representation not only remained the best system for enforcing quotas, but also delivered a much higher percentage of women MPs (25%) in 2012 than first-past-the-post (14%) or a mixture of the two systems (17.5%).”  

**Parliaments**

Parliamentary systems are more likely than presidential systems to elect women at the executive level. In other words, there are more female prime ministers than presidents. This is often attributed to the fact that it is easier for women to win the leadership of a political party than a country-wide open vote (Thames and Williams 2013, 913–920).

Parliaments themselves can pose barriers to women’s participation. The IPU has done significant work on gender-sensitive parliaments: “A ‘gender-sensitive parliament’ is one that responded to the needs and interests of both men and women in its structures, organization and operations, and mainstreamed gender concerns into its work as a nation’s peak legislative institution” (2009, 76).

In IPU’s 2008 survey of parliamentarians, many respondents spoke about the institutional culture, traditions, rules and norms of parliaments as a barrier (IPU 2008, 71).
Assessments of parliaments need to include the number of women who hold leadership positions (e.g., presiding officers, committee chairs, etc.), the rules of procedure, as well as the employment conditions of parliamentary staff, among others. In many cases, changes as simple as abolishing late-night sittings, providing on-site child care, and installing separate women’s toilets near the chamber have led to improvements.

**Political Parties**

Even where women overcome the social and economic barriers and decide to run for office, in most cases they need to acquire a party nomination. Whether political parties select candidates or party lists centrally or in some form of local primary system, more women are lost at this stage of the process than after they manage to get their names on a ballot. One of the reasons is that even where women are active in political parties, the parties often retain patriarchal structures and attitudes about what makes a desirable or electable political candidate. Parties are the main mechanism through which political recruitment takes place. An American study showed that “[the] politically engaged women we interviewed were only half as likely as men to have received such a suggestion [to run]” (Lawless and Fox 2010, 2379–2386). Political parties also often protect incumbents, who are disproportionately male, thus further limiting women’s entry.

Even when political parties wish to be more inclusive, they often lack the strategies to make systemic changes and opt instead for shortcuts, such as reserved seats or appointing women. But according to quotas scholar Mona Lee Krook, “these policies confer varying degrees of dependence between the women elected to these seats and the parties and elected officials who make their election possible” (2009, 110–113).

One mechanism used to mobilize women within political parties is the establishment of separate women’s branches. In some parties, such as the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, the women’s section has had real power and influenced the culture of the party:

*The advocacy efforts . . . by the ANC Women’s League against all forms of discrimination and gender imbalance led to the ANC resolution that one third of its representatives in Parliament must be women, which had a far reaching effect in transforming the newly-elected democratic Parliament of South Africa.*

(Lamakhosikazi 2010, 5)

However, when not linked to the transformation of broader norms and structures, these women’s “arms” or “wings” or “branches” of political parties can have a detrimental effect. Writing about South Asia, Farida Shaheed points out:

*Women’s wings of political parties are rarely integrated into the central power structure of the party. Functioning mostly as mechanisms for mobilizing support for specific parties, these wings may actually further marginalize women by limiting their presence and activism to this auxiliary role, bereft of any real political power.*

(2010, 6)
Over the past several decades women around the world have used various public spaces to leverage political influence. In many cases women have turned barriers to participation into opportunities. When confronting national-level institutional barriers such as electoral systems, women have pushed for quotas and reserved seats. Strategies that have worked in one part of the world spread to other countries and regions through transnational women’s networks. There is increasing recognition that many structural causes of inequality are not territorial in character, and that the opening of political space requires not only inclusion of women in existing state-level institutions, but also a transformation of the frameworks themselves.

“Temporary Special Measures”

Quotas and other “temporary special measures” have been referred to as the “fast track” to increasing the number of women in elected office. There is significant evidence that the introduction of quotas has increased the number of women in representative bodies. However, there is limited scholarship on whether quotas make these institutions more representative or political processes more inclusive.

There is also a large variation in the types of special measures used. These can range from constitutionally guaranteed or nationally legislated quotas, to reserved seats or female-only primaries, to voluntary party quotas, and finally to the outright appointment of women. The ultimate success of these measures depends on how well they intersect with existing political norms, attitudes, and processes. Political party quotas are the most common form of special measure, which originated in Europe. Reserved seats were used primarily in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East between the 1930s and the 1970s. Since 2000 legislated quotas have been most common, especially in emerging democracies, largely due to the influence of women’s NGOs, international organizations, and “transnational emulation” (Krook 2009, 103–109).

Quotas

Of the twenty-eight countries that have achieved 30 percent women in national parliaments, twenty-three have used some form of quota (UN Women 2011, 119). In 2012 some forty-eight countries held parliamentary elections, of which those with legislated quotas saw an average of 24 percent women elected, compared with 22 percent for countries with voluntary quotas and 12 percent where there were no quotas.22

In countries where there is a strong public expectation of gender equality, voluntary party quotas can be very successful because they intersect with a perceived partisan advantage. Women’s groups have capitalized on this interparty competition. For
example, in Canada a multipartisan women’s network called Equal Voice issued a public challenge to party leaders to increase the number of women running as candidates in order to exert electoral pressure on the parties.  

In countries where women face almost insurmountable structural inequalities, legislated quotas can create space for them where it otherwise would not exist. For example, Isobel Coleman argues that in Afghanistan, without a quota many women would not have dared to run for office, and in nearly two-thirds of the provinces not a single woman would have been elected. “The use of the quota shaved several decades off the time that it would have taken to get women into politics in any meaningful way in Afghanistan” (Coleman 2013, 182).

Quotas are much easier to implement in a proportional representation system and multimember constituencies, because political parties have greater influence over candidates’ lists and can specify that a percentage of candidates must be women. In a single-member constituency, national parties are more restricted. Often in such cases a certain number of seats are set aside as “reserved seats” for women.

Reserved Seats

It is possible with reserved seats to retain electoral competition, for example in women-only primaries or electoral districts set aside for only female candidates, where women compete against other women. But these are rare. More often reserved seats are appointed directly by the executive or elected indirectly by the national parliament. This can have serious implications for the perceived legitimacy of these women’s mandate. In Bangladesh, for example, fifty of the three hundred seats in the national parliament are reserved for women. The prime minister and leader of the opposition are also women.

However, there is a large discrepancy in influence between those women who were elected and those occupying reserved seats. Whereas the elected women sit in the front row or in the same section as the men from their political party, the women who represent reserved seats huddle together at the back of the chamber and are rarely called upon by the speaker. According to a recent UNDP report on women in the Asia-Pacific region:

> The process of indirect election has discredited legitimacy…. Women appointed to these positions by party leaders have no popular legitimacy or grassroots electoral base and often have little political experience or party connections, sapping their capacity to serve an independent role …. [T]he way that this policy has been implemented means that reserved seats have not necessarily led towards women’s empowerment. Indeed their use may have prevented other more effective steps being taken, such as gender quotas for candidate nomination processes within main political parties.

(UNDP 2012, 32)

Similarly, according to a study by the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), reserved seats in local government elections have
led to an inferior status for those women: “Since women councilors lack any constituency from where they are elected, they have to make extra efforts for establishing their credibility, which requires more resources, time as well as support of people” (iKNOW Politics 2010c).

The implementation of reserved seats can increase the number of women elected, but depending on how these seats are distributed (by direct election or indirect appointment), they may not necessarily enhance women’s influence or representation, and in some cases may even hinder it.

Appointments

While the international language of democratization equates greater electoral freedom and openness with increased numbers of women and minorities, there is empirical evidence to the contrary in some parts of the world. In 2009 the average percentage of women in appointed positions (mainly executive) globally was 19.8 percent, whereas the average for elected women (mainly legislative) was 17.45 percent. There were significant regional variations in this gap. The greatest difference between appointed and elected women was in Africa, while in Europe and Asia more women were elected than appointed (Sendukas 2010, 38). A recent study of the primary system in Latin America indicates that more women are successful in municipal elections where candidates are appointed than when they are elected in open primaries, because appointment allows them to circumvent both self-nomination and local power networks (Hinojosa 2012, 1509–1512).

Even when applied to process as opposed to numbers, there is some evidence that more open and transparent electoral processes do not necessarily lead to greater numbers of women being elected. In the Asia-Pacific region, a UNDP report indicates that there is a negative correlation between the number of female parliamentarians and the level of liberal democracy:

Processes of democratization are vitally important but in the short-term, at least, the transition to democracy does not, by itself, automatically strengthen the representation of women; rather the reverse can be observed. Thus the one-party Communist states of China and Viet Nam have more than twice as many women in their national legislatures than the democratic states of India and the Republic of Korea.

(UNDP 2012, 8)

This negative correlation between open democratic processes and the number of women only holds true, however, if representation is defined solely in terms of numbers of women present, rather than the representativeness, influence, and transformational potential of the particular women. According to Mona Lee Krook, parties may “hand-pick malleable women who will not question the status quo” (quoted in Hinojosa 2012, 1860–1863). Very few studies look at the characteristics of women who are (s)elected through different processes, and more research needs to be done on whether
the women who achieve power through less competitive processes make any significant difference once they are in office.

Local Government

In order to ensure greater political access for all women, we need to look at municipal or local-level politics. Women frequently gain political and electoral experience at the local level, then use this as a stepping stone to run nationally. On the one hand, the local level can be easier for women to contest, because it is more personal and there is often less competition. But in some areas local power monopolies make it more difficult. Jo Beal notes:

Local government is in an ambiguous position. It is the part of the state that is located closest to the people and to organised civil society. As such it has the potential to engage more effectively with women who are often confined through their domestic responsibilities to public engagement close to home, but because of its closeness to society the local state can also become too close to social institutions. In Africa, the latter can be deeply patriarchal, illustrated for example by the role of traditional authorities both in everyday life at the community level and in local government.

(quoted in IPU 2009, 45)

Data on the numbers of women elected at the subnational or municipal levels are difficult to obtain, and there are large variations between countries. In Africa the differences range from 2 percent in Angola to 58 percent in Lesotho (IPU 2009, 44). In Latin America women are currently doing better at the national level than the local level, with women comprising 20.5 percent of legislative bodies but only 7.4 percent of mayors (Hinojosa 2012, 1348–1352). In the Asia-Pacific region women do somewhat better at the subnational level, with the average varying between 16 and 26 percent depending on the level (rural, urban, district, regional), albeit with limited data and large variations (UNDP 2012, 22). While anecdotal evidence based on the career paths of successful female politicians would suggest that the local level is a frequent starting point for their political careers, more research is needed to understand whether this is because women are more represented at the local level or because the individual women who succeed at the local level frequently continue into national-level politics.

Egalitarian Ideologies

Typically women have been represented in larger numbers in political parties that are based on ideologies of egalitarianism, or “left-wing” parties. In the Nordic countries, where women have achieved the highest level of political leadership, the feminist movements were intrinsically linked with other progressive movements for social inclusion, such as the labor movement. This led to greater inclusiveness and equal opportunities for women. Policies such as publicly funded parental leave and child-care programs
have led to a reduction in many of the traditional barriers to women's political participation. As discussed previously, many communist countries have had greater numbers of women in parliament and higher gender indicators overall.

This emphasis on the positive role of the state in promoting gender equality is known as “state feminism.” Since the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action in 1995, many international feminist organizations have endorsed state feminism through national-level women's policy agencies, or what the UN refers to as “national machineries for the advancement of women” (Mazur and McBride 2008, 5271–5279). This concept of state feminism is strong in Latin America and stable democracies. However, it does not resonate well in postcommunist transition countries of Eastern Europe and CIS or the Middle East, where the joining of the “state” and “feminism” has often meant token women's representation aimed at legitimizing authoritarian regimes. In this context, “state feminism is seen as a product of decisions made by male elites who develop policies and structures to gain the support of women, with the help of individual female leaders, usually not affiliated with any broad-based movement” (Mazur and McBride 2008, 5749–5756).

Thus the effectiveness of using egalitarian ideologies and pursuing a proactive role for the state is context-specific. In many parts of the world, especially more mature democracies, this has been an effective way to enhance women's political equality. In other regions, where the state has been discredited, it can have a backlash effect.

**Family Relations**

One of the most obvious routes to political power for women, especially in traditional and hierarchical countries, is kinship. The so-called widow's mandate, particularly where her husband or father was martyred for his political ideals, is common, especially among female presidents and prime ministers. It is especially prevalent in Asia and Latin America, but the concept of “wives, widows and daughters” appears in mature democracies as well (e.g., Hillary Clinton in the United States). One analysis of women presidents and prime ministers found that 30 percent of them had family ties to incumbent male political leaders (Thames and Williams 2013, 1633–1636).

Wives and daughters are often able to transcend normal barriers faced by women because they are viewed as more trustworthy. Because of their family ties, they are perceived as carrying on the agendas of their martyred husbands and fathers. Kinship has also been used as a mechanism to quell potential political unrest and achieve support from the existing political establishment (Thames and Williams 2013, 906–913). The fact that many of these women continue to be successful in politics, including winning reelection, suggests that even if kinship has been used as a tactical mechanism to achieve power, they are often experienced and perhaps even transformative figures in their own right. In some feminist circles, the emergence of these women from “behind the shadows” of their husbands is cause for celebration.

It is important to note that men as well as women use family ties to advance politically. In Latin America this is so frequent that there are efforts to place legislative limits on the ability of family members of incumbents to run for office (Hinojosa 2012,
And the importance of blood ties is not limited to women at the top. In many traditional and tribal societies, bloodlines are the only way to gain political support. For example, Hemanthi Goonasekera writes about the political paths open to women in Sri Lanka: “One of the key qualifications to become a woman political representative in the current context is that she needs to have family ties (links) to major political parties, i.e., she [has] to have [a] husband, father or brother who is well connected to one of the two major political parties” (2010).

The presence of a female president or prime minister has no independent impact on the number of women elected to the legislative branch (Thames and Williams 2013, 416–423). While many women find themselves, by chance or design, in positions of political power as a result of family relationships, whether this translates into more equality for women depends less on the path to power than on how the individual women choose to use that power.

Crisis, Conflict, and Change

In many countries, especially during the 1960s and 1970s, women found openings to public life during periods of tumultuous change. Testimonials from female political leaders, including ministers from countries as diverse as Algeria, Nicaragua, and Vietnam, tell of women fighting alongside men in independence struggles and revolutions, who were able to translate this into political power following the achievement of national independence. Women in Rwanda were able to use the postconflict period to transform political institutions and achieve the highest number of women in parliament in the world in 2008. However, not all conflicts have had this transformative impact. In the Balkans women saw their representation decrease in the immediate postconflict period, and the “Arab Spring” that started in December 2010 has yet to result in political advances for women.

One explanation is that women are often associated with change, which may be good or bad depending on the context. According to Madeleine Kunin, former governor of Vermont:

*Historically, women are considered outsiders, which is positive when voters are looking for an antidote to corruption or want change, as was the case in Liberia and Chile. This is not so good if they question how a woman would run the government or deal with the legislature. Is she so far out of the mainstream that she is locked out of the existing power structure, which includes having access to funds to finance a serious campaign?*

(2008, 2545–2552)

At some moments of change, when the existing political elites are closely tied with international feminist movements, this can in fact lead to a backlash against women in politics. Isobel Coleman includes women like Suzanne Mubarak in Egypt and Queen Rania of Jordan in this category: “Arab women are already finding it easier to overthrow
dictators than to attain greater gender equality. Their task is today made harder by the fact that for decades in the Middle East, the women’s rights agenda was closely associated with the now-discredited authoritarian regimes” (2013, xi).

While periods of crisis and political transition have provided space for some women to achieve positions of political leadership, it is not a given that women who fight alongside men in “freedom” struggles will benefit equally from that freedom once it is achieved.

**Religion**

Because of a resurgence of politicized religious fundamentalism in recent decades, the current generation of Western-educated, secular feminists views religion with suspicion. The spread of organized patriarchal religious institutions, such as those of Catholicism and Islam, into parts of Africa, where they have displaced traditional maternal spiritual belief systems, has equated religion with colonialism in the minds of many women. Fatou Sow, in an article about the influence of religion in Senegal, states that traditionally Senegalese women were highly respected as leaders of worship. She argues that the introduction of Islam led to women’s absence from religious leadership and subsequently a “dwindling” of the role of women in society as a whole (2010, 7).

Pamela Paxton and Melanie Hughes discuss the impact of women’s subordination to men within Confucianism on women in politics in Asia: “In the Confucian Book of Rites it says that the woman should follow the man in her youth, as she follows her father and elder brother; when married she follows her husband and, when her husband is dead, she follows her son” (2007, 6).

But this was not always the case. The first wave feminist movement benefited greatly from the cultural dominance of Protestant Christianity. According to Paxton and Hughes (2007), the Protestant emphasis on rights and responsibilities of the individual led many women to pursue equal rights through the suffragist movement. Similarly, the emphasis on individual prosperity within Pentecostal Christianity in Africa, which rejects the sociocultural status quo and invites women and youths to take on leadership roles, makes it appealing to many women (Spinks 2010, 7). In India, women have used Hindu symbols of “mothers of the nation” to justify their entry into politics (Thapar-Bjorkert and Shepherd 2010, 7497–7504). In Latin America during the 1970s a new feminist theology emerged that emphasized economic justice for the poor and inspired feminist religious and political activism (Maher 2010, 11).

In the 1990s a new feminist paradigm began to emerge within Islam, which was grounded in a re-reading of the Quran to emphasize gender equality and social justice. Isabel Coleman defines Islamic feminism as “the promotion of women’s rights through Islamic discourse. Just as conservatives have used Islam as a barrier to women’s empowerment, Islamic feminists are turning that argument on its head and using Islam to promote gender equality” (2013, xxviii). She argues that making women’s participation in public life compatible with religion makes it appealing to average Muslim women, not just intellectual elites (Coleman 2013, 85).
Religion has long been used as a tool by patriarchal and conservative leaders to justify male dominance in the public sphere. But it need not be so. Many women in different religions have also created public space for themselves through feminist interpretations of religious texts that emphasize equality.

**Cross-Border Networking**

Evidence shows that when certain strategies, such as quotas, are implemented in one country, that influences other countries in the region and globally. This process is not entirely organic; it has been aided by international organizations whose primary mandate is cross-national sharing of knowledge. Foremost among these is the International Knowledge Network of Women in Politics, or iKNOW Politics. In 2007 a number of international organizations that worked on the enhancement of women’s political participation recognized that there was a need for a central access point for women in politics to find and share information. Five international organizations—the UNDP, UNIFEM, International IDEA, the IPU, and the National Democratic Institute—came together and established an online network with the mandate “to provide access to critical resources and expertise, stimulate dialogue, create knowledge, and share experiences among women in politics” (iKNOW Politics 2010). One of the key impacts of iKNOW-Politics was an increasing wealth of published material made available in a single place; women’s unwritten stories and strategies were for the first time being documented and disseminated, not only across national borders but also across languages.

In addition to online networking, various organizations bring together women in person for global conferences on the subject of women’s political participation. In addition, parliaments host study visits and delegations from other countries, and various networks of former female political leaders have been established. The field of democratic development has also been flourishing since the 1990s, and numerous training programs, manuals, and communities of practice have been established, all of which include best practices and strategies for electing more women.

The concept of “contagion” suggests that an increase in women’s representation in one institution affects others—both vertically within nations and horizontally between countries (Thames and Williams 2013, 105–111). In fact, if second wave feminists declared that “the personal is political,” transnational feminism promotes the view that “the personal is political and international and virtual” (Franklin 2010, 9031–9039).

**Conclusion**

Transnational feminist movements have influenced women’s political participation at the state level and are reframing the discourse at the international level. These movements have made significant contributions to UN conferences, conventions, and
agreements, which they then use to promote women's participation using the language of both human rights and human development.

While making room for the heterogeneity of women, there are common barriers to women achieving political power, including family and domestic responsibilities; lack of access to money networks; social and cultural stereotypes; education; “old boys’ networks”; political violence; and structural barriers within the electoral system, political party, or parliament. Women have found entry points into politics in sometimes unexpected places, such as through religious spaces and during times of crisis or revolution.

The experiences of women in politics depend very much on the context and political space available to them. In the Nordic countries the feminist movement arose out of the labor movement. In many regions, especially Asia, women have achieved the highest positions of political leadership (i.e., president, prime minister), yet there has been little resulting social change. In emerging democracies, especially during the wave of democratization in Eastern Europe and Africa in the 1990s, many countries—at the urging of the international community—adopted quotas and reserved seats for women, a practice that has had mixed success. In some postconflict or postrevolutionary environments, women and girls have found room to enter the political sphere once the conflict has ended, but in other countries periods of crisis have seen a decline in women's representation.

Women's experiences in some countries and regions have informed women's movements in other countries, especially since the introduction of global online social networks such as iKNOW Politics. Women are interacting across geographic, linguistic, religious, and ethnic lines to share strategies and reframe the discourse. Recognizing that structural barriers transcend national boundaries, the focus is not simply on adding women to existing state-level institutions but on transforming those institutions. There is a rejection of patriarchal political elites who appoint women in order to appear inclusive and an increased focus on diversity of representation and inclusivity of democratic processes.

Simplistic assumptions about women's political participation are being replaced with more nuanced understandings and the recognition that more research is needed. The assumption that the numbers of women elected increase in a linear upward projection is being questioned as parts of the world are seeing stagnation or even decreases in women's representation. An essentialist view of women's leadership style and “women's issues” is being replaced with the recognition that women have different life experiences from men and from one another, and that all these voices must be included in decision-making processes in order for them to be truly democratic. Therefore, causal linkages among women, democracy, and development are being recast within the framework of ensuring not only that elections result in greater numbers of women in office, but also that these women are not disproportionately from one socioeconomic or cultural background. More emphasis is being placed on the inclusivity of party selection processes, parliamentary procedures, and the ability of women to exert influence once they reach positions of leadership. Women have the democratic right to be present and
participate in politics, and the opinions and needs of all women (not just a select few) must be represented in order for democratic processes to be legitimate and inclusive.

Notes

1. In this chapter “political participation” is defined as the ability of women to take part in politics, while “political representation” refers to the actors (usually elected officials) who speak for women’s interests and for women as a constituent group. “Political leadership” refers to the ways in which individuals both participate in politics and represent constituent groups in order to influence the political agenda.

2. The term “critical mass” is often used as a justification for quotas and other affirmative action mechanisms. It is based on the theory that what cannot be achieved by individual women can be achieved when there is a large minority (usually 30 percent) to work collaboratively. It has come under criticism in recent years because it assumes a certain cohesion of interests that does not always exist. See Childs and Krook (2008).

3. See the database at http://data.un.org/Default.aspx for specific country examples: in Hungary the percentage of women elected dropped from 20 percent in 1990 to 11.4 percent in 1997, and in Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic the number decreased from 29.5 to 15 percent in the same period.


7. Queen Elizabeth II of the United Kingdom; Queen Margrethe II and Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt, Denmark; Governor General Hon. Dr. Dame C. Pearlette Louisy, St. Lucia; Chancellor Angela Merkel, Germany; Executive President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, Liberia; Governor-General Dame Louise Lake-Tack, Antigua and Barbuda; President Pratibha Patil, India; Executive President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, Argentina; Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajed, Bangladesh; Governor-General Dr Quentin Bryce, Australia; Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar, Trinidad and Tobago; President Dilma Vana Linhares Rousseff, Brazil; Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, Thailand; Prime Minister Portia Simpson-Miller, Jamaica; President Joyce Banda, Malawi; President Park Geun-hye, South Korea; Prime Minister Alenka Bratušek, Slovenia; Governor-General Dame Cécile La Grenade, Grenada; Premier Ministre Aminata Touré, Senegal; Capitano Reggente Anna Maria Muccioli, San Marino; Prime Minister Erna Solberg, Norway. http://www.guide2womenleaders.com/Current-Women-Leaders.htm (including only UN member states) (accessed October 20, 2013).


15. The International Colloquium “Women’s Leadership, Empowerment, Peace and Security” was hosted by Finland’s President Tarja Halonen and Liberia’s President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf on March 7–8, 2009.

16. Kamla Persad-Bissessar, the first female prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago, hosted a Caribbean regional colloquium, “Women Leaders as Agents of Change” for women parliamentarians, national gender machineries, civil society organizations, and regional agencies, in Trinidad and Tobago on June 28–30, 2011.


22. IPU (2013).


24. The author’s personal observation of plenary sessions at the Bangladesh Parliament in 2012.


26. iKNOW Politics operates in English, French, Spanish, and Arabic.

References


SECTION 3

BODY POLITICS, HEALTH AND WELLBEING
Section 3 looks at body politics as a key site of feminist political engagement and theorizing. The four chapters, by Rosalind P. Petchesky, Alexandra Garita, Thanh-Dam Truong, and Jose Fernando Serrano Amaya and Salvador Vidal-Ortiz, map out how feminist practice and theory have contributed to major changes in global practices in sexual and reproductive health and rights. They show how transnational feminist movements in national and international development processes have engaged in body politics, bringing a human rights framework to global policy on population, health, and sexuality and, in the process, shifting the meanings of the productive and reproductive body as well as of ascribed gender identities.

Rosalind P. Petchesky’s chapter, “Owning and Disowning the Body: A Reflection,” examines the shifting meanings of “ownership” of the body. Starting with six snapshots from newspapers and websites, she shows how feminists have expanded the concept of bodily integrity from the right to choose in terms of numbers of children, sexual partners, and abortion to such issues as gender identity, organ selling, and disability; and the right to wellbeing, security, and safety. Petchesky describes her own writing and actions since the 1980s, exploring the history of self-determination across different times, religions, and cultures. She documents early work on abortion and women’s choices and the lead-up to the Cairo conference on population and development in 1994. She is critical of the way radical claims and actions were collapsed in the post-Cairo era because the issue of sexual and reproductive health and rights “buries the sexual, folding it discreetly into marital/heterosexual and childbearing relations.” In unpacking this move, she points out how the “reproductive body, the medicalized body, and the sexual body” became fractured in late twentieth-century body politics. She describes the public debates over abortion, contraception, sex education, migration, sex trafficking, and Internet pornography and discusses the importance of Foucault’s concept of biopolitics in feminist thinking about the body, sexuality, and health as a gendered experience. Bodies in her analysis are part of an “unruly” politics used to resist established power. She traces the struggles around the body as feminists work together with other allies, such as trans*, differently abled peoples, and queer movements. She concludes that the new forms of
activism around the body, security and rights, and body politics are increasingly linking claims about reproduction, sexuality, and gender identity to those related to food security, housing, health care, livelihoods, ending war, poverty, environmental degradation, systemic violence, and racism.

Alexandra Garita’s chapter, “Moving Toward Sexual and Reproductive Justice: A Transnational and Multigenerational Feminist Remix,” describes how transnational feminist movements have engaged in backroom politics in establishing global policy norms for sexual rights and reproductive health over the last two decades, particularly around the lead-up and aftermath of the United Nations’ 1994 International Conference on Population and Development held in Cairo. Her chapter presents a history of transnational-feminist-movement organizing as it has had to tackle growing conservatism, and talks about the challenge for feminist, HIV, and LGBT groups to work in solidarity toward comprehensive health care and sexual and reproductive rights. Her account underlines the importance of the leadership in this global debate, from New York–based feminist organizations as well as from the Global South. She describes the generational shift now emerging among feminists working on body politics as the younger “post-Cairo” feminists claim their space, voices, and vision. She maps out the difficulty older “Cairo” feminists have had in passing on organizational knowledge and history, as well as positional leadership, to the younger generation. Some feminist organizations did hold training programs for young feminists, but the older leaders still found it difficult to give up power, undercutting many skilled but younger advocates who had different priorities than those of the older generation. Younger feminists have brought in new issues around: identity politics; the recognition of sexual orientation and gender identities (SOGIs); service needs; and the reproductive rights violations faced by women with HIV; the discrimination and violence faced by sex workers; and the claims of indigenous women. She points to the need to resolve these tensions through greater dialogue across generations to build common agendas, strategies, and solidarity among transnational feminists, taking “both negative and positive rights approaches forward within global policy norm setting on sexual and reproductive rights and health.”

Thanh-Dam Truong’s chapter, “Human Trafficking: Globalization and Transnational Feminist Responses” sets out the gendered political economy of trafficking and the responses of different transnational feminist movements to the governance and regulation of the sex industry. The four sections of the chapter look at (1) the debate on sex trafficking; (2) the interpretative tension between victimhood and agency and its meanings for social action; (3) the contributions of feminist scholars who are using Foucault’s insights on knowledge and power; and (4) the reproductive female body and the cross-border surrogacy, which Truong argues requires new perspectives on the interactions between the materiality of the human body and its changing symbolic representations. Truong’s exploration of the borders and sites of control around the transnational sex trade sets out the global and local sociocultural and economic relations involved in sex trafficking. Her analysis includes the growth of artificial reproductive technologies and cross-border commercial surrogacy and organ selling. She outlines the multi-layered meanings of human dignity in the deep intrusion of commercial interests into
sexual services and the human body. Her reflections show the difficulty of protecting the human rights of persons (their bodies and sexualities) in cross-border realities. Truong argues that the commoditization of the human body and its parts leads to the erosion of extant moral barriers and the formation of new ones, allowing for innovative ways for “rethinking the relationship between ‘sex’, ‘gender’ and ‘power’—both in theoretical terms and as regards social actions and their dilemmas.”

Jose Fernando Serrano Amaya and Salvador Vidal-Ortiz’s chapter, “Masculinities, ‘Profeminism’ and Feminism in Latin America,” looks at how men’s groups in the Americas engage in the fight against patriarchy and work to transform hegemonic masculinity. The chapter shows the complexity of alliances and solidarity among profeminist and feminist groups as both men and women feminists try to tackle structural sexism. The chapter traces the practices and activisms around profeminism beginning within the United States and its expansion to Latin American profeminism. Serrano Amaya and Vidal-Ortiz analyze the identification and organizing of profeminist (cis-gender) men in relation to (cis-gender) women’s feminist practice. They do so by answering the following questions: (1) What is the meaning of “profeminism” in Latin American profeminist and men’s groups? (2) How is it articulated? (3) What do these groups understand and represent as alliances and profeminism? (4) How do these members understand and publicize their goals? (5) What linkages to feminism (activist or academic) and women’s organizations do they sustain? Serrano Amaya and Vidal Ortiz argue that the experiences of profeminist groups expand notions of gender, of being a man, male, or masculine in the politics of gender and sexuality issues.
Chapter 9

Owning and Disowning the Body

A Reflection

Rosalind P. Petchesky


• In Egypt in 2011, Samira Ibrahim, a young feminist activist who openly opposes both the country’s military forces and the (then) ruling Islamist regime for their antiwoman policies, is subjected, along with six other women, to a forced virginity test after being detained during popular protests in Tahrir Square. Ibrahim brought a lawsuit against the military, but in 2012 the tribunal exonerated the military physician who conducted the tests. Ibrahim vows to appeal the case before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, defiantly proclaiming that “a woman’s body should not be used as a tool for intimidation, and nobody should have their dignity violated.” (Adel, http://www.thedailybeast.com)

• In 2012, a coalition of “young feminists” sends out an urgent “international call” over the Internet to mark the Global Day of Action for Access to Safe and Legal Abortion and to protest the failure of UN delegates even to mention the phrase reproductive rights in the final report of the international Rio+20 Conference. Noting all the ways their countries—Turkey, Poland, Brazil, United States, Spain—have restricted funds and access for women’s health clinics and safe contraception as well as abortion services, the group highlights the slogan, “My body is mine.” “We, young feminists,” they say, “demand respect for our right to choose what we want to do with our bodies and our sexualities. No one may interfere with our choices, our bodies and our lives, be it the State, religious authorities, or economic convenience.” (International Call 2012)
• In a July 2012 editorial in the *Times of India*, Gautam Bhan defends the rights of Pinki Pramanik, a person accused in the West Bengal courts of violent crimes but whose body and gender identity, not only her acts, are under public scrutiny and trial. Bhan denounces the ways Pinki’s body and person have been captured as “a public spectacle” and “reduced . . . to an object” as she is subjected to a biopolitical regime of stripping, probing, invasive gender testing, sexual harassment, and imprisonment (in a male prison) to arrive at an impossibly “scientific” determination of her “maleness” or “femaleness.” Pinki insists she is “neither intersex nor transgendered” but indisputably “a woman.” Echoing both Samira Ibraham and the September 28 Young Feminists, Bhan argues that “[Pinki] and no other person or institution—particularly the law or medical science—has the right to decide what her gender identity is regardless of her anatomy, her chromosomes or her hormones.” Bhan titles this piece “The Right to Our Bodies.” (Bhan 2012)

These examples are familiar iterations of a rhetoric of bodily self-ownership that has circulated across the borders of transnational sexual and reproductive rights activism and advocacy for nearly three decades (and much longer before that; see Petchesky 1995). Yet it would seem that rhetoric has spun into many less congruous lines of flight, ones that position bodies as transmission points in both neoliberal market transactions and neo-conservative policing and penal apparatuses. Witness these disturbing scenarios:

• A 2012 *New York Times* article titled “Black Market for Body Parts Spreads Among the Poor in Europe” describes the recent circuits of organ trafficking as they shift from the more traditional sites of China, India, Brazil, and the Philippines to impoverished populations in Central and Southern Europe. In Italy, Greece, Spain, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Moldova, and Serbia, organized crime groups and other illegal traffickers take advantage of the growing demand for organs in more affluent countries by targeting the growing mass of poor, unemployed, and indebted people in Europe. Through Internet advertisements, poor parents trying to feed their families are promised what seem like vast amounts of money for selling a lung, kidney, blood, or cornea. From the vantage point of the global marketplace, for which commercial transactions are by definition voluntary, the direness of the donors’ personal circumstances and the intimate nature of the goods being sold have no weight; a sale is a sale. But the donors too see the commodification of their body parts as an opportunity, not a form of exploitation. An unemployed father in Serbia, desperately seeking to exchange his kidney for economic security, declares, “It’s my body and I should be able to do what I want with it.” (Bilefsky, *New York Times* 2012)

• In September 2013, in Charlotte, North Carolina, a twenty-four-year-old black man, Jonathan Ferrell, former college football player, engaged to be married, holding down two jobs, becomes one of an obscenely long list of unarmed black men shot dead by local police officers or vigilantes in contemporary racist America. In this case, the killing was triggered by “a 911 call from a panicked . . . homeowner”—a white woman
whose doorbell Mr. Ferrell had rung to seek help after his car had crashed. The woman, at home alone with her baby, seeing a strange dark-skinned man at the door, immediately saw not another human being but danger (“Oh my God. I can’t believe I opened the door. What is wrong with me?”) and thus let loose a relay of fatal racist presumptions that ended in the ten shots that killed Mr. Ferrell. Underneath her hysteria festered centuries of race-baited white fears of black men as sexual predators threatening her right to control her body, her baby, her home, her white womanhood—the underside of bodily ownership (Severson, *New York Times* 2013).

- The same week, in New Delhi, hundreds, maybe thousands of Indian women march to hail the death sentences pronounced by the High Court for the three men convicted of the vicious rape and fatal beating of a twenty-three-year-old professional woman who had gone to a movie with her boyfriend. “Hang all the culprits,” their placards read, “Hang, them, hang them!” Shouts a grandmother, “If these were my children, I would have strangled them to death myself.” And the aggrieved mother of the murdered woman says on her daughter’s behalf, “Such culprits should be burned alive.” The celebratory, fist-pumping mood of the throngs is palpable, and many if not most of them seem to be women. (Barry and Sharma, *New York Times*).

Should we read their zeal to promote the death sentence for rapists as a banner for women’s right to control their bodies and win security and safety in public space? Will killing the perpetrators guarantee women and girls that safety?

And thinking further: Can the sacrifice of some bodies atone for the desecration of other bodies? Does reclaiming our right to our bodies and the sanctity of (some? all? “innocent”?) bodies confront us with a number of troubling contradictions and limits? These questions haunt me as I look back on a lifetime of writing and activism in defense of this idea that “my body belongs to me.

### Promoting Bodily Rights

**When another world seemed possible—the 1980s and 1990s**

The concept of *bodily integrity*, or the *right to control one’s body*, became a standard mantra of the feminist movement for reproductive rights that I participated in as both activist and theorist beginning in the mid-1970s. In protest against a US Supreme Court decision refusing to uphold federal Medicaid funding for low-income women to get safe legal abortions, a group of feminists in New York City founded CARASA, the Committee for Abortion Rights and Against Sterilization Abuse, in 1977. Like many other groups that succeeded it soon thereafter (the Reproductive Rights National Network in the United States, the Women’s Global Network for Reproductive Rights in Europe, the Latin American and Caribbean Women’s Health Network, and others),
CARASA was based on the principle of reproductive freedom. For us this meant that all women, regardless of class, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or physical ability, should have the right to have, or not to have, children with dignity and with all the necessary material conditions to make raising children a sustainable life choice. We deliberately paired abortion rights with opposition to forced sterilization and sterilization abuse to recognize a long history in the United States of pernicious eugenic policies and practices intended to restrict the childbearing of poor and marginalized women, especially those who were black, Latina, Native American, and immigrant. In other words, CARASA’s feminist politics were explicitly antiracist and class conscious, addressing the widely disparate social locations of women and girls and their very different material capacities to make reproductive and sexual decisions that we could call “free.” Rights over one’s body, we believed, were inseparable from radical changes in social conditions affecting access to health (including pre- and postnatal) care, housing, jobs with living wages, education, effective contraception, and an end to racism, misogyny, and homophobia. What Sonia Corrêa and I later termed the enabling conditions of reproductive and sexual rights deeply infused a feminist politics that saw abortion as but one crucial site in a much larger panorama. (Corrêa and Petchesky 1994)

Articulating the political theory that underlay this emergent social movement seemed to me important at the time, so I embarked on a series of writings in the 1980s and 1990s attempting to explore in some depth the critical ideas that inspired our activism. Why should women’s decisions about reproduction and sexuality have a privileged place? What did notions of the body have to do with it, and would the bodily integrity principle on its own connote a form of feminist and liberal individualism that sat uneasily, if not in direct contradiction, with our socialist and collectivist principles? In an essay that first appeared in 1980 and later as the introduction to Abortion and Woman’s Choice (1984, 1990), I identified two key ideas grounding a feminist view of reproductive freedom. One of these was a kind of commonsense, even consequentialist, principle but one deeply rooted in notions of social justice and fairness. It is the idea that women must maintain ultimate control over decisions related to reproduction, childbearing, and abortion because they are still the ones in most societies who carry the greatest responsibility for children and their wellbeing after they are born. This was the view we found most frequent among the grassroots women we interviewed in regional and urban settings in seven countries in the International Reproductive Rights Research Action Group (IRRRAG) project in the mid-1990s. For example, Lai Yin, a rural Chinese housewife in Malaysia, argued:

Childbearing is not by him. … Getting up in the middle of the night to give them milk, taking them to the doctor when they are ill—all this is my responsibility. He does not suffer, the suffering is all done by me. So when I tell him that we need to use the contraceptive, he cooperates.

(Petchesky and Judd 1998, 133)

Of course, the problem with the “social consequences” approach to reproductive decision making was that it reinforced and unwittingly ratified a gender division of labor
that feminism was also seeking to transform. CARASA’s founding document in the late 1970s asserted both women's right to control over reproductive decision making and “an end to the cultural norms that define women in terms of having children and living with a man; an affirmation of people’s right to raise children outside of conventional families; and, in the long run, a transformation of childcare arrangements so that they are shared among women and men” (Women Under Attack, 11). How could we insist on women's exclusive control when we were also aiming to explode the gender-divided traditions on which that control lay? In those days we lacked a queer vision of the potential fluidities and multiple gender identities that would call into question the gender binary itself, much less the possibility of trans* childbearing, family arrangements, and parenting? But we did have a glimpse of the fragility of motherhood as the normative ground for a defense of reproductive and sexual rights. In the end, the second pillar of a politics and ethics of reproductive freedom, the bodily integrity principle, would be the potentially more inclusive one.

In my early thinking about the ethical and political meanings of control over one's own body, I traced two distinct philosophical traditions underpinning this idea. One was the legacy of the most radical strains of European liberalism and the assertion by the Levellers in seventeenth-century England (or more famously, but less radically, by John Locke) of a property in one’s person, or a self-propriety. This meant that a person’s body was integral to her personhood and so could not be alienated or sold or “invaded or usurped by any” without violating the laws of nature and “justice between [human beings]” (Petchesky 1990, 3). It was a principle that became the bulwark of eighteenth-century abolitionism and the fight against slavery on both sides of the Atlantic by enslaved Africans and their allies for the next 150 years. Frederick Douglass testified to the integrity and inalienability of human embodiment when he wrote to his former master in 1848:

I am myself; you are yourself; we are two distinct persons, equal persons. What you are, I am. You are a man, and so am I, God created both, and made us separate beings. I am not by nature bound to you, or you to me. Nature does not make your existence depend upon me, or mine to depend upon yours. I cannot walk upon your legs, or you upon mine. I cannot breathe for you, or you for me; I must breathe for myself, and you for yourself. We are distinct persons, and are each equally provided with faculties necessary to our individual existence.

(Douglass 1984, 283)

Of course European and Anglo-American feminists had been drawing on these liberal ideas for ages in their protests against patriarchal marriage and family regulations and women’s confinement to domestic servitude (see Kelly 1984; Eisenstein 1981/1993). Similarly, the principle of ownership of one's body was both implicit and explicit in early movements of gay men, lesbians, and other sexual outlaws. Christopher Hill quotes a young man arrested for homosexuality in England in the early eighteenth century who defended himself by saying, “I think there is no crime in making what use I please of my own body” (1986, 233). An American Indian woman, Cora Anderson, who passed
for a man for thirteen years before World War I, implied that owning one’s body was more accessible to a man, even a gay man, than to a “passing” woman or a lesbian. When arrested on a disorderly conduct charge, she countered: “Do you blame me for wanting to be a man, free to live life in a man-made world? . . . In the future centuries, it is probable that woman will be the owner of her own body and the custodian of her own soul. [But] the well-cared for woman [now] is a parasite, and the woman who must work is a slave. . . . Is it any wonder that I determined to become a member of the privileged sex, if possible?” (San Francisco Lesbian and Gay History Project 1989, 186). Clearly, ideas about gender equality, gender identity, and sexual orientation were closely entwined in early Western modernity.

Reviewing a wide variety of historical and cross-cultural expressions of the notion of owning one’s body, I found time and again that claims of “my body is mine” emerged in contexts where the interdependence of those bodies, their embeddedness in a world of others, was deeply understood. Whether among seventeenth-century Leveller women petitioning Parliament for their right to a public role in political as well as commercial spaces; nineteenth-century slave women resisting sexual abuse and conspiring in the use of herbal abortifacients; mid-twentieth-century New Guinea highland women claiming ownership rights as mothers over pigs and coffee trees; or late twentieth-century feminists of color associating the struggle for reproductive justice with those for environmental justice and against massive incarceration, the strong linkages between rights of the body and rights of the community—not their separation—were the most salient takeaway. Research I did in the late 1980s and early 1990s pushed me to conclude “that how we think about the concept of ‘property’ in one’s own body or person may vary greatly depending on how we understand property in general.” (Petchesky 1995, 390) Among groups and social movements whose land and livelihoods and wellbeing, along with their bodies, have been systematically usurped and colonized, the language of owning or reowning may mean something very different from what it means in the privatized, exclusionary, hyperindividualized consumer societies of late capitalism (Hill 1972; Higgins 1973; Strathern 1984; Collins 1990; Williams 1991; Petchesky 1995).

Alongside these liberal claims for bodily self-ownership in Western political thought, Marxists writing in a critical humanist tradition would come to distinguish ideological individualism, used to justify exclusionary rights of private property and predatory capitalism, from a concept of individuality, linked to the universal and specific bodily needs human beings have to sustain their lives, develop their personalities, and participate in community life (Eisenstein 2004). A claim about social necessity and interconnectedness, I argued—what Judith Butler calls a social ontology—often permeated feminist, antislavery, and anticolonial demands for bodily self-determination. Thus, early birth control advocates like Ezra Heywood, Margaret Sanger, and Kamaladevi Chattopadhyaya would assert that “woman’s natural right to ownership of and control over her own body-self” is a necessary condition not only for reproductive health and rights but also for women’s full exercise of citizenship and partnership with men in national liberation struggles (Marcuse 1968; Heller 1976; Petchesky 1990, 4–5).
Such ideas were not confined to any one religion or culture. As I traveled in many countries and regions during the 1990s, teaching, lecturing, and attending meetings of women's health groups and UN nongovernmental organization (NGO) forums, I often was surprised by hearing variations on the theme of “my body (or my sexuality, or my reproductive capacity) belongs to me” in unexpected places. In a small workshop at a national meeting of grassroots and activist women in the (predominantly Catholic) Philippines in 1990—a gathering that included teachers, nurses, trade unionists, rural women's groups, university students, and fisherwomen—a rural woman argued that she should be able to make decisions about pregnancy and childbearing because “it's my own body.” In a course on women and society for trade unionists and teachers in (Communist) Vietnam in 1996, an elderly and revered partisan of Ho Chi-Minh who had taken the course, when asked what she had learned there, proudly exclaimed, “I learned I have sexual rights!” To the women I met, this did not seem like an alien or exclusively Western idea but rather somehow resonated with their experience. Even when language or cultural differences created barriers, the ideas underlying the words had some purchase. For example, at the very start of the IRRRAG project, some of our African participants argued that the discourse of rights would have little or no meaning among the communities where they would be carrying out their research. So we settled on the formulation of entitlement: Did women feel entitled to make their own decisions about contraception, abortion, pregnancy, sexuality, working outside the home? How, why, and when did they take ownership of such decisions or not? The body remained as the silent actor (Petchesky and Judd 1998).

Despite these reverberations, we met strong resistance during the proceedings of the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo in 1994 and the World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 to introducing the language of bodily integrity or women's bodily self-determination into the official documents. As we had expected, conservatives and proponents of religious and patriarchal doctrines of female subordination and a rigid gender binary opposed this concept in principle—the Vatican, evangelical Christians, and Islamists working hand in hand (Petchesky 2003, ch. 2; Girard 2007; Corrêa, Petchesky, and Parker 2008, ch. 8). But even feminists involved in lobbying government delegations were cautious, warning that bodily integrity could be applied against our interests to fetuses and that a phrase like security of the person would be more strategically advantageous. This circumspection—like the prolife discourse it mirrored—disregarded the fact that fetuses, at least to date, cannot walk on their own legs, breathe for themselves, or live as “distinct persons” apart from the pregnant women who shelter and nurture them.

It is worth stopping for a moment to mark the significance of this shift in rhetoric in the mid-1990s, from rights of the body to security of the person, because it seems to me it reflects the disastrous fragmenting of transnational movements around body politics into the different strands that remain more or less separate to this day. Replacing body with person in the UN documents of this period had the deliberate effect of dematerializing the subject of rights, removing her from her physicality and “sexualness” (see Khanna 2013). In the same way, feminist and mainstream reproductive health advocates
post-Cairo began adopting the label sexual and reproductive health and rights (predictably collapsed into an acronym SRHR)—a convenient elision that "buries the sexual, folding it discreetly into marital/heterosexual and childbearing relations" (Petchesky 2000, 97; in the same vein, see Miller 2000). Advocates for people with HIV and AIDS similarly tended to avoid the sexual in sexually transmitted disease, focusing instead on epidemiological and biomedical approaches, what Connell and Dowsett call scientificity (1999/2007). As a result, sexual rights would become its own separate political domain and gay men, lesbians, sex workers, trans* people, and queer youth its partisans and practitioners (see Petchesky 2000; Saiz 2004; Corrêa, Petchesky, and Parker 2008). The reproductive body, the medicalized body, and the sexual body would remain fractured in late twentieth-century body politics.

Postmodern, post-Foucaultian anxieties—the body as assemblage

So here we are well into the twenty-first century, and every day—not least on a personal level through the grips of aging—I am reminded of the many ways I have little or no control over my body, and few of us do. I walk into the security area of Heathrow Airport and am instantly subjected to a humiliating, invasive manual body search in full public view because I failed to remove my shoes when an agent told me it wasn’t necessary and I believed her. And, being a white, elderly, Western woman, I have to consider myself lucky because, unlike much of the world—dark-skinned, Asian, African, or Islamic men and women; all Palestinians in Jerusalem and the occupied territories; displaced migrants—I do not suffer this outrage routinely. Facial recognition technology and other biological markers mean we all leave traces of our bodies’ movements, whereabouts, and identities wherever electronic receptors—cameras, computers, cell phones—link us to the vast security and surveillance machine (editorial, New York Times 2013). In fact, the bionic recomposition of human bodies through electronic devices, chips, implants, and the like makes it increasingly difficult to perceive our bodies as contained tactile spaces and surfaces, to know where I as body begin or end. In the current context of bio-informatic bodies and unlimited electronic penetration, does a concept of bodily integrity even make sense (Thacker 2006). More generally, in contemplating techno-bodies, Wendy Harcourt asks, “Where do I situate myself as a feminist concerned with embodiment, gender equality, women’s rights, and ecological and social justice in this world of high tech, high investment, and high costs to people’s lives?” (2009, 163).

When Foucault theorized the biopolitics that emerged in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe and its colonies, to be augmented with twentieth-century racisms and biomedical science, he could barely have glimpsed how biopolitical regimes of the twenty-first century would ride the crest of new wireless and media technologies. Yet much of Foucault’s conceptualization of biopolitics and the disciplinary and
regulatory apparatuses it deploys remains important for any discussion of how we own or disown our bodies. At the center lies sexuality—not simply as a dimension or subfield of biopolitics but rather at its core. “Sexuality represents the precise point where the disciplinary and the regulatory, the body and the population,” meet, Foucault (1997/2003, 251) writes. The intense public debates in many countries over abortion, contraception, sex education, migration, sex trafficking, and Internet pornography would seem cases in point.

Although Foucault notoriously ignored gender, biopolitics as a conceptual frame has obvious relevance to feminist thinking about the body, sexuality, and health as a gendered experience and has influenced a wide range of feminist scholars (see Luibheid 2002; Butler 2004; Puar 2007; Cooper 2008; Corrêa, Petchesky, and Parker 2008; Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2009). Especially appealing to feminists is Foucault’s insistence that the new apparatuses or truth regimes of biopolitics—some directly tied to the state and statist institutions and others (e.g., the medical and psychiatric professions or the pharmaceutical industry) operating around or outside it—are inseparable from power. There is nothing disengaged, neutral, or “objective” in the knowledges and techniques that biopolitics deploys; on the contrary, whether directed at individual bodies or populations and general biological processes, they “[act] as factors of segregation and social hierarchization, . . . guaranteeing relations of domination and effects of hegemony” (Foucault 1978, 171).

These hierarchical and hegemonic effects are integrally bound up with capitalism. In Foucault’s analysis, from the eighteenth century on biopolitics came to intersect with all the regulatory mechanisms related to the flow of goods, capital, and labor. That is, the politics of markets, trade, and the liberal (laissez-faire) and neoliberal doctrines they would engender are inseparable from those that regulate the flow of people, bodies, viruses, sexual encounters, and cultures of sexual expression. It is no accident that his lectures of 1977–1978 focus on the relations between population, territory, and security and those of 1978–1979 titled The Birth of Biopolitics concerned the origins and diverse trajectories of neoliberalism (Foucault 2007, 2008). Securitization of bodies and borders and the pathways, pathogens, and substances that penetrate them not only serves global capital but also develops its own logic in the division and hierarchical ordering of human and all life.

I have digressed to review biopolitics as the dominant mode of exercising power over bodies and populations because I believe that framework still has great relevance to many governmental domains of our contemporary world. And this remains true even if the technologies—their speed, immediacy, and quantum or molecular reach—have undergone monumental shifts (see Cooper 2009; Clough 2010; Massumi 2011). Public health systems for tracking modes and patterns of HIV transmission become by definition mechanisms of judgment, categorization, and surveillance. Modern methods of childbearing deemed worthy of insurance coverage or donor aid come encumbered with fetal monitors, ultrasound, and a considerable risk of C-section to “protect” the fetus, regardless of the pregnant woman’s desires. Trans* persons who wish hormonal treatment and sexual reassignment surgery encounter tremendous barriers—social,
financial, legal—to having the body they want, while others, depending on the country or jurisdiction, are forced to undergo those procedures to be recognized as the gender they believe they already are. Meanwhile, intersex infants are subjected to sexual “correction” and must live with the results (Butler 2004; Cabral and Viturro 2006; Currah 2006; Eisenstein 2013a). Bodies that are too dark, too sexually or gender ambiguous, or are otherwise culturally marked as alien cannot move across borders without facing enhanced risks of search, seizure, detention, deportation, and possibly torture. But, as my Heathrow story was meant to illustrate, none of us owns our body when we enter an airport, cross a securitized boundary, or attempt to demonstrate peacefully in a public park or thoroughfare in our own city. 3 Since the advent of the infinite wars on terror, this is as true in London, Rio, or New York City as it is in Cairo, Colombo, and Istanbul (see Amar 2013)

Though Foucault was an astute observer of all the invasions and depredations that biopolitical governmentality has visited upon modern and postmodern bodies, he was not, as he is often viewed, a despairing pessimist. In The History of Sexuality, Vol. I, he discusses the “plurality of resistances” and “reverse discourses” that emerge to counter biopolitical power in the name of life and bodily self-determination (1978, 95–96). And he comes close to celebrating, in nearly ecstatic—if at the same time cautionary—terms the political struggles that we associate with movements for sexual and reproductive rights:

... What we have seen has been a very real process of struggle: life as a political object was in a sense taken at face value and turned back against the system that was bent on controlling it. It was life more than the law that became the issue of political struggles, even if the latter were formulated through affirmations concerning rights. The “right” to life, to one’s body, to health, to happiness, to the satisfaction of needs, and beyond all the oppressions or “alienations,” the “right” to rediscover what one is and all that one can be, this “right”—which the classical juridical system was utterly incapable of comprehending—was the political response to all these new procedures of power. ... (1978, 145) 4

But now I return to the problem I began with in this chapter: biopolitical reversals and resistances may follow very different trajectories and take different and sometimes very troubling forms, all in the name of reclaiming control over our bodies. Akshay Khanna cites the self-immolation of the Tunisian street vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, in December 2010 as a prime example of a reversal of biopolitics, and in this case a very momentous one, since it is widely credited with having set in motion the Arab Spring throughout the region. He suggests that Bouazizi’s seemingly extreme act represents a form of “unruly politics” that uses the body as a weapon against established power (Khanna 2012). So should we regard other instances of weaponized bodies in the same way, for example, Palestinian suicide bombers or Guantánamo detainees and other prisoners who go on hunger strike? Surely force-feeding of prisoners by “medical” personnel counts as one of the most heinous tools in the biopolitical arsenal. What about the Afghan refugees in an Australian detention camp who protested against their condition by sewing together their own lips (Gaylord 2002)? Or the proletarianized Indian
farmers, male and female, who commit suicide in the face of debt owed to bankers and landlords (Vasavi 2014)? How do we determine the boundary between resistance and desperation?

On a very different note, affirmations of sexual autonomy and self-expression may take a whole range of disturbing turns in the world of Internet and social media transactions. Is sexting—sending nude or seminude photos of oneself (“selfies”) on cell phones or Facebook—among adolescents or between adolescents and adults a way that young people can gain control over their sexuality in a world still fraught with censorious judgments and repressive norms? Or does it represent a new form of commodity fetishism and a regulatory system pulling young bodies to self-advertise through the electronic marketplace (Rollins 2013)? Does the Internet open up a whole new field of opportunities for people (gay, straight, bisexual) to enjoy erotic images or to make sexual liaisons, for either pleasure or profit, away from the scrutiny of police, parents, and moral censors? Or on the contrary, is the regulation of Internet prostitution and pornography, including child pornography, another twist in the spiral of biopolitical resistance and biopolitical control? Are there differences between cyberbeaming images of my unclad body, selling my sexual services, or selling my kidney over the Internet? Does the (mediated or unmediated) format even matter in trying to sort out the question of how we determine the boundary between “doing what I want with my body” and being exploited?

These questions cannot be resolved through a simplistic division into good and bad forms of bodily and sexual expression or into neat categories of resistance, self-determination, and oppression. Nor can we look to feminist theory or practice to find a coherent or consistent position on the matter of what counts as acceptable assertions of control over our bodies versus forms of exploitation or abuse or even which bodies count as authentic women. The militant throngs demonstrating in New Delhi in support of death sentences for rapists signify an extreme form of feminist victim mongering—the tendency of many self-defined feminist groups across the globe to privilege the fight against sexual abuse and violence against women (VAW, another acronym in wide use) as the highest expression of feminist activism. What Ratna Kapur calls the neocolonial discourse of the victim subject becomes the pretext for viewing women (and children) as always needing to be protected or rescued and thus reinforcing not only patriarchal but also punitive, criminalizing biopolitical strategies and even war (Miller 2004; Kapur 2005).5

Without denying that violence against women and systematic rape—in militarized as well as everyday civilian contexts—is real and endemic, we still need to point out the ways class, caste, and gender identity make some victims more visible (and grievable, to use Judith Butler’s term) than others. It is almost unimaginable that the same crowds of people, with the same vociferous intensity, would march in the streets to demand justice for a trans* sex worker or a poor Dalit woman who had been raped and beaten to death, just as none did in New York City or São Paulo or Mexico City and all the places where dozens of trans* women and men (most of them poor and dark-skinned) have been brutally murdered in the last year (O’Donnell 2012–2013). This is a matter not just
Owning and disowning the body

of perception or media coverage but also of feminist analysis and attention. A persistent refusal to recognize transgender identity or to accept the gender authenticity of trans* women has been a steady, venomous dogma among some radical feminist groups in Latin America, Europe and the United States. Denying the right, or capability, of individuals to define their own gender identity, as they experience it, is inherently to fall back on a kind of biological rigidity that is blind to the ways that bodies change all the time and gender diversity parades in front of us every day (Fausto-Sterling 2000; Currah 2006).

Nowhere is the paternalistic zealotry of rescue feminism more evident than in the abolitionist (or eradicationist) campaigns of groups like the Coalition Against Trafficking and Equality Now in their attempt to criminalize all forms of commercial sex work. Abolitionists erase entirely any distinction between consensual and coercive sex work as well as between children and consenting adults. For them, all participants in any sort of commercial sex are invariably the victims of sexual exploitation or sexual slavery, whose passivity and lack of agency is summed up in the label prostituted women. They loudly repudiate recent reports by the Global Commission on HIV and the Law and a joint report issued by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), and the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) on “Sex Work and the Law in Asia and the Pacific.” Both reports call on governments to “decriminalize private and consensual adult sexual behaviours, including same-sex sexual acts and voluntary sex work” based on strong evidence that criminalization increases stigma, discrimination, and intimidation of sex workers from seeking health services and reporting violence and abuse to the police. And they both clearly distinguish between sex work, which is consensual, and sex trafficking, which is not and where criminal sanctions may be appropriate (Long 2013).

But anti-sex-trafficking feminists will have none of it; prostitution is “bad sex” under any conditions whatsoever. Organized sex worker groups around the world—in India, Malaysia, Brazil, the United States, Netherlands, and elsewhere—who seek legality, dignity, health-care access, fair labor standards, and freedom from violence and police raids, even conducting “festivals of pleasure” in their communities, become, from the abolitionist view, accomplices in their own oppression rather than active human rights agents (Jayasree 2004; Bernstein 2007; Corrêa, Petchesky, and Parker 2008). Like anti-abortionists obsessed with rescuing fetuses, feminist rescue organizations (and their political and evangelical allies) use criminalization and rescue tactics to glorify their own moral virtue and evade the realities and social constraints that sex workers actually experience—and actively organize to change. Every bit as much as right-wing, antifeminist religious organizations, the feminist antitrafficking groups are engaged in creating what Gayle Rubin long ago identified as hierarchies of sexual value, deploying those hierarchical divisions to police behavior and impose moral dogma (1984).

Yet once we reject this kind of moral tyranny, are we left in an equally unsatisfying libertarian box, where all expressions of agency are taken at face value and all claims of ownership over our bodies have equal valence? Why do the bodily self-ownership assertions of the Serbian father, the white southern housewife, and the Indian women
marching for the death penalty make me uncomfortable while those of Samira Ibrahim, the youth coalition for sexual and reproductive rights, and sex worker and gender diversity advocates across the globe make me proud?

Before we decide to disown owning the body as either hopelessly utopian or inextricably complex, I think we need to revisit concepts of agency and autonomy from a more nuanced and contextualized standpoint. Judith Butler’s critical thinking on autonomy and personhood is particularly helpful here. In *Undoing Gender* (2004), Butler reminds us that “to be a body is to be given over to others even as a body is, emphatically, ‘one’s own,’ that over which we must claim rights of autonomy.” “We have to, we must” make these claims, she argues, as “part of the normative aspiration of any movement that seeks to maximize the protection and the freedoms of sexual and gender minorities, of women, defined with the broadest possible compass, of racial and ethnic minorities, especially as they cut across all the other categories.” In this one affirmative statement, she embraces gender diversity and trans* lives; the intersectional character of gender, race, ethnicity and sexuality; and the indispensability of a politics of bodily rights. At the same time, she urges us to rethink the body outside an artificially hermetic and individualized frame: “The body has its invariably public dimension; constituted as a social phenomenon in the public sphere, my body is and is not mine” (20–21). In *Frames of War* (2009–10), Butler likewise reenvisages the concepts of human life and personhood through a “social ontology” as opposed to “an ontology of individualism”:

There is no life without the conditions of life that variably sustain life, and those conditions are pervasively social, establishing . . . the interdependency of persons, involving reproducible and sustaining social relations, and relations to the environment and to non-human forms of life. . . . The question is not whether a given being is living or not, nor whether the being in question has the status of a “person”; it is, rather, whether the social conditions of persistence and flourishing are or are not possible. (Pp. 19–20)

A social ontology of the body as both “mine and not mine” does not require us to forfeit all notions of agency (which is different from autonomy). Indeed, without a concept of historical agents, whether individuals or collectivities, who act to change themselves and their world, any politics would be unthinkable. What it does require is a full recognition of our interdependency and that my embodiment is part of an *assemblage* of relations with others and things and the biosphere that make erotic pleasure, sensation, bodily wellbeing, and even survival possible. We need to go back to Marx’s great insight that human beings make their own history but not “just as they please,” not “under circumstances chosen by themselves but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past” (Marx 1852/1967). To see the body as social and relational—an assemblage rather than a monad—is also to understand that our bodies carry around layered histories written in our genetic makeup, our cultural memories, our psychic wounds, and all the imprints on us of race, class, gender, and sexual difference. These imprints paradoxically inform the ways we are able to move, or not, in
public space and to assert ownership over our bodies at the same time as they limit our capability to do so.

“The social conditions of persistence and flourishing” are at bottom the material components of social justice. They tell us not only that bodies cannot survive on their own but also that claims about reproduction, sexuality, and gender identity are inseparable from those related to food security, housing, health care, livelihoods, and an end to war, poverty, environmental degradation, systemic violence, and racisms. I am encouraged by a draft Asian and Pacific Declaration on Population and Development that ties together all these issues with unprecedented depth, detail, and urgency, addressing the specific needs not only of women but also of youth, the elderly, migrants, and sexual and gender minorities (ESCAP 2013). This outcome document, aimed at advancing the Millennium Development Goals and articulating commitments for countries twenty years after the Cairo ICPD, could happen only because of the determined efforts of a coalition of transnational feminist groups committed to a truly intersectional, multi-issue politics. A world that came close to such a vision might be one in which selling an organ to feed your children or slamming the door on a racial or gender or sexual other or celebrating the death penalty to defend personal security would no longer be thinkable expressions of bodily rights; would no longer be thinkable at all.

In a statement celebrating “A Billion Women Rising,” Zillah Eisenstein writes, “Our bodies are a treasure trove—they are simultaneously intimate and public, local and global.” Bodily integrity, she suggests, must be linked to a “notion of justice . . . that travels outward from our violated bodies to other violations: poverty, corruption, starvation, environmental plunder, imperialism, forced migration, exploited labor, global patriarchy, political repression, racisms, endless refugees of religious wars” (2013b). A politics of owning our bodies for the next decade must be coalitional and world transforming.

Notes

1. I specifically refer to trans* relationships here as the glaring absence in our thought. CARASA’s politics, like that of most feminist organizations at the time, certainly encompassed support for lesbian and gay parenting and households, without the current—and some would argue conservativizing—emphasis on marriage. My use of the asterisk with “trans” follows the Global Association for Transgender Equality’s definition and indicates “a placeholder for many identities, most of which are specific to local cultures and times in history,” but in all cases “people who transgress gender norms” and “broaden and expand a binary understanding of gender.” See http://transactivists.org/trans/.

2. The actual language adopted in the ICPD Programme of Action was “the right to life, liberty and security of person” (Principle 1); and the “right to make decisions concerning reproduction free from discrimination, coercion and violence” (Para. 7.3). The Beijing Platform for Action’s Paragraph 96 famously ended up with “The human rights of women include their right to have control over and decide freely and responsibly on matters related to their sexuality, including sexual and reproductive health, free of coercion, discrimination and violence. Equal relations between women and men in matters of sexual relations and
reproduction, including full respect for the integrity of the person, require mutual respect, consent and shared responsibility for sexual behavior and its consequences” (my italics). While many NGO participants in the Beijing process tried, unsuccessfully, to counter the heteronorativity of this statement, almost none perceived the weakness of replacing “body” with “person.” My late dear friend Rhonda Copelon and I worked together behind the scenes of the negotiations trying to make the case for keeping the language of bodily integrity, or bodily rights, but we were like lone voices in the wind.

3. As I write this, six students from my university, CUNY, are fighting charges after having been arrested during a peaceful protest against Gen. David Petraeus, former CIA director and military leader of the U.S. war in Afghanistan and other U.S. military actions. The protest took place on the sidewalk outside CUNY’s Macaulay Honors College, where he has been hired to teach a course. As described in a resolution by the faculty union, the students “were punched, slammed against vehicles and against the pavement by police captains and officers, after the NYPD forced them off the pavement and into the street.”

4. The cautionary note here comes through with the scare quotes around “right,” signaling Foucault’s awareness always of how easily rights in the biopolitical state could be turned on their head, my “right” become your exclusion (e.g., women’s “right” to public safety turning into a regime of racial profiling by the police) or the discursive scaffolding for a whole new apparatus of regulatory control (for example, the “right to treatment”). Foucault’s central message to us is how flimsy and historically constructed is the subject of these “rights.”

5. For a strong critique of feminist “victim” politics, especially with regard to sex work and sex trafficking, see Corrêa, Petchesky, and Parker (2008, Ch. 9). Unfortunately, the law—including human rights mechanisms—is not a good tool for transcending victim discourse. On the contrary, its adversarial procedures, particularly in the criminal but also in other legal arenas, can characterize actors only as either victims or perpetrators and “victims” as passive recipients of “justice” rather than active decision makers. See, for example, a report on current efforts to reform New York State law regarding victims of sexual trafficking by diverting them from the criminal courts to drug treatment, health care, immigration assistance, job training, and the like (Rashbaum, New York Times 2013). Decriminalizing “trafficked” sex workers, both juvenile and adult, is clearly a positive move, and the services offered may be helpful. But one wonders how much say the “victims” will have in creating their own futures and what kind of resources they’ll be given to enable some kind of real self-empowerment.

6. I am encouraged nonetheless by the beginning of outspoken statements on behalf of some feminist groups against the remnants of transphobia and gender binarism within our movements. For example, a recent letter circulated on the Internet and signed by dozens of people from a variety of countries, states: “We are committed to recognizing and respecting the complex construction of sexual/gender identity, to recognizing trans* women as women and including them in all women’s spaces; to recognizing trans* men as men and exploring the ways their experience of manhood complicates our understanding of masculinity; to recognizing the existence of genderqueer, non-binary identifying people and accepting their humanity; to rigorous, thoughtful, nuanced research and analysis of gender, sex, and sexuality that accepts trans* people as authorities on their own experiences and understands that the legitimacy of their lives is not up for debate; and to fighting the twin ideologies of transphobia and patriarchy in all their guises.”
7. Equality Now, the Coalition Against Trafficking, and celebrity anti-trafficking feminists like Gloria Steinem and the journalist Nicholas Kristof are certainly examples of what Zillah Eisenstein has called “imperialist feminism” rooted in the global North (Eisenstein 2004). However, contrary to Scott Long’s Paper Bird blog on “Sex Imperialism,” abolitionist activism is very much present in the global South as well and has been for decades. The first time I heard the term prostituted women, it was from feminist activists in the Philippines who were working with allies in Japan and elsewhere in Asia in the early 1990s.

8. The feminist groups involved in the 2013 ESCAP meeting and pushing hard for this comprehensive statement included ARROW (Asia-Pacific Resource and Research Center on Women), DAWN (Development Alternatives with Women in a New Era), IWHC (International Women’s Health Network), IPPF (International Planned Parenthood Federation), and RESURJ (Realizing Sexual and Reproductive Justice).

References


CHAPTER 10

MOVING TOWARD SEXUAL AND REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE
A Transnational and Multigenerational Feminist Remix

ALEXANDRA GARITA

INTRODUCTION: THE GAINS OF CAIRO AND BEIJING—TRANSACTIONAL FEMINISM AT ITS HEIGHT

The main achievement of the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) was what came to be known as the “Cairo Consensus,” which represented a major paradigm shift in the population field, moving away from prior policies of imposed demographic targets aimed at reducing fertility rates (population control) to recognizing women’s reproductive autonomy and human rights. This shift would not have been possible without the active role of a strongly articulated and well-organized transnational feminist movement (Friedman 2003; Joachim 2003).

During the ICPD the feminist agenda to define “reproductive health” and “reproductive rights” within population policies was achieved for the first time in international development (United Nations 1994). Governments agreed that in order to stabilize population growth and achieve sustainable development, it was critical for women to have equal access to information, education, and employment, as well as to integrated health services, and respect for their sexual and reproductive choices. For the first time in such debates, unsafe abortion was considered a major public health problem and discussed as such, and there was global recognition of the need to address it to prevent women’s deaths and safeguard their health. The transnational women’s rights movement was also able to ignite global debates at the ICPD about adolescent
sexuality, looking to guarantee rights to education, information, and services and recognizing that this was a neglected and important area in the population field that often took into account women who were married or in a union. Finally, the recognition that achieving gender equality was inextricably linked to sustainable development was a breakthrough, which had begun at the Rio Conference two years earlier. This recognition was based on the premise that unless women and men have equal access to opportunities, enabling equal rights and participation in the social, environmental, and economic development of their communities and nations, there could not be sustainable development. These gains in international policy were and continue to be groundbreaking, given that they sought to achieve both gender and economic justice (Sen and Correa 1999).

These successes recurred at the UN Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 as well as at the conference's five-year reviews in 1999 and 2000. The continuation of a strongly articulated and well-organized transnational women's human rights movement during these follow-up meetings demonstrated that what had happened in Cairo was not a one-time achievement, but rather a sustained commitment to engagement and collaboration by transnational feminists and government allies to set global norms on women's human rights (Steans 2007, 22). Taking the Cairo Consensus one step further, paragraph 106k of the Beijing Platform for Action called on governments to consider reviewing laws that punish women who have undergone illegal abortions. This gave feminists an advocacy tool, agreed on internationally, to push for access to safe and legal abortion in countries where it is criminalized. On sexuality, paragraph 96 asserted the right of women “to have control over and decide freely and responsibly on matters related to their sexuality” (United Nations 1995b), paving the way for an internationally agreed definition of “sexual rights.” Five years later feminist movements continued to gain ground on women's sexuality, adolescents’ rights and health, and ending gender-based violence as critical components of development and population policies (Correa, Petchesky, and Parker 2008, 170). A decade later, however, the gains of the 1990s were being significantly eroded within the United Nations, the transnational feminist sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) movement was not as active as it had been, and rising religious fundamentalisms as well as conservative population control agendas were gaining traction (Girard 2004).

**The Lull: A Decade of Dormant Transnational SRHR Feminist Presence at the United Nations**

The factors that contributed to a decade of stagnation at the UN on sexual and reproductive rights (2000–2009) were twofold: first, the conservative leadership of the US government under the George W. Bush administration, and second, the dominance of
a single-focused HIV agenda within the global health community, backed by a strong social movement that rallied around a single disease and an ample funding base. The combination of these two weakened the transnational SRHR movement and stymied any global progress on women’s sexuality and reproductive rights throughout the decade.

The Bush Years

In 2000 governments issued the Millennium Declaration, which captured development, human rights, and peace and security priorities for the coming fifteen years. However, the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan designed global development goals that could align donor priorities and for which progress could be quantifiably tracked. These goals went against the comprehensive development agenda set by the Millennium Declaration itself and by the UN conferences of the 1990s, which had created blueprints for action for each country to analyze and develop as appropriate. The reductionism embedded in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) has simplified the global development agenda to the lowest common denominator and ignored fundamental aspects of social justice and economic wellbeing that could contribute significantly to poverty eradication and development (Fukuda-Parr and Greenstein 2011). Women’s human rights movements were understandably disappointed in the MDGs, for they reduced the Cairo goal of achieving universal access to reproductive health and rights to one goal on improving maternal health and the Beijing Platform for Action to a target on eliminating disparities in primary and secondary education. Thus, feminists turned their attention to implementation of the comprehensive agendas achieved in the 1990s rather than to engaging globally (Antrobus 2005).

Feminist criticisms of the newly established development agenda and of the erosion of multilateralism were also due to the bigger battle being fought on global trade and economics. Middle income and poor resource countries were fighting to retain food security, ownership over their natural resources, and protection of their national economies from the bilateral and untransparent negotiations being held in the World Trade Organization (Khor 2000). Thus, the first decade of the twentieth century saw a real crisis in multilateralism from both social justice movements and numerous governments (Lloyd 2012; UN-NGLS 2012).

New York–based organizations in the SRHR field, such as the International Women’s Health Coalition (IWHC), the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), Women Deliver, Family Care International, and the Center for Reproductive Rights, were the primary active players at key UN meetings between 2000 and 2010. With the exception of the Cairo and Beijing ten-year reviews, at which there was some coordinated southern feminist presence with the engagement of some southern feminist networks, southern feminists seemed to be directing their energy elsewhere. Transnational feminists were struggling to keep alive the momentum of the 1990s regarding sexuality and rights within their own countries and in an increasingly conservative environment.
In addition, they were struggling to maintain political perspectives on women’s sexuality and reproductive autonomy in the midst of increased attention and commitment to a single-focused HIV agenda. The HIV movement during this time had skillfully mobilized resources and benefited from the Bush administration’s commitment to AIDS treatment and the creation of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria. Furthermore, the debates on preventing and treating HIV and AIDS were often dominated by epidemiologically focused arguments that did not consider power asymmetries and gender relations as structural drivers of the epidemic.

The growing power, money, and attention that treating HIV received within the health field created ideological and funding tensions among two very diverse transnational social movements (HIV and feminist SRHR). This could also be seen as a contributor to weakening the organizational capacity of the southern feminist SRHR constituency to continue the cohesive and solid engagement at the UN that it had demonstrated in the previous decade. While some feminist activists struggled to keep HIV prevention and treatment within sexual and reproductive health policy and programming, some HIV activists claimed that vertical programs were necessary to end the stigma and discrimination often tied to the epidemic. These tensions among movements were only exacerbated by donors’ focus on funding for service provision and not for political advocacy and human rights.5

With the onset of the Bush administration in 2001, politics at the United Nations took a sharp turn, in part due to its imposing conservative and religiously motivated patriarchal views on women’s reproductive health and bodily autonomy, sexuality, and human rights. Government delegations from the United States to the annual UN Commission on the Status of Women and the Commission on Population and Development included members of the ultraconservative Right to Life Federation, Family Research Council, and even a former advisor to the Vatican. The leadership of the US government was undermining and retrogressing the feminist transnational gains of the conferences of the 1990s. These efforts were aided and supported by conservative Islamist positions taken by Iran, Egypt, and Sudan, as well as conservative Central American countries (Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador). The 2001 UN Special Session on Children saw the first manifestation of this new and powerful alliance between the US and conservative governments determined to undermine any efforts that would secure sexual and reproductive health information, services, and education for adolescents. Transnational youth and women’s movements present were not deterred by these conservative forces, but all they were able to achieve was a brief reference reaffirming ICPD and Beijing (Girard 2002).

There were no significant advancements in global SRHR policies by feminists during this period, and there was a clear absence of southern transnational feminist movements from the United Nations during this time. In part, this vacuum created a space for a well-funded and articulate religious conservative base from the United States to influence UN policy negotiations. Throughout the decade, groups like the Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute (C-Fam) and the Human Life Institute adopted the successful organizing tactics of women’s movements during the 1990s.
This entailed members getting onto national delegations (including those of the United States and the Vatican, which holds observer status at the UN and has full speaking rights), where they influenced national positions, developed strong communications strategies, and mobilized other conservative governments to dismantle the sexual and reproductive rights agenda. This was abetted by a concerted effort of the US government (Barroso 2010). A decade later northern and southern feminists alike are struggling to gain back the “middle ground” countries in UN intergovernmental negotiations to raise issues and advance agendas to achieve gender equality and sexual and reproductive rights. This apparent regression could be attributed to the fact that many feminist activists from the North and South alike who had been involved in the conferences of the 1990s were fighting political battles at home as well as struggling to implement the Cairo agenda nationally and to hold their governments accountable. Feminists were also facing a political context in which there was a massive decline in resources for political advocacy. This environment depleted local, indigenous, women’s-rights-oriented organizations with small programs, as they were often unable to respond to donors’ demands for instituting larger-scale and “results-oriented” programs in the short term.

Furthermore, the HIV and AIDS global policy-setting agenda occurred between 2001 and 2006 at the height of the Bush administration and of right-wing conservative ideology that followed the World Trade Center attacks. This, together with the skilled negotiation tactics employed by the Organization of Islamic Conference States (Egypt, Yemen, Sudan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan) in alliance with Russia, created a tense environment for those feminists and progressive southern states that were engaged at this level trying to move forward. The 2006 meeting on HIV brought this tension to the fore. Feminist, HIV, and LGBT groups were more divided than ever, and they failed to work in solidarity toward a common goal of access to comprehensive health care and sexual and reproductive rights. According to feminist activist and scholar Pinar Ilkkaracan, the results of this conference fractured and further divided the transnational feminist SRHR movement.6

Financing for Sexual and Reproductive Health

By the year 2010 overseas development assistance (ODA) for health had more than doubled from 1995 (Lu et al. 2010), but the focus of these funds for development aid was on supporting vertical programs, with HIV/AIDS taking the largest share and other reproductive health programs declining (RHM and ARROW 2010). Recent studies tracking ODA in 2009 and 2010 indicate that this trend continues, even though funding for family planning and maternal health has increased only nominally since the 1990s, with the majority of funding (about 70 percent) aimed at preventing and treating HIV, 16 percent going to general reproductive health, and 7 percent devoted specifically to family planning (Hsu, Berman, and Mills 2013). Funding for sexual and reproductive health comes primarily from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria, the UK government, the
UNFPA, the World Bank, and the US government. Some European countries, such as Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, contribute significant portions of their ODA budgets to SRHR (Seims 2011). Some private philanthropic foundations also devote some of their large grant-making to servicing the population field, and a number of these foundations continue to be the greatest sources of support for feminist political activism for SRHR. Nonetheless, it can be said that overall, funding for the comprehensive sexual and reproductive rights and health agenda diminished the opportunities for social justice and feminist-oriented groups to fully participate in demanding further attention to the implementation of the Cairo Consensus.

At the country level, the feminist agenda achieved in Cairo did not get the necessary financial resources or the political will that would lead to its implementation. Family planning programs continued their vertical course, as did HIV programs, separately. Maternity care and safe abortion services became largely sidelined until relatively recently in the pressure to meet the MDG on improving maternal health. Thus, the concepts of holistic, comprehensive sexual and reproductive rights and health as cornerstones of population and health policies have not necessarily been successfully institutionalized nationally. Nevertheless, in the last few years there has been growing recognition once again among the health and population fields that the integration of services is critical for enabling better and more cost-effective health outcomes (WHO, UNFPA, UNAIDS, IPPF and UCSF 2009).

There could be reasons for optimism, with the World Bank increasing its funding for health system financing; the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria being replenished and experimenting with proposals that include a window for funding reproductive health services for women with HIV; and the UN Secretary-General’s Joint Plan of Action on Women and Children, which seeks to galvanize political and financial support for the implementation of integrated women’s health programs in more than fifty countries. Nevertheless, while these initiatives are focused on the provision of services, it is still questionable how these resources will be used in ways that are pro-human rights, pro-women, pro-poor, and pro-marginalized groups. Further, it is not clear where these funds go. Resources need to be used for infrastructure, human resources for health, commodities, and supplies (HIV medicines, contraceptives), but also for developing quality of care standards, training midwives and midlevel health workers, and strengthening the capacity of health systems to provide sexual and reproductive health services within primary health care. In addition, US funding prohibits funding for safe abortion services. So, while the HIV and women’s movements promote funding increases, it is also necessary to work toward using existing funds better. As for funding political advocacy for SRHR, particularly feminist movements in the global South, the donors (multilateral, private, and government) question their value because they have difficulty measuring the results over short periods of time. This panorama has undoubtedly contributed to a fractured transnational feminist movement working on SRHR as well as others working in the field, creating a sense of perceived and actual competition for limited resources among our several constituencies.
The 1990s saw the rise of a strong transnational feminist constituency advocating for sexual and reproductive rights and health (Joachim 2003; Steans 2007). The transnational feminist movement working the “inside track” (e.g., inside the political negotiations) was facilitated in large part by the International Women's Health Coalition (IWHC) and its feminist partners working on sexual and reproductive rights and health in India, Brazil, Nigeria, Indonesia, Mexico, Egypt, and Cameroon, among other countries. The Women's Environment and Development Organization (WEDO) had opened up access for women to UN intergovernmental processes at Rio a few years before and facilitated a much larger women's caucus during Cairo and Beijing, together with the Center for Women's Global Leadership, which had mobilized transnational feminists from around the world during the Vienna Human Rights Conference.

These three organizations, based in New York, with a firm commitment to facilitating space for women from the South to be heard and fully participate, and the transnational feminist SRHR movement created the “Cairo” paradigm shift and mobilized governments to implement population policies from the perspective of women's reproductive health and rights. After Beijing a network of transnational feminists formed a group called HERA (Health, Equality, Rights, Accountability), which worked on follow-up negotiations (the Cairo and Beijing +5 reviews), once again creating a formidable force against religious and political fundamentalisms and gaining ground for women's and adolescent sexuality and human rights. It can be said that these feminist organizations provided the intellectual leadership, organizing capacity, fund-raising efforts, and political strategy necessary for transnational and global successes on sexual and reproductive rights and health policy. These successes were due to two main factors: strong feminist leaders (both in New York and in the South) at the helm of organizations that many of them had founded, and the confidence of and significant investments by the donor community (both northern governments and private philanthropy) in feminist leadership to influence global policy.

However, in the decade 2000 to 2010 the transnational feminist SRHR movement was weakened, not only because of the funding crisis and the influence of the US government during the Bush administration, but also because these same feminist leaders who had taken center stage in the 1990s were ostensibly too busy surviving the financial and conservative crises. One implication of this survival mode meant they had less time to invest in a younger generation of feminists to take the work forward. The consequence of this lack of investment is palpable globally, regionally, and nationally, and younger generations of feminists entering transnational movements working for SRHR question whether there is a shared feminist understanding of power within it. In the eyes of
some older feminists of the “Cairo generation,” notions of power often involve either earning, claiming, or taking “the space,” whereas for younger generations, notions of power are shared across generations, within organizations, with different social actors and movements that share common ideals. According to a recent study conducted by the Association for Women’s Rights in Development (AWID), the power dynamics between and across women of different ages within our own movements have generated unnecessary suspicions, negative stereotypes, and competition, as well as false dichotomies across generations that can cause deep fragmentation. The unwillingness to share power is something younger feminists have identified throughout every region, attributing this dynamic to environments where trust is weak and where the contributions made by different generations are overlooked (AWID 2013).

The feminist constituency of the sexual and reproductive rights and health movement was also aging and not transferring organizational knowledge and history, positional leadership, or power to younger generations. Some organizations, such as the IWHC and Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN), developed training programs for younger feminist activists throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America. These programs helped build both the content and the advocacy capacity of younger generations to hold the ground on gender justice and sexual and reproductive rights in their countries and at the UN during the years of extreme conservatism imposed by the Bush administration.

As soon as the Bush era came to an end and Barack Obama was elected in the United States, some of the “Cairo generation” of transnational feminist activists returned to the UN space to reclaim SRHR globally. The result of this return was positive, in that some highly skilled and experienced feminist thinkers and organizers in the sexual and reproductive health field returned to the United Nations once again as a space for galvanizing political will and financial priority to women’s sexual and reproductive rights within development priorities. However, the reoccupation of this space as a return of the “Cairo generation” of activists also at times undercut a generation of skilled but younger and less-experienced advocates who were struggling to prioritize a different set of experiences within mainstream development discourse. The struggle for making certain groups of marginalized populations visible within intergovernmental negotiations led by younger generations was sometimes dismissed and considered unstrategic and unimportant. This was not a new debate (Correa, Petchesky, and Parker 2008), but it is being played out again with younger generations in discussions about identity politics, such as naming the violence and discrimination faced by people of diverse sexual orientation and gender identities (SOGI), including those who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender; paying attention to the particular service needs and the reproductive rights violations faced by women with HIV; the discrimination and violence faced by sex workers; and the claims of indigenous women to have access to services, information, and education appropriate to their cultures and in their languages.

Furthermore, younger generations of feminists engaged in advocacy for sexual and reproductive rights and health have taken more affirmative positions to move the Cairo agenda forward that are based on enhancing capabilities and freedoms to exercise positive experiences of sexuality. These arguments, founded on creating the enabling
environments necessary to exercise sexual rights and reclaiming pleasure, are in reaction to advocacy conducted in prior decades that focused on abuses and victimization of women’s sexuality (Petchesky, Correa, and Parker 2010). In the last few years transnational feminists engaged in UN advocacy, such as the Sexual Rights Initiative (SRI), the Coalition on Sexual and Bodily Rights in Muslim Societies (CSBR), and Realizing Sexual and Reproductive Justice (RESURJ), have all challenged this negative rights approach to women’s sexuality and human rights. Challenges still remain in building common agendas, strategies, and solidarity among transnational feminists to take both negative and positive rights approaches forward within global policy norm setting on sexual and reproductive rights and health.

Whatever the reasons are that have divided generations of feminists engaged in policy advocacy on SRHR, the set of principles that feminist organizations had upheld on a global scale were not being implemented within organizations and movement-organizing spaces. Younger women were participating in feminist movement meetings and working in feminist organizations where unequal power dynamics were not only common but proving to be debilitating. Expressions of dominance from those who had been a part of the regional and global conferences of the 1990s often created a stifling environment wherein creativity, regeneration, and a transfer of knowledge and ownership to a younger generation were nearly impossible. Moreover, internal feminist leadership was not being cultivated. Few were encouraged to grow and rise from within and to own the knowledge, history, and success of previous feminist generations. These dynamics have created a stagnant environment within transnational feminist movements working on SRHR, in which younger women often find themselves experiencing similar types of oppression that feminists have challenged for decades within male-dominated structures. Thus, the transnational SRHR feminist movement has appeared at times to be replicating the same patriarchal system that it has been struggling for decades to end. By the end of the first decade of the new millennium, there was a visible generational gap within the feminist transnational SRHR movement.

In December 2011 RESURJ and DAWN brought together in Mexico City thirty-five feminist leaders from twenty-eight countries, primarily from Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and across generations, to strategize for action in the coming years. The main objective of this political meeting was to develop a joint strategy for advancing women’s SRHR for the twentieth anniversary of the ICPD in 2014. Another clear objective, coming from feminists in their twenties and thirties, was to acknowledge the gaps in the movement and to think through solutions for addressing them. The joint political strategy was achieved and has been relatively successful, as I explain further in the next sections. However, the conversations on regenerating the movement were more difficult. One leading advocate stated: “Some of the Cairo generation seems to feel they have—and possibly should still have—the leadership. Others recognize the necessity for rejuvenated leadership, as well as membership into the movement . . . [and that perhaps] our biggest challenge is ourselves” (interview with author 2011). Another leader in the field pointed out that

Intergenerational concerns are a waste of time and energy. We spend too much time navel-gazing about the state of our ‘movement’, rather than being clear about our goals.
and getting to work on them. … We will never have a harmonious movement, but we can have an effective alliance if we stay focused on our goals and work to have everyone on board to move towards these. (interview with author 2011)

The younger participants issued calls throughout this reflection for there to be “mutual responsibility for leadership and sustainability of the movement,” which requires recognition and acknowledgment across the board; “thinking together instead of following instructions,” such as respect for each other’s ideas and a willingness to try new things and allow for different types of leadership to emerge; and “investing in people for sustained periods of time with time, knowledge and the commitment to a process of building movement together across generations,” which ultimately required sharing experiences, tactics, access, and power.  

It is important to note that in the last few years there have been numerous leadership transitions within several organizations involved in transnational feminist activism in the sexual and reproductive rights field in both the North and the South. This will undoubtedly generate different configurations of feminist organizing in the coming years. It is too soon to tell whether those in positional power in these institutions will uphold similar radical visions, organizing skills, and a commitment to listening to the diverse feminist voices from different regions that characterized many of the transnational feminists engaged in global and regional advocacy work in the 1990s. Whether the new leaders will have the capacity and willingness to share access, information, and the financial resources that are necessary to achieve our common goals is also in question. Regardless of the course that institutionalized feminism at the global level takes, it is important to note that increasing numbers of younger feminist activists across multiple social justice movements, working on issues of environmental sustainability, health, human rights, solidarity economies, antipoverty, youth, sexuality, transparency, and accountability, are making linkages across identities and issues, paving the way for innovative transnational feminist organizing. This is important because we are living in an increasingly polarized and co-opted world, where social justice movements need to come together and fight against the structural causes that prohibit the real economic and social transformation required to realize justice for all. There are relatively new feminist transnational alliances forming across generations and social movements that are beginning to ride the wave together in an attempt to shape global development policies and programs for greater social justice and inclusion.

**Transnational and Multigenerational Feminists Reclaim Multilateralism**

During the Mexico City meeting in 2011, transnational feminists issued a rallying call for social movements worldwide to take action for the twentieth anniversary of Cairo and the post-2015 development agenda. The “Our Rights, Our Lives” call to action was
signed by more than 750 women’s, human rights, HIV, and young people’s organizations, primarily from Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. It aimed to generate political will, sustained action, and accountability for the following:10

- Universal access to quality, comprehensive, integrated sexual and reproductive health services; counseling; and information for women and adolescent girls, with respect for their human rights, and with an emphasis on equity and respect for diversity. Comprehensive services include gynecological care; all forms of safe and effective contraception; safe abortion and postabortion care; maternity care; and prevention, timely diagnosis, and treatment of sexually transmitted infections, including HIV, breast and reproductive cancers, and infertility. Ideally, these should be integrated, one-stop services tailored to women’s needs throughout the life cycle and sustaining cultural sensibility, with effective referral.
- Programs that empower women, particularly adolescent girls and young women, to know their bodies and to exercise their rights, especially through comprehensive sexuality education.
- Protection and promotion of reproductive rights as human rights and international adoption of sexual rights as human rights. Full recognition and implementation, through policies and programs, of existing and emerging legal standards are urgently needed.
- Young women’s leadership at all levels and types of decision making on sexual and reproductive rights and health and the meaningful participation of women’s organizations in the design of health and development programs.

This call to action was significant because it mobilized transnational social justice movements to focus on these four priority areas in key global, regional, and national policy-setting fora for sexual and reproductive rights and health. It was also instrumental in demonstrating ways in which feminists from around the globe could work intergenerationally toward a common agenda and have an impact on the future of sexual and reproductive rights and health feminist organizing. The results of this meeting have been evident: at the UN Commission on Population and Development in 2012, which had the theme of adolescents and young people; at the Global Youth Conference in Bali in 2012; and at the regional ICPD Reviews in Montevideo, Uruguay, for Latin America and the Caribbean, Bangkok, Thailand, for Asia and the Pacific, and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, for East and Central Africa.


In April 2012 a group of feminist advocates from Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, Uruguay, Kenya, South Africa, Indonesia, the Philippines, India, Fiji, and China worked together
at the UN Commission on Population and Development to advance international norms on adolescent sexuality, health, and human rights. For the first time in over a decade, member states of the United Nations agreed on a landmark resolution for girls and young women that recognized their sexual rights and reproductive health; called for urgent steps to invest in adolescent and youth development, health, and human rights programming; and committed to providing financial resources, political priority, and protection of human rights to the 1.8 billion young men and women alive today. The adopted resolution captured all four of the main action areas identified by feminists a few months back in the “Our Rights, Our Lives” rallying call.

This success was possible for three main reasons. First, women’s organizations and transnational feminists had been preparing for months and were highly organized both in country capitals and in New York at the UN, working with allied governments supportive of our agenda, strategizing together, and determined to gain new ground. This group was intergenerational, with younger women active and learning, and more seasoned advocates holding the institutional memory; supporting with strategy; and working to transfer the know-how, share intelligence, and work together. Second, young people, feminists, and close allies and supporters were on official country delegations, which created a necessary insider/outsider strategy for the negotiations and also a moral authority of the “people” on which this resolution was based. Third, the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) had new leadership and wanted to show a political win.

At the end of an intense week of negotiations, country delegates from Brazil, Argentina, Cuba, Kenya, South Africa, Philippines, and Indonesia expressed grateful appreciation during the closing ceremony for the presence of young people in these negotiations whose lives this resolution was about. One delegate in particular thanked the women’s organizations, as we had “kept them on their toes and restored their faith in multilateralism, showing [them] once again that we can help to break the political stagnation at the United Nations.” The significance of this energetic and momentous occasion reminded both activists and diplomats of what had been achieved at the World Conferences of the 1990s (IWHC, DAWN, RESURJ, and AI 2012).

The 2012 CPD Resolution builds on feminist achievements at the International Conference on Population and Development in 1994, held in Cairo, and at the Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing a year later. Progressive, feminist positions on women’s sexuality, male responsibility, and human rights, including reproductive rights, were ingrained in these government agreements. This was due in large part to women’s leadership both in and outside the negotiations, building on national, regional, and global solidarity of women’s experiences and their fundamental right to control their sexuality and reproduction, free from violence, discrimination, and coercion. This feminist politics was again applied during the 2012 CPD to adolescents, who, in ways similar to what women have often faced and continue to face, have their human rights denied because they are not considered citizens, have no political voice, and are under the “tutelage” of others (parents, guardians, teachers, “adults”). This intergovernmental negotiation proved, once again, that it was possible for women’s and young people’s
The Bali Declaration: Younger Feminists
Shaping Global Politics

The UNFPA, mandated with implementation and follow-up to Cairo, created in 2012 a review process, “ICPD Beyond 2014,” that included three global conferences, a global survey of progress, and regional and global intergovernmental negotiations to assess and advance the sexual and reproductive rights and health agenda.

The first of these global conferences was held in Bali in December 2012 and aimed at taking stock of young people’s realities vis-à-vis the ICPD and mobilizing the international community toward implementation of the recommendations. This conference brought together more than three thousand young people ages fifteen to twenty-nine from over 150 countries. The younger feminist presence in this group contributed to articulating and writing recommendations that captured the rallying call developed a year before in Mexico, inspiring other young people to be bold and issue recommendations that would capture and address power asymmetries based on age, gender, caste, class, health status, national origin, race, location, and so forth, and that impacted their sexuality, health, and access to justice.

The outcome of this Conference, the Bali Global Youth Forum Declaration (United Nations Population Fund 2012), reflected the way in which transnational youth movements view themselves and their struggles. Perhaps most important, the declaration captured the multiple identities that young people carry and want to make visible, highlighting the particular barriers that they face, the stigma and discrimination because they are lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex, refugees, living in rural areas, sex workers, indigenous, afro-descendant, migrants, adolescent girls, and drug users, and so forth. This “listing” of populations has traditionally been problematic in transnational feminist movements working on global policy because of the acceptability or lack thereof of some of these groups within the movements, as well as a fear that this “listing” is not strategic and always leaves someone out. However, young people viewed this very differently in Bali, as they were committed to being inclusive in their recommendations and making sure that young people across the world could truly own this agenda and play a part in advancing it.

The conference was meaningful because attendees—governments, UN agencies, donors, and civil society at large—agreed to implement recommendations on sexual rights; gender equality; decent employment and access to education; comprehensive sexuality education; safe, legal, and accessible abortion services; and support for meaningful participation, especially of young women, in policy and program design and development. The significance that the Bali Declaration holds for young people across the world, and especially for those who identify with feminist politics, cannot be overestimated. With the largest generation ever of young people alive today, 1.8 billion, issues
of human rights, health, education, and employment require action more urgently than ever before. Furthermore, a feminist lens on population policy directed at young people continues to be paramount, given that the population establishment has often denied adolescent sexuality and young people's human rights. Younger generations of feminists led the charge in Bali, upsetting the status quo and claiming their space, their voice, and their vision.

The Regional ICPD Reviews: Transnational Feminists Making Gains in Montevideo, Bangkok, and Addis Ababa

The ICPD twentieth-year regional review in Latin America and the Caribbean, celebrated in Montevideo, Uruguay, in the summer of 2013, demonstrated once again the power of transnational feminism to set the tone of the debate on population and development.

Feminists aged twenty to thirty, working on human rights, sexuality, reproductive health, young people and youth participation, indigenous people, violence against women, and comprehensive sexuality education—from the countries of Mexico, Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Barbados, Jamaica, Belize, Peru, Bolivia, Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Colombia, and Paraguay—came together a few days prior to strategize and set their agenda. Their priorities were to make visible the deficit of implementation on sexual and reproductive rights and health in the region, particularly for those in marginalized situations, such as indigenous and afro-descendant girls and women; adolescents; sex workers; women living with HIV; lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people; migrants; and refugees. This group and the many other feminists present in Montevideo were successful in ensuring regional commitments to the following:

- Define and secure sexual rights (separately from reproduction). The words “sexual rights” were defined for the first time in a UN intergovernmental process, although the famous paragraph 96 from Beijing had done this already in relation to women's sexuality, albeit not calling it “sexual rights.” Protection of these rights as separate from reproductive rights in the Montevideo Consensus included committing to the creation of laws and policies that specifically tackle discrimination and violence based on sexual orientation and gender identity.
- Ensure access to comprehensive sexual and reproductive health services for women, adolescents, and young people, including safe abortion services and the removal of barriers to access both in law and practice.
- Provide prevention, early diagnosis, and treatment of STIs and HIV free from stigma and discrimination.
- Provide comprehensive sexuality education programs both in and out of schools that teach sexuality, gender equality, and human rights.
• Prevent unwanted pregnancies and unsafe abortions among adolescent girls and young women, including through CSE, access to accurate and confidential information, and all technologies and quality services, including emergency contraception without a prescription and male and female condoms.
• Eliminate maternal mortality and morbidity, including through providing comprehensive sexual and reproductive health services.
• Ensure access to safe and legal abortion services.
• Review laws and policies that criminalize women’s sexuality, including abortion, in order to secure the health and life of women and adolescents.
• Eradicate all forms of violence against all women and pay particular attention to those who are in situations of greatest vulnerability, such as sex workers, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender women, women with HIV, migrant women, indigenous women, and afro-descendants.
• Engender respect for the human rights of indigenous women, including their right to land and to previous, free, and informed consent on all matters related to their lives and livelihoods.
• Guarantee the right to health of indigenous peoples, including their sexual and reproductive rights and health, including through employing their own methods of traditional medicine.

The document was adopted by consensus, and no government entered a reservation or even an explanation of position (ECLAC 2013). This clearly marked a shift in the region, with the opposition to the women’s human rights, sexual diversity, and abortion coming from Chile, Jamaica, and Honduras isolated and neutralized. Uruguay, Cuba, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico played a particularly important leadership role for SRHR throughout and have announced their intention to fight the assault on human rights and gender equality and take forward the Montevideo Consensus as a whole in global debates. This is a real win for feminists of the region but also globally, as governments and feminists can use these regional commitments during the global review of the ICPD in 2014 (IWHC, DAWN, RESURJ and YCSRR 2013).

The 6th Asia Pacific Conference on Population and Development, held in Bangkok in September 2013, created similar optimism and urgency among both regional feminists and governments. Feminists began working in preparation for this meeting many months in advance, collaborating with other like-minded colleagues in the region. Feminists from Bangladesh, China, India, Nepal, Philippines, Indonesia, Fiji, PNG, Australia, Malaysia, and Pakistan were instrumental in setting a political feminist agenda for the larger civil society representatives to rally behind. This diverse group of women was brought together specifically to influence the negotiated outcome document of the conference, which it did successfully.

Barring less than a handful of states (Iran, Russia, Afghanistan, and Azerbaijan), which objected to defining and ensuring sexual rights and ending violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, every other government in the
Asia and Pacific region adopted a strongly progressive and meaningful outcome document that, among other things, makes commitments to the following:

- Ensure that human rights will be recognized as central to all population and development programs.
- Ensure access to comprehensive sexual and reproductive health services for women, adolescents, and young people, including safe abortion services and the removal of barriers to access both in law and practice, such as parental and spousal consent.
- Support prevention, early diagnosis, and treatment of STIs and HIV free from stigma and discrimination and pay particular attention to key affected populations.
- Provide evidence-based, comprehensive sexuality education programs to adolescents and young people.
- Recognize the importance of sexual rights, in addition to reproductive rights, and eliminate violence and create laws and policies that specifically tackle discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.
- Eliminate maternal mortality and morbidity through providing comprehensive sexual and reproductive health services, including safe abortion.
- Eradicate all forms of gender-based violence and pay particular attention to the harmful cultural practices that perpetuate the lower status accorded to women, as well as provide survivors of violence with the necessary health services.
- Recognize the multiple forms of discrimination against women and their interlinkages with discrimination based on race, ethnicity, religion or belief, health, disability, age, class, caste, and sexual orientation and gender identity.
- Eliminate harmful practices against girls and women, such as early and forced marriages.
- Provide migrants with information, education, and services and protect their human rights.

This again would not have been possible without the work of feminists across the region both within and outside of the political negotiations. It is particularly important to mention the leadership role that India, the Philippines, and the Pacific Islands played during this negotiation. It is also not a coincidence that these were the countries where there were feminists within the national delegations (in the case of the Philippines and India) or where feminists had been working with governments for months beforehand in preparation, as in the Pacific Islands (Cook Islands, Vanuatu, Samoa, Marshall Islands, Federal States of Micronesia, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Tuvalu, Solomon Islands, and Tonga). It is also worth mentioning that young feminist activists were actively mobilized, coordinated, and working successfully with governments toward these progressive outcomes.

Finally, the Addis Ababa Declaration on Population and Development in Africa beyond 2014, which was the last of the regional ICPD review conferences and took place the last week of September 2013, also reflected key feminist priorities for the region.
These included attention to fulfilling the sexual and reproductive rights and health of adolescents, who make up almost half of the population of the continent, as well as preventing and treating HIV and AIDS; eliminating preventable maternal deaths; and ending harmful practices that discriminate against and violate the human rights of girls and women, such as early and forced marriages and female genital mutilation, among others. The progressive leadership on SRHR came from South Africa, Liberia, Ghana, Namibia, and Zambia.

Some countries vehemently opposed any references to ending violence and discrimination against people with diverse sexual orientations and gender identities (SOGI), and had reservations about the declaration’s references to protection of human rights “without distinction of any kind” and to “guarantee equality before the law and non-discrimination for all people” (para. 17); promulgating laws to prevent and punish hate crimes (para. 18); and enacting and enforcing laws and policies that respect and protect “the sexual and reproductive rights and health of all individuals” (para. 35). These countries were Algeria, Benin, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, Djibouti, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Sierra Leone, the Sudan, and Tunisia. Chad did not adopt the document.

The vocal and articulated resistance was not relegated to issues of SOGI. Some African health ministers publicly questioned ideas that had been agreed to more than twenty years before, such as ending gender-based violence, responding to adolescent’s sexuality through comprehensive sexuality education programs, and ensuring women’s and girls’ human rights and health, including their sexual and reproductive health. Nevertheless, significant outcomes and commitments emanated from this conference that feminists both within national delegations and working from the outside advocated for, including the following:

- Review and abolish laws that discriminate against girls and women.
- Guarantee women’s equal access to resources, including land, property, and inheritance rights.
- Prevent all forms of child abuse, including sexual violence, and promote safe spaces for girls.
- Eradicate all harmful practices, including early and forced marriages and female genital mutilation.
- Eradicate gender-based violence inside and outside the family.
- Protect the human rights of all individuals without distinction of any kind.
- Enforce laws to prevent and punish hate crimes without distinction of any kind.
- Achieve universal access to sexual and reproductive health services free from discrimination.
- Enact and enforce laws and policies to respect and protect the sexual and reproductive rights and health of all.
- Support the integration of sexual and reproductive health services, such as HIV and family planning.
- Provide safe abortion services to eliminate maternal deaths.
- Adopt comprehensive sexuality education programs in and out of school.
Despite these gains, it is important to note that the strong opposition to advancing human rights protections, primarily in matters related to sexuality and reproduction in Africa, is not dissipating and is perhaps stronger than it was twenty years ago in Cairo. Without fully resourced and actively vocal feminist movements on the continent challenging the systematic human rights violations as well as the current economic frameworks that are being imposed on the continent by the international financial and trade institutions, injustice and poverty will prevail.

There is reason to be hopeful, however. The coming together of multiple generations of transnational feminist activists in the twentieth-year ICPD review process, including within both the development and human rights fields, has led to some visible gains that can help set the regional and global sexual and reproductive rights and health policy agenda for the next twenty years. The movement will need to keep the momentum in implementing these agreements. This includes reexamining SRHR movement priorities, constantly reinventing ways of building solidarity within and across movements.

**Current Conundrums for Transnational Feminists Working on SRHR**

There are three “conundrums” for feminist SRHR transnational movements to address in the coming years.

**Moving on from Identity Politics**

One of the reasons for the fracture among feminist transnational SRHR movements seeking global action can be the lack of agreement on how to claim identities as the basis of political analysis and action. The identity politics of indigenous women; young women; women living with HIV; lesbian, bisexual, and transgender women; disabled women; and sex workers particularly have made it challenging for collective feminist movements on sexual and reproductive rights and health to agree on joint strategies at the United Nations, for example. Many have opted for avoiding the process of finding common ground among all of these groups, focusing instead on naming the legal, policy, economic, social, and cultural barriers necessary to overcome exclusion by addressing the asymmetries in power relations that have enabled stigma, discrimination, and human rights violations related to all these groups. Yet this strategy has also proved to be counterproductive, because minorities in the feminist SRHR movement, namely those of diverse sexualities, abilities, health status, ethnicity, race, or profession, have often felt that their particular claims are unacknowledged and therefore not properly taken on board by the movements or by governments. If transnational feminist movements are
Moving toward Sexual and Reproductive Justice

To succeed in the coming years, a joint sense of ownership over a common agenda that is inclusive and mutually understood and agreed upon must be developed. Currently, the way in which younger generations of feminists are working indicates a sense of mutual respect for difference, of finding strength in these differences, and of willingness and perhaps greater ability to organize jointly for mutually assured goals. However, the struggle to find a balance between claiming identity politics and finding common ground will always remain. It undoubtedly takes leadership, sensitivity, and strategic thought to manage these tensions and take joint action for mutually agreed goals.

Reinvigorating the SRHR Transnational Feminist Movement

The impact of feminists and the determination and persistence of those with feminist politics within various social movements to mobilize multiple constituencies toward greater political and societal change at the United Nations is evident. Time and again we have seen how, at the United Nations, the progressive, feminist, and human-rights-oriented groups are the ones that advocate effectively for taking the moral high ground and are able to appeal to government representatives’ sense of justice, in addition to holding them accountable to national political priorities and international human rights obligations. Therefore, it is imperative that we collectively strategize about how to build cross-generational feminist solidarity, knowledge transfer, and power sharing to keep our movements alive, dynamic, and actively engaged. This requires openness to difference and dissidence, particularly among younger people, who do not have a shared feminist history and experience and are stepping into global organizing, as well as a generosity for sharing ideas, histories, and experiences across generations. It is also necessary to examine the active involvement of young feminist men in transnational feminist SRHR organizing and to take on notions of masculinities within our advocacy. Finally, it is important to transform feminist organizations and institutions; to invest in feminist training, strengthening of shared understanding, and capacity to do political work; and to create space for challenging internal power dynamics in ways that are mutually respectful.

Implementing SRHR Locally and Sharing Experiences Globally

Even though transnational organizing for SRHR among feminists has been crucial in reconceptualizing global health and population policies, it is apparent that the real gaps are in their implementation. Thus, feminist transnational movements must find innovative and creative ways of focusing more time on building bases of support, awareness, and political change locally, within communities and nations, and having the time and space to share these globally and continue having an influence at all levels. This requires both a steady funding base of support and increased resources for local and regional political work toward implementation of sexual and reproductive rights and health
programs and policies, as well as for creating spaces for the re-envisioning of global agendas. Increasing financing for transnational feminist SRHR movements has never been more urgent. None of the successes of the 1990s or more recent successes would have been possible without resourcing feminists working at all levels, as well as regional and local social-justice-motivated organizations that realize the threat the Cairo agenda is under and are mobilizing again to not only defend it but also move it forward.

These three “conundrums” will be tackled in an increasingly conservative economic and political scenario. The move toward market-oriented social and economic policies that prioritize profit over people is having devastating effects on social justice movements. Thus there is an urgency and great need to invest in younger generations of feminists who are savvy, radical, and vocal about the multiple challenges that feminist agendas all over the world face and have innovative ways to organize around these and mobilize for a truly transformative development agenda that is inclusive, just, transparent, and sustainable.

Addressing these three conundrums will help the transnational SRHR feminist movements grapple with and eventually overcome the dangers of going back to Malthusian-type population predictions fueled by the increasing environmental destruction caused by unsustainable patterns of production and consumption. Transnational feminists are looking for ways to transmit to governments the urgency required to redistribute resources in order to meet people’s needs and diminish the success of greed. This includes continuing to place the importance of women’s sexuality and reproductive autonomy and our human rights at the center of health and population policies. Young people’s movements are increasingly making the links between environmental health and sexuality, climate change and conflict, toxins and noncommunicable diseases, natural disasters and humanitarian disaster. The post-2015 sustainable development agenda offers opportunities for feminists to voice these interlinkages and to join forces with other social movements.

**Conclusions and Ways Forward**

In this chapter I have brought to light the successes and setbacks of the feminist transnational movement on sexual and reproductive rights and health in global and regional policy-making arenas within UN processes. The successes achieved at the normative global policy level are palpable: on adolescent sexuality, comprehensive sexuality education, and respecting their human rights; new regional definitions and reaffirmations of existing ones on sexual rights; and ending all forms of stigma, violence, and discrimination, including on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity, among others.

The setbacks that the transnational feminist SRHR movement continuously faces are due to conservative forces that strive to undermine any and all gains that seek recognition and justice for those whose human rights are consistently violated, particularly in the realm of sexuality and reproduction. This opposition to women’s human rights,
erotic justice, and diversity is well organized and growing in influence. It remains to be seen whether transnational feminists can and are willing to counter these forces both in their local contexts as well as in their regions and globally. The other major challenge that transnational feminist movements face is financing political advocacy work and sustaining the type of programming and political organizing needed to continue to make gains across all aspects of sexual and reproductive health and rights.

Gaining ground for feminist visions of sexual and reproductive health and rights will necessitate greater investment in feminist transnational organizing, especially among younger men and women who are not afraid to speak and act and are uncompromising in their commitment to sexual and reproductive justice for all. It will require generations of older, younger, and middle feminists to come together and develop shared knowledge, analysis, and strategy through processes of accompaniment based on principles of solidarity, cooperation, mutual respect, generosity, and nonviolence. It seems important for leaders in feminist SRHR movements, of all generations, to create spaces for building trust and a commitment to shared power, and to develop joint strategies that are widely owned and acted upon. In order to grow and transform transnational feminist movements that draw on the strengths of their diversities and narrow the generational divide, members need a commitment to and insistence on solidarity and renewal. In this same vein, it is also imperative that transnational feminist movements continue to keep in mind the people and communities that this work is for. This will take significant time, care, and investment.

Notes

1. ICPD, para. 8.25.
2. ICPD. para 7.46.
3. ICPD, para 4.1.
4. These networks were Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN), the Coalition on Sexual and Bodily Rights for Muslim Societies (CSBR), the Latin America and Caribbean Women’s Health Network (LACWHN), and the Asia-Pacific Research and Resource Center on Women (ARROW).
7. RESURJ is an alliance of transnational feminist activists, ages twenty to forty, formed in 2010 with the support of the International Women’s Health Coalition (IWHC), where it was hosted before becoming independent in 2012.
8. All quotes come from notes from a feminist SRHR strategy meeting for Cairo +20 organized by IWHC, DAWN, and RESURJ in Mexico City in December 2011. The notes are on file with the author.
9. The International Women’s Health Coalition, the Center for Women’s Global Leadership, the Women’s Environment and Development Organization, the Coalition for Sexual and Bodily Rights in Muslim Societies, the Latin America and Caribbean Women’s Health
Network, and the Asia Pacific Research and Resource Center on Women have all undergone recent leadership transitions.


References


APPENDIX ONE

NGO DOCUMENTS ON SRHR


APPENDIX TWO

UN DOCUMENTS ON SRHR


Appendix Three

Interview

Much of the debate in the last decades on trade in human beings has been conducted within feminist frameworks of analysis and advocacy. Initially restricted to the internal and cross-border trade in human beings for the purpose of prostitution, the debate had been expanded to cover other areas such as reproductive care (internal and cross-border) in the form of domestic services and commercial surrogacy involving the treatment of cells and tissues. Feminist frameworks used to address the intrusion of market relations in the domain of sexuality and social reproduction can broadly be distinguished as global, international, and transnational. Each of these positions is embedded within differing worldviews with different lines of reasoning and political agendas.

The key contentious issues in the debate among these three positions include the defining of treatment of the body as an instrument for pleasure and biological reproduction, the varying interpretations of the use of force, and the nature of human agency, decision making, and choice. Global feminism tends to squeeze all forms of violence against women, including sex trafficking, into the concept of patriarchal culture as a single mould. International feminism emphasizes the politics between nation-states and underscores the role of gender as a structure and a process that together shape the current global political economy of cross-border prostitution, sex trafficking, and reproductive care services. Transnational feminism rejects the binary divisions of rich–poor, North–South, and male–female, problematizing instead gender issues within the context of emergent global capitalism. The focus is on gender identity shaped by specific
intersections between national identity, race, and sexuality and linked to specific forms of economic exploitation. Transfeminism aims to outline the complexity of identity formation and the meanings of agency as produced by the interrelationships and interactions among actors. In this framework the differences in women's lives are shaped by the positions they occupy within a given set of local–global relations and determine how they seek to build solidarity. Understanding the protection of the human rights of persons (their bodies and sexualities) who live cross-border realities is ridden with many difficulties due to the incongruence between the normative understanding of the ideal self (as the foundation of rights) and the perceived self based on power and knowledge and its historical articulations.

This chapter presents these feminist frameworks in their historical context, noting the major shifts and changes in the lines of reasoning along with their relative positions in the structure of knowledge about state, society, and human rights where the treatment of persons is concerned. Specific attention is given to differences in interpretation and the consequences for understanding the situations of those whose dignity is violated. At a time of growing interconnectedness in respect of nearly all aspects of human lives, it is important to emphasize that the commoditization of the human body and its parts reflects the erosion of extant moral barriers and the formation of new ones. This requires critical consideration of human agency and its complexity and innovative ways for rethinking the relationship between sex, gender, and power—both in theoretical terms and regarding social actions and their dilemmas.

The chapter is divided into four sections. The chapter first examines the debate on sex trafficking, which began with earlier deliberations on slavery and evolved into feminist actions toward establishing a global agenda on violence against women. The potentials and limits of this debate are discussed in the light of the interpretative tension between victimhood and agency and its meanings for social action.

The chapter first reviews the contributions of feminist scholars using Foucault's insights on knowledge and power and shows how an understanding of prostitution and sex trafficking is within the bounds of the disciplinary power of the state. The state's surveillance mechanisms and maintenance of a social order are governed by a normalization of heterosexual morality, which is ambivalent toward race and ethnicity. The redirection of emancipatory social action is highlighted. The rejection of what is considered an account of violence against women—one that reduces causal forces to sex, patriarchy, and capitalism—in an attempt to include plural forms of violence based on gender identity now requires human rights campaigners to take into account the power of interpretation, which may include their own, and the accountability it entails.

The chapter then brings into focus the significance of the reproductive side of the female body and the ethical reasoning governing cross-border surrogacy, thus connecting the two sides of sexuality as pleasure and as reproduction of the human species. Rooted in the history of slavery, the practice of commercial surrogacy has now reemerged under market relations as a form of gestation service facilitated by assisted reproductive technology (ART). Though cross-border surrogacy is not comparable with sex or labor trafficking, their arrival on a transnational scale requires new perspectives.
on the interactions between the materiality of the human body and its changing symbolic representations. These interactions do produce new social meanings in the use of the human body—with consequences for classical definitions of the legal meanings of the person (Scheper-Hughes and Wacquant 2002).

The conclusion underscores the deep intrusion of commercial interests into human bodies as such (a source of labor, sexual pleasure, and life itself). For historical and cultural reasons, nation-states do not share the same ethos regarding the human body. Or there may be legislations lagging behind the current reality of developments in technology triggering new forms of trade in human beings. This intrusion is a gradual process no longer involving actors within a nation-state but those who are involved in cross-border interactions and who play a significant role in forging transnational transactions in the trade in human bodies. When interpreting human agency and choice in respect of these issues a socially responsible theory can no longer afford to leave the field poorly chartered and must take serious consideration of unequal structures in the global order plus the diverse forms of social stratification and inequities. Neither the women-centered perspective on sexual violence nor the specific perspective of the own-account sex worker on pleasure and emancipation nor that of the suffering body of the trafficked person is alone sufficient to understand the complex layering of social worlds in this trade. Likewise, neither the perspective of stratified reproduction in the business of renting wombs nor the own-account commercial surrogate and her agency is adequate. Reconstructing the principle of humanity requires a reconstruction of the values that protect human dignity at each layer of the transnational commerce involving the human body. This requires challenging the specific rationality that underpins and informs the way the sex trade and the trade in gestation services are governed in specific places to better resist forms of governance that are intolerable to the subjects in question.

**SEXUAL TRAFFICKING AND SLAVERY:**
**THE OBJECTIFICATION OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN AS SUBJECTS OF RIGHTS**

Classical studies of slavery generally connect the forms of enslavement through the last centuries with industrialization, the rise of capitalism, and colonial expansion. Enslavement and debt bondage—including generational forms—have been explained in terms of the specific economic, institutional, and technological aspects of a country or region (Sawyer 1986; Miles 1987; Plant 1987). Since the antislavery movement beginning in Britain over two centuries ago and the ensuing campaign against the white slave trade, feminist contributions to debates and advocacy have challenged the whiteness of sexual slavery and have sought to bring issues of gender, sexuality, and race into new frameworks of analysis. The key issue emanating from the debate on the master–slave relationship revolves around the relationship of objectification and domination.
Papadaki’s (2007) careful reading of Immanuel Kant’s position on sexuality and objectification is very helpful to understanding the controversies regarding women’s rights, sexuality, and the human being as an end rather than a means—a persisting fundamental issue in the question of human rights. Kant viewed sex as nature (animal instincts for pleasure and procreation) and sexual objectification as a process by which a person becomes an object of the gratification of another’s desire (a means rather than an end). Objectification in sexual relations can be eliminated when sex is socialized into a monogamous marriage (assumingly heterosexual) based on romantic love, since this provides the conditions for mutual acceptance and reciprocity and avoids the reduction of a person to the level of an object for use. Kant saw women who sell themselves for money as thereby reduced to an object and therefore to be blamed for the harm done to her humanity (Papadaki 2007, 335).

Two waves of feminists have taken issue with Kant’s position. After the first wave on equal political rights had subsided, the 1970s saw the reemergence of vibrant debates on women’s rights related to the body, such as sexual slavery and bondage, domestic and intimate violence, and pornography. Rooted in the US Civil Rights movement, the debate on sexual slavery is part of a broader debate on sexual politics initiated by Kate Millet (1970), set in terms of the master–slave relationship (dominance and subordination) to throw a political light on the relations between the sexes. Debates on sexual objectification span a spectrum of sex acts and their linkages. Barry (1979, 40–41) claims that pornography feeds into domestic violence and rape and that rape provides social and political contexts in which victims are enslaved, especially in international traffic of women and prostitution.

More broadly, these debates have led to the establishment of a global agenda on violence against women that includes the issues of sexual slavery in armed conflicts and rape as a tool of war (Meyer and Prügl 1999). The goal has been to document incidences of violence against women; to expose how the gendered nature of the institutions, practices, and discourses on sex and gender has contributed to the obliteration of such violence from public policy agendas; and to demand the legal recognition of these acts so as to open up avenues for criminal liability—nationally and also in international human rights law. By providing a synchronic account of female sexual slavery across cultures, Barry posits the thesis that female sexual slavery in all its forms is the mechanism for controlling women through the sex-as-power ethic (1979, 194). Holding that women’s own acceptance of their status as “sexual slaves” should not be taken as given but a result of the absence of legal and social sanctions against its practice, she appeals for authority to pay attention to the denial of rights to women living under sexual enslavement and to acknowledge the role of a sexual culture based on aggression, a position shared by the antipornography campaign (Leidholdt and Raymond 1990).

Though a step forward from earlier attempts at moral reforms common in the prohibition approach at the turn of the twentieth century, the definition of the sex-as-power ethic and its culture conflates sex and gender and overgeneralizes gender as a binary construct of male and female, thus providing a synchronic view on various forms of sexual enslavement without explaining their differing trajectories in time and place. This
suppresses the issue of diversity regarding the social experiences of women in the sex trade and simplifies the meaning of the masculine culture\(^3\) as well as the issue of female agency in prostitution.

The Coalition Against Trafficking in Women (CATW), which Barry cofounded in 1988, used the human rights approach to launch an attack on trafficking and the sex industry and has played a central role in influencing the terms used in the drafting of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crimes (henceforth the Protocol) ratified in 2000 and signed by 176 states (Kim and Chang 2007; Weitzer 2007). The Protocol specifies the term exploitation as including “at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs” (UNODC 2004, 42). The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons is irrelevant to the Protocol.

In the process of implementing the Protocol, several contentious issues on objectification and harm, women’s agency, and choice have emerged. At one level many researchers have demonstrated how some antitrafficking programs have created a rescue industry whose practices conflate prostitution with trafficking, ending up with ascribing a victim status to people (mostly women) who have made conscious decisions to migrate (Law 2000). These women are more concerned about their working environments, economic exploitation, and violation of initial agreements (Breuil et al. 2011). Some women consider themselves to be not victims of trafficking but survivors at the margins of society (Agustín 2007)—a position that also excludes them from reproductive health and HIV/AIDS services (Brussa 2009).

Those who have been rescued and placed in government-sponsored shelter have to bear with the antisex industry attitude of the rescuers, who not only infantalize their opting to migrate but also pathologize them and classify their entry into prostitution as deviant behavior. This in turn fosters surveillance practices, putting restrictions on the rescued victims in their communication with people outside the assistance system and thereby impacting their agency and ability to dissent and negotiate within the assistance program framework (Brunovskis and Surtees 2008). Evidence shows how a top-down fight against human trafficking, often seen as an evil, can end up placing the burdens of being evil on those enduring such practices. At the level of social assistance the prostitute continues to be held accountable for the harm done to her own humanity, despite the formal acknowledgment of gender inequality as a factor at the societal level. The conflation of sex and gender in the Protocol also oversimplifies both the process of trafficking as cross-border migration and its intersections with the provision of sexual services. The controversies around consent, sexual exploitation, slavery, and accountability, four positions articulated by the women in prostitution\(^4\) themselves—with the support of their sympathizers—are summarized as follows.

The first is founded in and focused on the United States with the name of Women Hurt in Systems of Prostitution Engaged in Revolt (WHISPER). It claims that prostitution is not a victimless practice and endorses Barry’s position, especially the systemic
nature of the relationship between male violence in intimate relations and female entry into prostitution and the multiple harms inflicted on women upon entry, during the time of practice, and after exit. Feminist professionals in health, law, and social care who work with women in prostitution and are members of CATW also support this position (Farley 2004; Jeffreys 2009). Based on accounts of multiple harms, WHISPER rejects both the notion of sex as work and prostitution as a viable livelihood option for women. Apart from giving direct assistance to those being harmed by prostitution, the organization campaigns for decriminalizing the prostitute and for more effective legislation by which to track down the perpetrators and penalize them; it also engages in finding alternative options for those who exit prostitution and in educating the public about the violence in prostitution (Bell 1994; Powell 2005).

The second position is that held by Call Off Your Old Tired Ethics (COYOTE), organized for sex workers’ activism in 1973. Members consists of a mix of libertarian activists and people related to the sex industry in various ways: women in prostitution who claim the identity of sex workers and former sex workers; clients; social workers; and health service providers. This organization also supports the decriminalization of the prostitute and of the act of pimping by claiming that the pimping law—which criminalizes all those who derive earnings from a prostitute—can affect a prostitute’s dependents (who could be her own children) or prevent sex workers working together. The organization also calls for the elimination of social stigma placed on prostitution and the acceptance of sex work as an occupation so that women in prostitution can be entitled to health care in a dignified way—especially for reproductive health and HIV/AIDS. Through international campaigning the organization also contributed to the drafting of the World Charter for Prostitutes’ Rights in 1985, demanding recognition of sex workers as persons with agency who sells their services and of the act of selling sex as a financially and sexually rewarding option for them (Pheterson 1989). Two interrelated principles are involved: reduction of the harm done by stigmatizing women in prostitution; and enablement of the voices of own-account sex workers to be heard as subjects of rights in the public sphere.

A major point of tension in the process of drafting this charter was the absence of the voices of migrant women in prostitution who held an irregular status and by virtue of their legal position could not take part. Decriminalizing the act of pimping can have negative implications for these women, since this can benefit the syndicates, which organize their migration and place them in debt bondage and servitude within and across borders. The issue of agency and the organization of sexual services cannot be abstracted from the contextual power relations that define the conditions under which their sexuality becomes a source of sexual labor for enterprises (Truong 1990). A hegemonic perspective on agency and voice regarding sex as work can privilege some positions and silence others (Kampadoo and Doezema 1998).

The third approach is that of the Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women (GAATW), founded in 1994 by women’s activists at a meeting in Chiang Mai, Thailand. The emphasis was placed on understanding the diverse elements of trafficking from the perspective of the human rights of persons who have been victimized by actors
functioning within local, translocal, and transnational networks of this trade and to use this understanding to improve the lives of trafficked women. This organization’s documentation of these women’s experiences reveal the realities of discrimination compounded by multiple relations of power (gender, racial and sexual identities, class, migrant status) and how such discrimination can span many different localities and jurisdictions where they are subject to both prostitution law and migration law in the countries of origin, transit, and destination (Skrobanek, Boonpakdi, and Janthakeero 1997). In other words, in the process of migration multiple dimensions of harm and accountability result from practices of facilitating the movement of persons across borders, which can intersect with those acts defined as trafficking specifically using sexual labor for commercial purposes.

GAATW criticizes the lack of precision in the interpretation of sexual exploitation and proposes sex trafficking be legally treated as one category in the broader problem of labor trafficking, where the use of force (abduction, threat, deception, and coercion) and abuse of authority, debt, bondage, or fraud are involved (Kim and Chang 2007). Not all forms of prostitution are organized based on the use of force, and not all entry into prostitution is a result of the abuse of authority. The language of the prostitution of others in the Protocol does not allow for recognition of women’s autonomy in sex work in the absence of force and without abuse of authority. The Human Rights Caucus supported this position in view of the fact that in a globalized economy men, women, and children are trafficked for a wide range of labor activities; the sex sector is just one among them, albeit the largest. A distinction should be made between adult and child to avoid a perspective that theoretically reduces women to the level of children in need of protection and in effect can prevent them exercising their right to choose (Human Rights Caucus 1999).8

The fourth position is advocated by the Network of Sex Work Projects (NSWP), which was initially set up in 1990 as an informal alliance by a group of sex worker rights activists working within sex work projects around the world. It has grown into a global network of organizations whose work aims at resisting a criminal approach to sex work and trafficking by building up an actual leadership from the sex workers themselves to enable their positive contribution to policy processes that affect them—such as the formulation of policy guidelines in the global response to HIV/AIDS as well as human trafficking. Sex workers are of different genders (female, male, and transgender). Therefore, NSWP argues, making sex work free from discrimination, persecution, and violence—especially by holding that the health and human rights of sex workers are as important as anyone else—can ensure safety for all concerned. This position find resonance with GAATW’s rights-based approach to trafficking, which places the needs and concerns of the people being subject to trafficking as the baseline from which to negotiate with governments and find solutions for them in respect of their basic right to self-determination. A point of divergence may be the claim by some members of NSWP that sex work should be considered an honorable occupation (Doezema 2004). This is a subjective claim that extends well beyond the principle of self-determination and right to choose one’s trade, occupation, or profession freely.9
While the defense of human rights is the prime motivation of all endeavors to prevent sex trafficking, the key divisive issue lies with the ways of thinking about sexuality within the humanist paradigm of the Enlightenment—being the intellectual motor of the human rights project. Liberal attempts at enabling the voices of women in prostitution have brought to the fore the diverse realities of prostitution, migration, and sex trafficking as well as the plurality of meanings given the exercise of sexuality and the varied identity of the sex worker. Mediated by so many institutions that occupy the space between the state and the individual, these realities also question whether equality and reciprocity can be ensured given the social hierarchy within the sex trade, especially when its transnational dimension is taken into account. For this reason, and having in mind the large constituency of migrant women in prostitution in many countries (Kim and Chan 2007; Brussa 2009), human rights advocates call on governments to give priority to addressing the immigration status of the persons who sell sexual services (Barnet, Casavant, and Nicol 2011). Some states in the region covered by the Schengen Agreement (Norway and Italy) have experimented with the treatment of migrant women with an irregular status as rights bearers but have made it conditional on their leaving the sex trade. Results show that many women who have benefited from this treatment have returned to the sex trade on their own account in view of their financial burdens (Skilbrei and Tveit 2011). A perspective on women’s agency cannot be omitted from the agenda of transnational debates on sex trafficking and migration.

The sex trade and trafficking as a social construct and a reality: Borders and sites of control

A reappraisal of both the Kantian perspective and antitrafficking strategies by postmodern scholars has opened up new ways for understanding the place of sexuality in trafficking. This reappraisal draws on Foucault’s ideas about experience as something to be conceptualized in terms of an interrelation between knowledge, types of normativity, and subjectivity in a particular culture at a particular time (Foucault 1978, 1992). Such a view provides the possibility for a historical and place-specific reading of the exercise of sexuality and can help differentiate the modes of understanding of sex trade practices and the cultural hybridity involved. The full consequences of this notion of experience for organizing and producing knowledge about sex trafficking are beyond the scope of this discussion. The main attempt here is to point to some innovative ways for rethinking the relationship between sex, gender, and power in an era of globalization—both in theoretical terms and regarding social actions and their dilemmas.

Limoncelli’s (2010) book on the divergence within the humanitarian approach to the control of prostitution and antitrafficking campaigns in Europe at the turn of the twentieth century is one of the most lucid historical analyses of the first international
movement against the trafficking of women. Drawing from a wide range of historical data and secondary sources, she shows how the experience of campaigning for women’s rights in trafficking and its trajectories emerged from an interaction between the knowledge about sex prevailing at that time (resonating Kant’s view) and its social consequences during the colonial era.

In the early phase of colonialism, “going native” by conjoining with local women as the Other through cohabitation was an acceptable way for colonial men to obtain sexual, domestic, and care services. Their native partners could keep some degree of independence. As empire building intensified, state officials became implicated in organizing and institutionalizing prostitution by setting up brothels in ports and garrison towns for soldiers and colonial officials (see also Stoler 1989; Truong 1990). The movement of European women into the sex trade in the colonies brought about a new dilemma: though they were seen as necessary for the brothels, they were also expected to show exemplary morals of their nations and safeguard its imperial prestige. Miscegenation became a problem for the colonial authorities, seeking to contain sexual relations within racial categories.

Limocelli (2010) emphasizes how race as a construct became a policy by which to regulate and manage gender and sexual relations. Two types of policy have reflected how gender and sexuality were essential to the expression of whiteness. Antitrafficking policy—built on the definition of trafficking as the abduction and transport of women for prostitution—sought to ensure the protection of white women from being trafficked to the colonies, though their migration for marriage would be accepted and encouraged. By contrast, regulated prostitution involving non-European women could ensure the satisfaction of extramarital sexual needs of colonial officials and male laborers. The once independent native women who provided sexual services for gains became common prostitutes and were subject to hybridized forms of surveillance depending on the local reactions. The campaign against white slavery showed an ambivalence between two different lines of thinking: (1) the idea held by the International Abolitionist Federation (IAF) of protection as redemption for women and girls across global, racial, or ethnic lines; and (2) the notion of protecting social purity and moral hygiene held by the International Bureau for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic (International Bureau), which emphasized criminalization of the act of prostitution for being immoral.

IAF favored the use of education to support women migrants (white and otherwise) who consented to prostitution to find alternatives. The International Bureau was opposed to prostitution, obscenity, and homosexuality, and it supported the state view on the exercise of sexuality only within heterosexual marriage as the norm of purity and backed regulations against any expression of sexuality outside the norm. Working hand in hand with governments, the International Bureau helped governments to use antitrafficking measures selectively to control women’s sexuality and their movement as a primary state interest. Yet the disciplinary power over prostitution was in many ways incomplete owing to resistance inside empires as well as in colonies themselves. Limoncelli remains ambivalent about the justifiability of either decriminalization or abolition. Today she endorses the usefulness of a perspective on a gendered political
Thanh-Dam Truong

304 \THANH-DAM TRUONG

economy that places both trafficking and prostitution on a continuum of women's formal and informal labor activities in migration, which may help elucidate the specific dimensions of women's vulnerability in the global economy that drive them into sex work (Limoncelli 2009, 266).

In recent years, knowledge of local complexities of migration and its intersection with sex trafficking has gained prominence as the preferred approach to search for the means of redress. Doezema's work covers the same historical period as Limoncelli's plus the more recent rise of abolitionism globally linked to the adoption of the UN Protocol in 2000 and the subsequent passage of the US Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (TVPA), which has had an impact on legislation worldwide.\textsuperscript{10} Highly critical of feminist scholars who have been at the forefront in pushing the paradigm of gender as a social construct, Doezema (2010) charges that they have left out prostitute as a construct to be scrutinized. Her work sets out to fix the record by contrasting the social construction of the prostitute in the white slavery debate and its resurgence in contemporary negotiation on the legal meaning of human trafficking.

Using the image of the master–slave relationship, Doezema places those engaged in giving meaning to the term prostitute in different fields (research, media, law, and policy) in the position of the discourse masters. Endowed with the privilege of fixing cultural definition and identity, some of these actors took the liberty to define others as sex slaves—the main object of their concern. In doing so they have simultaneously discarded the voices of sex workers and strategically used their own knowledge about women in prostitution to influence the process of codification of victims of sex trafficking during the entire consultative process of international law-making both in the past and today.\textsuperscript{11} This is considered as an exercise of colonial and postcolonial power, or a practice by which an author “denies the subject the opportunity for self-representation” (Doezema 2005, 73, referring to Liddle and Rai, 1998).

Using Foucault's genealogical approach, Doezema exposes the politics of myth construction of the prostitute, showing how new myths replace old ones yet maintain a similar logic of exclusion. A myth construction is an outcome of the articulation of ideologies rather than the falsification of truth. A myth is something that appears in the form of a description of a reality while actually being an ideological narrative aimed at achieving certain effects (Barthes 1973; Laclau 1997; Haag 1999). Myths operate in sustaining relations of domination through the regulation and production of meanings in modern political cultures to support the hegemony of the ruling class; they naturalize what is contingent and historically produced into what is timeless (Doezema 2005, 64–67). The myths constructed about the woman who sells sex can be strategically used to shape the direction of policies in conformity with the dominant view on sexuality at the time.

The continuity of a moral panic as a common sentiment had been noted in the campaigns against white slavery in the past and sex trafficking today. Doezema (2002) shows how in the previous era these myths were about the innocent victims, the immoral prostitute, those with innate moral weakness, easy preys for white slavers, and the recipient of contagious diseases and filth. These lend support to the Kantian view the
accountability of those who sell sex: they are to be seen as having inflicting harm on themselves rather than choosing marriage as the appropriate context for exercising sex. The degree of leniency toward the fallen women did vary according to age and degree of maturity, which then defined the means of redemption or punishment. In the 1949 UN Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, prostitution was considered incompatible with the dignity of the person. Therefore, in many countries the issue of consent has no licit place in the apparatus of surveillance. Abolitionist law in many countries prevents women in prostitution from working together given the clause on pimping, considers their attempts at union forming as unlawful promotion of prostitution, and bars them from legal redress in cases of violation of their labor and civil rights (Doezema 2002). Myths about the prostitute have consistently portrayed her as a victim but at the same time made her accountable for the harm she experiences. Where appropriate humanitarian solutions could be found she is to be dealt with as a human being, without reference made to being a subject of right.

At the turn of this century—an age of deepening globalization—sex trafficking becomes inevitably linked with other concerns, such as the ease of travel plus the growing movement of people across borders in respect of emerging regional economic blocs, the growing complexity of illegal markets and transnational organized crimes, the rise of Internet culture and its influence of sexual cultures with their affects on young people, and the HI/AIDS pandemic. Set in this context the UN Convention on Transnational Crime and its Protocol on Human Trafficking are more far-reaching than sex trafficking and express deep anxieties regarding cross-border movements of specific categories of people (Kapur 2011; Truong 2011).

Doezema (2010) demonstrates the ways sex became set apart from other forms of labor trafficking. Some civil organizations have aligned themselves with state actors whose main concerns were with nationalistic worries about migration and the control of undesirable migrants in particular. A dividing line exists among civil society organizations involved in the consultative process on the UN Protocol. Groups upholding the perspective of law and order as primary stood firmly on one side. On the other side was a mixture of entities with conflicting interests including antiglobalization; antimigration and antimigrant; labor activism and antilabor corporate lobbies; and evangelical Christians and radical feminists, both of whom shared the same view on sex and gender that underpins the position of global feminism. Within this mixture of entities, the deep ideological divide prevailed on the relationship between trafficking and consent; the evangelical Christians and radical feminists found common ground in defending President George W. Bush’s position on trafficking as a special evil. This has triggered what Doezema calls the exhumation of the myth of white slavery to silence the voices of the sex workers and to regain a dominant position at the negotiation table. By deploying the concepts of human dignity—the basic concept in human rights and that of sexual violence (of which sex trafficking is one form) as an assault on human dignity—those endorsing the global feminist position has enclosed sex workers in a space unprotected by international law by denying their agency. This lays bare a persistent line of
thought on prostitution, structured by a binary opposition between purity and pollution. However defined, prostitution continues to be placed in a category with pollution, incompatible with purity expressed through the notion of the dignity of the person.

The struggle for recognition thus involves an epistemic struggle to recode the meanings of sexuality generally but specifically its relationship with markets. Scholars who draw on Foucault’s ideas about neoliberal governmentality—first introduced in 1979—to connect analyses of micro power with the reordering of society at the macro level have provided important insights on the complex relationships between thinking and ruling (in respect of the sex trade). Governmentality is the semantic linking of governing and modes of thought and consists of the systematic ways of thinking about how to govern alongside what exactly shape subjectivities and notions of personhood (Lemke 2007). Both facets are in constant interaction, and therefore the social experience of the governing of mentalities over a particular domain is to be analytically treated as bound by both time and place. This perspective is especially important for analysis of migration, prostitution, and sex trafficking.

In neoliberalist thinking, borders act as a method of categorizing and stratifying labor (Mezzadra and Nielson 2013) or a triage—a process of selecting those people endowed with vital skills and capital rather than those classified as representing a threat to economic and social wellbeing within a territory (Truong 2011). Torpey (2000, 12–13) makes the point that identities must be studied not only in respect of the power of subjectivity but also in regards to how they are anchored in law and policy, codified, and institutionalized before becoming socially significant. Under the ongoing process of categorization of nonnationals, residents, and migrants lies a process of labor control in multiplied forms that together shape an emerging transnational labor system enabling the matching of labor with volatile capital (Mezzadra and Nielson 2013).

The transnational sex trade consists of an array of services. Its legal side rests within the leisure and tourism industry (entertainment, strip clubs, and escort agencies), and its illegal side consists of indoor services in private places and outdoor street soliciting. Truong (1990) makes the point that governing the sex trade is inevitably directed by a variety of rationalities (financial benefit for the formal sector, social order, health, human rights protection). Given that states are themselves made up of networks of institutions with asymmetrical powers driven by different modes of thought and direction of interests, each of these rationalities can come into conflict with one another. Thus, despite the identity of the sex worker being nonexistent in the variance of prostitution law (prohibition, abolition, legalization, regulation), at the social level in countries where the right to health and self-determination is taken seriously the term is gaining currency among community workers and health professionals (Grover 2010) alongside sex workers’ organizations.12

Cross-border migrants who are engaged in the formal section of the sex trade can gain entry by obtaining an entertainment visa (Williams 1999). Others enter into contracts with people who will sponsor and assist their entry into a country where they expect to find work with higher earnings than in their home countries or use the services of a broker to facilitate completion of documentation (Tyner 2004). At the interface between
law and society migrants involved in the sex trade are affected not only by the legal classification of identities that separate them from nationals and legal residents but also by the social hierarchy of identities within the population of foreign sex workers—itself being formed by an interaction between their migration status (regular or irregular), ethnic, racial, sexual identities, and economic relations (Andrijasevic 2009; Scoular 2010). In addition, variant gender identity has also emerged as an entity in the sex trade (Ocha 2012). The interaction between law, economy, and society in respect to prostitution is such that just as the sex worker” cannot be treated as a uniform category, so too the tasks performed by the worker and the nature of contracts between the worker and employers in sex work depend greatly on the context of migration given the temporal and spatial movements in this trade.

The functional redefinition of borders in different contexts also entails new configurations of power producing new relationships between sociophysical space and subjectivities in the sex trade. For example, the discourse prostitution in Amsterdam in the 1980s and 1990s in which the notion of sex workers’ rights had been prominent is now shifting to public security around and within the locales of prostitution (Outshoorn 2012; Zuckerwise 2012). Hubbard, Matthews, and Scoular (2008) observe in their comparative study that despite sharply different policy frameworks (prohibition, Sweden; abolition, United Kingdom; legalization, the Netherlands) there is a shared preoccupation with repression of street prostitution. Yet since sexual exploitation in prostitution extends well beyond the street—also involving indoor places—the hierarchically organized indoor systems of predation remain impenetrable. Hubbard et al. conclude that, while states may intervene in the markets of sex work at sites accessible to law enforcers in the name of tackling gendered injustice, they may also leave some inaccessible locales untouched. In so doing states are also perpetuating the geographies of exception and abandonment.

These findings point to the need to ground the study of migration and sex trafficking in specific contexts to understand how distinctive patterns of management of labor flows into the sex trade are being generated and how the interactions between the law and social forces can shape the identities of migrant sex workers with consequences for human rights policy. Understanding how processes of categorization and stratification are built from different types of borders (culture, morality, economy) and social spaces can generate new insights on the relationships between sex work and place-based subjectivity—something that may help clarify the specific meanings of dignity and rights for particular groups.

The postmodernist approach to the study of sex trafficking has produced a wealth of material. By providing diverse perspectives about prostitution as a social experience (à la Foucault) this approach has posed significant challenges to classical feminist theorizing on prostitution as being but one aspect of the more general debate on sexuality, sexual violence, and patriarchal culture. It has shown how the literature about the persons called prostitutes has by and large reflected the views of the writers and prevalent political agendas, whereas the incorporation of the perspectives and voices of the women engaged with prostitution as a dynamic institution can help reveal the diversities
extant. Neither the women-centered perspective on sexual violence nor the specific perspective of the own-account sex worker on pleasure and emancipation nor that of the suffering body of the trafficked person is alone sufficient to understand the complex layering of social worlds in this trade. Scholars who address these issues from the perspective of bordering and sites of control have exposed: (1) the weakness of a purely discursive approach to subjective identities; and (2) the pitfalls of an approach to human rights in prostitution based on a singular understanding of sex and gender. Human rights approaches that are insensitive to local sociocultural factors and their interactions with economic relations are less able to ascertain those micro-transformations within the migration and sex industries likely to eventually generate some shift in the dynamics of human trafficking—be it in a positive or negative direction. In this respect, feminist positions from all points of the political points need to reckon with the diversity of meanings and experiences of the act of selling sex,

**Globalization, commercial surrogacy, and transnational mobility: Borders and the multidimensional character of sexual and reproductive labor**

The reproductive side of transnational migration has been studied mainly from the perspective of domestic work and commercially-arranged sexual services (Truong et al. 2013). Commercial surrogacy as a theme of research has emerged recently due to the globalization of health services, reproductive technology, and the ease of travel, which together allow seeking extraterritorial assistance to evade compliance. In view of the widespread use of ART, breaching many ethical barriers, the term surrogate motherhood and its practices have met with many controversies in recent years from the standpoint of the service seekers as well the providers of services, involving professionals in many fields as well as the women to lend their bodies to gestate at a fee.

Since the technological revolution in the late 1970s that enabled conception by in vitro fertilization (IVF), the total number of births using IVF has reached five million. A recent estimate of the monetary size of the market for international surrogacy cites an annual worldwide figure of $6 billion annually worldwide (Mohapatra 2012, 2). Factors contributing to the growth of extraterritorial ART services may include limited access to gametes due to restrictive regulations affecting the size of the pool, or simply legislative bans. In addition, barriers to access based on social identity, such as marital status (single, cohabiting couple) and sexual orientation (same-sex couple), also play a role. The legal framework for ART is anchored in the morality of the patriarchal heterosexual family. Those who do not conform to the patriarchal ideals of motherhood must seek ART services extraterritorially (Shenfield et al. 2010).
From a technical perspective, surrogate pregnancy under ART may be defined as the process by which one woman, chosen by an infertile (biologically or socially) couple, carries and delivers a child for the couple with the support of the new reproductive technology. A common form is assisted insemination using the sperm of a partner or through actual sexual intercourse. The surrogate mother is usually a family member who altruistically volunteers to provide her gestational service. A major drawback of this form is the fact that the genetic relationship between the surrogate and the intended child can become a legal complication since the surrogate is provided with parental rights and can claim the baby following delivery should she change her mind about the prepregnancy agreement. The other form is gestational surrogacy involving the method of in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer to the uterus of a surrogate mother. Through a complicated process involving higher cost, this latter form of surrogacy ensures the genetic link between both parents and the child and can avoid dispute on parental rights with the surrogate mother. Both forms of surrogate pregnancy can be based on altruism, though coverage for medical expenses for the surrogate mother (fertility treatments, medical examinations, pregnancy, and delivery) is the responsibility of the intended parents. When the agreement between the intended parents and the surrogate involves a payment for services above the pure medical costs, the contract is considered as commercial surrogacy.

Advances in information and medical technologies and the globalization of health-care services have permitted transnational arrangements for medical care known as the medical tourism complex in which cross-border arrangement for commercial surrogacy is nested (Cohen 2013). The role of intermediary companies has recently become an issue of public concern. These companies bring together donors, parents, surrogate mothers, and fertility clinics and make the necessary legal arrangements. Yet the lack of clarity in law (interjurisdictional arrangements and immigration rules) and professional standards can place the surrogate, the commissioned parents, and the babies in a vulnerable position (Mohapatra 2012). Though cross-border commercial surrogacy is not comparable to sex tourism, for which there are clear laws and international cooperation to fight the sexual exploitation of underage people, there is no such thing for commercial surrogacy. The issue of forced commercial surrogacy has been raised for the first time in 2012 as a practice that falls within the scope of human trafficking.

A parallel may be drawn between the different perspectives on sex trafficking and commercial surrogacy, namely, (1) the Kantian view on human dignity as treatment of the human being as end rather than means, thus protecting the moral worth of heterosexuality and opposing its objectification, especially through commodification; (2) the feminist view on unjust differences of power and wealth and the intersections of race, class, and gender in the commodification of sexuality transnationally; and (3) the postmodernist view regarding the plural identities and subjective experiences of surrogate mothers and ART-assisted parents and the need for a more inclusive approach to diversity in sexual relations and family forms.

The prevailing Kantian objection to the trade in organs is applicable to commercial surrogacy, based on the treatment of the human being as an end. Additional reference
to the notions of parenthood and the family is also relevant in the case of surrogacy. Sandel (2000) points to the genetic link between the child and the surrogate mother that makes her renouncement of her parental rights equivalent to the act of baby selling. More broadly, the compensation that the surrogate receives for her service provision leads to its association with the commoditization of reproduction, the corruption of moral goods and social norms associated with pregnancy, child bearing, and parenthood. Surrogacy treats women’s bodies as factories—a means, not an end. Furthermore, by requiring the surrogate mother to repress her feelings of parental love for the child, the surrogacy contract can be considered as converting the woman’s labor into a form of alienated labor (Anderson 1990, cited by Sandel 2000, 82–4).

Kerstein (2009, 149) makes the point that though opponents to the commerce in human body parts and in surrogacy have aptly appealed to Kant’s principle of humanity, their argumentation is less helpful than it might be because they do not specify clearly what dignity is or what measures are necessary to ensure the respect of it. The wrongness of an agent’s treating another person merely as a means should be assessed by first clarifying conditions under which this treatment occurs. This is a context-dependent empirical question regarding the behavior of each of the agents: the provider of the service, the state, the broker, the medical institution, and the service seeker.

When assessing the right and wrong of commercial surrogacy from the perspective of dignity (as the respect for the worth of a person’s humanity), aspects of consent, mutual respect, and reciprocity present in the entire reproductive process must be taken into account—from the prepregnancy agreement through to conception, gestation, delivery, and postnatal care. Yet so far much is left to be desired, for even the representation of cross-border commercial surrogacy in media, research, and public opinion can be offensive to the dignity of the parties involved.

Matorras (2005), the president of the Spanish Society of Fertility, objects to the use of the term reproductive tourism (Pennings 2004) to refer to those seeking extraterritorial ART services. To him the term tourism implies traveling for pleasure; infertility patients traveling across borders to obtain seeking ART services is necessary—given they cannot access the services in their home country. The term also predisposes the reader against infertility problems and stigmatizes the subjects living with infertility and possibly also the children born from commercial surrogacy. Matorras proposes reproductive exile as an alternative—a patient-centered concept considered to be more politically correct. The likening with political exile invites a reader to think about the importance of recognizing the individual right to decide on procreation and the personal consequences of political obstruction. Mohapatra (2012) documents many case of babies lost in legal limbo due to the differences between national laws on surrogacy and inconsistencies regarding laws on citizenship. People seeking ART services today are not only those who are biologically infertile. Infertility can be a result of choice of identity and lifestyle (same-sex coupling, heterosexuals choosing to have someone else bear their child for reasons related to their career, or other preferences). Casper (2011) adds that using the term tourism for global reproductive transactions misrepresents the human agency driving these practices and the significant consequences that result—reducing all
women’s choices, life histories, embodied realities, desires and hopes, fears and regrets to either financial gain on the side of the surrogate or potential parenthood for the commissioning party.

Though cross-border reproductive care (CBRC) is clinical, descriptive, and apolitical, it is more commonly accepted because it is free from insinuation about any particular social group. CBRC puts ART services in the domain of reproductive care (abortion, sterilization, contraception), which has a long history of extraterritorial practice given the ever prevalent control some states have over women’s bodies and their procreative capacity. It can be said that CBRC acknowledges the right to reproductive care as well as connects ART services with the ongoing liberalization of health-care services across the world. The term cross-border throws light on the relations between nation-states, the systems of commerce adopted, and regulatory frameworks giving rise to the transnational networks organizing commercial surrogacy as a business. Beyond and above the relation between the gestation surrogate and the commissioning parents, this opens the framework of analysis to include scrutiny of the standards of practice among health entrepreneurs across borders. Where there is no effective law these health entrepreneurs make the rules, usually going by market competition and leaving ethical questions to the state.

The representation of surrogates recruited by agents working for hospitals and clinics offering ART services is no less controversial than that of commissioning parents. Because most of the surrogates are poor (whether women of color in rich countries or citizens of a low-income country), emphasis has been given to their becoming a social class in the global division of reproductive labor, a domain neglected by economists and sociologists. Borrowing from studies in industrial relations in a globalized economy, terms such as outsourcing pregnancy, rent-a-womb business, and assembling the global baby have been used to depict the sale of reproductive labor in an increasingly competitive global market. The commentator of the film The Google Baby puts it succinctly when suggesting that taking sex out of making babies “turns the miracle of life into an international ethical quagmire.”

Drawing a parallel with migrant domestic work, Twine (2011) uses the concept of stratified reproduction to show how gestation surrogacy is embedded in a transnational capitalist market structured by racial, ethnic, and class inequalities and by national regulatory regimes that do not recognize this work. Under stratified reproduction only the elite can afford this service. For the service provider, the gestation surrogate, there may be substantial financial benefit above the wage she could otherwise earn in the period required, but once the contract ends she must meet any consequential health-care costs. Although the intentions of representations of surrogates in research and media are to draw public attention to the ethical complexities of this commerce, they could reinforce the view about them being a means—often at the expense of their own sense of dignity (personhood and embodied knowledge about their labor and subjectivity).

In a similar treatment of surrogacy as labor—therefore likely to be susceptible to exploitation as are other forms of labor—Pande’s (2010) ethnographic study of surrogates in India deals with both the women as critical agents and the environment (the dormitory
attached to the clinic) in which their work is embedded. To study aspect work from an organizational perspective she uses Foucault's concepts of power (self-discipline and internalized surveillance in an enclosed space) to explicate the details of a process that produces the perfect docile mother worker. The formal rules of the dormitory—where the women stay during nine months of gestation as workers and watch is maintained—mirror surveillance techniques to ensure successful embryo transfer and gestation. Pande brings out two distinct types of self-surveillance: the disciplinary techniques of producing a modern mother as the normalizing power in reproduction; and reproductive-health-related discipline to produce the perfect baby. Regarding the normalizing power, the women also are taught the skills to relate to future international clients through the Internet—thus bolstering the image of the clinic as a respectable place with skilled reproductive workers able to do anything to produce a “perfect” baby.

To study the surrogates’ resistance, Pande (2010) introduces the concept of sexualized care work to describe commercial surrogacy, which she considers as similar to existing forms of care work except that it is stigmatized in the public imagination particularly because of its parallels with sex work (Pande 2009a). The narrations by surrogates bring out their covert resistance against public opinion that depicts them as women who sell their body and their baby. Distancing themselves from the term prostitution and from the thought of being someone who would give away their own child, the surrogates describe their gestational labor as involving a great deal of emotional effort defending themselves against rhetoric that reduces them to a vessel, a rented-out womb, or a one-off contracted worker. These women see the baby they carry as a product of their own blood and use their own cultural norms to draw a parallel between the relinquishment of the newborn to giving a daughter away at marriage (Pande 2009b). Their choice does not necessarily imply enhancement of their personal autonomy but is linked to the desire to give their “own” children—born within a heterosexual marriage—a better future. Their sense of dignity retains the notion of a good mother”—an ideological cornerstone underlying women’s dignity. Pande’s findings call for greater scrutiny of the subjective experiences of the surrogate mothers and the general relationship between mothering and dignity. Some women have rejected the term surrogate, preferring gestation mother as more dignified (Kirkman 2010).

Research on ART services and commercial surrogacy has opened new windows on the multilayered meaning of human dignity for workers in the domain of reproduction—the intimate Other of production (Truong 1990, 1996). Though seemingly different, transnationally organized forms of sexual or reproductive labor need to be put together in the framework for analysis in regard of the globalization of reproduction as a macrosocial phenomenon to reveal the technologies of political power wielded over the workers involved. The moral boundaries established between the sexual and social aspects of reproduction have created various concepts (sex worker, sexualized care worker, surrogate mother, gestation mother, domestic worker) linked under a stratified system of globalized social reproduction, which calls up new attitudes toward the body and results in new skills among these women in smoothly handling detailed aspects of their service. Though these workers are becoming part of the landscape of transnational transactions,
they are not visible to the public eye as workers because of an epistemology that sets their activities in the private domain. The general moral imperative that disallows the exercise of sexuality and some forms of care outside the confines of the family—and views its pursuance under market relations as aberrant—has produced subjectivities arising from context-dependent interactions between these workers and local forms of power. Given that their workplace is physically, morally, and socially enclosed, individual workers draw on their own moral resources to justify their thinking, their desires, and utilization of their own bodies. Because of this enclosure their resistance, in the majority of cases, is limited to being an individualized affair. The challenge to the feminist political agenda is to acknowledge the dividing line between different feminist frameworks of knowledge to treat these as outcomes of the wider politics of gender transformation and to find new ways to weave together insights in order to defend the rights and dignity of these workers effectively.

**Conclusion**

This chapter discussed the commoditization of the human body in the context of the neoliberal order and the implications for transnational feminist politics. The background has provided a body of knowledge in re the conditions for the emergence of sex trafficking. Initiated by feminist scholars and advocates in the late 1980s this awareness has extended to cover human trafficking in other forms of trading human bodies. As certain ideas in the body of knowledge on sex trafficking began to affect policymaking and to provide guidelines for administration of justice in the late 1990s, they intersperse with growing knowledge about cross-border migration through the means of brokerage for other economic sectors that had adopted practices similar to sex trafficking. These intersections of ideas have produced new understandings of gender, sexuality, agency, and enslavement in migration. The marketization of health-care services combined with advanced reproductive technologies has resulted in ways of commercial surrogacy organized transnationally, involving the provision of labor for biological reproduction parallel with sexual labor for pleasure.

The deep intrusion of transnational commercial interests into the human body as such (a source of labor, sexual pleasure, and life itself) is unprecedented, and the current commerce of the human body is rewriting the body, conceptually dividing it into parts, organs, and cells. This reveals the ambiguity of humanity as a political entity and poses great challenges to the classical construct of the body and self as timeless and unchanging. The female body, sexuality, and reproductive capacity carry the legal and social brunt of this rewriting, owing to multiple layers of transactions being negotiated within unequal structures of diverse power in a new global order. Newly formed transnational feminist knowledge must build bridges between different epistemological positions to deepen understanding about the emerging structural contradictions in the human trafficking business. So far, transnational feminism has argued for democratization in
representation of humanity as a political entity to be governed and the utilization of new
tools to undo the rationality behind the mode of governance that affect them to more
effectively resist tyranny. What seems necessary in an era of globalization is the defining
of the notion of political responsibility that can span across different locales connect-
ing various actors and the reformulation of rights that mirrors the contextual reality of
structural vulnerability to violation.

Both the Kantian and Foucaultian approaches need revising to reconceptualize
rights and resistance. Kant’s premises on objectification in the domain of sexuality is
limited in place and time whereas Foucault’s parameter requires the specification of the
place and time in which networks of power are routed before establishing a parameter
of judgment. Doing so, he also provides a much deeper meaning of corporeality (as
historically produced) than the notion of the natural body in Kant’s thinking. By giv-
ning voice to those whose dignity is being trampled on, Foucault and followers show
the importance of understanding dignity in contextual terms, signifying those mean-
ings defined by the historical interaction between the state and its subjects. By reject-
ing the Kantian range of choice in the exercise of sexuality (which is framed in terms
of a naturalization of heterosexuality and the institution of marriage), postmodernist
feminist scholars have turned to Foucault’s techniques in deconstructing the appara-
tus of knowledge on sexuality and the family. This apparatus is to be understood as
an ensemble of various institutional, physical, and administrative mechanisms and
knowledge structures about sexuality and the family that maintains and enhances dis-
cipline over the individual body through inculcating social and political beliefs and
values that shape choice and agency. Resistance means validating gender and family
diversity and sexual pluralism. Choice is considered to be an open struggle for recogni-
tion of different sexual subjectivities. The ensuing notion of dignity means the ability of
the individual to choose a course of self-realization through his or her own action as a
moral subject.

Kant drew a clear boundary limiting the market and commodification of the body.
Foucault and followers left this area open to the responsibilities of individuals to plough
through the machineries of power. Yet when trying to connect the transnational indus-
trial complexes of commerce in leisure, health, and reproductive care driven by capital
flow some key moral dilemmas have emerged on the question of agency. At one level
state liberalization of markets has facilitated the formation of transnational networks of
commerce that vet suitable sexual and reproductive labor for their undertakings. States
should not be allowed to abdicate from moral accountability. At another level beyond
some micro transformations of their lives, those persons placed in subordinated posi-
tions are separated and enclosed in their own realities cannot make significant changes
other than rationalizing their choice on the basis of their individual subjective expe-
riences. Redirecting emancipatory social action toward the reality of life as lived by
the subjects of concern must go hand in hand with setting new limits on markets to
redress the collusion between diverse forms of power (state, capital, technology) as well
as equalizing power in the domain of interpretation. Reconstructing the principle of
humanity requires a reconstruction of the values that protect human dignity within the multiple layers of transnational commerce involving the human body.

Notes

1. Under the system of slavery surrogacy was practiced in the form of stud farms to breed new slaves (Truong 1990).
2. Under the term sexual enslavement Barry includes prostitution (on the street or in brothels), marriage with battery, forced marriage, veiling and seclusion, incestuous family life, traditional genital mutilation, and the sanctioning of rape and pornography.
3. In the years of my research I have come across many male clients who actually helped female victims to escape, showing an awareness of rights rather than objectification.
4. Women in prostitution is preferred to avoid the stigma attached to prostitutes and also to acknowledge the diverse positions women may occupy in prostitution as a social institution.
5. See Powell (2005).
6. Author’s notes made of the working sessions when drafting the World Charter for Prostitutes’ Rights in 1985 in Amsterdam.
7. The author was part of this process but refused to speak on behalf of migrant women in prostitution, being aware of what McClintock (1992) coined as the racial geography of sex that maps the city and administratively partitions sex industry.
9. Honor is derived from practicing a profession with integrity, efficiency, and satisfaction of all concerned and should not be considered as a defining characteristic.
10. The US Trafficking Victims Protection Act defines severe forms of trafficking in persons as “sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such act has not attained 18 years of age; or the recruitment, harbouring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjecting to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery.” The Department of State’s Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons uses the Trafficking in Persons (TIP) annual report as the principal diplomatic tool to engage foreign governments in the matter of human trafficking, with consequences for negotiations on foreign assistance. The report uses a three-tier system of classification: Tier 1 are countries whose governments fully comply with the minimum standards set by the act; Tier 2 are those that do not comply but are making significant efforts to bring their law into compliance with those standards; and Tier 3 are those that do not fully comply and are not making any significant efforts to do so.
11. The consultative process was between governments and civil society organizations, from the Vienna conference on Human Rights in (1993) through to the Beijing Women’s Conference in 1995 and the meetings leading up to the drafting and passage of the Protocols of the UN Convention on Organized Crime in 2000.
Variant gender identities are emergent gender and sexual identities from sex-change operations.

Surrogate motherhood—bearing a child for an infertile couple or breastfeeding (wet-nursing) the child of another woman who is unable (or has chosen not) to lactate the infant is an old phenomenon (Grieco and Corsini 1991).


The cost of a single surrogate pregnancy in the United States can run up to $100,000 including medical expenses, of which the surrogate gets between $10,000 and $20,000. In the US law the form of contract signed by the commissioning couple and the surrogate mother requires the surrogate mother (and usually her partner) to agree to abstain from intercourse for a number of months, submit to regular and extensive medical exams, and agree to transfer parental rights to the couple once the child is born (Bryn Williams-Jones, Commercial Surrogacy and the Redefinition of Motherhood, 2 J. PHIL. SCI. & L., February 2002), http://www6.miami.edu/ethics/jpsl/archives/papers/comsur_williams-jones.html.

 Trafficking in human beings for the purpose of the removal of organs and forced commercial surrogacy (2012), http://www.dutchrapporteur.nl/reports/organ-removal-forced-commercial-surrogacy/. One example of human trafficking for commercial surrogacy is the case of the Bangkok-based Taiwanese-owned company (Baby 101) raided by the Thai police in February 2011 for allegedly offering commercial surrogacy services. Thirteen Vietnamese women from the Mekong Delta, aged between nineteen and twenty-six, were kept in confinement as gestation surrogates, seven of them already pregnant. These women were recruited for work described as compatible with their health and were brought to Bangkok without work visa and kept inside the clinic against their will. Their passports were withheld upon arrival. They were well fed and were promised US $5,000 per baby born. They would receive US $1,000 for each delivery, and the remaining amount would be send to their family in Vietnam after successful delivery. http://www.bbc.co.uk/vietnamese/vietnam/2011/02/110225_viet_surogate_bkk.shtml.

Audi and Chang (2010).


A hospital in the United States arranges for cross-border commercial surrogacy charges between $35,000 and around $68,000 compared with $200,000 for an arrangement in the United States. Of the $35,000, the hospital keeps around $3,600. Another $5,000 goes to the egg donor plus another $3,000 or so for travel expenses. The surrogate gets $8,000. The rest, around $15,000, is paid to the clinic (Audi and Chang 2010).

References


Men’s responses to feminism have been understood in various ways. Kimmel (1987) divided the reactions to feminism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the United States into three “ideological categories”: antifeminist, masculinist, and profeminist. Antifeminist reactions expressed attempts to reassert patriarchy, masculinist reactions opposed the feminization of culture, and profeminist reactions embraced women’s claims for change (Kimmel 1987, 262). In such analysis, reactions are defined in oppositional terms: against/pro. Men’s reactions have also been explored in terms of positionality, as in the case of the place of men “in” feminism (Jardine and Smith 1989); in terms of how men can enact feminist politics, as in men “doing” feminism (Digby 1998); or in terms of “engagement” of men with feminist struggles (Lingard and Douglas 1999). In popular culture, those reactions have been expressed in terms of resistance to change, as in ideas such as “men’s crisis,” or in terms of sequential temporal changes, as in “new masculinities.”

Such varying terms are not just linguistic quibbles, but signal different ways of understanding transformations in gender relations in historical and structural terms. In this context, profeminism can be seen as men’s responses to the effects of feminism and of women’s struggles for equity. Profeminist initiatives in the mid-twentieth century were led by progressive, independent thinkers, who were not yet a movement but
were supportive of feminist causes (Kimmel 1987). In the 1960s men’s groups emerged as male political activists forming collectives that questioned their gendered identities and their privileged social location (Ashe 2007, 2). In that context, profeminism aligned with feminist perspectives and challenged nonfeminist agendas (Ashe 2007, 3; Kimmel 1995). Profeminist groups incorporated the view of male activists, academics, and organizers whose goals were to dismantle inequalities based on gender hierarchies. In the literature on masculinities, profeminism emerges as a central element in discussions about the politics of masculinities (Ashe 2007; Clatterbaugh 1997; Kimmel 1995; Messner 1997).

Profeminist work is shaped by the specific context and needs to be understood in relation to gender politics of power at a macro level as well as at the micro and meso levels of collectives, organizations, and the search for individual transformations. Profeminism has been shaped by the interactions and networks of groups working on men’s power and their identities (Ashe 2007, 4). Although the initial development of the practices and activisms (within local social movements) in profeminism can be seen as beginning within the USAmerican context in the mid-twentieth century, this chapter looks at how profeminism has expanded beyond that to Latin American profeminism in the last few decades. It explores the relationship between profeminist (cis-gender) men’s groups and feminism in Latin America, looking at the similarities between and particularities of the Latin American experience and other geographic locations. It traces the identification and organizing of profeminist (cis-gender) men in relation to (cis-gender) women’s feminist practice. The chapter does not aim to frame USAmerican/Latin American in oppositional ways, but to better understand how structural and institutional elements influence the local organizing of profeminist activists, which sometimes coincides with, and sometimes departs from, the ways organizing took place in the “North.”

This chapter explores the following questions: What is the meaning of “profeminism” in Latin American profeminist and men’s groups? How is it articulated? What do these groups understand and represent as alliances and profeminism? How do these members understand and publicize their goals? What linkages to feminism (activist or academic) and women’s organizations do they sustain? Just as important is the question: What distance from state-enacted sexist practices are they denouncing—and if so, how? Similarly, it is important that we explore the ways these groups expand notions of gender, of being a man, male, or masculine, and their support for a number of themes and men not always welcomed in these groups (e.g., transgender men). We first situate men’s movements in the midst of second wave feminism, in the United States, in the context of the larger political events and challenges faced in the formation of a feminist front. We explore the politics and gender and sexuality issues that intersected with the mobilization of feminisms to establish a beginning for a profeminist agenda. The second part of the chapter looks at profeminist movements in Latin America, delving into similarities and particularities of those movements. The chapter aims to show how men’s groups understand and enact their answers to feminism and women’s organizations. The notion of “pro,” and the label “profeminism” is discussed in
detail, since they are not the only way in which those organizations develop their search for gender equity and social justice. The conclusion looks at the need to document Latin American social movements influenced by a profeminist lens and maps the potential trajectories of those movements for the first part of the twenty-first century.

**SECOND WAVE FEMINISM AS THE FOUNDATION OF THE US MEN’S MOVEMENT**

*Profeminism* is a term used mainly by men (and some feminist women) who responded to the call for a broader feminism and everyday feminist practices. It follows a 1960s–1970s deployment of second wave feminist activism and scholarship by women that attempted to revolutionize gender and social relations. The profeminist movement emerged in the 1970s when men and women were organizing for gender role changes, fighting the conservative backlash, and making a larger social move to recognize sexuality as an element that could be transformative (Clatterbaugh 1997; Connell 2005).

Some important context for this period in US history is necessary. Up to the mid-twentieth century in the United States and other parts of the Western world, a notion of sex roles established a hierarchy between the genders—a practice sanctioned in many ways by the social sciences (psychology and sexology; for a critique, see Irvine 1990) that naturalized this sense of sex roles as something “real” and “biological” (Clatterbaugh 1997). There were several feminist responses to this mainstream understanding of sex and gender. On the one hand were radical feminists whose position on sex and gender was based on a belief of multiple instances that subordinated women through men’s “control of women’s sexuality and reproductive capacity” (Lorber 1994, 2). On the other hand were structuralist arguments by Marxist feminists and psychoanalytical feminists, who looked at the ideas of difference, kinship, and motherhood. There were also the “pro-sex” feminists, whose view was that “pornography has a liberating potential” (O’Malley Halley 2007, 141). Cultural feminists challenged the dual, oppositional reading of sex/gender/sexuality, and liberal feminists focused on sex roles and work, but did not engage in a politics of deconstruction, as suggested by Judith Lorber’s study of gender (1994, 4–5).

Second wave feminism in the West fought for gender equality beginning with equal opportunity for equal work, balanced work in the home, and general recognition of women’s choices. However, the “women” in such instances were presumed to be white, heterosexual, middle class, and in the normative family constitution; the hetero norms were left unquestioned. Despite the “sexual liberation” of the 1960s, in the 1970s issues of “equality” truncated sexuality as a potential discussion. When the US National Organization for Women and other associations were founded (in the late 1960s and early 1970s), their goal was based on a universal category of womanhood and a quest for rights, and there was little concern with their sexuality and pleasure.
In an academic move to discuss “gender” instead of “women,” women and men became categories of analysis to contest gendered social expectations (Adams and Savran 2002). The move to use “gender” instead of “women” split the subject of study into “men” and “women” (effectively adding “men”), allowing for the exploration of the social construction of gender from varied sets of experiences and social locations. These moves to study gender from the perspective of men have led at times to male self-victimization and thus have been a distraction from the attention to structural issues of sexism and women’s inequality, as explained further in relation to the US men’s movement in the last couple of decades (Adams and Savran 2002).

Following the discussions about gender equity in the home, education, and employment, sexuality, including prostitution and pornography, emerged as a visible issue to be discussed. The feminist movement was haunted by nineteenth- and twentieth-century dualistic dynamics of pleasure and danger (O’Malley Halley 2007; Vance 1984). In the sexual liberation of the 1960s, women’s sexuality was still tied to men’s desires. In the 1980s in the United States, feminist studies of gender and sexuality began to challenge the tenets of pornography and prostitution as simply degrading aspects of women’s subordinate placement in society (Vance 1984), and there were powerful writings from the personal (e.g., Hollibaugh 1984) and astutely, from the political (Rubin 1984) vantage points that began to reverse the assumptions about power in desire. In April 1982 The Scholar and the Feminist IX Conference at Barnard College disrupted the traditional reading of a single feminism against prostitution, pornography, and women’s pleasure within heterosexual formulations (Vance 1984). This took place during the conservative Reagan years, when AIDS was not publicly acknowledged, and in an era of backlash against feminism, when the “Moral Majority” and conservatives were in power.

The 1980s debates by feminists impacted men and men’s movements, serving as the initial impetus for profeminist men to demonstrate how sexism affected the lives of men as well as women. That movement was divided into radical and liberal profeminists, the former invested in more structural elements of oppression (misogyny, patriarchy) and the repudiation of masculinity, and the latter focused on a more humanistic approach to more egalitarian gender roles (Adams and Savran 2002; Clatterbaugh 1997). As a fervent movement, and through group mobilization, community interventions, or face-to-face and electronic and conference forums, profeminist men tried to dismantle masculinist practices, evolving from the men’s movement that wanted to sustain a “promasculinist stance” (Yudice 1995) into what Yudice calls “leftist profeminist antimasculinism” (1995, 268).

In the United States the work on men moved toward a feminist practice/view of the world, and associations such as the National Organization for Men Against Sexism (NOMAS) were formed. Initially a group of men who were enrolled in a women’s studies course at the University of Tennessee, they held the First National Conference on Men and Masculinity in Knoxville. Other conferences followed, supporting an emergent network of men interested in fighting for a world without sexism.4

These organizations’ histories help us to consider parallel social movements that were directly implicated and impacted by the structural issue of sexism but were not
protagonists of the feminist movement. While profeminism organizing was instrumental in supporting feminist efforts, it also created a competing focus: “antisexist, profeminist” men. Creating alliances can lead to fruitful coalitions, but it also can create alternative identities that do not serve the efforts to bring about change. For example, a “straight (progay) ally,” a “white (antiracist) ally,” and a “male (profeminist) ally” are quasi-identities that derail efforts from the original focus: to fight homophobia, racism, and/or sexism. In relation to profeminism, men in the profeminist groups turned attention away from women to look at the anxieties surrounding being a man and the pressures it imposed on them. Scholars such as Michael Kimmel, in the words of Adams and Savran, “conceive of the study of men as distinct from, although often complimentary to, feminism” (2002, 5). The lack of men’s histories (as having been a hegemonic center with all the benefits and “no history”) and subsequent lack of male bonding only reinforce a profeminist male attitude that does little to change women’s work security or access to services, including health; lower the rates of rape or sexual molestation; or challenge cultural understandings and expectations about sexuality and reproduction as the purview of women.

Even given these historic concerns, profeminist men and profeminist spaces continue to be contentious and evolving. We now turn to one set of practices as an illustration of that evolution in Latin America. This combined research and activism was part of the wider transformation of Latin American societies in the last few decades, including the shift in gender relations when important numbers of women entered the workforce and women’s organizations challenged political, social, and economic male prerogatives (Parker 2004; Viveros 2004, 218).

Masculinity Studies, Activism, and Profeminism in Latin America

Actors in Profeminism

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and social organizations searching for social justice, challenging gender-based violence, and promoting sexual and reproductive rights have been incorporating men and discussing masculinities since the early 1980s. The engagement of men in processes for gender equity has gained recognition in public policies in Latin America since the mid-2000s. Some recent events illustrate how Latin American men’s organizations play a key role in promoting profeminism globally. In 2009 representatives of eighty countries participating in a symposium on men and gender equity signed in Brazil the Declaration of Rio, a call for action in fifteen areas, including violence against women, girls, and boys; violence among men; gender and sexual violence in armed conflict; global economies; engagement of men and boys in caring; gender and sexual diversity; men and boys’ health needs; sexual exploitation;
sexual and reproductive health and rights; and HIV/AIDS (VV.AA 2009). Men Engage, a global alliance of more than four hundred NGOs and United Nations agencies that aims to involve men and youth in gender equity and to work as an ally of the processes already promoted by women’s organizations, is present in several Latin American countries, including Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, Venezuela, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Mexico.5

Including men in public policies that address gender began in the early 1970s as part of programs to advance women’s health and sexual rights. In the 1980s men were the focus of programs on the prevention of violence against women (Keijzer 2011). In Colombia during the 1970s, privately owned sexual and reproductive health service providers were interested in understanding men’s situation, specifically their views on reproductive health and their role in the problems women faced in family planning and birth control (García and Gomez 2006). This early interest in getting men actively involved in women’s sexual health strategies was present in other Latin American countries through the International Planned Parenthood Federation network (Keijzer 2011). These concerns about gender-based violence and sexual and reproductive rights by women’s organizations were part of the 1980s dynamic social mobilizations for democracy and rights during the authoritarian regimes of Latin American countries, leading to the democratization led by civil society that characterized that decade (Chant and Craske 2003; Molyneux 2003). During the 1980s also the “right to have rights” and the definition of who the “subjects of rights” are became central to social movements (Craske and Molyneux 2002; Dagnino 2005).

Latin American academics play an important role in the production of knowledge on men and masculinities. The Red Internacional de Estudios sobre Varones y Masculinidades (International Network for the Study of Men and Masculinities) held four Coloquios Internacionales de estudios sobre varones y masculinidades (International Colloquia for the Study of Men and Masculinities) in Latin America between 2004 and 2011. The core topics of such colloquia offer an idea of how the field has developed in the region in the last decade. The first was held in Puebla, Mexico (2004), and discussed the epistemological background of the studies of men and masculinities. The second, held in Guadalajara, Mexico (2006), was about gender-based violence and the connections between violence and masculinities. The third, held in Medellin, Colombia (2008), analyzed the place of men and masculinities in terms of the intersections among gender, sexuality, race, and class. The fourth, held in Montevideo, Uruguay (2011), revisited, in a reflexive way, the experiences already implemented in the region around the incorporation of men and masculinities into public policies.

The study and thinking on men and masculinities in Latin America are directly linked to the development of women’s studies and gender studies, women’s organizations, and feminism (Careaga and Cruz Sierra 2006; Gutmann and Viveros Vigoya 2005; Valdés 2007; Viveros 2007). A platform was created wherein knowledge and experiences on men and masculinities were discussed beginning in the 1980s, notably when the Centro de Investigación para la Acción Feminista (Research Center on Feminist Action, Cipaf), in República Dominicana, translated into Spanish some articles by Michael Kaufman.
in 1989 (Valdés and Olavarría 1997a). Networks of researchers, academics, and practitioners were created in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s all over Latin America, often associated with gender studies and women’s studies units in universities (Valdés and Olavarría 1998). At the time a small number of male scholars focusing on men and masculinities declared themselves feminists, since the purpose of their research had been the promotion of changing the relationship among genders (Valdés 2007).

There were also specific developments of profeminism and studies of masculinities in the subregions of Latin America, such as the Andean countries, the Southern cone or Central America, and the Caribbean. For example, in Chile, beginning in the mid-1990s the Area de Estudios de Género in the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (Gender Studies Core, within the Social Sciences Latin American Faculty, Flacso) produced research on masculinities, fatherhood, and sexual and reproductive rights and coordinated a network of scholars from Peru, Chile, and Colombia. Economic, political, and social conditions in each country also defined a particular emphasis in different countries. In Mexico the Programa Universitario de Estudios de Género (Gender Studies University Program, Pueg) at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México initiated in 1993 a research area on masculinities. Inspired by feminist analysis of power in gender relations, Pueg explored masculinity’s social structures and related issues such as violence, development, public policies, and citizenship (Amuchastegui 2006, 15). In Colombia in the late 1990s, a perspective on masculinities was incorporated in public policies to prevent violence and to promote peace and nonviolent conflict resolution in families (García and Gomez 2006; Gomez 2000). A working group on gender and peace in the Cuban NGO Movimiento Cubano por la Paz (Cuban Movement Pro Peace) held seminars on masculinities dealing with women’s emancipation, peace culture, and violence, beginning in the mid-1990s (Gonzalez 2010). This group was also the base for a larger network of researchers on masculinities, with participants from the Caribbean, the rest of Latin America, and Spain (Gonzalez 2012).

These developments were not limited by linguistic or geographical frontiers. Exchanges with scholars from the United States and Australia are evident in the literature on masculinities produced in or about Latin America since the 1990s (see Valdés and Olavarría 1997). Collaborations in the 2000s expanded networks reaching out to African and South Asian scholars.

**Differing Influences and Debates in Masculinity Studies and Profeminist Activism**

The influence of gender studies and the role of feminist and women scholars in the development of men and masculinity studies in Latin America have been debated. Some scholars agree on the connections between studies on masculinities and feminism but also call attention to the evasions of material and symbolic male privilege and male dominance (Viveros 2004). Other scholars on men and masculinities in Latin American countries share some ideas with feminism, but distance themselves from some aspects
of feminist scholarship. Guillermo Figueroa identified differences between the study of men and masculinities from feminist and human rights perspectives; they define different subjects of rights and different strategies to transform exclusions (2011). For him, there is another genealogy for the study of men and masculinity emerging from the human rights perspective and the role of the social injustices faced by men (Figueroa 2010). The lack of analysis of the gendered situation of men, he argues, impedes a consideration of what men have lost with patriarchy, such as the joy of fatherhood, or the risks to their health (Figueroa 2006, 412–13; 2010, 27). Men and women’s rights need to be protected equally, and he concludes that a human rights perspective in the study and work on masculinities is more effective than a feminist perspective (Figueroa 2010).

Overall in Latin America, studies of men and masculinities are directly linked to gender studies, or gender as relational—and through them, with feminism and women’s organizations. Practices and interventions in sexual and reproductive rights that affect men directly or indirectly have happened within the framework of gender studies and gender policies, where discussions about men and masculinities have taken place. Research and activism to transform masculinities have been in close relationship with women’s movements and their demands, not in direct opposition to them, as is the case with some men’s groups in the United States, according to Amuchastegui (2006, 167). Such conclusions may be extended to other Latin American countries. The studies of masculinities in Latin America have been conducted or framed from a critical gender perspective; they do not aim to alleviate men’s discomfort with gender roles (Viveros 2007), as expressed in men’s groups and their discussions of the transformation of traditional masculinities, particularly those based in the United States and the global North (Messner 1997).

There is another genealogy that has had less recognition, but deserves more discussion: youth violence and the role of young men. Social and political violence is a central topic in development policies in Latin America. At the same time urban violence, armed violence, gang violence, and hired violence have focused policy attention on young men since the 1980s (Martín-Barbero 1998, 23). Interest in young men and violence and youth violence and masculinities is evident in the literature (Barker 2005; Olavarría 2003). Moral panic about the risks taken by young men in acts of violence and their role in violence is at the center of social policies (García and Serrano 2004). Organizations and agencies promoting justice or working in impoverished urban sectors focus on youth; young men are key actors in organizations such as Men Engage (Regional), Cistal (Bolivia), Promundo (Brazil), and Masculinidad y Equidad de Genero (Masculinity and Gender Equity, Chile). Papai (Brazil) started as a support program for adolescents and young fathers. Escuela Equinoccio (Equinox School, El Salvador) and Colectivo de Hombres y Masculinidades (Men and Masculinities Collective, Colombia) have held workshops with young men in working-class areas.

In addition to youth groups, there are also collectives and men’s groups in the region that express discomfort with traditional expressions of masculinities, in particular with the problematic concept of machismo, often used uncritically to describe Latin American cultures (Gutmann and Viveros Vigoya 2005, 123). Liendro (1998,
Masculinities, "Profeminism," and Feminism in Latin America

 describes the mission of the Colectivo de Hombres por Relaciones Igualitarias (Men’s Collective for Egalitarian Relationships, Coriac) in Mexico, which is to change “traditional forms of masculinity” that oppress women and diminish men’s lives. The challenge to power relationships between men and women and the promotion of non-violent masculinities is the motivation of several organizations, such as the Grupo de Hombres contra la Violencia (Men’s Group Against Violence) in Nicaragua (Sequeira 1998). The call to construct masculinities that are emotive, creative, or respectful appears in several groups; these masculinities can be seen as a reaction to discomfort with gender roles, but without challenging structural conditions of power that still sustain masculinities at the top. In this context, the concept of “new masculinities” is used to create a contrast with machismo and traditional oppressive masculinities, but suffers the same lack of criticism and unproblematic implementation.

**Some Latin American Experiences of Profeminism**

There is no one main movement in Latin America with similar characteristics to that in the United States in terms of public presence or organization. However, some men’s groups in the region describe foundational experiences that share elements with a mythopoeic movement in the “North.” In Colombia, the Colectivo de Hombres y Masculinidades is an extensive network of men who work to rethink masculinities in a personal, collective, and sociocultural way. One of its founding members described the beginning of the group as a collective ritual conducted in a rural house in which they sang, danced, and painted their bodies as a way to create connections between their members and facilitate the transformation of their masculinities (Ruiz 2007).

The development of men and masculinities studies runs parallel to the creation of collectives and groups of cis-gender men who discuss their experiences as men, their relationships with women, and their place in gender relations. In some cases, as mentioned previously, feminists participated in the creation of such collectives and groups as an extension of their work with women, the transformation of gender relationships, and the promotion of social justice. Three examples illustrate this interaction.

In Brazil, organized discussion groups about women and their experiences with gender oppression emerged from feminism and gender studies in the 1980s; there, they created the foundations for organizations working on sexual and reproductive rights (mostly comprised of young mothers and fathers), which evolved into a focus on preventing gender-based violence and later on masculinities (Médrado and Lyra 2008). In Colombia in the early 1990s, Taller Abierto (Open Workshop), a feminist organization engaged in partnerships with working-class women in the city of Cali, implemented workshops with men to discuss issues of violence, fatherhood, and male identities. These workshops were oriented to rethinking men’s experiences from a personal...
Jose F. Serrano-Amaya and Salvador Vidal-Ortiz

perspective, which often included references to emotions, giving them almost a therapeutic tone (García and Gomez 2006). Based in Mexico, the Laboratorio de Exploración de las Masculinidades (Lab for Exploring Masculinities) has for several years conducted workshops for men and mixed groups; this effort has not continued in that country, but has also been offered in Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Bolivia, and Ecuador (Cazes-Menache 1997).

Using a model based on participation and introspection, participants describe their experiences of being a man and their relationships with women and discuss relevant literature on gender and feminism. This format facilitates the externalization and open communication of fear, joy, or pain associated with the experience of being men. The scholar and activist work of the feminist anthropologist Marcela Lagarde is recognized as pivotal for the development of these workshops (Cazes-Menache 1997). In this context of accumulated experiences and different trends in seeking a better understanding of masculinities, a number of organizations have developed different ways to engage with feminism and with concerns raised by feminist and women’s organizations, such as gender equity. Those modes of engagement can be classified in three types: alliance, support, and identification.

An example of the first mode of engagement is presented by Instituto Costarricense de Masculinidad, Pareja y Sexualidad (Costa Rican Masculinity, Couples, and Sexuality Institute, WEM), which works with men to prevent violence and to promote new masculinities as a contribution to the efforts of women’s organizations, and for children’s rights (WEM 2013). The second mode of engagement can be found in organizations such as Varones por la Equidad (Males for Equity) in Argentina, which defines itself as a men’s group with the purpose of defending and calling for the fulfilment of women’s rights (Varones-por-la-Equidad 2010). Working within a human rights framework, the members characterize their work as supportive of the historical claims of feminist movements and the rights of women to exercise autonomy over their bodies. Another example, Social Training Research Center (Cistac) in Bolivia, develops advocacy-driven actions in terms of gender and sexual rights, women’s right to choose, and the participation of men in sexual and reproductive health (Cistac 2013). In a similar fashion, Promundo, in Brazil, promotes nonviolent masculinities through advocacy action for gender equity and social justice (Promundo 2013).

With regard to the third mode of engagement, there are Latin American organizations working on masculinities that explicitly identify their actions with feminism. In its work with men to promote human rights, social justice, diversity, and the elimination of inequalities, Instituto Papai, in Brazil, locates feminism as the foundation of its actions (Instituto-Papai 2013). Its notion of justice implies gender equity and the involvement of men in gender, reproductive, and sexual rights. In order to do that, the deconstruction of traditional masculinities and revision of the meaning of being a man are required. Another example, Escuela Equinoccio (Equinox School), in El Salvador, defines its work on masculinities as a commitment with feminism (Escuela-Equinoccio 2013). Its work is “profeminista,” because it assumes the political foundations of feminism to create an active feminist subject and equal opportunities for women. Feminism is also seen
as a theoretical framework to understand and deconstruct gender relations, in particular the meanings of being a man and, in the school’s terms, of “machismo.”

These men’s groups are aware of the challenges faced by women’s organizations and by feminism. As allies, advocates, and profeminists, they display a variety of strategies to implement their intentions:

- Supporting campaigns to prevent violence against women, such as the White Ribbon Campaign (http://www.whiteribbon.ca/), or to commemorate special dates, such as International Women’s Day (March 8) or the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women (November 25)
- Developing research and producing educational material
- Facilitating discussions on masculinities among different groups of men
- Participating in public events such as seminars, conferences, and workshops
- Doing advocacy and lobbying regarding public policies on topics such as sexual and reproductive rights, gender and sexual diversity, or gender equity policies
- Implementing public policies for gender equity
- Strengthening civil society organizations

Some of the practices to promote change implemented by these organizations are based in strategies created previously by feminism and women’s organizations. That is the case in the use of consciousness-raising pedagogies in several of these men’s groups, through which men explore their place in gender orders to promote personal, social, and cultural transformations. The practices used by these collectives can also be located in Latin American traditions of educación popular (popular education) and the pedagogies of Paulo Freire on social transformation, as Amuchastegui (2006, 167) argues in the case of men’s groups in Mexico. There is an “emancipatory perspective” in Latin American activism on sexualities and the promotion of health (Paiva 2006) that can be traced in the practices of these men’s groups.

Men’s groups and organizations working with men and masculinities in Latin America vary in scale and structure; not all implement all the activities mentioned previously. Some are structured and stable NGOs acting at a national or regional level (e.g., Papai in Brazil), while others are relatively informal groups with less-formalized structures (e.g., Colectivo Hombres y Masculinidades in Colombia). Their level of stability seems not to be affecting their commitment to feminism and women’s organizations, since all of them express, in one way or another, their interest in contributing to them and in changing unequal gender relations. However, there is a lack of discussion of what such engagement with feminism and women’s organizations means. Moreover, at the moment of putting that commitment into practice, the strategies implemented are multiple, but without a clear contribution to the demands raised by women’s organizations. Despite these groups covering a wide range of publics in their initiatives, there is a tendency to develop interventions focusing on young men or men who lack structural power.

There are also other elements to consider in masculinity studies. Discussions about HIV/AIDS, stigma, and homophobia are considered important elements in the process
of challenging masculinities in the region (Gutmann and Viveros Vigoya 2005). For example, Seffner (2006) explores the material manifestations of masculine power in bisexuality and the vulnerability to HIV/AIDS among bisexual men in Brazil. Public policies to prevent homophobia and to promote gender and sexual diversity rights intertwine with gender policies and discussions about masculinities, as can be seen in the case of Chile (Aguayo and Sadler 2011). However, the contribution to such interactions to developing links with feminism and women’s organizations is also underdeveloped. Moreover, gay men’s organizations have a weak and unclear connection with feminism and women’s organizations, even though it has been in spaces promoted by analysis and policies driven by gender that, in the case of Colombia, for instance, gay rights have been obtained, and advocated for, from women’s spaces (Serrano-Amaya 2011).

Transgender men are becoming key actors in actions to promote gender and sexual diversity rights, as the cases of Chile, Ecuador, and Colombia show. Some are entering into dialogue with cis-gender men’s groups, for example Entre Tránsitos, a Colombian organization focusing on people with trans-life experiences, which is participating in the network Colectivo de Hombres y Masculinidades. From there, they are challenging traditional constructions of masculinities operating in (cis-gender) men’s groups. Organizations focusing on trans-men are operating on multiple levels of activism and education work. Just as Entre Tránsitos works with cis-gender men, transgender men and their organizations in several countries in the region are participating in the activities organized by women and queer groups. The latter distance themselves from traditional feminist organizations reluctant to accept the presence of trans-people. From there, both segments are challenging (traditional or conservative) feminisms. The relationship between transgender men, feminism, and women’s organizations is also contradictory, with alliances and disagreements at the same time.

The need to explore and develop the connections between men’s groups and masculinities, on one side, and feminism and women’s organizations, on the other, is not only due to resistance, backlash, or negative changes in gender relations. It is important to place changes in gender relations in the broad context in which new gender orders are created and reconfigured in the region, in a context of global economies with an increasing level of precariousness and vulnerabilities. These issues are played out in a variety of ways in the current debates in Latin America about feminisms, masculinities, and profeminism.

**Analyzing the Role of Profeminism in Academe and Organizing**

The interconnections between academia and activism in the discussions of masculinities and the development of answers to feminisms and claims by women’s organizations are the consequences of the political commitment of academics to social movements.
and of the impact of knowledge produced in social movements on academia. However, it is important to consider how academic and activist spaces have enacted profeminism in different ways. We suggest that profeminism has reinforced the division between men and women as apparently separate and clear realms. Using the language of alliances, collaborations, or support, profeminism has contributed to an idea of gender as the result of the relationships between two homogeneous entities. In its enactment in activism it reinforces the idea of men and women as “groups” in need of collaborative action. In its enactment in academia it contributes to the separation or distance between the studies of men from the studies of women and gender.

Similarly, the exchange of knowledge and experiences in the discussion of masculinities and the promotion of gender equity reinforced a sense of difference in the meaning of profeminism between the “North” and “South.” Latin American profeminists saw the need to learn from previous experiences. However, there are important differences. The links between North and South flow primarily in one direction: with scholars and activists in the “South” learning and translating knowledge from the “North,” rather than the reverse. It could be argued that profeminism is basically an importation of debates produced in the “North” that were quite different than in the “South.” Reducing the discussion to a matter of importation or imposition renders invisible the particularities of developments in the “South,” in this case, in Latin American men’s groups and the feminist work that supported some of them in their early stages. The translation to Latin American organizations of USAmerican scholarship on men and masculinities and on profeminism can be seen as a strategy to open the space for connections between scholars and activists interested in the transformation of masculinities and women’s agendas for change.

It is important to stress the interweaving of North and South. Academic or activist enactments of profeminism in the North are not the same as those of academics or activists in the South. Table 12.1 illustrates how we perceive these interactions.

Although we have focused on Latin American experiences, such meanings cannot be found without a context in academia and in “North-South” relations. We argue that in Latin America there was a strong sense of connection between profeminism and masculinities and feminism and gender studies. That is different from what happened in USAmerican academia, where male scholars have claimed a particular and independent space for the study of men and masculinities. The variety of practices produced in Latin America reflected the challenges presented by advances on women’s rights and the need for gender equity. Most of these initiatives were not part of masculine studies in the United States and in the analyses of the changes and challenges in men and masculinities produced globally. The commitment to social justice, gender equity, and the transformation of inequalities is clearly established by Latin American men’s groups and initiatives on men and masculinities. Some participants in men’s groups have had a background in movements for social justice or in work with vulnerable populations, such as the founders of Colectivo de Hombres y Masculinidades in Colombia and several of the Central American men’s groups.

However, a lack of development of such commitment, particularly the lack of answers to the questions posed by women’s organizations and feminism, is also evident. The
connections with feminism and with women’s organizations and what it means to be an ally, advocate, or profeminist are still under construction in these Latin American men’s groups. In fact, they seem to have been replaced by an engagement with gender equality that recognizes feminism and women’s claims as a precedent to acknowledge and then dismiss. Men’s groups enacted their commitment with gender equity through limited actions at private or personal levels, such as workshops to promote changes in men’s experiences of traditional masculinity. Questions and critiques raised by feminist scholars, in both USAmerican and Latin American academia (Careaga and Cruz Sierra 2006, 14; Jardine and Smith 1989), about the place of men in feminism seem to be ignored or are not discussed sufficiently. Ideas like “dialogue,” “working together,” “collaborating,” and “solidarity between men and women” appear often in documents and organizational missions, but they do not go further than a declaration. The possible co-optation by men and male scholars and activists of the movement from women to gender, in academia in both the North and South, merits more discussion. The risk of co-optation and trivialization of women’s organizations and feminist agendas in such definitions of men as allies or advocates for women’s rights is mentioned in international and regional pronouncements, such as the Rio Declaration (VV.AA 2009). However, how those negative effects are to be tackled is not easy to identify in the discussions and activities promoted by men’s groups.

Some of these questions are considered theoretically by Latin American male scholars interested in exploring the connection between the study of masculinities and men and the practice of men’s groups (Medrado and Lyra 2008). Ideas about creating alliances, solidarity, or participating in advocacy for women’s rights run parallel with discussions about the vulnerability of men because of patriarchy and traditional masculinity. As a result, a space to reinforce men’s power, or even to facilitate antifeminist reactions, is created.

Table 12.1. Approaches to Profeminism

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<th>Space Geopolitics</th>
<th>Academia</th>
<th>Activism</th>
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<tr>
<td>“North” (USAmerica: focus on theoretical and in-group debates)</td>
<td>Studies on men and masculinities were complementary but distinct from gender studies. Therefore, profeminism can be seen as an answer from men to women and women’s demands.</td>
<td>Profeminism as a kind of identity that contributes to separating men from women, as groups, creating a specific space for men.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“South” (Latin America: focus on social justice struggles)</td>
<td>Studies on men and masculinities were connected with feminism and gender studies. Therefore, profeminism can be viewed as an extension of women’s discussions of gender power relations.</td>
<td>Profeminism as a claim for commitment, complementary to women’s organizations and women’s rights, that contributes to connecting men and women as groups.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Part of this situation can be located in the resistance and backlash against women’s rights, women’s organizations, and feminism experienced in various countries in the region. Such reactions can take the form of extreme initiatives highly attractive to the media, such as the Movimiento Machista (Masculinist Movement) in Colombia, which not only justifies gender-based violence but also enters into debate with feminist ideas, strategies, and language. There are also initiatives to impede the decriminalization of abortion or to reestablish its criminalization, using referendums and the hegemonic presence of men in positions of political power. Discussions of popularized ideas such as “men in crisis,” “new masculinities,” or the “rights of men,” also often echoed in the media, are used to justify the resistance of men to change. Such reactions create and reproduce negative representations of feminism and women’s rights and also weaken reflections and discussions intended to promote more relational approaches to gender relations and the transformation of gender inequities.

The limited commitment to feminism and women’s organizations by men’s groups can be seen in how and what has been changing in gender relationships. Initiatives to engage men in the promotion of gender equity not only in Latin America but also in other regions show that changes in gender relations can happen and have impact (Barker et al. 2010). However, the permanence and depth of such changes are a matter of debate. Based on studies about men and masculinities in Latin America, Viveros (2007) argues that changes in the relationships between fathers and children toward more participation and communication should be understood through the region’s tensions and transformations in social, economic, and cultural orders. Considering the case of Brazil, for example, she suggests that there are individual and collective resistances among men that limit the impact and possibilities of change in gender relations (Viveros 2007, 29). Research on youth and gender and young men also finds contradictory results in terms of rhythms and types of changes in gender relationships. Scholarship on youth cultures and topics such as new technologies, cultural exchanges, and immersion in global networks has found that young men and women are important actors of cultural change in Latin America (Cubides, Laverde, and Valderrama 1998). However, similar research finds that despite some changes (Olavarría 2003), regarding sexuality and gender relations, young men and women accept fewer changes than they do for other social, political, or cultural issues (García and Serrano 2004; Rodríguez 2000; Serrano-Amaya, Sanchez, and Del Castillo 2000). These findings are important given the focus men’s groups have on young men as promoters of change. Class is an important consideration, as the focus of masculinity projects is often on men from deprived economic, educational, and class conditions. Men in elites and powerful positions are not the target of men’s groups and women’s organizations searching to transform gender relations. As Valdés (2007, 62) argues, it is important to discuss who the male actors of change in power relations are and what the purposes of men’s groups are in promoting change in economic, political, and social relations that keep women subordinated to male power.
All feminisms aim to promote social justice and transformation in gender relations, through a variety of options and strategies according to their political outlook. Similarly, for men’s groups it is important to ask: What are the kinds of organizations and feminisms with which such alliances are promoted? With which ones are these groups creating distances or contradictions? The ambiguity inherent in not choosing alliances with specific feminist or women’s groups successfully allows profeminist men to avoid entering the political realm. This ambiguity begs the questions: How can profeminist men’s groups claim to be feminist when there is no feminist location? Which feminist groups or women’s organizations do they favor or support?

There have been significant developments in the study of men and masculinities in Latin America. Our chapter begins to tease out the different social mobilizations created by men and women to change gender relationships through the promotion of discussions on men and masculinities. The histories of men’s groups in Latin America, including the stories and perspectives of their participants, need to be heard more. They are important actors in gender discussions in Latin America, and their contributions to changing gender relationships deserve to be analyzed and evaluated, particularly because of the special place that feminism has in their development. Our attempt in this chapter is to share the initial traces of a map that requires the inclusion of more features, interactions, and geopolitical relations. We have pointed to the complex dynamics between USAmerican profeminist theorizing and Latin American scholarship and practice. We have suggested that profeminist work on social justice and work on violence in Latin America have successfully informed the work on gender in policy and in academic discourse and can teach profeminist movements in the “North” about their successes in tackling structural sexism and other women’s and feminist issues.

Notes

1. “USAmerican” denotes the ethnocentrist language explicit in the term “American” to reference only people from the United States. American properly references people from all of the Americas.
2. Cis-gender refers to men who were born as, have been identified as, and have identified as men. It is often used in opposition to transgender identity and experience. People who are cis-gendered often have no awareness of the privileges of being “gender congruent,” and the term proposes to bring awareness to their consciousness. A reference to transgender awareness is important in the study of profeminist practices because in both the United States and some parts of Latin America, nontrans (or cis-gender) men and transgender men have collaborated on profeminist agendas or agendas that incorporate “new masculinities.”
3. Though they are imperfect, we use the terms “North” and “South” to signal geopolitical power relations across regions.
4. The full history of the organization, as well as useful links and resources, can be found at http://site.nomas.org. Other organizations were launched to further support for women, especially in domestic violence, sexual assault, and rape. The American Men’s Studies Association also emerged as a supportive organization, with scholars such as Mike Messner (see http://mensstudies.org).

5. See http://www.menengage.org/.

6. “Michael Kaufman, PhD, is a public speaker, educator, writer, and consultant whose innovative approaches to engaging men and boys in promoting gender equality and transforming their lives has taken him around the world. He has worked extensively with the United Nations and with governments, NGOs, corporations, professional firms, trade unions, universities, and colleges. He is the cofounder of the White Ribbon Campaign, “the largest effort in the world of men working to end violence against women” (http://www.michaelkaufman.com/biography/, accessed October 28, 2013).

7. The information used for this classification comes from the Web sites of the organizations that are part of Men Engage in Latin America and the Caribbean. The list was retrieved from http://menengage-latinoamericaycaribe.blogspot.com.au/2009/04/puntos-focales-en-los-paises-y.html. The site was consulted on several occasions during July and August 2013. The authors are aware of the limitations of this strategy. The classification provided is not an attempt to assess the work of such organizations but to offer a way to enter the study of their developments.

References


SECTION 4

HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN SECURITY
This section comprises three chapters that explore transnational feminist movements’ engagement with issues of human rights, human security, and violence against women. Viviene Taylor interrogates the international human rights and human security frameworks from a Southern critical feminist perspective. M. Shanthi Dairiam focuses on the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) as the normative framework for advancing women’s political, economic, social, and cultural rights. And Rebecca J. Hall critically examines North American theory and praxis on violence against women from the 1970s to the present.

Viviene Taylor’s chapter, “Human Rights and Human Security: Feminists Contesting the Terrain,” takes as its starting point that “women’s subordination and exploitation is an outcome of structurally based and systemic inequalities in which patriarchy is a key factor but not the only one. Gender hierarchies and women’s subordination are part of systems through which compacts (usually among men) of economic and political power privilege a few and deny the majority the full realization of their rights.” Taylor’s feminist analysis of the human security discourse makes a unique contribution to the Handbook as well as engages in a dialogue with the chapters by Maitrayee Mukhopadhyay on women’s citizenship, Maryam Khalid on the gendered justification for the “wars on terror” in Afghanistan and Iraq, and Seema Kazi on women’s insecurity in South Asian countries experiencing “wars on terror” and “wars of terror.” Taylor explores the main causes of the upsurge in armed conflicts following the end of the Cold War: (1) state formation, nation building, the breakup of blocs and empires and the search for new identities, demands for legitimate democratic governments and the emergence of failed states; (2) the politicization of cultural differences (e.g., ethnicity, religion, language) fueling social inequalities, ethnonationalism, and conflict; (3) socioeconomic factors, including poverty and inequality, contributing to the breakdown of democratization processes, and economic systems that reproduce inequality and exploitative working conditions undermining women’s human rights and security; and (iv) the increasing levels of militarization and availability of weapons in many countries. Taylor indicates that “the narratives of women in weak, failed, or conflict-torn states expose, in brutal form, violations
of women’s human rights and human security. Threats against women are structural, systemic, and mediated through many forces.” In addition, “contemporary processes of economic globalization, underpinned by neoliberalism, generate greater risks and insecurities especially for women and the poorest peoples.”

**M. Shanthi Dairiam’s chapter**, “CEDAW: Gender and Culture,” asserts that the conception and development of CEDAW was a milestone in transnational feminist praxis. The UN Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) pressed for the convention and was tasked with its preparation in the early 1970s. Dairiam points out that neither the Universal Declaration of Human Rights nor the legally binding human rights treaties adopted prior to CEDAW had advanced the human rights of women; they did not “reflect the specific conditions that women experience,” and the neutrality of their provisions “had the effect of privileging a male model of existence.” CSW’s 1973 working paper argued for “a single, comprehensive convention that would legally bind states to eliminate discriminatory laws, as well as de facto discrimination.” The framing of the convention drew on contemporary feminist scholarship, knowledge, and theory from the global North and South (in the areas of political and public life, education, employment, health, rural women, law, and marriage and family life, among others). The chapter takes a bold approach to demonstrate the convention’s relevance to its 187 member state signatories, focusing on the CEDAW Committee’s reviews of Scandinavian and other high-ranking European countries in the Global Gender Gap Index, instead of targeting developing countries, which are routinely assumed to hold traditional customs, stereotypes, and harmful cultural practices that discriminate against women. Despite high levels of educational achievement, the effects of gender stereotyping and inequality on women and girls in European countries include occupational segregation; high rates of women in part-time employment due to their responsibility for social reproduction; wage gaps (with women earning between 66% and 84% of what men earn for work of equal value); lower pension contributions and entitlements than men’s, affected by career breaks for child care; unequal access to leadership and decision making; and the over sexualized depiction of women and girls in the media and advertising, which reinforces the women-as-sex-object stereotype and contributes to girls’ low self-esteem.

**Rebecca J. Hall’s chapter**, “Feminist Strategies to End Violence against Women” examines North American theory and praxis on violence against women from the 1970s to the present, drawing on global developments. She contends that “in the global North, feminist movements’ advocacy on battered women in the 1970s and 1980s was dominated by white middle- and upper-class women, and tended to focus on patriarchy as the root—and often the sole—cause of violence against women.” African American women, women of color, and indigenous women have challenged this singular focus on patriarchy, and re-examined the public-private dichotomy that informs radical and liberal feminist analyses of violence against women. Hall quotes bell hooks, who in 1984 (about the time DAWN was being conceived), argued that in the United States, “violence acted upon poor black women and men in the so-called public realm—through discrimination, harassment, exploitation, threats of violence, and actual violence experienced in places of work, schools, and the streets—is inextricably linked to violence in the home.”
Similarly, Hall argues that the Canadian state makes “selective, strategic interventions” in the private sphere of indigenous communities: Aboriginal children comprise 40% of children in foster care, a “huge overrepresentation when the Aboriginal population currently comprises 3.75% of the Canadian population.” The chapter also discusses the “culture versus rights” dichotomy, as it is borne out in the experience of Arab and South Asian Muslim communities in North America with regard to “crimes of honor” and “honor killings.” Finally, Hall discusses the depoliticization and professionalization of antiviolence work in North America, linked to mainstream feminist theoretical and strategic debates to “yield state responses,” which, while they “may have expedited short-term gains,” have “ultimately undermined transformative organizing around violence against women and inhibited grassroots alliance building within and across borders.” Hall indicates further that “this move toward depoliticized antiviolence work cannot be understood outside of the shifting political economy and in particular the increasingly punitive austerity of neoliberalism.”

Note

1. These were the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), all adopted in 1966.
CHAPTER 13

HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN SECURITY

Feminists Contesting the Terrain

VIVIENE TAYLOR

Introduction

The challenges of societies torn by conflict, deepening poverty, and increasing inequality have propelled issues of human rights and human security to the fore (Annan, 2000). Yet human rights and human security are not recent concepts. Critical feminist concerns with how human rights and human security intersect with issues of gender justice are also not recent. Although human rights and women’s human rights have been high on the agenda of global institutions such as the United Nations (UN) for many decades (Pietilä and Vickers 1990), the full realization of human rights for many women is yet to be achieved.

There is a gap between the recognition of human rights and women’s experiences of rights and freedoms. It is this gap between the recognition of human rights and women’s experiences of violence and exploitation that reveals why women’s human security—the protection of their bodily integrity and their social and economic freedoms—remains a serious concern. Recognizing women’s rights as human rights is an important step toward advancing gender justice and achieving security, but it is not the end. Feminist human rights advocates argue that the struggle for women’s human rights is about recognizing not only women’s roles and functions in society but also, importantly, the intrinsic worth and value of women as human beings (Tomasevski 1993). Struggles for the inclusion of women in economic and social systems as part of recognizing their social and economic rights take place alongside the recognition that these systems are themselves flawed and create the conditions for the instrumental and exploitative use of women’s labor. This chapter traces some of the main features that influence discourses on human rights and human security within transnational feminist movements and
Human rights and human security

links these discourses to issues of governance, globalization, militarism, war, conflict, postconflict reconstruction, citizenship, and economic and social justice. It is important to clarify human security as a concept and identify its relationship to human rights as a starting point.

As a concept, human security gains increasing prominence since the end of the Cold War and reflects a broadening of the role and objectives of the international system (through the United Nations) in relation to peacekeeping in situations of conflict and violations of human rights. Questioning whether human security, in contrast to state or national security, is a viable concept, Newman and Richmond (2001, 4) assert that as a concept it places emphasis on the human dimension of peacekeeping, peace making, democratization, and reconciliation in postconflict environments. In the context of changes in the international environment brought about by regionalism, globalization, and issues related to global governance they view the concept of human security as one that has the potential to offer a new multilateral paradigm that addresses international peace and security issues in ways that integrate development and conflict prevention. The increasing number and types of internal conflicts in many states focus attention, at the international level, on whether the principle of noninterference in the jurisdiction of sovereign states masks the impunity with which such states violate people’s human rights through mass murders, rape, and other atrocities. Human security links the loss of economic and social rights with violations of people’s civil, political, and cultural rights. Achieving human security, especially for women, helps to give expression to the full range of human rights through practical measures.

Human security reinforces the need to give effect to human rights. It widens and expands the concerns that relate to the security of people beyond postconflict situations to situations characterized by social conflicts due to deprivations of basic human needs. People experience the greatest hardship caused by structural sources of violence and complex conditions of deprivation. Cockell (2001, 17) points out that people experience human security when there is an absence of both direct and structural violence. Structural conditions of deprivation that lead to forms of violence arise from the systematic denial of basic social and economic rights. If human security provides ways of understanding and addressing the root causes of conflict, human rights provides the normative framework of guarantees (values and policies) within which human security becomes attainable.

This linking of human security with women’s human rights and development is especially significant given three features of the contemporary contexts in local, regional, and global development processes: (1) the increasing feminization of poverty in all countries and especially in regions such as Africa and South Asia; (2) the increasing casualization of women’s work; and (3) the exploitative ways women are integrated into the economy. These features also highlight the links among issues of governance, citizenship, and processes of economic globalization. Yet these trends and the links with economic and political processes at the local and global levels are not new.

Looking back it is possible to identify significant events that reinforced the links between women’s struggles for human rights and human security. These events brought
to the fore how violations of women's rights as human rights undermined their human security. Such events represent turning points in the history of women's rights and the advancement of gender equality. Importantly, they were pivotal moments of women's activism and struggles led by transnational feminist movements.

Between the period from the 1970s to the mid-1980s, women challenged issues related to their situations, needs, interests, and rights through processes under the banner of the United Nations Decade for Women (1976–1985), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW, 1979), and the UN Third World Conference on Women (Nairobi, 1985). The Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies reflect the vision and aspirations of women at the time. By the 1990s, the imprint of decades of women's organizing was apparent at the UN World Conference on Human Rights, held in Vienna in 1993. Transnational feminist movements drew the world's attention to the need to include women's rights as human rights. For the first time in the history of struggles for women's human rights, the Vienna Declaration (1993) defined women's rights as human rights. The UN Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995) and the Beijing Platform for Action as well as more recent initiatives have been significant spaces and periods for transnational feminist engagement on issues of women's human rights and human security.

The possibility of achieving women's rights and security links to issues of governance, economic processes that are inclusive, and the elimination of violence and prevention of conflict. Women's needs, interests, and rights are not and have not been automatically recognized or guaranteed, and it is through women's ongoing discursive struggles that rights-based policy changes are evident today. The variety of women's activism and engagement in social movements on issues of human rights, human security, and gender justice reflect a mix of concerns. These different experiences and concerns emerge in debates on issues of human rights and human security as fracture points that polarize feminist and mainstream discourses. The diversity of women's situations, needs, and interests that inform their activism and discourses on human rights and human security create entry points for strong coalitions as well as fracture points in feminist movements.

Depending on the historical contexts, socioeconomic class, race and ethnicity, and religion, there are huge variations between poor women's experiences of human rights and security and the international rhetoric within the United Nations system. Human rights, as a concept and operating principle in theory and practice, is already established in political and legal discourse and is codified in national and international law (Mani 2002), unlike the concept of human security. Human security as a concept raises concerns among women about how the UN system and other intergovernmental agencies and powerful states such as the United States will use such concepts to justify action to intervene in complex conflict situations for agendas that have little to do with people's human rights and more to do with resource capture and power relations. As noted by Richmond, “Peace making in the contemporary international environment must find a way of mediating between layers of the post-Cold War international system, harmonizing the forces of identity in the context of globalization, regionalization and
democratization” (2001, 32). Many questions remain open with regard to how women’s human rights and human security intersect with local and global agendas on conflict management, equitable development, and unaccountable systems of governance.

The co-option of women’s rights, needs, and concerns into mainstream policy rhetoric without meaningful change in women’s actual conditions spurs many debates and discourses on how to achieve the full realization of women’s human rights and human security. Over many decades, feminists have been able to voice alternatives to dominant systems that discriminate against, exploit, and violate women. An apt example of the role of feminist activism in changing discourses and approaches occurred at the end of the UN Decade for Women, at the Nairobi nongovernmental organization (NGO) forum in 1985. In a systematic and rigorous analysis of poor women’s experiences in the global South, Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN) argued that “equality for women is impossible within the existing economic, political and cultural processes that reserve resources, power and control for small groups of people” (Sen and Grown 1987, 20). Feminist researchers and policy advocates from the South were able to articulate a coherent and critical position on the intersections among women’s needs and interests and the flaws in the dominant economic development paradigm.

This was a seminal moment in development discourses. Through its analysis, DAWN revealed how poor women’s labor and social reproduction roles are central to and used with impunity in promoting a development model designed for wealth accumulation despite the human, social, and environmental costs. This analysis points to the flaws in dominant discourses on development, and it reflects the perspectives and alternatives of women scholars, researchers, and policy activists from the global South. DAWN’s substantive critique and alternative perspective on the development paradigm was significant at the time for a number of reasons. DAWN argued that women have different experiences depending on their race and ethnicity, class and caste, and other social locations. It articulated a Southern feminist perspective in linking women’s oppression based on sex discrimination, with other forms of social and economic oppression. Further, DAWN asserted:

> While gender subordination has universal elements, feminism cannot be based on a rigid concept of universality that neglects the wide variation in women’s experiences. There is and must be a diversity of feminisms, responsive to the different needs and concerns of different women and defined by them for themselves.

(Sen and Grown 1987, 18–19)

Women’s analyses and discourses have been able to reconfigure and reshape mainstream policy discourses to reflect the different experiences of women and men in many ways. In the current context, there is a new urgency to interrogate human security as a concept, its links with human rights, and its potential to advance gender justice. Exposure to new risks and vulnerabilities along with bad policy decisions of governments are a feature of our current social, economic, and political landscapes in both the South and the North. The record of policy choices made and paths not taken have led to continuing crises of poverty, inequality, and conflict, resulting in contradictory
and differential impacts on women and men. The links between violations of human rights, especially women’s human rights, the dominant development model, conflict, and human insecurity are increasingly raised as both causes and outcomes of contradictory processes of governance and economic globalization.

By the end of the twentieth century, many researchers (Van Goor, Rupesinghe, and Sciarone 1996; Newman and Richmond 2001) would refer to this period in world history as the bloodiest and as the period in which the violation of people’s human rights together with millions of deaths led to intolerable suffering. There was an upsurge in armed conflicts following the end of the Cold War. Besides the millions who have lost their lives, millions are homeless, displaced, and refugees. Attempting to make sense of the causes of such brutal acts, Van Goor et al. (1996) identify four categories of causes of violent conflict that impact on development and people’s lives and rights in significant ways.

The first category is the political domain, which places emphasis on state formation and nation building as reasons for the outbreak of civil war. They highlight the links between old feuds being reignited between groups due to the breakup of blocs (e.g., the former Soviet Union) and empires as people search for new identities. Increasing demands for legitimate democratic governments combined with the numbers of failed states in regions such as Africa, the political domain and governance emerge as strong factors in the loss of human rights and human security. The second category that influences human security and human development is that of culture. Van Goor et al. (1996) propose that there are cultural dimensions of a number of violent conflicts. When cultural elements become highly politicized as ethnic, language, and religious differences, they fuel social inequalities and conflict. Such studies highlight the significance of the relationship between ethnicity and nationalism and show how both are connected with the formation and disintegration of states. The search for identity and citizenship in multiethnic societies and the issues of who is a citizen and who is not have particular relevance for women and women’s rights, as is discussed later in this chapter.

The third category that links human security, human rights, and conflict relates to socioeconomic factors including poverty and inequality. While poverty is not directly linked to causes of conflict, Van Goor et al. (1996) find relevant connections between income inequality and the breakdown of democratization processes. Economic systems that reproduce inequality and exploitative work conditions especially for women combine with other systems of exploitation including gender hierarchies to reduce women’s human security and undermine their human rights. The fourth category that is a factor in the propensity for violent conflict and that undermines human security and human rights is the availability of weapons and increasing levels of militarization in many countries. The availability of small arms and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are contributory factors in conflicts and in the loss of human rights and human security, especially of women. The linkages among the four categories (politics and governance; culture and issues of religion, language, and ethnicity; denial of social and economic rights; and the availability and use of weapons) in the undermining and loss of women’s human security and human rights are increasingly evident.
Despite the emphasis placed by transnational feminist movements in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s on development crises manifested through poverty, food insecurity, environmental crises, and women’s economic marginalization and on the relations between these crises and governance and economic structural adjustment processes, the impacts of bad policy decisions remain a terrible blight on the sociopolitical landscape (Sen and Grown 1987; Taylor 2000). The continuation of a model of development that reproduces huge inequalities and social alienation through the exploitation of women’s labor and position in society increases their vulnerability to various forms of violence. Deepening poverty and social inequality, social alienation resulting from state-based and other forms of institutionalized violence, and violence within households and communities are the consequences of national and global policies and processes. An explosion of crimes of sexual violence used as weapons of war against women and of risks and vulnerabilities experienced especially by women in hazardous work reflect continuing narratives of chronic economic insecurity and exploitation. These features persist across regions and across decades, despite ongoing social mobilization and feminist activism (Taylor 2007).

The multiple and varied impacts of global financial crises spawned by a neoliberal model that privileges economic growth over human development has wrought havoc for many and huge wealth accumulation for a few. According to the Human Development Report 2003 (UNDP 2003), for many countries the 1990s were a decade of despair. Some fifty-four countries are poorer today than in 1990. In twenty-one countries, a larger proportion of people go hungry. In fourteen countries, more children die before the age of five. In twelve, primary school enrolments are shrinking. In thirty-four, life expectancy has fallen. Likewise, the increase in internal conflicts since the end of the Cold War continues to jeopardize the survival, livelihood and dignity of a growing number of civilians. In 2000, of the twenty-five major armed conflicts, all but two were internal, with the large majority occurring in the poorest countries, and of these, over half were in Africa.

In addition to human suffering, civilian casualties, and population displacement, internal conflicts destroy homes, economic assets, crops, roads, banks, and utility systems. Today, in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis triggered by the collapse of housing markets and financial institutions in the United States, indicators of poverty, inequality, and vulnerabilities are worse than in the period of the 1990s. Such trends raise concerns about individual and collective exposure to risks. In the context of the impacts of HIV/AIDS, continuing food crises, conflict and violence within countries, and the rise of different forms of fundamentalism and narrow nationalism, there has been a noticeable shift in emphasis from issues of women’s human rights in the 2000s to those of human security post-2000. Human security as a concept remains high on the international and national policy agendas, as governments and institutions seek answers to people’s exposure to new risks and vulnerabilities. Poorly regulated market systems that fail the most vulnerable, growing inequalities in wealth and power reinforced by many forms of violence, and epidemiological and environmental crises, are among many reasons for the emphasis on human rights and its links with human security.
The epistemic foundations of human security and its relationship to human rights raise many questions and issues. While debates on human security predate the end of the Cold War, new risks and vulnerabilities due to globalizing processes add renewed impetus to links among human rights, human security, and gender justice. Several independent commissions such as the Brandt Commission, the Brundtland Commission, the Commission on Global Governance, and the South Commission have contributed to these debates (Commission on Global Governance 1995; Acharya 2001; International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001). The Human Development Report 1994 (UNDP 1994), under the leadership of Mahbub ul Haq, was also influential in focusing attention on the need to link human development and human security. Placing emphasis on the need for a comprehensive approach to security, the report argues for a shift from a national state-centric perspective of security to focusing on the security of people, human security. Yet despite this emphasis, the interventions led by the UN system as part of peacekeeping and humanitarian measures in conflict zones have not been successful in linking human security, human development, and human rights.

Human rights activists and transnational feminist movements view with suspicion the United Nation’s establishment of the Commission on Human Security. Women’s skepticism about what underlies the policy agenda on human security has to do with its links to state security and the possibility that governments would intervene militarily in countries for reasons that are not in the interests of civilians. In such interventions, women’s rights tend to be among the first casualties. Feminists also have a genuine concern that human security debates and discourses will detract from human rights and place emphasis only on meeting the most urgent survival needs and not the full range of civil, social, and economic needs, which are part of universal human rights and are enshrined in the Human Rights Charter (Bunch 2004). Human security and its relationships with human rights emerge in the context of struggles waged over whose rights and security count and under what conditions. Given the struggles to achieve the recognition of women’s human rights, it is not difficult to understand these concerns.

**Human rights for women: Advances and retreats**

In tracing the history of women’s human rights, Tomasevski (1993) describes a circular process during which an early period of recognition of sex equality follows a long period of retrogression and struggles to regain rights that were lost or eroded. This process of advances and retreats in relation to women’s human rights may account for the fear of some women’s rights activists (Bunch 2004) that linking or focusing on human security can lead to a retreat from hard-won gains on women’s human rights. Historically, human
Human rights and human security

rights discourses gained prominence over 200 years ago during the French Revolution but achieved global recognition as a concept only in the wake of the Second World War and the establishment of the United Nations. The recognition and acceptance of human rights as a concept did not automatically result in the recognition and acceptance of women's rights as human rights. The history of women's struggles for human rights emerged in reaction to the rights of men and their claims to citizenship.

The pattern of advances and retreats in women's human rights and the experiences of women in placing women's rights on the agenda are evident from the approval of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen by the National Constituent Assembly of France in 1789 during the French Revolution. The exclusion of women's rights as human rights in this declaration led Olympe de Gouges to publish a response to the exclusion of women in the form of the Declaration of the Rights of Woman and the Female Citizen in 1791 (Tomasevski 1993). Women's struggles for formal recognition of their human rights have taken many forms in many different sites over the years. Yet these histories of struggle for women's human rights, especially by women in the global South, are not as prominent as they should be (Jayawardena 1986; Qunta 1987; Lagarde 1990). Today, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948, provides the contemporary framework for the recognition of human rights, places emphasis on the indivisibility of human rights, and focuses on nondiscrimination on the bases of sex, race, and color.

Significant advances in women's human rights do not reverse the experiences of discrimination and violence that women report within households and communities in conflict torn regions (Mani 2002). Since the advances of the 1990s in recognizing women's human rights, there is growing evidence of a backlash against women that takes the form of violence such as domestic abuse and rape. A disturbing trend in the reports of women's experiences is the complicity of the police in acts of violence and brutality against those women who report such incidences of violence (Taylor 2000, 2007). When women experience a backlash from law enforcers, who are complicit in violence and abuse against them, their human security is at risk. These reversals in the situation of women, as they begin to claim protection from the state or various arms of the state, highlight the need for practical measures to monitor and ensure the security and bodily integrity of women and people who are vulnerable to state-based and community violence. Claiming human rights is extremely difficult in situations where one's security is threatened and there are no protective guarantees against patriarchal and various forms of fundamentalist backlash.

Linking women's human rights and human security

Since the UN General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration on Human Rights in 1948, the United Nations has introduced some twenty-five additional international human rights’ instruments to protect and promote human rights, including a convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. These international
instruments came into being as a result of continuing violence and threats against peoples within states and the recognition that states are not only arbiters of security but often are themselves guilty of violations against citizens.

What is the significance of human security for women, and can it add value to the field of human rights? The reasons for the increasing significance and emphasis given to human security and debates on its relationships with human rights are many. The intellectual and political currents that propelled human security onto the international agenda relate to its linkages with human rights and human development and with processes of peacebuilding, conflict prevention, democratization, globalization, and governance. Alongside these currents has been the growing recognition that contemporary processes of economic globalization, underpinned by neoliberalism, generate greater risks and insecurities especially for women and the poorest peoples. The narratives of women in weak, failed, or conflict-torn states expose, in brutal form, violations of women’s human rights and underscore the necessity to link women’s human rights and human security. Threats against women are structural, systemic, and mediated through many forces. Recognizing this, feminists define security as the reduction of all forms of insecurity including physical, economic, and ecological (Tickner 1992).

Shifting the dominant paradigm from state security to human security

Over the last 400 years, the dominant paradigm of security has had its roots in the notion that threats to security constitute external threats against the state and state territories. The notion of state security gained prominence in the context of the Cold War with its emphasis on the ability of a state to counter external threat using military strategies. This is the view reflected in Chapter V11 of the United Nations Charter, according to which threats to international peace and security are threats from outside the state (United Nations 1945). By the late twentieth century, many factors led to a rethinking of state security as an effective means of dealing with internal conflicts, which had resulted in increasing numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons. Post–World War II, many wars have been fought within states and not between states. Civilians are increasingly the direct casualties in internal conflicts and account for over 90 percent of the casualties in almost one hundred conflicts since the end of the Cold War period (post-1989). Over four million people have lost their lives in contemporary internal conflicts, and almost 80 percent of those who survive as refugees and internally displaced persons are women and children (Troeller 2001). While wars and conflicts create conditions in which particular forms of gender-based human rights violations become weapons against women’s bodily integrity, women’s experiences also highlight that structural inequalities and violence cut across war-torn and postconflict situations. As with risks and vulnerabilities associated with economic globalization and systemic crises, internal conflicts and ongoing violence are part of a gendered system that hits women the hardest.
Conceptions of human security

In general, there are three main conceptions of human security (Hampson and Hay 2002). The first draws on notions of natural rights and the rule of law and is based on the liberal assumption of the individual's right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness and the international community's obligation to protect and promote these rights (Alston 1992; Lauren 1998; Morsink 1998). The second conception is more UN-centric and characterizes human security within a humanitarian approach. This view informs efforts to deepen and strengthen international law, especially with regard to genocide, war crimes, and weapons that are harmful to civilians and noncombatants. The United Nation's humanitarian interventions to assist refugees and internally displaced persons fall within this conception of human security. These two conceptions focus on fundamental human rights and their deprivations from a liberal perspective and are in contrast with a third, broader view proposing that human security should be widely constructed to include economic, social, environmental, and other forms of harm to the livelihoods and wellbeing of individuals (Hampson and Hay 2002, 5). This broad understanding includes a social justice component and takes into account a wider consideration of threats to the survival of individuals and peoples (UNDP 1994; Nef 1995; Tadjbakhsh, 2002).

In the Human Development Report 1994, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) brought human security issues to the fore. Mahbub ul Haq placed emphasis on the comprehensive range of issues that constitute human security:

Human security is not [only] a concern with weapons. It is a concern with human dignity. In the last analysis, it is a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, an ethnic tension that did not explode, a dissident who was not silenced, a human spirit that was not crushed.

(Mahbub ul Haq 1994, 10)

Taking such a comprehensive view, human security brings together concerns related to peace, security, and human development. It refers to protection from chronic threats such as hunger, disease, and repression and protection against sudden or violent disturbances in the way of life. Such a view of human security includes individual and collective needs and rights and fits well with the perspective of the Commission on Human Security (Sen and Ogata 2003).

The third strand of thinking on human security reflects the noticeable influence of the transnational feminist movements in shifting the discourses and linking human security and human rights (Robinson 2003; Bunch 2004). Arguing that security has links to equality and development and to the prevention of all forms of violence (from within households to war and state-based violence), human rights and women's rights activists have challenged traditional state and UN-centric notions of security (Mohanty et al. 1991). Critical feminists define human security in multidimensional terms. In their view, the shift is from security of the state as a territory to the security of people. The fundamental contribution of such a paradigm is the idea that states should not be the sole or
main referent of security. Instead, the focus should be people’s interests or the interests of humanity as a collective. This focus has introduced socioeconomic issues, sustainable development challenges, and environmental concerns into the concept of human security and enabled the agenda relating to threats to security to become much wider and deeper than before.

In the global arena, a matrix of organizations engage with issues of security and threats to states and people. Among these organizations, the United Nations and its agencies acting under the UN Security Council play a significant role. The United Nations has a mixed record of peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions in situations of conflict, especially where non-state actors are involved in conflicts within countries. The propensity for conflict and violence within states has multiple roots, many of which are structural and require comprehensive and integrated strategies for their resolution (Newman and Richmond 2001). Human security as a concept and as an operating principle offers a broader, more comprehensive approach for the security of people and not just the security of states as territories. The first approach emerges in the context of the post–World War II consensus reached by the United Nations that maintaining peace through humanitarian interventions should take the form of deploying UN peacekeeping forces in conflict zones with the agreement of the UN Security Council. Beyond the traditional deployment of peacekeeping forces in conflict situations, two additional approaches to peacekeeping characterize recent UN interventions.

A second approach incorporates a multifunctional peacekeeping force with humanitarian measures and provides assistance to promote democratization. The third approach includes quasi-enforcement operations (Richmond 2001). Cambodia, Namibia, El Salvador, and Mozambique are situations in which the United Nations claims relative success in peacekeeping operations. Such claims of relative success do not account for the tragic and horrific incidences of “femicide” (the killing of women because they are female), for example, in El Salvador. This inability to recognize the killing of women as an outcome of a gendered system that discriminates against women as human beings also reflects in the negotiated peace accord of the parties involved in El Salvador. Rwanda, Bosnia, and Somalia also provide tragic illustrations of the United Nation’s failure to act decisively in situations of conflict and to respond to violations against people and especially women and children. In such situations, security, sovereignty, and human rights concerns overlap, and debates on when to intervene and who should intervene to protect people emerge (Richmond 2001). The shift to a focus on human security is in part a response to such failures to intervene in a timely and appropriate manner to ensure the wellbeing of peoples within countries and not just to focus on the security of states.

Understanding that peacekeeping and peacebuilding as well as the promotion of human rights and development involves more than state and interstate actors, women’s rights activists have pushed for the involvement and participation of women and NGOs in postconflict processes. At another level, Japan and Canada were instrumental in shaping the debates on the need to shift the rationale for the approach to international or multilateral interventions from state security to human security. These countries, due
to their historical experiences and concerns with factors that influence development and conflict processes, focus on the international responsibility to protect and include human security as key components in their foreign policy and international relations (Hampson et al. 2002). Initiatives that influence the promotion of the concept of human security include the establishment of a Human Security Network that brought together scholars, policymakers, analysts, and practitioners to develop a human security research agenda and debate the implications of such a concept (Paris 2001).

The launch of the Commission on Human Security in 2000, with Amartya Sen and Sadako Ogata as co-chairs, gave further impetus to transforming thinking on human security (Commission on Human Security 2003). The report of the commission made explicit the linkages among human rights, human development, and human security. In doing this, it focused on the importance of the need for humanitarian intervention in situations of conflict and for building a lasting peace alongside measures to address human development and institutional capabilities.

**Feminists contesting the terrain**

The changing context

Feminists contest, at a conceptual level, the meaning and implications of human rights and social justice for women and those who experience persistent poverty and inequality. At a practical operational level, giving concrete effect to human rights and dimensions of justice in ways that ensure the experiences of those who live in poverty and who experience the persistent violation of their human rights is extremely difficult. Increasing levels of inequality and deepening poverty propel issues of social justice and human rights once again onto social policy agendas. In the contemporary context issues of human security, human rights, and human development intersect. Whose security, human development, and rights matter and under what conditions are fundamentally about social justice and gender justice.

Writing on three dimensions of justice in post-conflict peacebuilding, Mani (2002) refocuses attention on the critical nexus between rebuilding peace and restoring justice. The immediacy and brutality of lives lost and torn apart and the devastation, material, and psychological that communities and peoples experience influence the contours of debates, contestations, and social movement activism against war, militarization, and internal conflicts. Negotiating peace amid conflict is complex and difficult. Even more complex are issues of restoring social justice, especially if torture and other forms of exploitation accompanied unjust practices during the conflict. Issues of women’s human rights, human security, and gender justice are of serious concern when estimates indicate that by the end of the twentieth century over 100 million persons died because of armed conflict and some 170 million as an outcome of political violence (Troeller 2001, 77–8). In such situations, women and children experience the worst effects. Statistics
merely describe the situation. They do not tell the full story of the roots of the problem. In *Women and War*, Jean Elshtain (1992) relates how her views on war, nationhood, and identity crystallized after listening to hundreds of women relate their experiences during wars and conflicts. A recurrent theme emerges from these stories—one of sacrifice:

The young man goes to war, not so much to kill as to die, to forfeit his particular body for that of the larger body, the body politic, a body most often presented and represented as feminine: a mother country bound by citizens speaking the mother tongue. (Elshtain 1992, 141–42)

This theme of sacrifice, of women rearing their sons for civic necessity, to die as part of their duty as a measure of citizenship, can be traced to Rousseau and Spartan conceptions of women's roles in war and as citizens. Elshtain's views compel us to look beyond the obvious and to examine other explanations for war and militarization in contemporary society. “War constitutes solidarity” is a powerful way through which states and nonstate entities are able to proclaim their sovereignty and identities and gain recognition. “The state is free that can defend itself, gain the recognition of others and when citizens view the state as the source of all rights” (Elshtain 1992, 143). However, this view of freedom is one through which the freedom of individual citizens from fear and want dominates and “the freedom to be” is absent. The latter is vital with regard to issues of women's control over their bodies and lives and the assertion of their human rights. Women's concerns with citizenship and rights link to war and conflict in many ways.

A number of factors, including the availability of weapons and other instruments of war, spur the political economy of conflicts in countries and regions. Moreover, there is growing concern with the increasing role of military industries in peacekeeping and governance processes. Paramilitary and private security forces also play a role in destabilizing democratic processes in conflict-torn countries (UNDP 2002). Violence against people, especially women and children, has become “acceptable” in war and conflict situations, and euphemisms such as *collateral damage* have entered the lexicon to describe what happens to them. Evidence of the human costs of wars and conflicts highlight that in the 1990s there were 3.6 million deaths arising from fifty-three major armed internal conflicts and that most of these deaths were of civilians (UNDP 2002).

Feminist discourses on the construction of the state as a historically masculine basis of power highlight how patriarchy reproduces itself and results in many differential outcomes for women (Steinstra, 1994). Politicians often externalize threats to communities and states as a means of legitimating unaccountable state systems, reviving surveillance, and increasing militarization. For these and other reasons, feminists challenge the state-centric view of rights and citizenship that emerges in the context of war and conflict. The realities women confront in their everyday lives in times of peace and conflict exposes the brutality of the erosion of their rights within national boundaries. In the context of such erosion of women and people's human rights, there is increasing contestation around notions of patriotism and nationhood. There are contradictory dynamics in states and state-led processes. At one level the state is the protector and arbiter of justice, and at another the state that fails this responsibility violates citizens’ rights.
In situations of war and violent conflict, the state relies on citizens to fight to protect the country against external threats or threats from within the national borders. The justification for war and for increasing surveillance and militarization by states against identified threats leads to trade-offs that give less priority to human rights and human security. Critical feminist discourses on state security and interstate systems reveals the significance of women's experience and of women themselves as actors in resistance to and accommodation with structures of domination.

Women and men have complex and different relationships with the state as citizens. These relationships differ because of their gender identities, roles, and responsibilities and their position and status in state systems in which men dominate. The ways through which women struggle to gain legitimacy as citizens during conflict and war also differ and provide tragic examples of how war and violence affects men and women. As Elshtain (1992) notes, over many decades women's narratives of experiences in war reveal that for women who share their stories a way of gaining legitimacy and citizenship is by producing sons who in turn fight to protect the mother country. The idea of rearing children for sacrifice in wars as a means of legitimating women's struggles for full citizenship reveals the influence of state and patriarchal power over women as citizens and as subjects. The complex relations that women have with the state, with men, and within economic and political systems also reflect their ongoing struggles for survival and the lengths to which they are pushed to sacrifice their personhood, their autonomy, and human development. These narratives of women's experiences and actions in times of conflict and war reinforce the perspectives of critical feminists to promote equitable development, peacebuilding, and forms of social citizenship based on human rights. In these ways, critical feminism makes real links with human security and human rights, influences development outcomes, and changes mainstream discourses to advance women's full citizenship and gender justice.

Using a gender analysis in discourses of human security provides a critical understanding of why women's security remains adversely affected in many sites and spheres of life, despite the formal recognition of women's human rights. Over many decades of struggle and interrogating the dominant frameworks of development and governance (Sen and Grown 1987; Taylor 2000), feminists are wary of discourses on human security because such discourses tend to exclude a gender analysis. As Tickner states:

Unlike orthodox notions of security, feminist perspectives on security start with the individual or community rather than the state or the international system. Rejecting universal explanations that they believe contain hidden gender biases, since they are so often based on the experiences of men; feminists frequently draw on local interpretations to explain women's relatively deprived position and their insecurity.

(2000, 42)

Such critical feminist views shift the discourse and emphasis of human security so that the links with women's human rights advances are not lost. However, what are some of the key issues in feminist debates on human security, and how have these evolved over time? Moreover, what is the significance of human security for women and for feminist
discourses? These questions relate directly to how we understand security, how best to achieve it, and whose security matters.

Contesting state-centric views of security

Because the actors (including state and nonstate actors) in the security industry represent diverse interests and concerns, the challenges for a gender-responsive human security approach are complex and many. In the traditional view of security (which is regarded as state-centric), the nation-state has a monopoly on the rights and means to protect its citizens (Peterson 1992). States maintain their power and institutions through militarism, policing, and surveillance. By these and other means, states function as the primary guardians of security and territoriality. Yet in many countries governments and organs of the state fail people and at times violate fundamental human rights. Political, economic, and social dimensions of peacekeeping, disarmament, and humanitarian intervention and the needs of civilian casualties, internally displaced persons, and refugees magnify the changing role of the state in security and development. In addition, processes of political liberalization and democratization in many countries and regions have created not only new spaces but also new fault lines, such as political and economic instabilities and conflicts within states.

Even within a predominantly male and state-centric view of human security, for feminist advocates of a human security approach, four aspects of the debates illustrate its added usefulness. First, human security, understood as an instrument of national strategic priorities, is a means of reducing the human costs of violent conflict. Second, as an approach to enable governments to address basic human rights and offset the inequities of neoliberal economic globalization, it offers a developmental intervention that can include strategies for the (re)distribution of resources and power. Third, it offers a framework to address risks and vulnerabilities by focusing on the importance of social protection for poor women and other people living in conditions of deprivation, those working in the informal sector, and those who experience sudden and severe economic crises due to globalization (Acharya 2001). Finally, it also provides a policy continuum to address both critical and pervasive threats as well as long-term structural inequities. The latter is important for women in the global South who remain economically exploited and socially oppressed.

Intersections of processes of governance, globalization, and human security

Narratives of women and war illustrate the intersections among issues of nationhood, sovereignty, citizenship, and human rights. Increasing militarization of states and the propensity for conflict go together. As Prinsloo (1999) reflects, being a citizen of a nation-state and possessing a sense of identity as a national who holds certain loyalties
to a country is not simply an accident of birth or naturalization. She asserts that it is the product of continuous cultural and ideological work. In situations of war and conflict, this comes into sharp focus. Inscribing nationalism as a masculine position, within which citizenship takes on dominant and varied masculine identities, becomes a way of maintaining a gendered hierarchy and creating a basis for privileging the rights of males over females. Research in regions of the global South reveals that patriarchy has an adaptive character within modern state systems and intersects with other forms of inequalities to limit women’s citizenship and identities (Taylor 2007).

In an era of increasing globalization and an emphasis on global management of state and interstate processes, critical feminist discourses on the intersections among human security, governance, and gender justice as part of struggles for human rights are changing the contours of the debates. Just as the concept of governance achieved increased prominence in international and national discourses in the post–Cold War period, the concept of human security has also advanced. This engagement with human security is partly a response to the needs of a gendered global capitalist economy that continuously reshapes itself to counter the discursive and material struggles of a range of actors. Such actors include transnational feminist movements, who highlight the consequences of economic globalization (Rai 2004).

Progressive feminists contend that terms such as human security and governance contain assumptions about how power is distributed and used and under what conditions. Governance is increasingly about managing a global market economy to secure the interests of global capital, and in such processes women’s rights and human security tend to fall off the agenda. This is especially so when we examine decisions made in the UN system, the multilateral institutions of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization. These global institutions become the sites for contestation around whose needs matter and under what conditions. There are contradictions in the management of conflict and the use of power in the matrix of organizations that form part of the international system. As an association of sovereign states the United Nations and multilateral organizations such as International Financial Institutions came into existence to protect states, to prevent the abuse of power, and to address the shortcomings of the very states that are part of the international system.

The complex intersections of governance, globalization, human rights, and human security raise significant concerns for women. As Lane (2001) suggests, globalization has transformed our understanding of ethics itself, just as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights did on December 10, 1948. Responding to issues in the wake of a world war that included brutal attacks on civilians and genocide, the then recently established United Nations set in motion a new era in global ethics with the proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Contemporary debates about the meaning of rights and their enforcement in the context of globalization reinforce the significance of a rights-based approach and the ethical obligations of state parties to related conventions and treaties to give effect to them. However, the pursuit of ethical globalization and the promotion of transnational human rights experienced a sharp U-turn following the attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001. The response of the United
States and other dominant powers such as Britain to these attacks served to eclipse the significance of the emerging and fragile movements on human rights and ethical globalization. Coalitions and partnerships among governments to conduct the global wars on terror led to opportunistic diplomacy that overlooked domestic oppression and human rights violations in exchange for cooperation in pursuing terrorists.

Countervailing forces such as new social movements, in particular women’s human rights and environmental movements for social and gender justice, are being shaped and reconfigured in response to processes of globalization and governance. Gender disparities resulting from globalization are among the most pervasive of inequalities. While gender is at the heart of these processes, such inequalities extend beyond gender issues and often combine with race and ethnicity and class in ways that reinforce gender hierarchies. Feminists are still trying to make sense of the ways economic globalization intersects with new forms of colonialism, patriarchy, racism, ethnocentrism, sexism, fundamentalism, and narrow nationalism and how all of these undermine advances in women’s rights. The mainstream international debate on governance and human rights obscures these factors and reduces the debates to what kind of global management or global and regional governance is necessary for the global market. In such essentialist and homogenized debates, the focus is on promoting market-friendly environments at any cost, and the wellbeing and security of people, especially women, is not a priority.

**Conclusions**

How will human security contribute to concerns of widening inequalities, and, in particular, how can human security advance gender justice? Any focus on protecting and empowering people implies an emphasis on their active participation, on human agency, and on women’s agency. Precisely because of the gendered systems of states and state security, the representation of women in leadership and decision making is limited, and their experiences and analyses are absent in dominant discourses on human security. For example, when issues related to armed conflict are on the global agenda, women are assumed to be victims and passive beneficiaries of state or patriarchal benevolence rather than active participants with knowledge, experience, and other resources who can contribute to making policy choices on human security. Joanne Sandler, Jennifer Klot, and Sherrill Whittington (in this volume) highlight that it is because of strong feminist advocacy that the UN Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace, and Security were achieved.

While women have been visible in mobilizing and proposing changes affecting security at the global level, it is particularly at national and regional levels that systems of inequality and repression remain intact and women’s voices are absent. This, some assert, is because of the fundamental ways through which the state and its organs embed and reproduce patriarchy. The production of gender hierarchies and social inequalities create the conditions to generate conflicts and recurring social crises. The global gender dichotomy of masculine–feminine also fuels the production of other divisions
that shape world politics and power relations that determine whose security matters (Peterson and Runyan 1993). Increasingly, the complexities of modern states and interstate systems create divisions between individuals, households and communities.

At yet another level, nation-states have a role in configuring and reconfiguring individual and collective identities, shaping people’s histories, and promoting forms of nationalism that in turn influence public policy choices, with many consequences for women. Feminist perspectives in debates on human security provide the impetus to focus on the need for women to move from being the subjects of economic and social exploitation to agents of transformative change. A human security framework within a critical feminist perspective can link the micro with the macro and the need for individual freedoms with the need for systemic change. It does this by recognizing that women, as individuals, are entitled to fundamental freedoms and that women as a social category are located within state systems that are deeply gendered, underpinned by patriarchy and asymmetrical power relations (Taylor 2004). As DAWN argued decades ago, struggles against gender subordination and women’s oppression intersect with struggles against other forms of exploitation and discrimination (Sen and Grown 1987, 19).

Increasingly feminists engage with questions such as: What are the criteria for national identity formation, and how do we understand the multiple identities of women and citizens in this national identity formation? How do gender, race, class, spatial, and religious identities intersect in local and global spaces within which women challenge the denial of rights and security? Most importantly, how are the imperatives of gender equality and equity being addressed within national, regional, and global arenas? Further, what knowledge and insights have transnational feminists movements acquired over the years that can inform policy activism toward the transformation of existing processes of development? These are but some of the questions with which feminists engage to advance a process of development that will make women’s human rights and gender equity a reality.

In addressing some of these questions, transnational feminist movements have made vital contributions to discourses on security including issues of inequity, exclusion, and alienation and have shown how traditional power blocs dominate decision making in the complex arena of global and national governance (Taylor 2000, 2004; Tickner 2000). First, critical feminists have placed value on deconstructing experiential knowledge by incorporating feminist reflections, analyses, and activism within the broader framework of human security discourses. Such discourses have contributed to making visible the intersections among personal and institutional forms of power and the interplay of forces between the private and public arenas. Critical feminists have also highlighted the complex connections between the micro and macro, the gender hierarchies that exist in state and nonstate institutions, and the implications for poor people and women in particular.

Second, transnational feminist movements interrogate and expose how dominant discourses and theoretical frameworks undermine the significance of women’s lived experiences. Feminist perspectives uncover how women’s experiences within households and communities refract the violence that is inherent in the global economy. With
regard to human rights and human security in particular, feminists are rethinking the fundamental relationships of knowledge and power and how these shape individual, community and societal experiences. Alongside this rethinking is the recognition that existing dominant processes of knowledge production are outcomes of frameworks that automatically exclude women and people who challenge the status quo. Increasingly the institutional, political, and socioeconomic contexts illuminate the complex challenges women face in placing human rights, human security, and women's security at the top of national and global agendas (Taylor 2004).

**Notes**

1. Critical feminism in this chapter takes as a starting point that women’s subordination and exploitation is an outcome of structurally based and systemic inequalities in which patriarchy is a key factor but not the only one. Gender hierarchies and women’s subordination are part of systems through which compacts (usually among men) of economic and political power privilege a few and deny the majority the full realization of their rights. In this chapter, I recognize that the transnational women’s movement is not homogeneous but rather a broad coalition of forces that come together on specific issues to lobby for women’s rights. Progressive strands of the women’s movement have reached consensus on the need to protect the human rights of women as part of a broader international agenda on the promotion of such rights. Progressive in this instance is understood to include the promotion of both social and economic justice through equitable and inclusive development of poor women and men.

2. Peggy Antrobus’s chapter in this volume provides an overview of some of the significant processes and events in which DAWN was able to provide alternatives to the dominant development paradigm.

**References**


The idea of human rights has been espoused from as early as the thirteenth century by philosophers and rulers and through the mass awakening of people who struggled against abuse by those in power and authority. But it was in the twentieth century that a global awakening to the idea of human rights as universal occurred. As a consequence of the horrors of World War II and its assaults on humanity and human dignity, there was a growing conviction that “how human beings are treated anywhere concerns everyone, everywhere” (Henkin 1990, 16), leading to the adoption of the United Nations Charter, which was signed on June 26, 1945. The Charter declared that promoting respect for human rights was a principal purpose of the United Nations (Henkin 1990, 19). It affirms, in its preamble, “faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of Nations large and small.”

This purpose of the United Nations was carried forward by the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR), which states in article 1: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.” The UDHR defined human rights and was adopted in December 1948. By the mid-1960s, based on a need to make the UDHR binding, two covenants, the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), were adopted. Together they constitute the International Bill of Human Rights, which has been the source of legally binding standards for human rights within the United Nations.

However, these developments in mainstream human rights left women on the margins, although the ICCPR and ICESCR, in articles 2 and 3 of both treaties, prohibited discrimination on the basis of several grounds, including sex, and guaranteed the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all related rights. While these rights, which pertain to all human beings, apply to women, they do not necessarily reflect the specific conditions that women experience. The interpretation of the prohibition of
discrimination on the basis of sex therefore is often too narrow, and its frame of reference excludes women's needs and experiences. All that it may mean is that women will be protected from discrimination only in circumstances where they are situated similarly to men (Charlesworth 1995; Facio 2011). This constituted equality in a formal and rhetorical sense. These treaties failed women due to their interpretation of equality as “sameness.”

Such approaches were not grounded in the reality of women's lives and their differences from men's experience. The neutrality of these provisions had the effect of privileging a male model of existence. The dominance of men in social and political life and the accompanying power and often exclusive access to privilege and resources, the biological differences relating to pregnancy and childbirth, the socially sanctioned gender division of labor that stereotyped women as caregivers, and their perceived relegation to the private sphere deprived women of autonomy and maintained inequalities in capabilities and capacities. These differences and inequalities in the lives of women and men are perpetuated, and discrimination against women persists, when the law adopts a neutral stance or “consistency of approach” in treating women and men as the same (Charlesworth 1994).

At the United Nations there was realization of the need for a special international instrument prohibiting de jure and de facto discrimination against women with a specific monitoring mechanism. The UN Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) pressed for this convention and was tasked with its preparation, as the CSW was of the opinion that neither the UDHR nor the legally binding human rights treaties had advanced the human rights of women and that “universally-recognized human rights are still not enjoyed equally by women and men” (Pietilä 2007, 27; Francisca de Haan 2010; Burrows 1985).

The adoption of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) was the culmination of a long process, spearheaded by the CSW. In its 1973 working paper the CSW argued for a single, comprehensive convention that would legally bind states to eliminate discriminatory laws, as well as de facto discrimination. An impetus was given to this proposal when the UN General Assembly passed a resolution in December 1972 declaring 1975 International Women's Year, and 1976–1985 the Decade for Women. Since then four UN World Conferences on women have been held, starting with the UN Conference themed “Equality, Peace and Development,” held in Mexico in 1975. Participants at the 1975 Mexico Conference reflected on the fact that in spite of the global recognition of the human rights of people, evidenced by the adoption of the International Bill of Rights, its impact on women was minimal. The World Plan of Action adopted at the Mexico Conference in 1975 gave high priority to the adoption of a convention to eliminate discrimination against women (Burrows 1985).

On December 18, 1979, the UN General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which incorporated “the principles of women's rights and equality between the sexes in the provisions of international law” (Pietilä 2007, 29). The convention entered into force on September 3, 1981, after twenty ratifications. Today, with 187 states parties, it is one of the most highly ratified international human rights treaties.

With the adoption of CEDAW, universal standards were set for women's equality with men. The status of women's human rights was thereby elevated to a contractual
obligation for all governments (United Nations 1999). CEDAW remains the only international instrument that establishes women’s right to equality as a human right, placing legally binding obligations on states parties to eliminate discrimination against women and fulfill women’s right to equality.

The compliance by governments with their obligations under CEDAW is monitored by a committee of twenty-three experts (the CEDAW Committee) from various regions. They are nominated by their respective governments, elected by states parties for a four-year term, and serve in their personal capacity. The function of the committee is to interpret the standards of the convention and monitor its implementation by states parties through a reporting process. Every state party to CEDAW must submit an initial report one year after ratification and periodic reports every four years thereafter. The committee issues its views and recommendations to each state party at the end of each review, referred to as “Concluding Observations.” Since, theoretically, the state party has to report every four years, the Concluding Observations become a cumulative record of the progress made by a government in implementing CEDAW. The committee also issues “General Comments,” which are authoritative interpretations of rights and obligations contained in CEDAW or of the rights of certain groups of women or contexts in which women would need to exercise their rights. The General Comments are an expansion of the scope of rights and obligations covered by CEDAW. The meaning and extent of CEDAW has thus expanded over time, making it a dynamic and living instrument. States are obligated to read CEDAW along with the General Comments and report on them accordingly.

The reporting process requires a comprehensive review of national law, policy, and practice regarding respecting, protecting, and fulfilling women’s right to equality. Through a process of constructive dialogue between the state party and the committee, CEDAW facilitates reporting on achievements as well identification of obstacles to the realization of women’s rights in the member state. It provides opportunities for the committee and states parties to identify immediate steps and means for fulfilling obligations under CEDAW. Above all, CEDAW is an accountability mechanism whereby the state party shows good faith in submitting to an open and transparent scrutiny of the fulfillment of its international obligations.

**Key Features and Strengths of CEDAW**

The principle of the equality of women as an exercisable right, taking the contexts of women’s lives into consideration, was the goal of CEDAW. Article 3 of CEDAW embodies this goal:

> States parties shall take in all fields, in particular in the political, social, economic and cultural fields, all appropriate measures, including legislation, to ensure the full development and advancement of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality with men.

(United Nations 1979, Art. 3)
CEDAW establishes normative legal standards for equality that are substantive in nature, attributing equal value to women and men and indicating that there should be no hierarchy in the legal status of women and men. It provides a unique definition of “discrimination,” recognizing the gendered pattern of the lives of women and men that disadvantages women. It further recognizes that legal measures prohibiting current discrimination alone will not bring about equality, but that the disadvantage(s) arising from past discrimination must be addressed. Hence “nondiscrimination” does not mean identical treatment of women and men. Rather, the state has to take positive steps to redistribute resources, power, and opportunities to women to enable them to overcome the effects of past discrimination. This is referred to as the “asymmetrical treatment” of women and men, not the “same” or “equal” treatment. CEDAW also recognizes that traditional cultural beliefs and stereotypes are frequently premised on the notion of women's inferiority, and that this represents a serious impediment to the fulfillment of women's right to equality. Therefore it imposes duties on state parties to eliminate gender stereotyping and transform social mores and gender relations that are in conflict with the principle of equality. The obligation of each state under CEDAW is to eliminate discrimination against women and ensure not only legal equality but also “the practical realization of the principle of equality” (United Nations 1979, Art. 2a).

The Realization of the Promise of CEDAW: The Effects of Culture and Stereotyping

Despite the promise of CEDAW, there are many barriers to its realization, and there is still some way to go to accomplish women's equality.

Legal frameworks alone, although essential, will not create change. Individuals must have the capacity to take advantage of the options that the law provides, and they must be able to make choices in their best interests. But women and men are mutually constituted or stereotyped as unequal social categories, and this is legitimized by cultural norms (Whitehead 1979). So women are not positioned to take action or seize opportunities to their best advantage in the same way men are.

There is a need to explore how culture operates to produce, reproduce, and maintain such inequality. Naina Kabeer (1996) has pointed out that we have to confront the existence of an interactive and dynamic system and process within all institutions (private and public), which creates a social order through which entitlements, rights, and responsibilities are ascribed to women and men. The process starts within the family, where differing resources, rights, and responsibilities are distributed to women and men based on social norms that take the form of culture and tradition (Kabeer 1996). Gender stereotyping as a manifestation of harmful culture starts early in life, positioning men as
the primary wage earners and women as caregivers, in ways that limit women's options in public life, situating them in the private sphere of the family. This leads to forms of structural inequality that are universal and global.

Within these cultural belief systems and practices, which tend to be supported by religion, it is invariably women who are deprived of power. This takes place alongside the systematic domination of men over women in the public and private spheres, which are interconnected and reinforce each other (Raday 2007). The weaker position of women and the relegation of women to the private sphere are defended and maintained as markers of cultural and religious identity and as essential for preserving social integrity and cohesion, and thus change is often prohibited. In reality it is the balancing of power relations between women and men that is contested in the name of culture and religion. Discrimination against women is seen as necessary for the wellbeing of the family and society. As Raday states, “culture is a macro concept definitive of human society” (2007, 69). Thus the differing cultural and social conditions under which individual choice is exercised by women and men with regard to their respective roles in society are a serious impediment to the fulfillment of women's right to equality intended by CEDAW. CEDAW's assertion in Article 3 is that women should enjoy human rights and fundamental freedoms in all fields. However, if certain rights (e.g., equality in the family; women's right to decision making, autonomy, and leadership; the right to mobility; and the equal right to economic resources) are seen as antithetical to the preservation of culture and protection of religious freedom, then the ratification of CEDAW by states parties is in danger of being a hollow exercise.

The Universality of Gender Stereotyping as Culture

The CEDAW Committee's review of states parties' reports shows that one of the most globally prevalent, harmful cultural practices is the stereotyping of women exclusively as mothers and housewives, denying them opportunities to participate in public life, whether political or economic (Raday 2007). Practically every country that is reviewed faces the phenomenon of stereotyping, with negative consequences for women. At their worst, stereotyping and negative cultural norms result in the preference for sons and a negative sex ratio, as was the case in India in 2012, when there were 940 females for every 1,000 males, and in China in 2012, where the government estimated that the country has forty million more males than females. But in almost every country that the CEDAW Committee has reviewed, whether developing or developed, the effect of gender stereotyping can be seen in many contexts, such as women's unequal access to education, employment, and economic resources, as well as to leadership and decision making. Although some progress has been made, nowhere in the world do women have opportunities equal to men's in these and other fields. Rights are interrelated, and unless there is a comprehensive approach that enables women to exercise both civil and political as well as socioeconomic rights, their status and ability to be full and equal citizens will not improve.
When the social construction of gender and gender stereotyping are viewed as aspects of culture, it enables us to recognize the effect of culture in determining the distribution of power and rights between women and men. My work as a member of the CEDAW Committee from 2004 to 2008 gave me the opportunity to examine culture from this perspective, and I draw on this experience in the following sections. It was clear from the reports of states parties from a range of countries with widely differing socioeconomic and political contexts that there was a universal ideology and culture that ascribed appropriate identities, roles, and relationships to women and men and in turn determined the unequal distribution of power and rights between them worldwide. Thus, while there were differences in the manifestations of culture, such as the prevalence of “harmful traditional practices,” including child marriage, the practice of dowry, or female genital mutilation, in developing countries, women in developed countries also bore the brunt of gender inequalities. Like their counterparts in developing countries, women and men in the developed countries manifest gender stereotyping in identities and roles, with implications for rights. Women are primarily responsible for child care and as a result face restrictions in relation to career advancement, earning capacity, and participation in public life, and they are victims of domestic and other forms of gender-based violence with the same intensity and on a similar scale as in developing countries. By comparison, men in developed countries had much better options for job mobility (both vertical and horizontal), and their right to leadership and decision making was unquestioned. What was clear and universally true, with some exceptions, was that women were tied into a life of dependency and control in the private sphere, and that the domination of men in the public sphere was the norm.

Malaysia is an interesting case in point. While the CEDAW Committee commended Malaysia for the achievements of women in the field of education, it also expressed concern about the persistence of patriarchal attitudes and deep-rooted stereotypes regarding the roles and responsibilities of women and men in the family and society. The committee stated that these stereotypes present a significant impediment to the implementation of CEDAW and are a root cause of the disadvantaged position of women in a number of areas, including the labor market and political and public life. According to the Ninth Malaysia Plan (2006–2010), based on 2005 statistics, women’s matriculation in public schools was 67 percent, and their enrollment in public universities was 63 percent. However, their enrollment at the master’s and doctoral levels was 48.8 percent and 35.7 percent, respectively. There thus seems to be a (voluntary or involuntary) restriction on women’s access to higher education. In terms of employment and career advancement, they do not enjoy the same upward mobility as men. At the level of senior management, women held only 5.4 percent of those jobs, compared to 9.4 percent for men. Women are dominant in the clerical workers category, holding 17.2 percent of positions, compared to 4.65 percent for men (Ninth Malaysia Plan 2006, 283).

In this context, equal opportunity measures alone will not produce equal results. The CEDAW Committee recommended to Malaysia that “monitoring measures should be introduced to ensure effective implementation of efforts to promote change concerning the stereotypical expectations of women’s roles and the equal sharing of domestic and
family responsibilities, including making the flexible work arrangements envisaged in the Ninth Malaysia Plan equally available to women and men” (United Nations 1997, 2000–2013: CEDAW/C/MYS/CO/2, 2006, para. 20). This recommendation recognizes that the ability of women and girls to engage economically and politically according to their fullest potential is often limited by their disproportionate responsibility for unpaid domestic work, such as housework; cooking; and caring for children, the elderly, and the sick. In the sphere of domestic work, men’s role has to change.

Practically every country that is reviewed by the CEDAW Committee exhibits the phenomenon of gender stereotyping, with negative consequences for women. The thirty-seventh session of the CEDAW Committee considered a number of reports, including that of India, where “women represent 93 per cent of the workforce in the unorganized sector, facing job insecurity and unfavorable conditions of work, in addition to a persistent wage gap” (United Nations, CEDAW/C/IND/CO/3, 2007, para. 44). The persistence of patriarchal attitudes and deep-rooted stereotypes regarding the roles and responsibilities of women and men within the family and society is clear in the countries reviewed. For example, when reviewing Vietnam, the committee noted that these stereotypes are a root cause of violence against women and put women in a disadvantaged position in a number of areas, including the labor market and political and public life (United Nations, CEDAW/C/VNM/CO/6, 2007, para. 12). In Vietnam there is a wider range of occupations available to men than to women, based on what is perceived as appropriate work for women (United Nations 2005b, 17).

In its thirty-sixth session, the committee expressed a number of concerns about the situation of women in the employment sector in China: “Women lacked legal provisions guaranteeing equal pay for equal work and work of equal value; there was a higher concentration of women than men in the informal sector; a persistent wage gap existed between women and men; certain women workers were exposed to toxic and harmful environmental conditions; and women faced a reduction of income in a competitive job market.” While the committee appreciated the various efforts to promote the reemployment of laid-off women workers, it was concerned that “gender may have been the primary reason for women having been laid off” (United Nations, CEDAW/C/CHN/CO/6, 2006, para. 29).

Although there is a global perception that such situations predominate in developing countries, it is significant that the committee’s reviews show that these attitudes and situations are also prevalent in developed countries, with similar results. The Global Gender Gap Index examines the gap between men and women in four key categories—economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, political empowerment, and health and survival—on the basis of several subindicators in each category. What is evident is that even the top-ranking Scandinavian countries, such as Iceland, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, have not achieved gender equality in all fields. In these countries, near parity has been achieved in parliament: women in Sweden hold 45 percent of the seats, in Iceland they hold 40 percent, in Norway they hold 39.6 percent (IPU, 2013), and in Finland they hold 42 percent (United Nations 1997, 2000–2013: CEDAW/C/FIN/CO/6, 2008, para. 6).

Achievements of women in education are also generally commendable, even though the effects of gender bias can be perceived in the choice of subjects women study.
According to the periodic reports to the CEDAW Committee, in Sweden, among those studying at higher education institutions, 58 percent are women and 42 percent men. The proportions of women and men among undergraduate students have remained largely unchanged since 2001: 60 percent and 40 percent, respectively. The number of women in postgraduate education is shown to be growing. In 2004 the number of women beginning postgraduate studies exceeded the number of men for the first time. The proportion of women completing a doctoral degree has grown by four percentage points since 2001, to 45 percent (United Nations 2006a, 37).

In Iceland in 2004, 51.4 percent of upper senior school pupils were girls, and 48.6 percent were boys. Girls are in the majority in all courses of study in the upper secondary schools, with the exception of crafts and technical trades, in which they are in the minority (12 percent), and natural sciences, in which the division is finely balanced, with 47 percent girls and 53 percent boys. Women comprise the majority (63 percent) of students at university level. They account for the vast majority (83 percent) of those who pursue teacher-training and pedagogical courses. The proportion is reversed, however, in the case of engineering, where men are in the majority (76 percent) (United Nations 2008 34).

In Finland the share of women in education following basic education has increased steadily at different educational levels. In upper secondary education, polytechnics, and universities, women account for more than 50 percent of students and graduates. Women constitute a clear majority in preparatory education for immigrants (United Nations 2004, 33).

In Norway in 2008, in the higher education and research sector 61 percent of students were women. There are clear differences between women’s and men’s choice of course programs, although more women have recently shown an interest in mathematics, science, and technology programs: 31 percent of students in these programs are now women, an increase of 2.3 percent since 2005. The proportion of women in doctoral programs has also increased, to 45 percent in 2008. In medicine and health and the arts, women are in the majority, while the proportion of women in technological programs is only 21 percent (United Nations 2010, 25).

However, in spite of high educational achievements, there are clear gendered stereotypical assumptions regarding the roles of women and men, resulting in job segregation, underemployment of women, and prevalence of women in part-time employment. Wage gaps, increased vulnerability of women, and violence against women are prevalent. Sweden’s report to the fortieth session of the CEDAW Committee in 2008 (United Nations 1997, 2000–2013: CEDAW/C/SWE/CO/7, 2008, 44) provides a good example. A highly developed country, Sweden reported that part-time employment is particularly prevalent in sectors dominated by women. In 2003, 36 percent of employed women ages twenty to sixty-four with children under the age of seventeen worked part-time. The equivalent figure for men was 6 percent. The report does point out that over the years there has been a decrease in women working part-time and an increase in men working part-time. However, the gap is still significant. Sweden’s report stated further that regardless of whether women’s part-time employment was voluntary or involuntary, it affected their salary, career opportunities, and development, as well as levels of
compensation in the social insurance system (e.g., sick pay, parental leave insurance, unemployment insurance, and pensions (CEDAW/C/SWE/CO/7, 2008, 43). According to the report, wage disparities have largely remained the same since the early 1990s. According to wage statistics, women’s pay is on average 84 percent of men’s (CEDAW/C/SWE/CO/7, 2008, 46).

There are similar problems in the other Scandinavian countries. Iceland's report to the CEDAW Committee also showed that there are more women than men in part-time employment and that the reason for this is that women tend to take more responsibility for the care of their families and households than men do (United Nations 2008 41). Further, in reviewing Iceland, the committee showed concern about the persistent and significant wage gap between women and men, which can be explained as the result of direct discrimination. It was concerned that a 2006 study showed that men in Iceland have 16 percent higher wages than women when age, job status, job experience, education, and number of working hours are taken into account (United Nations 1997, 2000–2031:CEDAW/C/ICE/CO/6, 2008, para. 27).

With regard to Finland, “women earn about 20 per cent less than men in all the employment sectors of the labor market” (United Nations 2004, 37). In addition, 10.4 percent of all cases received by the Ombudsman for Equality concern discrimination related to women’s salaries (United Nations 2004, 38). In Finland, part-time work predominates in certain sectors. The share of women who had a part-time job as their main occupation in trade was 37 percent; the corresponding figure for men was 10 percent. In retail trade, 44 percent of women and 22 percent of men had part-time jobs (United Nations 2004, 40). Further, in 2004 one young woman out of two reported having experienced sexual harassment by men during the previous two years (United Nations 2004, 15).

In Norway, women's groups, in their shadow report to the CEDAW Committee, stated that although women are becoming an increasingly better educated workforce, research shows that they are still paid two-thirds of what men in comparable positions are paid, and the number of women in leadership positions is still far from being proportionate to the number of qualified women. They claim that this is the result of gender stereotypes and structural discrimination. Some 74 percent of Norwegian women are part of the labor force; 43 percent of women work part-time, 8 percent of whom do so because they cannot get longer hours. The women's groups have also reported that studies show the proportion of underemployed women is greater than these numbers indicate. Involuntary part-time work is a phenomenon that affects women in typical “female” occupations such as health care, cleaning, and the hotel and restaurant trades (FOKUS, 2011 30). The pay disparity between women and men has remained constant at about 15 percent over the past twenty to thirty years (FOKUS 2011, 32).

In its Concluding Observations, the CEDAW Committee raised similar issues for the following European countries (United Nations 1997, 2000–2013): Luxembourg, Germany, Denmark, and Austria. In all these countries, as for other developed countries, the committee noted the persistence of traditional attitudes and stereotypes, including women’s responsibility for child care, which affects their educational paths and leads to occupational segregation, ultimately reducing their chances in the labor market.
Various aspects of gender stereotyping are interconnected. For example, the expectation that women are solely responsible for upbringing children, and men are responsible for the economic provisioning of the family, leads girls to opt for courses that are associated with caring functions, thus limiting their career options. In the fifty-first CEDAW session (2012), the CEDAW Committee noted with regard to Norway, “the persistence of gender segregation in the field of education, starting with day care and preschools (which are still 90 per cent female-dominated), and particularly in vocational training and higher education, as well as stereotyped educational choices by girls and boys.” It further noted with concern that there was a lack of qualified personnel to implement gender perspectives in early childhood education (United Nations 1997, 2000–2031: CEDAW/C/NOR/CO/8, 2012, para. 27).

The CEDAW Committee urged Norway “to enhance its compliance with Article 10 of the Convention and to raise awareness of the important role of the educational system in overcoming differentiated professional choices and potentially unequal future prospects of women and men.” To this end, it urged the state party to

(a) Implement measures to eliminate gender stereotypes and structural barriers that might deter girls’ and boys’ enrolment in non-traditional educational and occupational choices, including by better training careers and vocational advice service providers throughout all levels of educational system; and (b) Consider adopting temporary special measures to accelerate advancement of women in academia, through women-specific grants and other affirmative action measures such as setting clear targets and time frames for improvement of this situation without delay.

(CEDAW/C/NOR/CO/8, 2012, para. 28)

The CEDAW Committee similarly cautioned Austria in 2013, stating that it was “concerned at the persistence of traditional attitudes and stereotypes, including the responsibility for child care, which affect the educational paths followed by women in the sciences and technical crafts that result, in particular, in their low level participation in apprenticeships, and ultimately reduce their chances in the labor market” (United Nations 1997, 2000–2013: CEDAW/C/AUT/CO/7–8, 2013, para. 22). The committee recommended that Austria “[i]mprove the gender awareness of teaching personnel at all levels of ways in which gender stereotypes are reproduced through various aspects of schooling; take coordinated measures to encourage further diversification of educational and vocational choices of boys and girls and increased participation of girls’ in apprenticeships, crafts, science and technology” (CEDAW/C/AUT/CO/7–8, para. 23, b, c, d). The committee further recommended that Austria “implement result-oriented budget management in the education sector to facilitate gender equality outcomes; use “reflective coeducation” to overcome stereotypical choices in primary and secondary schools, including through training intervention programs for teachers; give priority to vocational orientation and counselling for girls; reinforce its efforts to overcome gender segregation in the choice of disciplines and areas of study” (CEDAW/C/AUT/CO/7–8, para. 32, a, b, c, d).

The concerns and recommendations of the CEDAW Committee regarding women’s educational choices and its effects on their career paths in Norway and Austria
are also reflected in the Concluding Observations on other European countries, such as Lichtenstein and Germany. It was also noted by the committee that many women interrupt their careers to meet family responsibilities. Women are thus concentrated in the lower-paid service sectors and in part-time work, and they face wide and persistent gender income gaps. For example, the CEDAW Committee pointed out its concern to Austria that women’s pension entitlements continue to be lower than men’s because pension scheme contributions are affected by women’s child-care career breaks and part-time employment, which phenomena push them into poverty after retirement (United Nations 2013, para. 36).

A gender-based wage gap is also experienced by countries such as Iceland, Finland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Sweden. The CEDAW Committee recommended that these countries create more opportunities for women to access full-time employment; continue their efforts to allow women and men to reconcile family and professional responsibilities and shared responsibility for child care, including through awareness-raising; and intensify efforts to facilitate the reentry of mothers into the labor market after childbirth.

A further manifestation of gender stereotyping and women’s unequal career paths in the developed countries is that they do not achieve senior positions in key institutions such as private corporations, the judiciary, the diplomatic service, and academia, where they lag behind men. In Iceland the presence of women declines as they move up the professional academic ladder, so that they currently hold only 18 percent of professorships at the University of Iceland, while they make up 32 percent of associate professors and 54 percent of instructors (United Nations 1997, 2000–2013: CEDAW/C/ICE/CO/6, 2008, para. 25). The phenomenon of the presence of women declining as they move up the academic ladder is also noted in Sweden and Denmark, where they currently hold only 17 and 13 percent of professorships, respectively (United Nations 1997, 2000–2013: CEDAW/C/SWE/CO/7, 2008, para. 24; CEDAW/C/DEN/CO/7, 2009, para. 24).

The CEDAW Committee expressed particular concern to Norway about the persistence of appointment practices in universities that are advantageous to men, resulting in women accounting for only 18 percent of full professors in 2007, as indicated in the state party’s report, although it was also reported that there is no shortage of qualified and suitable women candidates (United Nations 1997, 2000–2013: CEDAW/C/NOR/CO/8, 2012, para. 27).

For Luxembourg, the CEDAW Committee expressed concern about the lack of information on the presence of immigrant women in decision-making positions in a country where immigrants account for approximately 40 percent of the population (United Nations 1997, 2000–2013: CEDAW/C/LUX/CO/5, 2008, para. 21).

**Gender Stereotyping and the Objectification of Women by the Media**

While the most pervasive of the harmful cultural practices has been the stereotyping of women as mothers, another significant form of gender stereotyping observed by
the committee is the commodification of women's bodies and promotion of images of women as sex objects through the media and advertising. This was especially so in the developed countries. The “shadow report” produced by NGOs in Sweden at the fortieth session reminded the CEDAW Committee that media and advertising that stereotype and objectify women violate women's bodily integrity and contribute to their commercialization and exploitation (CEDAW-Network and the Swedish Women's Lobby 2007). The NGOs referred to such advertisements as the “sexualization” of the public space and were critical of the fact that these advertisements were defended under the freedom of expression and freedom of the press laws. They recommended that the concept of “stereotypes” should be established in Sweden. In its Concluding Observations, the committee called upon the state party

to take proactive and sustained measures to eliminate stereotypical attitudes about the roles and responsibilities of women and men, including through awareness-raising and educational campaigns directed at both women and men and at the media. The Committee recommends that the State party continue to encourage the mass media to promote cultural changes with regard to the roles and tasks considered suitable for women and men, as required by article 5 of the Convention. The Committee calls upon the State party to strengthen its strategies to combat sexualization of the public sphere and to take proactive measures to ensure that media production and coverage are non-discriminatory and increase awareness of these issues among media proprietors and other relevant actors in the industry. The Committee urged the State party to undertake in-depth research and studies on the impact of gender-role stereotypes on the implementation of the Convention.


In the case of Norway (United Nations 1997, 2000–2013: CEDAW/C/NOR/CO/8, 2012, para. 21), the committee expressed its concern about “the omnipresence of media-driven hyper-sexualized and commodified representations of girls and women, potentially leading to gender discrimination of a more violent nature.” With regard to Finland (United Nations 1997, 2000–2013: CEDAW/C/FIN/CO/6, 2008, para. 19), the committee was concerned that “media and advertising in the State party were becoming increasingly pornographic, and that the over-sexualized depiction of women strengthened the existing stereotypes of women as sex objects, and girls' low self-esteem.”

**Gender Stereotyping, the Cultural Acceptance of Male Superiority, and Violence against Women**

If culture and gender stereotyping create a hierarchy in male-female relationships and entrench male dominance and female subordination, then violence against women is the mechanism that sustains this unequal relationship, as pointed out to Norway by the committee. The CEDAW reviews revealed evidence of these connections. The high rate of violence against women, including domestic violence, which sometimes leads to the murder of women by intimate partners, as well as the lack of adequate legal
protection for women and the low rate of prosecutions and convictions in countries such as Iceland, Finland, Norway, and Sweden,\(^1\) led the CEDAW Committee to express its grave concerns to these countries. For example, the Concluding Observations to these countries read, regarding Iceland, which ranked first in the Global Gender Gap Index: “The Committee remains concerned, as expressed in its previous concluding observations, at the light penalties for crimes of sexual violence, especially rape, and at the lack of updated detailed information, including statistics, on sentences imposed on perpetrators of crimes of sexual violence. In addition, the Committee is concerned that there is a significant disparity between the numbers of investigated cases of sexual offences, and the numbers of prosecutions and convictions” (United Nations 1997, 2000–2013: CEDAW/C/ICE/CO/6, 2008, para. 17).

About Finland, which ranked second in the Global Gender Gap Index, the committee stated: “The Committee is concerned about the high incidence of violence against women, including the high number of women killed in domestic violence, and sexual harassment, the absence of a comprehensive strategy to combat all forms of violence against women and the lack of an effective institutional mechanism to coordinate, monitor and assess actions at the governmental level to prevent and address this scourge” (United Nations 1997, 2000–2013: CEDAW/C/FIN/CO/6, 2008, para. 15).

The committee remarked about Norway, which ranked third in the Global Gender Gap Index: “The Committee expresses its concern at the high prevalence of violence against women in the State party, in particular, domestic and sexual violence, including rape and marital rape in some communities, the high level of acquittals, the lenient sentences imposed on perpetrators” (United Nations 1997, 2000–2013: CEDAW/C/NOR/CO/8, 2012, para. 23).

Regarding Sweden, which ranked fourth in the Global Gender Gap Index, the committee stated: “While commending the State party for the range of efforts made to eliminate violence against women since the submission of its previous periodic report, including the 2007 action plan on violence, new legislation on sexual crimes from 2005 and the extension of the provisions of the Act on Restraining Orders, the Committee remains concerned at the high prevalence of violence against women and girls, particularly domestic violence and crimes committed against women in the name of honor. The Committee is also concerned at the low prosecution and conviction rates relating to violent crimes in the State party and regrets that the Swedish crime statistics are not broken down by the sex of the victims (United Nations 1997, 2000–2013: CEDAW/C/SWE/CO/7, 2008, para. 28).

In addition, about France, which ranked fifty-seventh in the Global Gender Gap Index, the committee stated that it “remains concerned at the high prevalence of violence, particularly domestic violence, as, *inter alia*, shown by the recent research demonstrating that a woman dies at the hands of her companion every three days” (United Nations 1997, 2000–2013: CEDAW/C/FRA/CO/6, 2008, para. 28).

In summary, there is a high prevalence of violence against women even in the developed world.\(^1\) While there are significant efforts to combat violence, such as strong laws, institutions fail women because there is no comprehensive strategy to address the
problem, compounded by low levels of prosecutions and convictions, lenient sentences, and high levels of acquittals. Finally, there is a lack of mechanisms to coordinate, monitor, and assess actions taken. There is a lack of justice and remedies for victims, and corresponding impunity for perpetrators.

The committee’s reviews of the compliance of states parties with their obligations under CEDAW reveals not only the extent of violence against women in these countries, but also the apathy of formal institutions toward the phenomenon. No country in the world can be commended for having taken comprehensive measures to address the problem. To assess the lack of action in spite of the global acknowledgment that violence against women is a human rights violation, we need to examine the causes of violence against women and whether there are tensions between the awareness of violence against women on the one hand, and the social norms and culture that value women and men differently on the other.

Violence against women fits into this equation as a mechanism that maintains the traditional social order of male domination and female subordination, in both the private and public spheres. There is also an emerging international political consensus about the causes of violence. Cross-cultural studies have found that cultural norms endorsing male dominance, male authority in the family, and female economic dependency are predictors of high societal levels of domestic violence and rape (Heise 1994; Heise et al. 1994; Levinson 1989; and Sanday, 1981, cited in Htun and Weldon 2012). The connections among the effects of the culture of male dominance and female subordination, gender stereotyping, and violence against women are highlighted by the CEDAW reviews.

**Discriminatory Customary and Religious Laws Entrench Women’s Inferiority**

An issue of concern in previously colonized countries is the surge of interest in culture, customs, and traditions linked to definitions of national identity. Many of these countries maintain a dual system of both civil and customary law, mainly in the area of the family and access to economic resources such as land and inheritance, that operate to the detriment of women’s right to equality. Culture and custom are never static and evolve according to changing political, social, and economic circumstances. Precolonial culture was diverse, including aspects of patriarchy as well as fairness and justice. Women had access to and the use of economic resources as well as land, and the rights of male members were accompanied by duties to other members of the family, including women. There was also a liberal attitude toward the rights of mothers over children (Goonesekere 2007).

However, colonialism either entrenched various customary practices as law or rejected them in line with European values regarding marriage, the male head of household, inheritance of property, and family support. This served to reinforce preexisting patriarchal system(s) and in the process also removed or negated certain positive norms of precolonized peoples. By legalizing such customary practices, constitutional
status was given to custom and traditional practices (Goonesekere 2007). Many of these practices are harmful to women and have been responsible for discrimination against them and for their inequality within the family. Thus, in many postcolonial developing countries, the plurality of legal systems is a further hurdle that disadvantages women.

The CEDAW Committee has been critical of these discriminatory and harmful cultural or traditional practices during its reviews and recommends their abolition, as neither the preservation of culture nor the protection of religious freedom can justify their harmful effects on women. For example, in its Concluding Observations to Nigeria (United Nations 1997, 2000–2013: CEDAW/C/NGA/CO/6, 2008, para. 17), the committee expressed its concern about contradictions and inconsistencies created by the application of statutory, customary, and sharia laws in the state party’s tripartite legal system. It noted with concern the existence of discriminatory provisions within these sources of law with regard to marriage, divorce, custody of children, and inheritance.

Raday (2007) notes that traditional culture and religion have systematically imposed a subordinated status for women. Thus, even where new constitutions were forged in the postcolonial era, modernizing their legal frameworks, equality for women was exempted from constitutional protection in the name of culture. Countries such as Botswana (United Nations 1997, 2000–2013: CEDAW/C/BOT/CO/3, 2010), Lesotho (United Nations 1997, 2000–2013: CEDAW/C/LSO/CO/1–4, 2011), Gambia (United Nations 1997, 2000–2013: CEDAW/C/GMB/CO/1–3, 2005), and Zambia (United Nations 1997, 2000–2013: CEDAW/C/ZMB/CO/5–6, 2011) have explicitly exempted women’s right to equality in key areas of personal and customary laws—namely early marriage, payment of dowry (lobola), sexual cleansing, polygamy, adoption, marriage, divorce, burial, devolution of property on death, and other matters of personal law—from the equality and nondiscrimination protection of the constitution.

In countries such as Papua New Guinea (United Nations 1997, 2000–2013: CEDAW/C/PNG/CO/3, 2010), Burundi (United Nations 1997, 2000–2013: CEDAW/C/BDI/CO/4, 2008), and Ethiopia (United Nations 1997, 2000–2013: CEDAW/C/ETH/CO/6–7, 2011), where the constitutions and statutory laws coexist with discriminatory customary laws, although the latter are legally subordinated to the former, in practice it is the discriminatory customary laws that are applied and adjudicated through traditional structures.

**Discrimination against Women Is Universal**

From the CEDAW reviews, it may be seen that though it is true that in the area of women’s human rights there are differences in the contexts and experiences of women from the developed North and developing South, there are also commonalities. In the North, while women may have better standards of living, they are still dependent on men and do not enjoy full equality. For example, large percentages of women in these countries work part-time because of gender role stereotyping, gender wage gaps are prevalent, the glass ceiling is still evident, levels of violence against women are alarming, and women’s
unequal leadership and representation are not questioned. These phenomena are pervasive in both the North and South.

As an illustration of the fact that patriarchal norms prevail in the North and South equally, although the contexts may differ, excerpts from the CEDAW Concluding Comments for Norway and Nigeria are juxtaposed here. Regarding Norway, the committee made the following comments (United Nations 1997, 2000–2013: CEDAW/C/NOR/CO/7, 2007):

- The Committee is concerned that stereotypical cultural attitudes persist. These stereotypes are reflected in particular in women’s position in the labour market, where they predominate in part-time work, and in their educational choices, particularly in higher education (paragraph 17).
- The Committee remains concerned about women’s disadvantaged situation in the labour market, as reflected in a persistent wage gap between women and men, the predominance of women in part-time work and significant job segregation (paragraph 25).
- The Committee remains concerned about the prevalence of violence against women, including domestic violence. While commending the State party on its collection of data on the number of women murdered by their intimate partners, the Committee regrets the limited data and information available (paragraph 19).
- While appreciating the fact that of 19 cabinet ministers, 9 are currently women and that the representation of women in parliament and in county and municipal councils is relatively high, the Committee is concerned at the low numbers of women mayors, professors and judges at all levels of the judiciary (paragraph 23).


- The Committee is concerned about the persistence of patriarchal attitudes and deep-rooted stereotypes concerning women’s roles and responsibilities that discriminate against women and perpetuate their subordination within the family and society (paragraph 19).
- The Committee is concerned about the continuing prevalence of violence against women, including domestic violence (paragraph 23).
- Recalling its concluding observations of 2004, and while noting the efforts made to increase the number of women in both elective and appointed positions in public office, in the diplomatic service and in international organizations, the Committee is concerned that women continue to be seriously under-represented in political and public life, especially in leadership and decision-making positions (paragraph 27).
- Recalling its previous concluding observations of 2004, the Committee notes with concern the persisting wage gap between men and women, women’s higher unemployment rate, and women’s concentration in certain sectors, namely agriculture, animal husbandry, and service. The Committee also notes that women are predominantly employed in the informal sector resulting in their exclusion from formal social security programmes (paragraph 29).
• The Committee is concerned that widespread poverty among women, in particular rural women and women head of households, as well as poor socio-economic conditions are among the causes of the violation of women's human rights and discrimination against women. It notes with concern that discriminatory practices with regard to land ownership, administration of property and inheritance, limit women's access to economic resources, as well as credit and loan facilities (paragraph 35).

**SO WHAT HAVE BEEN THE GAINS OF CEDAW?**

The ratification of CEDAW and the ensuing obligation of states parties to report at the international level have generated greater awareness about women's right to equality and the need to eliminate gender-based discrimination. The rigorous country-specific reporting to the CEDAW Committee has exposed the inequalities faced by women both nationally and globally. It has forced governments to examine their lack of accountability to women in an open international forum and to commit themselves to remedying the situation.

The reporting process has also enabled the mobilization and participation of women as rights holders in exposing their governments, as they can attend the reporting sessions at the United Nations, provide alternative information through shadow reports to the committee, and assess the sincerity of their governments. There is much value to the NGO interactions with the committee that take place. Zwingel (2005) has posited that international discourses must have some connection and effect on domestic discussions and value systems, and vice versa. Otherwise they remain disconnected international rhetoric.

The CEDAW reporting process and the space it has created for NGO involvement and for the independent information input by UN agencies has made this process into a compelling international dialogue, creating synergy between domestic realities and international discourses. Not only does the committee’s constructive dialogue with states parties enable in-depth analysis of the contradictions between domestic realities and international norms and standards, but it also facilitates the committee’s interpretation of the international standards and detailing of states’ obligations in specific domestic contexts. It does the latter through Concluding Observations and General Comments, which creates an ongoing awareness of the contradictions between the value systems at domestic and international levels. It provides opportunities for national dialogue and action by many actors, including the states, NGOs, UN agencies, other multilateral and bilateral agencies, and the committee itself. Raday (2007) states that CEDAW provides a blueprint for planning women’s equality.

The case of Singapore and women migrant workers illustrates the impact of NGO involvement in the treaty reporting process. In 2001, when Singapore reported at CEDAW’s twenty-fifth session, NGOs from the Philippines attended the session and
M. Shanthi Dairiam presented a shadow report on the abuse of the human rights of Filipino domestic workers in Singapore. This was the first time that NGOs of another country had been present at the review of a state party that was not the government of their own country. The issue of migrant workers had also not yet been taken up by the committee. In fact, the issue of women migrant workers’ rights is not mentioned in the text of CEDAW. However, not only did the committee interrogate the government of Singapore in great detail about the abuses faced by foreign domestic workers (see United Nations 2001), but the issue of foreign domestic workers has since been raised consistently in the dialogue with other states parties, where relevant. Subsequently, in 2008 the committee noted the relevance of this issue to several countries and produced a General Comment on women migrant workers (United Nations 2008) that has become a blueprint for the protection of women migrant workers globally. What this has also done is to entrench firmly in the practice of the committee the universal principle of territorial obligations of the state with regard to women’s rights. Thus, all women within the territory of the state must be protected under CEDAW, not only its citizens.

As mentioned previously, the discourses on global human rights norms must be connected to domestic realities and appropriated within these contexts through ongoing processes of debate nationally and internationally. Nowhere is this more important than in the area of culture and tradition, a sensitive topic that is often at variance with international norms of equality. One of the key objectives of CEDAW is to combat the dominant gender ideology, value system, and stereotypes, as the treaty recognizes that these are the most serious impediments to its core principles of equality and nondiscrimination. Articles 5(a) and 2 (f) of the convention are focused on aspects of culture that condone women’s inferior status, permitting discrimination against them in law and practice. Raday (2007) posits that the clash between culture and equality is expressly regulated in CEDAW by article 5 (a), which states:

The State shall take all appropriate measures to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.20

The CEDAW Committee engages every state party in a conversation with regard to its obligations under this article, raising awareness through different approaches. One approach taken with all states parties is to encourage them to bring together various stakeholders, engage in open national debates, and create consensus on the changes needed. There are times when the committee may be said to reprimand a state party, as in the case of Iceland, when the committee expressed its disapproval of the suggestion that both women and men consider the gender wage gap to be acceptable (United Nations 1997, 2000–2013: CEDAW/C/ICE/CO/6, 2008, para. 15), or when, during a dialogue on the lack of action taken to transform gender relations, the committee asked Singapore to explain how the Government envisioned the shared responsibility between men and women. Since traditional values discriminated against women, it was disquieting to note the
absence of any efforts to counter the impact of traditional values and ensure a genuine sharing of duties. The stereotype of the woman as homemaker was reaffirmed throughout the report.

(United Nations 2001, para. 5)

At times the CEDAW Committee has provided detailed guidance, as with Liechtenstein, on steps to be taken to address the persistence of patriarchal stereotypes, including the limited participation of men in child raising and other domestic duties. The Concluding Observation states:

The Committee calls on the State party to: (a) Further strengthen its efforts to put in place a comprehensive policy with proactive and sustained measures, targeted at women and men, girls and boys, to overcome stereotypical attitudes about the roles and responsibilities of women and men in the family and in society, in particular in areas where women are in the most disadvantaged position; (b) Intensify its cooperation with civil society and women’s organizations, political parties, education professionals, the private sector and the media, in order to disseminate targeted information to the general public and to specific stakeholders such as decision-makers, employers, disadvantaged groups of women and the youth and to develop a more comprehensive strategy across all sectors to eliminate discriminatory gender stereotypes, specifically targeting disadvantaged groups of women; (c) Organize awareness-raising campaigns to promote responsible fatherhood and to sensitize employers and employees on the topic of flexible work arrangements for women as well as men in order to ensure that part-time employment is not taken up almost exclusively by women.


In the case of the Democratic Republic of Korea, the committee went out of its way to educate the state party on the links between stereotyping and women’s inequality and the concrete ways in which not placing an equal value on women compounds their disadvantages and inequality. This is the relevant paragraph in the Concluding Observations:

The Committee notes with concern the persistence of traditional and stereotyped assumptions and attitudes in respect of the roles and responsibilities of women and men, which are discriminatory against women and have a pronounced impact, particularly in the areas of education and employment as well as in other areas of their lives. For example, the Committee is concerned at the stereotyping of women, which perceives them exclusively as caregivers and homemakers and assigns them to areas such as education and employment on the basis of spheres suitable to their “characteristics”. The Committee is concerned that such expectations of women have serious consequences, preventing them from accessing rights and entitlements on an equal basis with men and creating a dependency on men, husbands and family for housing, food entitlements and other services. It is also concerned that in times of economic crisis, as in the current situation of the country, women’s prescribed roles and lesser entitlement intensifies their hardship and amounts to multiple discrimination.

Regarding Eritrea, the committee sought to educate the state party, pointing to the insidious ways in which stereotyping could affect women negatively. In the Concluding Observations, the committee stated its concern that “while participation in National Service creates eligibility for access to land and other economic resources, women are exempt from National Service on the grounds of marriage, thus losing eligibility for access to land and other resources” (United Nations 1997, 2000–2013: CEDAW/C/ERI/CO/3, 2006, para. 14).

Again in the case of Singapore, the committee pointed out in its Concluding Observations the need for normative standards in promoting women’s rights and explained the negative material consequences of certain aspects of gender ideology:

> While the Committee recognizes the importance of the family as the basic social unit, it expresses concern that the concept of Asian values regarding the family, including that of the husband having the legal status of head of household, might be interpreted so as to perpetuate stereotyped gender roles in the family and reinforce discrimination against women.

(United Nations 2001, 54, paras. 79–80)

Zwingel posits that “for the domestic implementation of CEDAW, three factors seem to be influential: first, the degree to which political institutions enable the representation of women’s interests within public policy formation; second, the existence of transnational governmental or non-governmental activism that supports the appropriation and implementation of international norms; and third, the level of cultural affinity with the Convention” (2005, 408). The CEDAW review and reporting process promotes all of these factors.

**NGO Activism Demanding Governments’ Accountability for Implementing CEDAW**

I argue, however, that the biggest gain from the convention’s treaty processes is the energizing of nongovernmental activism to demand accountability from governments. Through such activism at the international level, as well as by taking the international debates back to the national level, changes have been achieved in the areas of law and policy. Granted, there has been piecemeal reform of the laws for the advancement of women’s rights, but there have been significant ones, some examples of which follow.

In 2002 the Eleventh Amendment Bill to the Country Code of Nepal eliminated more than twenty discriminatory provisions in the law. Particularly significant were those on inheritance, adoption, divorce, and criminal laws, including laws on abortion, all of which had been strongly defended on the basis of culture. The need for such reform had been identified by NGOs at the committee’s review of Nepal’s initial report in 1999 and had been included in the committee’s Concluding Observations (United Nations 1997, 2000–2013: Nepal, 1999, A/54/38/ Rev 1, 58, para. 139). The NGOs followed up the
committee's review by mounting a large-scale advocacy campaign in the country, mobilizing widespread support for the legislative amendments.

The Concluding Observations addressed to India after its initial report at the committee's twenty-second session referred to several areas of discrimination against women in the law. They also touched on the need for compulsory marriage registration and sufficient and targeted resource allocation for the advancement of women (United Nations 1997, 2000–2013: India, 2000, A/55/38, 10, paras. 57–60). These issues had been brought to the attention of the committee by Indian NGOs in their "alternative" report. Since then the Indian government has amended some of the personal laws, such as the 2001 Indian Divorce Act, which covers women and men of Christian faith. Provisions in this act that were discriminatory to women have been eliminated, and uniform provisions for women and men with regard to grounds for divorce have been added (United Nations 2005a, 4). In addition, the 1956 Hindu Succession Act was amended by the government in 2005 in order to establish equality in property rights (United Nations 2012, 5).

Moroccan women's organizations successfully lobbied for amendments to Morocco's Personal Status Code in 2004, involving the removal of discriminatory provisions. Again, this recommendation had been made by the CEDAW Committee in its sixteenth and twenty-ninth sessions in 1997 and 2003, respectively (United Nations 1997, 2000–2013: Morocco, 1997, A/52/38/Rev.1, 13–14, paras. 64 and 71; 2003, A/58/38, 105–106, para. 163). The advocacy mounted by women's organizations to follow up the committee's recommendations was largely successful due to their mobilization of public support. Muslim women in Morocco now enjoy formal equality on the basis of their country's family laws. The new Family Code raises the minimum age of marriage for girls to eighteen, makes polygamy almost impossible, improves inheritance rights, makes divorce provisions more equal for women and men, and no longer contains humiliating expressions with regard to women. Speaking on the role of Moroccan women in the reform of the Family Code at an international seminar, "Trends in Family Law Reform in Muslim Countries," held in Kuala Lumpur in March 2006, Amina Lemrini of the Association Démocratique des Femmes du Maroc (ADFM) said that a coalition of two hundred women's associations had organized an unprecedented campaign to promote their cause between 1999 and 2004.

The Philippines introduced the Magna Carta of Women (officially titled the Republic Act No. 9710) in 2004, a comprehensive women's human rights law that seeks to eliminate discrimination against women by recognizing, protecting, fulfilling, and promoting the rights of Filipino women. The Magna Carta has relied heavily on the provisions of CEDAW, particularly its definition of discrimination against women and its specific provisions. It elaborates on women's rights to be protected from violence, to participate and be represented in all aspects of society, and to be treated equally before the law. Women's organizations in the Philippines were instrumental in the passage of this law and relied heavily on the content and procedures of CEDAW.

In Ghana, Sisters Keepers, an NGO, urged the government to investigate the murders of thirty-two women by mobilizing the public, organizing press conferences, holding demonstrations, and submitting petitions to the parliament and executive. This and
other forms of advocacy by Ghanaian human rights advocates led to passage of a domestic violence act in 2007, based on standards established in CEDAW’s General Comments (Manuh Takyiwaa).

Sometimes litigation has used CEDAW to claim rights. An example is a case in Japan, where in 2004 the Osaka Appeals Court ruled that the appellants (all women) and the respondent in a labor case had to reach an amicable settlement based on the principles of equality and nondiscrimination and provided specific recommendations. In its statement the court pointed out that national action must concur with international efforts toward the elimination of discrimination based on sex. The appellants had made specific reference to the CEDAW Committee’s concluding comments on Japan’s fourth and fifth periodic reports in 2003 (United Nations 1997, 2000–2013: Japan, 2003, A/58/38, 136, paras. 369–370), which pointed to “the lack of understanding regarding the practice and the effects of indirect discrimination as expressed in the government guidelines to the Equal Employment Opportunity Law” (Koedo 2004, cited in Dairiam 2007). The court in its decision went on to say: “It must be borne in mind, that to tolerate the vestiges of discrimination based on past social understandings would result in turning one’s back to the progress in the society.” This was a significant statement. When women claim their rights through the courts, it helps to establish legal standards that become binding and introduces changes to social norms. There are many examples of claims made by women through the courts using CEDAW, including its Optional Protocol.

Zwingel (2005) poses the question: “How do we assess impact and what do we value?” Citing a 2000 interview with a UNIFEM staff member, she asks whether impact can be measured only through changing the law using CEDAW, or through women’s organizations coming together and talking about women’s rights. This, in a nutshell, is what CEDAW has achieved. Since 1997 IWRAW Asia Pacific’s program “From Global to Local” has been responsible for facilitating the participation of women from about 125 countries in the CEDAW review process and in testifying against their governments. Systematically, with every session, women’s NGOs from the reporting countries present their shadow reports. But before that, they mobilize women’s groups in their countries for over a year, debating, prioritizing, strategizing, and generating consensus on the issues to raise and how to engage in follow-up from the review. Women from the countries concerned are systematically engaged in equality discussions and activism, creating synergies between international norms and their national reality.

**Conclusion**

CEDAW is the only human rights instrument that explicitly addresses the unique and gendered experiences of women’s lives. Its promises are powerful. But their realization does not always match expectations. While legal frameworks for equality, such as that provided for in CEDAW, may create opportunities for women and men, the capacity to exploit these opportunities and exercise the right to equality may differ for women and
men because of preexisting inequality. Such social inequality, often inherited from the past, is defended and maintained as a marker of cultural and religious identity and as essential for preserving social integrity, and so change is prohibited. The right to equality is a contested right; cultural and religious norms prescribe socially appropriate roles and economic entitlements to women and men and perpetuate stereotypes. Such prescriptions are not only descriptive of who does what but are also normative and reinforce women's subordination on all fronts.22

Discrimination against women is seen as necessary for the wellbeing of the family and society. This situation is universal and is experienced in all countries of the world, developed and developing. In almost every country that the CEDAW Committee has reviewed the effect of stereotyping can be seen in many contexts, such as segregation in education, underemployment of women, wage gaps, and exclusion from leadership and decision making on a basis of equality with men. While some progress in these fields has been made, nowhere are women the equals of men. Rights are interrelated, and unless there is a comprehensive approach that enables women to exercise both civil and political as well as socioeconomic rights, women's status and their ability to be full citizens will not evolve.

In every country of the world, even the most developed, violence against women, especially domestic violence, is prevalent. As the CEDAW Committee has pointed out, violence against women prevails as a result of stereotyping women and giving men control and power in intimate relationships with women. Without personal freedom in the context of intimate relationships, women cannot attain their full potential or make choices in their own interests. No country can be commended as having taken comprehensive measures to address the problem. Invariably, in most countries only piecemeal efforts have been made to address the problem, and a serious issue is the impunity with which violence against women takes place. This phenomenon is also global and universal, as seen from the CEDAW review of state parties' reports.

CEDAW is still the most useful instrument to bring about social change. It is unique among human rights treaties, because through article 5a it is cognizant of the fact that culture and tradition stand in the way of women's equality, and it places obligations on states parties to modify negative aspects of culture and tradition. In effect what is prescribed is the creation of a social environment through which society will accept and recognize women's right to equality. The committee diligently picks up on this requirement and challenges states parties on their obligation to bring about social change.

Change of course takes time, so one of the biggest gains of CEDAW is the opportunity it presents through the review process for the mobilizing of rights holders to participate in the review and to articulate their rights, bringing national realities to bear on the international process. This is the first step toward change.

Women claiming the right to equality are asserting their citizenship rights. There are many challenges to overcome. While respecting cultural diversity, there has to be a commitment to ensuring rights for all women, and the universality of rights must be protected. Without this commitment, women's rights will not be secure. Above all, communities and societies must be transformed to accept the principle of equality between
women and men and make it part of their value system. The CEDAW articulation of the principles of equality and nondiscrimination is unequivocal and universal in meaning.

Notes

1. Writers such as Susan Waltz, cited in Arat (2006), have pointed out there were various episodes of international human rights discussions prior to the twentieth century.
4. When the UN Charter was adopted, there was also a proposal that a Bill of Rights be appended to it. When the Human Rights Commission was established by the United Nations in 1946, it was tasked with drafting an International Bill of Human Rights that would be legally binding. The Human Rights Commission worked on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which was also not binding. It was only in the mid-1960s that the two covenants—the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on Socio-Economic and Cultural Rights—were adopted. The declaration and the two covenants are said to be the International Bill of Rights under the human rights regime of the United Nations (Henkin 1990, 24).
5. The UN Charter established three new substantive elements of crucial importance for women: 1) the Economic and Social Council as a principal organ “to promote economic and social progress and development”; 2) the Commission on Human Rights established under the auspices of ECOSOC with the broad mandate “to work for the codification, advancement, and protection of human rights and monitoring their implementation”; and 3) the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) as an autonomous entity to prepare reports and recommendations to the Economic and Social Council on promoting women’s rights in political, economic, civil, social, and educational fields. The CSW was established in 1946. As an independent commission, it was entitled to set its own agenda, decide its priorities, and report and make proposals directly to ECOSOC (Pietilä 2007, 12–14).
7. Writers and scholars such as Catharine MacKinnon, Hilary Charlesworth, Andrew Byrnes, Christine Chinkin, and Charlotte Bunch, among others, have also made similar criticisms.
8. The other UN World Conferences on women were held in Copenhagen in 1980 (the Second); in Nairobi in 1985 (the Third), which resulted in the Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women; and in Beijing in 1995 (the Fourth), which produced the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action.
10. Malla (n.d.). In 1993 a case was filed in the supreme court of Nepal challenging the discriminatory inheritance law of Nepal, which did not entitle a woman to inherit parental property until the age of thirty-five, and only if she remained unmarried. The court, in spite of recognizing the discrimination in the law, gave a directive to the government to
introduce an appropriate bill in Parliament, but cautioned that sudden change in social norms might destabilize society. Part of the court's decision reads: “In making sudden changes in traditional social practices and in matters of social norms pursued by the society since a long time ago, the society happens to become unable to adopt several matters, and if so happens, a different situation beyond perception would emerge.”

13. Malaysia is currently implementing its tenth plan (2011–2015). Since presenting its combined initial and second periodic report in 2006, Malaysia has not presented a report to the committee.
14. The thirty-seventh CEDAW session was held in New York in 2007. Countries reviewed were Austria, Azerbaijan, Colombia, Greece, India, Kazakhstan, Maldives, Namibia, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Peru, Poland, Suriname, Tajikistan, and Vietnam.
15. The Global Gender Gap Index is produced annually by the World Economic Forum, Geneva, Switzerland.
16. See government reports to the CEDAW Committee.
17. Every country reviewed by the CEDAW Committee shows high rates of violence against women, with low rates of convictions of perpetrators and inadequate remedies for women. In this chapter I highlight the situation of violence against women in developed countries to illustrate its universal nature.
18. Violence against women also prevails in the developing world, but I have only given examples of the developed world to indicate that it is just as much a phenomenon there.
21. The International Women’s Rights Action Watch (IWRAW Asia Pacific) is an international women’s human rights organization, established in Malaysia in 1993, dedicated to making CEDAW an effective mechanism for women’s right to equality. The author is the founder and first executive director.

References


In 1984 bell hooks challenged feminists to think bigger and better in their struggles against male violence. She called for activism and analysis to expand from addressing physical manifestations of male violence into a movement to end all structures of violence. She presented this challenge at an important moment; she was writing on a wave of successful demands for state action against domestic violence, particularly in the global North. In the preceding decade feminists had called for an end to impunity for acts of violence in the home and had made important gains, both in building grassroots community support and in demanding state funding and legislation to increase women’s safety. Further, in the early 1980s feminists had successfully brought violence against women to the agenda of international organizations. Indeed, it was just one year after hooks wrote this that the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on domestic violence, the first in a series of feminist gains in a struggle to put violence against women at the forefront of the international human rights agenda. However, in calling attention to structural violence and inequality, hooks was not simply advocating an unproblematized extension of existing feminist movements. Rather, she was critiquing assumptions and exclusions that lay at their core.
In the global North, feminist movements’ advocacy for battered women in the 1970s and 1980s was dominated by white middle- and upper-class women and tended to focus on patriarchy as the root—and often the sole—cause of violence against women. These dominant trends were criticized from both inside and outside the movements as exclusionary in their analytical and organizing omissions. Black feminists and feminists of color from the global North and South called for engagement with global structures of economic and social inequality—racism, imperialism, and capitalism—arguing that only through attention to these complex, interlocking structures of oppression could a movement to end violence against women truly be transformational.

Implicit in hooks’s formulation are some of the key epistemological and political challenges for feminist organizing to end violence against women. First, what is violence against women? What counts as violence, and through what material and ideological architecture is violence/nonviolence determined? How are the parameters of violence contested, extended, contracted, and redrawn? Second, what does a feminist strategy to end violence look like? What level of intervention (transnational, state, community) is most effective? How should feminists engage with governments, the judiciary, and international organizations? Finally, what makes a feminist antiviolence movement transformational? At a time when organizations established in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s are under attack by the intensifying austerity of neoliberalism, and at both national and international levels responses to violence against women are increasingly being shaped through either a medical or a juridical lens—resulting in individual punitive “solutions” or medicalized explanations for social deviance, rather than contributing to struggles for social change—this question carries no small dose of urgency.

In this chapter I approach the trends of feminist antiviolence movements from the 1970s to the present through the prism of these three questions. First, I explore conceptual approaches to violence against women that have informed contemporary feminist movements. Second, I examine various feminist approaches to ending violence against women. And finally, I highlight transformational feminist antiviolence action, both its challenges and its successes. The aim of this chapter is to trace transnational trends without collapsing into overgeneralizations that would inevitably privilege certain positions and silence others. As such, while the scope remains global, I ground my analysis in Canadian case studies, the primary location of my praxis, and also seek to make space for the global experiences shaped through distinct geographic, political, socioeconomic, and cultural locations.

**Conceptualizing Gendered Violence**

A number of terms have been employed by feminists to articulate gendered violence, including battered women, violence against women, domestic violence, intimate partner violence, family violence, and gender-based violence. In some cases these are overlapping or complementary terminologies; in others, charting language, and the ideological
framework from which it emanates, illuminates conceptual divergences that have had important political implications. In this section I replicate language used at different moments, with an eye to the political tensions embedded in definitional divergences and slippages.

The predominant approach to violence against women in North America in the 1970s and 1980s focused on acts of physical and sexual violence as a manifestation of patriarchy. This focus on patriarchy challenged long-standing conservative apologies for violence against women as personal, arbitrary, or the result of poor conflict resolution. However, as Gillian Walker argued, the focus on patriarchal violence divorced from an understanding of race, sexuality, and relations of production created a rift in the contemporary women's movement and helped contribute to the depoliticization of responses to violence against women (2003, 262), to which I now turn.

The North American “battered women's movement,” a second wave feminist response to violence against women in the home, may be contextualized within the feminist principle that “the personal is political” and calls to make the “private public.” Although there were important divergences in both analysis and action within this broad alliance, which I discuss below, the general aim was to challenge the liberal notion of a divide between the public sphere (which encompasses political and economic activities) and the private sphere (which encompasses the family and relationships, beliefs, and activities in which a person engages in her private capacity).

For second wave feminists, the liberal reification of a divide between the public and private was deeply pernicious, because it assumed a perfect equality between men and women in the private sphere and insulated the supposedly apolitical private sphere from political critique. In particular, feminists were concerned that this doctrine protected the family—specifically, the heteronormative nuclear family—from “public” intervention of any kind. Indeed, Catharine MacKinnon wrote that “[t]o complain in public of inequality within the private contradicts the liberal definition of the private. . . . In this scheme, intimacy is implicitly thought to guarantee symmetry of power. Injuries arise through violation of the private sphere, not within, by and because of it” (1989, 190). According to MacKinnon, the liberal public/private paradigm offers no recourse to women for whom the private sphere is not a haven of freedom, but is instead a space wherein they are beaten, raped, and oppressed. Thus, the feminist response must be to explode this erroneous binary and demand public (state) responses to what was previously deemed private (and therefore unpunishable) violence.

However, theorizing the public/private divide—even if it seeks to abolish that divide—implicitly includes only those people whose lives have been allowed to exist within that framework. For many people, this is a privilege not afforded them by the liberal capitalist state. Antiracist and anti-imperialist feminists from the global South and North have argued that the public/private divide does not represent their experience of the world in general or of violence in particular. Anannya Bhattacharjee’s work in South Asian communities in New York (1997) demonstrates that the experiences of family, community, and culture go beyond any simple binaries between what is public and private. Andrea Smith (2005) argues that MacKinnon’s formulation, calling for
greater state action, obscures the centuries of state violence perpetrated against indigenous women in the Americas. Similarly, Cyndi Baskin’s (2003) discussion of violence in Aboriginal communities in Canada advocates a holistic conception of “family violence” that transcends public/private borders, encompassing a cognizance of the ways in which individuals are tied to communities, spaces, and histories of colonialism and resistance. Indeed, the ongoing intervention of the Canadian state into the “private” lives of indigenous populations—and here I understand private lives not simply in the Eurocentric definition of nuclear family, but in a broader conceptualization of family, community, and culture—buries the notion that the state simply doesn’t act in the private sphere. This is a notion that is blind to the many state interventions in the private realm, particularly the homes of Aboriginal communities, communities of color, and poor communities.

The tragic death of Alice Black, an indigenous woman from an isolated community in Northern Canada, is a brutal illustration of this point. Alice Black lived in Gameti, a Tlicho First Nations community of about three hundred people in the Northwest Territories, one of the three federal territories of Canada. She was the mother of seven children. In 2009 she was murdered by her partner, Terry Vital. Prior to her murder, all her children had been taken by Canadian state social services because of Vital’s abuse, and because of alcohol use in the home (YWCA 2009). It is difficult to conceive of a more intense private intervention than separating children from their family and community. Yet the state did not intervene when Black called the police from a hotel room after being kicked in the mouth by Vital a year before he killed her. This is not a story of simple nonintervention in the private sphere, but of selective, strategic intervention. Aboriginal children make up 40 percent of Canadian children in foster care (Trocmé et al. 2004), a huge overrepresentation when the Aboriginal population currently comprises only 3.75 percent of the Canadian population. In the Northwest Territories and in provinces with significant Aboriginal populations, the foster care system is populated almost exclusively with Aboriginal children. It is described as the new residential school, a process that breaks Aboriginal families and communities, then justifies itself by arguing that they are broken.

Black’s story speaks to the problematic and underlying privilege in an approach to violence against women that is mapped through the public/private divide. It is an inaccurate and exclusionary approach for the many women who have never been offered the privilege of “privacy” by state or society to pursue the life they desire, and for the women whose experience of work, community, and family exists entirely outside of the public/private dichotomy. For indigenous women in Canada, their family and community lives have never been private. Indigenous antiviolence activism and theorizing have developed outside of the Western liberal public/private paradigm and through a very different understanding of state intervention. Instead of calling on the state to do more to end so-called private violence, it is approached through a critique of colonial and capitalist state violence.

Indeed, without the privilege of imagining violence against women as an expression of patriarchy alone, feminists of color from both the global North and South have long argued that feminists must approach violence against women through an engagement
with structural violence. For example, hooks (1984) argues that violence acted upon poor black women and men in the so-called public realm—through discrimination, harassment, exploitation, threats of violence, and actual violence experienced in places of work, schools, and the streets—is inextricably linked to violence in the home. This relationship is concealed when the public/private divide is assumed as a social reality.

Drawing on this critique by hooks and other antiracist theorists, Kimberle Crenshaw argues that violence against women in the home must be understood through violent structural inequalities based on race and class. In a discussion of women’s shelters that serve minority communities in Los Angeles, she notes:

_in most cases, the physical assault that leads women to these shelters is merely the most immediate manifestation of the subordination they experience. Many women who seek protection are unemployed or underemployed, and a good number of them are poor. Shelters serving these women cannot afford to address only the violence inflicted by the batterer; they must also confront the other multilayered and routinized forms of domination that often converge in these women’s lives, hindering their ability to create alternatives to the abusive relationships that brought them to shelters in the first place. . . . These burdens, largely the consequence of gender and class oppression, are then compounded by the racially discriminatory employment and housing practices women of color often face._

(Crenshaw 1991, 1245–1246)

An anti-imperialist, antiracist feminism implicitly conceptualizes violence through broader axes of oppression and exploitation. However, though there may be a broad consensus that embodied violence must be engaged with through material and ideological structures, there is an important divergence in the way these links are made. Sedef Arat-Koc (2001) offers an insightful discussion of ways to approach the relationship between embodied violence and exploitative structures. She notes the analytical and political tension between embodied violence and social inequality, on the one hand, and the worry that “extreme broadness” in definition lacks epistemological clarity and has the potential to obscure particular and immediate experiences of embodied violence. Arat-Koc distinguishes between violence and structural exploitation, while remaining attentive to their relationship and the fact that it is mediated by the state. Other anti-imperialist, antiracist feminists do not demarcate between structures of violence and embodied violence. For example, in her work on sexual violence against Aboriginal women in North America, Andrea Smith conceptualizes large-scale processes of appropriation, restructuring, and degradation (e.g., environmental exploitation) as gendered violence. She also understands sexual violence as a state tool of racism, colonialism, and patriarchy, as a tactic—and not simply an effect—of gendered colonial exploitation (2005, 8).

Like Smith, many feminists of the global South and North approach gendered violence through transnational spatial power relations. Indeed, Anna Agathangelou (2004) argues that the violence of neoliberal globalization—wherein the violence of capital exploitation is given greater mobility and freedom within and across borders—must be understood both structurally and corporeally. Patricia Hill Collins (2006) illustrates this transnational approach to violence and vulnerability in her discussion of Nigerian girls and women forced into sex trafficking in Italy. For Collins, one cannot approach
the particular violence experienced by these girls and women without a spatial feminist political economy of global exploitative structures. I argue that these theoretical approaches offer a useful base from which to organize transnationally against both structural and embodied violence, which I discuss in the final section of this chapter. In the next section I explore feminist strategies to eliminate violence against women, at varying levels of intervention.

**Feminist Strategies to End Violence**

**Antiviolence Feminism and the State**

Returning to the liberal feminist philosophy of the battered women’s movements in the 1970s and 1980s, its aim was to make the personal political and to make the private public. Many antiviolence feminist strategies of the 1970s and 1980s in the global North reflected these principles, which were manifested in organizing directed largely at the state. It is important not to confuse this early activism on violence against women with the contemporary manifestations of their effort; that is, to assume that the first support mechanisms (shelters, crisis centers, etc.) were characterized by the same politics as today. Indeed, though many of today’s organizations focused on violence against women or gender-based violence are depoliticized, professionalized service-provision entities—a shift I discuss below—the early battered women’s movement was a politicized process seeking to challenge patriarchal power structures.

In Canada the movement initially focused on opening women’s shelters for survivors of physical and sexual violence. In 1975, the year designated as International Women’s Year by the UN and the first year these data were collected, there were only eighteen shelters in Canada. Between 1975 and 1992 more than five hundred shelters were established, with the number leveling off after that point (Statistics Canada 2006). Many early shelters existed through a “sister solidarity model” (Schneider 1994), wherein women seeking support were not seen simply as clients, but rather as allies and activists themselves. Susan Schechter, charting the explosion of shelter services in the United States as it was occurring, wrote, “Although the programs for battered women that emerged in the 1970s articulated a multiplicity of philosophies, they shared one common belief: battered women faced a brutality from their husbands and an indifference from social institutions that compelled redress. This theme stimulated networks among thousands of women and programs throughout the United States, Canada and Europe” (1982, 54).

In the 1980s antiviolence efforts in Canada shifted from shelter services to an increasing focus on the criminal justice system (Koshan 1997). Feminist law reform efforts took up MacKinnon’s challenge to make the private public and to criminalize private violence. Koshan notes that in Canada up until that point, male violence against women was often dealt with in family court, if it was dealt with at all. As in much of the world, violence against women in the home was usually characterized as “domestic disputes,”
and sexual violence was consistently dismissed through sexist rhetoric, ranging from “just a case of he said/she said” to “she was asking for it” to “marital sexual obligation.” These patriarchal beliefs combined with a lack of juridical tools to create a culture of impunity for men who used violence against women. Feminists who pursued legal reform saw the judiciary as an arena that had the potential to provide “symbolic and actual justice for women” (Clark 1989–1990, 428) and “to increase public awareness of the issue of intimate violence” (Currie 1990, 405, quoted in Koshan 1997, 92).

Notably, in 1982 feminist lobbying succeeded in changing the Criminal Code of Canada so that rape was defined as an act that could occur not only outside of marriage, but also within marriage. A decade later the Criminal Code was further amended to define consent to sexual acts as “voluntary agreement to engage in the activity,” rather than leaving the question of consent to a judge’s interpretation (Sheehy 1999). Sheehy also noted, however, that the 1982 amendment removed the word “rape” from the Criminal Code, replacing it with “sexual assault” written in gender-neutral terms. This gender-neutral language persists to this day and has led to an increased criminalization of women, who are often countercharged by their assailants. It has also informed the depoliticization of family violence services.

In sum, the predominant antiviolence political strategies emanating from both radical and liberal feminists in the global North in the 1970s and 1980s often focused on demanding state support services and juridical responses to violence against women. These demands were enormously successful on paper. However, the results—more shelters, better legislation for women who are victims of violence—have not succeeded in significantly reducing violence against women. This is because state services, particularly the criminal justice system, reproduce the structural inequalities and violence that enable violence against women. While the importance of these services for the immediate wellbeing and safety of many women must not be ignored, neither must their gaps, exclusions, and inadequacies. Where state services do not address the structures of violence that support individual expressions of violence, they become complicit in these structures through that omission.

Indeed, beyond very real and important logistical barriers (a lack of services in an area, linguistic barriers, lack of knowledge about services, etc.), the risks a woman can assume in seeking help from domestic violence are great. (Here I’m referring specifically to state or state-sanctioned help—legal services, social services, etc.—not the many informal supports a woman may access to help herself when she is faced with domestic violence.) The possible benefits, on the other hand, are limited. For example, given the intensely racialized nature of the Canadian judicial process, a woman of color is much more likely than a white woman to face the social burden of “putting someone in jail.” The cost of having a partner in jail is sometimes simply not an option for poor families, which again is a deeply racialized phenomenon. The possible safety benefit of having someone in jail is limited, as jail terms for domestic violence are usually quite short, and a jail term has the potential of exacerbating a person’s violent behavior upon his return. Further, depending on the immigration status of a woman or her partner, either one could face deportation if state services become involved in their private life.
When seeking help a woman will attempt to ascertain how she will be treated. In a national context in which Aboriginal women are consistently tacitly written off as “deserving” of violence (Jiwani and Young 2006; Razack 2002) and the private lives of immigrant women are under constant interrogation, it would not be surprising if a woman chose not to engage with the state about something as painful and sensitive as domestic violence. Jennifer Koshan (1997) provides an excellent illustration of this argument in her discussion of the options available to women living in small northern Aboriginal communities, where the services are limited, the racism of the Canadian justice system is potent, and the possibility of anonymity is nonexistent.

Mandatory charging provides a particularly potent illustration of the inadequacies of the criminal justice approach. Many jurisdictions in Canada and the United States have adopted mandatory charging policies in cases of domestic violence. The justification for this has been that previously, police discretion often interpreted the abuse or rape of women as “marital problems” or “domestic disputes.” The purpose of mandatory charging is thus to eliminate this possibility. This shift emphasized that domestic violence was no longer viewed as a civil matter being brought by an individual against a perpetrator, but rather as a criminal matter being prosecuted by the state. Mandatory charging provides a level of assurance for victims of violence in that, on paper, once there is evidence that a violation has occurred, they are not subject to the whims and prejudices of individual police officers; in addition, the judicial machinery of the state takes responsibility for pursuing the case. However, in practice this is not always the case. Mandatory charging has in fact led to increased vulnerability for many women. It dissuades women who are uncomfortable with the criminal justice system from calling the police, because they no longer have a say in whether or not to prosecute their partners. Further, coupled with the gender-neutral language around domestic violence, it has led to an increase in dual charging, wherein a man who is being arrested simultaneously accuses his wife of abuse, and both end up being incarcerated.

The impact of this development falls directly on the shoulders of poor people and people of color, who feel the aggression of the prison system most consistently. The criminal justice system—and the state, more broadly—is not a safe space for all women, and the assumption that it is emanates from race and class privilege. Over the past forty years Angela Davis (1981, 2000) has voiced a powerful critique of criminalization as a solution to violence against women, arguing that for women in communities that are intensely policed and criminalized, increased juridicization makes women less safe, not more so. She thus argues for feminist analysis and action rooted against structures of racism, capitalism, and imperialism:

*We need to develop an approach that relies on political mobilization rather than legal remedies or social service delivery. We need to fight for temporary and long-term solutions to violence and simultaneously think about and link global capitalism, global colonialism, racism, and patriarchy.*

(Davis 2000, 5)
For centuries indigenous communities in Canada have been targeted by the military and police. It is therefore not surprising that Aboriginal women have pursued anti-violence strategies that name colonial violence, rather than relying on (violent) state structures. The following discussion outlines a feminist approach to violence against Aboriginal women in Canada that explicitly links embodied incidents of violence to past and present gendered colonial violence:

The overrepresentation of Aboriginal women in Canada as victims of violence must be understood in the context of a colonial strategy that sought to dehumanize Aboriginal women. While the motivations and intersections may differ, NWAC has found that colonization remains the constant thread connecting the different forms of violence against Aboriginal women in Canada. The value of Aboriginal women is diminished by the persistence of patriarchal values that, consciously or not, continue to influence and regulate social norms and gender relations.

(Sisters in Spirit 2010, 2)

This quotation is taken from the Sisters in Spirit campaign, a research and advocacy initiative undertaken by the Native Women's Association of Canada (NWAC). The program addressed violence against Aboriginal women in general, but its primary focus was the 580 Aboriginal women who have gone missing or been murdered over the past three decades in Canada and the limited state response. Mainstream media reporting on these missing and murdered women tend to focus on the fact that many of the women had engaged in sex work (Jiwani and Young 2006; Razack 2004) and are thus somehow more “deserving” of violence. In contrast, the work of Sisters in Spirit tells the stories of these women’s lives, of their friends and families, and situates the violence acted upon them within the context of colonization.

The Sisters in Spirit campaign emerged following a long history of impunity for violence against Aboriginal women in Canada. Sherene Razack’s Race, Space and the Law: Unmapping a White Settler Society (2003) captures this dynamic: from the brutal murder of Helen Betty Osborne by four white men, after which sixteen years passed before anyone was brought to trial, to the more recent mass murders of women—many of whom were Aboriginal—in a low-income neighborhood in Vancouver. Although the latter incident was the biggest serial killer case in Canadian history, it was characterized by years of limited response by the police. Andrea Smith, writing on sexual violence in Aboriginal communities in Canada and the United States, argues, “Native peoples’ individual experience of sexual violation echo 500 years of sexual colonization in which Native peoples’ bodies have been deemed inherently impure” (2005, 13) and thus inherently violable.

The Sisters in Spirit campaign sought to put an end to this impunity, challenging both individual violence and structural violence through a feminist, anticolonial framework. The campaign is an example of local organizing working in concert with international organizations. Drawing on the research done by Sisters in Spirit, Amnesty International (2009) and the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Committee 2010) have condemned the Canadian government for the high
Feminist Strategies to End Violence Against Women

rates of violence against Aboriginal women— in a 2004 survey, it was reported that rates of violence against Aboriginal women were 3.5 times higher than against non-Aboriginal Canadian women— as well as for the 580 Aboriginal women who have gone missing or been murdered in the past three decades and the limited state response (Amnesty International 2009, 4). International attention and grassroots organizing (annual vigils and marches) continue in an attempt to make violence against Aboriginal women visible and therefore abolish the impunity. In various regions around the country, these events and initiatives continue to be led by local Aboriginal women’s groups, connected through the national umbrella of the Sisters in Spirit project and supported by transnational feminist/Aboriginal movements and networks.

This is a good example of an international human rights framework providing useful tools for local organizing and greater scope for voicing demands. Indigenous communities in the Americas are often framed as “broken” and therefore irremediably violent. This erroneous discourse is mobilized to justify and mask impunity for high rates of violence. Feminists have strategically used the language of the “universality of human rights” to combat this impunity, drawing on state commitments to eliminate gender-based violence to challenge the Canadian government’s lack of response to violence against indigenous women. However, at the same time that universal human rights language has been used in a call for greater state action, indigenous women have asserted the violence inherent in the Canadian state’s past and present colonization of indigenous populations. Thus, although the Native Women’s Association drew on international human rights instruments to further its demands, it did not compromise the historically grounded analysis of gendered exploitation and colonization. This exemplifies the complex relationship between antiviolence activists— particularly those from marginalized communities— and the state. The Sisters in Spirit campaign is at once pointing to the ongoing colonial violence of the Canadian state and demanding protection from that state for individual acts of violence that emanate from these structural relations. This is not a contradictory position, but rather a complex one that must be pursued for the safety and dignity of the women most marginalized by state violence, inside and outside its borders.

Unfortunately this example also demonstrates the limited reach of international norms. In autumn 2010 the Canadian government cut funding for the continuation of the Sisters in Spirit project. This was done without warning; the Native Women’s Association of Canada had in fact been expecting a CAD $10 million renewal grant. The funding was “redirected” to the Department of Justice and the Ministry of Public Safety (Sterritt 2010). The withdrawal of funding was ironic and clandestine, given that it occurred only months after the Canadian government responded to Amnesty International and the CEDAW Committee about the concerns uncovered by the Sisters in Spirit initiative, arguing that it had earmarked a great deal of funding for addressing the problem of violence against Aboriginal women, including providing the initial funding for Sisters in Spirit itself (CEDAW Committee 2010). However, I argue that the withdrawal of funding is the result of the increasingly punitive, austere response to violence against women under neoliberalism. This is discussed in the final section of the chapter. First I turn to developments in international human rights organizing.
Antiviolence Feminism and Human Rights

The Beijing Platform for Action defines violence against women as

*any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm, or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or private life.*

(United Nations 1995, 73, 112)

As a result of global feminist organizing, this definition offers a fairly expansive articulation of violence against women, although it is specific to embodied and not structural violence. However, to suggest that this definition crystallizes one particular theoretical approach to violence against women would be misplaced; rather, it is the result of feminist political action emanating from different theoretical positions and geopolitical locations, and their engagements with both state-level and international institutions.

International human rights, as a normative framework and political tool for addressing violence against women, falls on the fault line between progression and regression. International human rights instruments have provided important and effective tools for transnational feminist organizing against violence, but this framework has also been co-opted as a legislative veil that obscures “business-as-usual” international policy and practice,17 and in a twisted irony has also been appropriated by imperial powers to justify large-scale violence. This section discusses the ambivalent history of the relationship between feminist antiviolence activism and human rights.

In the early 1990s violence against women emerged at the forefront of the struggle for women’s rights as human rights. The UN Third World Conference on Women, held in Nairobi in 1985, had resulted in the first UN General Assembly Resolution on domestic violence; however, the resolution was not gender specific,18 nor did it offer much in the way of political or legal teeth. The resolution oscillated between characterizing domestic violence as an interpersonal problem, calling for “appropriate methods of conflict resolution between the parties involved,” and a social problem, “which should be examined from the perspective of crime prevention and criminal justice in the context of socio-economic circumstances” (United Nations 1985). The suggested strategies to end violence mirror the strategies developed by the battered women’s movement in the global North (discussed below), although the analysis of patriarchy intrinsic to their praxis was omitted in the resolution. These strategies were increased social services (e.g., shelters and counseling), civil and criminal legislation directed toward domestic violence, and increased communications and research on the issue.

At the World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna in 1993, women’s organizations, building on a decade of mobilization, drew on the new human rights language and called for “women’s rights as human rights” (Merry 2006; Miller 2004). The CEDAW Committee put forward General Recommendation 19, which framed violence against women as a violation of human rights. This recommendation sought to make explicit the gendered nature of violence in the home and to broaden the scope from violence in the home to all forms of gendered violence. The recommendation led to
a UN Declaration on Violence Against Women, prepared by the CEDAW Committee and adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1993. The declaration does not articulate violence against women as a human rights violation, but it does define gender-based violence and makes explicit the state’s responsibility to address the issue. Two years after this the UN Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing, expanded the 1993 definition of gender-based violence and highlighted “specific forms of violence not explicitly mentioned in the Declaration.” These included forms of gender-based violence that had become more apparent since the adoption of the declaration, such as “violations of the rights of women in situations of armed conflict, forced sterilization and forced abortion, coercive or forced use of contraceptives, female infanticide and prenatal sex selection” (Connors 2005, 26–27). The Beijing Platform for Action also addressed marginalized women’s increased vulnerability to violence, which had not been made explicit until then.

These events mark a watershed in international organizing against gender-based violence. However, although feminist success in incorporating violence against women into the UN agenda was a new development, antiviolence feminist organizing across borders was far from new. While feminists in the global North focused largely on the state as their entry point for intervention, feminist movements in the global South had been analyzing global processes of exploitation and violence. Indeed, in the 1980s, before transnational theorizing on violence against women was on the radar of many feminists in the global North, Latin American feminist activists were making important links among US imperialism, state militarization, and violence against women in the home. Their activism took on these multiple sites of struggle simultaneously. In Honduras, for example, women’s movements against violence in the home emerged out of a mobilization against American troops in the country. Gladys Lanza, director of Visitacion Padilla—a feminist organization that provides services for victims of violence and for the last twenty-five years has been central to feminist activism in Honduras—describes the country in the 1980s as the “backyard” of the United States, a dumping ground for troops and military equipment that generated the mass militarization of a country that was ostensibly at peace. Lanza argued that the militarization of Honduras planted the seed for a culture of violence that was made manifest not just in military torture and disappearances, but also in the home. Thus, feminist activists rejected the presence of the military, both national and foreign. Among other actions, in 1995 a group of feminist activists went on a hunger strike for fourteen days and ten hours to protest obligatory military service in Honduras. Through this action they made explicit the links among state militarization, imperial occupation, and violence against women. Their demands were met, and obligatory military service was abolished in Honduras.

Although this example of feminist organizing in Honduras cannot be used to generalize about theory and strategy in other parts of the global South, it provides a useful context for the advent of the human rights approach to violence against women. Rather than a leap from the domestic to the international by feminists of the global North, the human rights approach emerged through decades of organizing by feminists of the global South and North and their engagement with international organizations. Feminist analyses
point to the ambivalence inherent in this process. Alice Miller (2004), for example, argues that violence against women was pushed to the forefront of the women's human rights agenda because it straddles the realms of rights and public health, both emerging political frameworks with a great deal of clout in the early 1990s. Miller notes that sexual violence, in particular, seems to have resonated in international political circles, perhaps because it embodied the gendered relations of power manifested in gender-based violence. She points to the ambivalence of violence against women read in public health or human rights terms: while the assertion that violence against women as a human rights violation has enormous transformative potential, it also has the potential to be read in regressive terms as a cry for protection. Similarly, Ratna Kapur (2002) notes the potential of this discourse to position women (particularly women of the global South) as perpetual victims.

Indeed, at the same time that feminist activists have used human rights tools to illuminate and eradicate particular vulnerabilities to violence in different global spaces, imperial powers have used violence against women to justify racist policies within their borders and occupation of lands outside their borders. Imperial violence has been rewritten as the protection of women from “violent, backward cultures” by a “non-cultural—and therefore non-violent” West, a strategy that serves to exacerbate local gendered violence. In writing on international law and colonialism, Elizabeth Philipose argues:

> Women's bodies in these instances of international law perform a recurring function in colonial systems—they are the justification for intervention, occupation, prosecution and colonialism. This is not to suggest that rape and sexual assault against women ought not to be prosecuted; rather, it is to draw attention to the form that prosecution might take, and the functions of international law given its colonial intent and foundations.

(Philipose 2008, 112)

This strategy is far from new. In tracing the continuities and splits in old and new colonial narratives, Anne McClintock (1995) outlines the way in which “indigenous” treatment of women—and particularly colonial discourses surrounding violence against women—is framed as a demonstration of their lack of civilizedness and therefore justifies domination, occupation, or colonization. This old colonial strategy has been remapped onto human rights structures through the language of cultural violence, which ascribes an inherent violence to certain non-Western cultures and places these in opposition to ostensibly noncultural, universal human rights. The alleged tension between a culture (usually written as homogeneous and static) and individual rights is a tension imposed by a hegemonic ordering of a secular West over a “backward” Other. This framing accomplishes a few things: it binds violence to a culture, erases the possibility of violence in the dominant culture, and erases the possibility of resistance from within a culture.

Himani Bannerji (2000) offers a potent challenge to this strategy, confronting the heavy silence around violence against women in communities of color in Canada. She
identifies the ways in which dominant political forces interact with minority groups to create a static notion of “community” and challenges the erroneous assumption that violence in some communities is “natural,” while at the same time bringing attention to the very real vulnerabilities faced by women in minority communities. She offers an excellent analysis of how the state works in concert with elite men from minority communities to create a falsely “static” version of culture that protects the propertied elite of minority communities at the expense of challenging patriarchy within communities:

In this erasure of class and gender, in protecting property and its proprieties, the “traditional” communities and the “modern” Canadian state show a remarkable similarity and practical convergence. . . . Through the mask of pre-modernity and anti-materialism they [the propertied elite] participate most effectively in a capitalist state of a highly modern nature. In return for proclaiming a primordial traditionality they are left alone as rulers of their own communities.

(Bannerji 2000, 166–167)

Nowhere has this been more evident in the past decade than in national and international responses to “crimes of honor,” or violence against women in communities read as Arab or Muslim. I put the phrase in quotations because, like Lynn Wellchman and Sara Hossain (2005), I am concerned by fixed definitions of “crimes of honor” that reduce the extreme violence the term encompasses to a cultural justification and, in so doing, simultaneously reduce a culture or belief system to that same violence. The culture versus rights dichotomy obfuscates what should be the central focus of these crimes—an extremely violent abuse of power—in the interest of subscribing to a binary that, in its rigidity, is unable to provide space for the agency of, or solidarity with, the women who are victims of these crimes, and may indeed facilitate their further oppression. Not only does this framing position Muslim women as victims of their culture, in its reliance on a dichotomy between culture and nonculture (i.e., Western culture), but it also creates an assumption of a Western society free from gendered and family violence. This conflation was central to the rhetoric justifying the US-led occupation of Afghanistan and is consistently recycled to shore up racist policymaking in the West. The mobilization of “crimes of honor” rhetoric is transnational in its intent and manifestations: it maps itself on the bodies of women whose communities are ravaged by conflict and “marginalized” women who live in imperial centers. Following is an illustration of the ways in which these structures are made manifest in the lives of racialized immigrant communities in Canada.

In 2007 Aqsa Parvez was killed in her Mississauga home by her father and brother. The youngest of eight children, she was sixteen years old. In the summer of 2010 her father and brother were tried and found guilty of murder. The trial was beset by a storm of controversy about the nature of this murder; that is, it was a cultural act, specifically an “honor killing.” Parvez’s father, Muhammed Parvez, was widely quoted as justifying his act by pointing to the embarrassing nature of his daughter’s actions and wants, which according to the national newspaper The Globe and Mail (2010), included hanging out
with her friends and wearing Western clothing. He said, “This is my insult. My community will say you have not been able to control your daughter. She is making me naked” (quoted in Wente 2010).

Coverage in Canada’s two national newspapers, *The Globe and Mail* and *The National Post*, subscribed to the alleged tension between (minority) culture and rights. Wente’s article was entitled, “The Immigration Debate We Don’t Want to Have.” The national media response was largely in line with the Canadian government’s response to this crime. Rona Ambrose, federal minister for the status of women, defined “real Canadian society” in opposition to the Parvez murder: “There is a small minority in some communities who use violence against women as a method of avenging their so-called honour. Let me be explicit: This type of violence, the most extreme of which is often [known] as ‘honour killing,’ has no place in Canadian society” (quoted in Galloway 2010).

This event coincided with the launch of a report, endorsed by the Canadian government, in which Aruna Papp contrasts cultural violence with a noncultural, nonviolent version of the West, writing that “violence against women is deplored in general in Canada. . . . In contrast, culturally driven violence is statistically frequent, stems from culturally approved codes around collective family honour and shame, is condoned and even facilitated by kinship groups and the community” (2010, 4–5). She adds that “although Western culture was in a generic sense also ‘patriarchal’ before women’s accession to the vote and their marks of complete legal and political equality, physical violence against daughters and wives was never a sanctioned practice here or in any Western country” (2010, 8). Minister Ambrose drew on this report to suggest intensifying screening in Canadian immigration. Beyond the deep racism informing this reaction, identifying insufficient screening as the aspect of Canadian immigration policies and procedures that causes problems for immigrant women is tragically ironic. Canada’s immigration policies have consistently been characterized by racism and sexism, greatly contributing to the vulnerability of immigrant women, which has intensified in recent years. Rather than looking to the very real vulnerabilities faced by immigrant women in Canada, this framing supports the intensified racialization and militarization of Canada’s borders, which can be traced to the Harper government, post 9/11 politics, and more generally the right-wing shift in government under neoliberalism.

**Ways Forward: Challenging Physical and Structural Violence**

In North America the battered women’s movement of the 1970s and 1980s was driven by a relatively politicized (albeit problematic) feminist agenda. Today these same issues and actions are often advanced through a professionalized, individualized, criminalized service-provision agenda. Gillian Walker argues that domestic violence has increasingly
been framed outside of politicized terms, as something clinical and thus requiring individual treatment, or as a legal offense against the state (2003, 271). Walker traces theoretical and strategic debates in mainstream feminist organizations in North America, noting that organizers and service providers chose (depoliticized) language that they thought would yield state responses. These choices—though they may have expedited short-term gains—have ultimately undermined transformative organizing around violence against women and inhibited grassroots alliance building within and across borders.

This move toward depoliticized antiviolence work cannot be understood outside of the shifting political economy, and in particular the increasingly punitive austerity of neoliberalism. The battered women's movement gained prominence in the global North in the era of the welfare state. The welfare state, as noted by Amina Mama (1989) in a discussion of the United Kingdom, was premised on a system of race and gendered exclusions; thus, one should not reify this moment as one we should attempt to return to. However, neither should we ignore the political space made available by welfare state policies and thinking, space that feminists used to transform responses and services to violence against women in a number of countries in a few short decades. Through neoliberal policies that have intensified over the past two decades, this space has increasingly been encroached upon. As such, many feminist organizations that existed in the West in spaces of relative stability and autonomy from the state now must scramble and compete for funding, twisting their mandates through feats of grant-writing acrobatics in order to stay afloat. Organizations that are partially or fully state funded are often restricted by state funding regulations that demand limited or no “political content” or “advocacy.” This austerity is coupled with an increasingly punitive response to violence against women. For example, as of 2004 the British Columbia government eliminated funding for women's centers, although research has clearly shown that many women will not make use of police-based programs (Todd and Lundy 2006, 366).

In this climate, many antiviolence activists—particularly feminists of color—are calling for creative, progressive solutions to ending violence against women. At the important “Color of Violence” conference in the United States, 24 feminists came together to ask what it would mean to “develop strategies that address community and state violence simultaneously” (INCITE 2006). Common themes that emerged from this conference, and subsequent publications and activism, are strategies that are community driven, antiracist, and transnational.

How, then, can communities come together to challenge violence against women and build safe, equitable spaces? As mentioned previously, indigenous communities in Canada and the United States are exploring restorative justice as an alternative to criminal justice, focusing on local anticolonial solutions, long-term safety for women, and overall community health. Although this should not be looked upon as a panacea, it offers promise in concert with community education. Communities Against Rape and Abuse (CARA), a grassroots antirape organizing project in Seattle, suggests that communities develop accountability strategies based on prioritizing the self-determination
of the survivor and long-term commitment to identifying clear demands and approaches, ongoing political analysis, and developing allies (CARA 2006). Sista II Sista is a “Brooklyn-wide, community-based organization located in Bushwick, New York. . . . [It is] a collective of working-class, young and adult, Black and Latina women building together to model a society based on liberation and love” (Sista II Sista 2006, 197). Its antiviolence model is based on community engagement and education. The group has operated a Freedom School for young women and organized Sista’s Liberated Ground as an alternative to turning to the police for safety. Sista’s Liberated Ground is a reclaimed area in Bushwick where violence is not tolerated: women from the organization built a public awareness campaign around the ground and inaugurated the space on July 28, 2004, at a block party at which community members were asked to sign an antiviolence pledge. The pledge reads:

I believe that in the struggle for justice, women’s personal safety is an important community issue. Violence against women hurts families, children and the whole community. As a member of this community, I commit myself to ending violence against women! I stand in support of Sista’s Liberated Ground, a territory where violence against women is not tolerated. I commit myself to working with the community to collectively confront cases of violence against women without the police and to work together so that violence against women stops happening. I will dedicate myself to creating relationships based on respect, love and mutual support and to struggling for justice and liberation on a personal and community level.

(Sista II Sista 2006, 204)

Inherent in these examples is a simultaneous engagement with race, class, and gender. Andrea Smith (2005, 2006) argues that an antiracist approach to violence against women is not one that includes women of color, but one that is premised on answering the question: What would it take to end violence against women of color? This sentiment echoes the challenge made by bell hooks, cited at the beginning of this chapter. I add to Smith’s formulation: What would it take to end violence against women across the globe? In violence enacted on women’s bodies, one can read local and global structures of violence, and responses to one must be tied to the other. As neoliberal retrenchment has snatched back many of the social gains made by feminists in the 1970s and 1980s, the response must not be one of defense. Instead, by reflecting on the limitations of antiviolence work that lacks an analysis of imperialism, racism, homophobia, and capitalism, and in rising to face new forms of sexism, austerity, conservatism, and xenophobia, feminist challenges to violence must expand, not contract. As articulated in the INCITE statement of purpose:

We seek to build movements that not only end violence, but that create a society based on radical freedom, mutual accountability, and passionate reciprocity. In this society, safety and security will not be premised on violence or the threat of violence; it will be based on a collective commitment to guaranteeing the survival and care of all peoples.

(INCITE 2006, 226)
Notes

1. This chapter is dedicated to the memory of Alice Black and Aqsa Parvez.
2. This will be discussed further in the chapter, but I am referring here to an increasingly individualized, depoliticized service provision approach to violence against women pursued, for example, by the Canadian government, through terminating funding to feminist organizations and moving victim services from community organizations to police-based agencies.
3. This formulation draws upon what Chandra Mohanty (2003) calls a democratization of experience; that is, an ongoing commitment to challenge falsely universalist conceptions built upon privilege, through meaningful democratization of academic and activist spaces. This democratization can be understood in contrast to tokenism, wherein so-called marginalized voices are included only in order to achieve optics of diversity or to satisfy vague commitments to multiculturalism.
4. The theoretical and political antiviolence trends described here were similar in the United Kingdom and Western Europe. However, for the sake of analytical rigor I focus primarily on North America.
5. In outlining early debates over language and approaches to violence in Canada, Walker stated that *wife abuse* was the preferred term, as it spoke to the gendered nature of the violence, but that frontline workers were concerned it would deter women who were not wives from seeking attention (2003, 258–59). Interestingly, at the time *domestic violence* and *family violence* seemed to be equated with one another. In contemporary discourse, *family violence* is the preferred state term, as it is not gender specific, whereas *domestic violence*, because of its activist history, carries a distinctly gendered connotation and a feminist association.
7. I focus on indigenous feminist anticolonial approaches to violence in Canada below.
8. Although a full discussion it is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is also important to acknowledge the engagement with gendered violence and its intersections with race and class by the international women’s peace movement (see Boyce Davies 2008).
9. Crenshaw’s formulation is a foundational piece in feminist intersectional analysis.
10. With regard to the gendered violence inherent in capitalism, Silvia Federici (2004) argues that capitalist production and reproduction is made possible through an ongoing violent appropriation of women’s lives and bodies. She illustrates this premise through a gendered analysis of the original capitalist accumulation and its relationship to the witch hunt in Europe.
11. In arguing for an intersectional approach to understanding violence against women of color, Kimberle Crenshaw (1991) provides a useful account of the logistical barriers they face in the United States when attempting to access antiviolence services. To give one example, she recounts the story of a woman who was forced to leave her home after her husband threatened to kill both her and her son. An immigrant from Latin America, she spoke little English. Because her language abilities were in Spanish rather than English, she was denied access to the local shelter, the shelter workers arguing that she would be unable to meaningfully consent to services or participate in counseling. When it was suggested that her son translate for her, the shelter argued that her inability to speak for herself would revictimize her. As a result, she was left homeless.
Mandatory charging of men and women accused of violence against their spouses was introduced into the Criminal Code of Canada in 1983 and has been duplicated by various jurisdictions; for example, Ontario adopted a mandatory charging policy in 1994. Some argue that this policy is important in that it eliminates the possibility of individual police officers dismissing a domestic violence call. However, in practice, response remains largely at the discretion of police officers, and as the Ontario Women’s Justice Network (2009) notes, because it does not specifically address the gendered nature of violence in the home, it has increased incidences of dual charges (that is, charging both the man and woman for assault). It also does not offer women the ability to seek police protection without charging the perpetrator. Thus, it serves to further entrench domestic violence as an individualized crime against the state, rather than the result of structural inequalities.

13. INCITE—an antiracist feminist collective working against violence—writes that often mandatory charging leads to police arrest of the battered woman. “[A]s an overall strategy for ending violence, criminalization has not worked. In fact, the overall impact of mandatory arrest laws for domestic violence have led to decreases in the number of battered women who kill their partners in self-defense, but they have not led to a decrease in the number of batterers who kill their partners” (2006, 223).

A punitive response is also potentially dangerous for people who are deemed “illegal” immigrants, whose citizenship status is precarious, or whose citizenship status relies on their partners. Sunera Thobani (1999) speaks to the particular vulnerabilities of immigrants and migrants to domestic violence.

Indigenous communities in Canada and the United States are increasingly implementing restorative justice (rather than criminal justice) responses to physical and sexual violence. While these programs confront many challenges—in particular, ensuring the safety of women and challenging gendered community power relations—they offer an avenue for anticolonial, community-based responses (Smith 2005, 158).

The UN General Assembly Resolution acknowledges its commitment to the fair treatment of women by the criminal justice system and the recommendations made at the Nairobi conference; however, “domestic violence” is written in gender-neutral terms and is viewed largely as a danger to the “family.” Indeed, the resolution reads, “Having regard to the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, in particular to principle 9 concerning the protection of the child against exploitation, neglect and cruelty, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; Mindful of the important role of the family in ensuring the proper development of the young and their integration into the mainstream of society, and in preventing delinquency” (United Nations 1985).


Feminism and War, a collection of essays edited by Robin L. Riley, Chandra Talpade Mohanty, and Minnie Bruce Pratt (2008), provides an excellent analysis of this.

I say “men” here with the understanding that this can also include elite women. Her point is that this is a patriarchal collusion for the advancement of national and global capital.
22. See Riley, Mohanty, and Pratt (2008) for a discussion of this. See also the chapters in this volume by Maryam Khalid and Seema Kazi.

23. Sunera Thobani (1999) wrote about the dependency imposed upon immigrant women by the Canadian state’s gendered immigration categories and their limited access to social services.

24. The Color of Violence conference, held at the University of California–Santa Cruz in 2000, aimed to develop “analyses and strategies around ending violence that place women of color at the centre” (INCITE 2006).

References


SECTION 5

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
SECTION 5 comprises four chapters, by Shahrashoub Razavi, Mariama Williams, Zohra Khan and Majorie Mbilinyi, that analyze how feminist activists working at the national, regional, and international levels have brought to the economic policy arena concerns about the feminization of poverty, women’s role in the care and informal economies, and the gender dimensions of production, trade and taxation, and gender-responsive budgeting.

Shahrashoub Razavi’s chapter, “Care, Social Provisioning and Social Reproduction: Some Reflections on Concepts and Politics from a Development Perspective,” looks at how feminists have brought the subject of care work into economic and social policy in alliance with different institutions, such as the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. The chapter has four sections. The first looks at currents of thinking and scholarship that have contributed to the analysis of care; the second reflects on some conceptual conundrums from a global development perspective; the third delves into the contexts and ideas that have enabled the creation of policies on care, particularly in relation to children, and addresses the disproportionate share of care allocated to women and their households; and the fourth turns to the question of the role of women’s collective action (or lack thereof) in triggering policy action around care in international development. Razavi presents both the conceptual, policy and political dimensions of care, with particular attention on the recent interest in care in developing-country contexts. She describes how feminists have brought to the fore issues of gender equality in the home and in the workplace in social and economic policy. Her analysis of how care has developed in feminist theory and practice highlights the growing literature on care that has emerged from various disciplinary perspectives in feminist economics and social policy research, as well as in philosophical writings on ethics and morality, reflecting the transnational feminist engagement in the issue.

Mariama Williams’s chapter, “Feminist Transnational Organizing on Gender and Trade: The Work of International Gender and Trade Network (IGTN),” looks at transnational mobilizing by feminists around global and regional trade and investment policies. She centers her analysis on the IGTN, which brought together women’s groups from
different arenas across local and global spaces in order to bring a feminist gender perspective to trade policy, trade agreements, and trade decision-making at the national, regional, and multilateral levels. Williams reflects on her own direct experience in this process as the coordinator of IGTN, as she traces the historical and contemporary feminist challenges to conventional economic analyses and policy prescriptions. IGTN is presented as a successful example of how feminists brought a rights-based approach to economic policy in the global arena. Williams underlines how feminist work on trade has emerged from the knowledge, theory, and practice of feminist economic analyses and research since the 1970s. She describes IGTN as an example of a feminist network that formed a conduit from academe, practice, and policy as it helped to shift the global debate on macroeconomic and financial policies.

Zohra Khan's chapter, “Gender-Responsive Budgeting,” looks at feminist practice and analysis in the area of fiscal policy. She sets out how the process of gender-responsive budgeting (GRB) tries to ensure a gender perspective in governmental planning and budgeting by earmarking resources for women's empowerment programs that address gender inequalities. Khan provides a historical and political overview of GRB, from the early experiences in Australia and South Africa to the more recent experiences in Morocco, Ecuador, and Nepal. She sets out the achievements and challenges by delineating three major phases of GRB: (1) the pioneering work done in Australia and South Africa; (2) the political uptake of GRB; and (3) the current high-level institutionalization of GRB within government processes. Khan looks at the alignment between policy commitments and financing for gender equality being forged by strong partnerships between ministries of finance, sector ministries, donors, national women's machineries and women's rights organizations, and women as rights holders. She asks in conclusion that feminists work to ensure that the current process of institutionalizing GRB into government systems does not depoliticize the women's rights agenda.

Majorie Mbilinyi's chapter, “Feminist Animation and Grassroots Women's Struggles for Livelihoods and Land in Tanzania,” provides insights into how global feminist movements’ practice and theory both support and learn from local grassroots research and activism in Tanzania. Her chapter analyzes the last three decades of work of the Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP). Using the framework of “transformative feminism,” the TGNP mobilizes rural women's response to the engagement of multinational corporations in mining, tourism, horticulture and large-scale agriculture that is expelling women peasant farmers and their families from the land. The TGNP instigates campaigns to change the neoliberal political environment that has ignored the productive and reproductive work of women in maintaining their and their families’ livelihoods. Framing her discussion on the TGNP within broader global feminist concerns, Mbilinyi analyzes how the TGNP has built up transformative, locally grounded feminist practice with a broad campaign for economic justice built on the recognition that the injustices of patriarchy and neoliberalism are inseparably interwoven. Using the methodology of animation, the TGNP has pioneered a transformative feminist methodology to support the knowledge, skills, and self-confidence of exploited and oppressed, economically marginal women. Animation uses dialogue to bring out strategies of action
based on local women’s critical analysis and self-awareness. It is based on creative listening to alternative points of view and on participatory ways of organizing, educating, and communicating. Mbilinyi’s self-reflections on the successes and challenges facing the TGNP illustrate how the transnational feminist practice of people-centered participatory development has enabled women in rural Tanzania to engage in local and global struggles over control of their livelihoods and resources.
CHAPTER 16

CARE AND SOCIAL REPRODUCTION

Some Reflections on Concepts, Policies and Politics from a Development Perspective

SHahrashoub Razavi

Introduction

The concept of care is now widely referenced in social science research and teaching, as well as in policy documents emanating from a variety of national, regional, and global institutions. This visibility and legitimacy, however, are of relatively recent vintage. As feminist philosophers, economists, and social policy analysts have argued, the historical invisibility of care reflects the androcentric biases of intellectual thought, within economics to be sure (Folbre 1994), but also in other disciplinary currents such as philosophy (Tronto 1993), sociology, and social policy (Daly and Lewis 2000; Lewis 1992). Given the facts that the actual tasks of caring are perceived as, and often are, quintessentially female/maternal, and that the concept of care itself was developed “to identify the specific, if not unique features of caring as an activity” that constitute a “defining characteristic of women’s life experiences” (Daly and Lewis 2000, 282), it is not surprising that the analysis of care has been most developed within feminist research. For the most part this literature has developed with high-income industrialized countries as its main point of reference.

Care arrangements and relations in developing countries, and their interactions with policy, have not received the same level of visibility and scrutiny. This oversight may have been in part due to the erroneous assumption that families in these contexts played a predominant role in social protection and reproduction, regardless of the broader economic context and without any inputs from states or markets. This lacuna was the main impetus behind the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development...
(UNRISD) research project—The Political and Social Economy of Care—that constitutes my starting point in this chapter. My broader aims, as the title suggests, are twofold, delving into the conceptual as well as policy/political dimensions. After a brief review in the first section of the currents of thinking and scholarship that have contributed to the analysis of care, the second section reflects on some of the conceptual conundrums, especially from a global development perspective. The third delves into some of the contextual and ideational changes that legitimated policy attention to care needs, especially those of children, in the “post-neoliberal” era, and draws attention to some recent policy innovations that ostensibly address the disproportionate share of care that is allocated to women and their households. The final section raises some questions about the role of women’s collective action (or lack thereof) in triggering policy action in this area, before drawing the paper to a close with some conclusions.

**Care at the Intersection of Disciplinary Currents**

The time and effort that people put into taking care of one another—whether mediated through kinship and family ties, neighborly relations and friendship, or paid forms of care—constitute a key input into human wellbeing, not only of children and frail elderly persons, but also of able-bodied adults.¹ Mainstream economics recognizes the contributions of educational and training institutions to the production of “human capital” but has not been willing to acknowledge the far more fundamental part played by care work, carried out within families and households and in care institutions, in the production of human capabilities (Gardiner 1998).

The costs of providing care are unequally borne by women, who perform the bulk of such work in all economies and cultures, whether it is done on an unpaid basis (Budlender 2010) or as a component of paid work (England et al. 2002; Razavi and Staab 2010). It is no surprise then that the analysis of care has been most developed in feminist work. In recent years there has been a growing literature from diverse disciplinary perspectives, underpinned by distinct conceptual and theoretical foundations converging around the issue of care. These intellectual currents include efforts within feminist economics and within social policy research, as well as more philosophical writings on ethics and morality, reflecting transnational feminist engagement with the issue.

The subdiscipline that is now referred to as feminist economics developed in response to the restricted view of “the economy” offered by mainstream economic thinking. The dissatisfaction stemmed from two key elements. One was the fact that mainstream economics privileged the monetized spheres of the economy, while ignoring the sphere of social reproduction, which included both subsistence production and unpaid care. The second issue, shared by other heterodox economists, was the validity and usefulness, for rich countries as well as poor ones, of the neoclassical assumption of rational choice
as a model of individual behavior and of the broader economy and society (Ferber and Nelson 1993). The critical engagement by feminist economists with the mainstream assumptions and practices of their discipline has both been policy oriented and involved engagement with transnational feminist interests. These transnational engagements have been particularly evident in the debates and policy interventions regarding the contours of activities that are counted as being part of “the economy.”

Making visible what is often hidden and taken for granted and providing a representation of the economy as “if women counted” (Waring 1988) has been the driving force behind a good part of feminist scholarship and engagement in policy work on care and related statistical work in time use surveys and “satellite accounts.” After much lobbying by activist networks, researchers, and some governments, the System of National Accounts (SNA) (a set of internationally accepted rules for calculating the gross domestic product or GDP) was revised in 1993 to include (1) undercounted work—that is, work that is not fully counted due to conceptual and methodological problems of data collection, often described as “difficult to measure sectors” within the market economy, and (2) uncounted work—that is, primarily subsistence work, the output of which is meant for self-consumption. Unpaid services for self-consumption (i.e., domestic work, person care, and volunteer work), however, continue to be excluded from the SNA.

The rationale given for this choice was threefold: (1) unpaid care services have limited repercussions on the rest of the economy, (2) it is difficult to impute monetary values to unpaid care services, and (3) the inclusion of unpaid care services will have adverse effects on the usefulness of the accounts for macroeconomic analysis and policy purposes and disturb historical trends. But it was recommended that the unpaid work that is excluded from the SNA production boundary be measured as “extended economic work” (extended SNA or ESNA) and be valued in “satellite accounts.”

Indira Hirway’s response to this exclusion of unpaid care work from the SNA is worth citing at length, as it succinctly captures the reasons for the continued invisibility of unpaid care work within mainstream economics, and also the kind of “productivist” arguments made to legitimize it:

Firstly, these services do not have a limited repercussion on the rest of the economy because these services contribute significantly to the total human welfare and well being and to human capital formation. Secondly, though there are problems with respect to their monetary valuation, these problems are resolvable. And thirdly, attempts need to be made to find out ways and means of incorporating them into macro policies in a meaningful way rather than exclude them from the production boundaries . . . the concept of non-economic unpaid work is in a fluid status, as it may acquire the status of economic unpaid work in the future! The unpaid non-economic work is after all a macroeconomic variable. (2005, 2–3)

In short, the exclusion (of unpaid services such as unpaid domestic and care work) seems arbitrary. In view of the very recent changes taking place under the auspices of the International Labour Organization (ILO) in redefining “work activities,” it may very well have to change. On October 11, 2013, the 19th International Conference of Labour
Statisticians (ICLS) adopted a new resolution, which redefines “work activities” to include all forms of work, including the unpaid care work performed by women and girls in households (ILO 2013).

One aim of feminist engagement with the statistical community and those responsible for the SNA has been to ensure that the work traditionally done by women is “counted in” and hence rendered visible to those who devise policies—to show that it has value and is not an unlimited and cost-free resource. Undertaking valuation, however, is not intended to imply that this work should necessarily be paid; instead the aim is “to provide support for arguments that those who do this work are entitled to a fair share of, and control over, the income generated by the paid work done by members of their family or household” (Budlender 2010, 35).

There is some dissonance, however, between those who highlight and seek to make visible the unpaid “productive” work of women and men and those who emphasize the unpaid care aspects of social reproduction. The former has a long-standing history within the debates on gender and development, going back to the pioneering work of Esther Boserup (1970). By stressing women’s unpaid participation in production, feminist researchers provided a timely challenge both to the definition of work and to the methods of data collection used for generating official statistics. An important component of this endeavor was the attempt to deal with the much-debated category of generally unpaid “family labor” (on smallholder farms and family businesses), as well as unpaid provisioning of water and fuel for household consumption. The analysis of the interpersonal, face-to-face care of persons, on the other hand, emerged from feminist work on advanced industrialized countries and is a relatively recent concern in the gender and development field.

Apart from statistical work, feminist economics has also sought to conceptualize the connections between the sphere of market-based capital accumulation, on the one hand, and that of nonmarket social reproduction, on the other. Two sets of debates in particular have helped crystallize the connections between these two realms. The first has come from work on how the unpaid economy acts as a “shock absorber” in periods of crisis (associated with structural adjustment policies in the South, or neoliberal restructuring more broadly), as well as episodes of rapid accumulation and growth. While the tensions between the commodity economy and the unpaid economy become particularly stark during periods of economic crisis, the process of capital accumulation, even in “successful” development episodes such as in East Asia in the 1960s and 1970s or in China and India more recently, engenders a potential trade-off with levels of nonmarketed output, including unpaid care (Elson 2005).

A second area of work has focused on the tension between providing good quality care beyond domestic institutions on the one hand, and the pressures for cost containment on the other. Good quality care, whether paid or unpaid, is very labor intensive, and therefore said to be afflicted with a “cost disease” (Donath 2000, drawing on William Baumol’s analysis of the service sector more generally). The attempt to raise the productivity of care work by increasing the numbers of people cared for at any one time quickly runs the risk of reducing the quality of the output (care). In other words,
there is a definite limit to the number of infants and small children or frail elderly and
discapacitated adults that one person can care for. “Going beyond this limit results in
neglected children, not productivity improvements” (Donath 2000, 118). How the
problem of high labor content and relatively constant productivity in care services is
dealt with varies depending on where care takes place.

Care providers operating in markets frequently attempt to keep wages down (or
to increase the hours of work for the same wage) by using “docile” labor provided by
socially marginalized social groups. In the public care sector the problem of low pro-
ductivity and the related cost increases are often interpreted as signs of inefficiency,
“rather than as the consequences of an inherent characteristic of care” (Himmelweit
2005, 7). This contributes to political pressures for the commercialization and privatization of public care services, and efforts to make the public sector behave more like
profit-making entities, by raising user charges and/or “rationalizing” staff time, some-
times with perverse outcomes for the quality of care that is delivered.

These are also issues that are analyzed by feminists working on social policy and wel-
fare regimes, who developed the concept (of care) as an important dimension of wel-
fare provision and of welfare state variation (Lewis 1992; Sainsbury 1999). One of the
strengths of this literature has been its cross-national comparative dimension. The other
has been its strong policy focus, using comparative analysis to reflect on the strengths
and weaknesses of various policy instruments (services, cash, time) in terms of a num-
ber of criteria and objectives, including gender equality and women’s choices (Daly
2001). The focus on welfare or care regimes has also underlined the fact that the relative
weight of different societal institutions (states, markets, households, and communities)
has profound implications for vertical and horizontal inequalities. The more redis-
tributive and rights-based approaches of social-democratic welfare states, for example,
illustrates that strong state provision can both mitigate class inequalities and improve
women’s economic independence through generous transfer systems and widely avail-
able public care services. In contrast, in liberal welfare regimes, where market mecha-
nisms dominate, the costs of care are most “privatized,” and the state assumes only a
residual role in its provision; here class inequalities loom large. This in turn leads to
important differences among women from different social and racial backgrounds in
terms of the opportunities and constraints for renegotiating the gender division of labor
and enhancing their economic independence.

It is only over the past decade or so that this body of analytical work on welfare
and care regimes has been extended to developing countries, that is, those with-
out institutionalized welfare states (Martínez Franzoni 2008; Peng 2011). There is a
growing scholarly literature analyzing the political economy of care within developing
countries and the role of public policy in this regard, as will become evident in
the following sections. What is particularly significant from a policy point of view
is the interest shown by the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC) in the topic of care, seeing it closely intertwined with the prob-
lem of inequality in the region. The ECLAC has provided useful analyses of care
through its flagship report, The Social Panorama, drawing on the work of feminists in
the region and sending important signals to its member states about the relevance and urgency of policy action in this area (ECLAC 2012).

Welfare regime analyses have been criticized for their methodological nationalism—that is, for ignoring the role of global forces in shaping within-country power dynamics and welfare settlements. One manifestation of globalism that has received attention in feminist analyses of care in recent years is the dynamics and impacts of cross-border migration of female labor for the purposes of providing social and health care services in people’s homes and public institutions. It has been argued that migration regimes increasingly shape the development of the national care sector (see also Williams and Gavanas 2008). For southern European countries, for example, Bettio, Simonazzi, and Villa (2006) suggest that migrant workers are making up for the structural deficiencies of public elderly care provision by caring for the increasing numbers of elderly people in private households. While this “transition from a ‘family’ to a ‘migrant in the family’ model of care” (272) may appear to be an attractive solution for states that are torn between the need to address growing care demands and the imperative of controlling public expenditure, it raises serious questions of long-term viability and equity.

Conceptual and Definitional Conundrums

Driven by different disciplinary currents and research interests, care has been defined in a variety of ways. Philosophical and ethical perspectives—such as Joan Tronto’s (2012)—have tended to define care broadly, while policy-oriented scholars have leaned toward more narrow definitions that allow for greater empirical operationalization—such as Mary Daly’s and Jane Lewis’s definition of care as “the activities and relations involved in meeting the physical and emotional requirements of dependent adults and children, and the normative, economic and social frameworks within which these are assigned and carried out” (2000, 285).

It is probably fair to say that most of the literature that has the postindustrialized countries as its point of reference has tended to focus on the relational aspects of care as face-to-face activities that strengthen the physical health and safety and the physical, cognitive, or emotional skills of the care recipient (England et al. 2002). This emphasis on nurturing, face-to-face interactions has sidelined domestic work—a set of activities (including cleaning and meal preparation) that provides the basis on which personal caregiving can be carried out, and a concept that was central to Marxist-feminist debates of the 1960s and 1970s. How care is defined has important implications for the visibility of work carried out by different categories of women, located in different regions and also occupying different class and racial groupings.

In developing countries, where time-saving domestic technology and basic social infrastructure are not readily available, domestic tasks like the fetching of water,
processing ingredients, and preparing food can absorb a huge amount of time, perhaps leaving little time for the more “interactive” part of care. This acknowledgment leads to quite a different set of policy priorities necessary to facilitate caregiving than does a narrow focus on the interpersonal aspects of care, an issue that I address in the next section. Even in the advanced industrialized world, domestic work continues to absorb a significant proportion of women’s time among low-income households, which are not able to hire domestic workers or purchase ready-made market substitutes. Biases based on class, race, and citizenship become especially notorious when it comes to paid care work. As Duffy has so eloquently argued, an emphasis on the relational aspects of care inadvertently excludes the employment experiences of poor women and women of color, “who do the back-room work of social reproduction” (2005, 79).

There are also other implications flowing from how care is understood in feminist thinking and research. In some of the existing literature, care is applied as a perspective or lens (rather than being seen as a sector or particular set of responsibilities and activities) through which to interrogate broader policies and structures that facilitate or hamper caregiving. What happens to caregiving and wellbeing in the process of economic development? How does economic development affect household structures, patterns of employment, and family formation? And how do these affect care? Rather than assuming a priori that development/growth will lead to an improvement in caregiving and human welfare, the argument is that macroeconomic policies and development strategies need to be scrutinized with regard to their impact on care.

Tronto (2012) provides a useful illustration of this more macro thinking about care. She underlines the limitations of thinking about care in terms of current emphases on the “political economy of work producing unlimited wealth,” because within such a framework care will always finish last, being seen as an “expensive or dilemma-inducing prerequisite to economic activity” (31). One of the most problematic outcomes of the present arrangement is the vicious circle of inequality that is intensifying and globalizing, wherein “economic inequalities leak over into care inequalities,” and the two reinforce each other. Arguments for making care-giving and receiving it a right (Knijn and Kremer 1997), though important, cannot in her view work within the current hegemonic paradigm that prioritizes the maximization of profits. What is needed instead is a radical reimagining of care’s place—one that starts by placing care at the center of human life, displacing the current priority of “making stuff” or “making money.” Tronto sees this as a political process. Care has to be brought into the public domain through a democratic politics that builds from the ground up and is inclusive of the demands of care workers, care recipients, and family caregivers, and the many social movements (disability rights movements, ecology movements, health-care rights movements, and so on) that are engaged in “maintaining, continuing, and repairing the world.”

A different understanding underscores the notion of a care mix (Daly and Lewis 2000) or a care diamond (Razavi 2007). Here care is used to draw attention to the diverse institutional sites (households, markets, the public sector, the not-for-profit sector) involved in the design, funding, and delivery of care, an issue explored in greater depth in the fourth section, in which I focus on recent policy developments with respect to care.
Diffusing Ideas into the Policymaking Domain

Feminist ideas and research on care have in recent years found their way into policy deliberations and public action, perhaps not always in the way they have been framed by feminists; that is, in relation to gender inequality and women's subordination. This process of diffusion has been made possible through different channels and modalities, including donor circuits and intergovernmental organizations, as well as in more diffuse forms through national, regional, and transnational “epistemic communities.”

There is a significant body of literature tracing how policies relevant for caregiving have been shaped within European welfare states and regional multilateral institutions such as the European Union (EU) and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The concerns raised about care by academic research and some social movements, this literature suggests, began to be taken more seriously by policymaking institutions as patterns of social change brought more women into the paid workforce, as family and household arrangements increasingly diverged from the normative family model (of heterosexual married couple with children), and as concerns grew about falling fertility rates and ageing societies. However, the pace and timing of policy response, as well as the manner in which policy responded, have been highly differentiated across Europe. What is clear is that the issue of care, and of child care in particular, has become central to contemporary redesign of the welfare state in this part of the world. How did this come about?

For some social policy analysts, changing demographic and social patterns required a recalibration of modern welfare states, away from their historical preoccupation with the risks of old age and unemployment visited upon the male breadwinner and his family, to the “new social risks” associated with postindustrial societies and economies (Bonoli 2006). Changes in gender roles, especially the movement of women into the labor market in large numbers, figure as a major driving force here, along with lone parenthood, population ageing, and the growth of unemployment and in-work poverty. Hence, the “new social risks” have been variously defined to include difficulties in reconciling work and family life, single parenthood, rising care needs of frail relatives, possessing low or obsolete skills, and insufficient social security coverage (Bonoli 2006). As Esping-Andersen puts it, assisting families (read women) to reconcile their work and family responsibilities is the surest way of meeting several targets: keeping women in the workforce, combating poverty and its intergenerational transmission, and allowing couples to have the number of children they desire (Esping-Andersen 2009).

These policy responses, however, were far from automatic. To shift policy away from the retrenchment/austerity mindset of the 1980s to one that was responsive to changing social and economic realities required new ideas that were not on offer on the narrow neoliberal menu of retrenchment and marketization. But by the mid-1990s spaces were opening up for new thinking. Jenson (2009, 2010) and Jenson and Saint-Martin (2006)
have traced how policymakers at the international, regional, and national levels began to converge around the key principles of what is now widely referred to as the “social investment perspective,” which is different from the post–World War II model of the welfare state, as well as being different from the residual “safety nets” of the neoliberal era (Jenson 2009, 449–450).

Central to this “postneoliberal” perspective was the notion of the state as an investor: to be effective, state spending must not be consumed in the present, to ameliorate current conditions; it must be an investment that will reap rewards in the future. Closely linked to the idea of the state as an “investor,” the new perspective has also implied a different notion of time to that found in the post-1945 welfare state (Jenson and Saint-Martin 2006; Mahon 2002), which was strongly focused on the task of redistribution and on fostering greater equality in the here and now. The social investment state, by contrast, puts the accent on the “equality of life chances,” which involves distribution and redistribution of opportunities and capabilities, but not necessarily of outcomes or resources. As such the social investment perspective is fully in tune with the notion of “equality of opportunity” that has become part of the common sense in current thinking about equality, displacing the earlier concern with equality of outcome (Phillips 2006). This sidelining of “equality of outcome,” as Anne Phillips has persuasively shown, is in tension with feminist notions of substantive equality.

A third element is the notion of learning as the pillar of the economies and societies of the future (knowledge-based economies), which underscores its preoccupation with “human capital” and how to strengthen it. At the same time a growing chorus of expert opinion has argued that early childhood education and care are necessary to prepare children for subsequent lifelong skill-acquisition, “a requisite for effective participation in the knowledge-based economy and society” (Mahon 2002, 345).

Coming together, these ideas have lent themselves to a particular focus on children and their “human capital” and capabilities and have contributed to a concerted push for child-centered interventions. The focus on children has been further reinforced by growing concerns about child poverty, which has been particularly high in the southern European countries, the United Kingdom, and Germany (compared to the poverty rates of average citizens in those countries).

The attention to children has not been merely rhetorical. There have been significant efforts in a wide range of countries to provide child-care services and income support. Even countries such as Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, which have historically treated child care as a private matter (for families themselves and/or for the market), have been undertaking reforms to improve the supply and widen the range of service providers (Daly 2011). However, despite an apparent convergence, national specificities persist. Rianne Mahon (2002) usefully distinguishes among three models of child-care provision across Europe, characterizing them as “neofamilialist” (France, Finland), “third way” (UK, The Netherlands), and “egalitarian” (Sweden, Denmark). Although each of these models seeks to address the challenge posed by the defamilialization of child care, Mahon’s contention is that only the egalitarian model aims to do so in a way that fosters both class and gender equality. It achieves both aims
by providing generously financed parental leave schemes based on the income replace-
ment principle (80–90 percent), complemented by publicly financed and largely pub-
licly delivered child-care services that employ a professional cadre of relatively well-paid
care workers. Mahon admits that in both Sweden and Denmark women still take the
majority of parental leave (despite the daddy quota), and the gender wage gap remains
an issue as well. However, on the more positive side, for women with lower levels of
education the gender wage gap is on the order of 25–30 percent, as opposed to 55 percent
in the United Kingdom. Thus “equality in the here and now has not been attained in
these countries either, but it remains very much part of the horizon of legitimate expec-
tations” (Mahon 2002, 360).

Setting aside these national specificities, others have argued that the child-centered
policy ideas of the social investment perspective have effectively sidelined the equality
claims of adult women. Their needs and interests have been “lost in translation” (Jenson
2009), in favor of those of children, including girls. To appreciate how this has hap-
pened, we need to locate the policy emphasis on children within the broader European
policy context. The EU has been particularly influential in shaping policies for work/
family reconciliation through parental leave and child-care services. Its interventions
have been predominantly framed by a concern to encourage women’s labor market
“activation” within a “flexible” employment regime that is necessary for increasing com-
petitiveness and growth. The employment policy objectives, which include the objective
of reaching at least 60 percent employment among women within a decade, were agreed
at the Lisbon Council in March 2000 and have been dominant in the work of the EU
since then.6

Maria Stratigaki’s (2004) analysis of relevant EU acts shows how a concept intro-
duced to encourage gender equality in the labor market, the “reconciliation of working
and family life,” gradually shifted in meaning from an objective with feminist poten-
tial (“sharing family responsibilities between women and men”) to a market-oriented
objective (“encouraging flexible forms of employment”), as it became incorporated in
the European Employment Strategy of the 1990s. She characterizes this process as one
of co-optation, because the goals of the original proposals were undermined by shifting
the meanings of the original concepts to fit into the prevailing political and economic
priorities—reminiscent of Lombardo and colleagues’ (2009) notion of “bending” gen-
der equality.

Others concur that the economic imperative to increase female employment, par-
ticularly strong since 2000, has resulted in some “extraordinarily instrumentalist
arguments” about getting more women into the labor force as a means of increasing
competitiveness and broadening the tax base of the continental European social insur-
ance systems (Giullari and Lewis 2005, 5). The academic arguments put to the EU since
2000 (by prominent social policy analysts such as Gösta Esping-Andersen) have tended
to assume the desirability of a defamilialization strategy. Yet there is little problematiza-
tion of the kinds of jobs women are getting, nor do these policy proposals deal in any
serious way with the question of gender inequality in unpaid work, given the limits of
defamilialization as a strategy (Giullari and Lewis 2005, 5). In other words, it is very
difficult to defamilialize all unpaid care work, even if it were desirable to do so (which many would question). So the issue of how such unpaid care work is to be divided within households remains an important one.

The Relevance of Care in Developing Countries

The idea that allocating public resources to social policy “crowds out” private savings and investment was deeply entrenched within the structural adjustment programs that cut into public social expenditure in many developing countries—despite resistance from local populations and extensive criticism from intellectuals. As was explained above, in the period since the early 1990s and prior to the recent wave of austerity measures, “roll-back neoliberalism” (Peck and Tickell 2002) was brought under question and decentered within global and northern policy institutions, while new perspectives with a focus on social policy in particular seemed to be moving to the fore.

These ideational changes, however, were not just confined to the institutionalized welfare states of Europe. There is indeed evidence that more positive readings of social policy became ascendant within development policy circles at around the same time, as Bob Deacon (2005) has documented. Drawing on a wide range of ideas, including the social investment perspective, attention has been drawn to the “productive” or “developmental” role of social policy for the process of economic development (Mkandawire 2001; Cichon and Scholz 2006)—a position promulgated by individuals and programs associated with several UN organizations and its Secretariat. However, as in the global North, here too there are variations in how developmental social policy is understood, from approaches that are more child centered and grounded in the basic needs logic of UNICEF and MDGs, to the more structuralist interpretations of organizations such as UNRISD and the ILO.

Indeed, child poverty and the need to build children’s capabilities have been prominent themes in the postadjustment development discourse and practice. The role played by UNICEF in issuing the first “wake-up call” from within the UN system in response to the austerity measures imposed by the international financial institutions (through its publication, *Structural Adjustment with a Human Face*), and the widespread ratification of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, were important moments in reinforcing the focus on children. Following in their footsteps, the MDGs, which are supposed to steer both donor and government policy efforts in reducing poverty, have also placed a strong accent on improving children’s wellbeing (reducing child mortality, improving access to education). Tellingly, gender equality has been largely framed in terms of positive outcomes for the girl-child (Goal 3) and the pregnant mother (Goal 5). Feminist organizations and networks have seen this as a reflection of the hegemony of the mother-child dyad and the narrowing down of the much stronger gender egalitarianism of the Beijing and Cairo documents that emerged from the global conferences of the 1990s.

The concern for children therefore has been largely framed within an overarching concern with disrupting the intergenerational transfer of poverty by building children’s
capabilities and making them school and work ready. In reference to antipoverty policies in Latin America, for example, feminist critics contend that the emphasis on children has naturalized motherhood and reinforced the long-standing maternalist thrust within social policy (Molyneux 2006). This critique has as its point of reference a new generation of antipoverty social assistance programs, known as conditional cash transfer (CCTs) schemes. Emblematic of this new wave and based on the pioneer schemes in Brazil (Bolsa Familia) and Mexico (Oportunidades), cash transfer programs have been piloted and/or institutionalized in at least fifteen countries in Latin America. CCTs such as Oportunidades are specifically targeted to poor women in their capacity as mothers and household managers, and made conditional on compliance with certain requirements linked to children’s wellbeing. It has been argued that while such programs have some potential to support women in their role as caregivers, they do not broaden their options beyond that role, for example, by giving them a more secure footing in the labor market (Molyneux 2006). CCTs thus seem to reinforce the traditional gender division of labor by discouraging men from caregiving, while they overburden women, whose (paid and unpaid) inputs into household survival have diversified and intensified in many countries.

This critique, however, cannot be easily extended to other contexts. South Africa, for example, another country where social assistance programs constitute an important component of the social protection system, shows important institutional and policy specificities. The centrality of social assistance in this context can be partly explained by the very high rates of structural unemployment that afflict the country, as well as institutional path-dependencies from the apartheid-era social welfare system. The child-oriented cash transfer scheme Child Support Grant (CSG), like other transfer schemes in South Africa (e.g., old age pensions) has not been made conditional, even though it is targeted through a means test. This means that the grant does not impose additional burdens on the mothers/caregivers who receive it, or on the schools that would have to verify children’s school attendance, or on the welfare administrators who would have to monitor compliance with the conditionalities.

Those familiar with the CSG do not see the scheme as reinforcing maternalism, especially since it was specifically designed to reach the child’s primary caregiver and not necessarily the biological mother (Budlender and Lund 2011). In fact, it is seen as a useful input in helping caregivers meet the needs of their households. This is not to deny some of the problems in delivering the grant to those who are entitled to it. There is evidence of sexist and abusive behavior by welfare officials within the system toward young women applying for the grant, and moral discourses continue to infect social security provision, stereotyping women who receive the grant as underserving and blaming the CSG for increasing teenage pregnancy (Hassim 2006). Nevertheless, the CSG, like the care-related benefits in Europe, indicates some degree of public responsibility for children and their care, without imposing onerous responsibilities on its recipients and instrumentalizing women.

Furthermore, cash transfer programs represent only one thrust of recent policy efforts aimed at children. Middle-income developing countries such as Argentina, Uruguay,
Chile, Mexico, and South Africa have also been experimenting with early childhood education and care services (ECEC), which can potentially be more supportive of feminist demands by shifting some of the responsibility for caregiving out of the household and making it a public concern.

In general the expansion of preschool education (for three- to five-year-olds) in these middle-income countries has been positive over the past decade. Gross enrollment ratios in preprimary education (three- to five-year-olds) for Argentina (64 percent), Uruguay (62 percent), Mexico (59 percent), and Chile (54 percent) compare favorably with some high-income countries (e.g., Canada at 68 percent, United States at 58 percent). While South Africa lags behind (at 40.5 percent coverage for the same age group), there has been substantial expansion of what is known as a single preprimary school year (five-year-olds), which the government hopes to have universally implemented within the next few years (Budlender and Lund 2011).

All of these countries, however, are also characterized by high levels of inequality by income, race/ethnicity, and region. The challenge they face therefore is not only to expand service coverage, but to do so in a way that reduces class and regional inequalities in the quality of service accessed by children from different socioeconomic groups. This becomes a formidable challenge when a mix of public and private provision is used and where different kinds of “public” services are targeted to children from different backgrounds. Most preschools are public, but they frequently run only half-day programs, limiting the extent to which they can meet working parents’ needs for child care. But it is in the provision of care services for the youngest age groups (three years and under) that more serious problems can be identified—in part because caring for this age group is a more expensive undertaking (given the higher staff/child ratios), as well as being widely seen as a familial, and quintessentially maternal, responsibility. This was, for example, the position taken by the Catholic Church in Argentina during the debates on ECEC reform (Faur 2011). The combination of fiscal and ideological concerns has put a brake on service development for this age group.

While class and regional differences in access to preschool education for five-year-olds have been substantially reduced in Argentina by making enrollment mandatory for this age group and by expanding public preschools, for the younger age groups public provision is limited and the market plays a dominant role. Not surprisingly, enrollment rates for children from lower income households remain only a fraction of those of children from higher income groups. Since low-income families cannot afford private child care (or nannies and domestic workers), they face long waiting lists for public crèches or rely on the less professionalized Child Development Centres (CEDIS) promoted since 2007 by the Social Development Ministry, which targets its services to poor children under four years of age (Faur 2011).

A somewhat similar situation prevails in Mexico, where from the early 2000s the Ministry of Public Education made public preschool education mandatory for all three- to five-year-olds (with impressive results), while the Ministry of Social Development (Sedesol) has put in place a large day-care program (Federal Daycare Program for Working Mothers) that is targeted to a younger cohort of children (one-to
four-year-olds) from low-income households (Staab and Gerhard 2010). The Federal Daycare Program relies on less professionalized and lower-cost care services, along the lines advocated by the World Bank.

A common concern in these two countries relates to the segmented nature of child-care programs. The facts that services for younger children are provided by a mix of public, private, and community providers targeted to different social groups, and that community provision very often means less professionalized and cheaper services with lower staff-child ratios and fewer facilities and materials, complicate the task of equalizing the quality of services while creating the danger of parallel and unequal provision for different groups. Higher income groups are provided with good-quality care services (the gaps between opening hours and parents’ working time are filled by domestic workers and nannies) that facilitate their growth and flourishing, and their caregivers have the option of holding onto stable employment. Among the poor, care has to be abbreviated as family caregivers seek irregular and unprotected paid work, and the services they access are often of dubious quality. Hence, even if one accepts the problematic premises of “equality of opportunity” (Phillips 2006), it is clear that in these countries at least, existing income inequalities are likely to be reinforced, rather than reduced, through ECEC provision.

Reflecting on Brazil’s ECEC experience over the past three decades, Fulvia Rosemberg (2003) underlines the class/race exclusionary implications of such dichotomized and segmented systems. Such a model was promoted in Brazil by UNICEF and UNESCO in the 1970s and by the World Bank since the 1990s. However, the Brazilian government has been able to steer a different course since 2001, when it adopted an integrated education plan for children from birth to six years old that recognizes out-of-home care for very young children to be part of the education system—an idea initially proposed by feminists and children’s rights groups during the struggle for democratization and in the run-up to the 1988 Constitution.

The problem of service segmentation can be overcome (to some extent) if steps are taken, as in both Chile and Brazil, to establish the basis for an integrated, universal, and high-quality education and child-care system. During her presidency (2006–2010) Michelle Bachelet developed a bold plan to provide guaranteed access to free crèche services and intermediate centers staffed by qualified personnel (Staab and Gerhard 2010). Of course some degree of segmentation is likely to persist in some of these contexts too, especially if the private sector plays a significant role, as it does in Chile, or when, as in the case of Brazil, responsibility for delivery of services falls on cash-strapped municipalities (Choi 2006, cited in Mahon 2011).

The second issue is about the kind of jobs that are being created in the care-related social programs. The first obvious point to make is that defamilialization of care (i.e., shifting care out of the family) and its commodification have not changed the fact that it is still predominantly women who do this kind of work (this is true even in Sweden). Moreover, as quantitative research on both high-income industrialized and developing countries shows, care work often carries a pay penalty in terms of wages and salaries, regardless of the level of skill and education content of the work (England, Budig, and Folbre 2002; Budig and Misra 2011).
What is particularly problematic is that the recent expansion of care-related social programs in the developing countries considered here has relied heavily on low-cost services and community work. This may be cost-effective for the state, but that is because the costs are shifted to the largely feminized workforce of the not-for-profit organizations (NPOs) that are sometimes contracted by the state to deliver the services. Some programs, for example the Mexican Federal Daycare Program for Working Mothers (Staab and Gerhard 2010), claim to expand employment opportunities for women by allowing mothers of young children to work, study, or look for a job, and by providing opportunities for women to work as self-employed care professionals within the program's framework. The South African Early Childhood Development (ECD) services that form part of the public works program also mention employment as one of their objectives (Budlender and Lund 2011). Both these programs, however, which are targeted to lower income children, rely on low-wage and precarious employment of women caregivers: in South Africa the “appallingly low” stipends of women care workers (Budlender and Lund 2011) compare unfavorably to the wages paid in the more traditional public works programs in which men more typically work, and in Mexico the self-employed care “entrepreneurs” are not even eligible for social security coverage (Staab and Gerhard 2010).

As Rosemberg (2003) explains, the informal model that is seen by multilateral agencies to be suited to developing countries “exploits female teachers in multiple ways: It pays them low wages, it fails to invest in their professional training, it offers a precarious work environment, and it offers obstacles to unionization and building a professional career” (2003: 257). The undervaluation of care work can happen even when the service being provided is formally part of the public sector. In Chile most educators and care workers in public and accredited crèches and kindergartens are publicly employed. However, while their employment status is likely to be better than that of self-employed care workers in Mexico, the salaries of early childhood educators (in Chile) “are among the lowest in the educational sector” (Staab and Gerhard 2010, 16).

The World Bank, a clearly influential actor within the development debate, has produced its own arguments for particular modalities of ECEC provision. Drawing on research produced by US-based academics, especially from the field of neuroscience, it has argued that cost-benefit analysis of human capital formation at different stages of the life cycle strongly favors investment in the young rather than in adults (Mahon 2010). Given the World Bank’s well-known preference for targeting public provision to the poor while letting the better-off go to the market, it has argued strongly in favor of targeting public preschool education and care services to the poor while also commending informal, community-based programs as less expensive options capable of reaching the poor (Mahon 2010)—policy ideas that were endorsed in the World Development Report 2012 on Gender Equality and Development (World Bank 2011). This stands in contrast to the more universalist preferences of organizations such as OECD (as noted in the previous section). These different models of service provision are now vying for attention, and not all countries are moving in the same direction.

The main rationale behind the child-oriented cash transfer schemes and ECEC programs is to build children’s capabilities and reduce the intergenerational transfer of
poverty, although some programs also make explicit references to enhancing women's labor force participation. Yet the availability of child-oriented cash transfer schemes is indicative of some degree of public responsibility for children and their care. Likewise, the increasing availability of preschools and child-care services can go some way in transferring part of the care responsibility for children from the family (meaning women) to public institutions (again, probably women). In other words, even if gender equality is not an explicit aim of these programs, the policy concern for children may open doors for adult women's claims-making. After all, greater attention to care means greater attention to an issue that shapes the experiences of many women both at home and in the labor market, and the availability of good-quality and accessible child care has been an item on women's movements agendas (Razavi and Staab 2012). However, as the specific examples in this section have underlined, "the devil is in the details."

Conditionalities that require unpaid work from time-pressed mothers are very onerous, while other conditionalities can deter people from making their claims; reducing or removing conditionalities can be a step in the right direction. Increasing the size of such benefits could also enhance their effectiveness (family benefits tend to be small compared to other benefits, such as pensions). There are also good arguments for making these transfer schemes universal (to reduce administrative costs and secure middle-class buy-in); the advantage of a more universal system from a gender perspective is that it can provide women in nonpoor households with an independent, even if small, source of income of their own during a period in their lives when they are financially dependent on others. However, in a political context in which social policy and public social provisioning are being reduced to one single, and relatively "cheap," instrument, it is equally important to insist that social assistance programs (of which the CCTs are currently the most popular example) be seen as one component of a much broader set of social policy and public policy instruments, and that it is dangerous to reduce social policy to a single policy instrument.

It has also been suggested that a more integrated system that brings together early education and child-care services, and in which the state plays a proactive role in financing, regulating, and at least partially delivering services, has greater potential in overcoming segmentation along regional, income, and racial/ethnic lines. The other challenge that such programs confront is the undervaluation of care work, which remains an important source of employment for a significant number of women. The problem of undervaluation is particularly rampant in decentralized community day-care and home-based programs using voluntary or low-paid precarious work by women without professional qualifications and training. Hence, shifting from a strategy that relies on market and voluntary provision of care that is of the most informal and exploitative kind to one that nurtures professional and decently paid forms of care is more likely to meet gender equality concerns.

In the lower income countries, such as India, Nicaragua, and Tanzania, care services tend to be rudimentary and inadequate. However, what became very clear from the UNRISD research is that some of the infrastructure for providing these services may already be in place. Examples include the crèche-nutrition units (anganwadis) in India,
the child-care centers in Nicaragua, and the home-based care programs catering to people suffering from HIV and AIDS in Tanzania. Yet public financing of these schemes is extremely low, and their reliance on very low-paid and “voluntary” work is not supported by adequate training and resources. As the analysis from several countries, including Nicaragua, Tanzania, and South Africa, suggested, “voluntarism” is deeply gendered. Although the costs of social programs can be reduced, it is highly questionable whether such “volunteer” support is appropriate in contexts where families, especially women, already face multiple demands on their time. It is also not clear what “voluntarism” means in contexts of extensive poverty or high structural unemployment, where many volunteers may have joined the program in the hope of acquiring skills that will channel them into paid employment.

UNRISD research in low-income countries also drew attention to the critical importance of what was called, “the preconditions for care-giving,” namely public provisioning of appropriate infrastructure and technology (water and sanitation, decent housing) to reduce the burden of unpaid domestic work, and enabling social services (health, primary education) to complement unpaid caregiving. These are important public goods that need to be publicly financed and provided. Both the welfare regime literature and its feminist critiques, I have argued, assume a fairly capable state that will collect taxes and finance basic amenities like electricity, roads, and safe water, and at the very least provide basic health and education services. These preconditions cannot be taken for granted in a developing country context (Razavi 2011).

However, before ending this section it is also important to underline a more serious concern with the ways in which the care agenda has been narrowed down to the issue of child care. The vision of care emerging from feminist work has not been confined to children. While infants and children need intense forms of care, with important connections to women’s wellbeing and autonomy, the care agenda is broader, encompassing care for frail elderly persons, those with severe illnesses and disabilities, and able-bodied adults. While it may be easy to argue for child care in terms of a “social investment state,” pointing to the high “returns” that societies can reap from such “investments,” it is more difficult to justify care for elderly people and those with severe disabilities on such instrumentalist grounds. The “social investment state” perspective, which has clearly been helpful in moving policy agendas forward by legitimating specific areas of public policy and public social expenditure, may have produced its own blind spots, marginalizing the needs and rights of other people who need care.

The Politics of Care Policy

The previous section reviewed some policy developments in developing countries that have the potential to address the disproportionate burden of care that is placed on the shoulders of women. This discussion was framed in terms of ideational changes around the positive developmental impacts of social policy and social protection mechanisms
(social investment), suggesting that this has opened some policy space for a more pro-active role on the part of the state (including developmental states), contrary to the retrenchment mindset of the structural adjustment years. I concluded the section by stating that the “devil is in the details”: if child-oriented programs are to deliver gender equality, then they need to be designed and reshaped with that purpose in mind. But I said very little about how these details can be shaped. Nor did I say much about how bottom-up claims-making by women’s movements and feminist groups may contribute to these policy innovations.

Care concerns have often been thrust upon the state by virtue of exigency, for example in the midst of health epidemics such as HIV/AIDS, which has intensified care needs and provided an opening for putting the issue on the policy agenda. In other instances interest in children’s wellbeing on the part of both policy elites and children’s rights advocates seems to have driven the policy process, especially at a time when attention to child poverty has been heightened. This seems to have been the case in Chile, Uruguay, South Africa, and Argentina, for example. However, policy response in all these countries has been facilitated by specific historical and political conjunctures: the coming to power of left-leaning governments, sometimes with feminists in critical positions (as in the cases of Chile and Uruguay) and the momentum created by democratic openings (as in South Africa).

The meek policy responses in the highly diverse contexts of Nicaragua, China, and India are an important reminder of the multiple forces and structural impediments that stand in the way of making care a legitimate public policy concern. China, and to a much lesser extent Nicaragua, have a history (albeit short in the case of Nicaragua) of socializing care needs through their state-socialist projects. The rejection of that model by promarket forces—whether of the heterodox (in the case of China) or neoliberal kind—has led to the “reprivatization” of care (Cook and Dong 2011). In India, strong notions of familialism undergirding state discourse and policy have placed serious limits on the state’s willingness to entertain the idea that caregiving could be made a public responsibility, even if only partially (Palriwala and Neetha 2011).

At the same time, as Elizabeth Jelin (2009) observes (with reference to Argentina in particular), there seems to be very little overt mobilization around these issues by women:

Policies seem to be imposed “from above” and not in response of mobilization “from below”: There may be demands for day care provisions, or for longer school schedules, but they seldom if ever become part of collective action or social movements. We live in a world in which still caring is seen—both by men and women—as women’s responsibility and women’s tasks. Also, that it is almost “natural” to perform these tasks out of “love,” in the private sphere of the family and parents-offspring relationships.

(Jelin 2009)

This raises critical questions for future research. Why are certain issues (e.g., violence against women) able to mobilize large numbers of women and become part of women’s collective action and not others (e.g., support for women’s unpaid care provision)? Does the availability of “cheap” private options, in the form of relatively low-paid domestic
workers, for middle-class women dampen their interest in mobilizing and pressing gov-
ernments for the provision of early childhood education and care services? In a recent 
paper, Merike Blofield and Juliana Martinez Franzoni (2013) suggest that among Latin 
American countries, Uruguay is in many ways an exception. Not only have recent pol-
icy developments canvassed by state experts broadened the focus from a concern with 
children to other groups needing care (the elderly, those with disabilities), but wom-
en’s organizations have also been mobilizing and proposing policy solutions far more 
actively than in Latin American countries such as Chile and Costa Rica, where policy 
innovations have been very much driven by state experts.

Brazil is another country that exhibits relatively strong interventions by women’s 
organizations and feminist groups in this regard. As Blofield and Martinez Franzoni 
(2013) show, the history of a strong feminist movement militating for crèches, going 
back to the 1970s, sets Brazil apart. Many of these feminist militants made it into the 
left-wing PT administrations and see ECEC services as an important dimension of 
women’s economic autonomy. However, both bureaucratic inertia and federalism con-
stitute major challenges: the municipal governments are not fully reimbursed for educa-
tional expenses, and the reimbursement for crèches and pre-schools is even lower.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown considerable convergence across disciplinary boundaries within 
feminism to provide a rich analysis of “care” and to make it visible and at the forefront of 
policy action. While much of the literature may have initially emerged from scholarly 
work that had high-income countries as its point of reference, the recent work on care 
issues in developing countries has enriched the debate and raised some difficult questions 
about what constitutes care, reminding us of older feminist concerns about domestic 
work and its connection to women’s subordination, and whether confining care to social 
policies is enough to give us the “care lens” that we need to scrutinize how the provision 
and receipt of care is impacted by the broader structures and patterns of development.⁹

A second point to highlight, perhaps a reflection of my own standpoint as someone 
who works within the UN system, is the encouraging cross-fertilization that is begin-
ing to take place among scholarly communities across the North/South and regional 
divides, as well as between scholars and a variety of development practitioners. I believe 
that UN research, whether at UNRISD, ECLAC, or the ILO, has provided a useful 
medium for these exchanges to take place, but it is also critical that these spaces of 
exchange and mutual learning be sustained, especially in the context of the financial 
challenges that bedevil UN research. The other advantage of UN research is that it has 
provided a connection with policy communities and debates at the multilateral level, 
whether in relation to technical statistical debates on definitions of work, in produc-
ing flagship reports that inform national policymaking, or in the context of multilateral 
deliberations on the broader development agenda. In that light, it will be interesting to
see whether in the 2015 review of Beijing transnational feminists can capitalize on the rich array of research and policy analysis that has taken place over the past decade or so, to advance the policy agenda on care beyond what was enshrined in the Beijing Platform for Action. There is no doubt that this will be a challenging endeavor.

Within multilateral fora, where developing countries often find themselves pitted against high-income industrialized countries, it will not be easy to get recognition for “unpaid care work” as an issue that is relevant for developing countries. There are concerns on the part of some developing country governments that by recognizing “unpaid care work” they will be opening the floodgates to a costly agenda whereby husbands or the state will be required to pay “wages for housework.” There are also deeper concerns, explicitly voiced by the Holy See but probably on the minds of many other delegations, that by giving recognition to the term “unpaid care work” and by having this work redistributed or shared between women and men, they would be giving the same status to care as to other kinds of work and questioning the quintessential feminine and maternal attributes of care. In other words, activities that should be done out of maternal love and devotion will be equated with market work, thereby taking away the feminine/maternal devotion of women that is essential for family life. On the other hand, some of the critical policy issues that feminists want to advocate for include the importance of “redistributing” care work from families to the public sector by having public financing for appropriate investments in infrastructure and accessible care services. This kind of demand is also likely to stir concern among austerity-minded governments in the North that are in the process of rolling back some of the public provisions that have been in place in their countries. In short, translating feminist research and policy analysis into global intergovernmental commitments is likely to remain an uphill battle.

My final point is the need for feminist researchers and policy advocates working on care issues to connect more forcefully with grassroots movements and women. In Europe, as Fiona Williams (2010) suggests, contemporary claims-makers in care comprise many different groups, including women’s organizations that mobilize for the recognition of unpaid care work and for collective commitment to the care needs of younger children and older people as part of gender equality at home and at work; trade unions that bargain about paid leave and working time; movements of disabled people demanding empowerment and independent living; and child rights advocates, service-users organizations, and care professionals. It is critical that feminist research and policy advocacy in developing countries reach out to ordinary women, especially those who are economically marginalized and who have the most to gain from a policy agenda that would seek to recognize, reduce, and redistribute care work along more equitable lines.

Notes

1. This section draws on Razavi (2007) and Razavi and Staab (2012).
2. This is the title of Marylin Waring’s (1988) classic book describing how economic orthodoxies exclude most of women’s productive and reproductive work, rendering half of the world’s population invisible.
3. Some countries such as Australia, Canada, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom now have satellite accounts that measure the output of unpaid care work, enabling economic aggregates to be calculated that take into account unpaid care.

4. The gender wage (or earnings) gap measures the extent to which earnings of women differ from those of men. A value of 0 would mean that the earnings are equal (at least on average), while positive values reflect the percentage by which women’s earnings are less than those of men.

5. Jenson’s (2009) argument, however, is not limited to Europe. She includes Latin America as the other region where the social investment perspective has gained ground and caused a similar displacement of gender equality goals. We elaborate on the non-European contexts in the following section.

6. It is not clear whether, in the context of the recession in Europe, support for women’s employment is weakening or is still a priority. Formally the vision laid out in Europe 2020 (EC 2012) remains the EU position. According to Europe 2020, “the employment rate of the population aged 20-64 should increase from the current 69% to at least 75%, including through the greater involvement of women, older workers and the better integration of migrants in the workforce” (2010, 10). In practice, however, fewer countries in Europe will be able to realize these targets.

7. “This goes against the orthodoxy that insists on behavioral conditionalities. However, there have been attempts to introduce conditionalities in South Africa since 2010; see Lund (2011) for clarification and for an argument about why linking the CSG to school attendance is “a step in the wrong direction”.

8. It was after the fall of apartheid that the apartheid-era State Maintenance Grant was transformed into the Child Support Grant. The committee responsible for the reform of this grant was headed by a feminist, Francie Lund. An important symbolic achievement of the committee was the move away from the familist “male-worker/female-carer” model of social policy. The committee chose to adopt a “follow the child” policy, with emphasis on the child rather than the caregiver, thereby paying the grant to the primary caregiver rather than the biological mother (Hassim 2006). This was a particularly important change in a context in which family forms are very diverse and a significant number of children do not live in the same household as their biological parents.

9. I am using the term development in the broad sense to refer to how economies and societies evolve (regardless of whether they are “developing” countries or high-income industrialized countries) both economically and socially.

References


CHAPTER 17

FEMINIST TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZING ON GENDER AND TRADE

The Work of IGTN

MARIAMA WILLIAMS

Introduction

This chapter discusses gender and trade organizing efforts as an example of what Valentine Moghadam, in the third chapter in this volume, identifies as a transnational feminist network (TFN), which “brings together women from three or more countries around a specific set of grievances and goals”; in this case, economic justice. Moghadam describes such networks as “fluid and non-hierarchical structures that span local and global spaces,” which target the neoliberal economic policy agenda (among other things). According to Moghadam such TFNs seek to “raise new issues”—in this case gender and trade—with a view to influencing policy by interfacing women’s participation and rights with institutions of global governance. Thus inevitably, as argued, such networks both contribute to, and benefit from, the global women’s rights agenda.

This description aptly fits the work of the International Gender and Trade Network (IGTN), a feminist nongovernmental organization (NGO) that emerged in the late 1990s to bring a feminist gender perspective to trade policy, trade agreements, and trade decision making at national, regional, and multilateral levels. IGTN members as a collaborative network of women’s organizations, researchers, and institutional gender focal points worked to transform the impacts of economic policy on gender inequalities.
Congruent with the analysis of feminist organizing laid out in chapter 3, the work of the IGTN grew out of the historical and contemporary evolution of women organizing at the global level to challenge conventional economic analysis and policy prescriptions within the framework of a rights-based approach to economic policy. This effort by women and gender activists is grounded in feminist work around the creation of knowledge, theory, and practice: the work of feminist economic analyses and research that had been ongoing in the late 1970s and emerged more into the mainstream with the launch of the International Association for Feminist Economics (1992) and publications such as Beyond Economic Man: Feminist Theory and Economics (Ferber and Nelson 1993) and Out of the Margin: Feminist Perspectives on Economics (Kuiper and Sap 1995).

I was the research coordinator working with the global secretariat of the IGTN for this network from its inception until its cessation (2009–2010). A feminist economist teaching international economics in a US-based university, I had taken a sabbatical in 1996 on a mission to better understand the application of trade theory and policy prescriptions in the real world of trade policymaking. The twin impetuses leading to such a journey were 1) a fascination with the evolution of trade-related global governance architecture and 2) the compulsion to seek a deeper connection with the emergent growth of feminist-led women’s advocacy on global and national economic justice issues. In the first case I was driven to grapple with the arrival of three exciting moments and defining frameworks for me as an international economist: the coming into effect of the Maastricht Treaty (1993) creating the European Union and the completion of the second stage of the Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union (January 1, 1994); the finalization of the Uruguay Round of Trade Agreement (1989–1994); and the coming into force of the World Trade Organization (WTO, January 1, 1995). The establishment of the WTO as a formal legal framework for the regulation of international trade (which absorbed the informal General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT) created the world’s only supra-agency dealing with the supervision of and the continuous liberalization of international trade on a legal basis.

Having also cut my teeth, so to speak, on women’s organizing on economic justice issues by working with cross-national teams of women advocates and independent researchers on economic issues during the preparatory phases (during most of 1994) of the World Summit on Social Development (held in Copenhagen in March 1995) and the preparation for the Beijing meeting, which began in late 1994 and culminated six months after the WSSD at the Fourth World Conference on Women (held in Beijing in September 1995). I was also quite interested in seeing how a feminist approach to economic analysis could be useful in furthering the work on women’s social and economic empowerment and the broader social and economic justice movement, which was now center stage as a result of activism around the processes of the UN Decade for women (1975–1985). Some of this initial work had animated the outcomes of the WSSD, which focused on poverty and social justice and were embedded in both the processes and the outcome of the Beijing Platform for Action.
Feminist economics began to achieve empirical and policy relevance with the critiques of structural adjustment policies (SAPs) by feminist scholars and activists from and in the developing world (Beneria 1999 and Badden 1993). These were the set of policies that were imposed on developing countries as part of the strategy to address the so-called third world debt crisis, which arose in the 1970s–1980s. With the implementation of similar “economic restructuring” policies facilitating the shift from manufacturing to services in the developed world—for example, in the United Kingdom, Thatcherism, and in the United States, Reaganomics—feminist economists and what Moghadam calls “scholar-activists” in North America began to develop careful analyses and critiques of these types of policies that were focused on promoting the free market, lowering taxes for corporations and investors, and deregulation of both finance and labor markets. These so-called supply-side economic policies or “trickle-down” policies had begun to weigh negatively on poor and working households in the United States and the United Kingdom, in particular. Feminist economists hence turned their attention specifically to macroeconomic fiscal and monetary policy.

Grounded in the application of a gender-sensitive, rights-based approach to economic policy, feminist economists have advanced to a significant degree a gendered and social accountability approach to fiscal and monetary policies. The bedrock of such an approach is that it is aware of and supportive of the household economy, the reproductive sector, as well as seeking to promote employment creation, ensure space for sustainable livelihoods, and enhance access to affordable public services. According to Grown et al., 2000, grounded in the human rights framework, this approach “recognizes women’s agency and their rights and obligations as citizens.” Riley and Center of Concer 2013 argues that this evolution of work “clearly illustrates a profound political shift by which women no longer focused on a narrow range of so-called women’s issues but were demanding voice in all arenas of economic and social policymaking.”

This shift was evident at the 1995 World Social Summit and the Fourth World Conference on Women, both of which witnessed an explosion of gender- and women-focused activities on economic issues. In the preparatory processes for both the WSSD and Beijing events, women’s constituency groups focused on economic issues. One key result of this attention to economic issues by women and gender advocates was the strong integration of the economic empowerment of women as one of the twelve critical areas and the integration of “women and the economy” as one of the “strategic objectives” of the Beijing Platform for Action (paras 150–180).

The work of feminist economists and gender advocates has shown that “gender as a relation of power, is a social stratifier that influences the distribution of output, work, income, wealth, etc.” (IWGEM 2006 and Çağatay 2001). And since “gender also influences the behavior of economic agents,” it is critical to our understanding of the
economy as well as the role of trade in the global economy (IWGEM 2006 and Çağatay 2005). As noted by feminist economists, “institutions, including free markets, that mediate between macro and micro levels of the economy bear and transmit gender biases so (they) cannot be assumed to be gender neutral” (Elson and Çağatay 2000). As so eloquently argued by Elson and Çağatay 2000, “gender relations are not something outside of the economy in some realm of ‘preferences,’ ‘aptitudes’ and ‘traditions’”; gender relations are continually reformulated and permeate all economic activities (IWG-GEM 2006, 1).

Feminist economists in this period opened up the discussion about how gender power relations are integral to macroeconomic policy. Conventional macroeconomic policy predetermines an overemphasis on growth, which reinforces an integrationist approach to gender mainstreaming, constantly shifting that process back into the women in development (WID) approach of the 1970s. This approach based women’s access to resources on their productive contributions, thus promoting (women’s) efficiency as the basis for equity, instead of an all-encompassing approach that emphasizes the need of women to participate in and benefit from development as a basic human right—a more transformative gender and development (GAD) approach (Razavi and Miller 1995). This tension between the WID and GAD approaches continues to underlie much of gender and trade analysis, especially in the latter-day discussions about global value chain analysis and trade facilitation (discussed further below).

The perpetuation of the WID framework occurs even within the context and frameworks in which policy norms speak about gender. But instead of being a comprehensive analysis that interrogates the policy dimensions of the subordination and vulnerability of groups of poor women and men, this approach simply focuses on moving resources to women to increase their productivity; thus women’s need for critical resources is ultimately validated by their need for resources in order to expand production and exports of developing countries (Razavi and Miller 1995). The WID approach hence does not focus attention on the systemic influences of global and national economic and social policy on gender inequalities; it simply assumes that focusing on ensuring greater access to resources by women will address systemic imbalance in global macroeconomic and trade issues.

At the macro level of globalization, of which financial and trade liberalization are key pillars, the emerging coherence between international financial and trade institutions greatly impinges on the policy space at the national level. But there is no policy interaction at that institutional level with regard to gender mainstreaming. Such a coherent global economic policy framework would ensure, in the first instance, that global policy works to address the systemic factors that contribute to women’s impoverishment. These factors would include the design of policies that improve food security and access to medicine, as well as an intellectual property rights regime that protects and ensures women’s innovation and ability to benefit from the patenting and copyrighting of indigenous technologies and inventions.

On the contrary, current approaches to, for example, macroeconomic policy, such as the approach to monetary policy targeting (i.e., inflation target) and the
associated policy instruments (engendering change in the interest rate, adjusting sales and value-added taxes in an upward direction), tend to result in regressive income and asset distribution to the poor, especially women and ethnic minorities and the working class, who have the least capacity to respond. This not only has direct implications for reinforcing a false choice between efficiency and equity, but it also tends to enforce limited antipoverty and social development agendas.

Within the context of the conventional macro framework, there is a sense that macroeconomic and trade issues are “hard areas” that have nothing to do with gender. Gender equality and gender mainstreaming are hence relegated to “softer” areas, such as education and health, that must work to complement and offset the necessary adjustment costs of macro planning decisions and outcomes. So, to take another example, from the vantage point of conventional economic thinking, it may be perfectly acceptable to examine areas of food distribution between men and women, but for conventional economists gender has no place in discussions about agricultural liberalization or tariff reductions. Yet both agricultural liberalization and tariff reductions have significant implications for food security, self-sufficiency, and sustainable livelihoods for boys, girls, women, and men.

Similarly, reform of the intellectual property regime is seen as a “hard area” with no gender dimensions, but women's and men's access to medicine, traditional knowledge, and technology development and transfer are impacted by intellectual property rights regimes. Similar arguments are proffered with regard to export promotion, the twin side of trade liberalization. Yet the attempts by government to promote increased production for trade for the most part have relied on the incorporation of women's labor as a cheap input into labor-intensive, semi-industrialized production (footwear, garments, and electronics), and nontraditional agriculture (cut flowers, etc.). Women in developing countries have become critical contributors (albeit at the lowest levels) to global value chains dominated by transnational corporations based in the global North.

Feminist Economic Activist Responses

By the early 2000s many women's NGOs were launching fully fledged economic work programs based on feminist economic critiques of economic policy in both the global North and the global South. The Center of Concern's Global Women's Project facilitated the autonomous study group Alt-WID, a coalition of Washington-based women working on economic issues. Alt-WID was also linked with a wider group of US women and gender activities, the Women Alternative Economic Network (WAEN), comprised of the women's division and programs in mainline church groups such as the United Methodist Women, Church Women United, and the Grail Movement. These organizations also developed and implemented economic literacy or popular economics education projects, working with civil society organization, trade unions, workers’ organizations, and community-based organizations in both the United States and
developing countries. WAEN proponents, such as myself, saw ourselves as building a counter narrative to that of the annual G-7/8 summits of the major economic and industrial powers. (In the early, heady days, we even envisioned launching annual women's economic summits at the same time as the G-7/8, now G-20, meetings.) The European network Women in Development Europe (WIDE) also created a work program on alternative economics, with a dedicated program officer to work on the issue. ⁸

A collaborating alliance of these northern feminist groups with southern feminist groups was initially formed with Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN), which had put together a strong critique of economic development issues and global crises policy responses since 1985. ⁹ Ultimately the collaboration extended to include other networks in the developing countries. In Africa, feminist economists were also part of the development of groups such as the Association of African Women for Research and Development (AAWORD) and the Council for the Economic Empowerment of Women in Africa (CEEWA). In the Caribbean and Latin America, women's groups such as Sistren and the Caribbean Association for Feminist Research and Action (CAFRA) were actively involved in working on economic justice issues at local, national, and international levels. The work of these groups built a strong feedback bridge between academic thinking and social activism, stimulating policy-oriented research and thinking about policy issues within academia as well as enhancing the work program of international organizations.

The women’s theater collective Sistren, which launched a campaign of resistance to structural adjustment by using performance art, theater, and poetry, drew attention to the negative impacts of the management of the debt crisis on women and vulnerable groups in Jamaica and the Caribbean region. This collective of independent cultural activists of working-class women, who use theater to analyze social and economic conditions in Jamaica, as well as the work of grassroots organizing in Latin America and the Caribbean, helped to stimulate more interest in the debt crisis and its impact on lives and livelihoods. Their work caught the attention of feminist and gender advocates in international organizations such as the Commonwealth Secretariat (London), which created an expert group on women and structural adjustment, drawing on feminist scholar-activists, including feminist economists, to explore the issues in greater depth. The work of this expert group resulted in the path-breaking book *Engendering Adjustment for the 1990s* (Chinery-Hesse et al. 1989), which brought widespread international attention to the gender and social dimensions of adjustment and the third world debt crisis.

The work by grassroots women activists such as Sistren is the kind of interlinkage of transnational feminism to which Moghadam refers. My own venture into scholar-activism was propelled by an encounter with members of Sistren and other grassroots activists from developing countries at a World Bank-International Monetary Fund (IMF) meeting in the early 1980s. I and other feminist economists and US-based gender activists were invited to a side event to hear women from developing countries speak about their experiences with structural adjustment. Immediately after their excellent and cogent presentations and analyses, the women turned the tables on us: they
asked us to discuss the experiences of women in the United States and Europe with structural adjustment, Reagan and Thatcher style. None of us in the room from North America or Europe could give a cogent answer to that question. Though we knew a lot about what was happening with the IMF and World Bank programs in the developing world, we had not done the empirical work or the analysis at home. After that challenging moment, Alt-WID was formed, with the express purpose of studying Reaganomics as structural adjustment.

**Feminist Economist Analysis Today**

Today feminist analysis of and research on macroeconomic and finance policies are accelerating at a rapid pace. Feminist economists have focused attention on the social content of macroeconomic policy as well as evolving a human-rights-based approach to macroeconomic policy (Elson and Çağatay 2000; Balakrishnan, Elson, and Patel 2009). Despite this development, the strongest empirical advance of women’s organizing on economic issues is centered in two areas: gender budgeting and gender and trade.

**Gender Budgeting**

Organizing around engendering budgets in order to ensure gender-sensitive budgetary allocations that meet the needs of women, girls, boys, and men and simultaneously promote equity, transparency, and the efficient use of national resources has been underway since the first Australian women’s budget (1984–1996; Sharp 2000). The gender budget movement grew slowly and has mushroomed since 1996 with the participation of intergovernmental agencies such as the United Nations Fund for Women (UNIFEM, now the United Nation Entity for Gender Equality, UN Women) and the Commonwealth Secretariat. Efforts to engender budget (now termed “gender-responsive budgeting”) are currently being made in more than sixty countries, ranging from Least Developed Countries (LDCs) such as Tanzania, to middle-income countries such as India and Barbados, to high-income countries such as Finland.10 The effort has the support and active participation of gender activists such as South African Debbie Budlender and feminist economists such as Diane Elson and Marilyn Waring (Elson 1997; Budlender and Sharp 1998; Esim 1995).

By 2000 gender-responsive budgeting initiatives could count on the strong participation of ministries of finance in Belgium, India, and South Africa (Budlender 2000, 2005; Bakker 2006; Caglar 2010). However, the recent financial crisis and its persistently negative aftershocks, especially the implementation of austerity programs across diverse economies, continue to pose great challenges to the progressive application of fiscal policy.
Gender and Trade

Gender and trade work emerged in the late 1990s with the advent of the WTO Agreements, which came into force at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of Trade Agreements, replacing the provisional set of rules promulgated in 1947–1948 to facilitate international trade arrangements, the GATT. Unlike the GATT, the WTO Agreements, which cover goods, services, and intellectual property, are a comprehensive set of trade rules reaching far beyond borders into government policy decision making on matters such as the distribution of water, domestic regulations, and government procurement. For the first time there was an agreement on agriculture as well as on intellectual property rights. In the words of the WTO: “It covered almost all trade, from toothbrushes to pleasure boats, from banking to telecommunications, from the genes of wild rice to AIDS treatments” (2013). Thus these agreements portend serious implications for food security and access to essential services (including pharmaceuticals and other medicines). Coming into force the same year as the Beijing Platform of Action, with its attention on economic empowerment and call for macro policy, including trade, not to adversely affect women and gender equality, the WTO Agreements immediately became the focus of attention of gender advocates working on economic justice issues. At the same time, in academe many feminist economists challenged traditional trade analysis, decision making, and policy implementation.

GENDER AND TRADE INITIATIVES AND THE WTO

Despite the recent discourse about the construction of new global economic governance architecture, the WTO Agreements remain the current conceptual and operational framework for globalization. Through its enforcement of hyper-trade liberalization and the continuing push for the liberalization of imports, the WTO has disproportionately strong effects on the ability of countries, particularly the least developed countries and small island states, to participate effectively in the global economy. For example, the WTO Agreements include more rigid discipline on agriculture than had existed under the GATT. Many developing countries now have to eliminate quotas and other measures that had been used to protect the local domestic market. Import liberalization led to the intrusion of cheaper (often highly subsidized) agricultural products, which reduced the market share of small farmers, especially women. The agreements also included a phaseout of a previous agreement that had protected the textiles sector in many countries, opening this sector to foreign competition, which led to some women in some countries losing jobs and others in other countries gaining them. The agreement on intellectual property imposed greater protection and the enforcement of intellectual property rights, which also meant that for some countries pharmaceuticals
and medicine would become more expensive and therefore less available to poor women and men.

In the case of many developing and food-deficit importing countries, dramatic rises in food and fuel prices and the stress and strains created by the lowering of import tariffs and nontariff barriers, coupled with the aftershocks of the financial-crisis-generated global economic recession, are imposing disproportionately heavy burdens on both the informal and the household sectors and are creating high levels of food and other types of insecurity, as well as rising anxieties within and across all sectors of the global economy. At the same time, the WTO agreement on agriculture has placed strict limitations on subsidies that support food security and the preservation of hard-hit domestic markets.

The WTO-led globalization has serious implications for developing countries’ commitments to social cohesion, gender equity, and social equity and the ultimate achievement of the millennium development goals (with a target date of 2015). Therefore, careful attention needs to be paid to the gender as well as the social impacts of trade policies. Paradoxically, though the WTO is seemingly associated with challenges around democratization and accountability of governments to civil society, resistance to these aspects has at the same time opened up a new political space for women’s organizing.

Beginning with the first WTO ministerial meeting in Singapore in 1996, women who had been members of the economic justice and linkages caucuses of both the WSSD and in particular the Beijing process converged on the WTO. Initially they formed an informal women’s caucus. After that meeting a number of mostly European-based gender activists from trade union movements, churches, and scholar-activists came together in organizations such as WIDE, Women Working Worldwide, Oxfam, and the International Confederation of Trade Unions, as the Informal Working Group on Gender and Trade (IWGGT). The IWGGT, which was coordinated from Brussels by WIDE under the auspices of my work program on alternative economics, worked to ensure a physical presence at the subsequent meetings of the WTO, including the second ministerial meeting (IWGGT 1998) and its first public forum. The IWGGT did the initial identification of the impacts of trade on gender issues and other information gathering.

The WTO arena and contesting trade policy is the site where women have had the greatest traction on economic issues. This is truly global organizing, with strong cross-national organizing by gender activists on trade issues. Much of this activism is directed at the WTO, but some of it, and increasingly more, is directed at regional trade agreements such as the Economic Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific states, and the various US-initiated free trade agreements (FTAs) in Asia and Latin America.

In the last nineteen years feminists have recognized the presence of the WTO as a supranational entity that has tremendous impacts on economic and social policies and structures and the significant role that it plays in the globalization process (Joekes and Weston 1995, Fontana et al. 1998, Fontana 2001 and 2002). The organizing around trade issues and the WTO represents an explicit recognition by feminists of the limitations of a strategy that “confines the empowerment of women to meet the challenges of
globalization at the national level” or solely around conventionally recognized gender issues such as health and reproductive rights (Kelly, Bayes, and Young 2001).

With the advent of the WTO Agreements, the reconstruction of the multilateral trading system has focused narrowly and rigidly on multilateral liberalization and the erosion of preferences (preferential access granted to some developing countries importing into developed countries’ markets). This was inherent within the principle of the “single undertaking” (everything is part of the whole or a single package) that dominated the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations (1984–1994) and continues to undergird the WTO system. The understanding around the single undertaking—that each party is obligated to implement all the agreements and selective implementation is not allowed—signaled a breaking away from the old consensus on development, which allowed for differential obligations in the implementation of different aspects of the provisions of trade agreements between countries at different stages of development. This differentiation process occurred primarily through the recognized instrument of “special and differential treatment” (S&DT). In the new framework, S&DT is simply a matter of lagged timing around implementation between developed and developing countries. The single undertaking approach therefore does not leave much significant scope for ensuring policy space to deal with the paramount imperatives of developing countries: poverty eradication, equity, and sustainable development.

**The Work of the IGTN**

My reflections on gender and trade and IGTN, presented in the rest of this chapter, aim to bring out lessons on gender and the broader areas of macroeconomic and financial policies now informing global political economic discourse in the context of the post-2015 development agenda. The IGTN has played a critical and sometimes catalytic role in the evolution of the work on gender and trade, and many of its members were critical to the design and implementation of the work by international organizations on gender and trade.

In the context of the post-2015 or new development agenda discussion, international trade will play an important role. The twelve goals put forth by the UN Secretary General’s high-level panel of eminent persons for the post-2015 development agenda, as well as the sustainable development goals being discussed in a parallel process in the UN, will all hinge on policies that promote employment and inclusive growth. Given that most developing countries rely on international trade to a significant degree for employment and livelihoods, it is certain that the role of trade will be a key area of discussion.

Yet much misgiving and uncertainty remains about cross-border trade and its impacts on development and social welfare (UNCTAD 2013). Though tariff liberalization has led to the proliferation of low tariffs, the expected development dividend from trade liberalization simply did not materialize as expected for many developing countries. At the
same time, there has been a rise in nontariff barriers (NTBs), such as traditional quotas and subsidies, in particular in agriculture, and nontraditional ones, such as technical barriers to trade (standards, testing and certification, etc.) and sanitary and phytosanitary measures (food, plant, and animal safety regulations). Emerging growth areas of NTBs are environmental protection and climate change, including the rise of unilateral trade measures and carbon border taxes (border measures for environmental reasons). As noted by UNCTAD (2013), the implications of these NTBs for trade flow and social welfare are unclear and not well-studied.

The current emerging narrative of global value chain analysis and the concerted push by developed countries for multilateral rules on trade facilitation (i.e., customs procedures), which will primarily benefit their multinational corporations (MNCs), has further implications for issues such as access to technology and women’s employment and empowerment (Mitchell et al 2009). These issues are dear to the IGTN.

The IGTN and Women Organizing on Trade Issues

Originating from a meeting in Grenada in December 1999 of women and gender activists, who had been part of the IWGGT, as well as an extended set of activists who had been part of the yearlong, online Strategic Seminar on Women and Trade initiated by Maria Riley (the Center of Concern) and Peggy Antrobus (DAWN), the IGTN was created as a “a plural and democratic platform for women organizations or mixed organizations.” Its focus was on building and infusing a gender perspective that sought fair and equitable integration alternatives to the prevailing trade liberalization and financial deregulation in the negotiations of regional economic agreements currently under way all over the world. The IGTN hence became a worldwide network, with regional coordinates in the major geographic areas: Africa, Gender and Trade Network in Africa (GENTA); Asia, Asian Gender and Trade Network (AGTN) and Central Asia (IGTN-CA); the Caribbean, Caribbean Gender and Trade Network (CGTN); Latin America (The LAGTN); the IGTN Middle East and Gulf Region (CRTD.A); the Pacific, Pacific Gender and Trade Network (PGNTA); North America, the US Gender and Trade Network (USGTN); and WIDE as the focal point in Europe. The International Steering Committee of the IGTN was in charge of general management; it was composed of focal point representations and an Executive Secretariat that was initially run by the USGTN out of the Global Women’s Program of the Center of Concern, United States. In later years coordination shifted to Brazil under the auspices of LAGTN. (See chapter appendix 2 for a detailed description of the core organizations of the IGTN.)

The IGTN is a complex effort to coordinate the activities among a number of quite varied actors, such as well-established feminist networks and smaller, lesser known organizations and individual researchers. In its transnational organizing, IGTN associated with multiple global networks to increase its visibility, influence, and standing with social movements. It was at the core of the formation of the Our World Is Not for Sale (OWINFS) network,19 which consolidated global civil society organizing around
trade issues. Members of the IGTN Secretariat were also key players and participants in
the World Social Forum Process. In the global women’s movements, IGTN members
also played important roles in the Beijing Plus five and ten years’ processes as well as in
the Feminist Dialogues and the Global Campaign to End Poverty (GCAP). Members
of the IGTN Secretariat were also critical to the development of the Women Working
Group on Finance prior to and after the 2008 financial crisis. The network was also a
founding member of the now well-established International Working Group on Trade–
Finance Linkages.

Its partners and the IGTN have always focused on the need to work toward alternative
models to the current neoliberal, market-driven framework, particularly in the national
and regional spheres. The Steering Committee of IGTN considered it absolutely critical
that a feminist gender analysis be central in the sustained analysis and mobilization that
is being generated toward a set of economic, social, and political alternatives in various
spaces. The political agenda of the IGTN was fourfold:

- Support global and regional economic integration rules and processes that build
  sustainability of the productive (monetized economy) and social reproductive
  (care economy) work and the rights of all people, particularly women.
- Monitor trade and trade-related negotiations to expose and oppose undemocratic
  trade rules in the WTO, regional trade, and bilateral forums. IGTN’s goal is to
  reduce the scope of the WTO and all trade agreements to specific trade issues and
  preserve spaces for the promotion of just, democratic, and rights-based poverty
  eradication.
- Build alternatives from a feminist perspective that respect rights standards and
  provide real opportunities for eradicating poverty and inequalities.
- Work to achieve just, democratic economic policies, domestically and globally.

In Williams (2013) I identified the IGTN as the prototype of “transnational forma-
tion of gender advocates with a global agenda and working with regional and national
threads.” This template is also now being replicated in the area of gender and climate
change, where the Global Gender and Climate Alliance (GGCA), which involves
the joint efforts of about thirteen gender focal points of UN agencies and more than
twenty-five women’s NGOs working on environmental and climate issues, has
come together to better ensure the integration of gender issues within global climate
policymaking:

IGTN is the product of the blending of the common priorities and concerns of
many feminists organisations working at the global level, with regard to economic
and trade-related issues into the mandate of a singularly focused entity. . . . [T]hese
organisations had to a certain extent developed a high level of comfort and aware-
ness of each other’s focus on economic justice, through their joint collaboration dur-
ing the preparatory processes of the Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing
1995) and the World Summit for Social Development (WSSD, Copenhagen 1995).

(Williams 2013, 96)
As the research coordinator for the network working with the International Steering Committee, with representatives from all regions, we work to ensure that “each organization retained its autonomy and identity but lent its resources and reputational capital to the creation of an independent and autonomous entity, the IGTN, with its own governing structure, leadership and decision-making” (Williams 2013, 96). The IGTN drew strength from the political, social, and academic work conducted in other spheres and by members of the partner organizations.

The IGTN was a focused entity within the orbit of larger, more recognized, and more powerful women’s organizations, such as DAWN, the Women’s Project of the Center of Concern, and WIDE (later the European Network around Women’s Rights and Development). However, smaller organizations such as the Caribbean Association for Feminist Research (CAFRA) and the Windward Islands Farmers Association (WINFA) also had a strong influence on the organizations. The IGTN was also open to participation from activists in smaller regional and national organizations, who did not feel constrained by the representation of the larger groups but held their own as regional representatives. (See chapter appendix 2 for a brief discussion of these organizations.)

The gender and trade network functioned as an independent and autonomous entity in which the individuals on its Steering Committee represented their regions and were not constrained by any single or multiple roles they performed in other organizations. Members’ external affiliations added value but did not detract from or obstruct the functioning of the organization with regard to its core work on trade. This was due in part to the fact that individuals were not selected to join the IGTN based on organizational affiliation (i.e., were not nominated by an organization), but rather joined the IGTN based on their commitment to the core work and out of regional concerns and priorities in their geographic location or work interests. It was also due in part to the fact that the IGTN was evolving the gender and trade analysis as it grew (in real time, so to speak), so there was no a priori position or historical organizational gender and trade reference point to draw upon.

The IGTN’s Strategic Approach

According to IGTN’s literature, the imperative of the network was to develop and implement a critical, political analytical approach to development and trade from a gender perspective. As emphasized by the LAGTN Secretariat:

Commercial dynamics such as those in discussion at the WTO do not provide for the participation of civil society nor favor the incorporation of the proposals or alternatives offered by social actors. Together with efforts that seek to advocate the trade agenda throughout the continent, however, local resistance and social mobilization have exacted an increasing pace that includes women’s active participation, even if in different modes to comply with their different countries.

Beyond mobilizing, though, it takes knowing the characteristics of the agreements and their contents to be able to participate and advocate negotiations and to call
attention to adverse effects. This is why it is necessary to research and learn the effects of gradually liberalizing economies. At the same time, there is remarkable need to provide popular economy tools and to inform of free trade impacts upon larger groups in order to promote overall participation in social movements and particularly women participation in decision making. Both analyzing and educating about free trade impacts, from a gender perspective, are ever increasing activities in NGOs and research centers throughout the world.

(IGTN 2005 and Williams 2002)

An important imperative of the network was to strengthen national actors by disseminating information and training to the various social sectors in order to allow for social organization and mobilization, since agreements continue to be negotiated without any transparency or any real citizen participation. The network identified its target audience as the women's movements and social movements in the regions, which connect the various regions and trade negotiators and trade policy decision makers. To meet its fourfold agenda and the diverse needs of its target audiences, the IGTN developed a triple strategy of economic and trade literacy for capacity building among gender activists; building evidence based at national and regional levels through policy-oriented, empirical research; and global, regional, and national advocacy.

The IGTN’s research was tied to exploring and operationalizing the areas of feminist economic thinking and analysis relevant to the trade area. I have argued elsewhere that “IGTN researchers were very much integrated into academic networks such as the International Working Group on Gender, Macroeconomics and International Economics (IWG-GEM) as well as within their own networks, where the twining and linking of other issues on gender was constantly reinforced” (Williams 2013).

Research was specifically policy focused. It aimed to provide continuity to existing research processes about the gender and trade issue; to exchange existing research and work methodologies among focal points and among IGTN regions; and to contribute to developing researchers’ networks within the regions. Its capacity building also added value to existing women's organizations and contributed to the growth of new or fledgling organizations in some regions.

Quite early on the IGTN developed a presence in Geneva, Switzerland, host country of the WTO Secretariat and other trade and trade-related institutions such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), in order to coordinate work with trade negotiators and to have its own source of linkage to the trade negotiation agenda. It was thus able to have visibility in the WTO arena and become accepted as a recognized player among the development and trade NGO community (Williams 2013).

The IGTN, through its Geneva office, provided timely and easily understood, updated information within the context of gender analysis on the pace and turns of the WTO negotiations, through its monthly electronic bulletin (Williams 2013). The Geneva office also produced occasional special reports on specific topics such as ‘gender and special products’ (Hernandez 2005) that were high on the agricultural trade negotiations agenda. The IGTN also participated actively in social movements’ activities and
in transnational networks such as the Third World Network and the Seattle2Brussels, a European-wide trade and development activists’ network. Within the regions, focal points could focus on the specific issues linked to their regions such as the European Union–Latin American Summits, the US Free Trade Agreements, and the Hemispheric Social Alliance; the African region was also strongly focused on exploring the gender dimensions of the European Union-Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (EU-ACP) economic partnership agreements and the Asia regional, focused on understanding the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) movements.

The IGTN forged informal and ongoing partnerships with women leaders in male-led organizations (such as Oxfam and Christian Aid), as well as itself becoming part of large trade advocacy networks such as Our World Is Not For sale (OWNFS). It has formed working relationships with women’s groups focused on UN-centered activism, in addition to networking with gender focal points inside the UN system (Williams 2013). Though a few groups, such as Women and Environment Organization (WEDO), which had been part of the IWGGT, disconnected from the formal gender and trade networking early on, they continued to collaborate with specific regional women’s organizations that were part of the IGTN. Women’s Edge, now Women Thrive, was never part of the informal or formal mechanisms of IGTN, but developed its own program on trade, through which it had multiple kinds of working relationships with regional focal points of the ITGN, such as CAFRA and the USGTN. Thus there were quite significant multi-source pressure points on the issue of gender and trade.

In the first five to six years of its existence, the IGTN was nurtured by the Center of Concern in the United States. As a full-time visiting research economist at the COC for the first five years, my task was to support the development of the trade analysis and develop a global network of researchers mainly from the developing countries to provide analysis and policy insights to the network. I had the full support of the coordinator of the Global Women’s Project, more than half of the work time of a program staff assistant, and access to the management and administrative staff of the COC. The IGTN also benefited from the unswerving commitment and the keen experience and financial management of the then president of the COC, Father James E. Hug, SJ. The COC did indeed invest significantly in the development of the IGTN. In 2005, following prior agreements reached at its founding, the Secretariat was moved to the global South, to Brazil, under the auspices of the Latin American Gender and Trade Network. The IGTN Secretariat and regional work were sustained for the first six years by substantial grants from the Ford Foundation. However, since then the global Secretariat has become defunct due to funding and financial challenges. Activities now primarily occur at the regional and national levels. This has created a gap in international trade and economic advocacy from a critical gender perspective and by women’s organizations. The gender and trade policy research advocacy gap is increasingly being filled by institutional players, such as UNCTAD, the Commonwealth Secretariat, and the World Bank, and bilateral donors such as the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). These institutions have seemingly recast the work in terms of a “trade and gender”
approach, with the emphasis on trade promotion with a gender angle. Thus the political directedness and critical feminist political economy approach is a seriously missing ingredient as this work continues to unfold at the global level.

The IGTN focused on subjects such as food security (later articulated in terms of food sovereignty) and access to basic social services, such as water. Making the case for the linkages among gender, trade liberalization, and food security, water, energy, and sanitation may seem an obvious natural fit for linking the ongoing proliferation of bilateral, regional, plurilateral, and multilateral trade agreements to gender equality and women’s empowerment, but it has been an uphill battle. The network proponents emphasized the importance of governments having a high degree of policy space for enabling their control over domestic regulations regarding the supply of services, foreign direct investment, and government procurement policies in order to undertake remedial measures such as affirmative action programs and to support the household and reproductive sectors of the economy as necessary. These same topics are the bone of contention and the underlying cause of the slowly dying Doha Round of trade negotiations.

The topics of agriculture and food security and domestic regulations (in the liberalization of services) in particular, horizontal disciplines that apply across sectors as varied as agricultural services and tourism, were the focus of strong gender-based advocacy by the IGTN before they became the contentious issues that they presently are in trade negotiations. Long before development and trade NGOs focused on food crisis/food security and trade, the IGTN and gender advocates made a strong and radical call for agriculture to be out of the WTO. Back then the only other groups making such a call were the farmers’ and peasants’ movements under the rubric of La Via Campesina. Now well-recognized farmers’ groups are likewise calling for a rethinking of agricultural liberalization under the WTO.

The UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter, has also argued that the WTO Agreements are incompatible with food security measures, as they treat “food security as a deviation from the primary objective of agricultural trade liberalization” (De Schutter 2011, cited in Wise 2013). It is unfortunate for the millions of poor and hungry women, men, and children in developing countries that the IGTN position question the treatment of agriculture, especially food items in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) is now being validated. The question of food security is now dominating the WTO negotiations with the G-33 group of nations, including India, arguing for the AoA to be amended so as to facilitate the removal of limits on food security and public stock holding using price supports, food reserves, administered markets and subsidies, culminating in the so-called ‘food fight’ at the ninth Ministerial Meeting of the WTO, held in Bali, Indonesia, December 2013. Many developing countries, led by India, asserted the right to implement food security programme including public stock holding. Addressing this issue in the AoA would enable developing countries such as India, in the face of high price volatility and rising food prices, to purchase food stocks to ensure the food security of poor people. (Under the AoA such purchases face restrictive limitations and are generally treated as subsidies and seen as market distorting even though unlike many of EU and US subsidies, they are not directed at the export market
but are for the domestic markets.\textsuperscript{37}) Unfortunately, due to the intransigence and hypocrisy of the US and other OECD countries, the AOA has not been modified. The agreement reached at Bali, the so-called Peace Clause 2, only allows India and (other countries with established food security programme at the time of this agreement) to be excluded from challenges under the WTO dispute settlement for the next four years\textsuperscript{38}. Unfortunately, many developing countries who were anticipating establishing such food security programmes are not covered under the agreement reached at the Bali Ministerial.

In the case of domestic regulations, as early as 2002 this item was a dominant theme on the agenda of the IGTN, with Asia GTN leading the work in this area. Domestic regulations are qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards, and licensing requirements that may trade in services (such as distribution, finance, transport, and telecommunications). Government may implement domestic regulations regarding services in order to meet public service obligations and for social and equitable policy reasons (job creation affirmative action for micro and SME service providers). The IGTN has been concerned that the heightened push for greater liberalization of services may compromise women’s access to public services or may limit government flexibility in taking remedial measures to address historical gender and other forms of discrimination in terms of access to employment, markets, and services. Today domestic regulation is high on the negotiations agenda and an area of great tension between developing and developed countries in the negotiations.

Long before the 2008 financial crisis, the members of the IGTN refused to be confined narrowly to trade issues but rather chose to project the network as a technical resource and a center for networking and disseminating initiatives regarding both financial deregulation and commercial and investment liberalization agreements and their specific impacts on women. It based its organizing efforts on “the development of alternative gender proposals for an integration model on a par with sustainable development, social justice and the wellbeing of the peoples” (LATN internal document).

\section*{The Impacts of IGTN and the Current State of Play in Gender and Trade Work}

A number of international institutions such as UNIFEM and UNCTAD have strongly supported the gender and trade agenda with substantive reports. Drawing on the IGTN’s work, the Commonwealth Secretariat organized capacity-building workshops with developing countries’ trade decision makers in the mid- to late 2000s.\textsuperscript{39} Based on the efforts of the Commonwealth Secretariat, by 2009 a few governments, notably those of India and Uganda, were actively involved in either conducting research on gender and trade issues or integrating gender-based analysis into different aspects of their import strategy formulation (India, Lucknow 2012) or export promotion program (Uganda's
Feminist Transnational Organizing on Gender and Trade

National Export Strategy). By 2010 key international organizations, including the World Bank, the United Nations Economic Commission on Africa, and the International Trade Centre, a joint agency of the WTO and the UN focusing on the competitiveness of businesses in developing countries as it relates to trade, were either producing substantive analytical pieces on the subject or implementing gender and trade programs and projects.

Indirectly, due to the efforts of the IGTN trade negotiators and ministries of trade, such as those in India and Uganda, undertook their own gender and trade studies. Institutional players such as UNCTAD, UN Women, the Commonwealth Secretariat, bilateral developmental assistance agencies such as CIDA, and the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) are all strong supporters of gender and trade.

UNIFEM (now UN Women) and UNCTAD were key to the development and elaboration of early thinking on gender and trade, but their work in this area ebbed and flowed (see UNCTAD 1999, UNCTAD n.d., Tran-Nguyen and Beviglia Zampetti 2004 and Muselli and Zarilli 2012). The Commonwealth Secretariat in the mid-2000s leveraged the IGTN work to develop its own work program (funded by DFID) on gender trade, extending into the specific area of gender and export promotion. The North South Institute of Canada was also a strong early player, providing analysis on gender and trade. This in a sense also made up for the dip in Canadian women organizing on gender and trade, which never really got started after the founding meeting on the island of Grenada. The World Bank is also now engaged in gender analysis of trade areas and has produced a number of analytical and policy works on gender and value chain and gender and trade facilitation (Klugman and Gamberoni 2012 and Higgens 2012). In addition, a number of NGO-type think tanks, such as the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), have been (since 2008) involved in the work on gender and trade, or trade and gender as they would have it (ODI 2008).

In 2007–2009 UNIFEM launched a multicountry, comprehensive study on two thousand women informal cross-border traders in Cameroon, Liberia, Mali, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. In 2009, along with United Nations Commission for Africa (UNECA), it commissioned research on gender and trade policy in the African region. Work by both UNIFEM and the International Labour Organization (ILO) points to the fact that though women informal cross-border trades contribute significantly to national output (64 percent of value added in trade in Benin, 46 percent in Mali, and 41 percent in Chad) (UN WOMEN 2009) and play a significant role in the growing cross-border trade, which has helped to cushion the effect of the most recent financial crisis, they are still ignored and neglected, with a persistent lack of recognition of their economic contribution.

UNCTAD, which also very early on held one of the first expert group meetings on the subject of gender and trade (UNCTAD 1999), involving a number of persons from the IGTN network, published two key volumes on the subject of gender and trade. UNCTAD later became the lead focal point of the UN Inter Agency Task Force on Gender and Trade (which includes the ILO, FAO, ECE, ESCAP, ECLAC, ECSWA, and ECA). The task force is part of the UN Inter-Agency Network on Women and Gender
Equality UN System on gender. But for much of the period 2001 to 2008, UNCTAD had a low profile in the area. However, since 2009, as has UN Women, UNCTAD has been strongly pursuing its work on gender and trade (Muselli and Zarilli 2012 and UNCTAD 2012). Through its Trade, Gender and Development Section, located in the Division on International Trade in Goods and Services, and Commodities, UNCTAD is now actively working to mainstream gender into trade policy. It has a threefold strategy: 1) research and analysis, 2) teaching packages on gender and trade for national government, and 3) awareness raising on the issues at a high political level. Its research and analysis has so far focused on analyzing trade and gender at the country level through country case studies—Bhutan, Cape Verde and Lesotho, Angola, Rwanda, and Uruguay—that seeks to “gauge the impact of trade policy on women in productive sectors,” as well as on women as consumers and other dimension of their lives (UNCTAD 2012). In 2012 it also launched a report on trade policy and gender inequalities, a country-based analysis that uses country case studies to “map” the gendered effects of trade in each country.

The Commonwealth Secretariat launched its capacity building in gender and trade project, which includes a focus on export promotion and gender, from 2003 onward. During that time it implemented a series of two national (India and Uganda) and four regional seminars with policymakers, national women’s machineries, and trade negotiators in East and Southern Africa, South Asia, and the Caribbean. These trainings involved twenty countries and eighty participants. The output of the multiyear gender and trade programming includes 1) a handbook, *Gender Mainstreaming in the Multilateral Trading System* (Williams 2003); a resource, *Gender and Trade Action Guide* (Atthill, et al. 2007); and 3) a volume of case studies, *Trading Stories* (Carr and Williams 2010). The Commonwealth Secretariat also currently hosts a Web-based resource platform on gender and trade that links research, advocacy, and action across the commonwealth countries, with the objective of facilitating and promoting gender-sensitive trade policies at the national, regional, and multilateral levels’ (Eghobamien 2010).

Other international agencies working on trade and gender are the ILO, the International Trade Centre, the Africa Trade Policy Centre (ATPC), and the World Bank Group. The ILO has for some time been involved in exploring the impact of global production processes on women workers. The International Trade Centre, which has been exploring the impact of trade rules on women entrepreneurs, works with governments, the private sector, and women entrepreneurs to enhance the participation of women in global trade. It has a women and trade program with a dedicated program manager. It has also produced a series of ‘case story’ on the gender dimensions of aid for trade (Banga 2012, Eghobamien 2010 and Mathiba 2012). The ATPC of UNECA is also developing work on integrating gender and trade into its work program. According to the ATPC, it undertakes “specific regional & African research on gender & trade and targeted dissemination to gender networks as part of mainstream.” It argues that it is “a strategic interlocutor between gender advocates and trade policymakers by using its convening power to communicate directly with trade ministers and senior officials in
Africa to be better able to include gender issues in trade preparations and negotiations” (Nagah Elbeshbishi 2012).

The World Bank Group New Trade Strategy considers gender an “integrated and cross-cutting” issue. A key element of this is the trade and gender agenda that is implemented through partnership between the bank’s International Trade department and its Gender Development Unit. According to the bank, the main objectives of this agenda are twofold: to offer guidance for identifying and assessing the gender dimensions of the activities of task managers of trade-related projects and to “develop policy relevant knowledge products in areas where knowledge gaps exist” (Staritz and Reis 2013). The main thrust of this work is global value chains (GVCs) and trade facilitation, both part of the negotiations in the WTO.

The linkages and networking undergird the work of international agencies. A few governments have begun to examine their trade reform and export promotion policies and programs to pay attention to various aspects of gender and women’s empowerment concerns. The South African Development Community (SADC), a regional economic and trading block in Africa, has a gender protocol in place, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the East African Community (EAC) have a gender policy currently in draft form. As noted by the UN Women report on gender and trade policy in Africa (UN Women/UN ECA 2012), gender audits are being increasingly performed to ensure appropriate attention to the gender dimensions of trade. While the IGTN cannot take complete credit for this, it is the case that the Gender and Trade Network in Africa (GENTA) has worked quite hard in the region to bring awareness to the issue of gender and trade (GENTA 2001a, 2001b, and Pheko 2005). From 2000 to 2005 GENTA organized economic literacy workshops and training on gender; trade; New Partnership for Africa’s Development NEPAD; WTO policies; and the impact of globalization and privatization on women, families, and communities throughout Africa. GENTA works with participants from the private sector, the women’s movement, government, labor, and civil society in their education and advocacy efforts (GENTA internal document). In addition, IGTN partnered with the Gender and Economic Reform Programme (GERA) of Third World Network Africa and other collaborating networks of researchers and undertook many years of organizing advocacy and research on the links between gender and trade in Africa.

African feminist researchers in collaboration with GENTA and other women’s groups have also produced widely quoted empirical research on the impact of agricultural liberalization, the European Union-Africa, Caribbean and the Pacific Economic Partnership Agreement, as well as on the US-Africa Growth Opportunity Act (Madonsela 2002; Pheko 2005). However, as also noted by UN Women/UN ECA (2012), there is still not sufficient empirical information on the impacts of trade liberalization at the national and regional levels. The same is true in Asia, where members from AGTN (IGTN-Asia) such as Gigi Francisco and Marina Durano from DAWN, were very involved with the Asia Development Bank, trade unions, and social movements in the region, focusing on capacity building around gender, trade, and economic issues.
Undeniably, trade liberalization has been the driving agenda within international macroeconomic policymaking in the more than fifteen years since the WTO was established. Since the 2011–2013 period, the WTO discourse now focuses on new or revitalized areas such as GVC analysis and trade facilitation and other “Singapore” issues. This debate, the outcome of which will primarily benefit the MNCs of the developed countries, particularly the United States, instead of the development imperatives, dominated the preparatory process for the WTO ninth ministerial meeting (MC9) held in Bali in December 2013.

For the most part, the institutional players who now work on “trade and gender” have simply extended their analysis to incorporate the issues of the role and challenges of women’s small and medium enterprises (SME) with regard to value chain analysis and trade facilitation, without a proper discussion of the overall development, equity, and sustainable development dimensions of the trade agenda (Higgins 2012). The body of this work too often seems tilted toward helping to move along the agenda of the developed countries in the WTO by apparently giving space to women. But a critical exploration of the way the topics are unfolding and the nature of the rules being proposed for related measures such as trade facilitation shows that GVCs and trade facilitation are not unambiguously favorable to the economic and social empowerment of women and to developing countries, broadly (South Centre 2013). Hence, trade activists, especially gender advocates, need to exercise a great deal of caution in advocating policy frameworks that enhance either of these trade aspects.

In the case of GVCs, for example, the key driver remains the minimization of cost and maximization of profit by the core (lead) multinational firms in each sector and industry, which work through supply chains to accomplish these goals. These motivations do not easily lend themselves to a greater appreciation of or policy to mitigate gender inequalities. At best there may be a benign approach, and at worst, the adoption of the same strategies and tactics utilized in the first generation of export processing zones or traditional manufacturing processes in the developing world. Thus women are simply integrated as cheap labor (for the supposedly feminine skills and sensitivities of dexterity and the ability to deal with tedious processes for a long time). Women tend to be found at the low-value end of value chains as workers and as entrepreneurs. In many sectors they are relatively invisible as entrepreneurs, and they become less dominant at the higher, upgraded end of the value chains, as men assume more of these jobs and functions. (Appendix 3 in this chapter presents a short overview of some of the key issues in gender and GVCs as well as trade facilitation and aid for trade.)

Trade facilitation, which is inextricably linked with the need for MNCs with their GVCs to have a high level of certainty that their products will reach end or intermediate users in as quick, efficient, and cost effective a manner as possible, is an area of
growing interest in ferreting out the gender dimensions of trade. But here as well caution is needed in linking trade facilitation to women’s empowerment. Trade facilitation narrowly focused on enhancing custom and border procedures and transit processes will not benefit women-owned or other SMEs unless specific sets of gender and other social aspects are proactively included. A critical examination of the few case studies thus far presented on gender and trade facilitation is less than sanguine about the ultimate ability of trade facilitation frameworks to enhance the empowerment of women. As discussed in appendix 3 to this chapter, when narrowly construed to focus more on the import facilitation side, which is beneficial to MNCs, trade facilitation measures may not be very beneficial to women (as SMEs or workers). This is so in the first instance because it may engender more foreign products in the domestic market that compete with local products. Second, implementing trade facilitation measures such as computerization of customs is quite costly and will require budgetary allocations (for enhancing customs facilities, etc.), which distorts budgetary priorities in developing countries already suffering from severe budgetary constraints.

If trade facilitation is looked at more broadly to support productive and export capacity (through, for example, supporting infrastructure, such as storage, feeder roads’ connectivity to markets and ports, and supporting SMEs with marketing), it may be beneficial to women. Hence to be useful for women’s and men’s empowerment, trade facilitation has to be broad based, have a relatively neutral budgetary impact, and make the entire process of mainstreaming customs and border processes and procedure gender sensitive. Budget neutrality can be achieved through demand- and gender-sensitive-driven “aid for trade” processes that are primarily grant based. But these have to be built in and struggled for by pro-poor and pro-employment trade and gender advocates.

**Conclusion**

Numerous and persistent questions have been raised about the operations and functioning of the trade system. Questions abound about the legitimacy, fairness, efficacy, and ability of the system to adjust (and respond) to the different circumstances of many groups of countries, which range in spectrum from poor and least developed to the very rich and most developed. There are also questions about the soundness and empirical validity of the analytical framework, which posits an automatic and inherently positive link between development and trade liberalization in the context of poverty eradication and sustainable development with equity. In spite of these concerns, proponents of free trade have insisted that what is needed is rapid acceleration of trade liberalization. However, trade and gender advocates have been vociferously challenging the push for trade liberalization at national, regional, and multilateral levels, arguing strongly that trade liberalizers need to be mindful of the food security, poverty, and inequality effects of trade policy reforms.
These are the issues with which the IGTN-inspired focal points in the various regions of the world and their colleagues in the wider trade advocacy movement will continue to struggle. Although there is now greater awareness that gender issues and concerns are important to the hard areas of macroeconomics and trade, there is no overall gender analytic framework as it relates to those policies. Thus the understanding of gender, gender issues, and gender analysis—in terms of a) the contribution of men and women to the development process and b) a systematic awareness of the direct and indirect benefits and costs of proposed policy changes on men and women as distinct target groups—is not fully integrated into the design, implementation, and monitoring of policies and programs.

In the aftermath of the 2007–2008 financial crisis, greater and rapid liberalization is being accompanied by a seemingly regressive U-turn on the promotion of social development and equity. After an initial round of unrestrained bank and financial sector bailouts and stimulus spending to specific sectors, countries are now pulling back into a damaging fiscal austerity pathway that is troublingly reflective of the 1980s. There continues to be a need for feminist activism on the big issues of financial and trade reform at global, regional, and national levels.

However, paradoxically, while the activism of institutions on gender and trade is increasing and becoming more programmatic under government and intergovernmental forums, gender and trade activism by women’s organizations at a global level has weakened.

While it is difficult to establish the direct causal impacts of the work of the IGTN, especially in an area with vast numbers of contributors and cross fertilization, the IGTN network and its members have produced useful analysis showing gender and trade linkages. The body of work produced by the network and its contributors highlights more clearly some of the likely pathways and impacts of trade liberalization in terms of class, vulnerable groups, and gender concerns. The Association for Women’s Rights and Development (AWID) and DAWN, which remain the two strongest feminist networks, have continued the work of exploring the linkage between economic policy and gender justice. Thus to a certain extent they are carrying on some of the work of the IGTN. But neither has taken up the gauntlet of gender and trade organizing in the IGTN-focused mode. There appears to be a need for a more coordinated approach between the national and regional work in the area of gender and trade reform. The struggle continues!

APPENDIX 1

Overview of the Evolution of Gender and Trade Organizing and the Work of the IGTN

1994: The WTO agreements/the Uruguay Agreement are concluded, and WTO enters into force in 1995. This is the same year that member states of the United Nations agree to the Beijing Platform of Action (September 4–15, 1995).
A coalition of women’s groups who had been part of the economic justice caucus operating during the Beijing process began immediately organizing around trade and gender.

1996: This coalition created itself as the Informal Working Group on Gender and Trade (IWGGT) and emerged from the Women’s Caucus at the WTO Conference in Singapore (1996). 47

1997: The IWGG met informally with the director of the WTO’s Trade Policy Review Division (TPRD) about incorporating gender-aware perspectives in trade policy reviews.

1998: The Global Woman’s Program of the Center of Concern, under the leadership of Maria Riley and Peggy Antrobus (DAWN Caribbean), created the Women Strategic Planning Seminar on trade, which focused initially on building understanding of trade issues for a wide variety of women’s groups, through an intensive online process. 48

The Seattle Women’s List and Steering Committee became part of the worldwide Civil Society coordination process. The Women’s Listserv was successful at effectively coordinating women’s NGO participation at the Seattle Ministerial.

1999: The debacle in Seattle: the WTO Seattle Ministerial witnessed the first wide scale and spectacular collapse of multilateral trade negotiations, due to the strong resistance of developing countries.

December: More than forty-eight women’s organization’s working on economic issues and interested in trade (many had been part of the Women’s Strategic Planning Seminar on gender and trade) met on the island of Grenada, where they agreed to form the International Gender and Trade (IGTN) autonomous advocacy network to promote gender analysis and integration into trade policy and to provide linkages between trade at the multilateral, regional, and bilateral levels with the women’s movement and the organizations involved. 49

2000-2008: The IGTN’s most active intervention period.

2009-2011: Trade advocacy globally becomes dormant. Doha Round is comatose. Many attempts to kick-start the Round are made, to no avail. The IGTN global secretariat is inactive.

2012-2013: The WTO trade agenda picks up in preparation for MC9.

APPENDIX 2

CORE ORGANIZATIONS OF THE IGTN NETWORK

The Center of Concern is a research, advocacy, and educational NGO, which partners with southern networks and coalitions on common agendas (COC internal document). The Center’s Global Women’s Program, under the leadership of Maria Riley (O.P) and Peggy Antrobus of DAWN-Caribbean, instigated the Strategic Seminar on Women and Trade and organized the Grenada meeting that founded IGTN as a response to the growing importance of trade as a global economic determinant (COC internal document).

The Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN)—with almost twenty years of policy-oriented research and global advocacy and activism in the areas of the political
economy of globalization, sexual and reproductive health and rights, sustainable livelihoods and environmental justice, and political restructuring and social transformation—was pivotal in lending its name and resources to this third entity. The IGTN was fully accepted as an important organization that was also a partner of DAWN. DAWN Asia regional coordinator Gigi Francisco was an independent member of the steering committee of the IGTN, with an IGTN Asia focal point. The IGTN hence benefited from DAWN’s observation, analysis, and action the linkages between the struggles for new directions for development and the global economy and the concerns of feminists to ensure gender equality and justice.

**Women in Development Europe (WIDE)** is a European network of women’s organizations, development NGOs, gender specialists, and human rights and social activists, established in 1985. It is composed of eleven national platforms and one regional platform, with a secretariat based in Brussels, Belgium, and has strong links to partners in the global South. WIDE monitors and influences international economic and development policy and practice from a feminist perspective. WIDE, which has a well-established approach to the trade-development-gender nexus, led the Informal Working Group on Trade and then later led IGTN’s Economic Literacy Program, with the implementation of a three-year trainers’ program that covered all the regions of the network. The network is especially focusing on the role the EU is playing in this global trade and development scenario.

The **Caribbean Association of Feminist Research and Action (CAFRA)**, though a small organization, had members who were critical in the development of feminist activism on structural adjustment programs throughout the Caribbean region and was a key player in the beginning of the IGTN process. It was also a long-standing partner of WIDE and participated in the economic literacy program. It led in the Caribbean on action-oriented research and advocacy on the WTO Agreements, The FAA, the Cotonou agreement, and the Caribbean Single Market Economy processes. CAFRA was a very active part of the network until 2006.

**APPENDIX 3**

**Expansions of Gender and Trade Analysis and Advocacy into New Terrains: Global Value Chains, Trade Facilitation, and Aid for Trade**

The nature of trade is changing due to increased integration of economies in global trading and the fragmentation of stages of production across countries (due to outsourcing) (Mitchell et al. 2009.). The dominant features of this change appear to be the rise of trade in intermediary goods and process (as opposed to final goods). Many, however, will argue that the key is the control of trade by a small subset of core MNCs, including the incursion of supermarket chains now with their own production chains (vertically and horizontally integrated), as well as companies such as Nike, Nestlé, and Apple operating in developing countries.

While some researchers will argue that there is nothing fundamentally or remarkably new about the so-called new trade, there is a push within the trade policy arena to carve out specifically focused policy dimensions that would support global value chains (GVCs). This is so, for example, with the renewed push for a trade facilitation agreement within the WTO. Gender
activists and the broader trade advocacy movement struggled against the incorporation of this item along with three others as the so-called Singapore issues inside the WTO, arguing that these were issues best addressed at the national level based on country needs and capacity. However, this topic is once again on the agenda. Hence there is a need to explore more thoroughly the gender dimensions of these agenda items and developed key advocacy points to ensure beneficial effects on women. Some of these beneficial effects can be promoted by yet another strand of global trade governance, the Aid for Trade initiative.

**Gender and GVCs in Brief**

The central question from the perspective of gender and trade is: To what extent does the integration of global production-trade present a positive momentum for women’s economic empowerment, or not, in developing countries? This issue is important because, as noted by Mitchell and colleagues (2009), “trade policy reforms have not delivered the growth and poverty reduction benefits anticipated,” and although trade intensification has increased female employment, it has not necessarily improved in unambiguous ways women’s social and economic status more broadly. Feminist trade theorists have hence emphasized the trade and poverty and socioeconomic consequences of trade flows (Mitchell et al. 2009). This framework includes a focus on GVCs that involves examining the effects and impacts of the “various tiers of suppliers” from the point of raw material acquisition, through production, to the point of final consumption. These GVCs, which include buyer-led chains (e.g., supermarkets), producer-driven chains, and agricultural value chains, are focused on traditional issues of labor costs, productivity, and quality control—core issues that impact their competitiveness. In addition, these contemporary GVCs are also keenly aware of and advocate for improvement of the general business conditions, including pinpointing issues such as customs clearance for imports and exports as well as external trade governance: tariff levels, trade preference, quality specification, and rules of origin (Mitchell et al. 2009).

Women and men engage with value chains at various points and in different capacities—as workers, consumers, and producers (Mitchell et al. 2009). The current preoccupation with gender and global value change analysis by conventional thinkers supposes ambiguous benefits for women. But given a cost minimization predisposition by lead firms, women are at a comparative advantage in low levels of the value chain, just as they were as cheap labor inputs into early export processing zones. Thus the following questions can also be raised about GVCs: To what extent do these allow for sustainable upgrading of women’s and men’s positions? How available is the access to GVCs? Can women overcome entry barriers to joining the management of GVC structure? What are the possibilities for women and poor men in vertical coordinated GVCs through mechanisms such as contract farming (in, e.g., horticulture out-grower farming)? How does the challenge of meeting new standards constrain women-owned SMEs? To what extent does process and product upgrading impact women? How can sustainable income in GVCs be ensured?
Undeniably, given the pressure to reduce cost per unit of output and increase output volume that suppliers face, women continue to face the same set of issues as in early forms of trade: a comparative disadvantage in social and economic returns and conditions of work, including job segmentation and a persistent gender wage differential. In addition, women workers are vulnerable to a variety of occupation-related illnesses (e.g., in the cut flower industries). SMEs, especially women-owned ones, are at the low end of global production chains. Most often they lack capital and technology for upgrading and may be at risk for downgrading (Mitchell et al. 2009).

Beyond these specific gender issues, GVCs may have other indirect influences that adversely affect women and gender equality interventions. Mitchell and colleagues point out that “GVC-related exports have lower-value added (are lower in the value chain)”; hence they may not increase export value, with implications for generating sustainable employment and decent wages. The authors also argue that the “GVC prescription offered by international institution may also distort public policy priorities in developing countries with negative impact on the vulnerable even though they may facilitate the international operation of MNC.”

Gender and Trade Facilitation in Brief

Increasingly with the growth of GVCs, developed countries are intensifying their efforts to include legally binding measures on trade facilitation in the WTO multilateral trade rules. At the same time, international institutions such as the World Bank and the ITC are interested in exploring and promoting linkages between trade facilitation and gender empowerment.

Unquestionably the improvement in the movement of goods and services across borders in a timely, efficient, and cost-effective manner is a desirable outcome for both developed and developing countries involved in global trade. To the extent that this facilitates employment and better working conditions, it is a desirable outcome for both workers and firms.

Trade facilitation, however, has multiple dimensions, some of which may be more favorable to the MNCs who run GVCs and some of which may have specific social and gender dimensions. If trade facilitation is narrowly construed to focus only on customs and border procedures such as harmonization and expedited services, then while it may benefit MNCs, it may also have an untoward impact on poor women and men and may ultimately not even be beneficial to small and medium-sized businesses. Facilitating imports can benefit women-owned and other SMEs if there is proactive attention to gender training of customs and border personnel; special lines for clearing of their goods; and other measures to ensure the security, profitability, and growth of SMEs involved in trade.

However, in order to contribute more to gender equality and women’s empowerment, the focus on trade facilitation must be much broader and must also include measures on the export productivity side (building productive and trade capacity). These
may include, for example, trade facilitation measures that support infrastructure such as storage and feeder road connectivity to markets and ports. Support of marketing networks can also be beneficial to women. Such a broader approach to trade facilitation would help women-owned and other SMEs to expand production and more easily access regional and global markets.

Trade facilitation that is biased on the import side by focusing mainly or only on measures and policies for the simplification, harmonization, and standardization of border procedures will not be necessarily beneficial to development and may only serve large foreign traders. Such an approach, if ingrained in the WTO Agreements, can actually be detrimental to women, in three ways. First, it can bring in more import competition, which may further damage the domestic market access of local producers. Second, if trade facilitation brings new obligations for governments that require expenditures on human resources, equipment, information technology (such as X-ray scanning machines), and computerized custom management systems, it can have adverse impacts on domestic budget and allocation decision making.\textsuperscript{51} If technical assistance and grants are not provided governments may have to incur debts to meet these new legally binding obligations.

If there is not appropriate support and sequencing of measures, including spending allocation over time, trade facilitation may have negative impacts on public policy spending decisions as well as on the balance of payments. Hence money that should be spent on poverty eradication and health and gender intervention may be diverted to meet the requirements of trade facilitation.

Third, increasing imports (due to TF biased toward bigger traders) can have adverse impacts on the balance of payment, with transmission effects through the credit and goods market, and can ultimately impact the cost of living.

So trade facilitation may only be beneficial to women if it a) is sequenced in a timely manner according to the needs of the economy, b) comes with grant-based financing and technical assistance, and c) considers the gender differentiated needs of female- and male-owned SMEs involved in exporting and importing. Hence, trade facilitation should also be linked with demand-driven and gender-sensitive Aid for Trade.

**Gender and Aid for Trade**

The Aid for Trade (AFT) initiative was created as an adjunct to the trade reform process, hopefully to engineer processes that would increase gains from trade for many developing countries, especially the least developed ones. It has multiple goals and objectives:

- *Technical trade-related assistance*: for example, helping countries to develop trade strategies, negotiate trade agreements, and implement their outcomes
- *Trade-related infrastructure*: for example, building roads, ports, and telecommunications networks that connect domestic markets to the global economy
• **Productive capacity building** (including trade development): for example, providing support to allow industries and sectors to build on their comparative advantages and diversify their exports

• **Trade-related adjustment assistance**: helping developing countries with the costs associated with trade liberalization, such as tariff reductions, preference erosion, or declining terms of trade

• **Other trade-related needs**: if identified as trade-related development priorities in partner countries’ national development strategies

Aid for Trade, to be successful, cannot simply focus on the tradable sector alone without making the critical linkage between women’s ability to adjust household sector activities with their productivity and the availability of exports/tradable sector activities. So the infrastructure development must also to some extent ensure the availability of water and energy inside communities. Thus attention must go beyond creating ports and superhighways to building community and domestic infrastructure, such as feeder roads and accessible water facilities.

Women’s businesses are also impacted by investment and trade promotions that determine the flow of project funding and technical assistance. Most often they are the least serviced, if at all. Thus there is a need to tailor programs and projects focused on investment expansion or the key critical needs of women-owned micro businesses and SMEs. Women may also require highly differentiated business support services that are specifically targeted to meet their priorities and concerns. Women entrepreneurs who are involved with the export sector or who are contemplating future involvement in this sector may also require particular attention in the area of trade finance, trade promotion, market analysis, and development.

As has been noted by Elson and Gideon and the World Bank, women may also be differently impacted by the design and development of physical infrastructure, such as roads and ports, that would be part of the dynamics of any trade-related infrastructure under Aid for Trade and trade-related capacity-building initiatives. The focus on what kinds of infrastructure will receive priority attention and support—whether feeder roads or only main roads—is critical to the survival and expansion of women and small farmers in ensuring access to markets and their ability to be independent of middlemen; it may also lessen their dependency on the less remunerative farm-gate pricing structure.

Women and poor minority businesses operating in the export and import sectors have a greater need for accessing many of the softer elements of market access and market, entry such as incentives, tricks of the trade with regulations, and assistance with the costs of information and communications, as well as dealing with global supply chains and product development. Programs geared to providing export training; building and maintaining trading networks; and assisting with capital upgrading, technical standards, and regulations for specific export markets, if tailored with adequate gender sensitivity, can prove highly beneficial to women economic actors

AFT should seek to remedy and transform the most developmentally unfriendly and negative aspects of trade provisions on the ground and support flanking policies that
will make trade reform sustainable and increase its gender equality and impact on women's economic empowerment.

Notes

1. The General Agreement on Trade and Tariff was a provisional agreement and organization that set trade rules for forty-seven years, 1948–1994. The GATT rules were subsumed under the Uruguay Round of Agreements (as GATT 1947), for which negotiations started in 1986 and concluded in 1994. The WTO Agreements superseded the GATT both as an institution and as the legal framework for multilateral trade on January 1, 1995.

2. There were two preparatory committee meetings and one intersessional meeting for this summit, starting at the end of January 1994 and continuing through October 1994, with women's group and gender advocates intensifying activities on gender and economic justice issues, especially around the third and final set of meetings of the Preparatory Committee in January 1995 in New York.

3. Women's groups such as DAWN, WEDO, and CRIAW, who were part of the so-called Linkage Caucus, consisting of subcauses ranging from economic justice to human rights, were very involved in the preparations for the Beijing meeting, under the subheading action for equality, development, and peace. Regional conferences and other international conferences were held starting in September 1994 and culminated in an expert group on women and economic decision making, institutional and financial arrangements, and peace and women in international decision making, in New York November 7–11, 1994, November 21–23, 1994, and December 5–9, 1994. A final meeting (the 39th Session of the Commission on the Status of Women, acting as the preparatory committee for the FWCU) was held in March–April 1995 in New York.

4. See, for example, Strategic Silence Gender and Economic Policy. (Bakker 1994), the 1999 World Survey of Women in Development, and Elson and Çağatay (2000).


7. One of the first workshops that I facilitated was with the Grail (New York) for the inception of its global program, Women Breaking Boundaries. I subsequently became a frequent Grail contributor and participant, working on economic literacy and social justice with these and many other communities in the United States. This experience helped to cement my commitment as a graduate student seeking to make my graduate experience relevant to the world. This led to further contacts with women in the religious world through speaking engagements on the debt crisis and later numerous training programs on economic literacy/popular economics. (My PhD thesis looked at the macroeconomic impacts of the cross-border public and publicly guaranteed debt on the Jamaican economy.)

8. I held this position from 1996 to 1999.

9. Founded in Bangalore in 1984, DAWN was launched on the international stage with the showcasing of its analysis at the Nairobi Women's Conference (1985) and the subsequent publication of its widely read and respected publication, Development, Crises and Alternative Visions: Third World Women's Perspectives (Sen and Grown 1987).
10. See chapter 22 in this volume.

11. The WTO Agreements cover the agreement establishing the WTO, the outcome of the Uruguay Round Agreements (including the original GATT 1947; the updated rules on goods, called GATT 1994; rules on services; the General Agreement on Trade in Services; and the rules on intellectual property rights, the Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [TRIPs] agreement).

12. See, for example, the work of the International Working Group on Gender, Macroeconomics and Trade (IWG-GEM 2006).

13. The Multifibre arrangement, which was replaced by the agreement on clothing and textile, was phased out over a ten-year period along with it quotas on the sector.

14. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization, “the prices of food commodities (such as rice, wheat, maize and oilseeds) on world markets, adjusted for inflation, declined substantially from the early 1960s to the early 2000s, when they reached a historic low” (FAO 2011)). They increased slowly from 2003 to 2006 and then surged upward from 2006 to 2008. But since mid-2010 food prices have began to climb upward once again (FAO 2011).

15. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were developed in the background of the Millennium Declaration. The Millennium Declaration, signed by 189 governments, including 147 heads of state, in September 2000 at the UN Millennium Summit, stated: “No individual and no nation must be denied the opportunity to benefit from development. The equality rights and opportunity of women and men must be ensured.” These are the MDGs: Goal one, eradication of poverty/hunger; Goal two, achieving universal primary education; Goal three, gender equality; Goal four, decrease in child mortality; Goal five, improved maternal health; Goal six, control HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; Goal seven, ensure environmental sustainability; and Goal eight, develop a global partnership for development. Specific targets relative to each goal were established to be substantially achieved by 2015. Other conferences and arenas in which women’s role in development and gender equality have been affirmed include the Earth Summit 1992, the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD)—Cairo 1994, the World Summit on Social Development—Copenhagen 1995, and the UN Conference on Human Settlement, Habitat II, 1996.

16. The target end date for the achievement of the eight MDGs was 2015. Since 2011 the UN has set in motion a process now known as the post-2015 development agenda. Roughly eleven thematic global consultations are part of this process, involving a multitude of online discussions; expert group meetings; and consultations with civil society, academics, policymakers, and the business community. (The eleven themes are education, energy, food security and nutrition, health, water, growth and employment, governance, environmental sustainability, population dynamics, conflict and fragility, and inequalities.) The output from this two-year process is anticipated to launch a new development era. Gender advocates, led by UN Women, are pushing for gender inequality to be a central plank of this debate and discussion.

17. I have been intimately involved in working with women advocates as well as feminist trade scholars on elaborating the conceptual and operational pillars of gender and trade, trade-finance linkages, and supporting trade advocacy with policy-oriented research. Early on, as a program officer with WIDE, I developed economic literacy training and trade advocacy networking with many feminist colleagues and contributed to the seeding
of the global work on gender and trade as the research coordinator of the International Gender and Trade Network in organizing work.


19. The OWINFS is a loose grouping of organizations, activists, and social movements worldwide fighting the current model of corporate globalization embodied in global trading system. It is committed to a sustainable, socially just, democratic, and accountable multilateral trading system. Members of the IGTN were active participants in this network in its early formative years.

20. The World Social Forum emerged in 2001 from a vast gathering of NGOs and civil society organizations in Porto Alegre, Brazil. Its focus is on countering hegemonic globalization and ensuring spaces for plural dynamics, sharing, and discussion of alternatives to globalization. Members of the IGTN, in particular Gigi Francisco (Asia-GTN) and Graciela Rodriguez (Brazil, LAGTN), were key movers in ensuring the space for women and gender perspectives.

21. The Feminist Dialogue was the key instrument created for inserting and integrating feminist perspectives into the framework of the World Social Forum. Multiple strands of women and gender advocates created processes for structured discussions around ways and means to ensure strong spaces for women in global social movements. Gigi Francisco and Graciela Rodriguez were tireless proponents and key architects of the Feminist Dialogue.

22. The GGCA has been operating since about 2008. Its Steering Committee members include UNDP, IUCN, UNEP, and the Women and Environment Organization (WEDO).

23. The IGTN Geneva office was funded by the MOTT foundation through the visionary intervention of Sandra Smithey. Geneva is also home to many of the economic and technical staff of many developing countries’ missions.

24. The Hemispheric Social Alliance is a movement of social organizations, networks, and sectors from the whole hemisphere of the Americas, from Canada to Chile.

25. Economic partnership agreements (EPAs) are trade and development agreements negotiated between the EU and Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific countries engaged in a regional economic integration process.


27. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, is a group of member states. The founding five are Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand (all since 1967), followed by Brunei Darussalam (1984), Vietnam (1995), Lao PDR (1997), Myanmar (1997), and Cambodia (1999). ASEAN works on a broad and comprehensive set of issues, ranging from cooperation and the promotion of economic growth (especially with regard to sectoral issues such as agriculture and industries), to trade expansion, peace and stability, and mutual assistance. The group focuses on creating an ASEAN community (by 2015).
28. The Center of Concern is a faith-based organization that through education, advocacy, and capacity building challenges structural injustice and promotes innovative economic alternatives. The Global Woman’s Project was created in 1974; its coordinator, Maria Riley, and Peggy Antrobus, then a coordinator of DAWN, were the developers of the initial idea of a coordinated global women’s approach to trade issues.

29. The Ford Foundation, under the inspired leadership of Manuel Montes, both funded the operations of the Secretariat and independently supported, through its regional program/offices, the regional focal points of the network. The IGTN survived primarily by being fully funded by Ford for well over five years. When that fund dried up in the context of the lessening attractiveness of trade advocacy work, restructuring and reprioritization within Ford, the dormancy of multilateral trade negotiations, and financial management challenges in the African region, the network was unable to secure the core funds needed for its Secretariat operations.

30. See, for example, Red Internacional de Género y Comercio, capítulo latinoamericano (www.generoycomercio.org) and Collective for Research & Training on Development—Action CRTDA (the IGTN Middle East and Gulf Region) (crtda.org.lb), and IGTN-Central Asia (including Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan), which became part of IGTN in March 2004.

31. According to the World Food Summit (1996): “Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.” By this definition the critical factors are availability and access to food. In contrast, food sovereignty is the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable agricultural practices. Food sovereignty, as distinct from food security (food availability and access to food), which can be obtained through food imports and food aid, was first brought into the trade debate as an expressly political stance by Via Campesina (a network of small farmers and peasant organizations in the global South). The recent food storage issues and food price volatility demonstrate the singular importance of food sovereignty.

32. Domestic regulations are discussed in the context of the liberalization of services under the General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS) and refer to issues such as qualification requirements, licensing requirements, limitations on the number of service providers and the number of persons employed, and so forth. These are normally areas of domestic policy that governments can use to balance social, developmental, and other equity concerns.

33. La Via Campesina is an international movement of about 200 million peasants, small and medium-sized farmers, landless people, women farmers, indigenous people, migrants, and agricultural workers from around the world. It defends small-scale sustainable agriculture and food sovereignty as a way to promote social justice and dignity. Created in 1993 in Mons, Belgium, it strongly opposes corporate-driven agriculture and transnational companies, which it sees as destroying people and nature.

34. The FAO now also features numerous reports on the relationship between trade policy reforms and food security. At a meeting of Dakar Agricole (April 2011) sponsored by President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, Pierre Pagesse, Chairman of Limagrain and of momagri, the French agriculture think tank (Mouvement pour une Organisation Mondiale de l’Agriculture), raised questions about agriculture being a part of the multilateral trade negotiations. He was not alone, as many participants, from governments
A coalition of forty-six developing countries in the WTO is pressing for flexibility for
developing countries to undertake limited market opening in agricultural issues. The
group, which is called Friends of Special Products (in agriculture), includes Antigua
and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Plurinational State of Bolivia, Botswana, Côte
d’Ivoire, China, Congo, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada,
Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Republic of Korea,
Madagascar, Mauritius, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama,
Peru, Philippines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,
Senegal, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (WTO 2013).

The G-33 group has been proposing since 2006 that the rules be updated to allow devel-
oping country governments to buy farmers’ crops at supported prices if the programs
address food security (Wise 2013).

Though under the so-called peace clause negotiated in the 1994 Agreement on Agriculture
(AoA) during the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, which also created the WTO, the
EU and the United States were permitted to continue to subsidize their farmers; this option
is not available to most developing countries. This is why the G-33 is seeking the amendment
to the AoA. Ironically, the countries, such as the United States and those in the EU, that are
not vulnerable to food insecurity have been grandfathered in so they can offer subsidies;
at the same time they are fighting to maintain a rule that blocks the developing countries from
protecting the most impoverished citizens in the world. The United States, even as it defends
its Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), “which costs about $78 billion last
year to assist a much smaller number of people,” is opposed to India’s food security program,
which uses the same measures as the United States and costs $20 billion, reaching more than
600 million farmers and roughly 830 million hungry boys, girls, men, and women, most of
the women living on close to or less than $1.25 a day (Wise 2013). The United States argues
that India’s program is a violation of the WTO agreement. (India’s recently enacted food
security program entitles around 67 percent of the population to 5 kg of subsidized food
grains; the subsidies are likely to breach the 10 percent limit; Wise 2013).

However, under this arrangement, developing countries remain vulnerable to challenges
that may be brought under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing mea-
sures; So no permanent solutions has been reached on this issue.

I was the adviser and lead facilitator on this project. We also incorporated regional mem-
ers of the IGTN network and activists who had been involved in IGTN training courses
both as participants and facilitators where possible in many of these workshops.

The UN Women (UNIFEM) study (2008) reveals that the contribution of women informal
traders to national GDP amounts to 64 percent of value added in trade in Benin, 46 percent in Mali, and 41 percent in Chad (Charmes 2000).


FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe;
ESCAP, Economic and social Commission for Asia Pacific; ECLAC, Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean; ECSWA, Economic and Social
Commission for Western Asia; and ECA, European Economic Commission for Africa.
This has a high-level staff member, Simonetta Zarrilli, as Chief, Trade, Gender and Development Section, and Gender Focal Point.

This was undertaken under the Social Transformation Programme Division (STPD), which covers gender and youth.

This section draws heavily on Williams (2005).

The Singapore issues were a quadruplet of extremely contentious topics—trade and investment, trade and competition policy, transparency in government procurement, and trade facilitation—put on the WTO liberalization agenda by developed countries at the 1996 WTO Singapore Ministerial Conference. The first three topics are nontrade issues and hence objected to by developing countries as part of the trade agenda. While trade facilitation is possibly the most clearly related to the WTO agenda, developing countries saw the so-called Singapore issues as portending adverse effects for their economies if agreements about these issues were made under binding multilateral discipline; they thus fought these issues to a standstill from the Seattle (1999) to the Doha Ministerial (2001) Conferences. (For details on the development implications of the Singapore issues, see Khor (2008).


The Women Strategic Planning Seminar on Trade, which is cosponsored by DAWN Caribbean and the Center of Concern (Washington, DC), has been functioning since the fall of 1998. It is multistage process aimed at developing a strategic plan to enhance the effectiveness of feminist economists, activists, and economic literacy providers in bringing a gender perspective to trade negotiations and institutions. The mechanisms included an electronic conference with seminar rooms on five topics: textile, investment, intellectual property rights, agriculture, and services and e-commerce. The e-conference discussion culminated in a seminar scheduled for the end of 1999. The Women Seattle listserv planned a mechanism for a women’s caucus at the Seattle Ministerial.

This meeting had been planned before the Seattle breakdown of the WTO but was helped by that process.

Value chain analysis describes the activities from input through end use that control either by vertical integration or horizontally with complementarity. Global value chain production in service and products is dominated by a few well-known, large chains, such as Nike, Nestlé, and Microsoft (Mitchell et al. 2013).

Studies on trade facilitation in developing countries identify that countries such as Jamaica and Bolivia have thus fare spent $5.5 million and $38 million, respectively, toward computerizing customs. These costs do not include the cost of maintenance and upgrading—life cycle costs of the initiatives.
References


Introduction: Understanding the Links

Budgets matter because they determine how governments mobilize and allocate public resources. Budgets are used to shape policies, set priorities and provide the means to meet the social and economic needs of citizens. (Heyzer 2002)

Gender-responsive budgeting (GRB) is a gender-mainstreaming strategy premised on the idea that budgets are not gender neutral and that the choices governments make about how to raise and distribute resources can reinforce, maintain or reduce gender inequality (Elson 2012). GRB emerged out of feminist politics and organizing in the 1980s and 1990s. But it gained real momentum following the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing (1995), which called for “the integration of a gender perspective in budgetary decisions in policies and programs” (Sharp and Broomhill 2002). This moment ignited an unprecedented global interest in GRB and resulted in a number of initiatives taking off around the world, building on decades of critical feminist analysis and research on the links between macroeconomics, poverty and inequality.

In the 1970s and 1980s transnational feminist movements in the global South and North argued that macroeconomic policy prescriptions, in the form of structural adjustment, had particularly harmful impacts on women. These movements challenged the gender neutrality of those policies and brought to the fore major biases in economic policy and practice, including, among others, a lack of recognition of the care economy and of women’s role in it. Feminist reflection and activism in the decades that followed sought to dismantle the ways in which economic policy was conceived and practiced and offered new approaches for addressing problems of inequality that centered on recognizing the sexual division of labor and the gendered nature of economic institutions (Cagatay 1998).
A strong body of critical analysis and thought known as “feminist economics” emerged out of this movement that brought gender and power analysis into the discipline of economics. Feminist economists challenged the mainstream neoliberal economic theory and practice that had become the baseline for formulating development policies and programs. They argued that women’s needs and concerns have been marginalized in conceptions of macroeconomic theory and practice, that have as their starting point the assumption that men and women benefit equally from economic growth. Household analysis, including of distributional inequalities in access to resources within households, is ignored, while women’s contribution to gross domestic product (GDP) in the form of reproductive activity is not included in labor force or national accounting systems and is therefore assumed to contribute nothing at all to economic growth.

In her analysis of macroeconomic policy in the 1990s, feminist academic Diane Elson argued that mainstream economic policies are imbued with three male biases that shape macroeconomic policy and prevent the formulation of more gender-responsive models. Feminist economists, such as Marilyn Waring (1990), argued that ignoring the value of women’s work as producers and reproducers renders their contribution to national accounts invisible, while development theorists such as Kabeer (1994), Sen (1990) and Moser (1993) interrogated assumptions about the household and women’s role in it. This line of analysis resulted in an influential and rich body of work (see Beneria and Sen 1981; Elson and Pearson 1981; Sen and Grown 1987; Folbre 1992; Waring 1999; Agarwal 1994; Kabeer, 1994; Mohanty, Russo and Torres, 1991) that continues to inform feminist research and activism on a range of issues, including globalization, austerity and inequality.

In the late 1990s, feminist economists and activists brought their analysis of macroeconomic policy to government fiscal policies and national budgets. They identified this as an important entry point for addressing gender inequality and strengthening the links between budgets and social-policy outcomes. Because the budget is considered the most important economic policy tool of government, it was necessary to understand the impact of budget decisions on women, men and children and to advocate for changes or shifts in expenditure where needed (Budlender and Hewitt 2003). GRB made visible some of the “blind spots of traditional macroeconomic theory and practice” (Budlender, 1996) by drawing attention to the issues of unpaid labor and distributional inequalities within households. Gender budget analysis offered a practical approach for assessing a government’s commitment to realizing women’s rights. It gave expression or meaning to the strong normative frameworks for gender equality and women’s rights articulated in national constitutions, bills of rights and domestic legislation on a range of issues, including violence, pay parity and other antidiscrimination legislation. Many feminists saw GRB as a matter of good governance and a way to hold governments accountable for their commitments to women.

In this chapter, I provide a historical and political overview of gender-responsive budgeting, from early experiences in Australia and South Africa to more recent experiences in Morocco, Ecuador and Nepal. I present how GRB has evolved, who the key
actors and drivers are, what some of the challenges are and what GRB has achieved. In doing so, this chapter delineates three major moments or waves of GRB that have collectively resulted in better financing for gender equality and women’s rights. The first wave includes pioneering work undertaken in Australia and South Africa that established useful conceptual and methodological approaches to GRB and set the stage for many experiences that followed. The second wave followed two major global conferences that put gender equality firmly on the agenda of ministers of finance and resulted in more than a decade of high-quality technical work, including the development of tools and capacity that led to a significant degree of political uptake and institutionalization of GRB. The third, and current, wave followed the fifty-second Session of the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) that considered financing for gender equality as a priority theme against the backdrop of a major global, systemic financial crisis and a surge in new private sector development financing actors. These three waves are not discrete or mutually exclusive but are rather part of an iterative process that involves many actors and many strategies. Further, because the actors driving GRB approaches range from women’s organizations to feminists who are working within government ministries (femocrats) to a combination of both, there are considerable variations in experiences around the world. For example, in many least developed countries (LDCs), GRB started as a direct response to structural adjustment programs (SAPs) and was led by civil society organizations (CSOs); in other countries, GRB is linked to a political or economic reform process, and is therefore led from within.

By drawing on select experiences from around the world, I demonstrate the potential of GRB to effect systemic changes in policy frameworks, capacities, plans and budgets. I argue that where GRB has succeeded, it has resulted in better alignment between policy commitments and financing for gender equality, with strong partnerships between ministries of finance, sector ministries, donors, national women’s machineries, women’s organizations and women as rights holders. I then raise important questions about the future of this work. Is GRB still a relevant strategy to achieve gender equality given the profound impact of decades of economic liberalization that has placed power and decision making outside the realm of the state and in the hands of global institutions? How can we ensure that GRB supports the realization of women’s rights and that the original intention of GRB, so clearly articulated in the Beijing Platform for Action, is fulfilled?

Where It All Began: The First Wave

Since GRB came to the attention of the international community three decades ago, a number of initiatives have emerged. These are a result of calls from women’s organizations for strong and robust implementation of government and donor policy commitments to gender equality and women’s rights. Because GRB emerged from a variety of different sources, there is no single approach to it. Gender-responsive budgets, or
“women’s budgets”, as they are sometimes called, have many definitions and purposes depending on who is driving a particular effort and the political and economic context within which it is located. Some, such as those in Australia, have emerged as government- or bureaucracy-led initiatives, while others, such as those in South Africa, are the result of feminists working inside and outside the state apparatus to ensure adequate resource allocation and good governance. There are advantages and disadvantages to both approaches, as Rhonda Sharp posits:

Inside government models (for example Australia, Scotland, Barbados and France) have the advantage of being able to access a range of information and data about government budgets and policy not readily available to community groups. They also have the capacity to make a direct input into the budget decision-making processes within the bureaucracy with a view to bringing about changes in policy, processes and resource allocations. Community-based gender budget exercises (for example, South Africa, Tanzania and the UK) face significant data and resource constraints yet can prove crucial in fostering democratic debate about the budget and in making more substantive criticisms about the gender bias of economic and social policies of government than those conducted within government (2002: 29)

In this section, I describe two of the early experiences of GRB, examining what has been achieved and how they have contributed to the strengthening of feminist analysis and the understanding of current GRB practice.

Australia launched its pilot Women’s Budget Program in 1984 under the leadership of the then Labor prime minister Bob Hawke. The program, which ended in 1996, had been pushed by feminists in the government and is an example of a “bureaucracy-based strategy” (Budlender and Hewitt 2003). Sharp argues that one of the reasons the Women’s Budget flourished in Australia is that a strong national women’s machinery had been set up in the preceding decades and a number of feminists had taken up positions in the administration. In her analysis of the main achievements of the Women’s Budget Program during the twelve years of its existence, Sharp notes that the results achieved were in keeping with the three main goals of the Women’s Budget: raising awareness, increasing government accountability and effecting changes to budgets and policies. Despite some important achievements, however, a major limitation was the lack of substantive engagement with feminists from the outside, which led to, among other things, an inability to challenge the macroeconomic framework within which the budget was situated (Budlender and Hewitt 2003, 42). Furthermore, the fact that the program was driven entirely from within the government meant that it was very vulnerable to changes in government, and in 1996, when a new government took office, the program ended. Despite this, the Australian experience informed many GRB initiatives in the 1990s (Sharp and Broomhill 2002).

One of the most significant contributions to come out of the Australian experience is Sharp’s three-way categorization of gender expenditure that informed many experiences, including the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations (UN) gender markers, today. It represented the first attempt at conceptualizing what constituted “financing for gender equality,” which Elson later described as “financing that should actively aim to eliminate
discrimination, expand women’s capabilities, access to resources and opportunities” (Elson 2012).

The South African Women’s Budget Initiative (WBI), on the other hand, was one of multiple strategies with multiple actors and pressure points. It began a year after the first democratic elections and was part of a massive political and economic reform project that the newly elected African National Congress (ANC) government immediately put into place following the dismantling of Apartheid. Under the Nationalist Party, the Apartheid system of racial segregation was skewed completely in favor of white citizens and resource allocation was enmeshed in the racist political ideology of the government. The ANC was expected to reverse these injustices and set out an ambitious reform agenda with race and gender equality at its heart. Drawing on international and regional best practice, South Africa developed strong institutional mechanisms to facilitate the promotion of gender equality, much as Australia had done. Often cited as the most comprehensive in the world, South Africa’s national machinery included a parliamentary committee; the independent Commission on Gender Equality; the Office on the Status of Women, located in the President’s Office; and gender focal points in government departments.

Civil society groups and parliamentarians initiated the WBI. Although it was not a government initiative, over the course of a few years, there was a strong degree of political uptake by the Finance Ministry. The WBI drew heavily on the skills and analysis of feminist researchers outside the government to provide the evidence on government spending, and the political influence of women parliamentarians inside to advocate for more and better resources. The Joint Monitoring Committee on the Improvement of the Quality of Life and Status of Women (JMCW) was able to use the budget debates to raise public awareness of financing gender equality by asking ministers for reports and holding hearings with civil society groups on poverty, gender and budgets. A year after the WBI was established in 1995, the finance minister, in his 1996 budget speech committed the government to developing gender-disaggregated data, gender-sensitive targets and indicators and a performance-review mechanism (currently part of the Provincial Budgets and Expenditure Review tabled annually in Parliament). He also committed the ministry to counting unpaid labor as a contribution to the national economy, and in 2001, Statistics South Africa produced the country’s first study on unpaid labor. In 1997, when it submitted its report to the JMCW, the Finance Ministry indicated its commitment to “an integrated gender analysis to macroeconomic policy”. In the financial year 1998/9, the National Budget Review was presented to Parliament and the government reaffirmed a commitment to “integrate gender analysis into budgetary processes”. The Budget Review also indicated that the Department of Finance had included ‘gender-disaggregated information where available and appropriate, to permit an informed analysis of the impact of the budget on men and women’ (Claassen, 2008).

With these successes, feminists in nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) began using GRB as part of their advocacy on issues such as ending violence against women, poverty and HIV/AIDS. They found that despite a plethora of progressive laws and policies on gender equality and women’s rights, there was very little funding or capacity within government departments to fully implement these. One organization, the Centre
for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR), conducted an investigation into the implementation of the Domestic Violence Act of 1998. It found that the government had invested woefully little to implement the Act, despite high levels of domestic and other forms of violence against women. The study found that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were filling the gaps in service provision left by the state, and that such services were being delivered either voluntarily or through donor funding, raising important questions about the state’s obligations to women (Vetten and Khan, 2001).

The WBI ended in 2000. A number of factors contributed to this, not least of which was a major macroeconomic policy shift. This entailed a change from a progressive macroeconomic policy framework that focused on the redistribution of wealth and a fairer distribution of resources, with gender as a core consideration (the Reconstruction and Development Programme)—to one which focused on job creation and economic growth (the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy), in which there was little consideration of gender. Other reasons included a lack of political will and government leadership and the resignation of a GRB champion within government, Pregs Govender.

These early experiences in Australia and South Africa, along with Canada in 1993 and the Philippines in 1995, paved the way for many other GRB initiatives. The enduring impact of the Australian and South African examples can be seen in many iterations of GRB today.

**Gender-Responsive Budgeting Takes Off: The Second Wave**

The Commonwealth played a leading role in initiating GRB during the first wave. In 1995, it launched the Gender Budget Initiative and began pilot programs in Barbados, Fiji, South Africa and Sri Lanka (Budlender and Hewitt 2003). As the Commonwealth tried to promote GRB among its member states, it brought in key partners, including the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and the International Development and Research Centre (IDRC). In 2000, it formalized a joint partnership aimed at supporting both governments and civil society in implementing GRB programming. The partnership had four main objectives, namely, to strengthen the capacity of government to incorporate a gender analysis in planning and to evaluate the impact of revenue raising; to support strategies for women’s participation in economic decision making through their engagement in budgetary processes; to enable women to hold governments accountable for their commitments to women’s rights; and to support the incorporation of gender into economic governance (UNIFEM 2002).

The partnership created the space to come together, reflect and systematize knowledge and experience on GRB just as a number of new initiatives were taking off all around the world. Two important meetings were held in the years following the formation of the
partnership that led to a groundswell of support for GRB and kicked off the second wave. The first took place in 2001, when UNIFEM, in collaboration with the Government of Belgium as President of the European Union, the OECD and the Nordic Council of Ministers, held an international conference on GRB. The conference endorsed a vision of implementing GRB initiatives in all countries by 2015 and paved the way for many declarations of political support. In 2002, at a meeting of Commonwealth finance ministers in Trinidad and Tobago, the ministers “agreed to make substantial progress on implementing gender-responsive budgets within their respective budget setting process” (UNIFEM 2002). It was the first time gender had been included as a specific agenda item at a meeting of a group of finance ministers. By 2005, finance ministers had committed to integrating gender into their respective budget-formulation processes and to establishing institutional mechanisms within their countries to monitor the progress on implementation. As a strategy to increase political uptake of GRB, the partnership idea worked. It brought together a number of key providers of technical and financial assistance that joined in solid support for these new GRB initiatives, enabling them to thrive.

An outcome of the 2001 conference was the launch of UNIFEM’s first GRB program, which supported governments in over twenty countries with technical assistance and financial resources. GRB became the flagship of UNIFEM, with a clearly developed strategic vision and the highest level of political support. Over the course of only a decade, UNIFEM, and now UN Women, has expanded its support at the national and local levels to over sixty-five countries in five regions. GRB continues to be a major focus of the entity’s work and is central to its understanding of effective policymaking. In the words of the UN Under-Secretary-General and Executive Director, Dr. Phumzile Mlambo-Ngucka:

We know that strong political will and action drive results for gender equality and women’s rights. We are making progress. More girls are in school. Fewer women die in pregnancy and childbirth. And more women are in leadership positions. Yet progress is slow and uneven and quite frankly it is insufficient. One of the main barriers is the chronic underinvestment in gender equality and women’s rights, which impedes delivery on obligations to women, girls and society overall. Effective financing for gender equality is first and foremost a matter of human rights. (2014)

In this second wave, emphasis was placed on the technical aspects of GRB and therefore feminist economists played a significant role in developing GRB tools and analytical capacity. Drawing on the experiences of Australia (Sharp’s expenditure categorization) and South Africa (Budlender’s five-step approach), a set of policy tools was produced that enabled budget analysis at all levels of the policy, planning and budgeting cycles. These tools were geared toward highlighting the limitations of existing mainstream budgeting tools, which had many built-in assumptions about the impact of government expenditure and revenue-raising on women and men. The newer tools asked the big questions that feminists had been asking, such as how a policy impacts women and how women would benefit from a particular type of expenditure. These formed the basis of capacity-strengthening strategies and approaches that governments needed
to implement GRB and that civil society groups needed to analyze budgets and advocate for fairer distribution of resources. Many countries have used either one specific GRB tool or a combination of many. For example, gender budget statements have been used very effectively in Morocco and Mozambique’s finance ministries. Other countries, like Nepal and Ecuador, have developed comprehensive tracking systems to track gender-related expenditures across line or sector ministries.

Civil society organizations have harnessed the potential of these tools to generate robust and concrete evidence of funding gaps. For example, Dynamique Citoyenne, a network comprising over 400 organizations covering the ten regions of Cameroon, conducted a gender-aware beneficiary assessment (GABA) of reproductive health services in 2011 in order to inform the Ministry of Public Health’s sector-wide approach (SWAp). The GABA provided gender-sensitive data and analysis of the sociocultural factors leading to the high maternal mortality rate in Cameroon, including why services were not reaching women. Dynamique Citoyenne used the data collected from the tracking exercise to advocate for greater budget allocations in order to increase the availability of targeted maternal health services for women.

A major achievement of the second wave was the building of strong relationships with Ministries of Finance and Economy. While these government ministries are not the natural allies of gender equality advocates and feminists, their leadership and political commitment was crucial because GRB required changes in their own public finance management systems. In many cases, the willingness of the ministries to put in place the comprehensive structures required to mainstream gender into their system has meant the difference between success and failure. Feminist strategies were therefore focused on generating political support for GRB while simultaneously providing technical assistance and capacity strengthening for gender analysis to these ministries. As a result, GRB has made an important contribution by ensuring that directives from ministries of finance, that set the parameters for budget decisions, in the form of budget statements and call circulars, included consideration of gender equality.

In some countries such as Nigeria, finance ministries have provided strong directives and incentives, resulting in greater allocation of resources for gender equality. Through the “Growing Girls and Women” (GWIN) Programme, the ministry of finance provides additional resources to key sector ministries tasked with expanding opportunities for women and girls in sectors including agriculture and infrastructure. This has resulted in about two million women farmers receiving mobile phones that allow them to access information to improve their farming methods, while an e-wallet system allows the transfer of mobile money to purchase agricultural inputs. With regard to infrastructure, an estimated one thousand five hundred women have received training in road maintenance and related vocations (Okonjo-Iweala, 2014).

Other positive trends include the development and use of comprehensive tracking systems that assess the allocations for gender programs and the establishment of budget committees that provide guidance and oversight to sector ministries.

Nepal and Ecuador have well-developed systems for tracking allocations for gender equality and women’s empowerment in key sectors. For example, Nepal developed a
budget-classification system that includes a set of criteria and indicators to categorize sector budget allocations as directly gender-responsive, indirectly gender-responsive or gender neutral. This tool monitors resource allocations in the sectors with the most pressing gender needs, including in education, health, local development, and peace and security. Between 2012 and 2013 the Government of Nepal increased direct gender-responsive budget allocations from $0.877 billion to $1.13 billion, or 21.75 percent of the total budget (UN Women, 2014). Ecuador uses a budget classifier that tracks all public allocations against the national equal-opportunity plan, assessing how the funds contribute in such dimensions as women’s political participation, freedom from violence and equal work opportunities. As a result of effective tracking and continuous refinement of the classifier, Ecuador almost doubled the funding allocated to the implementation of gender-equality policies from US $1.4 billion in 2011 to US $2.6 billion in 2012 (UN Women, 2013). These examples show that the establishment and continued improvement of monitoring and accountability systems have generated data, which, when made publicly available, become crucial evidence on which civil society demands for action and government accountability can be based.

One of the major successes of the second wave has been the strong political uptake and institutionalization of GRB tools and strategies in mainstream government planning and budgeting. UN Women alone supports programming in sixty-five countries and there are many more GRB initiatives at the national and local levels worldwide. Morocco, for example, has made impressive strides in anchoring GRB into its public finance management system with the passage of a law, approved in January 2014, which mandates sector ministries to integrate gender into their strategic objectives, results and performance indicators of their respective budgets. Even before the law was adopted, Morocco has taken a systematic approach to GRB over a number of years and achieved significant results. Most notable is its success in reducing maternal mortality by sixty percent due to increased investment and a focus on three key interventions, namely “reducing physical and financial barriers to obstetric care; improving the quality of care and improving health system governance” (Ministry of Health and UNFPA, 2011). This resulted in a dramatic decline in maternal mortality from 332 deaths per 100,000 live births in 1990 to 112 death per 100,000 live births in 2009 (Ibid).

Despite significant progress on GRB in many countries, resources to implement the range of policies and programs needed to support gender equality and women’s empowerment remain inadequate. Quantifying the financing gap is difficult, but feminist economists and GRB experts have conducted analyses using existing data and are continually developing new methodologies for data collection to support the call for more resources. To illustrate, in 2006, feminist economists estimated a financing gap for Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 3 and gender mainstreaming activities in the range of $8.6 billion (2006) to $23.8 billion (2015) for low-income countries (Grown, Bahadur et.al., 2006). Despite this need for increased investment, the opposite has occurred. More recent research examining MDG-related spending in fifty-five countries in the areas of agriculture, education, environment, gender, health, social protection, and water and sanitation found that spending had fallen as a percent of GDP or total expenditure in
almost all areas and remained stagnant in one, water and sanitation, in the majority of countries (Budlender, Matthew and Watts, 2013). UN Women’s analysis of sectoral spending in education, health and violence against women found persistent and chronic underinvestment in programs addressing these issues (UN Women, 2014).

Bilateral and multilateral organizations have invested significantly to develop tracking systems to quantify donor investment in gender equality and to use these to improve gender equality outcomes. The OECD gender equality policy marker, a statistical tool that categorizes expenditures as either principally or significantly focused on achieving gender equality (OECD, 2014), was developed to quantify aid spending. Similarly, the UN has developed a system-wide gender marker that looks at financing throughout the UN system.

The total volume of Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members’ aid commitments targeting gender equality and women’s empowerment nearly tripled, from $8 billion in 2002 to $24 billion in 2012, despite the financial and economic crisis. Even though there is a positive trend in ODA overall, funding gaps in particular areas of importance for women and girls, including economic empowerment and peace and security, remain inadequate. For example, despite relatively high levels of funding in the health sector overall, the OECD’s own analysis found that funding for family planning had declined substantially, from 71 percent in 1995 to 36 percent in 2012 (OECD, 2014). This drop is of particular concern at a time when an estimated 222 million women of reproductive age currently have an urgent unmet need for family planning (Singh and Darroch, 2012). Similarly, donor aid flows that target gender equality in the peace and security sector have remained stagnant and very low despite the commitments that have been articulated in various UN Security Council resolutions and the disproportionate impact of conflict on women and girls. The OECD states that aid targeting gender equality has been $459 million on average since 2002, but only $60 million of this targets gender equality as the principal objective (Lopez Treussart and Piemonte, 2013).

The efforts of feminists working inside bureaucracies to develop tracking systems for gender equality financing have been crucial in building the evidence and making the case for increased investment. It is possible to analyze the OECD spending on gender equality only because of the systematic work of feminists within the DAC Gender Equality and Development Network (GENDERNET) in developing and continually refining the gender equality policy marker.

**FINANCING FOR DEVELOPMENT, NEW ACTORS, NEW LANDSCAPE: THE THIRD WAVE**

An important site for transnational feminist activism and advocacy, and the context of the third GRB wave, is the financing-for-development agenda. From the outset, feminists have coalesced around the UN-led Financing for Development (FFD) and the OECD Aid Effectiveness Agenda and have identified the policy debates and processes
Gender-Responsive Budgeting

as strategic avenues for advocating for increased financing for gender equality. Two major processes, led by the UN and the OECD, respectively, the 2002 Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for Development and the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, were instrumental in creating high-level political support for more effective development financing and served as opportunities to strengthen the links between GRB and financing. The Monterrey Consensus, which brought together major stakeholders in development financing, agreed on six “leading actions”, including mobilizing both international and domestic resources for development and addressing the lack of coherence in the international monetary, financial and trading systems in support of development (UN, 2003). The Paris Declaration put forth five principles (ownership, harmonization, alignment, managing for results and mutual accountability) for enhancing aid delivery and impact. The principles, endorsed by over 140 development partners, national governments, international agencies and CSOs, were the result of decades of uncoordinated donor support to countries that had resulted in a high degree of fragmentation of efforts. The aspiration was that the new aid modalities (direct budget and sector support) that flowed from the Paris Declaration would improve the quality and efficacy of aid by aligning support to country systems.

Although this was a positive development, many countries had embarked on initiatives to promote national ownership and co-ordinate aid financing even before the 2005 Paris Declaration. For example, the Tanzanian government has been conducting aid-management reforms as part of a set of broader economic policy reforms since the mid-1990s (Rusimbi and Kikwa, 2008).

Feminists, however, were concerned that the Paris Declaration was “highly technical and donor driven and focused more on aid management and delivery [rather] than development outcomes” (Schoenstein et al., 2011). Even though both the Monterrey Consensus and the Paris Declaration called for gender mainstreaming in donor and country financing systems, no consideration had been given to how gender could be mainstreamed in aid-management processes and instruments.

There was much evidence of this policy implementation gap in donors’ own practices. In the 1980s and 1990s, spurred on by the global women’s conferences, a number of bilateral donors developed gender equality policies and action plans and created specific position within their institutions to lead the mainstreaming efforts. Despite this, there was growing evidence that gender policies were not informing donor country strategies and were not matched with adequate resources or with specific performance indicators. In the 1990s and early 2000s, the period leading up to the FfD conferences, feminist networks and organizations, in the global South and North, began analyzing the impact of aid on women’s lives, looking at both the content of donor gender equality policies and how they were being implemented. Feminist networks, such as Women in Development Europe (WIDE) and its UK platform, the Gender and Development Network (GADN), lobbied both the European Commission (EC) and the UK Department for International Development (DfID) for full implementation of their gender policies in EC and DfID internal and external operations, resulting in a number of important achievements.
At the global level, transnational feminist networks concerned about the lack of transparency in the Paris Declaration process brought together a strong collective of women’s rights networks to advocate for gender equality and to ensure that their voices were heard in discussions on aid effectiveness. The Association for Women’s Rights in Development (AWID) mobilized women’s organizations and gender equality advocates in a series of national, regional and global meetings to raise awareness and develop positions on the key demands of women’s organizations. A strategic moment for collective action was the fifty second Session of the CSW (2008) that had “financing for gender equality and the empowerment of women” as its priority theme providing a perfect opportunity for reinforcing demands for increased financing. Feminists within the UN and the OECD produced policy briefs, research papers, and analytical reports to strengthen the evidence base, but they also used their positions to mobilize political support within their own institutions and among like-minded donor and recipient member states for increased financing. The combination of feminists working ‘inside’ – governments, donor agencies and multilateral organizations - and transnational feminist networks on the outside calling for more resources resulted in the Commission noting that ‘insufficient political will and budgetary resources posed obstacles to promoting gender equality and women’s empowerment and continued to undermine the effectiveness of national mechanisms for the advancement of women’ (2008:3). It called for greater action by governments and donors to address this.

The alliance of feminist networks (AWID, Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN), WIDE, FEMNET, International Gender and Trade Network (IGTN), NETRIGHT and WILDAF) was a strong and powerful presence at the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF3), held in Accra, Ghana, in September 2008. Feminists from bilateral and multilateral agencies joined the call for greater democratization of the aid agenda with human rights at the center. Specific demands were made for gender equality financing increases in official development assistance (ODA) and the use of mixed funding mechanisms, not only direct budget support, to ensure progress on gender equality and women’s rights.

It was a major achievement that the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA), that came out of the HLF3, responded to the calls for more linking of aid management systems to human rights standards, development goals and gender equality. Paragraph 13c of the agenda stated that

"developing countries and donors will ensure that their respective development policies and programmes are designed and implemented in ways consistent with their agreed international commitments on gender equality, human rights, disability and environmental sustainability."

(Accra Agenda for Action 2008)

The AAA also committed to a deepening engagement with CSOs and to creating an enabling environment to ensure that their contributions to development reach their full potential (Accra Agenda for Action, 2008, para. 20). While the feminist alliance was not entirely satisfied with the AAA owing to the lack of clear targets and a commitment to
more financing, the joint strategizing, alliance building and networking that feminists networks, groups, and femocrats had embarked on represented a major gain (Craviotto 2010). A noteworthy achievement of the HLF3 was the agreement to shift the discourse from *aid* effectiveness to *development* effectiveness, which created a space to discuss issues such as policy coherence for development.

These various meetings held against the backdrop of a major, global, systemic financial and economic crisis in 2008 coalesced into something of a perfect storm and reenergized the GRB movement. For the next three years, emphasis was placed on strengthening the evidence base through the collection of data and statistics on financing trends. The 2011 Fourth High Level Forum (HLF4) in Busan, South Korea, was a turning point for feminist advocacy and activism on gender, financing and development. As a result of close collaboration and joint strategizing by the OECD DAC, UN Women and the feminist group of the Betteraid Coordinating Group (BACG), the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation made strong commitments to gender equality and women’s empowerment. Paragraph (20) committed governments to

> [accelerating efforts] to achieve gender equality and the empowerment of women through development programmes grounded in country priorities, recognizing that gender equality and women’s empowerment are critical to achieving development results. Reducing gender inequality is both an end in its own right and a prerequisite for sustainable and inclusive growth. As we redouble our efforts to implement existing commitments, we will:

a) Accelerate and deepen efforts to collect, disseminate, harmonize and make full use of data disaggregated by sex to inform policy decisions and guide investments ensuring in turn that public expenditures are targeted appropriately to benefit both women and men.

(Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, 2011)

The outcome document also called for gender equality targets in accountability mechanisms and the integration of gender equality and women’s empowerment in peacebuilding and state building. The emphasis on data and financing provided a strong platform for strengthening GRB because it called for the systematic integration of gender into the public-finance management cycle. To operationalize this vision, UN Women and the OECD DAC GENDERNET developed an indicator that measured the “percentage of countries with systems to track and make” public allocations for gender equality and women’s empowerment, as part of the global monitoring framework.

In 2013, UN Women tested the indicator in twenty countries, with an aim of covering all the UN Women program countries by 2017. As a first step in early 2012, the indicator was included in UN Women’s Strategic Plan 2011–2013, which ensured systematic data collection on the indicator on an annual basis. Reporting began at the end of 2013 through UN Women’s annual country-level reporting system. The 2013 data also provided the baseline information on the number of countries that have systems in place for tracking and making allocations for gender equality public.
Thirty-five countries reported on the indicator as part of the Global Partnership global monitoring framework. Of these, twelve have a system in place to track and make allocations on gender equality public: Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Jamaica, Kosovo, Mali, Nepal, Philippines, Rwanda, Sudan and Tanzania. Five additional countries (Côte d'Ivoire, El Salvador, the Republic of Moldova, Niger and Togo) report having systems for tracking allocations on gender equality, but these allocations are not made public. This shows that countries are making serious efforts to track investments in gender equality and make them publically available, thereby increasing government accountability.

Overall, the experience of feminist engagement in the FfD arena yielded very positive outcomes. A range of strategic alliances were formed with feminist networks, partner and donor governments, that included not only gender equality advocates but also economists and policymakers within these spaces. These partnerships have combined to support evidence building and awareness raising that have been instrumental in influencing political negotiations and processes. Feminists within the UN and the OECD have been at the forefront of collective strategizing and have sought to influence the debates and discussions within their own institutions. The political significance of this work is that feminists are working inside, outside and across bureaucracies to push for transformative change. These joint strategies have resulted in collective achievements that have supported the call for more and better resources for women and girls.

The third wave of GRB is also characterized by a rapidly changing development financing landscape with the emergence of new actors and financing mechanisms. The growth in new development actors, including private companies, philanthropic organizations and international NGOs bring a particular understanding of gender equality and women’s rights often making a “business case” argument that gender equality is good for economic growth. This has led to a proliferation of programming on women’s economic empowerment that is focused on “investing in women and girls” as a proxy indicator for achieving development outcomes and gender equality. While multistakeholder action is essential to achieve gender equality, viewing women primarily as economic agents raises important questions about how these actors understand the causes and impact of gender inequality. Simply absorbing women into highly fragmented, segmented and unequal labor markets will do little to bring us closer to eliminating discrimination. For decades feminists have continually argued that ignoring the structural causes of gender inequality (including unpaid care work, unequal participation in economic and political decision making and unequal access to land and productive resources) perpetuates gender inequality. Effective financing for gender equality addresses the multiple needs of women and girls and therefore requires an approach that is both multidimensional and multi-sectoral.

The increased interest in women and girls, however, has not translated into increased investment for women’s organizations that is vital for transnational networking and movement building. Analysis of funding trends from AWID suggests that
one of the striking paradoxes of this moment is that the spotlight on women and girls seems to have had very little impact on improving the funding situation for a large majority of women’s organizations around the world.

(Arutyunova and Clark, 2013)

Their research also found a crowding-in by other civil society actors to the area of women and girls without necessarily approaching the issues from a rights perspective.

The context within which GRB has to find relevance today is, therefore, increasingly complex. The financial crisis and economic recession of 2008 have brought into stark perspective the challenges countries face in expanding fiscal space in order to prioritize social spending. It its recent report (2014), the Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing notes: “the global economic and financial crisis revealed risks within the international financial system, as well as vulnerability of countries to external financial traumas, adversely affecting their capacity to mobilize resources for development” (UN, 2014:9). The global economic crisis has had profound impacts on the livelihoods of women and men around the world, resulting in job losses, declining earnings and decreased investments in social infrastructure which have increased income poverty. The impact of the crisis has not been gender neutral. There is a significant body of feminist research and analysis showing that women’s and men’s livelihoods have been affected in different ways due to inequalities in access to resources, employment, markets and decision making. Furthermore, the economic crisis is part of an interlocked and multidimensional food, climate, energy and fuel crisis that has deepened and exacerbated existing gender inequalities.

Macroeconomic policy responses to the crisis have been largely gender blind. They have ignored women’s role in the productive and reproductive economies and have failed to put in place measures to address the increased care burden arising from the crisis. Such responses have threatened progress toward gender equality and women’s empowerment because women are more likely to be in insecure jobs, unemployed, to lack social protection and to take on the added care burden resulting from cuts in social services.

While the ongoing economic crisis poses a particular threat to the achievement of gender equality and women’s empowerment, it also presents an opportunity to enforce existing measures for equitable, results-oriented investment. A twin-track approach of engendering fiscal stimulus packages while introducing measures for protecting and improving the quality of investment in key social sectors, such as health and education, is what is needed. Increased investment in gender equality and women’s empowerment is an effective measure to mitigate the impact of this crisis.

Feminist economists Elson and Radhika Balakrishnan have used the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) to make the argument that states must devote the maximum available resources to fulfilling their obligations.\(^{13}\) They must ensure the progressive realization of rights and must avoid deliberately retrogressive measures. It follows that public policy choices and budgets must benefit women and men equally, and that resources generated through domestic revenue, economic
activity, ODA and borrowing are used efficiently and effectively to address women’s needs, remove inequities and achieve development outcomes.

**Conclusion**

Given the bleak context of shrinking budgets, reduced fiscal space and continued aggressive economic liberalization that reduces the role of the state in service provision, the question now arises, to what extent is GRB a relevant strategy for bringing us closer to gender equality? In her reflection on the experience of gender-responsive budgeting in India, Devaki Jain writes: “Gender budgeting is meaningful only if budgetary support is put in the hands of institutions that are representative in character, operate at ground level and are accessible and accountable. (Jain 2002.). Her observation is grounded in the belief that good governance is a prerequisite for the success of GRB. While there is considerable merit in this, the opposite is also true: GRB supports the democratization of institutions by integrating the voices of women into government planning and budgeting.

This chapter has provided a historical and political overview of GRB over a period of three decades. The lessons learned in the first, second and third waves of GRB provide valuable insight into the necessity to ground GRB scholarship, activism and advocacy in a framework of good governance with its emphasis on participation, transparency and accountability. Like most strategies to achieve gender equality, GRB is not a silver bullet. It cannot alone transform macro-economic policies within which budgets are embedded, but it has a very important purpose - to shed light on biases in public spending and revenue raising that, if not addressed, could lead to deepening gender inequality and women’s insecurity. The importance of GRB is that it proposes measures to eliminate these biases by introducing changes to government systems and, in doing so, brings important sites of feminist struggle (care economy, women’s employment, access to resources and safe spaces) directly into the mainstream of public policy, planning and budgeting. It is perhaps inevitable that GRB will lose some of its political impact as it becomes enmeshed in government systems and processes and this is one of the reasons that it is sometimes criticized for failing to change upstream macro-economic policies.

The evolution of GRB as a matter of good governance takes us back to our starting point in the 1980s and 1990s and brings us full circle. While GRB remains an important strategy for achieving gender equality, it must be linked to a broader strategic framework for change that involves many strategies, many actors, and greater emphasis on citizen-state participation and accountability. Transnational feminist networks and movements have always approached gender inequality as a multi-faceted problem that involves changes at all levels – micro, macro and meso-levels advance both systemic and structural change. One is not a precondition for the other.

The fundamental question is how feminists can ensure that GRB continues to be a relevant political strategy in today’s rapidly changing economic and political landscape with shrinking states and shrinking budgets.
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Notes


2. Expenditures explicitly targeted to women and girls: beneficiaries are all female; (2) expenditures explicitly targeted to promoting gender equality: beneficiaries may be women and girls and/or men and boys. Examples include equal-opportunity training for public officials and campaigns of men and boys against domestic violence; (3) all other expenditures: beneficiaries may be women and girls and men and boys. This category includes both expenditures on services and income transfers that go to identifiable individuals and also expenditures on infrastructure, including “public goods” that may be used simultaneously by more than one person, such as street lighting.

3. The OECD and the UN have developed gender markers to track gender-equality expenditures.

4. Debbie Budlender’s five-step approach involves (1) analyzing the situation of women, men, girls, and boys; (2) assessing the gender responsiveness of the policy; (3) assessing the budget allocation; (4) monitoring spending and service delivery; and (5) assessing outcomes.

5. A gender-aware policy appraisal examines a particular government policy. It questions the assumption that the policy is “gender-neutral” in its effects and asks instead, in what ways are the policies and their associated resource allocations likely to reduce or increase gender inequalities? Gender-disaggregated public expenditure reveals the distribution of expenditures among women and men, girls and boys. A gender-disaggregated beneficiary assessment looks at the extent to which a government policy and program matches the priorities and needs of actual or potential beneficiaries from both sexes. Gender-disaggregated tax-incidence analysis examines both direct and indirect taxes. Gender-disaggregated Analysis of the Impact of the Budget on Time Use looks at the relationship between the national budget and the way time is used in households. A gender-aware budget statement tool requires a high degree of commitment and coordination throughout the public sector as ministries or departments undertake an assessment of the gender impact of their line budgets and of how expenditures affect gender equality using a variety of indicators (adapted from Elson 1997b, tools for gender integration into macroeconomic policy).

6. The call circular is an official notice issued by the Ministry of Finance, the Planning Commission, or a similar agency at the beginning of each budget cycle. The purpose of the circular is to instruct government agencies about how to submit their budget demands for
the coming year. In some countries, call circulars may go by other names, such as “budget guidelines” or “Treasury guidelines,” but their purpose is basically the same. The call circular goes to all spending agencies (ministries, departments, and other government-funded institutions). It usually tells each agency what its budget “ceiling” for the next year is, i.e., how much the Ministry of Finance or the Planning Commission plans to allocate to that agency. In some cases, the call circular describes government priorities that should be addressed in the coming year’s allocations. The circular also gives a range of other instructions to the agencies about how to construct and format the draft budget for the coming year and how to present the motivations for that budget. The planning and budget officials within the agencies then use this information to draw up their budget submissions. These submissions are inspected by, and negotiated with, the Ministry of Finance or the Planning Commission before they go to the cabinet. The format of budget submissions differs widely from country to country. A gender budget statement is a gender-specific accountability document produced by a government agency to show what its programs and budgets are doing with respect to gender. A gender budget statement therefore shows: the agency’s intention to do something to improve gender equality and that the agency is putting money where its mouth is, i.e., the budget follows from the policy commitment (UNIFEM 2007).

7. In 2007, Nepal’s Ministry of Finance introduced GRB into all government ministries as part of an overall budget reform. Under this system, the proportion of funds tagged as “directly responsive” for gender equality has increased from 11 percent in 2007/8 to 19 percent in 2011/12, encompassing essential investments in women’s health, education, and livelihoods.

8. The five principles of the Paris Declaration aim to strengthen national ownership of development plans and strategies; that donors and others align their support to these plans and strategies; and harmonize their efforts with each other; for development plans to have clear, achievable and monitorable goals to enable managing for results; and for national governments and donors to be mutually accountable for achieving results.

9. The Monterrey Consensus calls for the mainstreaming of a gender perspective into development policies at all levels and in all sectors. The Paris Declaration—though it is a narrower approach—also states that “similar harmonization efforts (as environment) are also needed on other cross-cutting issues, such as gender equality.”

10. See, for example, Bell 2003; Whitehead 2003; Theobald et al. 2004; Subrahmanian 2004; World Bank 2001; Khan, 2003.

11. For example, the EC established a Gender Helpdesk to serve as a one-stop shop for EU delegation / field staff and developed a toolkit on gender-based programming approaches; DFID developed a Gender Equality Action Plan (2007–9) in line with the Gender Equality Duty of the 2006 Equality Act that required public bodies in the UK to promote equal opportunities between men and women and to build gender equality into their work. DFID had a cadre of senior Social Development Advisory personnel who oversaw the implementation of its Gender Equality Action Plan and drew extensively on the work of the UK GADN to push for institutional behavioral change within the DFID itself. Of note was the gender bonus incentive scheme that targeted senior management and was created to bring about a shift in attitudes about and awareness of gender equality among DFID management.

Article 2.1 of the ICESCR states: “Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.” (International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966)

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CHAPTER 19

TRANSFORMATIVE FEMINISM IN TANZANIA

Animation and Grassroots Women’s Struggles for Land and Livelihoods

MARJORIE MBILINYI

INTRODUCTION

Transformative feminist activists in Tanzania have been struggling for decades against patriarchy and neoliberalism, guided by a theory that links gender and class analysis and an activism that challenges sexism, racism, homophobia, ageism, discrimination against people with disabilities and HIV and AIDS, and all other forms of oppression. Their terrain of struggle has ranged from academia and mainstreaming government programs to grassroots organizing and networking. This chapter argues that the greatest advances in theory and activism have been made when scholar-activists have engaged in participatory action research, working “on the ground” with grassroots activists to understand our world and change it. Animation (which is employed in participatory action research) has been adopted as a methodology and a philosophy by TGNP Mtandao to guide all of its activities.

When TGNP Mtandao began as the Tanzania Gender Networking Programme in 1993, the structural adjustment Policy (SAP) had already taken hold; liberalization and privatization policies were gaining sway in the economy as well as in the social services sector. However, few predicted then how rapidly neoliberalism would impose itself as the dominant ideology in both government and civil society. Institutional memory of the ideals, values, and objectives of socialism and self-reliance have been erased, and few recognize the concrete achievements of the Nyerere era in Tanzania. Instead, neoliberal macroeconomic policy provides the rationale for massive plunder of resources, including land, water, forests, minerals, oil, and gas, which has escalated since the global crisis
of 2008, along with increased inequality at all levels. At the same time, popular resistance to land grabbing is growing throughout the country, led by small-scale peasant producers, but increasingly winning support from other groups in society.

TGNP Mtandao has responded to this context by deepening its activist and analytical work at the grassroots level through its intensive movement-building cycle program. Grassroots activism is combined with continued efforts to challenge macroeconomic policy at the national, regional, and global levels. It is essential to continue to bear witness to visions of an alternative better world, characterized by people-centered participatory democracy (TGNP 2007).

TRANSFORMATIVE FEMINISM

Early Beginnings in the Third World

Transformative feminism has developed over several decades in Tanzania and elsewhere in postcolonial Africa, as well as Latin America and Asia. Feminists in the global South sought to respond effectively to the growing challenges of patriarchy and neoliberal globalization, which were epitomized by the imposition of structural adjustment policies (SAPs) by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the 1980s. Elements of what we now call transformative feminism were articulated by progressive third world feminists in the 1970s and increasingly from the 1980s onward. Of paramount importance was the emphasis on the need to challenge both patriarchy and economic and cultural globalization and to embrace struggles for national and regional liberation and development as well as liberation of women (Sen and Grown 1988). At the same time, activists struggled against stereotypes about “powerless” African, Asian, and Latin American women, often reproduced by “first world” feminist researchers and others working in the third world in what Mohanty (2003) referred to as a colonizing process. Third world women were homogenized together as if they were all the same, without their own differences, subjectivities, and personalities. Moreover, the observer (who might also be an educated third world woman) assessed marginalized grassroots women from the standpoint of a supposedly liberated woman and as “the Other” in need of help and education,

Moreover, third world feminists had to struggle to have their own voices heard nationally as well as regionally and globally, and they faced marginalization in the global research and publications industry—a struggle that persists today (Iman, Mama, and Sow 1997; Meena 1992). Many joined together in local and regional organizations and networks to provide solidarity for each other, spaces in which to debate ideas, and a platform to promote alternative views. Of particular importance in Africa were the Association of African Women for Research and Development (AAWORD) and Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN)—the latter extended its
reach throughout the third world and had a strong base in Africa. More recently African feminists on the continent and in the diaspora have formed the African Feminist Forum (AFF) to advance a specifically feminist agenda “with no ifs no buts.” In 2006 they drafted together the Charter of Feminist Principles for African Feminists, which has been circulated widely. The aim of the charter is to advocate for feminist principles and to hold one another and themselves accountable personally and organizationally to follow those principles (see www.africanfeministforum.com).

Another significant initiative is the establishment of the African Women’s Development Fund (AWDF) to provide an alternative source of funding for African groups and organizations (www.awdf.org). The AWDF also hosts the AFF and has stimulated the creation of national women’s development funds as well, including Women Fund Tanzania, which was registered in 2008 and launched at the recent Gender Festival hosted by TGNP (September 2013).

These groups took advantage of the spaces provided by global fora such as the World Conferences on Women in 1979 in Copenhagen, 1985 in Nairobi, and 1995 in Beijing to advance third world feminist positions globally while challenging the neoliberal and colonizing feminist ideas and/or methodologies mentioned previously.

In the 1970s and 1980s the mainstream women in development (WID) framework was rejected by transformative feminists on the grounds that third world women were already highly integrated in the globalizing development process, which exploited and oppressed them. Their objective was far more transformative—to change the overall neoliberal macroeconomic structure and policy framework and create people-centered, participatory development and democracy that would embody women’s liberation and gender equity (Sen and Grown 1988). Models of “gender and development” and “women empowerment” partly responded to this critique and were embraced by United Nations agencies and others, but were rapidly domesticated by neoliberal ideology. As noted by Nancy Fraser (2013), by the 2000s empowerment of individual women took the place of sisterhood solidarity, and entrepreneurship principles of the free market replaced the struggle over waged work and a transformation of the workplace. The early feminist emphasis on valorizing unpaid work, much of it in the care economy, has been replaced by the drive to commoditize and exploit all of women’s work. Women all over the world have been forced to intensify their labor in the market place to supplement or replace the reduced and lost incomes of their male partners. As real incomes have declined, women have taken up the slack, at great cost to their own health and wellbeing, as well as that of their families and communities. In reality this has meant that capital has created conditions whereby all the members of a family, including women and children, have to earn money to maintain the family (Mbilinyi 1991, 1997). Yet their conditions are often worse than before.

Fraser’s (2013) article is a welcome call to remain vigilant about the core principles of transformative feminism. Neoliberal feminism has gained ground during the 2000s, with major financial backing from multilateral and bilateral development agencies. This is a significant part of the globalizing context in which transformative feminist activists work.
Tanzanian Initiatives

In Tanzania as elsewhere in Africa, feminist academics met resistance and open hostility from male colleagues in the early days when they sought to develop and teach feminist coursework and research, which was labeled as women’s or gender studies. Feminist scholars engaged in concrete activist work within the halls of academia to create the opportunity for themselves and their students to study, research, and write about feminist issues. They also had to challenge the male-dominated administrative structures and in the process became part of a burgeoning democracy movement in many universities. All too often, however, supposed “brothers” in the democracy struggle rejected feminist work as divisive, demanding that first priority be given to the “broader” question of democratic transformation (see Imam, Mama, and Fow 1997; Meena 1992).

In the 1970s and early 1980s few if any feminist activists in Tanzania had ever studied in a women’s studies or gender studies program. They had to create a study program for themselves and eagerly sought relevant literature from sympathetic colleagues and fellow activists in-country and abroad, reproducing it as reference material for their students. University teachers and postgraduate students, together with women working outside of the university, created study groups to access and share relevant materials and to educate themselves. Another initiative was to mainstream women’s/gender studies into ongoing social sciences and development studies coursework or to create separate coursework at the undergraduate and graduate levels (Mbilinyi 2011).

Early examples include the Women’s Research and Documentation Project (WRDP) and the IDS Women Study Group (IDSWSG), which began in the early 1980s at the University of Dar es Salaam (Mbilinyi 2011). These groups supported participants in their efforts to advance feminist theory that was relevant to the local situation, and later to carry out meaningful policy-oriented research. Other women professionals also banded together in the 1980s and early 1990s for solidarity and to advance women in their respective fields; at the same time they provided invaluable services and support to marginalized women. The Tanzanian Women Journalists’ Association (TAMWA), Tanzanian Women Lawyers Association (TAWLA), and Women Legal Aid Clinic (WLAC) are outstanding examples.

Many researchers adopted participatory research approaches in order to help overcome the class divide between academic and/or middle-class researchers/activists and grassroots women and to enhance the relevance of their work. Research results were communicated in popular formats using the national language, Kiswahili. Feedback workshops at community and district levels provided space for researchers to share the results of their work with participating women and men and their communities, as well as with local government officials.

TGNP Mtandao (then TGNP) was begun in 1993 by a group of activists who shared a common feminist position that opposed both patriarchy and neoliberalism; they also embraced participatory methodology in their work. Taking advantage of the
preparations for NGO participation in the Third World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, they explored more activist-oriented ways of working that would lead to tangible changes and improvements in the lives of the majority of marginalized women. The first open symposium that TGNP Mtandao organized, in 1994, was on gender and structural adjustment, bringing together government practitioners and civil society activists to examine the impact of neoliberal macroeconomic policy on marginalized women and to collectively imagine an alternative development paradigm.

The TGNP Mtandao was a forerunner in developing a cohesive gender-responsive budgeting program in the mid-1990s. Since 1996 critical reviews have been carried out on an annual basis of the national budget and selected sectoral budgets (health, water, agriculture, HIV and AIDS), as well as selected district budgets, within an overall critique of the neoliberal macroeconomic policy framework (Rusimbi 2003).

By the early 2000s, impatient with the limitations of the gender mainstreaming approach, oriented as it was toward the government and without an adequate popular base among the people, the TGNP began a process of reconstructing itself and its program in a more transformative way, grounded locally. Policy and budget review work continued but became part of a broad campaign in the early 2000s linking HIV and AIDS, gender, and resources, labeled “return resources to the people.” Drawing on their understanding and experience of the organization’s work, two members produced “Notes on Transformative Feminism” in 2006 in draft form, in response to the organization’s demand for a clarification of the feminist conceptual and ideological framework guiding its work. The draft notes were circulated widely, popularized, and used as the basis for reflection sessions with members and staff, as well as for presentations using poetry and skits at the weekly Gender and Development Seminar Series (which consists mainly of leaders of local grassroots organizations). The notes were later revised on the basis of comments and questions received, which helped to sharpen the contents, and eventually published in the organization’s quarterly newsletter, *Ulingo wa Jinsia* (Kitunga and Mbilinyi 2006a) and in the *CODESRIA Bulletin*’s special issue on African women (Kitunga and Mbilinyi 2006b), thereby reaching a wider panAfrican audience. An updated version was published in the *Review of African Political Economy* (Kitunga and Mbilinyi 2009) and eventually led to the publication of a popular leaflet in English (TGNP 2010b) and Kiswahili.

Using participatory research methods, the organization updated itself on how grassroots women’s groups were organizing, through the “transformative feminist movement building study” in 2008 (TGNP 2009a, 2009b). A wide variety of women groups participated in all three districts of Dar es Salaam and Mbeya Rural District. The groups focused on income-earning activities, gender-based violence, HIV and AIDS, rights of widows, sex work, and the rights of lesbians. But all of the groups had one thing in common. They had learned through struggle that women would not be free until they had full economic independence. This finding inspired TGNP Mtandao to organise the next major campaign on “economic justice: making resources work for marginalized women,” which was launched in 2007.
Key Elements of Transformative Feminism

In the present context of Tanzania and Africa, transformative feminism concentrates on patriarchy and neoliberalism, which are perceived to be interwoven and inseparable (Kitunga and Mbilinyi 2009; TGNP 2010b). In the case of Tanzania, women peasants are exploited at one and the same time by male heads of household (fathers, husbands, elder brothers, uncles), the capitalist merchant who pays them a low price for their crops or livestock, and the woman or man commercial farmer who employs their labor on a casual basis during the peak harvest season of the year. A growing number of women peasants and their families are expelled from their land by the state on behalf of multinational corporations engaged in mining, tourism, horticulture, and large-scale agriculture (Mbilinyi 2012). In response, women peasants and their communities are increasingly challenging their oppression and exploitation in a variety of ways.

Transformative feminism guides activists in their exploration of gender and class dynamics in both production and reproduction. An enormous amount of energy and sheer drudgery is invested by women in unpaid care work, partly due to the underdevelopment and inaccessibility of basic infrastructure for water, electricity, and health, and the high cost of labor-saving technology. The majority of women, especially in rural areas, are at high risk during childbearing because of the lack of access to basic antenatal and delivery services, which are usually far from their homes and costly.

Women differ, however, depending upon their class, rural or urban location, nationality, ethnicity/race, disability, and aspects of social relations. Women have more in common with men in the same exploited class of laboring peasants, workers, and small-scale traders on many issues pertaining to economic and social justice than with women in the propertied and governing classes. Indeed, working women—and men—are exploited by women capitalist employers as well as men and find their citizenship rights trampeled upon by powerful women and men in the state. A growing number of young girls and boys work as cheap domestic labor for women employers, including feminist activists themselves—creating one among many contradictions that need further consideration.

Gender relations between women and men, young and old, parents and children also differ depending upon the same structural relationships of class, ethnicity, rural or urban location, and so forth. Transformative feminism identifies itself first and foremost with the struggles and demands of exploited laboring/working women (i.e., small-scale producers and traders and casual and low-income workers in both the formal and informal sectors, including those in the peasant economy).

The concept of “gender” is a central component of transformative feminism. It was deliberately and consciously developed by feminists working in academia, activist groups, and development agencies in the 1980s to challenge male domination and liberal feminist generalizations about “women” and sisterhood (see Kabeer 1994; March, Smyth, and Mukhopadhyay 1999; TGNP 1993). Gender refers to the social relations between women and men, girls and boys, and young and old, which are marked by male
domination and female subordination. Gender analysis therefore focuses, unapologetically, on women/girls as the most oppressed, exploited, subordinated sex. Women are more exploited and oppressed than men within the same exploited class of subsistence peasants, pastoralists and fisherpeople, and low-income workers. They are also exploited and oppressed by men within their own class, community, and family as well as by capitalists and imperialist globalizers through the exploitation of both paid and unpaid work (TGNP 2011c). Critics who argue that gender should mean equal attention to women and men misunderstand its origins and its purpose.

At the same time, transformative feminists recognize the way in which men are oppressed and exploited by patriarchy as it intersects with global capitalism. For example, young men are dominated by older men. Fathers dominate decision making about family resources and exclude their sons as well as their daughters from having equal ownership and control over productive resources and the income derived from the labor of the children and the wives. Boys and men who do not appear or act “manly” enough are often ridiculed and punished in our society, and they are socialized to fit patriarchal concepts of masculinity. Many boys/men adopt macho behavior in order to fit in with masculine stereotypes and “belong” to their peer group. This is one of the driving forces increasing their vulnerability to HIV and AIDS.

**LAND GRABBING AND PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION**

Transformative feminism has been conditioned by the context in which activists live and work in Tanzania and other third world countries. Of special significance is the renewed primitive accumulation process in Tanzania and Africa in the mid-1980s in association with SAPs, and its further intensification since the 2008 global economic/fiscal crisis. Key elements of this primitive accumulation process are land grabbing, commodification of labor, suppression of alternative production systems, and intensification of exploitation of unpaid labor (Bush 2009; Patnaik and Moyo 2011; Shivji 2009).

Primitive accumulation took place in the early years of capitalist development in Europe, and was the basis of capitalist accumulation in Africa during the precolonial and colonial era. Multinational corporations thrive on primitive accumulation today in Africa as well as much of the rest of the global South. They are supported by neoliberal macroeconomic policies imposed on developing countries by the international finance institutions, namely the World Bank, IMF, and World Trade Organisation (WTO). The policy rhetoric used is “macroeconomic stability” to provide “an enabling environment” for foreign private investment and the private sector in general. The main beneficiaries, however, remain multinational corporations (MNCs). Of particular importance in this chapter is the steady liberalization and commoditization of land ownership and tenure.
in Tanzania, which has provided large-scale investors with the opportunity to acquire huge tracts of land in an apparently “legal” way (see LARRI 2011; TGNP 2011a).

Feminists have emphasized the way in which gender and class interact in primitive and capitalist accumulation processes. During the colonial and immediate postcolonial era in Africa, African men were more employed than women in the formal sector, and women employees were usually relegated to lower income positions at the bottom of the occupational ladder. As men shifted from noncapitalist peasant economies to seek work in wage employment, women became the major source of paid and unpaid labor in the countryside as well as in urban informal economies. However, changes in the labor markets of advanced global capitalism during the last twenty to thirty years have meant that women are often preferred as cheap temporary labor in the formal sector as well, in export processing zones, plantations, and the agroprocessing industry (see Kerr and Tsikata 2000; Mbilinyi 1991; Tsikata 2009, 2011; and Tsikata and Wilks 2009).

In Tanzania, as elsewhere in Africa, capitalist accumulation has also been based on the extraction of surplus from women peasants working in both paid and unpaid work. Women carry out the major work in producing crops for sale in the market as well as crops and livestock for home consumption. Much of the market-oriented production is subject to control and appropriation of proceeds by male heads of household, however, and women have eagerly sought alternative crops to sell. In addition, rural women engage in multiple off-farm activities to earn cash incomes (Mbilinyi 1991, 1997, 2000).

A growing number of communities have been dispossessed of their land rights as a result of neoliberal land reform, which was a key part of structural adjustment and liberalization programs, and land has increasingly become a commodity (LARRI 2011; TGNP 2011a). Women are the most vulnerable to dispossession by the combined power of patriarchy and neoliberalism and the most ferocious in their efforts not to succumb to imperialist domination, as shown by the struggles of pastoralist women in Loliondo and many other locations (KIHACHA 2002; “Women of Ngorongoro District” 2009). In response, there has been a growing interest among donors and even some large-scale corporations in funding “women’s empowerment” projects as a way to divide women and co-opt feminist activism.

Primitive accumulation involves more than outright land grabbing, however. It also underlies past and present efforts to transform labor regimes from patriarchal (as well as feudal and slave) production systems into market-based waged and unwaged labor. The first formalized struggle to commoditize and transform African labor took place in the colonial era and was associated with the abolition of slavery, on the one hand, and forced labor and forced payment of taxes in money on the other. In order to get cash, male peasants were forced either to grow market crops and/or sell their livestock, or seek waged work outside of their peasant economies. These changes were marked by gender and age relations; young men were the majority of migrant workers in Tanzania, for example, selling their labor not only in distant plantations of sugar cane and sisal in Tanganyika, but also in the copper belt of Northern Rhodesia and the gold mines of South Africa. In the rural areas, older men dominated production of cash crops for sale in local and export markets, extracting the unpaid labor of dependent women and men, including wives and children.
I believe that the second round of forcible transformation of labor regimes is associated with the imposition of user fees for education, health, and water, which began in the mid-1980s and was imposed by the World Bank and IMF on Tanzania and other African countries as part of SAPs. Women as well as men have been forced to intensify cash earning activities in order to pay for user fees, as well as to buy food and other consumption goods. This has forced them to withdraw labor from food production for home consumption and reduced the time they have available for child care and other reproductive activities, with negative consequences for children as well as their overworked mothers.\(^5\)

Indeed, there has been a steady rise in commodification of African labor since the postcolonial era, with clear gender patterns. Men experienced declining incomes and employment during the global economic crisis that began in the late 1970s and was associated with the oil price shocks, and later with SAPs and the official policy of reducing public employment. As men lost jobs and incomes, women took up the slack in both paid and unpaid work. They were later encouraged in their efforts to replace male labor with their own by a multitude of donor policies and funding of credit and training that specifically targeted women, and these programs continue (Mbilinyi 2000, 2010).

Primitive accumulation within the export-oriented enclave economy of Africa has led to the steady erosion if not outright destruction of local indigenous agriculture and livestock-keeping. The quality of life for the majority of peasant producers has declined, while productivity has increased for a small minority of local producers who are linked through contract farming to agribusiness, as well as capitalist farmers and agribusiness itself.\(^6\) In areas where large-scale commercial farming has begun, women are marginalized and often reduced to becoming casual farmworkers on commercial farms and estates or unpaid family labor and/or casual farmworkers in peasant farm systems (Mbilinyi 2010).

In addition, the decline of state provision of basic public social services as a result of SAPs has undermined African families’ capacity to reproduce themselves (Bujra 2004). As a result, marginalized girls/women and their communities have less access to quality education, health, and safe and clean water. This has led to growing illiteracy, school dropouts, maternal mortality, neonate mortality, higher malnutrition and food insecurity, and higher levels of disease. Immunity levels to virus infection have dropped, and together these results have created the ideal conditions for the HIV virus to flourish. Girls and women are the most vulnerable to HIV and AIDS infection, at an earlier age than boys/men (Mabala 2006; McCleary-Sills, Douglas, and Mabala, 2011). Moreover, they provide the bulk of the unpaid work in caring for AIDS patients, along with other forms of care work within the family and community (TGNP 2011c).

The situation is worsened by high migration rates among young women and men who leave rural areas in search of more viable and independent livelihoods and employment. Out-migration undermines the reproductive capacity of local economies, however. Moreover, migration and urbanization increase the risks of HIV infection and reinfection, especially among young girls/women. Job alternatives are limited; many become house servants, bar “girls,” and commercial sex workers and are highly at risk. Moreover,
women are more vulnerable to HIV infection because of patriarchal structures of power in sexuality in and out of market as well as poverty.

In order to engage directly with and support the struggles of grassroots women over power and control of resources, the TGNP began to carry out participatory action research or animation in one rural district, Kisarawe, in 2010 (TGNP 2011b). Local grassroots activists enhanced their analytical skills and understanding of the basic causes of their oppression and exploitation, and together with TGNP staff and resource persons, generated new knowledge together. This knowledge was wedded to concrete action to demand government accountability and delivery of basic services and resources. Real changes took place at the local level after combining participatory action research with investigative journalism, whereby local press clubs exposed the issues to the public.

**Participatory Action Research as a Tool of Movement Building**

This section discusses the main principles of animation, which guide nearly all of the activities carried out by TGNP Mtandao. Animation as participatory action research, investigative journalism, and creation of local knowledge centers became the key element of an “intensive movement-building cycle,” which was successfully carried out in four rural districts of Tanzania during 2010, 2012, and 2013.

**Animation**

Transformative feminism is rooted in the unity between theory and practice, analysis and action. Feminists highlight the power of personal reflections on individual/collective experiences of struggle as well as more systematic analysis and research about structures, systems, and struggles. To support this, we have adopted animation as our basic methodology and philosophy to guide education, research, communications, and organizing (Mabala and Mwateba 2003; Mbilinyi 2003). Animation is often referred to as popular education or as participatory action research and is associated with the work of Paulo Freire (1970), Fals Borda (Borda and Rahman 1991), and Mohammed A Rahman (2004). Historically animation has been used as part of a process of strengthening the capacity of oppressed and exploited women and men to organize themselves, analyze their own situations, identify basic causes of their problems, and carry out strategic actions for change. The process is normally highly political; it leads participants to collectively challenge local power structures and to demand their rights, as women, as peasants, and as “ordinary” villagers.

The following basic assumptions and principles of animation have become an integral part of our understanding of transformative feminist methodology:
• Exploited and oppressed women know—they are not ignorant.
• The exploited and oppressed have rich resources of knowledge, skills, and self-confidence, which are often untapped and/or unrecognized by themselves and others.
• New knowledge is created on the basis of dialogue, whereby the knowledge of grassroots marginalized women (and men) is merged with that of animators/facilitators, who are often, though not always, more educated and may come from distant places to work with local groups/organizations/networks.
• New knowledge and strategies of action emerge from the triple-A process of assessment, analysis, and action, which is grounded in critical thought, always asking Who? Why? What? How? When?
• Animation tools are used to provoke critical analysis, consciousness-raising, and creative listening to alternative points of view; one of the most common and powerful tools is the pictorial code, based on grassroots women’s own analysis of their dreams, barriers to achieving them, root causes, and actions to overcome the barriers.
• Participatory ways of organizing, educating, and communicating are adopted.
• Democratic leadership styles are used, and hierarchies based on class, gender, race, ethnicity, age, and disability are increasingly dismantled in the animation process.
• Both sides of the brain are recognized and used: the logical/analytical and the artistic/emotional.
• Analysis and physical action are combined through games as well as problem-solving actions.

These basic principles of animation provided the framework within which movement-building processes have been carried out at ward and village levels in four districts of Tanzania, as discussed in the next section.

Intensive Movement-Building Cycle

Beginning in 2010, TGNP Mtandao has carried out intensive movement-building processes at ward level in Kisarawe Rural District (Coast Region, 2010) and in Morogoro Rural District (Morogoro Region), Mbeya Rural District (Mbeya Region), and Shinyanga Rural District (Shinyanga Region) in 2012 and 2013.

The cycle consists of the following core elements:

• Training and planning workshop for animation teams;
• Participatory action research at village and ward levels, which works with members of one core grassroots activist group every day for six days and also visits other activist groups in the same ward;
• Joint analysis of initial research findings by grassroots and TGNP Mtandao animators, focusing on the priority issues raised;
• Ward and district feedback workshops with local government officials and members of the core activist group in which key issues are presented and demands for specific concrete action are made by local activists to local government officials;

• Training and establishment of local knowledge centers associated with one of the activist groups/networks in each site, which provides space for information sharing, networking, and follow-up campaign work, linking all the activist groups together at ward level;

• Investigative journalism involving training of local press clubs, informing them of the key issues raised by participants in the participatory action research, and linking them with local activist groups through the knowledge centers; and

• Report writing by leaders of the animation teams, incorporating results of the initial field research, knowledge centers, and investigative journalism.

The cycle is designed as a cumulative process whereby grassroots activist animators of previous years are brought together with newcomers in the joint training and planning program, in order to strengthen the networking aspect of movement building and share experiences of local struggle. In 2012 and 2013 the same cycle was carried out in a different ward each year within the same district, so as to build synergy and enhance local networking. As part of this process, grassroots animators from neighboring wards also participate in the final district feedback workshop. Grassroots animators also participate in other TGNP Mtandao activities, depending upon their location, including the Gender Festival, which is held every two years; the weekly Gender and Development Seminar Series (Kisarawe activists); and training programs run by the sister organization, Gender Training Institute. These activities are oriented toward the economic justice campaign and incorporate lessons learned and demands arising from grassroots activists involved in the cycle, along with other partners. The intention is to produce a core group of strong feminist activists rooted in grassroots communities and leaders of local activist groups, who gradually become the foundation for a grassroots-based transformative feminist movement.

A reflection process is carried out throughout the cycle to identify strengths and weaknesses and plan appropriate improvements and adjustments for the next stage of the cycle, or the following year’s program.

Priority Issues

In spite of the very different locations in which the cycle has been carried out thus far, the issues raised by local groups have basically been similar. One whole set of problems centered around land grabbing, neoliberal investment policy of the government and the steady marginalisation of peasant producers in favour of largescale commercial growers. In some cases villagers were second or third generation and were suffering the consequences of land alienations that took place in the colonial era on behalf of sisal plantations, such as Mkambarali in Morogoro District in 2012-(TGNP 2013a). At the
same time, local residents were being deprived of their water rights by a more recent
investor who has been granted a near monopoly over the scarce resource in the ward.
At the ward and district feedback workshops, local government officials tried to prevent
the villagers from raising such issues. One woman councilor was particularly adamant
in arguing that the Korean company involved is not an “investor,” but rather a mission-
ary who has come to train local villagers!®

Similarly, in Kiluvya ward of Kisarawe District in 2010 local villagers only own some
2 percent of the total land available. The rest was appropriated during the postindepen-
dence period by the national electricity corporation, the Kibaha Education Centre, the
national roads company, and the national army, TPDF.

In Mshewe Ward, Mbeya Rural District in 2013, the women activists denounced
“poor investment policies” for their loss of control over a large segment of land, which
had been “sold” to a large-scale farmer by the village government. Many families no lon-
erg had enough land on which to farm and to hand over to their adult children. This
forced many family members, often girls/women, to seek work as cheap farm labor on
the neighboring large-scale farm. At the district feedback workshop, the group released
a press release calling for a review of liberal investment policies and the return of their
farmland. In response, the farm manager has reportedly begun to deny work to local
farmworkers who were involved in the movement-building cycle process.

Another set of responses concerned the lack of meaningful farm support systems
for local peasant producers, with an emphasis on the lack of viable markets. In every
location, local producers were forced to depend on middlemen traders who purchased
their crops at ridiculously low prices, often while those crops were still lying unhar-
vested in the fields. People also criticized the high cost of fertilizer and other farm
inputs, as well as the government’s failure to ensure that farm inputs arrived on time.
At the district feedback workshop for Mkambarali, Morogoro, for example, in 2012,
the district agricultural officer replied that local farmers were now benefiting from a
special farm inputs program. The grassroots animator immediately corrected him,
asking: “Why is it that the improved seeds you brought us do not grow?” and “Is it
not true that we received expired fertilizer this year?” This was a pivotal moment in
the workshop; later several of the local government officials present began to speak
openly about concrete obstacles they faced, including this same agricultural officer,
and joined in constructive planning for how to overcome some of the issues raised
(personal observation).

These two sets of issues, land grabbing and withdrawal of support for small-scale
peasant producers, reflect the primitive accumulation process, whereby the govern-
ment is encouraging large-scale investment in agriculture and other economic activities
at the expense of small-scale peasant producers and at the same time has reneged on
its responsibilities to provide support for the latter. At the same time, local and central
governments subsidize the large-scale producers through access to large amounts of
land at low rent, preferential treatment in access to water, and liberal trade policies that
allow farmers to export their commodities directly to buyers overseas without paying
full tariffs.
Water was a major issue in nearly every location. Clean, safe water was not available, forcing girls and women to spend seven hours a day or more fetching water from far away. As noted in the Kisarawe report for 2010 (TGNP 2011b), the quality of this scarce water is unthinkable, exposing people to health risks including waterborne and urinary tract diseases, which in turn reduce immunity to HIV infection. Fetching water was also considered a dangerous activity, exposing girls and women to sexual abuse and rape en route to and from water sources, and to wife beating by jealous husbands enraged at their wives’ absence from home. The paradox is that male demands for water took precedence over other family members!

Women activists also prioritized health issues in every location, including those related to childbearing, as well as general care and treatment. Skits were used to dramatize the inhumane treatment patients received from health workers, as well as corrupt demands for cash payments or bribes. The lack of drugs and medicine, trained health personnel, and appropriate maternity services was highlighted in every location. For example, in 2010 the Maneromango health center in Kisarawe had no toilet, no sterilizing facility, no water, and no labor wards for women. After the investigative journalists exposed this nationwide using electronic and print media, the district authorities took notice: a public toilet was built, a proper sterilizing cooker was bought, water was supplied to the center, and labor wards were built. Local community members also succeeded in getting resources for their local secondary school after the investigative journalism team confronted the Kisarawe district executive director. Solar energy was supplied to the school, teaching materials and laboratories were set up, and a water well was built. In effect, a spiral effect occurred in Maneromango, following the participatory action research and investigative journalism, leading to more support for building water wells by other actors, including International NGOs such as Plan International.

In Mshewe (Mbeya Rural District) in 2013, local activists prioritized health issues as well as that of land grabbing/investment. They exposed the high level of corruption and incompetence among health workers, in one dispensary in particular, including accusations of demanding sex for treatment from patients. After investigative journalists followed this up, the district removed all of the health workers at this one dispensary and replaced them with a new team.

This brings us to the other paramount problem that arose in every location: the nature of power relations between local government officials and ordinary women and men villagers. Accusations of corruption were widespread. Local authorities were accused of protecting the interests of large-scale investors, both local and foreign, at the expense of local villagers; this was also associated with bribing practices by the investors. The lack of accountability to local residents and poor performance in service delivery have already been mentioned. At the same time, the combination of participatory action research, knowledge center organizing, and investigative journalism enabled local activists in several locations to get a positive response from local authorities. In other cases, they collectively decided to vote corrupt and/or incompetent village leaders out of office and replaced them with new leadership.

Grassroots animators have also participated in gender budget review processes at district and national levels, which provides them with the opportunity to query to what
extent their priorities have received adequate resources from the government and follow up on how these resources have been allocated and used at the local and national level. Going public with the results of these reviews is especially contentious at the local government level, where pompous authorities are not used to being questioned by ordinary villagers, especially women. Backlash has been inevitable, something we anticipated but had not properly planned for. In 2012 in Mbeya and Morogoro grassroots animators who were members of local government committees were threatened with expulsion. Authorities in Ijombe, Mbeya, and Mkambarani, Morogoro, were particularly incensed by the way in which information was shared in the public fora of the feedback workshops, especially the district one, and with the media. In the case of Ijobe ward, Mbeya Region, a grassroots activist who has been a longtime partner in TGNP activities was falsely framed for fraud by the local ward executive officer and imprisoned in retaliation. Eventually she was released, but only after supportive action by another activist organization, Human Defenders, and local legal aid workers (TGNP 2013a).

This and other cases of backlash have taught us that it is essential to anticipate backlash and plan for immediate supportive action, including the creation of an emergency fund to help support local activists who are victimized because of their activism. Human Defenders now participates in all animation training and planning workshops so as to advise participants on how to handle backlash and where to seek support. More attention has also been given to strengthening communications with district government authorities before the field exercise, with the aim of not only providing them with adequate information but also securing backup support from government allies where they exist.

The feedback workshop process has provided a window through which to perceive local power relations in action. For example, government indifference to the needs and demands of local villagers was very evident in Kisarawe in 2010, where none of the substantive district leaders bothered to attend the district feedback workshop. They sat up and took notice only after the deplorable conditions of local water wells, dispensaries, and schools were displayed on local and national television for all to see. In Mkambarali in 2012, local government authorities successfully intimidated some of the local animators not to speak out during the ward feedback workshop. These local officials are, after all, their neighbors, whom they have to live and deal with on a daily basis. However, there is more distance between them and the district government leaders, and this may have helped them to speak out openly at the district workshop, including, surprisingly, some issues that had not been revealed during the initial fieldwork. In doing so, they overcame their fear of the same ward level officers who were also present at the district workshop and tried, again, to silence or ridicule the issues being raised. The grassroots animators were not intimidated this time, perhaps strengthened by their previous experience and the presence of a high-level TGNP staff member, along with the media. This confirmed for us the significance of organizing such feedback cum validation processes; they should be considered an integral part of the overall animation and campaign process, rather than an “ending.”

Assessment of the overall intensive movement-building process has also helped to strengthen the training and planning workshop process that begins the cycle. More attention is given to joint analysis of the overall context of plunder and patriarchy and the way that neoliberal macroeconomic policy supports this process. Tools have been
created to help animators enhance analytical skills, their own and those of grassroots activists, as well as to raise consciousness. The distinction between mobilization and animation is constantly emphasized; animators, be they from the grassroots or national level, are too quick to engage in problem-solving behavior, rather than problem posing, whereby participants are encouraged to ask and answer their own questions. It also became clear that more time is needed, prior to doing fieldwork, to carry out a thorough study of relevant information on the local and national political economies in question so as to be a more informed animator.

One of the major outcomes of animation that we noted in 2012 and even more in 2013 was the increased ability of grassroots women to identify and analyze their own situation and link it to dominant structures of power. Their ability to articulate and confidently defend their own positions was observed especially during the district feedback workshops, as already noted. Grassroots animators also became more connected with each other and were able to see their catalytic role beyond facilitating and providing support to their members. At the same time, participating activists appreciated how much they could achieve with a strong collective voice and action together rather than individually.

A major limitation of the intensive movement-building cycle, however, has been the tendency for the focus to remain on concrete practical issues and the difficulty of linking these to macro level structures and policy. This is so in spite of deliberate efforts to involve participating animators from rural areas in district and national budget review sessions and in national-level Gender Festivals, where they meet and exchange ideas with fellow activists from other rural and urban locations. Indeed, Rahman (2004, 26) has argued that “participatory development is far from being adopted in practice anywhere in a way which leads to major structural reforms and the transfer of resources away from those vested interests that control dominant society and political structures towards underprivileged people.” He is especially critical of the cooptation of participatory research methods by developing agencies like the World Bank and other donors, which ultimately are not participatory and enhance rather than reduce poverty. Nevertheless, much more work is needed to facilitate grassroots activists to link macro and micro issues together and to increase the scale of their work from village to district to national and pan-African level.

Lessons Learned

The intensive movement-building cycle has provided invaluable lessons for the movement and for transformative feminism in practice. First, grassroots women activists gave priority to both “production” and “reproduction” issues; neither seemed to have a higher level of significance. Moreover, they were often more successful in getting specific demands met related to service delivery with respect to health, water, and education. The care economy is shown to be an integral part of the overall struggle for land and livelihoods.
Second, grassroots activists concentrate on what is immediate and practical and do not necessarily see the connection between, for example, “bad government” and the underlying neoliberal political environment that fosters it. Animators need to strengthen their own understanding of the links between macro and micro policy and the changing political economy of Tanzania to facilitate further analysis at the local level.

Third, constant vigilance is needed to recognize that the conditions under study pertain to the majority of women, but by no means all. There are strong ideological forces promoting neoliberal feminism as embodied in micro credit and women entrepreneurship programs, which lead to the advancement of individual women while leaving the majority in a state of oppression and exploitation. The alternative is a concept of collective empowerment of all marginalized women, able to organize themselves, analyze, and make change happen (see Fraser 2013).

This is not necessarily a “win-win” situation in which all women come out sisters. Powerful women (and men) benefit from the existing power structures and will resist all efforts to deprive them of their privilege and power.

Fourth, there is a need to articulate a vision of the alternative to global capitalism, which resonates with local priorities. The concept of people-centered participatory development is a beginning, whereby women and men all benefit equally from development and participate equally in control over resource mobilization and allocation (Rahman 2004).

At the same time, the intensive movement-building cycle has shown the enormous potential of transformative feminist movement building, which is grounded locally with grassroots women activists. Every year we have incorporated lessons from the previous year in order to improve the preparation, training, and tools used and to strengthen and popularize the theory that guides the activism. Moreover, the application of animation in the intensive movement-building cycle provides an example of participatory leadership for local government officials. The participation of grassroots animators in later policy interventions, including gender-responsive budgeting, strengthens their credibility and helps forge the link between local and national policy engagement. Conscious efforts to enhance grassroots to grassroots networking and movement building within and between wards and districts provides a formula for strong movement building that is composed and led primarily by oppressed and exploited women themselves, acting on their own behalf.

Notes

1. Feminist activists at Makerere University went a step further and created a full-fledged women’s studies department, which now provides undergraduate and postgraduate degree work. Many other examples can be found in Africa, including the Institute of Gender Studies at University of Cape Town.

2. TAMWA stands for Tanzania Media Women’s Association, which began in 1987. One of its main focuses has been monitoring and reporting on gender-based violence and on the situation of “house girls.” TAMWA led a successful ten-year campaign for passage of the Sexual Offences Act, which severely penalizes perpetrators of violence against children.
and women, especially sexual abuse and rape. The campaign was carried out jointly with many members of the feminist coalition FemAct, which is coordinated by TGNP. See www.tamwa.org. TAWLA (the Tanzania Women Lawyers Association) began around 1990 and advocates legal reform in marriage, divorce, inheritance, land, and other areas. It also operates a legal aid clinic and has some 370 lawyers in its network. TAWLA coordinates the Gender Land Task Force, which advocated for gender-sensitive land law and for equal representation of women and men on land committees from the village level on up (www.tawla.or.tz). The Women Legal Aid Clinic (WLAC) was established in 1989 and has three major legal aid clinics in Dar es Salaam, as well as Kigoma, Mwanza, and Arusha. The largest portion of cases are matrimonial, followed by inheritance and land (see www.wlac.or.tz).

3. Demere Kitunga is a founding member of the TGNP; Marjorie Mbilinyi is a founding member and was also employed by the TGNP at that time.

4. The colonizers in Tanganyika imposed head taxes only on men, partly due to the emerging gender division of labor in the marketplace, as well as women’s resistance to taxation.

5. Women are regularly blamed, not only by the popular press, but also by nutritionists, health professionals, and others, for the high rate of child malnutrition in Tanzania. They are accused of neglecting their children, reducing the number of meals, adopting fast-cooking meals that are less nutritious, and remarkably, of working too hard to earn cash with which to feed their children!

6. The Tanzanian government, with the active if not aggressive support of external agencies such as AGRA and the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor, is deliberately promoting large-scale commercial agriculture at the expense of small-scale peasant production and openly seeking external investors, a large portion of whom are multinational agribusinesses (Mbilinyi 2012; TGNP 2010a).

7. A ward, in rural areas, is an administrative unit within local government in Tanzania, consisting of six to eight villages linked through development committees and represented by an elected councilor (diwani).


9. It is indicative that “investor” connotes an exploiter or unwanted invader of community land; that is, it has “bad” connotations in popular discourse all over Tanzania. The government has been forced to send politicians out to districts where new investment projects are under way to persuade local villagers and even many elected local government representatives that investors are “good” and should be welcomed!

10. See also Mbilinyi and Shechambo 2012 for other examples of local resistances arising from participation in IMBC processes.

11. Maia Green pointed out this shortcoming in her context report for TGNP Mtandao (TGNP 2013b); Gaventa and Tandon (2010) argue that it is possible to build institutional arrangements for joint learning across national and regional borders that impact citizen action, national policies, and global discourses.

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SECTION 6

CITIZENSHIP AND STATE-BUILDING
This section comprises four chapters that examine transnational feminist contributions to the debates and movements on citizenship and state-building. Virginia Vargas explores the exciting epistemological and political contributions of Latin American feminisms to a new “radical democracy.” Amrita Chhachhi and Sunila Abeysekera focus on the complex political contexts, subjectivities and nuances of South Asian transnational feminist movement building and contributions to cross-border democratization and peacebuilding processes since the mid-1980s. Lanyan Chen offers a profound feminist political economy critique of Chinese women’s activism in response to the government’s shift from a state-led socialist economy to a market-based “state capitalist” economy. And Maitrayee Mukhopadhyay critically interrogates “the successful installation of feminist ideas” in international development institutions, which has resulted in the increasing “homogenization” of the histories, needs, and interests of women in postcolonial societies.

Virginia Vargas’s chapter, “Feminism and Democratic Struggles in Latin America,” explores various phases of feminist engagement with democratization processes in the region. “First wave” feminism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries included the creation of feminist social and political organizations and focused, as in Europe and North America, on such issues as women’s access to education, the right to vote, and working women’s rights. The “second wave” of feminist organizing in the 1970s and 1980s that coincided with Latin American feminist struggles against dictatorships and authoritarian regimes. And in the third phase, from the 1990s to the present, feminists have responded to “multicultural and multiethnic realities, challenging the myth of the unitary nation on which the imagery of the state had been built.” Vargas argues that feminist epistemology and political theory have helped to radicalize democracy in the region; unpacked “the asymmetrical construction of democracy normalized under the abstract veil of universality”; and introduced “new subjectivities” into politics, including the links between knowledge and emotion, body and mind, and public and private. In the process, transnational feminist movements in Latin America have contributed new conceptualizations of democracy, citizenship, and “the right to have rights” that take
into account “multiethnicity, multiculturalism, intersectionality, multiple knowledges, colonialism, decolonization, depatriarchalization . . . [and] the body as a territory that carries rights,” as well as the urgency of redistribution, the active exercise of economic and social rights, the visibility of different “cosmovisiones,” and a range of social actors and subjects representing diverse cultural, sexual, and racial perspectives.

The chapter by Amrita Chhachhi and Sunila Abeysekera, “Forging a New Political Imaginary: Transnational Southasian Feminisms,” argues that the discourse on transnational feminist movements has tended to focus on the global/local and North/South and neglected regional transnational feminist movements and knowledge production. It focuses on “Southasian cross-border movement building” since the mid-1980s, and traces the encounters and knowledge production methodologies through which South Asian women claimed feminism and created a movement. The chapter connects the “subjective” life histories of individual feminists to key political events in the region (e.g., the partition of India and Pakistan into two nation-states based on religious identity in 1947, the war between East Pakistan and West Pakistan that led to the creation of the new nation-state of Bangladesh in 1971, and the Sri Lankan civil war based on ethnic identity and grievances that started in 1983). “We realized that the ‘imagined communities’ . . . of ‘Indian,’ ‘Pakistani,’ ‘Sri Lankan’ that had been clumsily crafted together through the symbols of ‘statehood,’ such as national constitutions, flags, and anthems, were not representative of the diverse religious, ethnic, and linguistic groups and indigenous and tribal communities living within their territorial borders. Nor did the nation-states offer the promise of equal citizenship to many.” However, such political positioning located South Asian feminists “outside any comfortable zone of belonging (nation, community or liberation movement), and had immediate consequences of [creating] solidarity across borders.” The chapter also explores feminist interventions in the wider South Asian cross-border democratization and peacebuilding processes.

**Lanyan Chen’s chapter,** “From Chinese State Capitalism to Women’s Activism: The Implications of Economic Reforms for Women and the Evolution of Feminist Organizing,” argues that the transition from the planned socialist economy (of the 1950s–1970s) to a market-based “state capitalist” economy (from the 1980s to the present) has been guided by a neoliberal growth-oriented agenda focused on the state’s use of power to protect capital over the rights of labor as well as those based on gender, class, ethnicity, migration status, and sexual orientation. In the process, Chinese women’s earlier achievements were extensively eroded. The chapter traces the emergence of Chinese women’s awareness of women’s rights from the government’s ratification of CEDAW in 1981 and the preparations for the UN Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1995, when the government declared “Equality between Men and Women” to be a “principal state policy.” Chen argues convincingly, that “while women in other countries have made advances in economic and political participation and protection of their right[s]. . . . due in part to the outcomes of the UN world conferences on women, China, the host of the UN Fourth World Conference, continues to systematically reverse the gains enjoyed by women in the pre-reform periods.” The chapter probes the government’s adoption of neoliberal policies and institutionalization
of values, rules and norms, through which the rights of all women, industrial women workers, migrant women workers, and rural women have been “systematically subjugated” to its “growth-oriented agenda,” “assaulted” and eroded. It interrogates the collusion and co-optation of the “national women’s machinery” and “state feminism” in the “failure to uphold women’s substantive social citizenship through the protection of entitlements guaranteed by the state.” Finally, it explores grassroots women’s growing awareness, organizing, coalition building (including with other disadvantaged groups based on class, ethnicity, migration status, sexual orientation, and so on, and progressive men), use of social media, and demands for their rights (e.g., the right to dignity; economic and political rights; protection against discrimination, sexism, and all forms of violence; and sexual and reproductive rights).

Maitrayee Mukhopadhyay’s chapter, “Gendered Citizenship in the Postcolony: The Challenge for Transformational Feminist Politics,” offers a significant critique of the current trajectories of transnational feminist movements. She argues that “the successful installation of feminist ideas in policymaking institutions is reversing the basic tenets of transnational feminist movements, which sought to decompose the production of the Third World woman.” Instead, “there is increasing homogenization of the histories, needs, and interests of the vastly different experiences of women around the world and the construction of the implicitly consensual priority issues around which all women are apparently expected to organize.” As a consequence, “the power to define women’s needs and interests is increasingly shifting to global policy arenas,” and “there is both derecognition of the local and context-specific struggles around women’s rights and an erasure of the structural and redistributional issues that lead to the denial of rights.”
CHAPTER 20

FEMINISM AND DEMOCRATIC STRUGGLES IN LATIN AMERICA

VIRGINIA VARGAS

Introduction

This chapter is grounded on considerable personal-political reflection. I have been engaged with many feminist struggles concerning democracy and have observed and participated in movements for radical change that served as means for bringing feminist political and theoretical vision to social struggles. I became a feminist activist at the end of the 1970s, at the Flora Tristan Centre in Lima, Peru. Since then I have traveled and been engaged with key feminist networks regionally. I have combined my activist commitment with theoretical reflection about feminism. I see myself as part of the plural, diverse, yet distinctly Latin American forms of rebellion. Globally, I have been actively involved (as the Latin American and Caribbean NGO coordinator) in the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing. Since 2001 I have been an International Council member of the World Social Forum (WSF), representing the Articulación Feminista Marcosur. With other women I organized the Feminist Dialogues at various WSFs, focusing on radical democracy, body politics, militarism, and neoliberalism. I have both learned from and tried to give greater visibility to feminist struggles globally. This chapter draws on this experience and knowledge.

The feminist movement has been one of the most important rebellions of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries (Larguía and Dumoulin 1971). Critically, it has helped widen the narrow democratic limits of Latin American societies and states. It is important to underscore that modern democracy did not grant women, or others who were not “universal” (i.e. white, male, heterosexual property owners), the rights to equality and freedom. Historically, women have had to struggle to be recognized as political subjects.
In Latin America feminist and women’s movements have always played a significant role in struggles for democracy. Battles for the reinstatement and widening of democracy have gone hand in hand with struggles for women’s full citizenship. From the beginning of the twentieth century Latin American feminists responded to the deficiencies of modern liberal democracy that women challenged—theoretically, politically, and epistemologically. In questioning traditional political paradigms, feminist movements introduced new democratic concepts as they pointed out the interrelationship between the public and the private and the sexual division of labor, and as they raised deep concerns about representation in electoral democracies. They introduced into the debate new and radical concepts concerning the body and sexuality.

**Opening the Space: A Brief Historical Overview**

The Emergence of Feminisms in Latin America

Toward the end of the nineteenth century feminists began to fight the absence of citizenship for women. The main battles of this period were over access to education, which was gradually obtained during the twentieth century. The first wave of Latin American feminism emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century. While the right to vote was one of the main issues in feminist mobilizing, it was not the only one. From the beginning feminist movements included solidarity with lower-class women, the defense of working women’s rights in the city and the countryside, and labor movement struggles for an eight-hour working day.

During the first three decades of the twentieth century Latin American women created autonomous social and political organizations that worked for cultural and civil rights, using different strategies, of course, being in different national contexts. In some countries it was possible to create women’s and feminist parties. Many national feminist movements were linked with other social and political bodies in Latin America and internationally.

Luis Vitale (1987) presents a clear picture of Latin American women’s initiatives during the early decades of the twentieth century:

- In 1910 a First Feminist Congress took place in Argentina, and in 1918 a National Feminist Union was founded. In Perú [in] 1911, María Jesús Alvarado launched the first Peruvian Feminist Manifesto.
- In Uruguay [in] 1911, Maria Abella de Ramirez created a first feminist group: the Uruguayan Section of the Pan-American Women’s Federation. Some years earlier, anarchist women formed Resistance Societies of washerwomen, tailors, and
ironers, described by Maria Collazo in the newspaper *La Batalla*. In 1916, on the initiative of one leading local feminist, Paulina Luisi, a National Committee of Women was founded, integrating various associations that sent delegates and worked in specialized commissions. Finally, in 1919, the Uruguayan Alliance for the Female Vote was created, part of one of the commissions of the National Committee of Women, which also published the magazine *Acción Femenina*.

- In Mexico, the revolution of 1911–1920 was fundamental to the organization of the First Feminist Congress, which was held in Merida [in] 1917. There, thousands of indigenous, peasant, worker, and middle-class women created a platform to fight for women’s rights. Previously taboo themes were discussed, such as abortion and prostitution, free love, and divorce. Peasant women challenged the Agrarian Code, which recognized men as heads of families and gave them priority over women in access to land.

- Early feminist parties emerged from women’s social and cultural organizations, the first of which was the Republican Feminist Party, Brazil, [in] 1910, founded by Professor Leolinda de Figueiredo Daltro. She proclaimed the emancipation of Brazilian women, stating in particular that public positions should be open to all Brazilian citizens independently of sex.

- Feminist parties [sprang] up across Latin America. In Argentina the National Feminist Party was set up in 1919. Then, in 1922, the League of Women Freethinkers was created, after which anarchist and socialist women promoted the first organizations concerned with the civil and political emancipation of women, improvement of women’s education, and the right to equal pay for equal work.

- In Chile [in] 1919, Amanda Labarca started a National Committee of Women. The Women’s Civic Party, the Centros Belén de Sárraga, and the Movement for the Emancipation of Chilean Woman (MEMCH 1936) are other examples of early feminist movements there.

- At the beginning of the 1920s, in Cuba, a Women’s Club was founded to press for equal rights for women. The Women’s Labour Union (1928) and the Suffragette Alliance were created to resist the Machado dictatorship.

- In Ecuador, Nela Martinez led the organization of an Anticlerical Women’s Front and a Women’s Alliance in 1920, followed by the Rosa Luxemburg Group’s leadership of agrarian workers in the first general strike of Guayaquil in 1922.

- In Bolivia [in] 1927, a Women Workers’ Organization of La Paz was founded.

- In Venezuela [in] 1934, women fought the Gomez dictatorship through a Women’s Cultural Group.

- In Puerto Rico during the 1920s, a Popular Feminist Association was founded, led by Franca de Armiño, leader of the tobacco workers in the Free Workers’ Federation. All these, and many more, provided inspiration for future struggles.

After a gap of several decades, toward the end of the 1960s and throughout the 1970s a new wave of Latin American feminism emerged. It was deeply influenced by that turbulent historical period in which the peoples of Latin America fought against
dictatorships and authoritarian regimes. Feminism made a major contribution to the general demands for democratic rights.

As Latin American women’s movements emerged on the public stage, three streams could be distinguished. Not all had feminist identities in that period, but all were involved in the struggle for their rights (Villavicencio 1984). One was the feminist stream, with many participants coming from the Left, who campaigned for new social and sexual arrangements, confronting the political parties and trying to impact society as a whole. They demanded an end to women’s exclusion from and subordination in both the public and the private spheres. The second stream was poor women from the shantytowns, who entered the public political sphere as they confronted traditional roles of women and the public-private divides. The third stream was women in formal political parties and trade unions, who started questioning the role of women and the democratic dynamics inside these traditional spaces of male legitimacy.

In the following decades these streams multiplied due to women coming into feminism with demands for diversity and the recognition of ethnic-racial, sexual, and generational concerns. The social, cultural, ethnic, and geographic variety of the Latin American region was mirrored in these streams.

**Feminisms in the 1980s**

In the 1980s, during the antidictatorship battles, feminists politicized the private sphere, changing the political forms in which democracy was fought. The Madres de la Plaza de Mayo are the most iconic expression of this. Playing on their traditional maternal role, they openly confronted the Argentinian military dictatorship and publicly demanded, day after day, the return of their “disappeared” sons and daughters.1

This daily-life revolution, making the private public, also emerged elsewhere in the region. The Salvadorean mothers, also known as Comadres, and the Mexican mothers, members of the Comité Eureka, tied themselves to crosses in front of the government palaces, demanding justice and freedom for their children. “These women came out of their private confinement, bringing their anguish and pain to the streets, presenting their symbolic opposition to the authoritarian and patriarchal regimes with their non-negotiable demand ‘alive they took them, alive we want them’” (Maier 2006, 37).

At the other end of the spectrum—social terrorism—women’s struggles for democracy find the paradigmatic figure of Maria Elena Moyano, historical feminist leader of the poor women’s movement in Peru. In 1992 her body was blown to pieces in front of her children by Sendero Luminoso (the Shining Path Maoist movement).

These political-personal processes produced a series of epistemological ruptures, suggesting new ways of interpreting reality. Politicizing daily life, feminists took the responsibility of voicing the private suffering of women in the public domain (Tamayo 1997), generating new categories of analysis, new visibilities, and even new languages to name what until then had remained nameless: domestic violence, sexual harassment, rape in marriage, and the feminization of poverty.
These are just a few of the new political categories that feminism put at the center of the democratic debates. The way these concepts were produced and circulated was varied, unconventional, and in some cases irreverent: “A new mixture of politics and daily life is created. A declassification of the codes and an inversion of the terms of what is important has been produced. Participation has become a social, real and concrete act” Kirkwood 1986, 194).

The publication of books, articles, manifestos, political documents, collective declarations, pamphlets, bulletins, journalistic reports, videos, films, slogans, and poems expressing women’s experience—with the will to communicate this knowledge in unique and defiant ways—was prolific. Out of these writings, manifestos, demonstrations, and communications the theoretical body of Latin American feminism developed.

Feminism moved forward through a unique combination of street protest, cultural subversion, negotiation, and pressure on the official powers, all accompanied by constant self-reflection on the advances and contradictions of what was being done. This helps explain why, in the context of mobilization, a slogan or a manifesto could have an impact that was the same as or even bigger than that of research, both for the creation of knowledge and for action. For example, Chilean feminists in 1983, in their vigorous struggle against the Pinochet dictatorship, extended democracy—politically and theoretically—through the slogan “Democracy in the Country and in the Home.” This synthesized a public statement that incorporated the politics of the private, in the dangerous terrain that Chile represented in the Pinochet era. This one slogan expressed a radical theory of democracy and a transgressive form of political action.

Latin American Feminist Encounters on the Regional and Global Levels

In the 1980s feminist movements developed regionally with the Latin American and Caribbean Feminist Encounters. Starting in 1981 and taking place every two or three years2 (the thirteenth meeting was planned for Peru in 2014), these meetings have fostered interaction and developed the capacity for feminists to express and exchange information and ideas. Democracy has been one of the permanent issues at these feminist meetings.

Beginning in 1990 Latin American feminisms also moved to the global arena, taking part in the various global conferences and summits organized by the United Nations. These global spaces were of seminal importance in widening the horizon of women’s rights. This started with the 1993 Human Rights Conference in Vienna, where for the first time women’s rights were enshrined as human rights. The process continued at the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo, where women’s rights over their own bodies were more widely accepted. Then came the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995,3 with its monumental Platform Action, attended by a large contingent of Latin American and Caribbean feminists.
The next significant conference was the 2001 World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, which took place in Durban, South Africa. Midway through the 1990s the institutional and political crisis of the United Nations prevented it from effectively supporting the construction and affirmation of such rights.

The entrance of Latin American feminists onto the global stage was an important learning experience that they then brought back to the region. It enabled to relate in a different way to their national political and public spaces.

Widening Democratic Trends in the Region

Feminism significantly changed—and was changed by the political, economic, social, and cultural dynamics of the region. The most significant shift to which feminism responded was the spread of liberal democracy as a system of government. New trends also began within feminist movements, as on the one hand, important actors began to emerge and on the other, parts of the movement became more institutionalized—an issue that continues to provoke tensions. There were strategy disputes of critical importance, which opened new horizons for democratic change and grew in strength in the first decade of the twenty-first century.

During the last couple of decades, however, it became clear that democracy was being increasingly threatened by the neoliberal wave of capitalism. Already in 1994, the Zapatista uprising in the Mexican state of Chiapas—an early response to that wave—had a dramatic impact on the democratic life of Latin America. Not only did it give visibility to new collective subjects, but it also introduced new democratic political ideas, with its slogan mandar obedeciendo (govern by obeying). Inside the Zapatista movement, a significant movement of indigenous women emerged with its own feminist ideas.

The emergence of the antiglobalization movement, further signified by the first World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in 2001, demonstrated a unique mobilizing capacity and has impacted all emancipatory movements, including the feminist one. Two slogans opened the margins of democratic politics to more utopian horizons: “Another World Is Possible!” and “No to the Single Idea!” (of neoliberalism). This democratic horizon was widened by a bigger presence, visibility, and voices of new actors: Afro-Latinos, indigenous people, people of different sexual orientations, and people of different abilities. This revealed the existence of other cultural possibilities, cosmovisiones (view or understanding of the cosmos, used by the Latin American indigenous culture) and paradigms and introduced a new dialogue concerning intercultural democracy.

New theories and concepts developed to handle this growing complexity, among them the “decoloniality” critiques colonial institutions and thinking and draws attention to rebellious actors, perspectives, and cosmovisiones. The theory of decoloniality builds on the long tradition of critical theories from Latin America that have questioned the cultural logic of colonialism, a social heritage that persists and multiplies even though colonialism ended in Latin America more than two hundred years ago.
Low-Intensity Democracy

After the end of the dictatorships, authoritarian regimes, and internal wars that dominated Latin America for decades, the return to liberal democracy allowed for a great advance in women’s rights and their political and civil citizenship. Since the last decade of the twentieth century, the mobilization of women’s and feminist groups has generated new state institutions that are committed to gender equality; new legislation against domestic, physical, and sexual violence; and policies of positive action such as quotas of representation. Some countries, like Bolivia and Costa Rica, moved beyond quotas to seek parity of representation. Women presidents in Latin America are no longer an exception. Women’s and feminist institutions have implemented numerous initiatives, such as observatories, monitoring strategies, and shadow reports on government assessments of gender equality. The result is a strong network of women and feminist organizations at the local, national, and regional levels.

Despite all these advances, however, democratic deficits persist under the growing social exclusion and an unacceptable polarization of wealth, which according to UN data, makes Latin America the most unequal continent (CEPAL-ECLAC 2011). Corruption, drug trafficking, social insecurity, and lack of transparency pose additional threats of destabilization. As a result, Latin American democracies remain fragile, or “low-intensity,” democracies (de Sousa Santos 2006), and there is a growing discontent with liberal democracy that endangers the rights already secured.5

These low-intensity democracies threaten to adversely impact all citizens, but especially women. For example, there is a growing tension between the market and citizenship or, more generally, between democracy and economic development. Under the current neoliberal capitalist model, citizenship is valued in terms of access to consumption rather than as entitlement to rights, so choice is exercised in the market rather than in the public sphere, thus debilitating collective social ties (Lechner 2006). This makes women’s daily contributions in the reproductive and domestic spheres less visible, as it is assumed that their work is not related to the interests of the market or of politics.

The Conspiracy of Silence: — The Unequal Development of Women’s Citizenship Rights

Under this logic of exclusion and discrimination, another threat is posed by a hegemonic form of domination that excludes the political, subjective, and paradigmatic consequences of diversity and differential access to power and resources. This impacts not only gender relations but also differences in race, class, ethnicity, and sexual orientation and obscures the multiple, persistent, and invisible forms of exclusion. Sueli Carnero, a black Brazilian feminist, speaks of a conspiracy of silence that denies and legitimizes racism, sexism, and exclusion (2008). This conspiracy is confirmed by some data provided
by Latinobarómetro for the period 1997–2007 (CEPAL 2010), which show that extreme poverty among Afrodescendientes (those of African descent) and indigenous people was much higher than for the rest of the population in several countries of the region. Similarly, evaluations of the advance of gender equality reveal that the highest rates of exclusion in Latin America are concentrated among indigenous and black women.

However, other more inclusive and encouraging trends have appeared, challenging the myth of the unitary nation on which the imagery of the state has been built. There has been a call for the recuperation of “heterogeneous times” within nations built on a homogenous and empty time. Bidaseca (2010). Some countries have begun to implement profound changes in their institutional frameworks, such as the “plurinational” states in Bolivia and Ecuador. These processes have stimulated reflection and challenge concerning, for example, the harmonization of women’s rights and the manner in which these are taken into account. In Bolivia, an Office of Depatriarchalization was created within the Vice-Ministry of Decolonization. We can also see a new geopolitics taking shape among a group of progressive governments in the region. However, these are mostly based on extractivist economies, and more than one has experienced open conflicts with indigenous and peasant communities that oppose attempts to build roads or mining projects in their territories. The most notorious cases have perhaps been the battles against the transnational mining corporation Conga in Peru and the Belo Monte hydroelectric dam in Brazil, the protests against the route through the TIPNIS region in Bolivia, and the confrontation between the Ecuadorean government and its most significant indigenous organizations.

The Latin American state has in general become weaker in granting and administering its citizens’ rights, due to the state’s shrinking autonomy (Bareiro and Soto 2007). Its role as mediator in social conflict has been undermined, and its democratic power and areas of activity have been limited. Governments lack the capacity and strength to deal with not only macro issues (global migration or planetary survival), but also the daily worries of their citizens.

For example, throughout Latin America there is legislation on violence against women, but what has actually been put into practice is extremely limited. Violence against women is visible and persistent. New forms of violence, such as political harassment of women holding public positions, have developed. Bolivian congresswomen and ministers have demanded a new law following the murders of female state officials. Their demand is spreading and becoming part of a wider feminist call for legal regulation throughout Latin America. Another newly recognized dimension of violence, feminicide8 (Lagarde 2005), is a frightening reality in most countries of the region. Advances in sexual rights are minimal,9 and the civil and political rights already won are facing serious limitations. As shown by recent studies by the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB),10 affirmative action policies are not always put in place, those who should obtain positions do not get them, women are not always adequately paid when they do are hired, women are intimidated, and women are often victims of sexual harassment. Political and parliamentary leadership, moreover, does not express the ethnic-racial, cultural, and sexual diversity of the region.
There is also an extremely unequal development of economic and social rights in the region, where black, indigenous, rural, urban working-class, and disabled women are excluded, lowering their capacity to fight to expand other dimensions of citizenship. Such women face obstacles as they join a rapidly feminized labor market. They have a double burden of having to work outside the home while having to continue their reproductive role in the home, with no public policies to support women's caring duties or to promote the shared caring responsibilities of women and men (Montaño and Calderón 2007). Such a lack of gender awareness in public policy leads to a weakening of women's collective consciousness as subjects worthy of rights and to an undermining of the value of their role in care work.

Citizenship has become a contested term in relation to democratic practice in Latin America. There have been moments when an emphasis on women has actually counteracted citizen rights. In Peru during the Fujimori dictatorship, what looked like a good thing for women was in fact disastrous for democracy: while there were advances in terms of legislation, institutionalization, and the acknowledgment of women's rights, this equality was obtained at the expense of women's dignity. Rights were turned into charity, and in practice, their votes were bought with both money and food. Even worse, the body-rights of women were used to justify massive policies of forced sterilization. Formal equality was obtained at the expense of limited citizenship without democratic space to exercise true citizenship. The Peruvian situation reveals that the expansion of citizenship and democracy is not necessarily a simultaneous process. In response, Latin American feminists have revised their understanding of women's rights so that these are not seen as a goal to be obtained by themselves but as embedded within wider democratic processes. There have been other deformations: liberal democratic mechanisms have been used to implement antidemocratic coup d'états, such as that in Honduras in 2009, and in a more recent reversal in Paraguay in 2012. In Lima, Peru, an obviously antidemocratic and unethical use of the right of recall was exercised against a female mayor, Susana Villarán.

**Democracy in Times of Militancy**

The struggle for a democracy based on diversity has acquired new significance in the twenty-first century. According to Gilberto Valdés (2009), these struggles imply: 1) a political militancy because they question the multiple structures of domination, beginning with gender, patriarchy, racism, economic exploitation, and the destruction of the ecosystem; and 2) an epistemological visibility because they show dimensions of reality that have been negated, treated as folklore, or made invisible by the hegemonic culture—thus revealing perspectives, outlooks, or cosmovisiones not dependent on Western culture.

This militant democracy has opened dimensions unconsidered in traditional perspectives on citizenship. As shown by Alvaro Bello in a CEPAL study on ethnicity and citizenship in Latin America, the search for such new dimensions obliges us to think of
new forms of inclusion, of new plural and diverse forms of representation. Daily life and aspects of citizenship that had been relegated to private life have become politicized, and the horizon of rights has expanded along with the increasing spaces and struggles of transformation. The examples are varied; for instance, the ethnic-racial dimension of citizenship, introduced by the indigenous and Afro-Latino movements, has positioned the battle against racism, the perspective of multiculturalism and intersectionality, as co-substantial to the project of democratization. These struggles raise collective rights, stressing how the battles also relate to the common goods of nature such as water and territory. In addition to carrying on a battle in their communities for equality, women present definitions of the person that transcend Western individualism. This is done through concepts of a dignified life that go further than the right to property, and through conceptualizations of equity that include complementarity not only between genders (Bello 2004), but also between human beings and nature.

Equally, feminist movements in Latin America have made a significant democratic impact by demanding recognition of the body as worthy of rights, as loaded with citizenship, and therefore as a political subject, a subject of knowledge, and of the freedom of expression. Sexual rights have been fundamental to the defense of one of the most important and historical gains of liberal democracy: the separation between political power and religious institutions. This has meant placing religion in the private sphere, as an expression of private, not public, interests. In the words of the Mexican theologian Julian Cruzalta: “A secular state does not have a religion, does not go to mass, is not a believer, it guarantees freedoms and rights of all varieties, including religious freedom” (2008, 2)

A secular state leaves decisions on reproductive and sexual rights to women’s conscience, providing them with the necessary information and enabling them to exercise their right to decide. All these dimensions are included in the draft bill proposed by Latin American and Caribbean feminist movements, under discussion at the Interamerican Convention on Sexual and Reproductive Rights. The rights to global citizenship are part and parcel of both the horizon and the practices of Latin American democratic movements. There have been important, if insufficient, advances in international law: pacts, conferences, and conventions; institutions of regional and global justice, particularly in relation to women, such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); and recommendations of the UN World Conferences. In the region there is an Interamerican Convention of Belem du Para, opposing all forms of violence against women and the work CEPAL is doing through expressions of regional consensus, especially the Quito Consensus (2007), the Brasilia Consensus (2010), and the Santo Domingo Consensus (2013). These instruments are part of a global institutional framework for citizens’ rights, which should also take into account global migration and such universal rights as those to water, air, and planetary survival.

The new democratic trends include those of the environmentalist movement in its fight against climate change and the indigenous movement with its notion of “buen vivir” (Sumak Kawsak, living well) calling for the recognition of the rights of nature and the ecosystem. The indigenous women’s movements, together with urban ones,
including feminist ones, are developing their own interpretation of what “buen vivir” means for them. These are cultural, social, and political transformations, but they have material and symbolic implications for democracy. They echo what Fernando Calderón and Mario dos Santos (1989) argue: that citizenship is not a fixed fact but rather a never-ending sociocultural construction.

**The Feminist Contribution to Radical Democracy**

Latin American feminism has been nurtured by and contributed to the democratization of civil society and the shaping of its public spaces. Feminist movement visibility has helped to radicalize democratic meanings and spaces by incorporating new subjects, themes, and horizons of change.

**Widening Politics**

The widening of politics implies a change from the perception of the political as the art of ruling (which values the stability of regimes through disciplining its citizens) to a nurturing of democracy based primarily on public consent (Wills 1999). This breaks with the traditional idea of representation and gives it a new meaning. The current crisis shows that the hegemonic model of democracy (i.e., representational democracy) is inadequate to defend our fundamental freedoms, as the interests requiring representation are far greater than those actually represented under the current liberal-democratic system. Furthermore, disenchantment with political parties and representative institutions is growing among citizens, and there is a renewed search for different forms of representation—of collective, interdependent, and anti-authoritarian ones. Above all, there is a growing awareness that obedience is not something that is due, something naturally given, but rather something constructed by and involving all citizens (Vargas and Celiberti 2013).

Encompassing wider spaces of democratization has meant a restructuring of the political field: social battles and social movements have moved the political beyond the boundaries of the formal structures and hierarchies (parliament, governmental structures) toward the streets and barricades, assemblies and communities. The new spaces of debate transcend and subvert the liberal conception of politics and are personified by these new actors and movements (Vargas and Celiberti 2013).

The widening of politics extends to daily life, a strategic area in which can be constructed a varied texture of democratic practices that nurtures a democracy of proximity. The historical feminist contribution to the political dimension of the personal, summarized in the slogan “The Personal Is Political,” has politicized daily life, opening spaces for women and widening society’s horizons. For women, the transformations in
daily life and its democratization have been and continue to be of vital importance. It is in the daily space that the relations of inequity between men and women are woven, where the sexual division of labor is legitimized. Studies in the region have shown that women, especially married women and mothers, devote much more time than men to reproductive work, including when they enter the labor market. Feminist analysis has broken down the traditional devaluation of reproductive work, positioning it as an embedded part of the economy of the nation and the world. The concept of a care economy demands the revaluation of daily, family, household, and community tasks so that men are required to share them with women.

As daily life has been politicized, Latin American feminists have called for its democratization. The struggles to recognize different sexualities, different types of families, and domestic and sexual violence have given new meaning to the sexual division of labor, declaring the body as worthy of rights. The quality of democracy is therefore also measured by its expression in the private sphere. This is critical to thinking and imagining a truly participatory politics.

A New Subjectivity

Another key dimension for feminists in the region is the recuperation of subjectivity in politics as a fundamental dimension of action and knowledge. As a consequence of the devaluation of the meaning of the public due to the logic of the market, says Lechner (2006), numerous topics previously confined to the private world—gender discrimination, racism, ethnic identities, sexual diversity—have now come to the public light. In these circumstances the public agenda is colored by private experiences, introducing into politics aspects previously considered irrational. According to Lechner, if politics does not take responsibility for the aspirations, fears, and subjectivities of daily life, it is reduced to insignificance.

Feminist epistemology in Latin America has contributed enormously to this perspective with the idea of an incorporated knowledge that is inserted into a concrete social structure. This in turn produces situated knowledges that are by no means less objective (Leiva and Speed 2008). Popular classical and radical education has also contributed to this. To paraphrase Paulo Freire, it is impossible to really acquire knowledge if we despise intuition, feelings, dreams, and desires, because it is the whole body that acquires social knowledge.

Equality and Diversity

Equality is a foundational element of democracy. At the same time, it is elusive, abstract, and apparently unreachable. Some of the democratic questions concerning equality are: How do we define and who defines what makes people equal in reality? How do we avoid the androcentric dualism that defines equality within a masculine paradigm? How do we avoid women’s experience being perceived as something particular, devalued, and
opposed to another particular—masculinity—understood as something both universal and hegemonic?

Latin American feminism has contributed to understandings of equality that include and depend on the existence and recognition of difference. Equality for everybody is impossible if we do not take into account differences and where equal starting points are not guaranteed—both between men and women and among women—and if these starting points and forms of existence are unequal as far as they relate to access to rights and recognition.

Conditions for equality in diversity, between women and men, require some unavoidable fundamental conditions. On the one hand, as argued by feminism, a new sexual pact is necessary between women and men, one that changes the sexual division of labor and ends the concentration of women in the private sphere and the (near total) monopoly of men in the public sphere (as pointed out by proponents of the care economy). However, this sexual pact needs to be linked to something else: the recognition of sexual difference, giving it visibility, politicizing it, stressing the sexually differentiated life experience of women, and ensuring such differentiation doesn’t become a form of exclusion among women (Lamas 2007). This recognition of sexual difference opens up many more dimensions. It encourages us to visualize the democratic imbalances of power between genders and to question a binary perspective on gender—adding the complexities of the transsexual and intersex bodies and “other genders.” The recognition of difference is a human right it is a matter of envisaging citizenship from our own multicultural reality, which demands deep organizational, institutional, and mental changes. These are required if democracy is to develop effectively: it requires the radical decolonization of the social and political structures within which our social coexistence has historically been formed (Rivera Cusicanqui 2004).

Equality for all is highly political due to its relationship to power:

When you are on the margins, when your history has marked the place from which you speak, when racism and economic exploitation have marked your identity, you cannot leave history aside and talk “from nowhere”. This neutral place that appears, representing the idea of the de-identification, does not exist, it is always a place of power.

(Hernandez 2003, 5)

We have to rethink democracy in a multicultural perspective, creating a dialogue between different experiences, cosmovision, and life perspectives. To recognize diverse visions of knowledge and life as equal, from the perspective of an “ecology of knowledge,”17 is a fundamental challenge for democracy.

Recognition of diversity within diversity has brought about other changes. Afro-descendents and indigenous feminists have shown the dangers of not only the universalism within feminist thinking but also universalist and totalizing perspective within their own cultures when these are presented as homogenous entities. This has meant selecting some traits while obscuring others as representative of a culture and hiding the networks of power that create this representation of difference even though they violate women’s lives (Suarez 2008).
The democratization of these structures is currently the main contribution to women's battles within their own organizations and movements. At the same time, Latin American women have produced a series of reflections and contributions from new feminist and women's movements' voices, positioning other dimensions, realities, and theories: communitarian feminism, indigenous-parity feminism, Afro-Latino feminism, feminisms from the margins, decolonial feminisms, and trans-feminisms, together with ecofeminisms, urban, and rural feminisms. One of the common elements is the growing recognition that gender cannot be thought of as the defining issue in the lives of women except in its profound intersection with class, ethnicity, race, sexual disidence, and a new relationship with nature.

The Expansion of Citizens’ Imagination: The Right to Have Rights

The collective imagination of citizenship is based both on an objective dimension, which expresses the actual and real existence of rights, and a subjective dimension: the perception of one's own rights, the degree of knowledge, faith, credibility, fear, insecurity, or affirmation of belonging to a political community. These perceptions undoubtedly relate to the real and imaginary barriers that people perceive and experience. These subjective barriers are based on nonlegal discriminations, which are persistent in daily social life. They also generate traumas and superiority and inferiority complexes that prevent people from feeling equal and treating each other as equal despite differences; people perceive rights not as something that belongs to them but as favors granted.

For women, because of the historic precariousness of their rights, the relation they establish with citizenship has generally been based on a partial knowledge of rights and a weak awareness of merit that echoes the devaluing of their citizenship by society. This inadequate consciousness of the right to have rights has huge effects on the political culture of society: it weakens the relation between democracy and citizenship, deeply distorts the meaning of rights, and legitimizes exclusion.

In recent times, feminist struggles involving new subjects and citizen demands have raised new concepts of rights, some of which are still to be recognized but are nevertheless starting to change women's subjective feelings of citizenship. The classical understanding of Marshall (1950), which covers the civil, political, and social dimensions of citizenship, now proves to be too exclusive: it forgets other dimensions that are absolutely crucial in today's world. An example is how awareness of ethnic and cultural diversity and knowledge introduces new rules of the game, such as the right to territory and therefore to consultation about the use of that territory. Another example is that of body-rights, which are strenuously resisted, showing that today in Latin America, sexual and reproductive rights are not only the dimension of a right but also a strategic necessity for making women real citizens. If we continue to consider the equation of sexuality/reproduction as invisible (Lamas 2007), women's identity will be confined only to their capacity to be mothers and will be not extended to their capacity for citizenship rights.
All this has had an enormous impact on the subjective citizenship of women, who now feel like subjects worthy of rights in a way that they have never felt before. The strengthening of the awareness of the right to have rights is possibly the most significant contribution of the democratic and citizenship struggles of women.

**Conclusion**

In these steps toward democratic transition and consolidation, there are ambivalences and setbacks but also real advances. A new phase of democratization is taking place, one that interprets democracy as a form of life and not only as a form of government. This contributes to the deconstruction of homogenous visions about the nation, women, citizenship, and cultures. It has broken down the monocultural perspective that negates the validity and contributions of other cosmovisiones and life paradigms.

This consideration of new dimensions of citizenship has led to its redefinition (Avila 2000) as it unpacks the asymmetrical construction of democracy normalized under the abstract veil of universality. The radical democratic horizon becoming visible shows that democracy is not only about political systems. It is also about awareness and a way of organizing social life at all levels. It calls for a perspective not anchored to the Western framework. An important point is made by Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2006) when he speaks of *demo-diversity*, which is nurtured by the recognition and acceptance of different democratic models and practices around the world. A radical democratic perspective underlines the urgency for redistribution: active exercise of economic and social rights and—for recognition—active visibility of cosmovisiones and the different cultural, sexual, and racial perspectives of all social actors and subjects.

**Notes**

1. Later, the Abuelas (Grandmothers) de la Plaza de Mayo would also do this.
2. The Encuentros are spaces in which feminist theories and strategies for national, regional, and global advocacy are constructed, such as the No More Violence Against Women Day, celebrated on November 25 in honor of the Mirabal Sisters, killed by the Trujillo dictatorship, which has become a day of both regional and global mobilization. Another example is the September 28 campaign, which advocates for the decriminalization of abortion.
3. The Latin American Caribbean region was the only one that challenged the UN imposition of a Regional Coordinator. In the Latin American and Caribbean case, this was a woman of right-wing Catholic background. Acting quickly, in the space of a few days, activists managed to replace her with a feminist (I was the person in charge of this collective action). On this occasion, Latin American Caribbean feminism managed to carry out a wide and inclusive action, through a powerful, articulated, and politically oriented movement. Its fundamental contribution was to put on the table the deepening of democracy as a core gender issue and the issues of body politics. At the same time it developed a capacity to make
demands of, negotiate with, and dialogue with states and governments. The participation in the Beijing Conference was also a major breakthrough for Latin American feminism.

4. This cultural and social Eurocentrism practically and symbolically grants superiority to European civilization as a model to follow, both in terms of economic development processes and in its hierarchical civilizing structures. In colonial regimes the concepts of race and gender as advocated by decolonial feminists are central to structuring social and sexual hierarchies in the framework of the modernity-coloniality axes.

5. Example of the setbacks showing that what seemed like irreversible gains can indeed be lost are the democratic conflict experienced in Honduras after the coup d'état and the Nicaraguan government's repeal of Latin America's most long-standing abortion law and prosecution of nine feminists.

6. This Office of Depatriarchalization was the product of the pressure generated by a very persuasive campaign by feminist groups, who launched the slogan "Without depatriarchalization there is no decolonization."

7. Thus, in government action clearly motivated by social movement agitation, the government of Uruguay legislated the right to abortion; the free union of gays, lesbians and transsexuals; and the legalization of marijuana.

8. Feminicide, the Spanish word for “femicide”, is the expression of a new, alarming wave of violence against women that is leading to their mass murder. Femicide began in the city of Ciudad Juarez-México, where between 1999 and 2005 more than 6,000 women and young girls were murdered. In Guatemala, 2,857 women were murdered between 2000 and 2006. Femicide is considered a state crime because the state practices and favors impunity and fails to undertake investigations, thereby acting as an accomplice through inaction. At the moment this violence is being investigated in many other countries in the region. There is some dispute about the term. Mexican theoretical feminist Marcela Lagarde calls it feminicide, arguing that femicide, in Spanish, is homologous to homicide and means only murder of women. Feminicide refers also to impunity; it is considered a crime of the state because it does not prevent and protect women from gender violence.

9. The right to abortion in Latin America and the Caribbean has been obtained only in Cuba, Guyana, Puerto Rico, Uruguay, and Mexico City.


13. The Quito Consensus, the Brasilia Consensus, and the Santo Domingo Consensus are the products, respectively, of the 10th Regional Conference of Women in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2007, the 11th Conference in Brasilia in 2010, and the 12th Conference in Santo Domingo in 2013.

14. The paradigm of “buen vivir” is a product of the Andean indigenous cosmovision. It proposes an alternative option to the hegemonic system. It calls for the basic premise of the demercantilization of life, which entails searching for harmony with nature, peace, and social balance; deepening of the quality of democracy in conditions of social and material equality; and the elimination of inequalities and creation of scenarios that promote solidarity, parity, emancipation, and autonomy of human beings. It starts by acknowledging their diversity. Two countries in Latin America—Bolivia and Ecuador—have incorporated
the notion of “buen vivir” into their constitutions. However, it is not a static proposal but rather is based on the needs and calls of various social actors in their diversity, including women, sexual diversities, ethnoracial diversities, generational diversities, and geographical diversities. Therefore, some of the principles established by “buen vivir”/“vivir bien are unity in diversity; assuring that each person and community can choose the life they want to live; the promotion of equality, integration, and social cohesion; the fulfillment of human rights and the strengthening of human capacities; a harmonious relationship with nature; the development of solidarity and cooperative cohabitation; the enjoyment of work as a freeing force as well as leisure time; the reconstruction of the public as a fundamental part of societies’ development; the generation of a representative, participatory, and deliberative democracy; and the creation of democratic, pluralist, and secular states.

15. The care economy states that the care dimensions are of fundamental economic importance in society and that therefore they are not only women’s responsibility but that of women, men, and society as a whole. The theory perceives this as a strategy of justice that nurtures new sensitivities and subjectivities around the interdependency of life. The care economy brings with it another sense of time and work. In Latin America, research and spaces of reflection over this dimension have been provided by CEPAL in the last few years, with interesting studies in particular on use of time.

16. In Latin America both feminist movements and CEPAL are calling for this reflection and proposal.

17. The ecology of knowledge recognizes the epistemological multiplicity of knowledge and the social practices that produce them, promoting a coexistence of the knowledges that have been mostly excluded and delegitimized. By so doing, they break away from the hegemony of one type of knowledge—the Western and academic one—considered as the only valid one.

18. Some objective barriers for women (e.g., domestic work, unpaid family work), as well as the various forms of discrimination by society in relation to gender, ethnicity, and sexual and reproductive rights, are not necessarily enshrined in the law (apart from the right to sexual choice, which is still legally punished in most countries and is considered an offense to tradition, and abortion, which is penalized in most countries of the region).

19. A dramatic example of how the logic of unworthiness of rights goes far beyond those who feel excluded, projecting itself over society as a whole, is the results of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Peru. Of the approximately 70,000 who died during the decade of the internal war, 75 percent were quechua speakers or were of quechua origin. The Truth Commission also picked up on something that had been made invisible in the accounts of war damage: the systematic sexual violation of women by all actors in the conflict.

References


CHAPTER 21

FORGING A NEW POLITICAL IMAGINARY

Transnational Southasian Feminisms

AMRITA CHHACHHI AND SUNILA ABYESEKERA

Introduction

This chapter is a contribution to the ongoing debate on transnational feminisms, which has tended to focus on global/local and North/South transnational interactions and neglected regional transnational feminist networks and knowledge production. Mendoza’s trenchant review and critique of transnational feminisms at the global, regional, and local levels raises a number of important issues (2002). As she points out, the automatic association of the prefix “trans” in transnational feminisms with the global/international limits its focus and misses out on the rich experience and political dynamics of regional transnational feminism(s). The most well-known regional transnational feminisms are the dynamic Latin American and Caribbean encounters (Alvarez et al. 2002 and the European Union. Analytical literature is slowly appearing on regional feminisms in Africa (Adams 2006), the Balkans, and other regions. This chapter contributes to this emerging body of knowledge, concurring with Alvarez that these movements are not only “historical markers,” but also “productive transborder sites that not only reflect but also reshape local, national, and regional movement discourses and practices” (Alvarez et al 2002 4).

We present analytical reflections on two decades of Southasian cross-border movement building, which have coalesced over time into a new political imaginary for a Southasian identity currently being articulated by feminist scholar-activists in the region. The identification of the South Asian region is itself contested. Different United Nations (UN) mandates and United States state security geopolitical interests, among others, define South Asia as extending westward to Afghanistan or eastward to Myanmar. In response, activists within the region have named and claimed its meaning
through self-definition: “South Asia signifies a geographical placement of the region, a name given to us by others. We can convert this to our own purpose by keeping the spelling of our region as Southasia—a name we can clutch closer to our hearts and an identity we can all create together” (HIMĀL 2011).

In this chapter we use the term Southasian (merging the two words) to refer specifically to processes and interventions articulating this new identity. This also distinguishes Southasian transnational feminisms from, for example, anthologies of national feminist movements in each country of the region, which are often presented under the title “South Asian feminisms” (see, e.g., Loomba and Lukose 2012). “Southasian feminisms” is hence a political project in the making, which seeks to create a new space for democratic deliberation and the articulation of a new epistemic frame of Southasian citizenship that would restructure state-society relations within and across countries in the region, questioning notions of “sovereignty” and creating new subjectivities and sites of reflexivity. We look at this regional transnational movement through a temporal lens, tracing the initiation of cross-border linkages in the late 1980s by South Asian feminists, which have continued to the present.

The process of globalization is a key determinant of the emergence of transnational feminism, which is distinguishable from earlier instances of international feminism as well as the notion of global sisterhood. In addition, the emergence of Southasian feminisms in the 1980s was in response to regional geopolitical dynamics that included wars between neighboring countries. Rather than labored distinctions between the “old” and the “new” transnational feminisms, we trace the lineage of Southasian feminisms in the 1980s from similar efforts during the anticolonial struggles of the early twentieth century.

What is new, or rather renewed, from earlier debates in the South Asian anticolonial movements is the articulation of a political imaginary that is deterritorialized, “opening the way to new rights to options which cross borders that until recently were policed by traditions, nationalisms, language or ideology, oftentimes by all of them together” (Santos 2002, 262). Alongside the use of “old” methods such as making claims on the nation-state in each country, these transnational feminist movements deploy other methods—mobilizations, methodologies (cultural/discursive/symbolic)—that involve a more organic process of transformation of subjectivities and the emergence of affective communities. Southasian cross-border interventions illustrate both tendencies: denationalization where the focus is on “the transformation of the national, including the national in its condition as foundational for citizenship,” as well as postnational “where new forms that we have not even considered might emerge out of the changed conditions in the world located outside the national rather than out of the earlier institutional framework of the national” (Sassen 2006, 305).

Conceptually, this chapter also relates the discussion of regional transnational feminisms to current debates on the distinctions between state-civil/political society, denationalized/postnational/multilayered citizenship and questions of whether such a movement counters the dominant narrative of modernity, the nation-state, and citizenship. We argue that these transnational feminist networks embody modes of
political practice that challenge the either/or position in current discussions on postcolonial state-society relations, which either view globalization as leading to the demise of the nation-state and hence the necessity to think and act transnationally (Appadurai 1996), or that “the question of the democratic negotiation of citizenship under conditions of globalization” and “the dimensions of power and political strategy can only be addressed within the nation by separating the two interrelated issues of civil society/modernity and political society/democracy” (Chatterjee 1998, 68). As in the debate on transnational feminism, both these positions also view the transnational as global and ignore the emergence of new forms of political practice for democratizing citizenship at the regional level.

We explore how far these initiatives form part of the ongoing development of new regionalisms and the possibilities of moving from narrow identity politics toward a “transversal politics” and a “rooted cosmopolitanism” (Yuval-Davis 2006, 280–286). We also question if this movement expresses an “epistemology of the south” (Santos 2014) and whether it in fact transcends “the conceptual borders inherent in the old cartographies” (Mohanty 2003a, 241).

The dynamism and underlying forces driving this movement are located in a shared South Asian historical experience and in a contemporary political economy that binds the countries of the region together in interactions that are always complex and often tense. Memories of the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 persist—India and Pakistan have gone to war three times since then, with the continually reiterated threat of a nuclear strike from either state. In 1971 Bangladesh (former East Pakistan) was created after a violent war of independence. In both Sri Lanka (1983–2009) and Nepal (1996–2006), armed civil conflict raged for decades. Despite differences in regimes and institutions in each South Asian country, the mutual imbrication of globalization, militarism (including nuclearization in India and Pakistan), and religious fundamentalism/terrorism spills over borders (see Seema Kazi’s chapter in this volume). This creates the potential for both competition and conflict as well as cross-border political activism and solidarity.

Conscious of the pitfalls of a teleological reading, we trace instead the “molecular” and “capillary” processes through which such initial encounters and interventions grew into a movement. Two caveats are in order here. First, although the UN-related conferences and regional meetings have played an important role in furthering regional linkages, the processes we discuss were not directly linked with this “official” transnational feminist organizing, even though the initiative to organize these early meetings was taken by a feminist located in a UN organization. Very few of the women who met in 1986 were part of the UN process or had attended the three World Conferences on Women (in Mexico in 1975; Copenhagen in 1980; and Nairobi in 1985). Second, since the 1990s a number of South Asian feminist issue-based coalitions and networks have emerged, some formed directly as a result of the preparatory process for the Beijing Conference in 1995 and others that started independently. Insofar as these articulate a joint Southasian vision, they all constitute the broader Southasian feminist movement, with multiple actors and voices and diverse locations operating on multiple scales in the region. Our focus, however, is on a particular experience of the first encounters.
between South Asian feminists in the 1980s and the process of creating an affective Southasian feminist community, which preceded the formation of such organizations. From 1998 onward, after the formation of Sangat: A South Asian Feminist Network (founded by some of the South Asian feminists involved in the initial process), subsequent meetings and interventions discussed in this chapter were linked to this network, which continues to hold month-long workshops and works on cross-border dialogues through people-to-people contact, peace delegations, cultural exchanges, and joint signature campaigns, particularly countering India-Pakistan (Indo-Pak) war-mongering (see http://www.sangatsouthasia.org/).

In the first section we elaborate on the processes by which cross-border solidarities were constructed—a process that Dufour and colleagues (2010, 3) have aptly referred to as the intramovement daily political work required to build solidarities based on recognition of multiple identities, mutual interests, and the need for joint action. The second section explores knowledge production through interactive regional analyses, as reflected in the South Asian Feminist Declarations of 1989 and 2006. This is followed by a discussion of two key Southasian feminist interventions in wider social movements: the Pakistan-India peace movement and the movement for a People’s Union of South Asia/People’s South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, as an alternative to/transformation of the “old” regional political formation, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). The final section discusses the project of “denationalizing” and the emergence of a new generation of feminists who are asserting a somewhat different notion of the “regional/transnational.”

### The Process of Creating an Affective Southasian Feminist Community

Imagine a beautifully situated training centre near a tiny Bangladeshi village; imagine this centre itself, functional and spacious and green; imagine the trees, the large courtyards, the lawns and even a fish pond; and then imagine 38 women from Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka spending one month there together, teaching... and learning from each other; imagine them laughing and sometimes crying; imagine the joys, the frustrations, the depressions; imagine them arguing and even fighting as they struggle to understand each other and the world around them; imagine friendships made and friendships changed; imagine the singing, the acting, the making of posters, the daily exercises and even the cooking; imagine these women grappling with... theories and ideas and experiences; imagine them expanding themselves and adding horizons and dimensions and areas of creativity, and entering spaces within themselves that they had not realised existed; imagine these women breaking down the barriers that are their countries, their religions, their traditions, their backgrounds, their education and their levels of consciousness.

(Bhasin and Said Khan 1988, 1)
This workshop, held in Koitta, Bangladesh, in March 1986, was one of the first South Asian feminist encounters and marked a turning point in the lives of the thirty-eight women who participated. For most of the women, this was the first time they had spent a substantial period with other women from the region. It also represented the first time that Bangladeshi feminists were meeting Pakistani feminists after the 1971 war of independence between their countries. It was through intense processes of “grappling with each other” that a new Southasian feminist consciousness emerged. Unlike normal “training” courses, the workshop used multiple agendas and methodologies—personal, historical, and conceptual as well as physical mind/body learning. The first few days were spent sharing our personal stories, with no time limits. “As we listened to each other’s life stories, there were many instances when, struck by the cultural similarity, one of us would say ‘if the names and places were replaced, the same story could be my own’” (Chhachhi 1996, 1). Soon smiles and nods of recognition and sympathy flowed across the room, creating personal bonds across national boundaries.

The life histories of the women included key political events in the region: the partition of India and Pakistan into two separate nation-states in 1947; the separation of East Pakistan from West Pakistan in 1971, which led to the creation of the new nation-state of Bangladesh; and the separatist war based on ethnic identity in Sri Lanka, which started in 1983. Our stories reproduced the multiple “national” narratives of these historical events. Women from Pakistan listened with disbelief and amazement as Bangladeshi women described the experiences of rape and abuse they had suffered at the hands of the Pakistani army during the War of Liberation in Bangladesh. This had been selectively excluded from the history taught in Pakistani schools. Tension rose palpably as Pakistani and Bangladeshi women sat at two opposite ends of the room. As the workshop progressed, grappling with the history of the formation of the individual nation-states and our shared colonial and postcolonial legacy, the denial and anger slowly dissolved. One of the most poignant moments occurred midway, when women from both countries crossed the floor and hugged each other. At the end of the workshop, the process of bonding was transformed into a commitment when women from various countries in the region, including warring nations (India and Pakistan, and Pakistan and Bangladesh) tied rakhis on each other’s wrists, sealing a pact of sisterhood, promising to protect each other across borders.

Integral to the workshop methodology was the bridging of mind and body, mental and manual labor. Every morning, Indian danseuse Chandralekha led a session on “body work” through which notions of femininity, somatophobia, and sexuality were interrogated. Collective singing followed this, and sessions were interspersed with songs, poems, and impromptu skits. We learned screen printing skills from Pakistani artist Lala Rukh, since in that period we (rather than professionals) did everything ourselves—analyzing, writing pamphlets, making posters, acting in street plays—a mode of activism that has more or less disappeared. The conceptualization and visualization methods resulted in posters on themes including invisible reproductive work, domestic violence, and feminist solidarity visualized as $1 + 1 = 11$, which are still in circulation today. A vivid poster depicting different religious symbols oppressing women was
Amrita Chhachhi and Sunila Abeysekera boldly titled “Men, Money and Morality,” prescient of the escalation of the power and domination of our lives by the market, religious fundamentalism, terrorism, war, and multiple patriarchies in subsequent years.

Throughout the month we developed deeper understandings of our shared history and its impact on contemporary South Asian societies and battled with the theorizations of the nation-state and processes of state formation. In each of the “states” we “represented,” there were in fact many nations; we confronted the reality that in none of our “nations” did the democratic “social contract” prevail. We realized that the “imagined communities” (Anderson 2006) of “Indian,” “Pakistani,” and “Sri Lankan,” which had been clumsily crafted together through the symbols of “statehood” such as national constitutions, flags, and anthems, were not representative of the diverse religious, ethnic, and linguistic groups and indigenous and tribal communities living within their territorial borders. Nor did the nation-states offer the promise of equal citizenship to many, as described by the Sri Lankan and Nepali women, who shared their experiences of brutal suppression of political dissent and, in the case of Sri Lanka, the evolving civil war with armed militant groups emerging from the minority Tamil population. Discussions of war and peace were central to the process of interrogating the stereotypes and systematic “othering” by the state and society of each other’s national identity.

Further bonds were forged through analysis of the processes of globalization experienced in each country, especially by women. The Sri Lanka experience was significant because, at the time, the country’s establishment of export processing zones was most directly connected to the global garment industry, as well as the outflow of Sri Lankan women (primarily as domestic and unskilled workers) to countries of the Middle East such as Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. The Sri Lankan participants included women such as Kumudini Samuel, with long histories of working with the labor movement, including within the export processing zones in Katunayake, situated near the capital, Colombo. One woman had worked in Kuwait as a migrant domestic worker. Through this sharing of experiences evolved a discussion on the intersection of gender, class, and ethnicity in the context of globalization.

The discussions in Koitta laid the ground and created the imperative for us to remain connected as South Asian feminist activists. We wished to explore, on the one hand, our national (and other) subjectivities within the context of a shared historical meta-narrative of colonialism (except for Nepal), and on the other hand, to understand and respond to the postcolonial context. The latter included South Asian countries’ impulse to create shared markets and free trade agreements as well as political frameworks for coexistence that both affirmed existing hegemonies and posed a challenge and even a threat to social movements, including women’s movements, as well as the potential for cooperation and peace in the region.

In a sense, the shifts in consciousness that occurred through this workshop could be likened to a mini “epistemological rupture.” A new vision, an awareness of “the region” that transcended the national, had become integral to our analysis and actions. In September 1989, some months after the South Asian feminist declaration was written at the second South Asian feminist workshop held in Bangalore, Dr. Rajini Thiranagama,
lecturer in anatomy at the University of Jaffna in Colombo and founder of University Teachers for Human Rights in Jaffna (UTHR-J), was shot and killed while on her way to work. Her assassination tragically reflected the issues discussed at the Koitta workshop that were articulated in the South Asian Feminist Declaration of 1989 (see below). Rajini had actively promoted nonviolence in the struggle for self-determination and was therefore perceived as an “enemy” by the forces who sought to steer the Tamil claim for equality in Sri Lanka along paths defined by a militarist ideology and acts of terror. Being present at her commemoration meeting was hence an act of courage, and the Southasian feminist network was there, standing alongside other Sri Lankan activists. Kamla Bhasin from India spoke at a meeting convened in Colombo, while Nighat Said Khan from Pakistan and Govind Kelkar from India traveled to Jaffna to participate in commemorative activities there. Gabrielle Dietrich wrote a poem for Rajini that was published in newspapers in India and Sri Lanka.

Seven years later, in 1996, another significant act of solidarity cemented the links forged among South Asian feminist activists. The Women’s Action Forum (WAF), a women’s organization in Pakistan, issued a public apology for war crimes committed by the Pakistani army in Bangladesh in 1971. The apology asserted:

The state and the people of Pakistan must reflect on the role played by the state and the Pakistani military in the unprecedented and exceptionally violent suppression of the political aspirations of the people of Bangladesh in 1971. Continued silence on our part makes a mockery not only of the principles of democracy, human rights and self-determination which we lay claim to, but also makes a mockery of our own history. WAF would like to use this opportunity to build public awareness on the issue of state violence and the role of the military in 1971. At the same time, there is a need to focus on the systematic violence against women, particularly the mass rapes. While we try to focus the nation’s attention towards a period in our history for which we stand ashamed, Women’s Action Forum, on its own behalf, would like to apologise to the women of Bangladesh that they became the symbols and the targets in the process of dishonoring and humiliating people.

(WLUML 1996)

Through this statement, feminists in Pakistan made visible and open to public scrutiny this “hidden” part of their country’s history, while in Bangladesh it evoked a cathartic response and enabled the relationship between Pakistani and Bangladeshi women activists to grow and flourish. Pakistani feminists were publicly attacked for being “disloyal to the nation”—the same charge that was made against Sinhalese feminists belonging to the majority ethnic group who supported minority Tamil women in their struggle for self-determination in Sri Lanka.

The workshop marked the beginning of lifelong friendships and intimate and new chosen affective kin relationships—identities of affinity—“a self constructed space that (affirms) . . . on the basis of conscious coalition, of affinity, of political kinship” (Haraway, quoted in Chhachhi 1991, 148). The process we experienced is similar to the formation of new communities built on friendship and solidarity forged between people from the metropolis and the periphery during the nineteenth-century anticolonial
struggle, described in L. Gandhi’s book *Affective Communities* (2006). Through a fascinating exploration of “multiple, secret, unacknowledged friendships and collaborations between anticolonial South Asians and marginalized anti-imperial ‘westerners’ enmeshed within the various subcultures of late Victorian radicalism” (Gandhi 2006, 10), she draws on Derrida’s concept of the “politics of friendship” (Derrida 1988). The invisible and some visible acts of solidarity between Southasian feminists described above resonate with Derrida’s conceptualization of “the trope of friendship as the most comprehensive philosophical signifier for all those invisible affective gestures that refuse alignment along the secure axes of filiation to seek expression outside, if not against, possessive communities of belonging” (Gandhi 2006, 10). A similar process is uncovered in Kumari Jayawardena’s rich history of white, Western women’s involvement with feminism, nationalism, and class in South Asia during the colonial period, showing how these women crossed boundaries, forging affective relations, which she calls “sisterhood,” creating and joining newly formed feminist constituencies (Jayawardena 2005).

**Knowledge Production Through Interactive Regional Analysis**

Along with the new subjectivities forged, expressed in new forms of political intervention, South Asian feminist encounters also generated new knowledge production through interactive regional analysis. Too often knowledge is associated only with academic output. Given the methodology of the workshop, knowledge production took many forms. Original songs were written, one of which was included in a cassette of feminist songs and used as the opening theme of a film on gender discriminatory laws in Pakistan, *Who Will Cast the First Stone?* Following the workshop, in response to the expressed need for reading material in an accessible form, two participants wrote a booklet, *Some Questions on Feminism and Its Relevance in South Asia*, which was published by Kali for Women (the first South Asian feminist press, based in New Delhi) and subsequently translated into regional languages.

In 1989 another important encounter took place in Bangalore, India. This meeting of twenty-three women from South Asia explicitly focused on collective reflection on and conceptualizations of feminism, the relationship of the women’s movement with other social movements, and developing a Southasian perspective. The meeting resulted in the South Asian Feminist Declaration (SAFD) of 1989. This declaration is a powerful statement that wove together the historical, theoretical, and experiential dimensions of a Southasian feminist perspective. In 2006 another significant South Asian feminist encounter was held in Negombo, Sri Lanka, which brought together many of the participants from the original 1986 workshop and the 1989 meeting in Bangalore, as well as others. The SAFD 1989 was updated and released at the meeting as the South Asian Feminist Declaration of 2006.
The decision to reissue the 1989 declaration with an update in 2006 instead of writing a new declaration reflected a process-oriented approach and acknowledgment that understandings and positions could not be held dogmatically and rigidly, but needed ongoing reflection, dialogue, and reformulation among South Asian feminists. The 2006 version incorporated an assessment of new configurations of power at the international, regional, national, and local levels. New developments and shifts had taken place in the region since the 1986 workshop. Processes of state centralization had been strengthened, India and Bangladesh had attracted large sums in foreign direct investment, cross-border tensions and internal conflicts had intensified, and the emergence of religious fundamentalist groups posed significant threats. Pakistan and Bangladesh had become self-proclaimed Islamic states; Sri Lanka had affirmed the primary role of Buddhism in its constitution; and in India, Hindu fundamentalism had infiltrated the political and public arenas.

The 1990s were also a period of significant shifts in the global women's movement, with the Vienna declaration on “women's rights as human rights.” As Charlotte Bunch, a key mover of this resolution, stated, it shifted the analysis beyond identity politics and laid the basis for building global alliances (Bunch and Fried 1996). A number of South Asian coalitions were formed prior to the Beijing Conference and continued later, especially through advocacy at global forums. Some feminists who had attended the 1986 workshop were involved in these initiatives, but given that the region had strong women's movements, the global complemented rather than replaced the local. Alongside these developments, the increasing professionalization and “ngoisation” of feminism raised troubling issues about restricted mandates prescribed by donors and the shift from a feminist movement approach to organizations focusing on single issues and service delivery.

In the following section we elaborate on some of the key conceptual understandings, formulations, and positions articulated in the 1989 and 2006 declarations on the nation-state, patriarchies, communalism/religious fundamentalism, militarism and political economy, development ideology, and environment in South Asia and South Asian feminisms, and their relationship to left- and right-wing social movements, which emerged from intensive personal, political, and theoretical discussions.

Deconstructing Nationalisms and Militarization

The character of the postcolonial nation-state in the region and its centralizing/homogenizing tendencies was pivotal to the analysis. South Asian states had been constructed through institutionalizing exclusions based on gender, caste, or ethnic/tribal differences, majority/minority populations, and structurally embedded discrimination. For example, the formation of the Indian and Pakistani nation-states was based on an ideological mobilization that equated the nation with a particular religious community identity, despite avowals of secularism. The recovery (often forced) of women abducted by both sides during the partition of the subcontinent in 1947 was cast within a discourse of
protection/contamination/control of women’s bodies, in which citizenship was defined in religious community terms. In Bangladesh, the state used the rape of Bangladeshi women by the Pakistani army to forge a nationalist identity, but subsequently the birongonas (heroic women) were stigmatized and ignored. In each country, discourses of external and internal differences deployed gendered representations through the media, history textbooks, and popular discourse, often using hypermasculinist symbols to bolster a militarized masculinity.

The interactive regional analysis highlighted some new areas. For example, the construction and discourse of each nation-state defined the “self” in opposition to the “other”—not just the majority community/nation against minorities internally, but also the “unitary” nation-state in opposition to the neighboring country:

National and religious chauvinism built on mutual hostility becomes the binding force to maintain the nation state. It becomes possible, even commendable to kill, humiliate, maim and threaten the citizens of another country, religious or ethnic group or nationality in the name of preserving the unity of one’s own. This has characterized the actions of state, state-like and non-state actors in our region.

(South Asian Feminist Declaration 2006, 8–9)

The experience of Tamil women in the Sri Lankan civil war involved the emergence of a new form of institutional control exercised not just by the state and nonstate actors, but also by “state-like” actors in “liberation zones” who also used intimidation and terror. Such political positioning located South Asian feminists outside any comfortable zone of belonging (nation, community, or liberation movement) and had immediate consequences for solidarity across borders:

When we reach out in support of other women fighting against conflict and violence in the region, and especially when we are critical of the roles played by our own states in these conflicts, we run the risk of being labelled anti-national. Activists and intellectuals who take a democratic stand in Sri Lanka are branded as traitors to the Sinhala nation. Indian women who spoke out against the carnage in Gujarat were attacked as being Pakistani agents. Support by the Indian women’s movements for women in Pakistan and Bangladesh who fight against Islamic of the State and other groups, is perceived as a “Hindu” reaction and the women’s organisations in Pakistan and Bangladesh at the receiving end of this solidarity and support are seen as Indian agents.

(South Asian Feminist Declaration 2006, 10)

Through an intricate and context-sensitive analysis of “the multidimensional and interconnected impact of patriarchies, globalization, religious fundamentalisms and militarization” (South Asian Feminist Declaration 2006, 15), the manifestations of each of these is traced in relation to the state, community, and family, identifying, reinforcing links between the discrimination against, control over, and violence against women as well as ethnic minorities, dalits, and working classes. The declaration drew on scholarship and experience in the region, arguing for the imperative of South Asian solidarity and joint initiatives to forge an alternative. This would build on the myriad forms of resistance and struggle by women’s movements and other social movements in the region.
Such intersectional analysis has been integral to South Asian knowledge production, as evidenced in some of the early key publications on gender as well as subsequent scholarship. The women's movement in the region, similar to those in other Southern countries, has been distinguished by an analytical and practice-based engagement with the intersectionality of gender with other axes of difference and inequality—it was never narrowly confined to only "women's issues" or the family. It is a reflection of the power of the US women's studies academy as well as its percolation into contemporary donor-supported feminist activism that the origin of "intersectionality" is traced only to Crenshaw's 1991 article, which was considered a major breakthrough conceptualizing the experience of North American black women/women of color and disrupting the liberal assumptions of the Western women's movement. The genealogy of the concept could well be traced through a rich older heritage, starting with Southern women's movements. South Asian feminisms that started, and to a large extent still continue, to link with struggles of dalits, peasants, and the working classes, illustrate that the political economy of redistribution and cultural politics of recognition of identities are often integrated, in practice and in the analysis of the criticality of gender, caste, and class in the construction of the state/nation/communities (Chhachhi 2012, 119). Of course it has required continuous internal struggle to raise issues of caste and gender in these broader movements, as well to incorporate the specificities of the experience of women from religious minorities and dalit communities within the women's movement. The 2006 declaration restated this through showing how multiple patriarchies coexist, imbricated with class, caste, ethnicity, and minority status in each country of the region.

Neoliberal Globalization

The contradictory effects of neoliberal globalization in the region were mapped, identifying "the ways in which our geographies and topographies connect our countries, creating a range of problems which often set one state against the other in the name of development, efficiency and seemingly public goods such as electrification" (South Asian Feminist Declaration 2006, 12). The lives and struggles of coastal fishworkers in South Asia is an example that sharply illustrates the linkage between neoliberal globalization and the deep ambivalences about the nation-state and citizenship. Coastal borders in the South Asian region are conceived primarily in relation to nation-building, a space where there are ongoing processes to codify and territorialise the decoded, de-territorialised flows of the coasts to ensure rights to coastal production and security. Caught in the 'cartographic anxieties' (Gupta and Sharma, 2008) of nation states are coastal fisherfolk – an everyday conflict that goes unnoticed. Along with effects of privatization, depletion of ocean resources etc, which have affected their lives and livelihoods, there are regular arrests and detentions of coastal fisher people as prisoners of war when they cross maritime “boundaries”. Hundreds of fishermen are arrested regularly, accused of ‘straying’ into Indian, Pakistani or Sri Lankan waters and many are languishing in Indian and Pakistani jails.
Counterposing the effects of what we called—rather dramatically—the political economy of death on people and especially working women, alternatives based on the “production of life” and socially useful production were presented, ranging from protection of subsistence economies, to resisting the monetization of land and water, to reinstating the right to the commons, to resisting new forms of colonization with food as a weapon, to ensuring social and economic citizenship-based entitlements (South Asian Feminist Declaration 2006, 14–15).

These discussions have continued with diverse constituencies. A significant workshop was organized by SANGAT in 2002, attended by two hundred activists from peasant organizations, representatives of women’s movements and people’s organizations, and individual researchers and NGOs from five South Asian countries. Not all were feminists, but all were involved in resisting the “dictatorship of the market” (Menon-Sen 2002, 133). It is important to note that these discussions went far beyond the frame of women’s rights as human rights, incorporating a political economy perspective and arguing for economic rights as well, which has tended to be marginal in the transnational feminist human rights movement.

Claiming “Feminism”

The preamble of the 1989 declaration stated that

[a]s women, our lives are subject to control through predominantly patriarchal structures and family laws and institutions, often justified on the basis of religion. The onslaught of capitalism and imperialism in the post-independence period has led to increasing restrictions on our space and access to resources, and a destruction of our traditional skills and knowledge systems. (South Asian Feminist Declaration 1989, 1)

The first person “we” in the declaration and the thrust of the analysis sought to assert commonalities, a shared structure of gender subordination, and “our political commitment to a broad-based South Asian feminist platform.” The self-identification as “feminists” was not assumed, but arrived at through collective discussions on contested notions of feminism. At the 1986 workshop, the standard categorization into liberal, radical, socialist, and Marxist feminisms had been hotly debated. These categorizations, drawn from the Western context, did not fit the issues and struggles of the South Asian women’s movement. Discomfort was expressed through formulating “in-between” categories, for example, “I am a radical feminist with a guilty conscience” or “I am a socialist feminist with internal contradictions.”

Feminism and Nationalism, the acclaimed book by Sri Lankan feminist historian Kumari Jayawardena, played a key role in reclaiming and asserting our own history of feminism in the region. This history has been critical in countering attacks from both the left and right wings, which continue to categorize feminists in the region as Western, bourgeois, and anti-men.

What is significant about the declaration is, first, that it views feminism as an evolving ideology:
Forging a New Political Imaginary

Feminism is the expression of women in struggle for social transformation and therefore an ideology which will develop in practice as more and more women begin to join together against the structures which oppress and exploit them.

(South Asian Feminist Declaration 2006, 20)

Second, it acknowledges that there are differences within the “we” and yet affirms that it is still possible to have a “shared commitment to a feminist transformational praxis for the region” (South Asian Feminist Declaration 2006, 15).

In the 1989 declaration, this vision had been explicitly linked to socialism and feminism, seeing both as essential to a struggle against patriarchy, imperialism, and capitalism. In the 2006 version, the term “socialism” was dropped, but the content of the feminist vision remained the same:

It rejects separatism and a narrow focus on individualism. It has opened the way for looking at alternative ways of living, of building relationships, of an alternative decentralized economy and polity. It has struggled for dignity and for the humanisation and democratisation of the family.

(South Asian Feminist Declaration 2006, 20)

The 2006 declaration asserted the importance of the “recognition of differences, inter-linkages and coalescence of multiple identities within women’s movements and social movements” (South Asian Feminist Declaration 2006, 17). Reflective of the emergence of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) movement in the region, heteronormativity was added (South Asian Feminist Declaration 2006, 16). In particular, the emergence of muslim women’s organizations and dalit feminism had raised conceptual and strategic issues, which challenged some of the assumptions of the women’s movement in the region. The pluralism evident in the way women have organized—“on secular platforms, through multiple identity-based groups, through reclaiming, reinterpreting and reformulating theologies, mythologies, ideologies, thereby broadening the terrain of the articulation of feminist principles and spelling out forms of secularism more vibrant and inclusive than the mere letters in most of our constitutions” (South Asian Feminist Declaration 2006, 17)—was highlighted.

While there was recognition of different frameworks and locations, the thrust of the declaration is on shared oppressions. The stress on commonalities as creating a material base for solidarity would be trashed today as the false assumptions of second wave feminism. Yet what the South Asian feminist encounters and declarations also express is a recognition of difference: in location, experience, and strategies. The articulation of commonalities (the analysis of specificity highlighted similarities in the exercise of control over women’s labor, sexuality, and mobility, with violence cutting across a range of axes of difference), did not mean a collapse into essentialism or identity politics, since it combined this understanding with a broader shared political vision—similar to the “epistemological communities” that have emerged “across borders and boundaries of ethnic and national conflicts” (Yuval-Davis 2006, 284). Contrary to the postmodern nihilism that eschews any collective political project, our experience of South Asian
feminism has shown the need to continue to create solidarity based on a critique of common structures of oppression and a shared political commitment to transformation.

**Interventions in Other South Asian Movements**

The process we have described above is a political one, which has created new subjectivities and a widening consciousness of a Southasian feminist identity. This perspective was raised and brought into dialogue with other social movements. One such intervention took place at the convention held by the Pakistan-India People’s Forum for Peace and Democracy (PIPFPD) in Lahore in November 1995. Noting the absence of a gendered understanding of war and militarism, we proposed that

>the governments and civil societies of Pakistan and India . . . undertake measures to counter adverse effects of foreign and domestic policies of a militaristic nature on the daily life of citizens, reflected in the growth of a culture of violence, hatred and guns, an aggressive and communalized nationalism, a distorted model of masculinity and an increasing sense of insecurity for citizens of the two countries.

(PIPFPD, Resolutions 1995)

Further concrete demands added to the resolution stated that “(a) the governments of India and Pakistan should dismantle and refrain from installing weapons of war as national monuments; (b) wasteful expenditure on military parades and exhibitions of military hardware be stopped; and (c) a citizens monitoring group be set up to monitor hate producing and sexist images of war and military prowess in the media” (PIPFPD, Resolutions 1995). The resolution was initially greeted with sneers and sniggers, but it was finally passed unanimously and reported in the Urdu press.

Another significant intervention took place in 2010 in the growing movement to make the SAARC accountable to the people of the region. From the mid-1990s, a proliferation of South Asian networks had emerged: on human rights, the South Asian Forum for Human Rights (SAFHR) and South Asian for Human Rights (SAHR); on poverty, the South Asian Alliance for Poverty Eradication (SAAPE); and on media, youth, and art, in addition to coalitions of parliamentarians, chambers of commerce, official SAARC-related organizations, and so forth. A number of these diverse groups, representing a wide range of interests, had coalesced into the People’s SAARC (PS). In 1994 a meeting had been held in Kathmandu, Nepal, to discuss ways to foster cooperation, solidarity, and action at the people-to-people level in a fragmented South Asia, and a number of feminists who had been involved in the encounters in the late 1980s were involved in this initiative.

The objective of the People’s SAARC was to transform the official SAARC, established in 1985, from an inert political formation into one oriented toward human security. The focus of the official SAARC was trade, which facilitated the free flow of capital, while the free flow of labor and people remained restricted. The PS campaigned for liberalization of visa restrictions and people-to-people contact across borders. This ongoing
Forging a New Political Imaginary

process over the last decade has led to another political objective: the creation of an alternative regional institutional structure. Such an institutional mechanism was viewed as being imperative not only to counter the competition between the countries in the region and the threat of war (particularly between India and Pakistan) with potential impacts on the whole region, but also to further the vision of Southasian citizenship.

By 2010 the PS had focused on exposure, “naming and shaming” South Asian governments for violating people’s rights, making demands to protect these rights and deliver a people-oriented model of sustainable development, and building South Asian solidarity. The PS movement felt it was now time to demand the transformation of the official SAARC from a state-centric regional body into a more people-oriented Union of South Asia, which could install institutional structures whereby a common charter of people’s rights at the South Asian regional level could be codified; the obligation to implement them would be clearly stated; claim-making mechanisms would be established, leading to adjudication of these claims and enforcement as a result of adjudication (Alston 1994); and implementation would be at the South Asian level. Such an institutional structure would be more accessible than global institutions such as the United Nations. A commonly formulated Charter of People’s Rights would also counter the standard reaction of governments that dismissed issues of human rights and women’s rights as Western impositions and imperialist conspiracies.25

As these networks geared up for the meeting to be held parallel to the official SAARC meeting in Delhi 2010, differences emerged over the question of whether the PS should in fact formulate a demand for an alternative South Asian Union/People’s Union of South Asia or just continue to put pressure on the official SAARC. Conspiracy theories of “a hidden Indian hegemonic agenda” and accusations of “romanticism” began to circulate. Given the years spent in building a Southasian feminist agenda, we felt we had to intervene with a feminist perspective on the debate. A key impetus was our struggle for full citizenship rights for women, which remained multilayered (Yuval-Davis 1999) and incomplete because they were embedded in separate religious-based personal/family laws in the region. The postcolonial state had maintained and reinforced these laws, which governed the private sphere on critical issues such as rights to inheritance, divorce, custody of children, and so forth. While some laws have been reformed, others could not be due to perceived threats to minority identities. The demand for a common civil code of equal rights for women was scuttled time and again because of national and regional political dynamics (see Menon 1998 for the Indian debate on personal laws). Lifting this demand out of the national level majority/minority community dynamic as well as the self-definition of each nation in relation to the other, to a regional level, would create the possibility of ensuring that this raft of gender equality laws could be applied across the region.

The booklet A Feminist Vision of a People’s Union of South Asia (FVPUSA) was written in 2010 in response to the skeptics and argued strongly to endorse the idea of a South Asian Union. The first section reasserts the importance of dreaming and imagining a new regional configuration that transcends state sovereignty and empowers people:

*What is exciting about our dream of a People’s Union of South Asia is that we are in it together to turn the dream into reality. This is a collective project that connects us across*
borders. It is a dream whose time has come. It is historically grounded and already partly actualized in the ongoing efforts of millions of South Asians who want a peaceful South Asia and who are actively working towards it.

(FVPUSA 2010, 1)

Since much of the debate had been uninformed about postcolonial efforts to create alternative regional unions, starting from Simon Bolivar’s call for a South American Union in the nineteenth century, the booklet discussed the positive and negative features of recent initiatives such as the Organisation of African Union (now African Union), Union of South American Nations, and East Africa Community. For each, it highlighted the specific mechanisms installed to ensure women’s rights. Given the skeptics’ focus on Indian hegemonic ambitions in the region, it argued for safeguards and checks and balances to ensure equal representation and power. The importance of having access to regional level mechanisms rather than just the UN was stressed. This required the following:

A South Asian Charter of People’s Rights (including a commitment to ending discrimination, covering civil and political rights as well as economic, social, and cultural rights; the right to work, food, and shelter; and a comprehensive package of women’s rights, rights of migrants, etc.), which would be legally binding on all South Asian countries. A South Asian Court of Justice, comprising citizens from member countries, to which individuals and groups could appeal and which would provide access to justice for citizens and social movements in the region by providing frameworks within which they could invoke the union’s regulatory powers against discriminatory practices by national governments.

Bearing in mind geopolitical pressures, the demand for a South Asian Union was not seen as a point of arrival but as opening up another arena of struggle and negotiation. The need to forge a new political imaginary—long articulated by South Asian feminists—was cast in a broader framework with a list of seven key challenges that feminists in each country had to overcome (FVPUSA 2010, 12–13). The intervention has continued to be discussed in subsequent People’s SAARC meetings and has been widely circulated.

**Conclusion**

Since 1986, a very broad-based movement has emerged for a South Asian regional identity, peace, and cross-border interactions. As Kamla Bhasin notes, its growth has been phenomenal:

_In 1975, none of us knew feminists and women’s groups in the neighboring countries. One by one we identified them through my visits to these countries and through the courses . . . Today hundreds of groups in every country, know hundreds of groups in other countries. People are crisscrossing South Asian borders despite the visa problems._
We have formed PSAARC, SAHR, SAFHR, South Asian Women’s Fund, etc., etc. Many of them organize South Asian Women’s Day on 30th November which we started. (Bhasin interview 2014)

This broad-based movement is a “rhizome,” which is “both heterogeneous and multiplicitous. It can be entered from many different points, all of which connect to each other. . . . The rhizome does not have a beginning, an end, or an exact center.” It is characterized by “multiplicity, variation and expansion” (Shapiro et al. 2014, on Deleuze and Guattari 1987). Feminist organizations within this categorization range from advocacy NGOs, to SAARC-linked NGOs, to autonomous feminist groups.26

We have focused only on one node of the rhizome.27 The emergence of a Southasian feminist community involved an ongoing process at many levels: transforming subjectivities, creating a gendered regional lens, and intervening politically in other regional forums. However, the struggle for a denationalized/regional identity and politics is not a seamless process—it is fraught with internal contradictions as well as external geopolitical dynamics. Discussions on the new imaginary are often blocked or superseded by deep structures of nationalism that rise from unexpected quarters, even among ourselves. Indian hegemony in the region remains a sensitive issue, and even within Southasian feminist encounters, it is at times perceived as a threat. Tensions between the Indian and Pakistani states tend to overwhelm the concerns of other countries in the region, and this is often felt in the identification of issues and strategies developed within a Southasian perspective.28

Differences in positions that had been or could be resolved can at times lead to destructive actions that undermine the bonds of solidarity. For example, at the Beijing Conference in 1995, a group of South Asian feminists campaigned to prevent people from entering the Peace Tent, where there was an installation on Kashmiri women. Their argument was that placing multicolored threads, which viewers could tie onto a string as symbols of solidarity, was “Hindu,” and hence anti-Muslim/anti-Pakistani/anti-secular. There was a confrontation in front of the Peace Tent, reported incorrectly by the media as a fight between Pakistani and Indian women over Kashmir. We mention this painful incident because it reflects the ways in which state-defined nationalism can influence our own actions despite a shared political perspective.

The process of creating an affective Southasian feminist community is an example of “transversal politics.” However, the dialogical processes of “rooting” (reflective knowledge of one’s own identity and location) and “shifting” (empathetic placing of oneself in the other’s position to move toward a shared understanding)29 are not a linear process; there are reversals to “rooting” as a response to external geopolitical dynamics as well as internal personal dynamics. The forging of the Southasian affective community also has its stories of personality clashes, personal tensions, and ego struggles; the sense of betrayal when such voluntary intimate bonds break can have emotionally shattering effects.

As tensions increase in the region (the terrorist attack on Mumbai in 2008 marks a watershed in Indo-Pak relations), along with geopolitical interventions in the region as part of the “wars on terror,” which exacerbate these tensions, there are setbacks and
great pressure on those seeking to further a joint Southasian agenda. The creation of Southasian affective communities remains imperative, given that a regressive form of denationalization is also an agenda of nonstate, transnational religious fundamentalist actors who have also built “affective communities” based on narrow, divisive identities.

In terms of the often tense relationship between local/global and North/South feminisms, although we focus on transnational Southasian feminism, we do not dismiss global transnational feminism. One of us has been involved at the international level for decades. What our critical reflective analysis raises is not just the importance of location and vantage point, but also that the production of knowledge and experience from diverse places should be integrated into new shared genealogies and strategies. Our experience reasserts the importance of feminism as a political project in terms of the transformation of subjectivities as well as in relation to existing institutional power structures. Current discussions tend to lose this perspective by privileging one form of activism over the other. A feminist political agenda would instead see these as complementary and important strategies that are and can be deployed at different levels.

Another area of concern is that denationalization of a limited kind via the creation of a regional institution is also part of a neoliberal agenda. Corporate capital in the region (whose representatives are also part of the polymorphous PS and also have their own cross-border exchanges via the SAARC Chamber of Commerce and other business associations) is also interested in allowing free trade across borders and abolishing restrictive visa regimes. A question facing the broader Southasian movement (of which Southasian feminists form a part) for a new political imaginary based on democratization, equality, and justice from the perspective of discriminated and marginalized sections is, how can it differentiate itself from facilitating the project of neoliberal capitalism?

The answers will perhaps come from a younger generation of feminists in the region. Many of us involved in these first encounters came from the immediate postpartition generation, having internalized the mixed emotions and memories of partition of our parents, who had lived through the experience. Some of us were active participants in the liberation struggle in Bangladesh in 1971 and experienced the violence of that war directly. Today there is a new generation of feminists who have grown up in the political and cultural context of a new nation, fortified national borders, and more wars—between India and Pakistan, as well as internally in Sri Lanka and Nepal.

A new layer of younger South Asian feminist activists has emerged in the movement. They question the “baggage of partition” that informed the initial initiatives, asserting a different notion of the “regional/transnational.” For example, a group of young women started “No Man’s Land,” a South Asian initiative that specifically reaches out to young people via social media, online space, art, and cultural programs. In an interview, Sonya Fatah, one of the founders, stated:

*Yes, we do have forums like SAARC, but there is lot of politics to governmental organizations. Our future generation will interact differently, think of ideas differently, present them differently and share them with more openness. Our younger*
Younger feminists engaging with the SANGAT courses, which follow the format of the 1986 Koitta workshop, find them as transformative as that workshop was for us: “The most frequently used term is ‘life changing’ experience. The 18 South Asian courses and the 15 two-country courses have brought over 1,200 women across borders and created life long friendships between them” (Bhasin interview 2014).

The transnational Southasian regional feminist movement has made a significant contribution toward giving political expression to the intersectional knowledge produced through sharing experiences and conceptualizing the linkages among political economy, globalization, multiple patriarchies, religious fundamentalism, and militarism. The South Asian Feminist Declaration (1989/2006) is quoted in academic writings (see D’Costa 2011; Loomba and Lukose 2012) and also used in the syllabuses of women’s studies courses. Has this movement managed to bring about any change? There are no conventional achievements we can speak of—no new law, limited outcomes of joint campaigns, the political imaginary of a Southasian People’s Union is still a dream—but it has made a tremendous impact at other levels. Its primary contribution has been the transforming of subjectivities—a molecular political process that subtly creates epistemic shifts. These have led to more overt political actions wherein each gesture of solidarity, each time borders are crossed, there is a challenge and questioning of the divisive discourse and exclusionary structures of the nation-states in the region. Insofar as this movement goes beyond the “global gender equality regime” (Kardam 2004) paradigm, questioning the sovereignty of the nation-state and the destructive effects of neoliberalism and struggles for wider social transformation and emancipation, it does represent what is a specific aspect of Southern transnational regional feminism: issues of decolonization and democratization that address multiple levels—of the self and the collective—as well as an anticapitalist, socialist political project (Alexander and Mohanty 1997).30

Spanning three decades, the movement will perhaps take a different form as a younger generation begins to articulate its own South Asian vision. As Sunila reflected:

I always have a lot of hope in the younger generation. They think differently from us, do things differently, their whole world is different, twittering away social mobilization through social media. . . . But what I find is that they are not as familiar as we are with the history of the region or the world. They don’t really have a strong feeling about what a horrible experience partition was or even of World War II or of 1971. That way the Bangladeshis are more aware because there is a strong movement there, which keeps the memory of the martyrs alive. Generally there is a lack of history and that leads to a lack of context and understanding of why people behave in the way they do. Young people in South Asia face a huge challenge today—our countries are connected by trade, we have to deal with the issue of India being an economic giant and other countries are satellites. . . . I think unless there is a push on our part to educate and raise awareness about the historical context and why it is so important to know that there were leaders, movements in our countries for peace, for non-violence, for justice, we will not be able to stem the
violence. We are still very much countries riven by violence which permeates at the level of state to state, people to people, husbands to wives, parents to children. I really think we as adults, as seniors have a responsibility towards young people to share our histories.

(Abeyssekera interview 2013).

EPILOGUE

Sunila and I started writing this chapter together in 2012 and presented a draft at a workshop on civic activism in May 2012. The writing was put aside as Sunila entered another period of struggle with the return of cancer. She lost this battle in September 2013. It has been painful for me to revisit this chapter without her physical presence—but she has been with me—disagreeing, arguing, agreeing, and urging me on to complete writing up this important experience of South Asian feminism so that it can be more widely shared. Another global affective feminist community emerged around caring for her in the last months through the formation of the e-list Team Sunila. Emotional support poured in from all over the world, almost daily. I thank you all for reaffirming the possibility of—old-fashioned as it is—transnational sisterhood and love.

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NOTES

1. Milevska has pointed out: “Positioned between local and global feminist tendencies, regional feminist knowledge is very often neglected and its potentialities remain unrecognized within the wider picture of transnationalism” (2011, e-52).

2. Both authors have been actively involved in these South Asian cross-border interventions. This chapter is a critical reflection on practice (a kind of auto-ethnography), developing a situated knowledge framework to locate, interrogate, and generate critical knowledge from that experience.

3. See Abeyssekera (2012) for an overview of these shifts.

4. Various attempts have been made to distinguish among transnational networks, coalitions, and movements. See Dufour et al. (2010) for a summary and Moghadam (2005).

5. The activities of Sangat are diverse, and we are not reflecting on or assessing all of them here, nor do we examine the network’s organizational structure, etc.

6. Indian feminist activist Kamla Bhasin, who was (then) working at the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Regional Project, New Delhi, initiated the workshops
and continues to be a key figure in fostering a South Asian feminist vision through Sangat and other organizations.

7. A brief report on the workshop that captures elements of this encounter was written by Kamla Bhasin and Nighat Said Khan, aptly titled “Grappling with Each Other: Action and Theory” (Bhasin, K., and N. Said Khan 1988).

8. Khushy Kabeer and Sultana Kamal, both of whom were actively involved in the liberation struggle, shared the blood chilling experience of women in Bangladesh during the war.

9. Rakhsha Bandhan (the knot of protection) is a Hindu festival during which sisters traditionally tie rakhis (threads) on their brothers’ wrists to seek their protection. This religious ritual was transformed into a secular one, reversing this patriarchal custom, and has become an integral part of South Asian feminist encounters.

10. The participants came from different class backgrounds: many were middle class, and some were from the lower middle class and working class, especially those from Sri Lanka. Despite their different class backgrounds and locations as professionals and activists, everyone was linked with organizations and movements working with women, peasants, tribal communities, and workers.

11. A concept drawn from Gaston Bachelard by Althusser to analyze the theoretical and historical discontinuity and shift from ideology to science in Marx’s writing (Althusser 1969, 168).

12. The first public statement against the genocide in Bangladesh was issued around August 1971 and signed by, among others, the poet Faiz Ahmed Faiz, journalist Mazhar Ali Khan, and trade unionist Tahera Mazhar. These signatories were at the time accused by the Pakistani state of being antinational and subversive, and they paid a price for their courageous defiance.

13. For example, we are godmothers of each other’s daughter and son, both of whom were born after we first met in Koitta.

14. Basu (2000) has pointed out that transnational women’s networks have been less effective where strong local women’s movements already exist.

15. The discussions in this workshop have been summarized in Bhasin and Menon (1989), Pressing Against Boundaries: A Report of an FAO/FFHC/AD South Asian Workshop on Women and Development; sections include “Feminism” (Nandita Gandhi and Vasantha Kannabiran); “Feminism, Women’s Movement and Mass Movements” (Gail Omvedt); “The Left and Feminism” (Kumari Jayawardena and Govind Kelkar); “Women, Development and Ecology” (Vandana Shiva); “Patriarchy” (Vasantha Kannabiran); “Identity Politics” (Amrita Chhachhi); and “The State, Militarization and Alternative Politics” and “On Conceptualizations” (Gabriele Dietrich).

16. This analytical contribution by Sitralega Maunaguru brought in more complicated dimensions to the usual simple binary between state terror versus terror by non-state actors used in political discourse.

17. Dalit (broken, oppressed) refers to a category of people who were deemed untouchables. Dalits prefer this term rather than the derogatory “untouchable” or patronizing “harijan” used by Mahatma Gandhi.

18. See, e.g., Sangari and Vaid (1989) and Chhachhi (1989). A rich body of literature has been produced on gender and nationalism in South Asia in the past decades, which informed the analysis in the declarations. See Jayawardena and De Alwis (1996); Tharu and Niranjana (1996); Hussain, Mumtaz, and Saigol (1997); Bhasin and Menon (1998); Butalia (1998); Jeffery and Basu (1998); Rouse (2004); and D’Costa (2011).
19. In India from the 1970s on, the issue of violence against women centered on the rape of lower caste, tribal, and poor women and rape by forces of the state. From the 1980s onward the issue expanded to include domestic violence, honor killings, and campaigns against son preference, as well as struggles around equal wages, housing rights for single working women, and interventions to redefine women’s work to include hidden labor in the informal economy.

20. Another expression of intersectionality in practice is that most of the South Asian feminists were involved in a number of organizations and movements for peace, democracy, and economic rights as well as women’s rights issues, multiple locations reflecting a broader conception of feminism. To a certain extent this continues, although today there are more single-issue-based feminist groups than in the 1980s and 1990s.

21. Western theories formed part of our analytical frameworks but were constantly interrogated, adapted, and transformed. As Mary John points out, “Western concepts have often occupied distinct trajectories in our academic and political contexts. Thus, for instance, the concept of patriarchy (which Western feminists have more or less dropped in favour of gender) has been repeatedly pressed into further service here” (1998, 12). Further theorization of the concept in the region has led to the analysis of the interactions between ‘multiple patriarchies’ in the state, community and economy (Sangari, 1995)

22. Feminism was defined as “an awareness of patriarchal control, exploitation and oppression at the material and ideological levels, over women’s labour, fertility and sexuality, within the family, at the workplace and in society in general; committed to conscious action to transform society” (South Asian Feminist Declaration 1989, 5).

23. For example, differences were expressed with regard to the human rights framework, with some believing that it was individualistic and reinforced capitalist inequality, while others felt that this framework had been strategically useful and could be extended to include collective rights.

24. In 2006 the South Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) was signed, with a commitment to lowering duties and tariffs on trade among the countries of the region. A SAARC Development Fund and SAARC Food Bank have been set up. There is discussion on the creation of a South Asian Economic Union. The 2007 SAARC Heads of State declaration “agreed to the vision of a South Asian community, where there was smooth flow of goods, services, peoples, technologies, knowledge, capital, culture and ideas in the region.”

25. This was an important consideration in the efforts of African women’s networks to “engender” the African Union (see Adams 2006).

26. In 2012 a new South Asian feminist network was formed, the South Asian Feminist Alliance for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (SAFA), at the Program for Women’s Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ South Asian Regional Feminist Forum in Negombo, Sri Lanka. SAFA issued the Negomobo Declaration, which focuses particularly on women’s economic rights.

27. The South Asian coastal fishworkers movement is another significant example of challenging borders. The movement has pushed for a project of greater coastal bilateral and regional integration which questions the notion of sovereignty and demands that coastal waters be declared as a shared regional commons.

28. See Menon-Sen (2002) for further examples of these dynamics in a workshop on globalization in South Asia.

29. See Yuval-Davis (2006) for elaboration of these concepts as well as critical reflection on the “women’s rights are human rights” approach.
This Southasian consciousness is but a political expression of the almost daily border crossings in the region through migration for work, marriage and refuge from persecution.

References


CHAPTER 22

FROM CHINESE STATE CAPITALISM TO WOMEN’S ACTIVISM

The Implications of Economic Reforms for Women and the Evolution of Feminist Organizing

LANYAN CHEN

Introduction

The Chinese government started a process of economic reforms in the 1980s to expand production and trade through the introduction of the market system and joint ventures between state-owned companies and international capital. The political and corporate elites who have led this transition to “state capitalism” rely on internal and external markets, as well as profit-driven corporations, including state-owned companies, to push for economic growth. These elites dominate the government and domestic investment and key commodities markets and have benefited most from the economic growth.1

Today the Chinese government has grown to be the richest in the world (based on its enormous foreign reserves), and the economy is the second largest after that of the United States (as measured gross domestic product). According to the World Bank,2 the “poverty headcount ratio” at $1.25 a day in China declined from 85 to 11.8 percent between 1981 and 2009. However, the working women and men—particularly migrant women, many of whom work under the most draconian management in the export-oriented manufacturing industries, and rural women, who work in isolation in the contracted farm fields controlled by their husbands’ families—have helped create increased wealth but have been deprived of their fair share. In 2010 women were disproportionately represented among low-income groups in both urban and rural areas (59.8 and 65.7 percent, respectively; approximately 19.6 and 31.4 percentage points
higher than men). Women over the age of sixty, especially those living in the countryside, have no pensions and depend largely on their children. The revival of the traditional cultural preference for sons has led to discrimination against girls before birth; in 2011, for every 100 newborn girls, 117.8 boys were born (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2012, 3, 53). Inequality has grown exponentially across regions, between the coastal areas and the hinterland and among social groups differentiated by gender, class, ethnicity, age, other forms of diversity, and migration status.

During the preparations for the UN Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1995, the Chinese government declared that “Equality between Men and Women” was a principal state policy. Chinese women first became cognizant of women’s rights following the government’s signing of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1981 and then, more importantly, through their participation in the Fourth World Conference on Women and subsequent advocacy and action to realize its goals. Consciousness-raising occurred first among women intellectuals and feminists in state institutions who had close interactions with transnational feminist movements. Studies on women’s issues in China started appearing in the 1980s, and in the 1990s women’s studies centers emerged in Chinese universities (Chow, Zhang, and Wang 2004, 168–169). This increased awareness was augmented by the introduction of gender analysis in the “state feminist” approach.

However, nearly twenty years have passed since the principal state policy “Equality between Men and Women” was adopted. The government has delayed action to deliver on its promises to advance gender equality, despite being repeatedly reminded of its commitments written into the Chinese Constitution in 1982 (Article 48) and amendments in 1999 and 2004. While women in other countries have made advances in economic and political participation and protection of their right to dignity, health, and access to services, due in part to the outcomes of the UN World Conferences on women, China, the host of the UN Fourth World Conference, continues to systematically reverse the gains enjoyed by women in prereform periods.

Industrial women workers, migrant women, and rural women have become increasingly aware that women’s rights are being swept away by the government’s policies over the past few decades. As a result, these women have started to demand their right to economic and political equality; protection from discrimination, sexism, and all forms of violence; sexual and reproductive health; and dignity. These demands by grassroots women have been in opposition to the Chinese government’s policies on the liberalization of the economy and the control of population growth, both of which had led to the extensive erosion of women’s previous gains. Women’s coordinated efforts, increasingly facilitated by new social media, have brought feminist organizing to a level where grassroots women’s demands have become just as effective a force in advancing women’s rights through influencing government policies and court decisions as the women’s organizations led by the Chinese Communist Party.

This chapter examines feminist organizing in China in opposition to the government’s assaults on women’s human rights and labor from a feminist political economy
perspective. This lens brings together decades of research on women’s status and gender inequalities in China, feminist anticapitalist critiques informed by historical materialist analysis of oppression, and international advocacy and struggles for women’s human rights. It enables a more comprehensive understanding of the oppressive nature of Chinese economic reform policies, under which women have been relegated to reproductive responsibilities in isolation from their claims to decent work, a political voice, as well as dignity and reproductive health. The chapter pinpoints the failure of “state feminism” to uphold women’s rights and gender equality and to build coalition among grassroots women, other disadvantaged groups, and progressive men to challenge the government’s practice of state capitalism.

In the following sections I discuss the feminist political economy perspective and the impacts of government policies. I then draw on official and academic analysis, reports on groundbreaking cases and incidents, and my own research to illustrate the evolution of Chinese women’s struggles. Through an account of the transition from the adoption of legislation and national action plans on women’s advancement to the rise of grassroots women’s activism demanding women’s rights and citizenship, I suggest that building networks among disadvantaged groups, with the participation of progressive men, presents a future pathway for feminist movements in China. This strategy emphasizes the need for further feminist research and networks surrounding a progressive agenda for equality, including demands for overcoming the government growth model that exploits women and the disadvantaged based on gender, class, ethnicity, other forms of diversity, and migration. The growth of alliances of feminist organizations and civil society movements is a potentially formidable force for pressing for the expansion of social security reforms—instituted by the Chinese government as part of the stimulus plan in response to the effects of the world economic crisis in 2008—through the protection of social citizenship for all regardless of their gender, class, ethnicity, sexual identity, or migration status.

**Feminist Political Economy**

Feminist political economy is an interdisciplinary study of society that is established on a nexus of interdependent and intersectional relationships, including the political, economic, social, and cultural (Chen 2011, 252). It is centered on building an equitable and just society based on the recognition of women’s contributions to production and reproduction; in other words, the labor involved in the daily and long-term maintenance and reproduction of life through the provision of necessities such as food, clothing, and shelter as well as care and socialization (Luxton 2006, 35). This labor traverses all the previously mentioned relationships in society. Critically, the division of labor in many societies around the world, including China, subordinates reproduction to the production of wealth by rendering women’s maintenance of family wellbeing—central to which is the care of men as heads of households, as well as the young, the old, the sick—as having
little or no value. Women's provision of family care is unpaid, and women provide more and receive less care than men.

To overcome this inequality in the provision and reception of care, and to envision a possible interactive existence of the processes of production and reproduction, Diane Elson has argued that a viable option is universal, state-based entitlements that operate on the principles of equality and fairness; are made available to all members of a society; and are likely to be more accessible, transparent, and effective (2011, 8–12).

However, important questions have been uncovered by feminist scholarship. Is the state the unitary actor in the design and distribution of entitlements? How can citizens influence the state's decisions? If membership in a society is based on citizenship, how can citizen equality be promoted/achieved in the context of diverse and plural societies? For a long time, transnational feminist movements and their theoretical underpinnings (including feminist political economy) have focused on the first two questions and made headway in integrating feminist principles into the operations of the state without fundamentally transforming it.

The legacy of feminist political economy has been, at one level, the development of various tools, including sex-disaggregated statistics, time use surveys to inform gender analysis, and the development of gender-sensitive indicators and gender-responsive budgets as a means of mainstreaming gender into policy, in order to effect substantive equality. At another level, it has been influenced by liberalism and Marxism in the belief that policymaking is a site of contestation where women and the disadvantaged need to exercise citizenship to demand policies that promote due protection of their rights, fair recognition of their contributions, and the equitable distribution of resources. This chapter seeks to include the third question by linking “substantive social citizenship” with feminist political economy and a focus on women's activism for equality and justice in collaboration with the disadvantaged and progressive men.

Women's activism in the 1990s through fora such as the UN International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo, 1994) and the UN Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995) encouraged the international community to adopt agreements, visions, goals, and standards that recognize access to water, food, housing, health, and education—central to reproduction—as legitimate rights claimable by all, including women, men, girls, and boys. The recognition of these rights by state policies in countries such as Sweden—especially social policy to address reproductive issues including food security, health, education, decent work, child care, and family welfare through universal entitlements—proves that care matters for the overall wellbeing of people and also for economic production (Chen 2011, 254).

Bringing about the recognition of these rights by more countries around the world requires fundamental changes in the relationships between production and the social order that currently deny women “substantive social citizenship.” An example of this citizenship is the exercise of an array of civil, political, and social rights through participating in social governance (Marshall and Bottomore 1992, 66). These rights, when juxtaposed with a feminist political economy perspective, include not only decent work and a political voice, but also dignity; equitable access to resources; sexual and
reproductive health; and protection against sexism, discrimination, and all forms of violence. Achieving these rights is the goal of the feminist praxis of citizenship, which is different from traditional understandings of citizenship in that

\[\text{it extends the obligations of the state . . . to ensure (that) material conditions exist for all people to live full lives and to have the means to participate within the wider community. Social exclusion and outright deprivation are the results of circumstances where the state fails to provide the benefit of social citizenship to all groups and individuals.}\]

(Cohen and Pulkingham 2009, 12)

First, a feminist political economy perspective is useful in analyzing the gendered impacts of economic reforms as the leading cause of Chinese women’s declining status since the 1980s (Chen 2008). In addition, it exposes the male-dominated Chinese government’s pursuit of a neoliberal, elitist approach to development through subjugating women and other disadvantaged groups to its growth-oriented agenda, including denying them the right to social citizenship.

China’s current development agenda, implemented through various policies over the past forty years, has resulted in China’s growth and expansion in the globalized capitalist markets. However, the division of labor that underpins this agenda has favored male-dominated production at the expense of reproduction and has subordinated women and other disadvantaged groups. Women’s subordination in this transition to capitalism has been reinforced by a set of institutionalized values, rules, and norms that govern the distribution of power, resources, and benefits among social groups on the basis of their gender, class, ethnicity, diversity, and migration status.

The Chinese government, controlled by the Communist Party, occupies an overwhelmingly powerful position through its influence on the legislature, administration, and judiciary and its location at the pinnacle of the three other major institutions in society: the market, civil society, and kinship groups. An example of a social norm institutionalized in state policies is the core Confucian value that “men govern the outside, while women govern the inside” (of the household) as the basis of the head of household registration system, favoring the male head of household and urban status in the control and distribution of resources and services (Chen 2011).

An analysis of Chinese women’s oppression must examine the economic reforms of the 1980s, when the government implemented policies that re-created the divide between the public and private spheres through the household registration system. Although the household registration system was adopted in China in 1953, the effects on women then were not as detrimental as they have been since the economic reforms. In prereform China, women worked side by side with men in the farm fields and on the workshop floors, receiving state or collectively funded welfare covering housing, health care, education, child care, and pension and/or old age support (Chen 2009, 35). The state-led, collectively funded Maoist socialist experiment integrated production and reproduction in its construct of egalitarianism and collective welfare. However, through the dissolution of the communes in the countryside in the 1980s and the privatization of small state-owned enterprises in the 1990s, most women were sent home to take on
the major share of family care and work to pay for the rising costs of services, including health and education. This separation of reproduction from production through privatization of care and services reflects a worldwide trend in neoliberal expansion toward the exclusion of women from social citizenship.4

Today the Chinese household registration system disempowers rural women who have continued to work on the land, in a situation where title deeds are held by their husbands or husbands’ fathers. When their husbands migrate to the cities to work, women are left behind to look after the family and the land, but with limited decision-making power over land use. The household registration system has also disempowered women who have migrated to urban centers but do not have an urban registration status and are therefore not eligible for services provided to residents with urban household registration. Most notably, the children of migrant families are denied access to urban schools unless the families pay a special fee, which is often beyond their means. Migrant women work hard to raise their families, travel long distances to see their children schooled, and are still regarded as contributing less than their husbands.

Overall, the household registration system in China places married women at a disadvantage with regard to the protection of their rights to dignity, reproductive health, and a fair share of family assets. Women shoulder the majority of family planning responsibilities, rape in marriage is not recognized as a crime, and the courts rarely require the husband to disclose his assets in situations of divorce. The household registration system subordinates women by rendering their responsibility for reproduction as having no value and thus restricting them from claiming full citizenship with equal political, economic, and social rights. Other social groups who do not have equal access to these rights include the majority of peasants, ethnic minorities, rural migrants who work and live in urban areas, and persons with LGBT sexual orientations, because they cannot freely claim their rights to land or housing or to practice their beliefs and lifestyles. Even though some individuals who had been previously excluded have gained formal citizenship, such as migrant women who married urban men, they still do not have substantive social citizenship.

Second, the present perspective helps to identify changes in the Chinese male-centered state practice. During the height of world neoliberalism in the 1980s, the Chinese government adjusted its Marxist doctrine, given that it sought to incorporate market operations and private ownership in achieving its development goals. It celebrated “to be rich is glorious” and allowed the rise of a class structure (Zhang 2012). During the preparations for the UN Fourth World Conference on Women, the Chinese government incorporated commitments to international agreements framed within human rights norms into its official gender rhetoric and policies and further opened up opportunities for women’s research to expand the concept of gender equality. The Beijing Platform for Action requires governments to establish formal organizations (also known as the “national women’s machinery” or “state feminism”) to implement the goals of the international conferences in eliminating gender inequalities. It is in this context that the principal state policy “Equality between Men and Women” emerged, and the National Working Committee on Women and Children was established in the
government of China's State Council or Cabinet. This committee, like other national women's machinery around the globe, drew up national action plans and developed mechanisms to implement them.

It was in this context that Chinese scholars in the 1990s started to examine patriarchy and introduced new concepts and a gender perspective on issues of inequality, poverty, violence, HIV/AIDS, and sexual and reproductive health into public discussions in China. They also expanded research on concerns with women's rights and conditions to include rural women and ethnic minority women. The All-China Women's Federation's (ACWF) official publications, China Women's News and the journal Collection of Women's Studies, issued a call "to incorporate gender into policy making, we have to begin gender analysis before a policy, a law, a program, and a project are made" (Chow, Zhang, and Wang 2004, 180). The attempt to influence state policies had opened the door not only to analysis of gender inequalities and differentiation between women and men and among women themselves, but also to activism for the protection of women's rights. Women's organizations, led by the ACWF, campaigned for the inclusion of domestic violence against women as a crime through the amendment of the Marriage Law in 2001 and rural women's rights to control land in the Land Contract Law in 2002. These successful campaigns are milestones in Chinese women's movements in recent decades, built on the strength of the collaborative effort between the ACWF and nongovernmental grassroots groups (Chen 2008, 38, 75). These and other campaigns, including antipoverty and environmental protection, led to research on health and social determinants of health (Chen and Standing 2007, 189–212).

However, at the same time that “social investment discourses” became prevalent in the rest of the world, the Chinese government (under President Hu Jintao, 2002–2012) pursued a strategy of “scientific development,” focused on macroeconomic stability and strengthening and internationalizing Chinese state-owned corporations, which simultaneously sidelined its commitments to equality and women's rights. The adoption by the Chinese government of social security reforms at the height of the world economic crisis in 2008 was a strategy to ensure stability rather than the material conditions necessary for all citizens to be able to live full lives and participate in all levels of governance to overcome the impacts of the crisis (Chen 2011). These social security reforms revived cooperatively funded health care in the rural areas, which had been dissolved during the economic reforms of the 1980s, but they still left the lives of 350 million migrant workers in jeopardy. These rural migrants face much higher costs of care in the cities where they work and live than the reimbursements from their rural cooperative health insurance.

The Chinese Communist Party has moved to exert firmer control over the ACWF through top leadership appointments, which has resulted in the ACWF being more supportive of the government's policies and cooperating less with grassroots women's groups. The national women's machinery has also been sidelined, weakened, and co-opted by the male-dominated, elitist, neoliberal state. Because the “state feminist” approach does not fundamentally challenge the capitalist economic system and the
existing state apparatus, attaining equality between men and women in China is far from being achieved.

The consequences of these changes in Chinese state practice for women are uneven, as women’s organizations that are sponsored by the Communist Party have often been ineffective in holding the government accountable to its international commitments. While women’s representation in political decision-making bodies has remained at approximately 22 percent since the economic reforms, increasing numbers of women have attained a university education. According to the most recent census in 2010, 48.5 percent of graduate students and 51.1 percent of postsecondary university students are female. In 2011 there was a record 31.6 percent women entrepreneurs and women directors of companies.7

However, according to Liu Bohong and Li Yani (2009, 227–233), women university graduates face discrimination in the job market, often do not work in the fields in which they are trained, and receive less income than their male counterparts. While more urban, educated young women have become economically independent, they increasingly face difficulties with men who are uncomfortable with this newfound independence (Keenlyside, 2012). Overall, Chinese women have been experiencing setbacks since the privatization and streamlining launched by the urban economic reforms started in the 1990s. They have been systematically pushed out of the formal sectors, namely state-owned and collectively owned enterprises, where income, social benefits, and overall job protection were most secure and basically intact after the economic reforms. For example, in the years 1990, 2000, 2004, and 2011, the total number of women employed in urban areas increased from 72 to 130 million. Among them, however, the number of women employed in the state-owned and collectively owned formal sector decreased drastically, from 53 to 27 million. Based on these and other statistics from studies and publications by the National Bureau of Statistics of China, I have compiled approximations of informal employment, including in private companies, share-holding companies, companies with foreign investment, and individually owned and self-employed businesses (see table 22.1).

In the two decades of the 1990s and 2000s, the number of women who obtained informal employment increased from 19 to 104 million. In 1990 and 2000 the majority of employed urban men worked in the formal sector. Only in 2004 did the majority of employed urban men work in the informal sector, compared to the majority of employed urban women, who had worked in the informal sector since 2000. In 2004, among employed urban women, there was a 25 percent increase in those working in the informal sector, while among employed urban men the increase was only 10 percent. There was a 70 percent greater likelihood that women who worked would find employment in the informal than in the formal sector in 2004, compared to 22 percent likelihood for men. What this shows is that although women’s overall employment in urban areas increased, their employment in the formal sector declined and therefore, in general their income and social protection suffered. As I discuss later in more detail, working-class women, rural women, migrant women, ethnic minority women, women with disabilities, and women displaced by natural disasters as well as economic downturns have
### Table 22.1 Urban Women’s Employment in China in 2011, 2004, 2000 and 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>1990</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total urban employed</td>
<td>359 mil</td>
<td>265 mil</td>
<td>232 mil</td>
<td>167 mil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>130 mil</td>
<td>114 mil</td>
<td>100.5 mil</td>
<td>72 mil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>229 mil</td>
<td>151 mil</td>
<td>131.3 mil</td>
<td>95 mil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal employment</td>
<td>73 mil</td>
<td>110 mil</td>
<td>116 mil</td>
<td>141 mil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>27 mil</td>
<td>42 mil</td>
<td>44 mil</td>
<td>53 mil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>46 mil</td>
<td>68 mil</td>
<td>72 mil</td>
<td>88 mil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&gt;F</td>
<td>19 mil</td>
<td>26 mil</td>
<td>28 mil</td>
<td>35 mil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal and other employment</td>
<td>287 mil</td>
<td>155 mil</td>
<td>116 mil</td>
<td>26 mil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>104 mil</td>
<td>72 mil</td>
<td>56.5 mil</td>
<td>19 mil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>183 mil</td>
<td>83 mil</td>
<td>59.3 mil</td>
<td>7 mil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&gt;F</td>
<td>79 mil</td>
<td>11 mil</td>
<td>2.8 mil</td>
<td>F&gt;M 12 mil</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

wexperienced setbacks and violations of their rights to dignity and access to services and justice.

Third, the present perspective helps differentiate between the two strands of feminist debate in China that started in the 1990s: the “Marxist perspective on women,” officially held by the Chinese Communist Party and the Party-sponsored All-China Women’s Federation, on the one hand, and feminist theoretical and analytical perspectives informed by the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and Western feminist scholarship, on the other hand. One strand focuses on the ability of the state to co-opt women’s initiatives and the attempts of official women’s organizations to achieve international goals. Some scholars (including those at the ACWF) view the Chinese application of Marxism as a viable theory to explain women’s liberation. More recent developments have included the reconsideration of Marxism and the recognition of class by some researchers, especially as decades of economic reforms have moved China closer to capitalism, with the state as the leading force protecting the interests of a small group of investors and corporate executives against the rights of the working class and the rural and urban poor, a large proportion of whom are women. This reconsideration has marked the growth of the strand of feminist research and analysis that questions the gender-blind Chinese Marxist assumption of the material base of women’s liberation through public/state ownership and draws attention to the unmet goals of the UN Fourth World Conference on Women. This strand mirrors more recent international feminist interrogations of citizenship that seek to gain socioeconomic and political rights for women and the disadvantaged and reflects more critical feminist research by grassroots nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) championing women’s rights. Grassroots women activists argue that women’s liberation under socialism was a state-sponsored project that fostered women’s dependency on the state rather than self-development, and they question whether the state is working for women’s best interests (Chow, Zhang, and Wang 2004, 182).

In recent years, as discussed in the final section of this chapter, women’s groups have aimed to achieve feminist goals and sought to build alliances with other social movements, represented by progressive men and other disadvantaged groups, in their demands for protection of the environment and the rights of the poor, migrant workers, people living with HIV/AIDS, the disabled, and LGBT people. These feminist groups have consistently strived for the recognition of women’s human rights in all spheres, including the political, economic, social, and cultural. This feminist praxis of citizenship offers the possibility of a broadly based realization of substantive citizenship for women and the disadvantaged to gain equitable rights to dignity, access to and utilization of social security services, and participation in decision making. This inclusive exercise of citizenship will help counter the Chinese development agenda that services the needs and interests of the elites. It will also be a force to implement the Chinese “state feminist” commitment to “gender analysis before a policy, a law, a program, and a project are made.” (Ibid, 180)
The Impacts of China’s Neoliberal Development Agenda on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality

When the late Chinese leader Mao Zedong issued the call in 1952 for women to hold up “half the sky,” he meant to unleash the talents and the labor power of half of the population to help build a socialist economy. By the 1970s Chinese women had greatly improved their social, economic, and political status, having achieved more than 30 percent political representation in the Chinese legislative body, the National People’s Congress; close to full employment; and basic “from cradle to grave” health care in collectivist China, which was built largely on central plans and state and collective ownership that together contributed to the distribution and management of state welfare.

The Chinese economic reforms in the 1980s and the 1990s, as I have argued previously, moved China from socialism toward capitalism. This transition began with the government exerting control over women’s bodies, downgrading their reproductive roles, and subjecting them to excessive exploitation as a cheap labor force. This section discusses the impacts of China’s development agenda in three phases: the control of women’s bodies, the use of women and other disadvantaged groups in the accumulation of wealth for international and domestic investors from the 1980s to the early 1990s, and the more recent callous appropriation of women’s and others’ last assets for consolidating domestic capital against international competition. This discussion exposes how the “Chinese development model” that served to create “an economic miracle” augmented the political and economic power of elites through market expansion and the cohesive use of state force.

Subordination of Women through Birth Control

On the eve of the economic reforms at the end of the 1970s, under the slogans “Whoever catches mice is a worthy cat” and “To be rich is glorious,” the Chinese government launched a family planning policy drive that initiated assaults on women’s bodies. Also known as the “one-child policy,” this birth control policy primarily targeted women as a means of curbing population growth and increasing economic development. This policy has been strictly enforced in urban areas, while in the rural areas it is often translated “to permit a second child if the first born is a girl” (Chen 2008, 70). In most rural households there are two or more children, despite government fines and bullying.

This system of state management of human reproduction—an area of individual activity that is private, involving individual volition and sexual orientation—took a male-dominated approach that focused on regulating women’s fertility and the spacing of pregnancy, largely neglecting men’s participation and their reproductive responsibilities. In the process, women suffered humiliation, lost their personal dignity, and became
vulnerable, as they were frequently checked by local family planning officers, fined, or forced to undergo abortions in rural areas.

This policy was declared a principal state policy sixteen years before the declaration of “Equality between Men and Women.” It has been used consistently over the past thirty years as an assessment indicator, along with the gross domestic product (GDP), to appraise local government officials’ performance. Ironically, despite their responsibility for advancing women’s rights, the national women’s machinery and the All-China Women’s Federation gave their local branches the task of surveillance of women in villages and urban neighborhoods to ensure the successful execution of the policy (Chen 2008, 71). Even though it was claimed that the policy was successful, as 400 million births were prevented from 1979 to 2011, the impacts on women and girls have been widespread and immeasurable, as every woman of childbearing age is involved in the process of delaying marriage, preventing pregnancies, and achieving “quality” births. Women who give birth to girls and/or disabled children are frequently discriminated against, abused, and rejected by their husbands and husbands’ parents. A survey in Shenyang in 2005 found that 57.3 percent of single-parent families faced economic difficulties, and most of these families were single mothers with their daughters.8

The implementation of the policy brought out the worst aspects of a traditionally patrilineal culture, in which girls have a low status in the family and, in rural areas, are still expected to live with their husbands’ families (often located in another village) upon marriage. Sons are highly valued and preferred as heirs, as they are important for carrying on the family name, worshipping the ancestors, and caring for their parents. Under the “one child policy,” the preference for boy children has become acute, and girl babies are unwelcome. Sex-selective abortions are a common occurrence throughout the country to terminate unwanted female fetuses. Newborn girls are vulnerable to infanticide, abandonment, and death due to neglect.

The latest population census in 2010 revealed that there were 118 boys born for every 100 girls. Thirty years of such a high imbalance in the sex ratio at birth, caused by the “one child policy,” has given rise to thirty to forty million more males than females in the age group between fifteen and fifty-nine (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2012, 4, 7, 10). The resulting shortage of females, however, has not made women any more favored in the male-dominated society. On the contrary, it has given rise to the trafficking of women as wives to men in poor and remote areas, where men have little chance of finding a spouse locally, as well as the forced trafficking of girls in the sex trade.

State management of women’s reproduction has subjected women to men’s control not only at home but also in society through the promotion of the model of “a good woman,” one who produces a son, is a dutiful mother, and takes care of all reproductive responsibilities. This model has led not only to the devaluing of women’s work in the home but also to discrimination against women in the labor market. According to Xiaoayuan Dong and Xinli An (2012, 3–4), women continue to perform the lion’s share of housework and child care (on average, women spend 26.5 hours per week doing housework, 16.7 hours more than men). Moreover, the paid caregiving work in the society, for example domestic work, which is done mostly by migrant women workers, is largely
informally arranged between them and their employers. A 2009 ILO report indicated that there were some twenty million domestic workers in China, working predominantly in the big cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Guangzhou.9

At the start of the economic reforms in the 1980s, when rural women first migrated to urban areas to earn a living to support their families, they were concentrated in home-based care work. This work was undervalued by society and was often arranged informally through hometown connections. In the 1990s these domestic workers were joined by urban women who had been laid off from their jobs during the industrial reforms. The adoption of the Labor Contract Law in 2008 resulted in an increase in wages for domestic work and the beginning of contractual relationships, due to the establishment of domestic service agencies, which mediate between individual workers and employers.10 Despite this, domestic work, like manufacturing work, in which many migrant women have been engaged since the economic reforms, offers few opportunities due to its low status. Migrant women’s rural status prevents them from accessing urban services and resources, including, most importantly, social security and bank loans. An increasing number of migrant women resort to the use of their “sexual capital” to realize their ambitions and achieve their goals as they face discrimination in formal channels of advancement, due in large part to gender-based income disparities and men’s control of resources in a highly commercialized economy (Farrer 2013, 12–29; Yu and Ho 2013, 43–60).

Women as the Cheap Reserve Workforce for Economic Growth

The economic reforms in the rural areas, followed by the urban areas, turned women into a cheap workforce for the creation of economic growth. Both initiatives constitute an assault on women as Chinese citizens.

The implementation of the “household contract responsibility system” in villages across the country in the 1980s allowed individual households to have land use rights for a fixed period. At first this period was fifteen years, then thirty years in the 1990s, and presently seventy-five years.11 Before the rural economic reforms, all farmland was controlled by the state through the communes. Some people, mostly men, who were closely connected to local governments, took advantage of the move to dissolve the communes by contracting out collective operations known as township and village enterprises (TVEs). Many of the TVEs received local government assistance and entered into the processing and marketing of agricultural and animal products. Some of these TVEs became the first generation of private companies in China in the 1990s.

After receiving their contracted land, the majority of rural households could not support a typical family of four. According to Yin Chengjie (2009: 157–158), the annual cost of living for a family of four, with a son and a daughter in school, was an estimated 17,000 yuan (in 2010, the exchange rate was approximately 1 yuan = US$0.15). Income from farming the contracted land, however, barely reached 6,000 yuan (US$900). The
husband would often join the fast-growing migrant workforce, earning a living in construction in a town or city. Women, who were left to take care of the land and the family, began to raise chickens, sell eggs, and undertake subcontracted work at home to pay for household utilities, school fees, and medical bills. If the son attended university, often the daughter would go to work to support her brother's education. She might work in a TVE, like many young women in the villages and rural towns. If working at a TVE was not an option, she would likely join the massive female manufacturing workforce in an export processing zone in Guangdong or Fujian Provinces.

Rural women, often with absentee husbands, experience multiple inequalities, as they tend to work in isolation on their husband's family's contracted land, farming and raising animals. On the other hand, rural men generally move into more value-added jobs in the industrial sector or in the processing and marketing of agricultural and animal products. While these rural women perform the lion's share of productive work, they face increasing threats from the appropriation of land by local governments and the rising costs of production, food, and social services. Farmers' lives have become difficult due to a slower growth of income than the rising cost of living; obsolete agricultural production systems and practices, which are disadvantaged in the face of world competition; and the underdevelopment of rural areas due to an urban-biased economic policy orientation (Chen 2008, 19, 31–34).

These problems are particularly exacerbated by the unequal gender distribution of income. As indicated by a government report in 2004, 60.1 percent of employed women were in agriculture, 9.4 percentage points more than men, and in 1999 these women earned only 60 percent of rural men's earnings. This increased to 68 percent in 2005, but in 2010 their earnings sank to 56 percent of rural men's earnings. Rural women's income has unquestionably been affected by the rural reform policies that have placed women farmers at the lower end of the production system and failed to improve equality and equity between men and women.

China's "open door" policy, adopted in the 1980s, invited foreign investors to take advantage of the country's "cheap labor." One of its main sources was young women who had left their villages looking for work. The abundant supply of migrant women workers created a manufacturing boom through the setting up of export processing zones in China's southern coastal cities, such as Shenzhen. Investors came from South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong and started labor-intensive enterprises that manufactured footwear, textiles, toys, electronics, and other consumer products. The recruitment agencies for these factories targeted young rural women in their mid- to late teens, who were viewed as being "inexperienced, docile and unorganized" (Ngai 2005; Lee 2007).

In the 1990s, according to one estimate, females comprised 80 percent of migrant workers in Guangdong Province (Chen 2009, 186). Many women migrant workers worked in very regimented and poor working and living conditions, in which employers dictated the terms of their employment, confiscated their identity cards, and charged them "deposits" of up to a month's wages. They received not only much lower wages than their counterparts in the cities and state sector, but also no social protection such as health care, insurance for work-related injury, or pensions. In 2006 women migrant
workers in manufacturing received on average 300 to 800 yuan (US$38 to $100) per month. Seventy-six percent of migrant workers were not paid overtime and worked on holidays. They worked up to eleven hours a day and more than twenty-six days a month (Chen 2009, 190).

Unlike their predecessors in the 1950s, who had been recruited from the countryside and systematically absorbed into the industrialization process through the expansion of factories and collectivization movements, the migrant workers of today’s globalizing China are classified by various levels of government as a “floating population” (*liu dong ren kou*) to indicate their unofficial, temporary, and unregistered or “non-*hukou*” status. The term “floating population” refers to those who have moved, temporarily or for the long term, from their registered place of residence without a corresponding transfer of official residence registration, namely *hukou*. This status distinguishes them from local urban residents who have a local household registration. In addition, whereas their predecessors of the 1950s were covered under the labor insurance system established in 1953 when they became employed in a factory or a cooperative, migrant workers since the 1980s and 1990s have relied largely on informal social networks for job opportunities and have been unorganized and excluded from social security programs.

To support its “open door” policy, the Chinese government invested in buildings, roads, and infrastructure, and suppressed autonomous workers’ organizations outside of government-sanctioned trade unions operating under the rubric of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions. While the government focused on the transfer of advanced technology and management know-how to China, it did far less to ensure that labor standards conformed to Chinese labor law. In fact, all levels of government were keen to generate higher revenues by attracting foreign capital with favorable taxation rates and tax holidays, as well as reduced tariffs on imports and exports.

This government-sanctioned assault on labor led to widespread violations of workers’ rights. Workers began to stage strikes, mostly on the shop floor, demanding better pay and working conditions. The seemingly inexhaustible pool of cheap labor doomed the strikers’ demands, as the employers simply replaced them with a fresh batch of workers. However, since the adoption of the Labor Contract Law in 2008, the rise of social media has helped in the organization of strikes across shop floors and in attracting international attention. For example, from 2008 through 2010 the world was shocked by the suicides of young workers at Foxconn, a Taiwanese multinational company that manufactures electronic products for Apple and others and hires hundreds of thousands of workers in its factory locations in the cities of Zhengzhou, Taiyuan, Chengdu, and Shenzhen. Finally, during a strike in the Foxconn factory in Taiyuan on September 25, 2012, workers connected with other factories using social media, and in early October strikes broke out in the Foxconn factories in Chengdu and Zhengzhou. Women workers from the shop floor were among the labor representatives who demanded more humane treatment, better working conditions, and the right to organize unions. With the world watching, workers’ lives at Foxconn in China have since improved. However, conditions still remain below the standards established in the Chinese Labor Contract Law.
The “open door” policy initiated China’s engagement in globalization, first by inviting international capital into designated special economic zones in the southern coastal cities, and second by expanding the reach of international capital into the interior provinces in search of even cheaper labor, drawing more villagers, especially rural women, into the industrial workforce. These migrant women workers, through their work in the export-oriented manufacturing sector, have helped China achieve a breakneck economic growth rate of over 10 percent of GDP per annum for more than a decade, becoming a major supplier in world markets. Women’s work, including domestic work, home care, and work in the manufacturing and service sectors, has also contributed to economic growth across China’s cities. These categories of work had been regarded as “dirty,” and the wages were so low that most urban residents would not consider doing them. The feminization of migration for these types of work was subsequently coupled with the feminization of layoffs in urban areas, where women workers in state-owned factories faced streamlining and retrenchment in the further wave of industrial economic reforms to increase China’s competitiveness in the 1990s.

Increasing China’s Competitiveness Through the Appropriation of Assets

In order to maintain the country’s annual growth rate of 10 percent and global competitiveness in the 1990s, the Chinese government sought to reduce its financial burden. First it privatized small and medium-sized state-owned enterprises across the country, while it concentrated its support on megaprojects, such as major railways and roads, and a few leading industries, including energy, communications, steel, and banks, to increase their productivity and competitiveness. Second, it decentralized financial responsibilities to lower tiers of government, making local governments responsible for organizing and financing economic development and social services as well as maintaining the stability of local society.

The first aspect of these reforms, which sought to diversify industrial production and increase the market-based economy, gave rise to urban poverty, especially among women who were laid off from state-owned enterprises. The second aspect resulted in the launching of economic projects by local governments, which often appropriated assets, especially land, from villagers in the countryside and residents of urban neighborhoods. Although there was often compensation offered, “land grabs” represented an outright assault on people’s rights to housing, a decent standard of living, and dignity. Villagers were forcibly evicted from their land, on which they had built their homes and planted their crops, and urban residents were forced out of their homes by bulldozers. This assault was just as brutal and devastating to disadvantaged groups—including peasants, migrant workers, the urban poor comprising the laid-off, self-employed migrants, and the disabled—as was the earlier assault on workers in the export processing zones through the deregulation of labor standards in support of the “open door” policy.
Through the first phase of the reforms in the 1990s, women in urban areas became vulnerable, as many small and medium-sized state-owned enterprises that were being privatized were in the handicraft and light industrial sectors, where women comprised the majority of the workforce. One outcome of the privatization of these enterprises was that many women workers were made redundant. One of the reasons women were laid off in larger numbers than men was the unequal retirement age. In the industrial sector, women were, and still are, mandated to retire at the age of fifty, whereas men retire at age fifty-five. In the state sector and institutions like universities, the retirement age for office workers and junior managers is fifty-five for women and sixty for men. It is only at the level of full professors and senior managers that women and men have the same retirement age, sixty. In poor rural towns women were laid off as early as ages thirty-five to forty-five (Chen 2008, 42).

Women who were laid off or took early retirement were officially sent back to their local communities, with the local government being tasked to provide reemployment and a monthly allowance for up to a year. Many of these women ended up in service industries through informal arrangements, often having lost job security and entitlements to social benefits. They became vulnerable, without a regular and stable income, due to part-time and casual employment in informal sectors, the lack of a formal contract or a long-term employer/employee relationship, and contribution arrangements upon which most social security schemes set up since the 1990s are premised (Chen 2008, 42). A system of “pay-as-you-go,” which replaced the previous national labor insurance under the planned economy, was set up to transfer the administration of social security benefits from the enterprises to local government institutions. Provinces have different levels of economic development and financing, and there has still not been a social pooling of social security funds across the country (Chen 2008, 50).

There are disparities between the provinces on the east coast and those in the western interior. In addition, disparities are evident within provinces between workers in the formal sectors, the majority of whom are men, and workers in the informal sectors, the majority of whom are women. Since the 1990s many women in the informal sectors have tended to earn less than half the wages of those employed in state-owned enterprises. They sometimes had to move to another city in search of jobs, joining the rural women who had migrated to work in the manufacturing or service industries in the fast-growing urban areas. The gender-biased economic reforms thus undermined women’s individual entitlements and capability to build assets in their own right through the pursuit of full-time or lifetime careers in the segmented labor markets.

The Chinese government’s next move threatened women’s rights to assets, such as land in rural villages and houses and apartments in urban neighborhoods. In the 1990s decentralization policies made local governments at the city and county levels responsible for financing local economic growth, building infrastructure, and providing social services such as health care, education, and housing. In poorer provinces the local governments had far less ability to raise taxes and resorted to grabbing land from villagers for commercial development. This land grab resulted, on the one hand, in a real estate housing boom (a bubble that recently burst in some areas), and on the other hand,
in the loss of arable farmland. In Guangdong, Guizhou, Hebei, and Fujian Provinces, local governments often connived with village councils to forcibly push farmers off the land. Villagers, including women, died or were severely injured in fighting local governments’ land grabs. Some of the worst examples of land grabbing occurred when rural people, often in remote and ethnic minority areas, were forcibly relocated to make way for dams, irrigation, and land excavation projects. Once relocated, these people lost their means of livelihood, such as farming, and once their mediocre compensation was depleted, women who had no jobs or training often resorted to garbage picking at industrial dumps. People from smaller minority groups were so suppressed under the domination of the Han majority that they had little ability to defend and claim their rights, and activists who spoke up on their behalf were silenced or jailed by the government. Only when activists, many of whom were women, mobilized local people to resist government plans to grab land, did justice prevail; local people were able to keep their living environment intact, at least in some areas for the time being.

In cities, local governments pushed residents out of old but highly valued commercial neighborhoods to give way to new commercial developments. Residents were often paid so little that they could only afford a small apartment in a city suburb to house an extended family of five to seven. Those who refuse to move have been isolated and pressured to accept the payment. Those who appeal to a higher level of government or the legal system, which is often influenced by the Communist Party, are doomed to fail and risk being sent to a local labor camp. A story in April 2013 about Ma San Jia Women’s Prison in Liaoning Province revealed that women petitioners often do not have their grievances heard by a higher court or level of government, but instead end up in a camp doing hard labor for up to twenty hours a day and being brutally tortured if they resist (Tatlow 2013b). Petitioners and protestors against forced evictions and land grabs, among whom women have been at the forefront, are among prisoners in Ma San Jia as well as many other labor camps across the country. Women’s activism against injustice and oppression has increased in recent years as they have become more organized and are demanding their human rights and substantive social citizenship. This activism has informed a new feminist pathway in China that is distinct from the “state feminism” of the government. It includes justice and equality as a common cause for all disadvantaged groups in civil society, as well as movements against labor suppression, social and cultural subjugation, and environmental degradation.

**From “State Feminism” to Feminist Praxis of Citizenship**

The All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF), which was established upon the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949, championed women’s issues by exercising influence over policy making in the Communist Party and the National People’s Congress. Even
after the adoption of “Equality between Men and Women” as a principal state policy in 1995, the ACWF actively worked in the National Working Committee on Women and Children to put forward action plans encouraging the national and regional governments to include concerns for women’s advancement in their policies.

Three decades have passed since the economic reforms were launched in the early 1980s, accompanied by the gradual undermining of the political, economic, and social status that women had in prereform China. There is no critical mass of women representatives at each level of policy making. This failure of “state feminism” is rooted in the systemic gender biases manifested in state-led policies and policy implementation that have prevented women’s advancement despite gender-specific action plans and programs. Acknowledging this failure of state feminism would hopefully lead to a reevaluation of its gender analysis and strategies, as well as the building of coalitions with grassroots women’s movements to overcome gender and other forms of oppression, as will be demonstrated next by an account of recent events in which feminist organizing and public campaigns have helped to promote the recognition of women’s rights.

As I argued previously, the economic reforms that started in the early 1980s were overwhelmingly oriented toward growth of the country’s GDP, and little effort was made to strengthen local civil society organizations, such as farmers’ associations and women’s village committees (vestiges of grassroots women’s organizing during the period of the communist revolution and socialism from the 1950s to the 1970s). Without such local organizations to ease the changes that the economic reforms wrought on social relations, the traditional patrilineal system of tracing surnames, descent, and kinship through male ancestry has been revived in villages and has again become a powerful institution in rural China. This patriarchal system has firmly placed women in a subordinate position and formed strong attitudinal and structural barriers to women’s participation in decision making at the local level.

There are still gender blind spots and discriminatory factors working against women in the legislation and policies intended to promote women’s political participation. The promotion policy, for example, states that to be promoted to the level of county governor, potential candidates must be thirty-five to forty years old and have experience working on two portfolios in different townships, requiring a difficult choice between family and career for women with children. Even women who, against these odds, are promoted to the level of county governor, tend to be assigned to a deputy role and are given “soft” responsibilities, such as health, education, and social and cultural affairs, while men are given responsibilities for finance, economic planning, public security, and even family planning. This leaves women fewer opportunities to be nominated as delegates to the legislative bodies of the People’s Congresses. The Program for the Development of Chinese Women set a target of at least one woman official at each level of decision making, from village councils to national government offices. Despite being a very conservative figure, this target has not yet been applied to the most senior level of leadership in the country, the Politburo of the Central Party Committee, the chief executive policymaking body of the Party/State. The ACWF and its associates have for decades argued against discriminatory policies, such as the unequal retirement age,
that affect women employees in government and the formal sector more than women in informal employment, and promotion policies, without tangible results. Their demands for better benefits for women workers and their campaigns against domestic violence and sexual harassment in the workplace have seen better results, as these efforts have received strong support from women’s NGOs and grassroots women’s groups.

Since the 1980s women have been organizing from the ground up in areas of concern such as migration, health, HIV/AIDS, domestic violence, media watch, religion, and sexual orientation. Many of these groups are autonomous and professionally based; engage in local research; and are often supported by UN organizations, bilateral agencies including the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), and international organizations such as the Ford Foundation. There are, for example, associations of women judges, entrepreneurs, police, and journalists in various cities and provinces. Women’s/gender studies centers associated with universities and research institutes tend to be represented by scholars and researchers. In addition, coalitions of local groups have emerged—including, for example, the Anti-Domestic Violence Network, Women’s Legal Aid Research and Counseling Center, Maple Women’s Psychological Counseling Center, and Migrant Women Workers’ Center—which have been building linkages with grassroots women based on services. A number of these women’s organizations have undertaken feminist research to better advocate for women’s rights. In recent years feminist researchers and advocates have rejected the official translation of feminism as nuxingzhuyi (literally “female-ism”) and replaced it with nuquanzhuyi (a conviction that espouses women’s rights).

One immediate effect has been the advancement of feminist organizing in civil society movements. The Women’s Voice, a biweekly online newsletter, was created recently by a group of feminists who left the official mainstream media and now use social media to spread their observations about male domination in Chinese society. The newsletter projects a feminist perspective on issues of inequality and injustice and has become a rallying point for thousands of followers through QQ (Chinese Twitter). This social media network, created by the Women’s Voice, is a coalition of groups working on issues of equity in development, feminism in action, queer concerns, violence against women, and HIV/AIDS prevention, and has mobilized support for women suffering from injustice. In the recent past this coalition of groups has collaborated in support of civil society movements targeted by the government under Hu Jintao, the previous president of China, who had increased control of the Internet, suppressed political dissent, and turned against political reforms.

In addition to the labor strikes and the protests against local government land grabs discussed previously, it is important to recognize feminist activism centered on human rights, which has led to changes in policies and court decisions. In the face of government’s hardline responses to public protests and even online petitions, feminist demands for fair court decisions in cases involving violence against women have become a channel for public dissent. An example is the ongoing feminist mobilization
to press for the adoption of legislation to protect women against domestic violence and sexual harassment in the workplace.

A case in point is that of Deng Yujiao, the twenty-one-year old pedicurist who, on May 10, 2009, allegedly stabbed her assailant, a local government employee, after he pressed her for sexual favors at work. Deng’s act of self-defense resulted in the man’s death. Only after a huge public outcry did she receive a lenient sentence (Branigan 2009). In another case, in Beijing in 2011, Kim Lee, an American woman, publicly accused her famous and wealthy husband, Li Yang, of domestic violence. Lee, a former public schoolteacher in the United States, had worked closely with Li to build his business. Li, the father of the couple’s three daughters, argued on television that domestic violence was acceptable in China and threatened Lee after she documented the abuse for the police. According to Didi Kirsten Tatlow (2013a), during the painful months of Lee’s divorce hearings, when men on the streets cursed her and people in positions of authority told her to give up, she expressed her sympathy for all the Chinese women who try to speak out about their experience of domestic violence.

Many Chinese women do not even start divorce proceedings, or give up, because of these pressures. Kim Lee pressed on because she received encouragement from many women, young and old. Women’s groups across the country organized protests in front of local courts and at the entrance of a hall where Li was giving a talk. Lee received many letters and e-mails from abused women and their children, describing their fear and suffering. She created a precedent in China by going public and using the courts to enforce the law. Finally, on February 3, 2013, in a historic victory for feminists and the rule of law, a Beijing court granted Kim Lee a divorce on the grounds of abuse and issued a three-month protection order against her ex-husband—a first in the nation.

The high-profile case was widely circulated on Chinese microblogs and through the media. Feminists and human rights activists were elated at the court victory and the three court orders: the acknowledgment of domestic violence as the grounds for divorce, the grant of a protection order, and the order of compensation for the violence in the amount of 50,000 renminbi (RMB) or US$8,000. However, according to Guo Jianmei, a leading human rights lawyer, Kim Lee should receive 12 million renminbi (US$1.9 million) and a fixed sum annually until her daughters reach the age of eighteen. Guo argues that the financial terms of this settlement showed that Chinese courts failed to uncover Mr. Li’s true assets and charge him commensurately. One loss for feminists, as articulated by Tatlow (2013a), was that “the court didn’t force him to reveal [his true assets]. So in reality the settlement was very unjust.” At the core lies the failure of the state to protect the weaker and poorer against the stronger and richer. Guo said, “It’s a huge flaw in the system. The state doesn’t intervene to force rich men like Mr. Li to reveal their true assets, and it doesn’t allow lawyers like us to do it either, it doesn’t give us the rights. This is a society that doesn’t control those with money or power. It doesn’t see things through to the end.”

Kim Lee’s personal battle is over, but her support for the feminist struggle against domestic violence continues. Based on her success in the courtroom, she is advising women to use their legal rights instead of taking desperate measures. Li Yan is a woman
from Sichuan province who was sentenced to death for murdering her abusive husband in 2010, a sentence feminists are fighting frantically to overturn. During the abuse she went to the police, but got no help. Kim Lee’s example shows that social support can help abused women embark on the long and difficult road of defending their rights.

Feminist organizing within civil society movements in China is also putting women’s issues on the agenda of mainstream policies and public actions in situations of natural disasters and environmental pollution. A New York Times report on May 12, 2013, indicated that civil society activists, who were quick to organize relief for the people in Lushan in Sichuan Province after the deadly earthquake of April 2013, included sanitary napkins as part of the essential goods transported to the affected villages (Levin 2013). This is testimony to the effect of a discussion led by the Women’s Voice on the gender-blind approach to relief efforts in the aftermath of the earthquake in Wenchuan, Sichuan, five years earlier, when women’s basic needs were ignored.25

A further testimony of the impact of feminist organizing, widely circulated by women’s online media, was the adoption, on April 28, 2011, of the Special Provisions on Labor Protection of Female Employees. This decree has made several improvements over the earlier legislation (the 1988 Provisions of Labor Protection of Female Employees), including eight additional days of paid maternity leave (previously fourteen weeks or ninety-eight days) and the employers’ obligation to pay for maternity leave when women have no insurance.26 However, the new Supreme Court interpretation of the Marriage Law of 2001, issued on August 11, 2011, represents a defeat for feminist advocacy, as it stipulates that property acquired before marriage reverts back to the purchaser upon divorce, sentencing divorced women to homelessness since men traditionally provide the family home in China (Tatlow 2011). A further difference is that the former decree represents a significant feminist achievement in labor law that has not been seriously enforced by the government (especially in the private and informal sectors). On the other hand, the Supreme Court ruling will have real legal ramifications for men. The men who form part of the ruling elite have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo, as the existing institutions helped them establish their wealth and privilege. The Supreme Court decision has not only helped them to maintain control of economic assets but has also reinforced the traditional subordinate status of women. The examples discussed here suggest that feminist organizing can help change policies, but an even wider coalition is needed to have a greater impact on the government’s economic development policy and male privilege.

Women’s participation in resisting government projects has had some impact on the government’s decisions. Their active leadership in resistance to the megaproject of transporting water from the south to the north may have delayed the completion of the project, just as other protests supported by women activists, against the building of dams on the Nu River, brought the government’s plans to a halt. A women’s rights activist gained international recognition for her assistance in the escape from house arrest on April 22, 2012, of Chen Guangcheng, the blind lawyer who had defended women’s rights against abuses in official family planning practices and took refuge in the American Embassy in Beijing until his departure with his family to the United States.
Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the transformation of women’s organizing in China over the past fifty years from a feminist political economy perspective. This perspective is centered on building an equitable and just society based on integrating production with reproduction through the protection of state-led entitlements. It helps to situate the various approaches taken by the women’s movements against the neoliberal, growth-oriented agenda of the male-dominated Chinese establishment. The pursuit of this agenda through the economic reform policies in the countryside in the 1980s and urban areas in the 1990s transformed China from a socialist economy into a “state capitalist” economy. While women under the socialist economy gained rights as part of the labor force in the effort to build collective welfare, in the current “state capitalist” economy state power protects and promotes capital over the rights of women and those disadvantaged by their class, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and migration status.

The feminist political economy perspective helps expose the oppressive nature of Chinese economic reform policies, under which women have been relegated to reproductive responsibilities in isolation from their claims to decent work, a political voice, reproductive health, and dignity. This separation of women’s contributions to the daily and long-term maintenance and reproduction of the population from the production of wealth has led to the denial of women’s substantive social citizenship and the decline of women’s status. The reversal of the status of Chinese women in politics, for example, from number 16 in 1997 on the Inter-Parliamentary Union ranking of women’s representation in national legislative bodies to number 53 in 2013, proclaims the failure of the “state feminist” approach to achieve equality, especially as it has adapted to the Chinese legacy of Marxism, namely the male-dominated state determination of socioeconomic life.

However, the Chinese male-centered state practice is not immune to pressure to change or modify policies in response to women’s and other social demands, especially when there are external and/or internal pressures, such as the global financial crisis in 2008 and mounting social unrest across the country. The tools of gender analysis developed within the “state feminist” approach—time use, sex-disaggregated statistics, and gender-responsive budgets—that have begun to take root in China have helped to advance research on health and a more widespread understanding of the social determinants of health in the last two decades. The social security reforms instituted in 2008 to revive the cooperatively based health-care system in the countryside served as a strategy to address the rising inequalities and deleterious effects of the financial crisis. These reforms, however, did not go far enough to cover the millions of migrant workers and shall prove even more inadequate considering that the government is determined to speed up urbanization, with a target of half of the population living in cities by the end of 2030.

Substantive social citizenship is an important conceptual framework in the feminist political economy perspective, as it provides a pathway to building an equitable and just
society through the exercise of citizenship rights. First, the exercise of civil, political, and social rights leads to demands that the state ensure the necessary material conditions for people to live full lives and have the means to participate in the wider community. The fulfillment of this obligation will help accomplish what “state feminism” has failed to deliver: the integration of production with reproduction through the universal protection of state-led entitlements. Second, the examination of who is, and in what ways they are, excluded from social citizenship—namely, the necessary material conditions and means to which one should have been entitled—is becoming an important task in feminist analysis. Using this analysis to evaluate state action, or inaction, helps to formulate and structure demands for policy and institutional changes.

In recent years in China women’s coordinated struggles for justice and recognition of their rights against sexism, discrimination, and violence against women have helped to establish a wider recognition of women’s rights as human rights. Their victories in groundbreaking cases have helped strengthen public resistance, from protesting against local governments’ land grabs in the countryside to campaigning against government corruption and environmental degradation. While tackling social exclusion and deprivation remains a major task for Chinese feminist analysis, there is also an urgent need for feminists to build networks among the disadvantaged and coalitions with progressive forces, including men, around a discourse of social citizenship, equality, and justice. A large part of these efforts should be about constructing social policy to bridge the divide between production and reproduction through recognizing the value and importance of protecting social rights and social citizenship for all. Would the adoption of this social policy require a transformation of production through the reconstruction of relations of production? It is important that feminists help envision ways to establish relationships of inclusive citizenship in the organization and management of production, so that individuals, despite their gender, class, ethnicity, diversity, or migration status, can gain substantive citizenship through their rightful claims to decent work, access to social services, and participation in all levels of decision making.

Notes

1. I gratefully acknowledge the valuable comments made by Marjorie Cohen, Pat Howard, and an anonymous reviewer, and Peter Forster’s unwavering support and insightful observations.
3. For discussions on these questions, see Dobrowolsky (2009), Cohen and Pulkingham (2009), Luxton (2006) and Sangster and Luxton (2013).
4. Contemporary women’s movements emerged on the world stage in the 1970s, when many countries, including the socialist eastern bloc and the industrialized capitalist West, adopted policies to achieve “equal pay for equal work,” as well as social welfare policies to promote the provision of maternity benefits and child care. However, the onslaught of globalization, liberalization, and deregulation across the world, and a shift to a conservative,
neoliberal focus on market concerns over socioeconomic rights claims in political discourses in the 1980s and 1990s, have affected women negatively.


6. In the past decade the Chinese Communist Party has consistently appointed one of its Central Committee staff members to head the ACWF.


8. There are very few statistics or research studies on single women heads of households. See Wang Ke (2010) on a study in Shenyang.


10. Presentations by Han Huimin, head of the Beijing Centre for Migrant Women Workers, on the center’s research on domestic work, and Xinying Hu (2011), at the panel on “Gender and Paid Domestic Labour,” at the IAFFE Annual Conference in Hangzhou, China, June 25, 2011.

11. The “household land contract responsibility system” made the shortage of land a contentious issue in rural life. A household of six or seven in most agricultural provinces can gain access to no more than a few mu of land (1 mu = 614.4 square meters). This is not enough for all the able-bodied members of the household to work on the land. Male farmers comprise the majority of those who leave for urban areas in search of employment, leaving women behind to work on the land.


13. National Bureau of Statistics of China (2007, 60, 63, 65); All China Women’s Federation and National Bureau of Statistics of China (2011). The decline of rural women’s income, compared to men’s in recent years, as this chapter argues, is one indication that inequality in the countryside is expanding as a result of the gender-based division of labor in agriculture.

14. Two documentary films provide details of the lives of women workers in these factories: China Blue (2005) and Mardi Gras: Made in China (2005).

15. For more on Foxconn, see Duncan and Jim (2012); Groel (2013); and Chakrabortty (2013), about Tian Yu, a woman worker at Foxconn who jumped off a building in protest.

16. Rural women are particularly vulnerable to “land grabs” as they are still expected by local customary regulations to give up their rights to land in their maternal home villages once they follow the Chinese tradition to marry out into their husbands’ villages (Sun 2013).

17. According to one estimate, there were 180,000 incidents of unrest in China in 2010, the majority of which were linked to land grabs (Freeman 2010). One struggle that captured the world’s attention was the Wukan village revolt against land development without villager consent (Jacobs 2011).

18. See the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation’s (2011) documentary, Waking the Green Tiger.

19. According to the most recent population census (2010), the majority Han Chinese comprised 1.23 billion of the total population of 1.34 billion. The balance of 0.11 billion is made up of fifty-five other ethnic minority groups, who live in most cases along the Chinese borders.


21. For details, see the documentary Waking the Green Tiger (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2011); and Pei Minxin (2010).

22. See Jacobs (2008) on two older women protesters in Beijing, and Jacobs (2011) and other news coverage on protests against land grabs in China.
23. Labor camps in China were first established in the 1950s as “reform through labor” or “reeducation through labor” camps, to incarcerate people who disagreed with the views of the Chinese Communist Party during the “anti-rightest” movement. Since then they have been used by local police to detain/imprison people without trial. Since the late 1990s, the UN and human rights groups have called for the Chinese government to reform the labor camp system by providing the people detained with rights to counsel and due process. There has been no noticeable improvement.


25. See the Women’s Voice at www.genderwatch.cn.

26. For further details, see Zhang (2012).

27. See the IPU Web site at http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif-arc.htm (accessed August 16, 2013). This suggests that while many countries have improved on women’s representation in political decision making, China has barely maintained the same level or has declined.

References


Chapter 23

Gendered Citizenship in the Postcolony

The Challenge for Transnational Feminist Politics

Maitrayee Mukhopadhyay

Prologue

“No brother, there are only two jatis1—women and men.”—Noor, woman litigant, to her lawyer.

(Mukhopadhyay 1998, 72)

In the early 1990s, Noor, a resident of Calcutta, India, registered an appeal in the lower court that her estranged husband maintain her according to her right by law. Her husband’s elder sons by his first marriage had evicted her from the marital home, a move that he felt powerless to prevent. Noor was homeless and had no means of support. Her lawyer instructed her to report to the police station that her husband had beaten her so as to strengthen her case in court, which she refused, because Allah (God) was her witness and she could not lie. Her husband had neglected her and not protected her from his sons, but he had not beaten her. Her lawyer then harangued her, in my presence, that she should never have married a Muslim (this was Noor’s second marriage). He argued that it would have been far better to have married a Hindu who could not so easily divorce her (referring to the oft-repeated stereotype that Muslim marriages could be easily dissolved by the man pronouncing “talaq” [“I divorce you”] three times). Noor replied that she had been afraid to marry a Hindu because her community would have ostracized her. Hearing this, the lawyer expansively claimed that all “jatis” were the same, we were all Indians. Having heard him out patiently, Noor made the above statement.

(Mukhopadhyay 1998)
In summing up her experience, Noor recognized the unequal status of women compared to men and of wives compared to husbands, in their relationships with the state and society. Her experience in many ways encapsulates that of women across the world, even in “modern” Western societies. What is particular to Noor and many other women living in the postcolony, however, is that her relationship to the state as a citizen is mediated through multiple identities shaped by administrative discourses of rulers, both colonial and postcolonial, a phenomenon that is illegible in mainstream state theory, in the political sciences, and indeed in contemporary discourses on governance popularized by global development institutions. Noor is not just a “woman,” but a member of a minority community—a woman with a Muslim identity in India during the 1990s, when Islam was being actively reshaped into a retrogressive “tradition” that oppresses women.

For those of us studying the phenomenon at the time, this was reminiscent of the colonial discourses that had shaped identities on the Indian subcontinent and provided the rationale for the “progressive” forces of colonialism. A central justification of British colonial rule was the “degenerate” and “barbaric” social customs of the Indian people, sanctioned, as colonial rulers believed, by their religious traditions. And nowhere was this more evident than in the ways in which tradition, derived from religion, treated women. Colonialism was therefore seen as performing a “civilizing mission” (Chatterjee 1989, 622; Mani 1989, 120). In the 1990s there were thus parallels with the colonial era. A similar equation existed between the law and religious identity. But this time the “civilizing mission” was being conducted by the Hindu majority, lamenting the fate of Muslim women, who were viewed as being oppressed by their religious tradition (Mukhopadhyay 1998).

**Transnational Feminisms: The Heritage and the Present**

In the 1990s feminisms and transnational women’s movements became a global phenomenon in ways that they had not been in earlier decades. Whereas feminist activism for equal rights and citizenship had featured prominently in national and local struggles, its emergence as a global phenomenon was definable in the 1990s. What was also evident was that national and local struggles for women’s equal citizenship, while sharing some of the universal claims of feminism, were largely being articulated and represented globally by activists from the global South. These shifts were enabled by numerous events taking place globally, regionally, and nationally. An important prompt was the United Nations World Conferences of the 1990s on various development themes that were critically important for women, where women’s rights advocates articulated a distinctive voice, quite different from that of previous decades. These global conferences provided both the space and the opportunity for organizing, taking action, and influencing the politics of development.
The achievements of this period are evident today. Feminists have a presence in global and national development institutions; feminist knowledge has been deployed in critiquing mainstream development, while at the same time contributing to gender-just alternatives; and women are organized at regional and global levels to monitor the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), act against violence, and advocate for reproductive and sexual rights (among other global women’s rights agendas).

Although the 1990s witnessed the emergence of feminisms and women’s movements as a global phenomenon, the intellectual and political foundations for this had been laid in earlier decades. Numerous shifts had been occurring in global academia since the 1970s. Postcolonial writers and scholars had begun to question truisms about society, peoples, and histories of the hitherto colonized world that had dominated knowledge production and academic disciplines. This was also reflected in the work of feminist movements and academia, with the assertion of difference and critiques of universalism and global sisterhood.

The origins of transnational feminisms can be traced to the intellectual movements of the 1970s and 1980s, in both feminist knowledge production and its political practice. Rejecting the term “international” on the grounds that it denoted all women’s struggles for “equal rights” against oppression as having similar origins and therefore solutions, “transnationalism” signified the recognition of differences in the histories and contexts of women around the world; their colonial pasts; and their race, ethnic, class, and caste markers. Transnational feminisms demonstrated that the nonrecognition of these differences is a political act and leads to domination by those who are in a position to appropriate and codify “scholarship” and “knowledge” about women in the Third World by using particular analytical categories that take as their primary point of reference feminist interests as they have been articulated in the United States and Western Europe (or indeed the interests of intellectual, middle-class elites in the Third World who take their lives as the reference point in describing the Other in their societies—the poor, rural woman).

In her now classic work, “Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses” (1988), Mohanty pointed to the remarkably similar effects of various analytical categories and strategies that codify the relationship of the West to the Other in implicitly hierarchical terms. In so doing, the material and historical heterogeneities of the lives of women in the Third World are colonized, producing/representing a composite, singular “Third World woman”—an image that appears arbitrarily constructed but nevertheless carries with it the authorizing signature of Western humanist discourse. For example, an analysis of “sexual difference” in the form of a cross-culturally singular, monolithic notion of patriarchy or male dominance leads to the construction of a similarly reductive and homogeneous notion of the “Third World difference”: “that stable, ahistorical something that apparently oppresses most if not all the women in these countries” (Mohanty 1988, 63). It is in the production of this “Third World difference” that Western feminisms appropriate and colonize the constitutive complexities that characterize the lives of women in these countries.
Similarly, in the field of international development, transnational feminist scholarship revealed the tensions between First and Third World women over how the problem of women and development was to be conceptualized. This was evident from the early days of “women in development” (WID) advocacy. A common feature of dissent from WID was the insistence by Third World feminists that the subordination of women could not be divorced from an analysis of the political and economic structures within which women were located (Kabeer 1994). For example, the Committee on the Status of Women set up by the government of India in 1972 (to prepare the report for the First World Conference on Women, held in Mexico), while agreeing with WID scholars in the North that women had been marginalized in the development process, differed nevertheless in its analysis of the reasons for this marginalization. The committee’s report, *Towards Equality* (1974), showed that this marginalization was not due just to faulty planning, but also to the structural inequalities within the development process itself, which needed to be addressed at a global and national level. Beneria and Sen, critiquing Boserup’s work, observed that in the light of these broader processes of inequality, Boserup’s recipe for reversing the declining status of women by better education and training was akin to “treating cancer with [a] band aid” (Beneria and Sen 1981, 287).

Challenges to global sisterhood came from Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN) and Association of African Women for Research and Development (AAWORD). According to DAWN, many Third World women were caught between their reluctance to separate the struggle against women’s subordination from the struggles against poverty, apartheid, and neocolonialism, on the one hand, and their unwillingness to compromise the struggle against women’s subordination or to postpone it, on the other. Given the very different positioning of Third World women within the intersecting structures of oppression, the ideas of global sisterhood defined by First World women or of integration into development processes initiated by First World donors or the elite classes in their own countries were seen as deeply uninviting prospects (Kabeer 1994). Similarly, AAWORD pointed out that whereas patriarchal views and structures oppress women all over the world, women are also members of countries and classes that dominate others and enjoy privileges.

WID scholarship, writes Kabeer, rarely acknowledged that the distortions brought about by colonial penetration in the global distribution of privilege and resources also extended to the unequal terms on which First and Third World women entered into the development policy domain, whether as researchers, advocates, or practitioners.

Friedman (1999) attributes the development of a transnational women’s movement to the UN world women’s conferences, in particular the two held in Nairobi (1985) and Beijing (1995). Alvarez (2000), however, shows that international activism (and what came to be referred to as cross-border and transnational organizing) had characterized first- and second-wave feminisms in Latin America and most other world regions since the 1980s. In particular, the Latin American and Caribbean “feminist encuentros” (region-wide feminist meetings, literally “encounters”) in the 1980s and 1990s helped to forge a self-consciously regional feminist political identity, which was assertively distinct from that of North America and Europe.
Thus while the 1990s witnessed the ascendance of a new form of international activism among growing numbers of feminists—one targeting intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and international policy arenas and thereby hoping to gain global leverage in pressuring for changes in gender policy on the home front—in the case of Latin America, the particularities of the regional and national political contexts in which feminisms unfolded also impelled local movement actors to build transborder connections from the bottom up. The “logics” of the two forms of organizing, one through the encuentros and the other through participation in international fora targeting IGOs, were different. Alvarez (2000) argues that an internationalist identity-solidarity logic prevailed in the “encuentro-like” intraregional feminist activism of the 1980s and 1990s, whereas a transnational IGO-advocacy logic came to predominate in the regional feminist organizing around the UN World Conferences of the 1990s, held in Rio de Janeiro, Vienna, Cairo, Copenhagen, and Beijing.

The conferences of the 1990s and the impetus they provided for transnational feminist organizing are most often referred to in a celebratory mode. In introducing the concept of “transnationalism reversed” to refer to the impact nationally and locally of this form of organizing, Friedman calls attention to the ambivalent gains and in some instances deleterious consequences of these processes. Both Friedman and Alvarez show that the impact has been mixed and can have distinct political consequences for activist discourses and practices and intramovement power relations on the home front. However, the different forms of organizing with their different logics—encuentros and around the IGOs—have had differential impacts on promoting desired policy changes and on feminist politics. Alvarez explains that whereas the interplay of these two transnational activist logics has brought certain benefits to local movements, the predominance of IGO-advocacy activities among growing sectors of Latin American feminist movements since the 1990s has had more ambiguous and sometimes contradictory local consequences.

Almost two decades since the landmark conferences of the 1990s, in which women’s constituencies played a key role, and a decade and half since Friedman and Alvarez wrote about transnationalism reversed, the term has been used in several ways to critique what happens when advocacy for women’s rights and citizenship becomes global, is taken up by international institutions and donors, and forms part of the agenda for the global governance of gender (Chowdhury 2011; Mukhopadhyay 2014; Nesiah 2012). As Halley (2006) points out, there has been an “incremental but now quite noticeable installation of feminists and feminist ideas in actual legal-institutional power,” which she refers to as “governance feminism” (2006, 340). Prügl rephrases this as the “governmentalization of feminist knowledge”; “that is, feminist knowledge has been adapted so that it becomes available for the government of conduct” (Prügl 2011, 72).

This chapter argues that the successful installation of feminist knowledge and ideas in policymaking institutions is reversing the basic tenets of transnational feminisms, which sought to decompose the production of the Third World woman. There is increasing homogenization of the histories, needs, and interests of the vastly different experiences of women around the world and the construction of the implicitly consensual
priority issues around which all women are apparently expected to organize. Nowhere is this more evident than in the field of women’s rights and citizenship. With the power to define women’s needs and interests increasingly shifting to global policy arenas, there is both derecognition of the local and context-specific struggles for women’s rights and erasure of the structural and redistributional issues that lead to the denial of rights. This calls into question whether women like Noor are served by the universal definitions of and strategies for inclusive citizenship sponsored by global institutions. Is there a feminist politics beyond developmentalism? Have we “governmentalized” feminism?

This is not to suggest that all feminist activism today is governance feminism (Prügl 2011). There is a diversity in feminist movements and resistance in different social locations. Further, there is also what Alvarez (2009) described as a phenomenon that grew throughout the 1990s and in the first decade of the millennium, the “hybrid identities” of many feminist NGOs in most regions, which despite the NGO-ization of the organization and content they addressed (policy issues and IGO-advocacy), nevertheless remained committed to their feminist roots. I agree with Alvarez, who suggests that feminism in many countries in the region today has not only been “mainstreamed” so that it extends vertically across different levels of government and engages with a variety of national and international policy arenas, but has also been “side-streamed”—spreading horizontally into a wide array of class, caste, and racial-ethnic communities and social and cultural spaces, including parallel social movements. By producing feminist knowledges, disseminating feminist discourses and serving as nodal points for networks on specific subjects, feminists in NGOs have helped to link diverse and dispersed feminist actors. Therefore, when asking whether there is a feminist politics beyond developmentalism and if we have “governmentalized” feminism, I do so reflexively, as an “insider” and “outsider,” interrogating governance feminism today and what Alvarez has termed IGO advocacy transnational feminist organizing.

This chapter has four main sections. The first section traces the rise of the citizenship discourse in development studies, aid policies, and development practice, with the aim of analyzing how changes in development priorities have shaped and configured citizenship and emptied it of political content. The second part interrogates current understandings of citizenship in the postcolony and elsewhere. It explores how the meaning and practice of citizenship as equal rights irrespective of race, ethnicity, class, caste, or religion has been overtaken by “governmentalities” that have resulted in not one rights-bearing citizen but several population groups, differentiated according to their vulnerability and targeted by government. The third part explores the specific historical processes that have shaped state-society relations in much of the Third World and locates gendered citizenship in the postcolony. The fourth part cites two case studies of transnationalism reversed and shows how there is both derecognition of the local and context-specific struggles around women’s rights and erasure of the structural and redistributional issues that lead to the denial of rights. The conclusion calls for a new basis for solidarity, other than the successful insertion of “gender” in existing international frameworks and through a re-energized feminist politics of recognition and redistribution.
Citizenship as a concept and practice began to interest the international development community in the 1990s, in the wake of the international rights movements and the “good governance” agenda. A link was made between the main development agenda, poverty alleviation, and the importance of poor people having rights, access to institutions, and a voice in decisions affecting their lives (Mukhopadhyay and Meer 2004). Citizenship in development theorizing and policymaking shifted its meaning from that of a legal conception of rights and formal citizenship to a form of personhood that links rights to agency.

The advent of citizenship in the development discourse is attributed by researchers and commentators to several shifts in development practice that occurred in the 1990s. Among these was a shift in the meaning of the concept of peoples’ “participation,” from participating at the level of community projects to an understanding of citizens having influence over wider decision-making processes and the right to political participation (Cornwall 2000; Gaventa 2002). O’Brien and colleagues (2000) suggest that the shift was the result of the pressures generated by global movements for social justice, demanding rights and a say in determining the future of international development. The convergence of the human development and human rights communities in the common purpose of expanding freedom, wellbeing, and human dignity for all (Sen 1999; UNDP 2000) was seen as contributing to the discourse on rights. The construction of the subject of rights, “the citizen,” evolved through related discussions on rights-based approaches to development, poverty, and social exclusion.

By far the most influential shift in the development discourse in the 1990s was the “good governance” agenda promoted by the international development institutions. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s international development institutions and their policies profoundly affected the role and responsibility of the state in developing countries, and they continue to do so in the new millennium. In turn, this has had an impact on state-society relations and the development of citizenship. In the 1980s the international policy agenda, led by the neoliberal framework of the main international financial institutions (i.e., the World Bank and International Monetary Fund), downsized the state and eroded its powers. In the 1990s the state was brought back in as the institution that bore the main responsibility for governance.

The first phase of the “good governance” agenda sought to build a technocratic state that would be an efficient and honest manager (Nunnenkamp 1995). Subsequently, however, there was growing interest in reforming the political state and fashioning liberal democracies. Despite the realization that entrenching democracy and enhancing the role of the state in safeguarding citizens’ rights required rebuilding the political relationship
between the state and society, the formula for democratic reform concentrated on the institutional design of the state. It involved reform of electoral, legal, and administrative systems, and decentralization and devolution of government. Development discourses, backed by the power of financing, projects and knowledge production, constructed the idea of a state without politics and proposed a generic model of a citizen unmarked by social relations. A plethora of new sites for “citizen participation” were opened up at the insistence of donors: from consultation exercises around the formulation of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (World Bank–driven macroeconomic frameworks for highly indebted countries) to decentralized government—sites where state-society relations were expected to be built.

A considerable volume of research, action, and funding has gone into constructing the “citizen” in the global South; the voice of the poor; and state accountability (albeit a technocratic state) that could deliver on health, education, and related welfare measures, most often as a regulator. In the post-Beijing era, feminists in international development institutions and in international and national NGOs struggled to insert gender analysis into rights and governance frameworks. Consultancies to produce manuals, checklists, and tools proliferated. States that were recipients of donor funding had to undergo mandatory gender training and show willingness to mainstream gender issues in policies and programs. Increasing the number of women in national parliaments and local government councils was one of the important strategies for building inclusive citizenship. Aligning national legal frameworks to international human rights standards and to CEDAW was also de rigueur.

In the new millennium and as a response to what had increasingly become the technocratic exercise of gender mainstreaming, feminists articulated the notion of gender justice. In defining gender justice and linking it to debates on citizenship, entitlements, rights, and law and development, Goetz (2007) raised a number of dilemmas for feminist politics. Discussions of gender justice have many different starting points: political philosophy discussions of human agency, autonomy, rights, and capabilities; political science discussions involving democratization, citizenship, and constitutionalism; and discussions in the field of law about judicial reform and practical matters of access to justice. Among these discussions, similar unresolved dilemmas persist: Can absolute and universal standards be set for determining what is right or good in human social relations? How should the rights of the individual be offset against the needs of the family, the community, the ethnic “nation,” or the territorial state? What is the appropriate role for the state and the international community in promoting social welfare and human equality?

While these dilemmas persist in feminist politics, the adoption of feminist demands for gender justice, equal citizenship, and rights as global agendas has tended to reduce them to unitary programmatic solutions. This has had consequences for transnational feminisms organizing around global rights agendas that increasingly find themselves out of step with the messy politics of feminist resistance in different contexts. There is a growing disjuncture between the authoritative mantra of “voice,” “influence,” and accountability that reverberates in citizenship discourses promoted by international agencies
and feminist experiences on the ground. In a recent study of feminist voice and influence, “Voicing Demands: Feminist Activism in Transitional Contexts” (Nazneen and Sultan 2014), authors from South Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa show that the positive linear connection of voice to influence is questionable and expose the contingent, contextual, and often compromised experience of voice in feminist activism.

Citizenship in the Postcolony and Elsewhere in the Twenty-first Century

Citizenship studies have been largely the preserve of political science and philosophy, which explored state-society relations in primarily Western liberal democracies. It is therefore not surprising that most of what we know about “citizenship” is based on these experiences. They have become the standard by which citizenship in the global South is being reimagined by the global development, governance, and financial institutions, and indeed by nation-states and civil society, despite very different histories and contexts. Western provincialism is circulated as universal. In this meta-narrative the oppression of women, for example, is an aberration, a remnant of the premodern period, part of the religious or some other immutable tradition. This happens in the global South, and it is they who need to catch up. The prescribed cure is modernization and progress and the modern state, which is fully accountable for upholding the rights of the citizen.

These universals simply don’t lend themselves to understanding Noor’s status as a subject-citizen. Her identity is imbricated in notions of womanhood in a particular community, as well as a subject-citizen. As a subject of rights, she asserts both the universality of women’s subordination and the state’s responsibility toward her. This is the experience of citizenship in most of the world, where the co-presence of several times, or what Chatterjee (2004) refers to as “heterogeneous time,” is the lived experience of most citizens. It refers to the continuity between tradition and modernity in the way most people think and act, challenging the time-space dichotomy of the traditional versus the modern. Chatterjee claims that the idea of time as being premodern (read “traditional”) graduating to modern conveys a utopian homogeneous idea of time; the time of capital which connects past, present, and futures in a linear manner. For example, modern German coal miners, besides using the most advanced technology and being organized in strong labour unions, also celebrate St. Barbara as their patron saint, with an entire day devoted to church services annually. Noor declares her sense of belonging to a particularistic identity and community, being Muslim, while at the same time claiming her rights as a citizen of India.

The progress from the premodern period to modernity, presupposed in universalisms like the rights-bearing citizen-subject, democracy, and secularism, is the utopia that we all try to live up to; indeed, it is the function of international development to promote these concepts through research, policies, and programs. This obscures what
recent ethnography has revealed: that “premodern” customs, traditions, and practices in the present (in conflict with notions of the “modern”) are not remnants of an earlier, immutable past but are new products of encounters with “modernity” itself (Mani 1989; Mamdani 1996; Mukhopadhyay 1998; Chatterjee 2004).

The concept of citizenship holds out the promise of equal rights and a direct relationship between the legal subject of rights and the state. In legal-political theory, it implies that every person, irrespective of race, ethnicity, class, caste, or religion, is entitled to the same rights and treatment as any other person. This does not mean, however, that social and other distinctions between people in a society disappear: “Rather, the universalism of the theory of rights both presupposed and enabled a new ordering of power relations in society based precisely on those distinctions of class, race, religion, gender, etc.” (Chatterjee 2004).

Nevertheless the emancipatory promise of equal rights and citizenship has inspired struggles for equality and social justice over the last two centuries and continues to do so. At the heart of the concept of equal rights and citizenship lies the opposition between, on the one hand, equal rights without distinctions of race, ethnicity, class, culture, etc., and on the other, the particular demands of cultural identity, which calls for differentiated treatment of particular groups on the grounds of historical injustice or vulnerability, or other reasons. This opposition has been regulated through modes of governance that mitigate the conditions of population groups who because of their difference are not equal citizens.

This mode of governance, whereby groups in need of differentiated treatment are identified and become the target of governmental programs, has been around for some time. In Europe, Enlightenment ideas of free will and individual conscience fuelled the struggle for equality and citizenship in the eighteenth century. But the masses of people remained unfree until the Industrial Revolution, which released them from bondage and subordination to ascribed relations. However, they were not “citizens,” since the gap between the masses and the propertied classes persisted and in some cases widened. Kabeer (2002), echoing Marshall (1950), suggests that citizenship was made more inclusive through state provision of social welfare measures. These measures reduced the differences within the population, lessened dependence on patron-client relations, built recognition for the identity and status of workers, and expanded voice and freedoms for the majority (Marshall 1950; Kabeer 2002).

Chatterjee (2004) disagrees with Marshall’s claim that these measures helped to build sovereignty and equal citizenship. He argues that whereas the social welfare measures alleviated the living conditions of population groups such as workers, the poor, and the extremely vulnerable, they did not eliminate class inequalities in ways that would guarantee equal rights. What these measures did, in fact, was to proliferate governmentalities, leading to the emergence of an intricate “heterogeneous social.” So there was not one rights-bearing citizen but several population groups, differentiated according to their vulnerability, who became the targets of government.

With the emergence of mass democracies in the last fifty years, new challenges and new problems of governance have arisen. The increasing differentiation among citizens
and the imperative that government must serve all is one such challenge, necessitating an array of policies to benefit different groups rather than one that might have sufficed in earlier eras. In addressing these new challenges, various governmental technologies have arisen to classify and categorize those needing services. Population groups thus get classified and divided on the basis of being target groups for basic governmental services.

In developing the concept of “governmentality,” Foucault (1991) sought to draw attention to a certain way of thinking and acting embodied in all those attempts to know and govern the wealth, health, and happiness of populations (Rose and Miller 1992, 173–205). Governmentality refers to the act of governing to produce the citizen best suited to fulfill its policies and to the organized practices through which subjects are governed. The implication is that governance in the modern era is not only about using coercive power to dominate citizens, but a rational exercise of power that tends to make the fullest use of knowledges capable of the maximum instrumental efficacy (Gordon 1991). New forms of political rationality represent the reality that has to be governed, making it possible to deliberate on it and to construct the means through which it will be addressed, managed, and changed. Simultaneously, governmentality also transforms subjective realities and desires, making it possible for individuals and groups, citizens and subjects to participate in the projects of power, and to reimagine themselves in the light of the political rationalities that have represented their realities.

In international development, an array of governmentalities differentiates among groups, categorizes populations, and produces knowledge and expertise on how to address them. In this sense, development interventions are about the differential treatment of groups because they are poor, women, ethnic minorities, or some other group classified by development institutions as being vulnerable and in need of assistance. That this mode of governing does not promote equal citizenship has been discussed, and perhaps it is not the intention of global development agendas.

Feminists and Gendered Citizenship in the Postcolony

Feminists have long critiqued the liberal conceptions of citizenship and equal rights on the grounds that these do not accommodate the reality of social relations and difference. While acknowledging that liberal conceptions of universal rights—that a person is entitled to the same rights and treatment irrespective of gender, race, ethnicity, class, and caste—have profound emancipatory potential because one’s identity and entitlement are not tied to ascribed relations, they have nevertheless limited rights to formal guarantees. Rights in the liberal framework are conferred on the human subject unmarked by gender, class, caste, race, ethnic, or community status. Legal personhood is based on this human core, and the law is then seen to be a neutral instrument that confers
rights conferred on this essence (Mukhopadhyay 1998). The citizen thus created, who is the bearer of rights and can act politically to secure more entitlements, is considered to be neutral (i.e., sexless, classless, etc.). While seemingly neutral in that they are conferred on the undifferentiated human subject, rights are in reality standards built with elite males as the norm in a given society. This is manifested in the substance of laws and policies and in their interpretation and implementation.

In the last three decades feminist critiques of universal rights and citizenship have been immensely influential and have fueled transnational feminist organizing on rights. This has led to changes in human rights policies and discourses in the international arena and to laws in the national arena. While changes in the formal laws have been secured, there has been little progress in making these rights real on the ground (Molyneux and Razavi 2002).

However, these critiques insufficiently explain why women in much of Africa, South Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa must relate to the state in terms of their relationships with men, families, and communities (as opposed to being the individual subjects of rights). It does not quite explain why customary and personal laws exist side by side with civil law and are more authoritative and binding in regulating gender relations within the family and community. Most explanations by international and national gender experts (some of whom are self-declared feminists) resort to oft-repeated “culture, tradition, and backwardness” arguments or blame state agencies for not implementing equality clauses in national constitutions and equal rights legislation.

Charrad (2007) locates the problem of differential and unequal citizenship for women and men in the present-day articulation of state-society relations in the Middle East and North Africa, in relations based on particularistic and ascribed identities of religion and kin-based formations. Mukhopadhyay (2007) similarly alludes to the historical processes through which the relationship between the colonial state and the individual was in reality a relationship between the state and groupings representing particularistic identities, a relationship that has been difficult to reverse in the postcolony. This set limits to what the state could intervene in to reform women’s position. These processes have also influenced how women’s rights are framed and fought for in different contexts.

As mentioned in the “Prologue,” what is particular to Noor and many other women living in the postcolony is that their relationship to the state as citizens is mediated through multiple identities shaped by administrative discourses of rulers, both colonial and postcolonial, a phenomenon that is illegible in mainstream state theory, in the political sciences, and indeed in contemporary discourses on governance popularized by global development institutions.

These scripts, shaped by administrative discourses of rulers, both colonial and postcolonial, have profoundly affected citizenship in the present. Despite the protracted anti-imperialist struggles that led to the formation of nation-states in Asia and Africa and the incorporation of all the trappings of modernity in the new states, identities based on religious affiliation, tribe, and ethnicity continue to persist and form the basis of state-society relations. The nation-states that emerged from colonialism in South Asia and in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa were unable to undo the legacy of state-society
relations produced through years of the colonial enterprise. This mode of relating to the state had made ascribed relations the basis of identity and relationship with the state. Colonial statecraft involved building a centralized authority (the colonial state) by replacing the heterogeneous and fluid social and political arrangements through which relationships within and between diverse communities had been managed. This was done by codifying the practices of the diverse communities and in effect setting up separate “bounded” communities based on ascribed relations (caste, ethnicity, and religious community), each governed by its own customs and traditions.

Gender relations and women’s entitlements were key in defining the identity of these bounded communities. One of the ways in which the delineation of these “bounded communities” was achieved was through the construction of personal law and customary law to govern private relations in the family (Mamdani 1996; Mukhopadhyay 1998). For the Indian subcontinent, this meant the “discovery” of religious and scriptural tradition as the basis of morality and customary obligations, which was then turned into “law.” In Africa, a dual legal system—a European system governing relations among the colonizers and a subordinated and regulated version of indigenous law for the colonized—was instituted (Mamdani 1996). This had two kinds of effects. First, gender relations and women’s position became emblematic of the authentic tradition of particular groups, giving meaning to specific forms of ethnicity, caste, and religious community belongingness. Second, the collaboration between indigenous male elites and colonial officers in the process of codifying custom and practice resulted in male elite interests being codified into law and reducing women to legal minors and dependents of men (Currie 1994; Mukhopadhyay 1998). No matter how constructed these norms were, in contemporary societies these norms, rules, and laws constitute the lived reality and identity.

This particular mode of state-society relations, wherein ascribed relations become the basis of identity and relationship with the state, has profound implications for women’s citizenship. Women’s rights cannot be discussed, claimed, or fought for separately from those of the “bounded” community.

The challenge for transnational feminist politics is to recognize these historical processes through which gendered citizenship in the postcolony have been shaped. Otherwise, advocacy for women’s citizenship rights can and does run into the quicksand of debates about the rights of a particular “bounded” community vis à vis the state.

**Transnational Feminism Reversed**

This chapter began with the tenet that despite the many successes of transnational feminist organizing, and perhaps because of the successful installation of feminist knowledge in global policy arenas, the basic tenets of transnational feminisms are in reversal. The power to define women’s needs and interests is increasingly shifting to global policy arenas, and there is both derecognition of the local and context-specific struggles around
women's rights and erasure of the structural and redistributational issues that lead to the
denial of rights.

Two recent studies reveal the processes through which powerful global narratives
about women's rights and citizenship hegemonize and thereby erase context-specific
struggles and with them the structural and redistributational issues that have led to denial
of rights.

In *Transnationalism Reversed: Women Organizing against Gendered Violence in
Bangladesh*, Chowdhury (2011) uncovers the genealogy of the movements against
anti-acid violence in Bangladesh led by the NGO Naripokkho in the 1990s, which
mobilized both national and international attention to the issue. The study begins with
a ceremony in New York to honor the work of a Western television journalist who had
received an award for “discovering” this form of violence. The ceremony presented two
women who were survivors of acid violence and had been aided by international insti-
tutions and philanthropists to undergo reconstructive surgery in the United States.
They were presented as the trophies of successful international efforts to rescue vic-
tims of acid violence. In the process, the struggles that had been waged by Naripokkho
at the national and international levels, the struggles over discourse (the deliberate
naming of those affected as “survivors” rather than “victims”), the struggles to put
government policy and programs in place to prevent and to treat women affected by
this and other forms of violence, and the founding of the Acid Survivors Foundation
were erased.

Chowdhury’s study deliberately focuses on the genealogy of the struggles against
acid violence, the role of Naripokkho, and the issue of gendered violence in the spe-
cific context of Bangladesh. This deliberate focus is juxtaposed with the other focus
of the story, which is the co-optation by certain local and international institutions,
resulting in the rewriting of the complex genealogy that led to the public recognition
of acid violence as an issue. Chowdhury is concerned not just with the erasure of local
activists’ efforts in global initiatives to fight gender violence, but also with the domi-
nant narratives of global feminism that only enable certain, partial stories to be told.
The dominant narrative she discusses is that of human rights being brought to Third
World victim women by international agencies and governments that rescue them
from the tyrannies of Third World states, tradition, and culture. She charts the dis-

tinct and evolving narratives of multiple actors’ entry into and engagement with the
campaign and a critique of the very frameworks that make stories like that of acid vio-

lence intelligible to a global audience. Thus the study does not celebrate local wom-

en’s activists struggles, but rather illuminates the challenges of transnational feminist
organizing.

Vasuki Nesiah (2012) analyzes the impact of UN Security Council Resolution 1325
and international conflict feminism in Sri Lanka in “Uncomfortable Alliances: Women,
Peace and Security in Sri Lanka.” A fact-finding initiative by a network of multi-ethnic
women’s groups in Sri Lanka in 2002 (just as the Norwegian government’s brokered
peace process was gaining momentum) had drawn attention to women’s experience
of the war and priorities for peace. Its report led to the formation of the all-woman
Sub-Committee of Gender to explore the effective inclusion of gender concerns in the peace process. This mechanism was probably the first of its kind established within a formal peace process, and the report of the subcommittee, which was inserted into the official process, was heralded as a success story for UN Security Council Resolution 1325. Initiatives like the fact-finding mission were not unique in the Sri Lankan women’s movement, which has had a long history of analyzing the ethnic conflict. However, after Resolution 1325 was passed, these initiatives became assimilated into a global narrative about women, peace, and security.

Nesiah’s article focuses on international conflict feminism in Sri Lanka rather than on Sri Lankan feminisms. It shows how the assimilation of national feminist initiatives into the global framework of the resolution created a dynamic whereby the global shapes the legibility of the local and the local makes itself legible through the frameworks of international conflict feminism and Resolution 1325; the political economy and the discursive capital of this assimilation thus has implications for national women’s movements seeking international recognition, funding, and collaboration.

International conflict feminism is part of the international corpus of conflict resolution engagement. It produces a conflict zone in order to intervene in it. A conflict zone is imaged as an ahistorical, irrational arena saturated by violence and the failure of modern institutions so that it now requires international intervention to restore order. Thus countries as diverse as Sri Lanka, Central African Republic, and Colombia become recognizable through the lexicon of violence. International engagement introduces similar recipes for ending violence couched in the language of peace and security. Within this broad recipe are political choices that seemingly appear as common sense but are in reality globally hegemonic: liberal governance and neoliberal economies. In this process, the structural causes and the context-specific politics of redistribution and recognition fall by the wayside.

International conflict feminism similarly normalizes globally hegemonic political choices in the name of women affected by conflict. The framing of feminist agendas in Sri Lanka in terms of Resolution 1325 was an example of this. Women’s physical insecurity necessitated the promotion of liberal governance to restore security and order. In Sri Lanka, as anywhere else in the world, conflict feminism initiatives were of two kinds: good governance and the promotion of reconciliation. Within the good governance agenda, conflict feminism’s invocation of 1325 is limited to three strands: rule of law advocacy, inclusion policies, and civil society promotion. The rule of law initiatives adhered to donor agendas for political and economic reform. For example, the regularization of the regime for private property rights became a 1325 issue because it privileged land titles for women. The domain of political inclusion was narrowed down to that of elections and the establishment of a regulatory order to guarantee security in property and contract. Resolution 1325 promoted an arithmetical approach to gender distribution in which increasing the representation of women was the sole objective. It treated women as a homogenous group. Its implementation was therefore not attentive to how ethnicity, class, or other social fissures shape reality. Civil society promotion privileged and funded NGOs that had considerable political capital and
were better positioned to navigate internationalized political discourses, practices, and institutions.

The field of reconciliation is diverse, and Nesiah focuses on those strands that were primarily targeted in Sri Lanka: women's dual realities as agents of peace and victims of war. In regarding women as agents of peace, international conflict feminism essentializes women’s role as almost “natural.” Although heavily critiqued, this mode of understanding women’s role was given a new lease on life by Resolution 1325. Nesiah shows that Resolution 1325 inspired peace activity by feminist groups in Sri Lanka focused on bringing together women from the north and south of the country and enabling inter-ethnic interactions. The primary problem addressed by these initiatives was building understanding and intercommunity rapport rather than the larger structural issues, thereby deflecting attention from the political and socioeconomic issues that had given rise to the conflict in the first place.

Nesiah contrasts these initiatives by international conflict feminisms to the “motherhood” movements of the late 1980s and early 1990s, cross-class social movements that thousands of women across ethnic lines had identified with and that brought the government to its knees and led to the defeat of President Jayawardene. No similar mass movements have been inspired by the international instruments. Nesiah attributes the changes of national feminist priorities to their assimilation into the international conflict feminisms and Resolution 1325 implementation, a move that has ensured funding, visibility, and international support. This reality has pressured national women’s groups to negotiate their interventions in ways that produce, enable, and constrain their own priorities, and to concede to global agendas that determine which projects are viable.

**Conclusion: Negotiating Citizenship in an Era of Governmentality and Neoliberal Globalization**

Both Chowdhury and Nesiah relate a cautionary tale for transnational feminisms. Making context-specific struggles legible to global institutions is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, identification with and participation in transnational feminist movements for women’s rights gives visibility to local concerns in international policy arenas. On the other hand, the power of international governmentalities ensures that these concerns can only be read in the light of global agendas. These hegemonize liberal governance and neoliberal economics. Liberal rights for women and gender inclusion are fundamental to these agendas insofar as these rights release the subject “woman” from her tradition-bound role and make her free to participate in the neoliberal economy. Addressing the structural causes of gendered citizenship in the postcolony does not feature in this agenda. The socioeconomic and political changes necessary to end poverty, enable distribution, and ensure security are also not part of this agenda.
Harcourt (2006) has pointed to the problematic nature of feminist engagement in international policy arenas. Whereas distinct periods of feminist activism from 1990 to 2000 made the gender and development discourse acceptable to global development institutions, inevitably the process simplified and codified the vastly different experiences of women around the world. Through the UN official texts, background reports, statistics, and evidence, these experiences became the generic gendered female body: the poor woman with an expertly understood set of needs and rights. It created a colonized poor and marginalized woman who needed to be managed, educated, trained for work and local decision making, and controlled sexually and reproductively through a series of development processes designed for “women’s empowerment.” Gender was made governable through the organized practices of transnational, global, and national development authorities.

There is no going back from where transnational feminisms have got to, but there is a need for finding new bases for solidarity other than the successful insertion of “gender” in existing international frameworks. A new and not new basis has to be the reenergized and combined politics of recognition and redistribution that can create solidarities with other social and political movements (Fraser 2012). The need to bring redistribution and the political economy back into the discussion of citizenship and rights is fundamental to resisting the litany of culture, tradition, and Third World state irresponsibility as a cause of gendered citizenship in the postcolony.

Notes

1. Jati refers to a Hindu caste or distinctive social group, a special feature of which is the exclusive occupation of its members. The term jati or caste has a variety of meanings, but they are always related to the classifications especially of social groups.
3. These universals refer to familiar concepts of social theory. Citizenship is a formal and legal identity, implying rights and obligations by virtue of a person having been born into a specific nation-state. Rights are conferred on the human subject who does not have a gender, class, caste, race, or ethnicity. The state is a just arbiter conferring and adjudicating rights and releasing the citizen from the bondage of ascribed social relations, from having to make claims based on norms, charity, benevolence, or patronage. The state is the formal structure of constitutions and laws, and all society is civil society; everyone is a citizen with equal rights and therefore to be regarded as part of civil society.

References


SECTION 7

MILITARISM AND RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISMS
This section comprises three chapters that explore feminist perspectives on militarism and religious fundamentalisms. Maryam Khalid interrogates the gendered assumptions and effects of militarism and war, and the United States’ deployment of gender, Orientalism, and race during the administration of President George W. Bush to justify the “wars on terror” in Afghanistan and Iraq. Mariz Tadros explores the changing dynamics of feminist movements’ engagement with religion, and the West’s post-9/11 instrumentalization of religion to advance its global security and strategic agendas. And Seema Kazi examines the gender dimensions of the “wars on terror” and “wars of terror” in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Sri Lanka.

Maryam Khalid’s chapter, “Feminist Perspectives on Militarism and War: Critiques, Contradictions and Collusions” explores “empiricist,” “standpoint,” and “poststructuralist” feminist approaches to unmasking militarism (viewed as an ideology that includes the military complex, security, war, and other state-led military interventions; indirect interventions, such as the proxy wars of the Cold War era; and international violence, terrorism, and so on). She argues that feminist perspectives illuminate that militarism is constructed through gendered assumptions about “men,” “women,” “masculinity,” and “femininity”; the privileging of “masculinity” over “femininity”; and the promotion of “military values,” such as aggression, violence, and unquestioning loyalty. Militarism underpins the construction of the patriarchal state, the “national interest,” and the state’s engagement in international relations. It functions to “normalize a view of the world… as marked by war, violence, and aggression;” and it sanitizes and makes acceptable the violence of militarism (e.g., employing such euphemisms as “clean bombs,” “collateral damage,” and “peacekeeping missiles”). Feminist analyses also point to militarism’s gendered effects, both in the context of war (e.g., the differential impacts of war and armed conflict on men and women, women’s experience of rape and sexual torture) and its “all-embracing reach in societies in which [militarism] is a dominant paradigm.” Khalid makes the point that “the increasing number of women in the military has not led to a rejection of key assumptions or characteristics of masculine militarism. Rather, women’s roles in the military are still linked to the feminine and function to support the
masculinity of the state and its militarism.” Significantly, the chapter exposes the wars on terror discourse of the US administration of President George W. Bush with its invocation of “naturalized” binaries of gender, race, and Orientalism to justify the US-led post-9/11 military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, thus making them appear not just necessary but inevitable. Not only were feminist language and concerns co-opted in a discourse that “constructed other women as voiceless victims of a barbaric (Other, male) enemy,” but some American feminist organizations colluded with the administration. The binaries included West versus East/Arab/Muslim; self versus Other; us versus them; civilized versus barbaric; rational versus irrational; progressive versus backward/stagnant; democratic versus despotic; developed versus underdeveloped; Western masculinity as moral, rational, autonomous, competitive, “the liberator,” needs to bring progress to “them” versus Eastern masculinity as barbaric, irrational, threatening, dangerous, violent, aggressive, “the oppressor”; and Western femininity as liberated, nurturing, supportive, needs protection from “barbaric” men versus Eastern femininity as passive, victims, oppressed, voiceless, lacking agency, and needs rescuing.

**Mariz Tadros’s chapter, “From Secular Reductionism to Religious Essentialism: Implications for the Gender Agenda,”** examines the complex and changing dynamics of feminist engagement with religion. The chapter focuses on religious forces (including governments, sociopolitical movements, faith-based organizations, and transnational networks and coalitions) that “play an intrinsically political role, rather than [view] spirituality as a body of beliefs.” Tadros argues that “the West’s engagement with ‘the Muslim world’ after 9/11 represents a shift from being blind to religious forces (secular reductionism) to working through a narrow ‘religious prism’ in engaging with highly diverse social, political, and economic phenomena (‘religious essentialism’), that has had “a highly detrimental impact on women’s rights.” The chapter makes the point that the “post-9/11 context has been characterized by a two-pronged approach: fighting terrorism through national security approaches, and targeting Muslims and Muslim communities through sociocultural interventions. Tadros concurs with other contributors (e.g., Khalid, Kazi, and Etchart) that the debate between the American liberal feminists who condoned and supported the US-led military intervention in Afghanistan in response to the Taliban’s violations of women’s rights, and the radical feminists who condemned the intervention as a form of “cultural imperialism,” served to essentialize Afghan women. The chapter also explores the diverse platforms of feminist scholarship and activism in countering and engaging with religion. For example, in 2007 the Association for Women’s Rights in Development (AWID) conducted a survey of 1,600 women’s rights activists from 160 countries, 80% of whom responded that religious fundamentalisms have had a negative impact on women’s rights in the areas of health and reproductive rights; sexual rights and freedoms; family laws; and economic rights; and women’s participation in the public sphere; and have resulted in a general reduction in women’s autonomy and an increase in violence against women.

**Seema Kazi’s chapter, “South Asia’s Gendered ‘wars on terror’”** leads directly from Khalid’s and Tadros’s discussions of militarism, religious fundamentalisms, and the “wars on terror.” Kazi defines “terror,” following Richard Falk, as “political violence that targets
civilians, independent of whether the actor is a non-state movement or a sovereign state.” The chapter traces the contemporary history of wars in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Sri Lanka. Kazi discusses the domestic “wars of terror” waged by these post-colonial states within their national borders and highlights the intersections with the US-led “wars on terror” in Afghanistan and Pakistan. She examines in great detail the gendered impact of the “wars on terror” and “wars of terror” in the four countries. Kazi makes the point that “prior to 9/11, the situation of Afghan women had not been part of global discourse on the war in Afghanistan. Indeed, throughout the 1990s, there was little international concern or sympathy for the suffering of Afghan women inflicted by two decades of war. It was only in the wake of the 9/11 tragedy and the retaliatory US-led Operation Enduring Freedom military offensive against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, that Afghan women appeared in the US foreign policy discourse and the international public imagination. The stated justification for the US counteroffensive was democracy, human rights, and the rights of Afghan women. Operation Enduring Freedom was constructed as a moral mission to rescue Afghan women from Taliban tyranny.” In pointing the way forward, Kazi refers to the South Asian Feminist Declaration (1989) and indicates that there exists “a broad regional/transnational feminist political opposition to war and militarization.” However, she acknowledges that the “security-centric discourse privileging the nation-state conflates criticism with treason and support for “the enemy,” making it much more difficult for women to challenge the “nationalist” paradigm and widen the analytic frame.
CHAPTER 24

FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON MILITARISM AND WAR
Critiques, Contradictions, and Collusions

MARYAM KHALID

Introduction

This chapter examines the gendered underpinnings of militarism, and the related concepts of war and peace, from a feminist perspective. Feminist approaches to militarism generally share an intent to uncover and change the workings of gender (in its various usages) in academic scholarship and political-military practice (Goldstein 2001, 38). In interrogating militarism, feminist scholars and activists have sought to illuminate not only the gendered effects of militarism but also the gendered assumptions that reinforce militarism and enable it to be accepted as “necessary” by many. Not only do militarism and war affect men and women in different ways, but the ideology itself also is constructed through gendered understandings of the world. This chapter demonstrates that militarism reflects and reinforces dominant understandings of men (masculinity) and women (femininity), us and them, and the roles and behaviors supposedly properly ascribed to these groups.

Although women have become increasingly visible in representations of militarism (e.g., in their presence in military institutions and in the waging of war), war and the military are still assumed to be the domain of men in dominant understandings. These dominant or mainstream understandings of the world are reliant on gendered assumptions of the terms men (masculinity) and women (femininity), and the former is privileged over the latter. Deconstructing the gendered underpinnings of militarism entails interrogating concepts of peace, war, security, and the military complex as components of militarism; uncovering dominant assumptions about gender (and race) that shape perceptions of war, gender, and militarism; and examining how representations and narratives based on these assumptions have material effects. Understanding these
material effects demonstrates that militarism has an all-embracing reach in societies in which it is a dominant paradigm. Recognizing the broad compass of militarism requires an examination of not only how gender (in terms of militarization) affects global politics and state–state interactions but also how the gendered nature of militarization in the sphere of elite politics has far-ranging impacts on ordinary people, particularly women.

War, for example, significantly impacts the lives of men and women, both in the activities and processes directly and most visibly associated with the military and the practice of war and also in everyday, less obvious ways. War is best understood in the broader context of militarism, which places importance on war and military values. The promotion of military values such as aggression, violence, and unquestioning loyalty produces narrow understandings of masculinity and femininity in the wider social context. Thus, militarism has many manifestations: it shapes elite politics but also the everyday; the lives of those who fight in wars and those who will never see the battlefield. Zillah Eisenstein argues that war is now “naturalized”; although it is horrific, it is “normal” and has become “part of the human condition: there will always be war(s)” (2008, 27).

Literature from a variety of disciplines has addressed the interrelated areas of militarism, war, international violence, terrorism, peacebuilding, and postconflict reconstruction. Within much mainstream academic and policy research, critical analysis often overlooks the ways militarism and related issues are gendered (Goldstein 2001, 34–36). For example, the dominance of men as decision makers of war (and in the military generally) is assumed to be the result of so-called natural gender differences that reflect essentialist assumptions of the innate nature of men as more aggressive, rational, and predisposed to violence than women, who are assumed to be inherently mothering, nurturing, and peaceful. And rationales for engaging in war are generally presented in terms of the national interest.

Attempts by scholars located within the mainstream international relations (IR) field to integrate gender analysis into IR theory have tended to use gender as a variable that can be added to mainstream analyses (Jones 2004). This approach limits gender to the differences between men and women and presupposes that these are stable and secure identity categories. In contrast, this chapter identifies with feminist researchers who explore gender as a category of analysis to speak about men, women, masculinities, and femininities not as attributes but as social relations of power that can differ in specific contexts.

**Feminism and gender**

Since the key concern of this chapter is to elucidate the construction and function of gender in militarism, it is necessary to expand on what is meant here by gender as an analytical concept. As an analytical tool, it may be used to reveal configurations of power that shape understandings of identity categories of men and women and masculinities and femininities in various contexts and at various times.
Gender is deployed in many international and state-based agencies, largely as a label for unproblematized categories of male and female, for example, in international institutions such as the United Nations and World Bank, which have adopted gender mainstreaming policies and practices. In these and other such institutions, data are collected and analyzed on the differential impacts of development policy on male and female gender groups, and new programs and projects are designed that take these findings into account. Such formal insertions of gender often tend to rely on and circulate understandings of gender that do not problematize the political and power relations underlying dominant assumptions about men, women, masculinity, and femininity.

Feminist scholarship seeks to move gender to the center of our understandings of the world; however, there is no single feminist understanding of gender. Rather, the term may have diverse meanings that vary depending on the ontological, epistemological, and methodological perspective taken. For example, gender can denote biological differences between binary sexes (male–female) or a way of conceptualizing socially constructed meanings attached to types of bodies. Thus, there is a range of feminist understandings and explanations of, approaches to, and recommendations on militarism, war, and peace.

It is useful to divide feminist approaches to gender into empiricist, standpoint, and poststructuralist approaches (Harding 1991; Sylvester 1994; Hansen 2010). Empiricist feminist approaches that take gender as a biological given assume that gender differences between men and women are the result of differences between natural biological sexes. However, this approach leaves unproblematized the binary distinction between men and women, taking these as biologically determined, as simply “assumed by the body and not assigned to it according to a variety of cultural practices” (Griffin 2007, 224–225). Thus, in the empiricist feminist view, gender acts as a label for a set of predetermined notions about the human body. That is, not only are maleness and femaleness biologically determined, but also “there exists one set of traits for characterizing men and one for women” as mutually exclusive categories (Griffin 2007, 225). Empiricist approaches also seek to add women to the concerns and analyses of dominant masculine approaches. As such, they tend to focus on subjects that men have already prioritized for study (Harding 1987, 4). Thus, an empiricist feminist approach to militarism is focused on interrogating mainstream concerns about the behavior of states and the differential impacts of their policies on women and men rather than expanding the parameters of militarism beyond the priorities and actions of states (Hansen 2010, 19–21).

Standpoint feminism interrogates this type of research agenda by conceptualizing the state as a “set of patriarchal practices” and through uncovering the impacts of these practices on “real living women” (Hansen 2010, 21). In this approach, gender is constructed through social understandings of masculinity and femininity. However, standpoint feminism presupposes that biological sex is given, and it is only gender as masculinity and femininity that is socially and culturally constructed.

Poststructuralist feminists point out that this would be to “refer to a ‘given’ sex or a ‘given’ gender without first inquiring into how sex and/or gender is given” (Butler 1990, 6). As such, poststructuralist feminists seek to interrogate both the biological and
social as constructed. This approach views sex and gender as discursive constructions, meaning that they are not intrinsically fixed or binary (e.g., transgender and transsexual categories complicate the binary). As Judith Butler explains, gender is not simply the cultural construction and inscription of meaning onto a pregiven sex but should be seen as “the very apparatus of production whereby the sexes themselves are established” (1990, 7). Christine Sylvester argues that this means that men and women are not prediscursive but rather that they are “the stories that have been told about ‘men’ and ‘women’” (1994, 4). In this sense, gender is more than simply “a noun (i.e., an identity) and a verb (i.e., a way to look at the world . . . ), but also a logic which is produced by and productive of the ways in which we understand and perform global politics” (Shepherd 2010, 5).

Gender is thus a set of relations of power, and this understanding informs the chapter as a whole. The latter part of the chapter explores the power of gender as a discursive/regulatory mechanism in reference to the wars on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq. These examples demonstrate the function of gender as discourse, in terms of its power to (re)produce and naturalize particular (dominant/hegemonic) notions of what it means to be masculine and feminine and to attach them to sexed bodies. Reading gender into militarism, and understanding militarism as configured by gendered logics, thus entails viewing gender as encompassing not only men and women but also masculinities, femininities, sex, and sexuality as constructed and contingent. Thus, understanding how militarism is gendered requires inquiring into the ways men and women come to be considered as such and how processes of gendering and militarism are interconnected, often leading to the violence of war and other military activities.

**MILITARISM, THE STATE, AND GENDER**

Mainstream research agendas into war, peacebuilding, and postconflict reconstruction generally focus on institutions of the state and the military and on elite politics such as processes led by politicians between (and within) states and international organizations.

Feminist research agendas, however, seek to widen the scope of such research by moving beyond the boundaries established by dominant approaches. This is reflected in feminist analyses of war and peace that conceptualize militarism as an ideology, a set of processes, and a materiality that go beyond simply the military-industrial complex and states’ engagements with warfare. In this understanding, militarism is an ideology that encompasses the myriad political, economic, and social relationships, processes, and practices that are organized around, draw on, and support military values. This ideology, discernible in many countries, is underwritten by the assumption that war is likely or inevitable, a concomitant belief in “military values and policies as conducive to a secure and orderly society,” and a willingness to use organized violence to resolve conflicts and implement policies (Reardon 1996, 14). Indeed, the policies of militarism themselves can lead to situations and behaviors that then justify the need for militarism (Horn 2010, 59).
Militarism and its assumptions also have effects beyond elite politics and the military complex, shaping all areas of society. And while it varies according to historical, social, and cultural contexts, feminists argue that gender has always been central to militarism's ideology and (re)production. Feminist understandings of militarism recognize the “gradual encroachment of the military institution,” its values, assumptions, and language “into the civilian arena” to the degree that militarism becomes “acceptable to the populace . . . seen as ‘common sense’ solutions” to a range of problems (Enloe 1983, 9–10). The material manifestations of militarism include wars (and other state-led military interventions) and indirect interventions such as the proxy wars of the Cold War era (circa 1947–1991).

Ideological expressions of militarism include the institutionalization of gender difference. This is seen most clearly in the dedication of high proportions of government budgets to the military, at the expense of, for example, social welfare programs. This can function to exacerbate gendered inequalities in society, for example, further disadvantaging women (and children) who rely on social welfare programs to a larger degree than men do (Beneria and Blank 1989; Abramovitz 2006, 348–349). Militarism, Betty Reardon writes, thus filters through nonmilitary state structures and has “served to legitimize both warfare and civil use of coercive force (i.e., national guards and militia) in the interest of ‘national security’” (1996, 14).

As an institution of the state, militarism must be understood as intricately linked to the creation of states and the establishment and exercise of power in state institutions as (re)productive of gendered power relations and hierarchies. Gender operates in the very configuration of state power—as “diplomatic, colonial, and military policies of major states have been formed in the context of ideologies of masculinity” (MacKinnon 1989)—that values traits such as rationality and toughness. Feminist scholars have pointed out that the gendered state is reflected not only in the disparity between the numbers of men and women holding political office but also in the fact that politics is overwhelmingly dominated by men (Connell 2005, 204–205). As R. W. Connell states, there is a “gender configuring of recruitment and promotion . . . of the internal division of labor and systems of control . . . of policymaking” (2005, 75). That is, sets of dominant state policies about men and women (and the masculine and feminine characteristics linked to them) in state institutions such as the military, the labor force, the medical field, and social welfare denote so-called proper or acceptable performances of masculinity and femininity (and also regulate various sexual identities as legal or illegal).

**Militarism as an institution of the state**

The patriarchal state is premised on binary gender divisions. These are configured around masculinities and femininities that are also reflected in militarism. Thus, the gendered assumptions of patriarchy and militarism inform and reinforce each other. The assumption that the exertion of power to control others and the use of organized force (the deployment of violence or the threat of violence) are essential to ensure stability
is reflected far beyond military and policing institutions. The assumptions inherent in military values, ideologies, and behaviors are also influential in shaping and structuring broader society in terms of political discourse, socioeconomic organization, and everyday language and relationships. The glorification of military institutions and encounters by the government and mainstream media is one important way this takes place.

Feminists have shown that patriarchal and sexist institutions and structures are hallmarks of highly militarized societies (Reardon 1996). Militarized states and societies are shaped around the notion that social stability is best achieved through hierarchical gender relations typical of military institutions and practices. Indeed, gendered relations of power are (re)produced beyond state institutions. For example, the heterosexual male-headed family unit has been a vital part of the defense of the nation and its security interests in militarized societies (Horn 2010, 59–60). Social acceptance of war and state violence as necessary is (re)produced in nonstate or military arenas through the glorification of war, the valorization of aggressive masculinities, and the presentation of these as natural and necessary.

Cynthia Enloe points out that militarism “affects not just the executives and factory floor workers who make fighter planes, landmines and intercontinental missiles, but also the employees of food companies, toy companies, clothing companies, film studios, stock brokerages and advertising agencies” (2000, 2). Thus, the language, ideas, and relationships associated with militarism operate in the seemingly mundane, apolitical, and everyday. Sports and other competitive activities demonstrate this, employing references to the annihilation and obliteration of the Other. Enloe's interrogation of the reasoning behind the decision to add weapons-shaped pasta to Heinz canned soup points to the unproblematic acceptance of militarized imagery far beyond military institutions (Enloe 2000). War, aggression, and violence are presented as an innate expression of masculinity by male bodies in popular culture.

The aforementioned narrow constructions of masculinity and femininity have become accepted as common sense and are essential to rather than simply a product of elite politics and the military-industrial complex. Enloe, writing in the 1980s, demonstrated that it was vital to the militaristic project to ensure a large proportion of men who accepted the warrior or protector role (Enloe 1983). While gender roles have transformed both in the military and wider society (particularly in developed militarized societies), with women taking on combat roles, the privileging of masculinities over femininities remains central to both the military and militarism (Peterson 2010).

The widespread use of militaristic language outside of military contexts and the minimization of the effects of violence that accompany this are indications of societal acceptance of militarism. The results of the violence of militarism are also made tolerable through a process of sanitization. For example, Carol Cohn argues that the euphemistic terms _clean bombs_, _collateral damage_, and _peacekeeping missiles_ are examples of the inverted meanings of military doublespeak that obfuscates the often devastating material impacts of war (1987; 1990, 33–35).

The importance of militarism as a key institution of the state also lies in its role in constructing national interest. Inherent in this is the creation and deployment of identity
categories and hierarchies in which gender, sexuality, race, and class converge to reflect a binary of us–them both within and outside the state. The construction of these identity categories (re)produce the concern with being able to assert power (us over them, masculine over feminine) that lies at the heart of militarism. International politics also plays a role here because the national interest is constructed in part through interstate engagements in the international arena. Thus, hierarchical power relations and structures (of gender, race, and economics) are mutually reinforced across the domestic and international and are reflected in national interests (Horn 2010).

Delimiting what counts as us and them in both the domestic and international arenas is itself gendered (and often racialized), marking out what is acceptable performance of masculinity and of femininity and which bodies can legitimately perform such behaviors. Nationalist identity making not only constructs us but also the Other as the enemy and perpetuates the very notion of (in)security that legitimizes militarism. In times of war, in particular, this is reflected in the construction of a homefront in support of the national interest, which reflects highly gendered and heteronormative understandings of men, women, children, and the family unit. Thus, the characteristics and behaviors of us–them versus the enemy are based on dominant male and female stereotypes and the concomitant division of roles such as the masculine protector and feminine victim. The identities and hierarchies central to militarism are, in feminist analysis, always gendered in that they rely on and reproduce a binary division between acceptable masculine and feminine roles.

**Feminism, War, and Militarism**

The assumption that men are inclined toward violence and war and women toward peace underwrites the gendered state and has been reflected in both popular discourse and academic scholarship. In prevalent understandings, war is a masculine, if not male, domain. In this conception of war, military personnel (typically the young male soldier) are seen as the main participants in and victims of war. Some feminist research (generally from the standpoint perspective) has also been based on this belief. For example, Nancy Chodorow and Sara Ruddick, writing on war and peace during the late 1970s to 1990s, posited that women’s inclusion in elite politics would change the character of foreign policy making to reflect traits of mothering, nurturing, and compassion (Chodorow 1978, 1992; Ruddick 1989).

**Women and Militarism**

While the military is a predominantly male and masculine institution, in many parts of the world women are now able to enlist and participate ostensibly in the same ways as men. The complex and contradictory roles of women in the military have raised a
number of issues and concerns around gender and militarism, in particular the ways the presence of women in the military speak to both feminist and masculine militaristic agendas. Some feminists, generally standpoint and empiricist, see the admission of women to the military as positive and as evidence of the success of the gender equality agenda and of the unraveling of biologically determined arguments about women’s abilities and proper roles (Shepherd 2010: 32).

However, this perspective has been critiqued by feminists who view women’s presence in the military as their co-optation into the institutions and processes of militarism. In this view, women's participation in the armed forces does not change the masculine nature of the military or challenge the militarization of wider society (Enloe 2000; Eisenstein 2008). Women who join the military are generally placed in administrative or service roles, and some military roles in many nations remain closed to women, such as Special Forces and artillery roles in the US army (Goldstein 2001). Women in the military also experience higher levels of sexual violence (both from within their ranks and outside) than do civilian women (Sjoberg 2010, 59).

Women’s involvement in the military is problematic for these reasons but also because it is often held up by liberal feminists and the state/military alike as evidence of women’s achievement of equality with men. This is illustrated, for example, by the abuses that took place at the Abu Ghraib prison during the 2003 US-led wars on terror in Iraq. In 2004, photographs of US soldiers (including one woman, Lynndie England) abusing Iraqi prisoners emerged and were published globally by the mainstream media. These images and the accompanying stories provide a particularly powerful illustration of the complexity of the role of women and femininity in the military. Feminists have read the sexualized abuse as designed to feminize the Other male (Kaufman-Osborne 2007; Richter-Montpetit 2007). On one hand, a woman’s participation in the abuse of male Iraqi prisoners was perceived as an aberration of the proper role women should play in the military. On the other hand, a woman’s participation in violence previously associated with men became an example of the equality that women had apparently achieved (Richter-Montpetit 2007).

Measuring women’s equality with men through their participation in the military serves to obscure the ways the military is a hypermasculinized institution. The necessity of the military, as discussed earlier, arises out of masculinist understandings of the world as characterized by conflict and requiring violence and control to ensure security. The integration of women into the military has not challenged this significantly or undermined the values of militarism. And since militarism is about much more than simply the military institution, it is important to note that women’s participation in the military has not transformed the impact of militarization on women outside the military institution. Enloe argues that women’s agency within the military does not “roll back militarization” but rather works to “integrate women ever more thoroughly into a militarized culture” (2000, 271). In ensuring preparedness for war, masculine authoritarianism, legitimization of violence, and aggression are encouraged and rewarded. By including women, militarism socializes them into masculinist (and patriarchal) positions (Chenoy 2004, 30). The need to control gender categories, particularly specific
expressions of masculinity, is evident in the infliction of violence against those who challenge them, such as those who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT; Cohn 1997, 130).

Enloe’s study into the roles played by military wives, military nurses, and prostitutes illustrates the importance of women adhering to traditional gender roles in support of the masculine military: “Making up a picnic basket can be militarized if it is packed with the intention of keeping up the morale of a soldier. Doing laundry for a son home on leave becomes militarized when the mother’s washing is undertaken in recognition that a soldier on leave deserves to be relieved of annoying household chores” (2000, 257).

Thus, women who support the military (both inside and outside formal military institutions) are essential in maintaining its masculine image, character, and practices (Enloe 2000, 226–227). While women may now have the ability to participate in the military in many parts of the world, the functions of this must be interrogated to avoid obscuring the gendered operation of military institutions and the broader processes of militarism.

Gender and militarism

The case has been made that war impacts men and women differently simply because men far outnumber women in militaries worldwide. However, beyond the battlefield, women and children comprise a large proportion of the victims of war. At least three-quarters of all casualties resulting from war (military personnel and noncombatants) are civilians, the majority of whom are women and children (Pettman 1996: 96; Ticker 1999: 10; Cockburn 2001: 21; Giles and Hyndman 2004: 3–5).

Feminist analyses of militarism, war, and armed conflict show that although there are differential gender experiences, women (generally as noncombatants) are very much involved in and affected by the violence of militarism. One particular form of violence that women commonly experience in times of war is rape and sexual torture. The perpetration of this violence is distinctly gendered. As feminists have argued, rape and other forms of sexual abuse are based on unequal gender relations of power, and this is especially so in the context of war (Seifert 1996; Enloe 2000; Hansen 2001). Rape and sexual violence perpetrated in war and military contexts is intrinsic to militarized cultures. The use of such violence is recognized as a deliberate policy, one that anticipates specific strategic outcomes that hinge on a masculinized understanding of the self and Other. That is, sexual violence is not indiscriminate; rather, “rape is intentionally committed by specific men against specific women and men—namely ‘enemy’ women and men” (Alison 2007, 79).

The use of sexual violence by men against other women is a weapon of war, aimed at undermining the masculinity of the enemy who is unable to protect his women. The stereotypical construction of women as weak, passive, and nurturing and in need of protection is here deployed to bolster dominant notions of masculinity as strong, active, and rational. The binary of masculine–feminine attached to male and female bodies in this context also renders women’s bodies as another battlefield (Seifert 1996).
This battle not only is gendered but also reflects the intersection between gender and race and ethnicity. As Miranda Alison explains, “not only is ‘masculine’ contrasted to ‘feminine’ within a group and ‘us’ contrasted to ‘them’ between groups, but ‘our women’ are contrasted to ‘their women’ and ‘our men’ to ‘their men’” (2007, 80). Gendered sexual violence thus serves to affirm the masculinity of those who are able to protect their women by asserting power over another group of men (and women) and by emasculating the enemy (Goldstein 2001; Hansen 2001; Alison 2007).

**Gendering (in)security and world politics**

Militarism has significant consequences globally and functions to normalize a view of the world and its people as marked by war, violence, and aggression. As discussed earlier, militarism both relies on and perpetuates the assumption that the best way to achieve so-called security (from war and violence rather than, for example, from hunger or environmental disasters) is to have a strong military system. Feminists have problematized this notion of the state as protector and provider of security for all citizens and the elite politics associated with it. Feminist analyses of security and insecurity question the ways that security and threat are constructed. Rather than being pre-determined, these concepts are constructed by reference to a range of identities that are stratified by gender, sexuality, race and ethnicity, and class. It is important to revisit the idea of the gendered state explored earlier in the chapter. Here, the state is constructed through the reproduction of a particular gender system and power relations, for example, one in which masculinity is linked to aggression, strength, and rationality and is dominant over a femininity that is expressed as weak, passive, and irrational (Peterson 1992; True 2001). The state is gendered in terms of not only its domestic organization and institutions but also its international relations.

The masculinity of the state and its role in the global arena is central to mainstream theorizing about security and international politics. For example, Francis Fukuyama highlighted the tension between gender equality and militarism when he warned that the breakdown of sex segregation in the military would be dangerous. He saw the world as requiring a toughness and aggression in international politics that would be undermined by a female presence in the military (Fukuyama 1998). His analysis has been critiqued by feminists who point to the gendered and racialized underpinnings of his understanding of international politics. Fukuyama’s assessment of the world is under-girded by the assumption that global politics is inevitably driven by competing masculinities, and security is threatened by femininities. As Barbara Ehrenreich writes, this world view indicates a concern that “the female, and hence over-kindly, heads of state who arise in the northern democracies will be a poor match for the macho young males whom he expects to dominate the south” (1999, 122).
There is an intersection between gender and race here that is reflected in a masculinist concern for protecting the feminine (read female political leaders) from the uncontrolled, immature, and threatening masculinities of the global South, embodied in “Slobodan Milosevic, Saddam Hussein, and Mobutu Sese Seko” (Tickner 1999, 6). Further, these views not only serve to fuel questions about the legitimacy of women in international politics but also work to justify broader mainstream (realist and neorealist) International Relations perspectives that reinforce “polarized views of the world in terms of civilization clashes and zones of peace versus zones of turmoil” (Tickner 1999, 5). In this worldview, the feminization of world politics would ultimately leave the West vulnerable in a world that is assumed inevitably to be centered on masculine states and groups vying for power.

To be concerned with security then does not simply focus on the identification of an external threat but also involves the construction of the self and state identity (Campbell 1992). Identity creation can be seen as binary, whereby the self is created only by reference to the Other. Militarism, while it might be thought to function as a mechanism to ensure security and avoid war, actually "sustains a war-like peace that revolves not only around preparation for collective conflict but also around a war-like politics" (Elshtain and Tobias 1990, x). Militarism requires the construction and (re)production of seemingly immutable and fixed identities of us, placed in opposition to them, with which military personnel as well as civilians are encouraged to identify. The interplay between nationalism (the carving out of us vis-à-vis the Other) and militarism (which conceives of a world under constant threat) transforms the Others into enemies, and the (re)production of enemy Others perpetuates the need for militarism.

Thus, there is a nexus between militarism, war, and (in)security that requires some interrogation of the ways representations and narratives based on gendered assumptions function as discourses that make it necessary to engage in war and militarism to ensure security.

**Deploying masculinities and femininities**

Reading gender into (in)security and militarization is particularly important for understanding the ways men, women, masculinities, and femininities have been constructed in dominant discourses of militarism in terms of enacting war. It also illuminates the roles played by various categories of men and women (physically, symbolically, and ideologically) in supporting and challenging war and militarism. As discussed earlier in the chapter, there is a commonly held assumption that men have an innate predisposition to war. Feminists have challenged the essentialism of this view and have shown that many men in various contexts have either been against war or have tried to avoid being participants in it. For example, men have avoided conscription and have been involved in protesting against war (Ehrenreich 1999). Ehrenreich argues that individual impulses of men or aggressive male instincts do not lead to the complicated, orchestrated, highly organized undertaking of war. She posits instead that “no plausible instinct would
impel a man to leave his home, cut his hair short, and drill for hours under the hot sun” (Ehrenreich 1999). Moreover, “it is a large step from . . . biologically innate leanings toward individual aggression, to ritualized, socially sanctioned, institutionalized group warfare” (Kroeber and Fontana, cited in Ehrenreich 1999, 118).

In addition, war would not be possible without women’s cooperation, support, and co-optation (Enloe 1989; Pettman 1996). Although they are not always willing collaborators, women and the dominant notions of femininity that are attached to them in hegemonic gender discourses, support militarism through their performance of specific gendered roles. Women’s performances of acceptable femininity become relegated to supportive roles, which are not always invisible or passive. Women have played a range of roles in the practices and processes of militarism in complex and historically contingent ways. They have supported masculine militarism in a material sense by providing services to men and the military, stepping into traditionally masculine arenas and roles when men are at war, as military personnel and as citizens who provide the votes and tax revenue necessary for war (Pettman 1996, 91–96).

Women and femininities also play an important role in service of ideological campaigns during times of war. Women have been held up as symbols of motherhood during times of war and in its aftermath. In various historical contexts, women’s belonging to the nation has been constructed around a duty toward the state in sacrificing their sons for the good of the nation and providing future soldiers (Steans 2008, 171). In the recent past, the ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia (circa 1991–1999) involved the mobilization of motherhood as symbolic of the nation. In the postwar period, motherhood has remained attached to women and has become a security strategy. Performance of acceptable femininity is linked to the willingness to become a mother. In Serbia, motherhood has become part of the security discourse, as the ability of the nation to defend itself is portrayed as being dependent on ensuring a rising birth rate (Bracewell 1996).

**The US-led Wars on Terror**

The United States instigated the wars on terror (with the United Kingdom joining as a key ally) in response to the September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda attacks on US soil. It illustrates the intersection of gender and race in making war within the logic of militarism. The construction of the world post-9/11 in dominant political and academic discourses has taken for granted (and in some cases has purposefully deployed) assumptions about the naturalness of binaries of gender and race, particularly via orientalism. This discourse of gendered racialization constructs an Arab and Muslim as being of the East in opposition to the West. A contemporary example is Samuel Huntington’s (1996) clash of civilizations thesis, which posits that distinct cultural boundaries are the fault lines of global conflict, and in particular, a long-standing conflict between the West and the Arab or Muslim Other. In official US government administration and mainstream media
Discourses in Western states (e.g., CNN, Fox News, NBC, and popular news magazines such as *Newsweek* and *Time*), gendered and orientalized representations of the Eastern Other were deployed to facilitate military interventions as part of the wars on terror (Cloud 2004; Stabile and Kumar 2005).

The official discourse by the US administration constructed the wars on terror as necessary to combat future threats of terrorism (defined broadly but in practice limited to Islamist violence aimed at Western targets and interests). During the course of the wars on terror, a range of binaries situated the West in opposition to the East. For example, good versus evil, civilized versus barbaric, rational versus irrational, and progressive versus backward were invoked to construct the attacks, the configuration of the world after these attacks, and the characteristics of various peoples and groups. The deployment of masculinities and femininities in and beyond the context of military interventions under the wars on terror were instrumental in making the US military interventions into Afghanistan and Iraq possible—and even necessary.

Thus, the wars on terror represents a discourse informed by gender and race (specifically, orientalist racialization) and illustrates the complex roles of men, women, masculinities, femininities, and feminisms in militarism and war. The wars on terror discourse has been constructed around a dichotomy between the civilized, moral, and benevolent masculinity of the West and the barbaric, backward, oppressive, and deviant masculinity of the “brown man” as well as the free, Western woman and the oppressed, subjugated “brown woman” (Nayak 2006; Khalid 2011). These hierarchical categorizations reflect what has been described earlier in the chapter as a militarist concern with competing masculinities. A rational, assertive masculinity was harnessed in official US and mainstream media texts. This has been central to constructing the authority of the George W. Bush administration in wars on terror discourse, with a concern for security centered on the competing masculinities embodied in and performed by us and them (Tickner 2002; Ferguson 2005; Shepherd 2006).

In this discourse, the United States and its allies performed an acceptable masculine function as defenders of civilization and liberators of the oppressed. The male enemy, the Other, embodied a barbaric masculinity expressed through irrational violence and misogyny. A dual role was played by women in this discourse, both as visible symbols of our success in achieving female liberation (symbolizing Western civilization) and as potential victims of the uncontrolled male other. This is exemplified in the US rescue of Jessica Lynch in the war in Iraq, in which the image of a young white female American soldier became symbolic of the egalitarian nature of the US self, as a place of civilized values. Lynch, as a solider captured by Iraqi forces, also functioned as a symbol of US masculine power against the barbaric uncontrolled masculinity of the Other, who posed a threat to our women (Kumar 2004; Pin-Fat and Stern 2005).

Not only were feminist language and concerns deployed in the discourse, but some American feminists also colluded with the US administration. Most notably, the prominent liberal US-based feminist organization Feminist Majority Foundation (FMF) did not condemn the possibility of a US-led war in Afghanistan insofar as it would (it was claimed) liberate Afghan women. While the FMF has a long tradition of campaigning...
against gender-based violence, including in Afghanistan, its support for the 2001 US-led war in Afghanistan reflected an orientalist belief that women’s liberation through war was worthwhile despite the devastating effects it would have on Afghans, particularly women and children. As the FMF’s concern for the welfare of women in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan aligned with the Bush administration’s rhetoric of (female) liberation, women’s rights discourses became co-opted into a broader discourse of gendered orientalism that constructed other women as voiceless victims of a barbaric (Other, male) enemy (Khalid 2011).

Thus, the political and media discourse (including the FMF’s statements) that drew on feminist concerns and used feminist language functioned to make more plausible the liberationist goal of the wars on terror by reinforcing the construction of us as progressive and enlightened and them as backward and barbaric. The mainstream media and some liberal feminist arguments enabled the Bush administration to more convincingly present itself as bringing women’s rights to the backward East. The United States, in contrast, was positioned as enlightened, civilized, and justified in pursuing military interventions (Russo 2006; Khalid 2011). Dominant discourses not only harnessed anxieties around the masculinity of the United States after the 9/11 attacks (as war serves as a means of reasserting masculinity) but also attempted to camouflage the patriarchal and militarized masculinity operating in the push to war. Co-opting the language of feminism and women’s rights was vital to the success of the militarist project. As Enloe argues, patriarchy (which underscores militarism) “has survived because of its facile adaptiveness, not because of its rigidity” (2000, 285).

However, other feminists argued that war (whether in Iraq, Afghanistan, or elsewhere) does not empower women, as its architects claim. Feminist activists and scholars agitated against the 2003 US-led war against Iraq. Code Pink: Women for Peace was one of the most prominent of these movements (Cockburn 2007: 65). Code Pink is a non-governmental organization that describes itself as a “grassroots peace and social justice movement working to end US-funded wars and occupations, to challenge militarism globally, and to redirect our resources into health care, education, green jobs and other life-affirming activities” (CodePink, n. d.).

**Conclusion**

War and militarism are often considered to be the domain of those men who are involved in the military and elite politics. However, feminist analyses have shown that the practice and impact of militarism is much more ubiquitous, operating far beyond these realms into the everyday. Militarism affects all facets of life, engaging various groups of men, women, and children in either knowing or unintentional support of its values and activities.

Gender, as a hierarchical configuration of various expressions and performances of masculinity and femininity, shapes ideas of war, peace, and (in)security and is central
to understanding the ways militarism and military conflicts are enabled and played out. Gender is also configured through war and militarism, in that men and women are created through the military and militarism and through prescriptions of acceptable behavior and punishment for deviancy. As such, militarism institutionalizes sexual differentiation and produces and reproduces not only masculinity but also femininity (Eisenstein 2008, 35). In societies characterized by patriarchal gender regimes, masculinity is associated with authority, coercion, and violence that, supported by subordinate femininity, are both essential to militarism and dependent on militarism and war for its (re)production (Cockburn 2010, 152). The violence of war

... produces re-burnished ethnic identities, sharpened by memories of wrong and a desire for revenge. It produces particular gender identities—armed masculinities, demoralized and angry men, victimized femininities, types of momentarily empowered women. But these war-honed gender relations, “after war” (which may always equally be “before war”), again tend to feed back perennially into the spiralling continuum of armed conflict, for ever predisposing a society to violence, forever disturbing the peace.

(Cockburn, 2010, 152)

Feminist research on militarism has made significant progress in destabilizing the basic assumptions of militarist ideology and processes, but there still remains much to be done. For example, standpoint feminists have illuminated the alternatives to masculine militarism in terms of highlighting how characteristics not typically associated with masculinity (e.g., nurturing, compassion, and nonviolence) can be useful in world politics. Poststructuralist feminist understandings of war, peace, and militarism grapple with the ways these characteristics are attached to sexed bodies (masculine with men, feminine with women) and interrogate the assumed naturalness of these. By doing so, the gender dimensions of the institutions of militarism can be challenged. For example, the presence of women in combat roles and high positions within the military may be seen as a sign of gender equality and an avenue through which to impart feminine characteristics’ to a male-dominated institution. However, the increasing number of women in the military has not led to a rejection of key assumptions or characteristics of masculine militarism. Rather, women’s roles in the military are still linked to the feminine and function to support the masculinity of the state and its militarism, as illustrated by Jessica Lynch’s rescue.

The unnamed norm in mainstream discussions of war and peace remains masculinity. It is only when the privileging of masculinity at the very heart of (mainstream) research and social organization (both domestic and international) is interrogated that the ideational and material expressions of militarism can be challenged. There is also a need for the intersection between gender and race to be addressed in understanding how militarism is (re)produced and deployed, specifically in justifying and enacting military operations. The military engagements of the wars on terror illustrate that gendered and racialized constructions of the world and the people in it are central to militarism and have devastating material effects on those who are deemed to be in need
Feminist perspectives on militarism and war

of (imperial) liberation by those who subscribe to (masculinist) militarism. This expression of militarism also highlights the ways some feminist activism and activists play a crucial role in supporting militarism as much as others undermine it. It is vital to understand the complexity of feminisms in relation to militarism.

Feminist approaches to research and activism provide alternatives to the dichotomies that shape dominant understandings of war, peace, and human behavior in militarist societies. Feminist scholarship, for example, has illustrated the value of employing a dual focus, both interrogating elite politics and recovering knowledge about the marginalized and oppressed (often those who are deemed to be made secure through militarism). In particular, anti-imperialist feminist scholarship can, as Russo (2006) explains, help us to resist hegemonic and imperialist power by uncovering the ways this power operates so that we can disrupt rather than (re)produce relations of imperialist domination. Employing a self-reflexive feminist ethic can encourage us to be attentive to the ways our own privilege shapes our approaches to conducting research (Ackerly and True 2008). Importantly, this feminist ethic and the research it is used to produce are also helpful in shaping approaches to feminist activism, by centralizing the importance of looking outside the contexts of mainstream institutions and discourses, and recognizing the complexities of addressing the multiple sites and intersectionalities of gendered militarism.

Note

1. In the field of International Relations, realist and neorealist perspectives conceive of the international order as anarchic and share a concern with the pursuit of security through identifying the behaviors of states and the issues that face them. Key proponents include E. H. Carr, Robert O. Keohane, John J. Mearsheimer, Hans Morgenthau, and Kenneth Waltz.

References


CHAPTER 25

FROM SECULAR REDUCTIONISM TO RELIGIOUS ESSENTIALISM

Implications for the Gender Agenda

MARIZ TADROS

Introduction

This chapter examines the changing dynamics of engaging with the intersections of religion and gender through feminist praxis. It argues that there has been a paradigm shift from sidelining religion in development policy and practice to making it a central entry point for eliciting social change. While the recognition of religion as an identifier represents a welcome shift in policy analysis, its instrumentalization to advance Western security and strategic agendas can have a highly detrimental impact on human rights. This chapter argues that the West’s engagement with “the Muslim world” after 9/11 represents a shift from being blind to religious forces (secular reductionism) to working through a narrow “religious prism” in engaging with highly diverse social, political, and economic phenomena (religious essentialism), that has greatly negatively influenced women’s rights. This is particularly so against the backdrop of the rising power of ultra-conservative religious forces to influence national and international policymaking processes and outcomes on gender equality.

The first part of the chapter sets out briefly some of the key feminist debates on gender, religion, and agency. This is followed by a discussion of the shift in Western policy circles in engaging with religion and gender vis-à-vis the Muslim world and its implications for global and national policies on women’s rights. The third part of the chapter argues that this approach to the politicization of religion is congruent with the political agenda of religious forces, which have sought to forge united fronts in the global arena to block advancements in gender equality. They have, however, been countered by
transnational women’s activism, which has taken different approaches and speaks from different standpoints, specific cases of which are discussed herein. The final part of the chapter frames some of the key conceptual and policy issues associated with the intersections of gender, religion, and rights.

**Gender, Religion, and Agency**

Religion has been a potent force influencing global and local politics on gendered power relations in the private and public spheres, both in the global South and the West. In the early twentieth century, Western scholarly predictions that the influence of religion would wane with the modernization of countries have proven to be ill founded (Deneulin and Rakodi 2011). It may be helpful to differentiate between religion as spirituality and religion as an institutionalized political force (Baden and Goetz 1997). This chapter focuses on religious forces that play an intrinsically political role rather than spirituality as a body of beliefs. Religious forces, in their various forms such as governments, sociopolitical movements, faith-based organizations, transnational networks, and coalitions, not only affect people’s day-to-day lives but also have increasingly shaped global politics and continue to profoundly shape feminist and antifeminist agendas alike.

Feminist praxis with regard to religion has generated two important debates: the first on how religion influences the gender agenda; and the second on women’s agency in religious movements. The following is a brief summary of the key elements of these debates.

Feminist scholars and practitioners have engaged with the intersection of religion and gender from various standpoints. Razavi and Jenichen, writing from the standpoint of post-colonial studies, posit that “religious authorities commonly insist on regulating relationships of the private domain, including sexuality, biological and social reproduction, marriage, gender roles and definitions of what constitutes a ‘proper’ family” (836). Such regulations are steeped in patriarchal and heteronormative assumptions and often work to women’s disadvantage. “Private” issues, such as the right to divorce, sexual identity, and access to contraception and abortion, have become sites of intense contestation between conservative religious actors who view religious principles as “natural,” “moral,” absolute, and nonnegotiable (valid for all times and places) and feminist and other human rights advocates who argue for democratic, pluralist, and rights-based alternatives.

In many countries, the institutionalization of discriminatory practices was made through laws premised on religious precepts, as determined by religious scholars (e.g., the Personal Status laws influencing family matters such as marriage and divorce in Pakistan, Iran, and Muslims in India). However, Razavi and Jenichen argue that it is not only in the legal arena that religions shape gender inequality but also in public health, such as in Chile, Mexico, Poland, and the United States; in education, for example, in
Iran, Pakistan, Poland, and Turkey; and in welfare policies and programs, even where there is formal legal separation between religion and the state (2010, 836). They thus point out that the influence of conservative religious forces lies not only in the formal sphere where policies are formulated but also in the private sphere where the diffusion of normative religious values has an insidious influence on people’s thinking on gender identities and roles.

Fraser and Bedford present a political economy perspective on women’s growing attraction to evangelical Christianity in the United States, against the backdrop of a capitalist economy in dire crisis. They seek to understand what lies behind the increasing numbers of women in the United States who join patriarchal evangelical groups that promote women’s domestic role. Fraser and Bedford suggest that faith provides women from low-income families with a means to manage the insecurity associated with the economic hardship they endure as a consequence of neoliberal policies. “Many working-class women in the United States are deriving something significant from this ideology, something that confers meaning on their lives. But feminists have not succeeded in understanding what it is and how it works. Nor have we figured out how to talk to them or what feminism can offer them in its place” (303). Undoubtedly, religions have great appeal for many women, even beyond those belonging to the working class, and this has generated much debate within feminist circles on how to interpret women’s agency in such contexts.

Saba Mahmoud argues in *The Politics of Piety* (2004) that Western feminist scholarship has too narrowly analyzed women’s agency within the parameters of resistance and subordination to patriarchy, even when agency is expressed in multiple forms that does not necessarily have as its point of reference gender hierarchies or resistance to patriarchy. Taking a poststructural perspective, Mahmoud posits that feminist engagement with Muslim women is particularly problematic in this respect and seeks to present an alternative perspective on women’s agency through the examination of their involvement in the mosque revival movement in Cairo in the 1990s. Mahmoud argues that the mosque revival movement went beyond reinscribing women’s traditional roles and reconfigured the gendered practice of Islamic pedagogy and the social institution of mosques. She reflects that “the women I worked with did not regard trying to emulate authorised models of behaviour as an external social imposition that constrained individual freedom. Rather, they treated socially authorised forms of performance as the potentialities—the ground if you will—through which the self is realized” (31).

There has also been a growing body of feminist literature on religious feminism across a broad spectrum of faiths. Such scholarship has emerged from various disciplines—theology, politics, history, and literature—and explores the emergence of women’s individual and collective agency within different religious traditions and denominations. For example, Tomalin (2011) examines the struggle of women in Thailand to revive the tradition of the ordination of nuns in Buddhism. Tomalin shows that the inroads made within the patriarchal parameters of the religion that allow women to assume these female leadership positions are important not only for the nuns’ own empowerment but also for its impact on presenting women as positive role models in the wider community.
Promoting women’s representation in leadership roles in the religious establishment, as already shown, is one of the many ways through which religious feminists have sought to engage with the gendered and religious identifiers of women’s agency. The adoption of a feminist lens in the reinterpretation of sacred texts is an example of another approach to women’s agency (as discussed later with regard to *Musawah*).

**Instrumentalizing gender and religion: The convergence of Western and religious political agendas on Muslim women**

Western policy toward the Muslim world following 9/11 greatly influenced discourses, policies, and practices toward women in Muslim majority countries as well as Muslim women in the diaspora. The international community adopted a dual approach of fighting terrorism while also promoting a religious approach in its dealings with the Muslim community. Using religion as an entry point to engage with the Muslim world has entailed working with religious leaders and faith-based organizations to advance a progressive religious agenda, supporting women who ground their activism within a religious framework and the use of symbols and discourses that convey a positive image of the role of Islam in people’s lives and activities. Religion also became an important entry point in development policy and practice, against the backdrop of the entrenchment of neoliberal policies and the rise of identity politics. The promotion of welfare pluralism and decentralization policies in many developing countries undergoing structural adjustment brought to the forefront faith-based organizations as providers of welfare services, mediators of social change, and arbitrators in administering justice. Some Western donors espoused an agenda of engaging with Muslim leaders and of adopting a religious framework for advancing human rights in Muslim communities. Islamic political and social forces simultaneously contributed to a process of Islamization of society from below.

Religion in the Muslim world became used, in many instances, in an instrumentalized manner by global, national, and local actors as a means of engaging with gender issues in Muslim communities. The deployment of religion was intended to achieve two gains: first, to advance a progressive religious discourse in communities where religion plays an important role in people’s lives; and second, to adopt what is considered a more culturally sensitive and authentic approach to eliciting social reform. International actors deployed human rights to advance security agendas, while many donors assumed religion as an entry point to encourage social change. States instrumentalized both religion and secularism to control their political opponents. Feminists, human rights activists, and development practitioners sought to form alliances with progressive clerics and
mobilize religious idioms, symbols, framings, and discourses to accommodate an all-pervasive religiosity in the society in which they worked. However, the various forms of instrumentalism discussed here need to be set against the backdrop of other contending discourses that are deeply entangled in these political debates. These include the use of women’s rights discourses by Western governments to justify war (as in the case of the US-led wars on terror in Afghanistan) and the deployment of human rights discourses by Islamist groups to legitimize gender inequalities.

There is a need to problematize a number of overlapping tensions: international actors, including donors engaged with gender, human rights, and religion, through the prism of a security agenda; Islamist political forces using a cultural and religious rights discourse to champion the denial of women’s full citizenship rights; and highly authoritarian governments positioning themselves simultaneously as the guardians of Islam against the West, and the guardians of women against the emergence of Islamism\(^2\) in the society. In many contexts, such as the Occupied Palestinian Territories, the Palestinian Authority, the interim self-government body in the West Bank, has presented itself as the bastion for defending secularism against Islamism while simultaneously presenting itself as the protector of religion and cultural authenticity. Feminists, social movements, and human rights activists have been forced to reconsider their strategies of engagement with the Palestinian Authority as the normative framework within which they work became increasingly delineated by religion.

Since the colonial period (Said 1978) gender relations has always been a site of highly contested political struggles in Muslim societies, yet as Abu-Lughod reminds us, “The new twists and turns in global politics have also brought new forms of intersection with gender representing one of the most sensationalized issues on the current global stage, entangled with military intervention and transnational feminism, progressive foundations and right-wing think tanks, elite careers and welfare administration, literary commerce and marginal lives” (2010, 32).

For example, the debate between American liberal feminists who condoned the US-led military intervention in Afghanistan on account of its violations of women’s rights and the radical feminists who condemned it as a form of cultural imperialism served only to essentialize Afghan women further (Kandiyoti 2011). In this context, a Western liberal feminist agenda was deployed in service of the US security agenda, with little impact on transforming women’s lived realities on the ground (see the chapters in this volume by Maryam Khalid and Seema Kazi). Kandiyoti argues that “the workings of global governance institutions (United Nations agencies in particular) in the service of a gender equality agenda in Afghanistan instituted a form of donor-driven gender activism that could not reach beyond the ministries in Kabul in a country where the writ of the government barely extended outside the capital. This made the technocratic formula of ‘gender mainstreaming’ politically hollow and ushered in another layer of instrumentalism—this time in the service of development and post-conflict reconstruction” (2011 12).

The post-9/11 context was characterized by a two-pronged approach: fighting terrorism through security; and targeting Muslims and Muslim communities through socio-cultural interventions. Muslims, a group differentiated by geography, language, cultural,
political, and historical diversity, were homogenized into the Muslim community, which had to be engaged with to promote human rights values expressed in indigenous (read: religious) terms. Moustafa (2011) notes that when President Barack Obama visited Egypt in 2009 the media and policy commentary paid a great deal of attention to his advisor, a veiled woman, who accompanied him on the visit:

This was a symbolic gesture: engaging a veiled woman is commonly associated with cross-cultural interaction. Images of veiled girls and women are widely used in promotional materials circulated at conferences and other activities sponsored and supported by the international community to communicate with the Muslim “world.” The process aims to illustrate the positive presence of Islamic communities in the international sphere, or positive outreach by the international community to local realities. 

(Tadros 2011, 2)

Donors’ annual reports and studies on development aid now celebrate the image of the veiled woman engaging in sports and education, as culturally specific manifestations of liberation that are expressed in a religious idiom. And it is not just the donors and international organizations that have joined the cause. An Egyptian feminist recounted the following anecdote to the author: she attended a conference in the United States as part of a delegation of young activists, where she was asked by the organizers to make an intervention. She offered to speak about the status of women in Egypt. The organizers did not accept her offer and chose another delegate instead, a veiled young woman, to speak on the topic, even though this was not remotely the latter’s area of work or expertise. The justification was that the veiled woman looked more authentic and less Westernized.

Moustafa observes that there has been a conspicuous shift in some donor priorities vis-à-vis who and what to fund in the Middle East. He notes that while in the 1990s the funding of advocacy for the realization of political and civil rights was in vogue; today, the focus has shifted toward supporting cultural and religious initiatives. Grantees who wish to make a good pitch for donor funding are increasingly incorporating the participation of clergymen as partners and stakeholders in their funding proposals. “The message is clear: socio-political reform can only be furthered through negotiating the religio-cultural . . . The ability of these kinds of projects to integrate clergymen has become an indicator of their success” (Moustafa 2011, 23). Sholkamy (2010) argues that the fact that some donors have approached engagement with religious bodies in their development policies and projects in Muslim-majority contexts as an end in itself is cause for concern. It means that the goal (gender justice) has been sacrificed; the focus is now on the religious pathway itself.

Donor agencies’ engagement with citizens in terms of their religious identities has had grave consequences. Other dimensions of identity (e.g., ethnicity, language, class, and political affiliation) are muted. As Balchin (2011a) notes, the engagement with citizens as though they have a single identity, the religious, is congruent with the vision of Islamist groups, who also emphasize religious identity as the identifier of a Muslim Ummah (a global nation encompasing all Muslims). Balchin notes that approaches that
privilege religion as the main developmental issue are in tune with the Islamists’ assertion that Islam and Muslims deserve special treatment. Yet by engaging, for example, through religious clergymen, gender hierarchies are espoused that reflect and privilege their positions. In the Muslim-majority Mindanao region of the Philippines, Balchin notes that women’s rights activists were sidelined and their reproductive health initiatives undermined when a bilateral donor agency invited local clergymen (ulema) to participate in a reproductive health initiative and gave them central roles even in areas where they were not the main decision makers. The bilateral agency gathered the local clergymen and provided them with the convening space to produce a statement supporting women’s reproductive rights from an Islamic perspective. “Although this was not a normal sphere of the local ulema’s concern, the statement was duly issued, but more importantly the gathering facilitated networking among the ulema that subsequently contributed to the formation of a political grouping that promoted a fundamentalist vision of Islam” (17). In effect, this international development agency contributed to the marginalization of local women’s rights activists on an issue they had been working on for years and facilitated the mobilization of religious forces to create a countercoalition against their reproductive health initiative.

States have played a crucial role in mediating the international security agenda of combating terrorism and engaging Muslim communities in their national contexts. Pragna Patel (2011), one of the founders of Southall Black Sisters (SBS) in London, shows how, against a backdrop of the post-9/11 wars on terror the British government has pursued a series of domestic policies aimed at accommodating religious identity within public institutions. She argues that the shift from a multicultural policy (as problematic as it was) to a multifaith policy has encouraged increasing communalization of South Asian populations in London. A key result has been the erosion of secular spaces, spaces in which South Asian women, who choose not to identify, engage, or interact on the basis of a Muslim religious identity, are marginalized. Institutionally, Patel’s own organization, which serves as a platform for engaging minority women, was sidelined by the local council. The adoption of a faith-based approach to engaging with minorities became a political resource used by the state and the religious right in all communities leading in the same direction: a process of desecularization.

Yet another set of policies, not incongruent with the aforementioned, has relied on partnering with religious authorities, with severe consequences for protecting and promoting women’s rights. The Muslim Arbitration Tribunal (MAT) in the United Kingdom was established and has been managed in accordance with the Arbitration Act 1996, for alternative dispute resolution in civil law cases, especially family cases in England. Patel (2011) argues that MAT has widened the power base and authority of patriarchal religious actors whose verdicts have often discriminated against women. Balchin (2011a) points out, further, that a neoliberal privatization agenda stands to gain from relying on the extrajudicial arbitration of family matters under Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) legislation. It serves to reduce the caseload burden on the formal legal system, leaving it for more serious matters such as commercial disputes. Balchin observes that “the way a great many ADR systems have worked to date may well
be more in tune with hegemonic local cultural and religious norms than the formal legal system, but they have far less often been in tune with the poor’s aspirations for justice and women’s aspirations for equality” (8).

Patel (2011) indicates that the British government allocated 45 million pounds sterling to local authorities in 2008–2011 to tackle extremism among Muslim communities. In response, Ealing Council in London set up a Preventing Violent Extremism fund to engage only Muslims. In view of such new government funding for faith-based organizations, previously secular black and minority organizations have refashioned themselves as Muslim groups. Some faith-based organizations that do not have progressive social justice agendas have been strengthened through increased visibility and access to funds. Concurrently, women’s multiple identities are being reduced to the religious signifier of Muslim, whether they are religious or not.

**Transnational Feminist Movements Challenging Hegemonic Conceptions of Gender, Religion, and Rights**

This section examines ways transnational feminist movements have responded to the rise of politicized religious actors. Transnational feminist activism on gender and religion emanated from the realization that there are regional and global similarities in women’s struggles but also in a bid to counter the emergence of global and regional alliances and blocs that specifically instrumentalize religion to obstruct the advancement of women’s rights. During the twentieth century, there was the resurgence of religious conservative movements and their conspicuous influence on the gender agenda in global and national policy spaces. The alliance of the Catholic establishment represented by the Vatican with the Sunni establishment (Al-Azhar) and the Shia establishment (the Ulama of Iran), at the UN International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) (Cairo, 1994), and at the UN Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing 1995) was very much manifest in the synchronization of their agendas with respect to which elements of the gender agenda they should oppose and block.

These forms of ententes between conservative religious establishments have raised concerns among feminist scholars on the need to understand the dynamics of conservative religious movements. This is particularly so since these alliances are being forged not only within and among religious establishments but also between religious bodies and political forces, and between so-called religious and secular actors united by common political interests. For example, a survey undertaken by the Association for Women’s Rights in Development (AWID) indicated that in Latin America one of the top five most significant strategies of engagement among highly conservative religious forces is to establish alliances with the secular right (Balchin 2008). A resurgence of
religious activism has resulted in religious leaders and discourses being increasingly paired with civil society organizations as well as scientific, legal, or bioethical justifications being used in defense of dogmatic religious positions.

Feminist scholarship emerging over the past decade in particular has highlighted the ways religious movements has assumed a highly political role in national policymaking processes in many countries in both the North and global South. Research begun in 2007 by AWID involving 1,600 women activists from 160 countries revealed that in the experience of 8 out of 10 women's rights activists, religious fundamentalisms have had a negative impact on women's rights. This impact is felt in terms of reduced rights in the areas of health and reproductive rights, sexual rights and freedoms, women's participation in the public sphere, family laws, economic rights, as well as a general reduction in women's autonomy; and increased violence against women. Two-thirds of activists surveyed also regard the impact of fundamentalisms as more obstructive of women's rights than other movements.

(Balchin 2010, 5)

However, the impact of religious forces was most greatly felt on reproductive health issues and in particular on questions of the right to contraceptives and abortion (although other issues pertaining to sexual health were also matters of contention) (Baden and Goetz 1997). More recently, at the annual meeting of the UN Commission on the Status of Women held at UN headquarters in New York in February 2013, a similar alliance was seen between the Vatican (Holy See) and Egypt, Honduras, Iran, Jordan, Libya, Nicaragua, Qatar, and Sudan, who used religion as the basis for opposing language related to sexual and reproductive rights, in the Agreed Conclusions being negotiated by government delegations at the meeting. What was at stake for transnational feminist movements was that these conservative forces were seeking not only to hinder new advances in women's rights but also to undermine previous gains made at ICPD. In this context, “women's rights activists spent two tough weeks pushing back against fundamentalist opposition attempting to roll back women's human rights” (Tolmay 2013).

In almost all the contexts in which the influence of the conservative religious establishment has been felt, there has been sustained women's rights activism to counter their effects. One of the most immediate actions has been the documentation by feminist activists and scholars of the inconsistencies, contradictions, and questioning of the underlying motives behind conservative religious agendas. In addition, there was significant advocacy to press governments to comply with their obligations under CEDAW and remove reservations previously expressed, on the basis of their commitment to women's full citizenship and human rights. Concurrently, transnational feminist activists mobilized to denounce the practices of religious fundamentalist states and groups by issuing public statements naming and shaming the perpetrators and lobbying their governments to take an official stance in their bilateral relations with the governments of the countries in question. However, these efforts were sometimes not well received, and in some cases they generated an intense backlash against women's rights locally. In other instances, issues of power relations were at stake, with national and local activists
feeling circumvented by international feminist organizations who had bypassed them and assumed the right to speak on their behalf.

Toward the turn of the twenty-first century, new transnational feminist initiatives emerged that sought to engage specifically with women’s religious identity. For example, AWID has been leading a global research and action program on women and religious fundamentalism, which serves as a platform for uncovering the thinking, strategies, and dynamics of the transnational religious conservative mobilization around gender issues. As religious forces (governmental and nongovernmental) from different religious affiliations have formed a united front to challenge advancements in women’s reproductive health and rights, AWID has also sought to develop a coherent framework and stance on religious fundamentalist movements and on strategies for countering them. The AWID initiative has mainly centered on research, documentation, awareness raising, and advocacy to strengthen women’s rights activists’ capacity to challenge religious fundamentalist movements on the ground.

In 2007, AWID conducted a survey of 1,600 rights activists to examine their experiences of religious fundamentalisms. The strength of the research undertaken by AWID lay in its analysis of the experiences of women activists living in very different contexts and engaged with movements and forces affiliated to different religions. The results, published in a report titled “Religious Fundamentalisms on the Rise: A Case for Action” (Balchin 2008), sounded the alarm bells of the unrecognized threats to women’s rights emanating from religious fundamentalist movements across the world, whether wielding formal power (in government) or informal power (in communities).

The study uncovered some common strategies deployed by different religious forces working in various contexts for asserting power and dominance. Across continents, the study revealed the ways fundamentalists combine religion with other identity categories to mobilize power and wield control, for example, by forging alliances with highly conservative Right-leaning political forces that use cultural authenticity arguments to repress women’s rights. The study noted that in a number of countries (e.g., Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, India, Italy, Lithuania, Mexico, Peru, Serbia, the United States), while the state was theoretically secular, religious fundamentalists sought to subvert this by increasing their influence both within and outside the state. A pattern was also observed in their strategy of using democratic spaces (e.g., schools and civil society organizations) as entry points for introducing absolutist understandings of morality and also deploy language such as the right to life to undermine women’s rights. Importantly, the survey also spawned the paper “Key Learnings from Feminists on the Frontline” (Gokal, Barabero, and Balchin 2010), which focused on sharing feminist experiences and strategies of resisting and challenging fundamentalisms through eighteen case studies largely from the Americas. AWID subsequently published “Towards a Future Without Fundamentalisms” (Balchin 2011b) to highlight ways feminist movements can counter the influence of religious fundamentalist forces at the local, regional, and international levels.

One of the strengths of AWID’s work on religious fundamentalisms has been its sustained action over the course of many years (from 2007 to the present in 2013) and prolific production of useful material. Another important advantage of AWID’s challenge
to religious fundamentalism is its focus on a plurality of actors, forces, and movements, thus implicitly making the point that it is not politically motivated against any particular religion or region.

However, AWID’s transnational activism faces two challenges. The first is its unequal coverage of different regions, with the Middle East region featuring considerably less than others. The second is the imperative of reconciling global advocacy in solidarity with women affected by fundamentalist movements in different parts of the world with the need to be sensitive to the fact that they are often perceived as outsiders (agents of the West) in their own countries, which thus necessitates caution in speaking on their behalf. The issue is not whether transnational feminist movements should speak out against violations against women’s human rights committed in the name of religion but the framing, manner, and timing in which this is done. Balchin (2011a, 82) examines ways international and regional advocacy have had a positive impact on contesting policies aimed at inhibiting women’s rights, for example, in Nicaragua and Turkey. However, there have also been instances where international feminist advocacy has undermined local efforts by using inflammatory (and racist, orientalist language) in its condemnation that provided the fuel to religious fundamentalist movements to argue Western cultural imperialism, for example, in the campaign against honor killings in Jordan (Tadros 2011).

While AWID serves as a global platform for challenging religious fundamentalisms, other transnational feminist movements have been formed with a focus on geography (e.g., Women Living Under Muslim Law [WLUMIL]; the Campaign for an Inter-American Convention for Sexual and Reproductive Rights; Astra—Central and Eastern European Women’s Network for Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights) or religion (e.g., Catholics for Choice; Musawah, focused on the Muslim family).

The frame of reference across these transnational feminist movements varies dramatically. Catholics for Choice, for example, identify themselves as women and men who belong to the Catholic faith but who are against the Catholic Church’s stance on gender equality and reproductive health issues. Their point of reference is both the Catholic faith and international human rights frameworks. The network WLUMIL neither identifies itself as a Muslim organization nor necessarily restricts its framings of rights within Islam. In other words, it does not exclude but also does not work exclusively within an Islamic religious framework. On the other hand, Musawah, an international network that originated in Malaysia, clearly situates its identity as Muslim; its main approach is to seek reform within Islamic jurisprudence and sources. A Call for Equality and Justice in the Muslim family is being launched by a group of Muslim scholars and activists who insist that in the twenty-first century “there cannot be justice without equality” between men and women (Anwar 2009). Zainah Anwar, founder of Sisters in Islam, a Malaysian organization, and a founding member of Musawah, believes that the only option to fight the powers of the conservatives who have a stronghold on making claims to being guardians of the religion is to create countermovements. She states that Musawah “would make it [its] business to challenge the use of religion and culture to undo advances in human rights and women’s rights” (2009).
Feminist engagement with sacred texts, with the aim of exposing the patriarchal underpinnings of dominant interpretations and approaches, should be promoted as an end in itself. The production of a more gender-sensitive religious scholarship is an undoubted benefit, which would also expand the pool of scholars with expertise and leadership in the area. However, one must not assume that feminist engagement with religious texts within a religious framework is the panacea to challenging gender bias in laws, policies, and practices. The politics of transforming gendered power hierarchies may require strategies that go beyond dismantling the patriarchal religious interpretations of scripture on which they were justified—and in some cases they may not be at the core of beliefs on or attitudes to gender relations at all.

Mir-Hosseini et al. (2013, 5) argue that Islamic arguments in favor of gender equality under the law are particularly important in the context of potential political backlash against women’s rights in Arab countries. In the past, public demonstrations for women’s rights have been followed by Islamist political parties coming to power. Yet so far there is very little evidence that Quranic exegesis has been effective in countering the changes that Islamist forces in Egypt and Tunisia have brought about in formal and informal spaces with respect to women’s rights since the Arab Spring. In Egypt and Tunisia, the revolts in 2011 were followed by the ascendency of Islamist political forces whose powers were felt not only in public policy because they won the first parliamentary elections after the demise of autocratic rules but also in the day-to-day life experiences of citizens from below because fundamentalist religious movements that were formerly banned or whose activities were under security surveillance were allowed to freely operate. For example, when the Islamists assumed a dominant role in formulating policy frameworks in Egypt in 2011–2012, they launched a direct attack on international conventions such as the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Muslim women scholars such as Amna Nosseir, professor of Islamic philosophy at the Women’s College at Ain Shams University, and others had long advocated that there is no incompatibility between CEDAW and Islamic precepts. Yet these women scholars’ voices were completely disregarded by Islamist political forces in their narratives of the need to rid the country of the shackles of its commitment to Western normative frameworks.

There was no difference in outcome as a result of women’s rights activists’ attempts to contest Islamists’ claims by making reference to alternative progressive interpretations within Islam. Ultimately the struggle has been not between multiple interpretations within Islam but between different political forces with contending visions of how the state and society should be governed.

The limits of religious essentialism

While individuals and collectives have multiple identities that are subject to change and reconfiguration, both the post-9/11 Western policy toward the Muslim world and
Islamist political forces tend to reduce identity to a singular identifier—that of religion, in both instances to advance their own political agendas, with the common impact of undermining women’s rights.

Anne Phillips presents four distinct meanings of *essentialism* that are particularly relevant to the discussion of religious essentialism vis-à-vis women’s agency. The first is “the attribution of certain characteristics to everyone subsumed with a certain category” (2010, 71). This would apply, for example, to the agenda of many conservative religious forces on gender relations and reproductive health issues, which are informed by the belief that women’s roles are prescribed by their biological makeup. The second meaning of essentialism identified by Phillips is the “attribution of those characteristics to the category, in ways that naturalise or reify what may be socially created or constructed” (71). Phillips cautions that it is very troubling when claims are made that “culture x” organizes gender relations in a particular way, because it renders the subjects vulnerable to stereotypes, overgeneralizations, and the rigidity that fails to perceive when similarities are greater than differences. This speaks to Western representations of Muslim cultures as having religion as their primary identifier. The assumption here is that in Muslim communities people are devout followers of the faith, whose religious identity is the main driver behind their worldview and behavior. The policy implication is that religious leaders and movements are best placed to engage with them.

The third understanding of essentialism is the “invocation of a collectivity as either the subject or object of political action” (Phillips 2010, 71). The problem with this kind of essentialism, warns Phillips, is the way movements for political and social change conjure into existence particular groups, for example, the emergence of a counter-narrative around religious feminism (79). Musawah is perhaps an example, where, in response to conservative religious forces’ monopolization of the realm of religion a movement emerged that mobilized around Muslim women’s engagement with the Quran. In the process, it assumed that Muslim women wish to work within a religious framework and that they view their agency in religious terms. The fact that many Muslim women may reject religion altogether and do not see their agency in religious terms is perhaps one of the challenges of transnational feminist movements that essentialize Muslim women.

The fourth dimension of essentialism is “the policing of this collective category, the treatment of its supposedly shared characteristics as the defining ones that cannot be questioned or modified without undermining an individual’s claim to belong to that group” (Phillips 2010: 71–2). This kind of essentialism involves “the identity . . . being defined by reference to an essential defining characteristic and those who do not fit are in trouble” (72). A case in point is the aforementioned example where the international human rights organization replaced an Egyptian feminist activist at the conference with an Egyptian finance expert wearing a headscarf. It did so because it preferred that a veiled woman speak about women’s rights in Islam since “you are not really a Muslim woman from an Arab country if you do not cover your hair.” In other words, it feeds into the global stereotype about Arab Muslim women.
Conclusion

One of the critical steps going forward in addressing religious essentialism is to challenge existing binaries in political thought and practice. The current scholarly approach to the study of gender and religion is wanting—because it is locked in a binary framework of secularism versus religion, modernity versus tradition, and moderates versus extremists. As suggested by Kandiyoti (2011), we need new lenses to engage with the complexities of the politics of gender. New lenses, however, require the deconstruction of the old and greater conceptual clarity over what is meant by the religious and the secular.

The dichotomization of states, political forces, actors, and strategies of engagement as either secular or religious conceals multiple and complex ways in which both intertwine, intersect, and overshadow each other. Patel’s (2011) article on the politics of the British government espousing multifaithism in lieu of multiculturalism exposes the fragility of the idea of an allegedly secular Western state, when policies and programs are increasingly being infused with religion, driven by (wars on terror) security agendas.

The dichotomy between a secular feminist and an Islamic–Muslim feminist also needs to be scrutinized in light of the shifts in strategies of engagement. Secular feminists are increasingly using religious texts, framings, and idioms in mediating the meanings of international human rights conventions (e.g., CEDAW) with conservative audiences (Mir-Hosseini et al. 2013; Moustafa 2011; Sholkamy 2011). Likewise, women activists who belong to Islamist movements are increasingly using human rights discourses to argue for the traditional gender division of labor, for example, insisting that it is a woman’s right not to have to work to earn a living since it is a man’s duty to provide for her and her children (Tadros 2012).

Such binaries conceal the ambiguities and fluidity of identities, framing of ideas, and strategies of engagement. This is not to suggest that ideological projects are not important, only that the ways actors exercise their agency vis-à-vis different contexts and audiences may not fit neatly into one of two binaries, as problematized by the various case studies presented here.

Conceptual clarity is also needed to push the debates beyond essentialist framings. While religious agency has been the subject of much analysis, the multiple meanings of secularism have not. Kandiyoti defines secular spaces as “. . . spaces where justifications for pluralism and equality can be based on sources other than religious doctrine (though they do not exclude religion as a possible source). Those wishing to use religious arguments to achieve a more progressive reading of women’s rights are de facto members of secular spaces since feminists—of whatever persuasion—have little to gain from a closure of public deliberation” (2011, 13).

For Appleby, it is the secularism of the West that has become so hegemonic as to be exclusionary. He is critical of secular fundamentalists who are the “dogmatists who proclaim the creed of secularism, as if they were the sole bearers of truth and righteousness” (2010). According to Appleby, secular fundamentalists will go to great lengths to crush any forms of religion in the public sphere. On the other hand, Sholkamy (2011), writing
on the growing salience of religion Egyptian society over the past forty years in particular, suggests that it is the religious that has become hegemonic and that the cause and form of religiosity and its relationship with piety and morality is highly problematic.

The relationship between the secular, the religious, and pluralism lies at the heart of the debate. Some have argued that, in social orders where religion becomes hegemonic, what emerges is a form of support for communitarianism (based on the premise that this is the religion of the majority and it is what the majority wishes), under which those who deviate from the religious normative values, order, or ways are rejected.

At the level of praxis, using religion as an entry point to elicit social change should be recognized as one of a number of possible approaches to community engagement, and certainly not the only one, even in communities where religion is an important mobilizing force. This is not to suggest that religion should be ignored, only that people can be engaged with through various capacities and multiple identities (and not just their religious one). The religious framework is one pathway to engaging with gender issues, but the goal should be gender equality.

The challenges of transnational feminist movements seeking to address the growing threats to women's rights from fundamentalist movements operate on multiple planes. Globally, transnational feminist movements cannot ignore the power and influence of a securitized Western policy agenda and how it shapes development policy more generally and gendered policies in countries considered of strategic importance or of security risk more specifically. Transnational feminist movements also contend with the need to avoid secular reductionism, manifest in a nonrecognition of the influence of religion in people's daily lives in some communities while also avoiding religious essentialism, which assumes that religion is the principle identity through which women identify themselves and the main pathway for eliciting social change. As with transnational feminist movements more broadly, there is also a challenge in assuming a distinct identity while also being inclusive to difference and the need to work simultaneously on international policy influence while remaining connected to national- and local-level constituencies.

It is clear that transnational feminist movements have played an important role in exposing, critiquing, and countering the policies and practices of actors who instrumentalize religion in ways that intentionally or inadvertently undermine women's rights, be they global, national, or local. As power configurations at global, regional, and local levels shift, transnational feminist movements will also need to be responsive to their implications for the gender equality agenda while being sensitive to the historical, political, and economic contextual specifics in which it is being negotiated.

Notes

1. This chapter draws heavily on the case studies presented in the *IDS Bulletin* on “Gender, Rights and Religion” (2011) and the work of the late Cassandra Balchin. Her engagement for almost twenty years in advocating for women's rights in contexts both global and local in which religion was being deployed to undermine them has been unparalleled. We owe much to her prolific writing on the subject.
2. It is important to distinguish between the use of the terms Muslim or Islamic to refer to aspects or elements of Islam, the faith, and Islamist or Islamism to refer to political Islam. Islamism or political Islam emerged in the 1920s as a political movement that promoted the belief in the fundamental importance of modern nation-states being governed according to Islamic precepts (premised on the Sharia) and the need to revive the Islamic caliphate (universal Islamist rule in Muslim majority countries). See Tadros (2012) for further details.

3. Interview by the author with Mozn Hassan, director of Nazra for Feminist Studies, Cairo, July 2010.

4. These are some examples of the strategies being used. Please see Balchin (2008) for the full discussion.

5. Including for example, the publication of a Facing Fundamentalisms newsletter; http://www.awid.org/Library/Facing-Fundamentalisms-Newsletters.

6. While Musawah claims to use other approaches also, in reality its main approach is premised on seeking change through religious frameworks and traditions.

7. The Arabic word is tafsir, meaning the science of explaining and interpreting the Quran, the Holy Book of Islam.

8. Although, it needs to be noted that in the case of Egypt, the people's revolt against the Muslim Brotherhood–led government in July 2013, followed by its overthrow through military intervention, resulted in the removal of the Islamist political force from political power.

References


CHAPTER 26

SOUTH ASIA’S GENDERED “WARS ON TERROR”

SEEMA KAZI

INTRODUCTION

The concept of South Asia as a distinct geographic and political entity is a contemporary, roughly six-decade-old construct, formalized by the adoption of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Charter by the heads of state of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, and Maldives in 1985. Although Afghanistan is not part of SAARC, it is central to the ongoing wars in the region and is therefore included in this discussion with India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.

“Terror” is a generic term usually associated with nonstate groups; the implicit assumption is that there are distinct and self-evident groups of “terrorists” specializing in a unique and singular form of politics—“terrorism” (Tilly 2004, 6). This assumption, however, is incongruent with the empirical reality. Nonstate groups or movements have not always used terror as a form of political mobilization, even as states across the world have practiced “terror” on a far greater and graver scale than their adversaries. A disproportionate focus and emphasis on antistate terror obscures the fact that the major form of “terror” in the world today is that perpetrated by states and their allies, and that quantitatively, nonstate terror pales into relative insignificance by comparison (Sluka 2000, 1). It is equally the case that civilians are the primary victims of violence between states and nonstates. It is therefore prudent to discard reductive or partial notions of “terror” in favor of a citizen-centric understanding of the term. Terror in this discussion is defined as “political violence that targets civilians, independent of whether the actor is a non-state movement or a sovereign state” (Falk 2012, 242).

Wars between states and nonstates within national borders existed long before the rise of transnational, nonstate terror groups at the turn of the twenty-first century. The attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., on September 11, 2001, undermined the idea that state security could be achieved by securing national borders through military
means. The US-led post-9/11 “global wars on terror” unfolded in a geopolitical vacuum, with little opposition to US dominance. It encouraged other nation-states in the world to use “terror” as an excuse to crush and discredit local movements for self-determination and enhance their own repressive powers. Unable and/or unwilling to counter the United States, South Asian states backed the US-led “war against terror” in a region where there were already local “wars of terror” within state borders.

The chapter thus identifies two distinct dimensions of the “wars against terror” in South Asia: the first relates to the US-led “wars on terror” in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the second concerns domestic “wars of terror” within individual nation-states, which in some instances were prompted and reinforced by the former. This distinction is maintained throughout the chapter. The net effect of both types of war has been to render women increasingly subject to state and nonstate violence and unable to influence domestic or foreign policy, even as they were invoked as a justification for the US-led “wars on terror” (Stabile and Rentschler 2005) in the region. The “wars on terror” in Afghanistan preceded the “wars of terror” in Pakistan, India, and Sri Lanka. It is therefore appropriate to begin the discussion with the former.

**Afghanistan: From Cold War to “Wars on Terror”**

Lying west of the Indian subcontinent, Afghanistan is a confluence of Indian, Greek, Persian, Turkish, and Central Asian cultures. It remained neutral during the two world wars, during which time it was ruled by several monarchs whose attempts at reform met with limited success. Until the 1970s it received aid from both the Soviet Union and the United States. Afghanistan’s neutrality ended with the deepening of the Cold War and a series of domestic economic and political crises. In 1973 a group of military officers deposed the monarch, King Zahir Shah; Afghanistan was proclaimed a republic by a new set of rulers whose links with the Soviet Union resulted in the country’s alignment with the latter. To strengthen its regional influence, the Soviet Union sent troops into Afghanistan in 1979 and installed its protégé, Babrak Karmal, as president.

The Soviet intervention transformed Afghanistan into a tragic Cold War battleground. A conglomeration of armed Islamist guerrilla groups, the mujahideen (holy warriors), belonging to different ethnicities and geographical areas, drew together to wage jihad (holy war) against Soviet troops on Afghan soil. Within weeks of the Soviet invasion, the United States had decided to arm the Afghan resistance. The real objective of US support for the mujahideen was not to help the Afghans or promote democracy. Rather, as President Jimmy Carter’s national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, explained, it was “to give the USSR its own Vietnam” (Sidky 2007, 858). Afghanistan was to become the textbook case of a proxy war during the Cold War. Support for the US-backed mujahideen was channeled through Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), with the willing consent of its military dictator, General Zia-ul-Haq. Afghan mujahideen thus came to be funded, trained, and armed by the United States and Pakistan.⁶

During the 1979–1989 decade, large parts of Afghanistan were laid to waste by fighting between mujahideen and Soviet-backed forces on the one hand, and rival mujahideen factions on the other. The war greatly damaged the country’s political, economic, social, and cultural systems and inflicted great misery on Afghan citizens. For Afghan women, the impact was particularly severe and unrelenting:

*Years of war have left many subjected to an unusual kind of pain. Wives have had to cope with husbands and fathers leaving their families to take up arms, invariably for months at a time, sometimes for years. Mothers have watched as their teenage sons have been forcibly taken away to combat. And for literally millions of Afghan women, war has meant a forced march to survival as refugees in foreign lands. Cut off from their homes and solely responsible for the care of their children, they have endured an extraordinary burden.*

(ICRC 1999, 9)

During the twentieth century Afghan rulers had introduced modest gender equality reforms, including the opening of girls’ schools, the end of gender segregation, and women’s right to vote.⁷ These policies were further advanced by King Zahir Shah, who declared Kabul University coeducational and government support for voluntary removal of the veil. However, the benefits of these social changes accrued largely to urban women; only 8 percent of the total female population received a waged income. Yet despite their relatively small numbers, women’s professional enrollment and participation in public life increased during the 1970s, and by the time of the Soviet invasion urban Afghan women were fairly active in public life (Ahmed-Ghosh 2003).

Mikhail Gorbachev’s acknowledgment that the war in Afghanistan could not be won preceded a complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989. The United States had prevailed over the Soviet Union in Afghanistan using a local army of mujahideen. Yet the social and political impacts of the US administration’s Cold War “victory” were no more than a chimera for Afghan women. Upon seizing Kabul, mujahideen factions sought to Islamize the state through an explicitly gendered agenda. Women were dismissed from jobs and forced to wear the veil, and restrictions were imposed on female mobility and employment:

*Whereas previously 70% of teachers, almost half of civil servants and 40% of doctors had been women, they were altogether banned from paid employment, including trade, and prohibited from leaving their homes without a mahram (male relative). For war widows who had become the sole breadwinners of their families, this meant levels of destitution that reduced many to begging or prostitution.*

(Kandiyoti 2005, 7)

Paradoxically, with the fall of Kabul and its communist regime, the common purpose binding the mujahideen alliance dissolved. In the absence of unity among rival warlord
factions, each of which carved out its own local area of domination, a militia of Pashtun Islamists, the Taliban, took advantage of the ensuing political vacuum to emerge as a powerful force across the country. The Taliban were a product of the social forces unleashed by the Cold War in Afghanistan and of converging Pakistani and Saudi interests in the wake of Soviet and US disengagement from the region. By 1996 they had overrun the mujahideen alliance, captured Kabul, declared Afghanistan an Islamic Emirate, and imposed a puritanical and punitive version of Islam on Afghan society. Lacking public support, the Taliban exercised power and control through fear and terror. Their regime was characterized by brutal repression of women.

Women and girls were forbidden to attend school, leave their homes without a male escort, or work outside the home. Female education was restricted to the age of eight and confined to Quranic knowledge. The dress code of the burqa (a body-length robe covering the face and body, with only a mesh for seeing and breathing) was forcibly imposed on women; houses with female residents were forced to be marked with painted windows; women and men were segregated into separate hospitals; female medical workers were banned from working in public hospitals; health and humanitarian assistance to girls and women was disallowed; and women were barred from public life and space altogether. The Taliban-created Department for the Propagation of Virtue and Suppression of Vice enforced gender segregation, transgressions of which were punished by public beatings. The tragedy of Afghan women under the Taliban was summed up in a report by Physicians for Human Rights:

Kabul in 1998 [was] a city of beggars—women who had once been teachers and nurses [were] now moving in the streets like ghosts under their enveloping burqas, selling every possession and begging so as to feed their children. It is difficult to find another government or would-be government in the world that has deliberately created such poverty by arbitrarily depriving half the population under its control of jobs, schooling, mobility, and health care. Such restrictions are literally life threatening to women and to their children. (1998, 2–3)

During the 1990s significant quantities of arms and weapons supplied by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were liberally appropriated by Pakistan’s military intelligence agency, the ISI. Pakistan’s strategy of supporting the most politically conservative and socially regressive factions of Afghan mujahideen as a means of maintaining influence in Afghanistan produced droves of Islamist extremists who either collaborated with or joined Afghan Taliban forces. In 1996 Osama bin Laden relocated to Afghanistan from Sudan. After the 1998 bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania—allegedly masterminded by bin Laden—and the later refusal of the Taliban to turn him over, the United States embarked on a military offensive (“Operation Enduring Freedom”) in Afghanistan in late 2001 to destroy al-Qaeda bases. Bin Laden survived the US offensive and went on to collaborate with the ISI in extending the Islamist campaign beyond Pakistan into Indian-administered Kashmir—an intervention that reinforced the India–Pakistan rivalry over Kashmir and drew both states into a military and nuclear confrontation.
On September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda launched a series of coordinated attacks on the United States in New York City and Washington, D.C. Four passenger airlines were hijacked and crashed into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a field in Pennsylvania; almost three thousand people died in the attacks. The US response to the 9/11 attacks commenced in October 2001 with an aerial offensive against Taliban and al-Qaeda bases in Afghanistan, together with a ground invasion in collaboration with the Northern Alliance, with the aim of dislodging the Taliban regime and creating an alternative government that would facilitate US access to al-Qaeda hideouts.

Prior to 9/11 the situation of Afghan women had not been part of global discourse on the war in Afghanistan. Indeed, throughout the 1990s there was little international concern or sympathy for the suffering of Afghan women inflicted by two decades of war. It was only in the wake of the 9/11 tragedy and the retaliatory US-led Operation Enduring Freedom military offensive against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda that Afghan women appeared in the US foreign policy discourse and the international public imagination.

The stated justification for the US counteroffensive was democracy, human rights, and the rights of Afghan women. Operation Enduring Freedom was constructed as a moral mission to rescue Afghan women from Taliban tyranny. Using the excuse of women’s rights to wage war in Afghanistan proved to be particularly powerful and persuasive, given the Taliban’s brutal treatment of women. This argument also dovetailed with Western liberal opinion, wherein women’s oppression, the Taliban, and Islamic fundamentalism exemplified the danger posed by an enemy to both American citizens and Western civilization. There was accordingly considerable public sympathy in the United States for the US-led offensive to uphold Afghan women’s rights. A statement by Laura Bush, wife of ex-president George W. Bush, exemplified the instrumental use of gender in US foreign policy: “Because of our recent military gains in much of Afghanistan, women are no longer imprisoned in their homes… The fight against terrorism is also a fight for the rights and dignity of women.”

The burqa-clad Afghan woman thus became a justification and rallying point for devastating aerial assaults against an enemy thought deserving of precisely such treatment due to its cruelties against women. The image of the oppressed Afghan woman and the fundamentalist Taliban was as much part of US national security discourse as its self-declared moral and civilizational mission to bring democracy to Afghanistan. Couching Operation Enduring Freedom in the language of women’s rights also helped obfuscate and efface a decade (1979–1989) of devastation wreaked on a poor country by the US–Soviet Cold War rivalry. It also masked the dubious and opportunistic local alliance between the United States and mujahideen factions of the erstwhile Northern Alliance—a notoriously misogynist group comprising soldiers who had led campaigns of rape, torture, and slaughter in Afghanistan before the Taliban takeover. Northern Alliance members were also complicit in the abduction of young girls and women, gang rapes, and murders (Rahman 2012, 3). Among the groups favored by the United States was the Hizb-e-Islami faction led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar—a man known for throwing acid on the faces of women who refused to wear the veil; his faction received as much as 50 percent of US aid.
The Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA)—a well-known Afghan women’s organization—underlined the bitter irony of the US-led coalition’s selective use of the term “terrorist” and women’s security and justice concerns:

Western-supported warlords still control much of the country. . . . [T]hey are not regarded as terrorists since they work according to the directions of the Pentagon and White House. . . . Prominent warlords such as Abdul Rashid Dostum [a key member of the Northern Alliance] and many others have their own independent “governments” in different regions of Afghanistan. . . . [and] are involved in the abduction and raping of girls . . . and many other crimes. The local police and judiciary are composed of people appointed by these warlords. Therefore there is no implementation of law, justice and security in such places; and our people have no door to knock for help.

(RAWA 2009)

By 2011 there were 150,000 troops in Afghanistan. Yet the crisis of security persisted and was exacerbated with the advance of the Taliban in areas that had been previously peaceful. There was also widespread public resentment against a discredited government tainted by corruption, police abuses, arbitrary arrest of civilians, executions, torture, and a proliferation of criminal gangs. Civilians continued to pay the highest price for Afghanistan’s deficit of security and governance: between 16,725 and 19,013 Afghan civilians were killed during the 2001–2012 period (Watson Institute 2013).

This crisis greatly impacted Afghan women’s access to health care, education, employment, mobility, and political participation. In 2012 a group of women in the city of Kandahar told researchers that their lives were not much different than they had been under the Taliban:

It is like the Taliban times for women now. We are in the same situation as then. We cannot come out of the house to earn . . . money or get an education. The only difference is that our honour was safe then but it is not now. The emergence of a criminalized economy produced a dramatic increase in child, forced and early marriage of girls and women due to increased fears regarding threats of rape and the potential threat of forced marriage to militia commanders.

(Cortright and Wall 2012, 20–21)

In a statement to the United Nations Security Council in 2002, Dr. Sima Samar, minister for women’s affairs, highlighted the link between a general climate of insecurity created by the US-led “wars on terror” in Afghanistan and Afghan women’s participation in politics and public life:

The rights of women, in particular, are put at risk by the absence of security. Women continue to fear violence and to worry about the imposition of Taliban-like restrictions. Unless greater security is provided, the inclusion of women in the loya jirga [tribal council] may be undermined and the distribution of identification cards to enable women’s participation in future elections imperiled. Women in Afghanistan are finally beginning to see a little light after a very long darkness. But the gains that have been made in the past four months could easily be lost unless security is greatly improved.
In the same year, in a traditional Afghan grand tribal conference, the \textit{loya jirga}, Hamid Karzai was elected president. The election was dominated by former warlords and marred by complaints of interference and noninclusion of marginalized groups. Dr. Sima Samar was stripped of her post for opposing the Sharia. As the only female member of the interim administration's cabinet, Dr. Samar protested against the \textit{loya jirga}'s patriarchal politics: “This is not democracy; it’s a rubber stamp” (Veit 2002, 8).

A UN-supported constitutional \textit{loya jirga} in 2003 ensured that 20 percent of representatives were women in the deliberations for formulating a draft constitution. Yet women’s substantive participation was subverted by warlord domination and intimidation. Malalai Joya—a female candidate and founding member of the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA)—was provided special protection after her public criticism of Afghan warlords. An Afghan nongovernmental organization (NGO), Women for Afghan Women (WAW), drew up a bill of rights for women for inclusion by the Constitutional Commission. Upon release of the draft, however, many of women’s demands, including, among others, the right to equality before the law as men and the reservation of 25 percent of seats in the \textit{wolesi jirga} (lower house of parliament), were excluded (Grenfell 2004, 22–25).

The creation of a government through elections could not ensure political stability in Afghanistan. The Kabul government was widely perceived as allied with the United States and therefore illegitimate. A combination of factors—weak central authority; popular anger against the Western military presence; corruption and a destroyed economy; increased tensions with Pakistan over alleged al-Qaeda camps along the Pakistan–Afghanistan border; frequent airstrikes by the United States against alleged Taliban and al-Qaeda targets on Afghan territory; increased civilian casualties during such offensives; and numerous, often bloody skirmishes between Western forces and Taliban militants throughout 2004–2009—contributed to a climate of insecurity, instability, and social chaos across the country.

The grave security situation impeded women’s participation in public life. Women contested the presidential and provincial council elections, yet due to the escalating violence, female voter turnout was low, with reduced women’s participation as candidates for provincial council elections. Women’s presence in the civil services registered a modest increase (from 22 percent in 2006 to 25 percent in 2011), while women’s presence in the judicial (4.7 percent) and security (5 percent) sectors was minimal. In 2012 there were 1,300 female police officers in a force with more than 143,000 members (Cortright and Wall 2012, 15).

The new constitution of Afghanistan, drawn up in 2004, guaranteed gender equality and women’s right to vote; 25 percent of seats in the \textit{wolesi jirga} (lower house) were reserved for women, and a separate Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MOWA) was created. Important as these gains were, they did not translate into substantive change for Afghan women. The Afghan Parliament comprised a number of reactionary, conservative elements hostile to women’s rights; female members of parliament lacked decision-making power; and the few women in parliament and the cabinet were frequently aligned with warlords (Cortright and Wall 2012, 10). The contradiction between the Afghan
government’s stated policy and actual practice regarding women’s rights was apparent on the day of the signing of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) into law. On that day the Karzai government also signed a blatantly discriminatory Shiite family law. Women who protested against the legislation were deemed un-Islamic and denounced as Western agents and prostitutes (Cortright and Wall 2012, 11).

Generally speaking, the US administration’s self-declared mission to “save” Afghan women achieved little in its discredited and unwinnable “wars on terror”. Its military intervention in Afghanistan also served to discredit the women’s rights argument, because it was widely perceived to be associated with Western interests. After the killing of bin Laden in Pakistan in 2011, the US administration announced an earlier than scheduled withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan. At the time of writing, US forces were being withdrawn, with prospects of direct peace talks among the government in Kabul, the United States, and the Taliban.

The political forces created and cultivated by the CIA–ISI military strategic alliance in Afghanistan during the decade of the 1970s–1980s intersected with and reinforced those created by a post-9/11 bin Laden and al-Qaeda presence in the Afghanistan–Pakistan region. In an ironic twist, the Islamist militants nurtured by Pakistan’s military intelligence agency, the ISI, as strategic assets in Afghanistan turned to waging war against the Pakistani state.

Pakistan: War Without End

Pakistan’s descent into violence and chaos in the twenty-first century is rooted in the same Cold War machinations that had inflicted collective suffering and misery on the people of Afghanistan. Throughout the 1979–1989 decade, the United States channeled aid to some of the most chauvinist and misogynist Islamist groups in Pakistan, breeding violence, extremism, and a “Kalashnikov culture” across the Afghanistan–Pakistan borderlands (Riedel 2008, 33). During much the same period General Zia-ul-Haq’s military regime (1977–1988) transformed Pakistan into a site and conduit for bankrolling CIA-backed military operations by mujahideen fighters in Afghanistan.

The Pakistan regime’s collaboration with the United States in Afghanistan paralleled a domestic policy of Islamization. Women bore the brunt of an overtly gendered Islamization program: nonmarital sex and adultery were criminalized, and thousands of women accused of “honor crimes” were imprisoned. Women were unable to seek redress through the criminal law, as victims of rape and sexual abuse were deemed guilty of illicit sex, and the value of a woman’s testimony was deemed half that of a man’s (Lau 2007, 1296). These laws formed part of a larger Islamization agenda that included an antiblasphemy law with a mandatory death penalty for anyone defaming the Prophet Mohammed; it was routinely misused against religious minorities by extremist groups (MRG 2010).
State policy of using Islam to promote misogynist and sectarian agendas was taken further by the ISI, whose cultivation of *mujahideen* groups including al-Qaeda to maintain influence in Afghanistan bred a culture of weapons, violence, and anarchy in Pakistan's northwestern borderlands adjoining Afghanistan and a climate of violence, fear, and intolerance within the country. The core idiom of both General Zia-ul-Haq and the *mujahideen* was religion. While the former had used Sharia law to Islamize Pakistan during the 1980s, the Taliban and allied Islamist groups advanced a variation of the same agenda during the 1990s through indiscriminate violence and terror.

Pakistan's corrupt and discredited civilian governments (Benazir Bhutto, 1988–1990, 1993–1996; Nawaz Sharif, 1990–1993, 1997–1999), together with the continued dominance of the military and its collaboration with Islamist groups, weakened the authority of the Pakistani state and its capacity to impose law and order. In 1999 General Pervez Musharraf seized power through a military coup d'état. In the wake of 9/11 and the US-led “wars on terror” against bin Laden and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, Pakistan once again became a close and crucial US ally. General Musharraf’s domestic and foreign policies were at odds with his public commitment to clamp down on extremist groups in Pakistan: violence by Islamist groups continued, and Taliban and al-Qaeda fugitives remained elusive (Mir 2009, 383–384). Musharraf’s lack of a popular mandate, his fixing of elections, and attacks against Pakistan’s institutions—especially the judiciary—and the military’s continued patronage of Islamist extremist groups under his command further eroded the faltering integrity and authority of the state (Levy and Scott-Clarke 2007).

Pakistan was ostensibly committed to the US-led post-9/11 “wars on terror” in the region. Yet its internal contradictions impeded any meaningful progress toward eliminating the domestic roots of this terror. For precisely this reason, a democratically elected civilian government in 2009 possessed the mandate, yet lacked the power or authority, to contain Islamist terror. The state’s capacity to govern, eliminate internal threats, or protect citizen’s rights, especially those of women and religious minorities, was dangerously undermined. Islamist groups stepped up their war against the state, heightening the drift and chaos within Pakistan. In 2010 a spate of killings of religious minorities by the Taliban went unpunished even as its perpetrators “congratulated Pakistanis for the attacks, calling people from the Ahmediyya and Shia communities ‘the enemies of Islam and common people’ and urging Pakistanis to take the ‘initiative’ and kill every such person in range” (Human Rights Watch 2010).

More ominously, there was increasing evidence of links among the Pakistani military, its intelligence agency (the ISI), and Islamist militants. Under international pressure to curtail the activities of Pakistan-based Islamist militant groups in Afghanistan and Indian-administered Kashmir, Islamist militancy relocated to Pakistan’s far-flung tribal areas adjoining Afghanistan to perpetrate attacks against the state. This placed the military—the principal patron of Islamist terror in Pakistan—in the paradoxical position of having to wage war against the very constituency it had supported for decades.

Under assault from Taliban forces since 2007, the Swat Valley in northwestern Pakistan adjoining Afghanistan fell to the Taliban in 2009. A gendered parallel administration was swiftly established by the Taliban, with prohibitions against women's
presence in markets and other public places.\textsuperscript{24} The Taliban destroyed approximately two hundred girls’ schools, banned female education, and imposed Sharia law.\textsuperscript{25} The war in the Swat Valley had a profound effect on women, where a deeply compromised and weakened Pakistani state ceded its sovereignty to Islamists and was no longer in a position to protect women’s rights.

According to Pakistan’s National Commission on the Status of Women, women factory workers in Mingora, Swat’s main town, were unable to return to work. A woman from Swat described the gendered fallout of the security deficit created by Pakistan’s domestic wars of terror: “‘We worry the Taliban will return and the persecution will start again. In every neighbourhood there are people who are linked to the militants and who keep an eye on the activities of us women,’ said Sumira Bibi, 20, who works at a cosmetics factory in Mingora” (IRIN 2010a). Women’s premonitions in Swat were eerily prescient: the Taliban presence and assault against women continued. Taliban militants gunned down a young girl, Malala Yousafzai, in Swat for endorsing girls’ education.\textsuperscript{26} By the time the Pakistani military retook Swat, the war had created tens of thousands of refugees and a humanitarian tragedy.

Under pressure from the United States, the Pakistani military launched offensives in the remote, mountainous, and socially conservative areas of North and South Waziristan, which had become Taliban\textsuperscript{27} and al-Qaeda\textsuperscript{28} havens after 9/11 and the US counteroffensive in Afghanistan; militants fleeing the US assault had crossed the border to take shelter in Waziristan’s mountainous terrain. Facing stiff resistance and unable to overwhelm Taliban forces in Waziristan, the military entered into a hasty and temporary peace agreement with the latter, which worked to their advantage. In South Waziristan Taliban decrees enforced a gendered regime, including a dress code for women.\textsuperscript{29} A local resident of Miramshah, North Waziristan’s main town, described the strictures against women by the Taliban:

\textit{Tribesmen were informed through mosque loudspeakers . . . that no woman would be allowed to leave home and cast a vote. . . . [P]amphlets were handed out in Miramshah warning tribesmen not to let women vote in the general elections, threatening punishment for those who did. “Take our words, this kind of disgraceful act will not be tolerated and anyone influencing women to cast a vote will be punished,” said the pamphlet, signed by “mujahideen” and thrown from vehicles into shops. (Al-Arabiya 2013)}

Women’s rights workers faced ever-present danger, especially in the Afghanistan–Pakistan borderlands, where ideologies nurtured during the Cold War and fortified by a post-9/11 “wars on terror” and ISI-backed Islamization continued to extract a deadly price from women:

\textit{Farida Afridi, a 25-year-old woman working for Tribal NGOs Consortium in the Khyber Agency was shot dead by militants while on her way to work. “The militants are labelling the NGOs, especially where women are working, as spreading obscenities and vulgarities,” said a tribal elder in the region, who spoke anonymously for fear of being targeted for his comments and for talking to a female journalist. (Langevine 2012)}
By 2011 the deadly portents of Islamist terror had seeped into Pakistan’s Punjab heartland. The governor of Punjab was murdered for criticizing the misuse of a blasphemy law against religious minorities. Pakistan’s only Christian cabinet member, Shahbaz Bhatti, met with the same fate. Ahmadis, Christians, Hindus, and Shias, as well as moderate Sunnis, were targeted by Islamist groups. Suicide bombings, killings, and assassinations by Taliban and al-Qaeda-allied groups targeted all sections of Pakistani society, including journalists.

Pakistan’s “wars on terror” had the effect of heightening instability and reinforcing older conflicts. Baluchistan—Pakistan’s poorest, albeit mineral-rich province—turned into a strategic Taliban base and a hideout for the Quetta shura, a Taliban war council headed by Mullah Omar, an Afghan war veteran leading military operations against Western troops. The anarchy created by the Taliban incursion into Baluchistan reignited older fault lines of conflict: an ongoing Baluchi antistate movement for self-determination morphed into deadly attacks against non-Baluchi civilians. During 2008–2010 ethnic and religious minority (Punjabi and Shiite) teachers were murdered by Baluchi nationalists in a retaliatory response against the Pakistani state for abuses by its security forces (Human Rights Watch 2010).

There was an additional gender dimension to the US–Pakistan joint “wars on terror.” During the rule of General Pervez Musharraf there was a dramatic increase in the disappearance of terror suspects. Women formed associations to demand accountability for their “disappeared” male kin. One of the women, Amna Masood Janjua, has tried in vain to locate her husband, who disappeared mysteriously from a bus station in their hometown of Rawalpindi in July 2005. She believes her husband, a school principal and businessman, is one of the hundreds of people who have been detained without charge by Pakistan’s intelligence agencies in the state’s war against militant organizations and have not been seen since (Masood 2009). A US security official confirmed that the disappearances in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks were an outcome of the close cooperation with Pakistan in the fight against terrorism, and that “Pakistan had handed over terror suspects to us.” The allegations of women like Mrs. Masood “wouldn’t surprise me,” the official said, stressing however that they were unproven. In over five years, Mrs. Masood’s group registered 1,030 disappearances. “Some had been taken by police and plainclothes men for questioning and never came back,” Mrs. Masood said. “Others just mysteriously disappeared, like my husband—later we found out that they had been arrested.” Ninety-nine per cent are men. (Mekhennet 2012)

The instability and insecurity generated by the US–Pakistan collaboration during the Cold War and post-9/11 “wars on terror” created a climate in which women were subject to high levels of violence and killing across the country. In its 2009 report, The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan reported 1,384 murders, 928 rapes, and 604 “honor killings” of women. In 2012 there was a 7 percent increase in violence against women (The Nation 2012). Neither civilian governments nor Pakistan’s powerful military has been able to control the gamut of Islamist forces produced by both wars. Indeed, the military
is itself greatly compromised by colluding with the very forces it was subsequently battling to subdue. On the other hand, US policy to promote “democracy” in Pakistan is at odds with its close collaboration with military regimes in the country, its complicity in arbitrary and illegal detentions, and drone strikes in the remote northwestern region that promote a culture of impunity and increase Islamization of local populations in the region. A new democratically elected government headed by the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) was sworn in after elections in 2013. Whether it has the capacity, competence, or will to stem the tide of violence and extremism across Pakistan remains to be seen.

**India: Democracy at War**

Democracy is modern India’s singular and most enduring achievement in a South Asian region characterized by war, military intervention, and authoritarian rule. India has continued to be a functioning democracy, yet it has simultaneously witnessed increasing political violence and a deepening crisis of governability over the decades (Kohli 1990). The postindependence secular-nationalist consensus raised hopes for a stable, secular, and democratic India. However, within the first two decades (1947–1967) of independence, the order and stability provided by a pan-India Congress Party had eroded, together with a decline in the overall legitimacy of the political system.

One major dimension of the crisis has been the Indian state’s failure to accommodate the aspirations of ethnic minorities and the consequent emergence of a number of secessionist movements in the northeastern region, where demands for greater autonomy or self-determination were met by militarily backed repression. The state’s resort to extralegal means to address political grievance resulted in the rise of extremist/militant groups, whose targeting of state security forces rationalized ever higher levels of repression against civilians and self-perpetuating cycles of violence and abuse. Links between local militant groups and sympathetic cross-national constituencies reinforced a state-centric discourse of “terror” that sought to discredit and delegitimize local popular resistance precisely on this count. Presently more than fifty-six million citizens in eight states across India (see table 26.1) live daily under patently undemocratic and extraordinarily repressive conditions even as India is, simultaneously, the world’s largest democracy.

India’s domestic conflicts have not been accorded the international attention they deserve. The Indian state does not acknowledge the existence of domestic armed conflict for fear of according legitimacy to armed groups. It has employed arguments around sovereignty to deflect criticism regarding its human rights record in conflict zones. The empirical context of conflict zones in India is broadly similar in terms of a pervasive and intrusive security presence; repressive security legislation; and the suspension of, among others, the right to life, the right to free speech and peaceful assembly, the right to be free of inhuman or degrading treatment, and the right to a fair trial. India’s paradox
of a democracy at war is synonymous with increased reliance on the military as a means of asserting authority in the northeastern region and in Kashmir:

*India has not fought any war in the past 25 years but its armed forces remain the busiest peacetime army fighting internal wars. Officials refuse to provide exact force deployment. However, more than one-third of the army is engaged in Jammu and Kashmir and the north-eastern states.*

(Navlakha 1997, 299)

Among other laws, security legislation such as the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), in force in all conflict zones, empowers the military to search homes and arrest citizens without warrant, destroy houses and villages, and shoot unarmed civilians with the intent to kill. Soldiers and security forces are accorded immunity from prosecution for committing any of these acts, even as citizens in conflict zones are denied democratic rights and civil liberties—including the extraordinary denial of the right to life. The AFSPA violates the nonderogable provisions of international human rights law, including the right to life and the right to be free from arbitrary deprivation of liberty, torture, and cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment, as enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which India is a signatory. The AFSPA also violates article 21 of the constitution of India. Repressive legislation such as the AFSPA allows military forces to wage war against recalcitrant populations with impunity. An Amnesty International report on the northeastern state of Manipur captures the methodology of the Indian state’s offensive against domestic “terror”:

*A hardline combing operation launched in August 1987 has killed at least 14 Manipur villagers, tortured others and detained many more; 125 houses have been burned and dismantled, [and] grain stores, vegetable plots, domestic goods, and livestock looted.*

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**Table 26.1 States and Population under the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States in India under the AFSPA</th>
<th>State Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assam</td>
<td>31,169,272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manipur</td>
<td>2,721,756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meghalaya</td>
<td>2,964,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mizoram</td>
<td>1,091,014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagaland</td>
<td>1,980,602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripura</td>
<td>3,671,032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arunachal Pradesh (Tirap and Changlang districts)</td>
<td>259,949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jammu and Kashmir</td>
<td>12,548,926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>56,406,558</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Population Census of India (2011).*
Women have been sexually abused [and] beaten; nor have children (several dozen) been spared.

(Talwalker 1991, 89)

India’s domestic conflict zones are deeply gendered. Reliable information regarding the nature and scale of violence and repression against women in these regions is not available; for cultural reasons many rapes go unacknowledged and unreported. However, an increasing body of evidence testifies to the multiple and daunting challenges faced by women in India’s conflict zones: as victims and survivors of direct violence by state forces and nonstate groups; widows grieving for the loss of their husbands; female heads of household, burdened with the responsibility of ensuring the economic survival of their families; or citizens demanding justice and accountability from the state for the death or disappearance of loved ones. The trauma of losing kin members and the stress of widowhood and responsibility for the family inflict mental disorders, depression, insomnia, and poor physical health on women. Widowhood affects nutrition levels because it is often accompanied by poverty, and access to health care is especially difficult in rural areas. There are large numbers of young women and widows with very little hope of forming a marital relationship in the absence of eligible males (Human Rights Law Network 2010, 34).

Sexual violence against women has been integral to the Indian state’s counteroffensive in conflict zones. It is used as a weapon of war to inflict individual and collective dishonor on ethnic minorities unwilling to integrate within the Indian Union. In the northeastern state of Nagaland, for example, in a letter to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi dated September 14, 1971, Kuhovi Jimomi condemned the sexual offensive of the Indian Army against girls in her state, which she asserted was condoned, if not actively endorsed, by the highest executive authorities of the Indian state:

Hon’ble Prime Minister,
In the wake of the bestial debauchery exhibited by officers of the Indian Army, I send herewith a protest note to the Government and people of India. Mass rape committed by Indian troops against women residents of Cheswezumi on 9-12-1970 when 18 girls were raped; 9 married girls were raped. The animal passion of the Indian army personnel that fell upon the female population of Mao Song Song town on 24 March 1971…

The sexual depravity of the Indian army personnel against the Naga girls is a tactical move of the Indian army offensive in Nagaland. It has been widely demonstrated in all parts of the country during the sixteen years of the Indo-Naga conflict. There is glaring evidence that the Indian Army is conducting militarism and sexual debauchery through underhand directives received from the High Command.

(Desai 1991, 81–82)

Women’s sexual subjugation by state forces has remained unchanged for decades. In 2004 in the northeastern state of Manipur, Thangjam Manorama Devi was arrested at her home at night and taken into custody by soldiers of the Assam Rifles on suspicion of links to separatist militant groups. Her corpse was found by villagers a little distance from her home. She had been shot through the lower half of her body, raising
suspicion that the shooting had been used to hide evidence of rape. The Assam Rifles (a state-supported paramilitary outfit in India’s northeastern region responsible for the killing) claimed she had been shot while trying to escape. After Manorama’s murder, a group of Manipuri women protested by stripping naked in front of the military headquarters at the state capital, Imphal, holding a banner that read, “Indian Army Rape Us” (Human Rights Watch 2008, 2–4).

Impunity for perpetrators of violence against women in conflict zones, a self-serving policy that denies the existence of domestic war zones and supports a protective veneer of formal democracy, allows India’s appalling record in its conflict zones to go unquestioned. Justice for crimes against women by security forces is rarely, if ever, enforced. Nine years after her daughter’s death,

the frail mother of Manorama Thangjam, who was arrested, raped and shot dead allegedly by some personnel of 17 Assam Rifles on July 11, 2004, [told] Ms. Manjoo about the tragic death of the girl [and] fervently appealed to her for justice. Rashida Manjoo, U.N. Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, broke down and wept for a few minutes uncontrollably . . . during a consultative meeting here. It was attended by about 200 human rights defenders, families of victims and civil society organisations.

(Laithangbam 2013)

In an extraordinary protest, Irom Sharmila Chanu, a woman from the northeastern state of Manipur, has been on a hunger strike for thirteen years to press for the revocation of the AFSPA. She was prevented from meeting Rashida Manjoo during the latter’s visit to Manipur.

Among all the rebellions by ethnic minorities against the Indian state, the revolt in Indian-administered Kashmir was different by virtue of its international/external dimensions. Kashmir’s revolt (1989–1990) reignited a festering rivalry between India and Pakistan over the territory of Kashmir. Kashmir’s revolt against the Indian state and its demand for self-determination was met with a counteroffensive based on coercive repression. Sensing an opportunity to pin down archrival India, Pakistan’s political-military establishment diverted a conglomeration of Islamist groups from Afghanistan and Pakistan to fight Indian military forces in Kashmir. Pakistan’s military intervention in Kashmir inflamed the Indian–Pakistan rivalry over the territory even as it provided the Indian state with an opportunity to (mis)represent the Kashmiri movement for self-determination as cross-border “terror” emanating from Pakistan. As a result, the longstanding political dispute between the people of Kashmir and the Indian state that was, in fact, the source of the revolt, was completely overshadowed by the militarized and nuclearized Indian–Pakistan rivalry over Kashmir’s territory. In the aftermath of 9/11 and international, especially Western, fears regarding Islamist terror, it became relatively easy for India to claim to be a victim of Pakistan-sponsored “terror” in Kashmir. India’s self-serving offer of “unconditional and unambiguous” (Puri 2001, 3805) support to the post-9/11 US-led “wars on terror” in the region helped paper over its own extraordinarily repressive “wars of terror” in Kashmir.
The experience of Kashmiri women under the formidable antiterror counteroffensive by the Indian state was not very different from that of women in Nagaland or Manipur. Indeed, Kashmir has the dubious distinction of having the highest incidence of sexual violence in the world (MSF 2006)—a little-known fact internationally. Rape and sexual abuse of Kashmiri Muslim women by Indian state security forces is frequent and routinely goes un-investigated and unpunished. A case in point is the Kashmiri village of Kunan Poshpora. In February 1991 hundreds of Indian soldiers arrived at Kunan Poshpora at night. According to Amnesty International, the men from the village were taken from their homes during the night and interrogated and tortured about militant activity, while large numbers of women and girls between thirteen and eighty years of age were raped at gunpoint in their homes. The report quoted local magistrate S. M. Yasin, who testified:

_The armed forces had turned violent and behaved like beasts. Villagers said that local police had not permitted the women to be medically examined. Mr. Yasin requested an inquiry into the incident and punishment for the culprits. The state commissioner of Kashmir said that officials in Delhi had denied the charges without first checking with Kashmiri officials. Members of a Kashmiri human rights delegation were told that the police investigation ordered into the incident had not proceeded because the police officer assigned to carry out the investigation was on leave._

(Amnesty International 1991)

Official response to sexual abuse by state forces in conflict zones has centered on silence, denial, or obfuscation of evidence. Under the AFSPA, enforced in all conflict zones, legal impunity for sexual violence impedes investigation and prosecution of the perpetrators and preempts justice for the victims/survivors. The Indian State Party was reprimanded by the CEDAW Committee for its continued toleration of abuses by its armed forces in conflict zones and was urged to abolish the AFSPA:

_When the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women considered India’s second and third periodic reports in 2007 it noted the gender aspect of the abuses created or tolerated by the continued application of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act in the disturbed areas of India. It urged the Indian authorities to take steps to “abolish or reform” the Act and to “ensure that investigation and prosecution of acts of violence against women by the military in disturbed areas [including Manipur] and during detention and arrest is not impeded.”_

(Asian Human Rights Commission 2011, 15)

The “wars of terror” waged by the Indian state against ethnic minorities in the north-east and in Kashmir are indicative of a deep and corrosive political crisis whereby all demands for greater autonomy are construed as a threat to the nation-state. Those making such demands are deemed “undeserving of rights” and are subject to repression with impunity. The political costs of India’s domestic “wars of terror” are high; ethnic grievances and a sense of injustice run deep. The rationalization of ever greater levels of repression against dissident populations in conflict zones, including sexual and other
forms of violence against women, reinforces popular grievances and preempts the possibility of democratic and legal conflict resolution.

**Sri Lanka: State of Total War**

The situation in Sri Lanka is particularly tragic, given the country’s postindependence socioeconomic achievements. Until the 1970s, prior to the beginning of the Sinhalese–Tamil ethnic conflict, Sri Lanka was a developing country making impressive progress. A substantial social welfare program, including health and education, contributed to significant increases in women’s life expectancy rates, from 41.6 years in 1946 to 74.2 years in the 1990s, and in women’s literacy, from 67.3 percent in 1963 to 87.9 percent in 1994 (Basu 2005, 6). Despite the war, Sri Lanka continued to register high economic growth rates and social indicators; the crippling economic, social, and physical costs of war were largely confined to the Tamil-inhabited areas of northern and eastern Sri Lanka, which witnessed some of the most destructive and brutal fighting during the closing phase of the war.37

The Sinhalese are the dominant ethnic group, comprising approximately 75 percent of the Sri Lankan population. The Tamil minority resides in the northern and eastern parts of the island. Tamils are part of the Dravidian ethnic group of peninsular India, also regarded as the community’s cultural homeland. Much like India’s domestic wars, the war in Sri Lanka was precipitated by the accumulation of popular grievances in the wake of institutionalized discrimination against the Tamil ethnic minority:

*The Sinhala-Only Act of 1956, making ... Sinhala the sole language affected the advancement of Tamils in public sector employment. [The] land distribution policy by the state facilitated an increase in the numbers of Sinhala settlers in areas predominantly occupied by Tamils and Muslims. Access to resources, electoral outcomes and political representation for Tamil-speaking peoples were all affected. The frustration at non-violent efforts by post-independence Tamil political parties to have their grievances heard by Sinhala-dominated governments, and subsequently to secure self-determination through peaceful means, led to the rise of militancy among Tamil youth in the late 1970s. Events leading to the anti-Tamil pogrom in July 983 are deemed the official beginning of the armed ethnic conflict.*

(Tambiah 2004, 79)

Sinhalese nationalism, its opposition to Tamil moves for political decentralization, and the progressive demise of moderate Tamil groups allowed the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to emerge as the sole representative of Tamil aspirations for self-determination in the traditional Tamil homelands of northern and eastern Sri Lanka. Both areas transformed into sites of war and terror as the LTTE launched its armed struggle against the Sri Lankan state.
Women were integral to LTTE's ideology and agenda. In 1983 the LTTE established a women's wing whose cadres included young girls. In the early phase of women's recruitment into the LTTE, they were engaged in propaganda, surveillance, and medical and fund-raising activities. Subsequently, due to a shortage of personnel, women were incorporated into a well-organized women's military wing and given combat roles. They were also part of the LTTE's suicide squads and its naval force (Basu 2005, 9). Amrita Basu argues that female recruits joined the LTTE because they could relate culturally to its gendered appeals regarding sacrifice and nation (2005, 10). This may, however, be only a partial explanation in a context in which inordinate attention paid to the LTTE female suicide bomber and the stereotyping of female Tamil resistance fighters by the LTTE and the Sri Lankan state have impeded public dissemination of information regarding the subjective lives, the socioeconomic and educational factors, as well as the events, political choices, and convictions that shaped and drove women's decisions to join the LTTE (De Mel 2007, 199).

The elimination of moderate Tamil groups by the LTTE and its establishment of a de facto state in northern and eastern Sri Lanka preceded a Norwegian-brokered twenty-month cease-fire (2002) between LTTE and government forces. Repeated cease-fire violations occurred throughout 2006. In the same year military operations in the northern and eastern districts prompted LTTE attacks against Sri Lankan forces in both regions and a spate of suicide attacks and bombings in the South, including in Colombo, the capital. The LTTE also assassinated Tamils affiliated with other political factions, Tamil dissidents, and Muslim and Sinhalese citizens (Tambiah 2004, 80). The Sri Lankan state's counteroffensive centered on bombing and shelling Tamil civilian areas in the north and east; attacks on Tamil civilians; and the use of terror, torture, disappearance, and rape as weapons of war.

The destruction and ruin inflicted by decades of war is evident in the physical desolation of the northern and eastern provinces, where many towns resemble European cities after the Second World War (Sebastian n.d.). By 2002 it was estimated that some 70,000 people had lost their lives in the conflict; up to 600,000 people were displaced: 75,000 living in camps in Sri Lanka for internally displaced people and approximately 500,000 having left Sri Lanka (Alison 2003, 38).

The costs of three decades of war for women in Sri Lanka have been gruesome and chilling. Sexual violence and abuse of Tamil women by Sri Lankan security forces was integral to the state's offensive against the LTTE. The presence of armed female LTTE cadres imparted a sexualized edge to the anti-LTTE counteroffensive. There has as yet been no substantive study on sexual crimes against women during the war, although a growing body of evidence points to the complicity of state forces in the widespread sexual abuse of Tamil women in the north and east. Women's affiliation or links with the LTTE became a justification for rape and sexual abuse by state forces:

_They asked all six of us if we had any links with the LTTE. I did not want to lie and get caught so I told them that I had worked for the LTTE. I was taken to Veppankulam camp in Vavuniya. I was questioned and tortured by Sri Lankan army personnel and_
some were in uniform. I was raped many times. I cannot recall how many times. I was kept in detention for 15 days. Finally, I agreed to sign papers and admit that I was a full member of the LTTE. I just wanted the rapes and torture to stop.

(Human Rights Watch 2013, 1)

Rape was also used as an instrument to instill fear and terror. UM, a twenty-five-year old woman, was detained at Arunachalam camp after she managed to flee the fighting in the northern district of Mullivaikal during the final weeks of the conflict in April 2009. In her testimony to Human Rights Watch, she narrated her ordeal:

They questioned me about my links with the LTTE and asked about my activities. I said I was forced to work for LTTE and didn't know anything. They didn't believe me. They beat me, pulled my hair, and banged my head on a wall. They beat me with their hands and kicked me with their boots. One of the soldiers said, “We will teach you a lesson.” I lost consciousness that day and when I came to, I realized I had been raped. Then more soldiers came and raped me. This went on for many days. I can't remember how many times and how many soldiers raped me.

(Human Rights Watch 2013, 1)

The Sri Lankan civil war ended after close to three decades, with the Sri Lankan government claiming victory over LTTE “terror” in 2009. Credible charges of war crimes and sexual violence have been consistently denied by Sri Lankan authorities. Official investigations by the UN however, concluded that

while both the government and the LTTE committed atrocities in the final months of the war, the government was responsible for the majority of deaths and allegations of war crimes were credible. Some 40,000 civilians were killed in the first five months of 2009. Families and communities were destroyed beyond recognition. In one survey of the war-torn areas, 80% of women were either widowed, unmarried, divorced or living separately from their husbands. Among them, 70% were heading households and the majority had no jobs.

(“What the Women Say” 2013, 2)

The spiral of sexual violence produced by the war permeated the interstices of Sri Lankan society, leading to a dramatic escalation in sexual violence against women in the war-affected northern and eastern districts, with at least five reported incidents of rape every day; both regions also reported increases in sex work and forced marriage (“What the Women Say” 2013, 2). The destruction of the social fabric, together with the general devastation of the war, fueled increased alcoholism among Tamil men and domestic violence in Tamil households; women's education and employment were severely curtailed (International Crisis Group 2011). Even after the formal cessation of military hostilities and the decimation of the LTTE, there is little official concern for human security, and women remain marginalized from decisions regarding security: “While there are some female civilian officials and some programs nominally directed at women, all activities occur within a male, Sinhalese military structure. The vision of security the government has pursued is a masculine, militarized one” (ibid.).
In addition to being under state surveillance and threat, female kin of the dead, disappeared, or detained are subject to suspicion and hostility by the larger community. For instance, families of those who were killed or disappeared during 2006–2008 felt stigmatized and targeted at the time and feared they would be identified as a family that supported the LTTE. These families were shunned by the community due to fear they were under army surveillance. Often women have little knowledge of the legal system and have therefore been unable to seek legal recourse to pursue cases of disappearance and detention of male kin. In addition, fear of ostracism, social stigma, and retaliation by the perpetrators force women to keep silent. Their ordeal is heightened due to the culture of impunity enforced through legislation such as the Prevention of Terrorism Act (“What the Women Say” 2013).

Against the backdrop of physical and economic destruction, female survivors of war have little means of earning an independent income. The killing, detention, or disappearance of a large number of Tamil men has inflicted new forms of vulnerability on Tamil women. Economically underprivileged women lack the resources to take care of their families or of those injured or maimed in war. For economically underprivileged women, the death, disappearance, or detention of male family members deprives them of their major source of economic support. There has been a rise in the number of female-headed households, with increasing numbers of women seeking economic opportunities to support their families. According to the report by a UN agency:

*Fifteen months after the end of fighting between Sri Lankan government forces and the Tamil Tigers, women in the north are taking up a new and challenging role as breadwinners with more and more becoming day labourers to support their families. A survey conducted by the Jaffna-based Centre for Women and Development, a non-profit group, revealed that the northern region had approximately 40,000 female-headed households. “Three factors have reduced the male-headed households in number: the war, disappearances or being in military custody,” said Saroja Sivachandran, the centre's director. . . . Although up-to-date statistics are hard to come by because many people remain displaced . . . government officials say the northern and eastern regions combined are home to some 89,000 war widows.*

(IRIN 2010b)

Emergency laws put in place during the war have been extended. Laws under which suspects can be arrested and put in detention without trial and security forces can carry out search operations without a warrant are used against dissenters, including Sinhalese opposition politicians and journalists. There has been a concentration of power within the current ruling Rajapaksa family since the end of the war. As a result, the suppression of free media and of critical civil society activism is relatively easy, as is impunity for perpetrators of violence and sexual abuse against women. The Sri Lankan state’s unwillingness to end its military presence and operations in Tamil areas or to devolve power on provincial and local institutions ensures the persistence of the very grievances that produced Sri Lanka’s tragic and devastating war.
Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Sri Lanka share a rich ethnic diversity. However, post-colonial state building in India and Sri Lanka has been premised on the forced assimilation of political units peopled by ethnic minorities within a unitary concept of the nation-state. Minorities who reject integration have been subject to punitive repression, generating powerful antistate movements and the rise of militant groups opposed to the state. India's and Sri Lanka's domestic “wars of terror” originated in the failure of both states to honor, craft, and/or implement democratic power-sharing agreements with ethnic minorities and a singular contempt on the part of both states for the legitimate claims of such minorities to self-governance in their traditional homelands. The “legitimate”/state terror and “illegitimate”/nonstate terror binary in the Indian and Sri Lankan state narrative is misleading and diverts public attention away from the political origins of these wars. It also masks the use of terror on a grand scale by both states against non-state movements for self-determination.

The wars of terror in India and Sri Lanka involved high levels of violence and sexual abuse against women. Although Sri Lanka's war against the LTTE has ended, the lack of public accountability and the persistence of highly militarized postwar systems of governance in the north and east of the country are inimical to the human security or development interests of Tamil women. Unless women's concerns, vulnerabilities, and interests are taken on board, there is little possibility of an enduring or sustainable peace in Sri Lanka. India's refusal to declare the existence of domestic war zones denies women in these areas the protection of the Geneva Conventions. Further, the Indian state's policy of negotiating political conflict through military means, its enhancement of the repressive powers of the state, its denial of citizens' rights and liberties in conflict zones, and the impunity provided to security forces guilty of human rights abuse greatly diminish India's claim to democracy.

In contrast to the “wars on terror” in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which were the outcome of a range of factors—the Cold War, dominance of the military in politics, Islamization, and ISI collaboration with the United States—India and Sri Lanka's domestic “wars of terror” were legitimized through invocations of sovereignty and national security. Paradoxically, both “democracies” have retained highly militarized and repressive systems of governance in their respective conflict zones, with far higher levels of sexual violence than in their weaker and Islamist militancy-ridden neighbors (Afghanistan and Pakistan).

The origins of the wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan are rooted in the US–Pakistan collusion during the Cold War and the post-9/11 “wars on terror” that fostered and strengthened extremist militant groups in the region. Remnants of older Afghan-based Cold War mujahideen groups merged with newer post-9/11 local and foreign Islamist militant groups in Pakistan. These reconfigured groups carried out campaigns of terror against the Pakistani state in urban cities and remote mountainous areas, waged
war against government and US forces in Afghanistan, and fought Indian troops in
Indian-administered Kashmir.

The United States, India, and Afghanistan claimed to be fighting “wars on terror”
against Pakistan-based Islamist groups. Yet their dominant patriarchal, state-centric,
and security-centric narrative effaced the history (1979–1989) of US-led violence and
terror in Afghanistan in collaboration with a mercenary and misogynist army of local
warlords; ignored the Kashmiri struggle for self-determination and the Indian state’s
tyrrany in Kashmir, which in turn was exploited by Islamist militant groups in the
Afghanistan–Pakistan region; and overlooked the collaborative role of sections of the
Pakistani state in creating and supporting Islamist militant groups in the region. Each
of these strands fueled the parallel and intersecting wars on and of terror in South Asia
that have generated extraordinary levels of militarization across the region, reinforced a
culture of impunity, created gendered forms of insecurity and vulnerability for women,
reinforced gender inequality, and greatly eroded institutional mechanisms of justice and
accountability.

Women have resisted and survived the overarching US-led “wars on terror” against
Islamist groups in the Afghanistan–Pakistan region. Afghan women survived the vio-
lence of the US–Soviet Cold War confrontation in Afghanistan and resisted the restric-
tions and depredations forced on them by the Taliban. Despite the retreat of the Taliban
and the emergence of a civilian government, Afghanistan continues to experience a
crippling crisis of security and governance. Afghan women remain far from securing
substantive representation in democratic structures and processes or accessing educa-
tional, social, and political spaces. Western-backed pro-women policies have often pro-
duced a backlash against women and girls because of their perceived association with
Western interests. Real transformative change remains contingent upon the withdrawal
of Western military forces; demilitarization; the creation of institutions and mecha-
nisms for social interaction and mediation; and a representative, inclusive, gender-
responsive, and warlord-free government receptive to women’s security, development,
and justice concerns. Pakistan’s collusion with the United States in a “wars on terror”
in Afghanistan led to “wars of terror” within Pakistan. Both wars rendered women ever
more vulnerable to violence and discrimination by militant groups, with an increasingly
compromised Pakistani state unable to protect women’s rights.

There exists a broad regional/transnational feminist political opposition to war and
militarization. This is reflected in the growing body of scholarly literature in the area,
which has the potential to develop into a more substantive transnational alliance in the
region. Part of the reason this has not yet happened lies in the deeply entrenched state-
and security-centric discourse, which women have challenged yet have been unable to
dislodge. As the examples of the RAWA opposition to US foreign policy in Afghanistan
and Irom Sharmila’s thirteen-year protest against repressive laws in India (discussed
previously) indicate women’s opposition is ignored by governments and the media.
Further, a security-centric discourse privileging the nation-state conflates criticism with
treason and support for the “enemy,” making it much more difficult for women to chal-
gen the “nationalist” paradigm and widen the analytic frame. Feminist scholarship has
underscored the illegitimacy of national security regimes from a gender perspective. It has the potential to use its knowledge and resources to develop a comparative, transnational analytic frame to challenge the gendered insecurities and inequalities inflicted by androcentric, state-centric, and security-centric national, regional, and international regimes.

Notes

1. Among them were Abd ar-Rahman (1880–1901), Habibullah (1902–1919), Amanullah (1919–1929), King Nadir Shah (1930–1933), and King Zahir Shah (1934–1973).
2. Daud Khan deposed Zahir Shah to proclaim Afghanistan a republic. He was followed by Noor Mohammed Tarakki, Hafizullah Amin, and Babrak Karmal, all of whom were aligned with the Soviet Union. Tarakki was murdered, allegedly on the orders of his successor, Hafizullah Amin, who in turn was assassinated by the Soviets.
3. Soviet protégé Babrak Karmal resigned in 1986 and was replaced by another protégé, Mohammed Najibullah (1987–1993), who was murdered by advancing Taliban forces in 1996.
4. “Two decades of war in Afghanistan have left the country devastated, its population depleted, and the survivors physically and mentally exhausted. The numbers are devastating: 1.7 million dead, 2 million injured or maimed, 5 million driven from their homes… . . . War has swept across Afghanistan like wildfire, leaving broken lives and barren landscapes in its trail. . . . Warfare . . . has physically erased many of [the] country’s natural resources, reduced to rubble the monuments of its proud history and forever scarred its people” (ICRC 1999, 5).
5. “The decision to arm the Afghan resistance came within two weeks of the Soviet invasion, and quickly gained momentum.” In 1980 President Carter allocated US$30 million to the Afghan resistance. The Reagan administration contributed US$250 million to Afghanistan, with Saudi Arabia contributing an equal amount. By 1987 annual American aid to Afghanistan reached US$ 630 million. This figure did not include contributions made by other Islamic countries, Israel, China, and Europe (Rubin 2002, 6).
6. The American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) oversaw the purchase of weapons and training for their use; the Pakistan ISI controlled their distribution and transport to the war zone. “Upon the weapons arrival at the port of Karachi or the Islamabad airport, the ISI would transport the weapons to depots near Rawalpindi or Quetta, and then on to the Afghan border” (Rubin 2002, 7).
8. The mujahideen alliance declared Burhanuddin Rabbani president of Afghanistan in 1992. In 1996 Rabbani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (Hizb-e-Islami faction) signed an agreement making Hekmatyar prime minister. The accord could not withstand the Taliban advance. There was heavy fighting between Taliban (Pashtun) forces and the non-Pashtun Northern Alliance led by Ahmed Shah Massoud—an ethnic Tajik. In March 1999 a UN-brokered peace agreement between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance lapsed into renewed fighting between the forces.
9. The Taliban emerged in the Pashtun province of Afghanistan and is comprised largely of Pashtuns. They were led by Mullah Omar, a veteran of the Afghan war and a former student at a madrasa or madarsa (religious seminary) in Pakistan. “Omar was outraged by the
infighting of the mujahideen and especially by the increasing depravations they exacted on the Afghan people” (Riedel 2008, 34).

10. Pakistan created and used the Taliban in order to maintain influence in post–Cold War Afghanistan and to achieve “strategic depth” against India. The Saudis cultivated the Sunni Taliban as a bulwark against Iranian support for Shia groups inside Afghanistan (Sidky 2007, 864).


12. “The ISI refused to recognise any Afghan resistance group that was not religiously based. Neither the Pashtun nationalist Afghan Millat party, nor members of the Afghan royal family were able to operate legally in Pakistani territory” (Rubin 2002, 7).

13. Al-Qaeda is generally assumed to be an organization established by Osama bin Laden. However, the term “al-Qaeda” is not so much an organization as it is a mode of activism followed by individuals committed to defending Muslims against oppression. The word “al-Qaeda” was used by Islamists who fought in Afghanistan and who decided that their struggle did not end with the exit of Soviet troops in 1989 (Burke 2004, 2–3).

14. In 1998, prompted by their deepening rivalry over Kashmir, India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests that were widely condemned across the world. In 2001 an attack on the Indian Parliament, allegedly by Pakistan-based Islamist militants, led to the deployment of over a million troops on the India-Pakistan border in Kashmir and fears of a nuclear confrontation.

15. The Northern Alliance was a mujahideen group opposed to the Taliban. It was led by Ahmed Shah Massoud, who was assassinated by the Taliban in 2001.


17. When questioned about US support for Hekmatyar, a CIA official in Pakistan explained, “Fanatics fight better” (Hirshkind and Mahmood 2002, 343).


19. Statement by Dr. Sima Samar, Vice-Chair of the Interim Administration of Afghanistan and Minister for Women’s Affairs, to the UN Security Council on April 25, 2002.

20. The Sharia is a body of Islamic doctrinal law regulating the lives of Muslims that has been subject to varying interpretations over time. Among its most contested provisions are those related to family laws, especially women’s rights to divorce, inheritance, property, and the guardianship of children.

21. Among other controversial provisions, the law mandated a wife submitting to sexual intercourse with her husband every fourth night (Cortright and Wall 2012, 11).

22. In 2010 Saleem Shehzad, a reporter for Asia Times, reported that ISI officials knew the hideout of the top Taliban leadership in Karachi, yet did not pick them up. Shehzad also exposed links among the ISI, al-Qaeda, and Osama bin Laden. For a fuller exposé see Filkins (2011).

23. The state of Jammu and Kashmir (including the Valley of Kashmir, the location of the present conflict) was divided in 1948 between India and Pakistan without the consent of the people of Kashmir. The term “Indian-administered Kashmir” refers to the territory under Indian control.

24. Self-styled Taliban cleric “Fazlullah’s holy warriors issued new rules that reflect their own interpretation of Sharia. Women are already banned from visiting markets, under penalty of death, and girls prohibited from attending school. Police officers who obey orders from Islamabad risk having their ears cut off or being killed. Some 800 policemen have already deserted their posts to join the Taliban” (Koelbl 2009).
26. "A Taliban spokesman, Ehsanullah Ehsan, confirmed by phone that Ms. Yusufzai has been the target, calling her crusade for education rights an 'obscenity'" (Walsh 2012).
27. "South Waziristan became a stronghold of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)—an umbrella group of militants that Pakistani officials say have been behind some 80% of terrorist attacks in the country over the past few years, including the 2007 assassination of Benazir Bhutto" (Baker 2009).
28. There were reportedly one thousand Uzbek and foreign fighters in South Waziristan affiliated with Al-Qaeda (Baker 2009).
29. A government official confirmed the warning and told AFP that local militant groups had previously banned the sale of tight or see-through clothes (Dawn 2013).
30. The trial judge who sentenced Governor Salman Taseer's assassin to death was forced to go into hiding. In January 2011 thirteen Shia worshippers were killed in the city of Lahore. In June 2011 a sectarian organization, All Pakistan Students Khātim-e-Nubuwwat Federation, distributed pamphlets in the city of Faisalabad in Punjab, calling for the murder of members belonging to the Ahmadiyya community. In September 2011 a thirteen-year-old Christian schoolgirl from Abbottabad was accused of blasphemy and was expelled from school, and her family were forced to go into hiding, for misspelling an Urdu word (Amnesty International 2012).
31. "In Baluchistan, militants broadly known as the ‘Afghan Taliban’ operate without fear or hindrance. The long and largely unpatrolled border touches Kandahar, Zabul and Helmand, where almost 10,000 British troops are stationed. Commanders there complain that the Taliban are supplied in men, weapons and bomb parts from Baluchistan” (Walsh 2009).
32. The people of Nagaland, Mizoram, Manipur, and Assam in the northeast have resisted integration within the Indian Union.
33. In 1984 there were approximately forty million Indians living under military rule, if not military law, making India one of the largest military-dominated states, even as it was the world’s largest democracy (Cohen 1990, 100).
34. Based on the Common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and article 1 of the Additional Protocol II, the ICRC defines internal conflicts as “protracted armed confrontations occurring between governmental armed forces and the forces of one or more armed groups, or between such groups arising on the territory of a State [party to the Geneva Conventions]. The armed confrontation must reach a minimum level of intensity and the parties involved in the conflict must show a minimum of organization.” It is possible to apply this definition to the case of a number of armed confrontations in India. Although India does not officially declare any of its zones of violence as conflict zones, it has been fighting armed groups for decades in many of its states (Human Rights Law Network 2010, 6).
35. According to Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, no person may be deprived of life or personal liberty except according to procedures established by law.
36. Kashmir was not formally part of British India. After independence, India reneged on its promise to allow the people of Kashmir to determine their political future through a plebiscite. The unresolved status of Kashmir was recognized by the United Nations. The Line-of-Control dividing Kashmir, India, and Pakistan has never been accepted or endorsed by the people of Kashmir.
37. Approximately forty thousand female-headed households are known to exist in the northern areas, most of them created by the loss of husbands or male kin (Vasudevan 2012).
38. The Tamils of Sri Lanka are divided into two groups. The Sri Lankan Tamils comprise the larger group, and the Indian Tamils are descendants of Indian Tamil immigrants who migrated to Sri Lanka to work on the plantations during the colonial period.

39. There were several Tamil groups committed to fight for Tamil rights, including Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO), the People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation (EROS), the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), and the Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front (ENDLF).

40. There was intense fighting and shelling of the northern districts of Jaffna, Mullaitivu, and Kilinochchi, and of Trincomalee, Batticaloa, and Amparai districts in the east.

41. The LTTE assassinated leaders and cadres of moderate factions as a strategy to advance its claim to being the sole representative of the Sri Lankan Tamil cause. It is responsible for the assassination of TULF’s Amrithalingam and Yogeswaran, Uma Maheshwari of PLOTE, K. Padmanabha of the EPRLF, and TELO’s Sri Sabaratnam.

42. Among others, Kethesh Loganathan, Lakshman Kadirgamar, and Neelan Tiruchelvam were prominent Tamil dissidents dedicated to crafting a constitutional solution to the conflict. All three were killed by the LTTE.

43. The South Asian Feminist Declaration (1989) expressed concern at the militarization of societies across the South Asian region and violence against women by uniformed guardians of the state under the banner of national security and sovereignty.

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This section comprises four chapters that examine feminists’ engagement with peace movements, UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325), and postconflict state building. Linda Etchart traces the emergence and development of women’s peace movements globally from the nineteenth century to the present. Jennifer F. Klot presents an insider’s perspective on the framing of UNSCR 1325 on “women, peace and security.” Sherrill Whittington compares the gender dimension of postconflict decision-making in three Asia-Pacific states. And Helen O’Connell offers a feminist perspective on state building and rebuilding in countries in Africa and Europe experiencing conflicts and financial crises.

**Linda Etchart’s chapter**, “Demilitarizing the Global: Women’s Peace Movements and Transnational Networks,” provides a comprehensive overview of women’s antiwar movements that emerged and developed within “first wave” feminism(s) in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, “second wave” feminism(s) in the 1960s and 1970s, and “third wave” feminism(s) from the 1980s to the present. The chapter explores the theoretical and political complexities of the antiwar, antimilitarist, and anti-imperialist positions taken by first wave feminists and contends that “not only do the ideas within first wave feminism have enduring validity, but they suffuse second and third wave feminism(s).” Etchart indicates that “by definition, transnational feminist peace networks are means by which women extend the hand of solidarity across borders and across conflict lines to achieve just outcomes or compromises among leaders and their constituencies without resorting to violence.” Women’s old and new antiwar organizations are currently engaged in such activities as theorizing in the academy, acting locally in conjunction with other women’s organizations, joining forces with the Occupy and global civil society movements, and communicating globally.

**Jennifer F. Klot’s chapter**, “UN Security Council Resolution 1325: A Feminist Transformative Agenda?” makes the point about the adoption of UNSCR 1325 in October 2000 that, “It had taken the UN Security Council over fifty years to recognize the relevance of women’s rights and gender equality to the maintenance of international peace and security.” Klot challenges mainstream understandings of the genesis
Rawwida Baksh of UNSCR 1325 and offers “an alternative analysis of the political opportunity structures that were most significant” in bringing about the resolution. The chapter makes visible the cadre of “feminist norm/organizational entrepreneurs” within the UN system and in the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security (a core group of peace, humanitarian, and development organizations), who worked in collaboration with influential male and female “door openers” within “the very institutions that 1325 sought to transform.” It responds critically to feminist scholarly debates on the discursive terrain of UNSCR 1325, and points to the resolution’s origins in the UN discourse on peacebuilding and the Responsibility to Protect. And it addresses “the primordial dilemma of reconciling [feminist] antimilitarist and pacifist ideals with 1325’s legitimation of humanitarian intervention when threats to women constitute threats to international peace and security.”

Sherrill Whittington’s chapter, “Women in Postconflict Decision-making: Change for the Better?” compares the experiences of three Asia-Pacific states currently engaged in postconflict reconstruction: Timor-Leste, Bougainville, and the Solomon Islands. It examines how women’s active participation in “the brief window of opportunity” during the transition “from ceasefire to the negotiation of peace agreements and development of international peacebuilding mandates” is crucial to ensuring a critical mass of women represented in the state legislature because it opens the door to redressing “gender-based discrimination in social, economic, political, security and governance arenas.” Whittington underlines the importance of ensuring that CEDAW and UNSCR 1325 are written into the mandates of UN (and other) peacekeeping and transitional structures to provide the support framework for women’s efforts in postconflict fragile states. The chapter discusses the presence of such support in the case of Timor-Leste, its contribution to the achievement of a critical mass of women in parliament, and their impact on constitution building, legislative reform, political and socioeconomic development, and gender-responsive budgeting. In comparison, despite women’s active role as peacemakers in the conflicts in Bougainville and the Solomon Islands, their low to no participation in the peace negotiations and the absence of women’s rights and gender equality priorities in the mandates of the international peacekeeping and transitional structures are linked to fewer women in parliaments, inadequate international funding for women’s rights and gender equality, and “many lost opportunities for women’s voices and concerns to shape peacebuilding and postconflict reconstruction.” Whittington concludes that “ensuring women a critical role in postconflict governance should be accorded the highest priority in all peacekeeping mandates, donor conferences, priorities, and agendas of the international community. There must be a focus on enabling women to capitalize on their engagement in the peace process and gains made in postconflict elections, in order to transform the political, economic and social conditions of women [and men] in the country.”

Helen O’Connell’s chapter, “Feminist Perspectives on State-building or Rebuilding in Crisis Contexts,” makes the link between countries in Africa and Europe that are experiencing conflicts and financial crises, and the opportunities to build gender-responsive political settlements. The chapter interrogates concepts of “political settlement,”
"legitimacy," and "accountability," and envisions ways to advance gender and social justice in state building and rebuilding—for example, by writing or amending constitutions, undertaking law reform, and participating in political processes. O'Connell argues that in conflict contexts the "patriarchal political settlement . . . determines what social, economic, political, and cultural issues and problems are considered, what policy issues are deemed worthy of priority attention, what decisions are made, with, and for whom, and what resources are acquired and allocated to what programs." All too often, "internal and external actors promote or allow obeisance to discriminatory customs and attitudes to trump obligations to internationally agreed standards and values." The chapter also contends that as a result of the 2008 global financial crisis in European countries, "families and households on no, low, or modest incomes are hardest hit by the austerity or fiscal stringency measures adopted by governments to cut budgetary deficits." They are worst affected by "rising food and energy costs, wage freezes, job insecurity, and unemployment or underemployment. And women "bear a disproportionate weight of the burden, through public sector job losses and cuts in essential public social services." O'Connell proposes the following feminist definition of state building: "actions by internal actors (with or without external support) to develop inclusive political processes and the capacity and institutions of the state to fulfill its roles as duty bearer by respecting the human rights of all women, men, girls and boys (of all sexual orientations) and transgender and intersex people, by meeting at least the minimum expectations of all persons for security, access to justice, public services and economic opportunity, and by enabling the growth of a vibrant, independent civil society and media."
Introduction

Jean Quateart and Benita Roth refer to the “contentious histories of feminist activism unfolding in the period after World War II” (2012, 11). These histories date back more than a century—not least and perhaps especially in the realm of armed conflict and women’s position within or against it. Women have taken part in independence struggles acting separately and in concert with men for more than 100 years, and in revolutionary struggles in the modern period in Europe for more than 250 years: key moments were the French (1789) and European (1848) revolutions and the (1871) Paris Commune (Rowbotham 1972, 1992). The inspiration for second wave feminism emerged out of the gender conflicts that arose from women’s participation in anticolonial, anti-imperialist, and civil rights struggles in the post–World War II period.

Transatlantic women’s networks in the North began in earnest with the abolitionist movement in the United States in the 1820s, in which women activists, barred from male-only institutional structures, joined forces with women’s organizations in Europe to campaign for their voices to be heard and their views to be counted. Divisions among women along lines of race and class, as well as political ideology and nationalism, were at times fractious in Europe during the first half of the twentieth century; the two world wars both divided and united women across borders. Yet women’s transnational and local peace movements arose with each new conflict on all continents in struggles for a just peace and for disarmament. Their actions have resulted in changes to state policy and practice at national and global levels.
Women's antiwar or peace movements have been associated with pacifism, civil disobedience, and nonviolent resistance against state authority, themes addressed in the eighteenth century by Immanuel Kant, who warned against injustice as the price of peace (Kant 1970 [1795]).

Regarding pacifist movements in the modern period, it is also necessary to distinguish between absolute pacifism and conditional or contingent pacifism (Rawls 1971, 335), which is alternatively described as the difference between pacifism and pacifism, the latter endorsing violence as a last resort—in other words, “defensivism” contrasted with militarism and aggression. Pacifism does not allow for violence even in self-defense, so it runs the risk of resulting in our enslavement to those who wield the weapons. The men who fought in the American Civil War (1861–1865) on the side of the Union with the objective of preserving that Union and ending slavery believed that violence was justified, but the war presented a dilemma for the abolitionist Christian pacifists, who felt an obligation to condone violence in which they did not themselves participate (Early 1994, 77).

In terms of nonviolent resistance to slavery, Davis (1982) and Rowbotham (1992) trace the US women's movement to the antislavery campaigns that gathered momentum in the United States and United Kingdom in the 1820s. One of the key moments in women's participation in abolition occurred in 1833, when white and black women who were excluded from the antislavery movement in the United States formed their own all-women antislavery society. It was through antislavery activism that a number of informed white women became politicized and gained the confidence to speak in public. These women also learned how to win support by going door to door collecting signatures on petitions. By 1848 white women in the United States were campaigning for women's suffrage with the support of black activist/intellectuals, in particular Frederick Douglass (1818–1895), the first former slave to hold high government rank in the United States. It is notable that W. E. B. Du Bois (1868–1963), an African American scholar and civil rights activist and founding member of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), was also a women's rights campaigner (Davis 1982).

The campaigns and activities of the abolitionist movement brought together white men and women activists in solidarity with African Americans, although the courage shown by white abolitionists such as the Grimké sisters, who defied ostracism and persecution by elements of the white community in South Carolina in the 1830s (Davis 1982), was rare. All women were excluded from participating as delegates in the World Anti-Slavery Convention held in London in 1840 (Rowbotham 1992), and only one black and two white observers spoke up for women to be incorporated into the movement as equals. Not a single black woman attended the Seneca Falls, New York, Women's Anti-Slavery Convention in 1848 (Davis 1982, 52). The conference was initiated by Elizabeth Cady Stanton, author of the “Declaration of Sentiments,” a manifesto for the rights of women based on the US Declaration of Independence, which is often considered the beginning of the women's movement in the Americas. Nevertheless, it was only as a result of Frederick Douglass's intervention that the proposal for a resolution
on woman’s suffrage was introduced at the convention, and even then it was not unanimously agreed upon (Davis 1982).

The question of women’s suffrage became linked with that of the abolition of slavery, as both were part of a struggle for justice and civil rights—rights of citizenship—yet their juxtaposition became a source of friction among campaigners. One of the organizers of the 1848 antislavery conference, Lucretia Mott, was against bringing the question of women’s suffrage into the conference agenda, though on tactical rather than ideological grounds. Although women’s rights “were enthusiastically welcomed” into the black liberation movement (Davis 1982, 51), women’s suffrage tended to be a white middle-class affair from which black women were excluded. It is worth noting, however, that even in these early days of feminism, Lucretia Mott and the Grimké sisters were already beginning to elaborate their own feminist theory in the context of race and gender inequalities; this was more than a century before the women’s movement and gender theory began to be taken seriously in academia and the political realm.

Subsequent to the abolition of slavery and the end of the Civil War, debates arose about how race and gender intersected with the question of class exploitation within global capitalism. Davis (1982) illustrates how the position of most former African American slaves was more precarious after abolition than before: the exploitation of African Americans as domestic servants after abolition was imposed because they were poor rather than because of their race; racial discrimination used as a mechanism to maintain a hierarchy to keep wages low and retain an underclass. After abolition black women in the United States were employed as domestic workers in abysmal working conditions in both the North and South. Similarly, women—mostly white women—were employed as cheap labor in the factories of the North; these women came out on strike for better working conditions in the first decade of the twentieth century, notably in the Lawrence, Massachusetts, “bread and roses” strike of 1912. Among those at the forefront of these struggles for the cause of workers’ rights, which included gender equality, were peace activists Emma Goldman and Jane Addams, who led the campaigns against US involvement in the First World War.

**Women’s Activism and Peace Movements in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Europe**

In Britain women’s peace movements in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were riven by ideological tensions between those who supported and were supported by Quaker, socialist, anarchist, and free-thinking movements and those peace activists who were linked to the conservative establishment. The image of woman as peacemaker sat comfortably with writers and philosophers who wished to retain a
hierarchy with elite men in control, as well as with those whose pacifist stance led to a reinforcement of women’s subordinate position in the home. The influential art critic and social commentator John Ruskin (1819–1900) advocated a continuation of the view of women as caregivers and peacemakers, rejecting the suffragists’ claim to equality with men (Liddington 1989) and blaming women for causing wars. Thus, peace politics at the time was contrary to the interests of feminists.

As suffragists were primarily concerned with women’s achieving political equality with men, some of their adherents considered that it was not in their interest to endorse the view of women as peacemakers in the home or in the international arena—hence Millicent Fawcett’s position that there was no connection between feminism and anti-militarism. In her opposition to the Boer War of 1899–1902, Fawcett’s adversary, Emily Hobhouse (1860–1926), viewed militarism as the enemy of both civilization and women (Liddington 1989). Hobhouse campaigned against the British forces’ dereliction of duty toward women and children in the Transvaal “death camps,” as they were described in the British press at the time. These concentration camps were an outcome of British imperial ambitions to take control of mineral resources and trade routes in Southern Africa and resulted in the death of some twenty thousand Boers under the leadership of Cecil Rhodes and Herbert Kitchener, who enjoyed the support of patriots such as Millicent Fawcett.

Emily Hobhouse, like John Stuart Mill before her, believed that women’s suffrage and participation in decision making would end all wars. Both Hobhouse and Mill, unlike Emma Goldman, failed to grasp not only the dynamics behind armed violence but also the inability of women’s suffrage alone to achieve social transformation (Goldman 1917, 1987 [1931]; Liddington 1989).

**Transatlantic Feminist Antiwar Activism**

The purpose of the first International Council of Women (ICW), founded about 1888, was to work with agencies around the world to promote health, peace, equality, and education. From that time women’s peace movements spread across Europe and the United States, although international sisterhood—as transpired later with trade union solidarity—was considerably diminished by the nationalism generated by pre–World War I propaganda. Just as antiwar activists such as Emily Hobhouse had been pilloried in the British press for campaigning against the mistreatment of enemy civilians during the Boer War in 1899, British and German antiwar women activists faced accusations of supporting the enemy in their respective national presses during the 1914–1918 war (Gelblum 1998).

Once the First World War had been declared, many feminists chose nationalism over internationalism, as did the Second International. Dorothy Thompson notes
that the National Union of Suffrage Societies in the UK “split savagely” over the war (Thompson 1983, 187). A minority of social democratic and socialist feminists, such as Clara Zetkin and Rosa Luxemburg in Germany and Alexandra Kollontai in Russia, opposed what they viewed as an imperialist war. Zetkin, a founding member of the German Communist Party and the founder of March 8 as International Women’s Day, followed August Bebel in drawing the connections among class exploitation, racist oppression, and male supremacy, denouncing Germany’s prosecution of the First World War as damaging to the working class of all sides. She campaigned against standing armies, colonialism, imperialism, and militarism, for which she was imprisoned for four months (Davis in Foner 1984). Zetkin wrote in November 1914: “When the men kill, it is up to us women to fight for the preservation of life. When the men are silent, it is our duty to raise our voices in behalf of our ideals” (Zetkin in Die Gleichheit, Stuttgart, November 7, 1914, quoted in Foner 1984, 116).

Clara Zetkin had organized the International Women’s Day Conference in Copenhagen in 1910. German feminist antiwar activists Anita Augspurg and Lida Gustava Heymann took the position that women could transcend nationalism and seek peace among nations more easily than men. Despite suppression of their activities by the German state, Augspurg and Heymann were instrumental in organizing the Hague International Congress of Women in April/May 1915, which brought together women from twelve warring and neutral countries, with fifteen hundred delegates participating. The congress called for “recognition of the right to self-determination, minorities’ rights, abolition of secret diplomacy, international courts, disarmament, freedom of trade, and education for peace” (Gelblum 1998, 312).

The 1915 Hague Congress revealed bitter divisions among essentialist, nationalist, and internationalist feminists, and between pacifist and anti-imperialist feminists (Gelblum 1998). It was actively opposed by suffragist Emmeline Pankhurst, who assisted in preventing the British delegates from attending (German 2013). The congress called for political enfranchisement of women to enable them to act in solidarity to prevent future wars and led to the formation of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), led by Augspurg and Heymann and the US social reformer Jane Addams.

Zurich International Congress of Women 1919
Resolution VI: Program on the Status of Women

*This congress holds that women cannot make their fullest and most characteristic contribution to the community in any capacity so long as they have not social, political and economic independence and full opportunity for education and development: it believes that the recognition of women’s service to the world, not only as wage-earners, but as mothers and homemakers, is an essential factor in building up of the world’s peace.*

(Zurich Congress Resolution 1919, 98–99)
Taking place at a time of social ferment in Europe, the 1919 Zurich International Congress of Women, at which the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) was initiated, was divided between southern European countries, which supported working-class revolutions, and northern European countries and US delegates, who opposed them (Gelblum 1998). The WILPF attempted and failed to secure women’s representation at the Paris Conference of 1919 and described the League of Nations’ Covenant as a “League of conquerors against the conquered [which] would not save the world against future wars” (Vellacott 2001, 380). The WILPF was transnational rather than international and struggled for solidarity beyond nationality; it opposed imperialism, including British colonial activities in Ireland in 1920, and defended minorities (Vellacott 2001).

Following World War I Augspurg and Heymann continued to form women’s peace groups in Germany and to work with the German Social Democrats, but their activities were suppressed by the German government, leading them closer to the Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany (USPD). Over time between the world wars their position changed: they formed the opinion that alternative societal structures, “a different social and political order [was] the only way of preventing future wars and guaranteeing equal rights for all” (Gelblum 1998, 311), and moved toward socialism. They were both essentialist and liberal feminists, calling for women to have equal rights in a man’s world in order to bring a female perspective to decision making. It was only after World War II that they began to relinquish their pacifist stance (Gelblum 1998, 320).

**Antiwar Activism in the United States Prior to the First World War: Jane Addams**

Jane Addams, who cofounded the Women’s Peace Party (WPP) in 1915 in the United States, became first vice president of the Suffrage Association and a leading figure in the formation of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) in the same year. She began as a social reformer in the late nineteenth century, working to improve housing for immigrants, and remained an admired and respected figure until she ventured into what was considered the realm of men—war—in her case, the Spanish American War of 1998 and the First World War (Shepler and Mattina 2012). Addams critiqued the myth of the soldier, militarism, and the patriarchal structure of US society. She attended the 1907 Peace Congress held at Carnegie Hall, and she believed that women could persuade men away from war; women were less motivated by feelings of patriotism. Like John Stuart Mill, Addams believed that women’s participation in decision making would bring an end to war: “[W]omen should be allowed with men to vote upon the question of peace and war” (quoted in Shepler and Mattina 2012, 165).

The difficulty for Addams was not only that the suffrage movement had to be nonpartisan in the sense of supporting votes for women for all political parties from Left
to Right, rather than taking a socialist line (with which she was connected), but also that when confronted with imperial aggression pacifism (nonviolence) led to a stance of “peace-at-any-price . . . clamouring for an end to the war on any terms”—the words for which she was condemned in the New York Times as she was returning from the Hague International Women’s Conference in 1915 (New York Times, July 6, 1915, in Shepler and Mattina 2012, 165–166). Although Addams did draw the connection between justice and peace, it was her contemporary, Emma Goldman (1869–1940), who attributed pressure for war-mongering partly to elite capitalist interests that were able to benefit from militarist propaganda in the press.

On June 14, 1917, in New York in her speech “Against Conscription and War,” Goldman declared:

"You will put the young manhood of America in the uniform, you will drag them to the battlefield and into the trenches, but while they are there, there is going to be a bond of anti-militarism among the people of the world [great applause] . . . you will become militiamen and you shall be ordered to shoot your brothers and fathers and sisters and mothers in the name of democracy that you are going to carry to the poor unfortunate people of Germany . . . . Guns and bayonets have never solved any problems. Bloodshed has never solved a problem. Never on earth, men and women, have such methods of violence, concentrated and organized violence, ever solved a single problem."

(Goldman 1917)

Goldman’s stand was against the violence of the repressive state, which she argued drove the violence of the oppressed against the oppressor: “It is organized violence on top which creates individual violence at the bottom. It is the accumulated indignation against organized wrong, organized crime, organized injustice which drives the political offender to his act” (Goldman 1917).

### The Second Wave Feminist Movement in the United States and Europe in the 1960s

Angela Davis recounts how Capitola Tasker, a black sharecropper from Alabama, after returning to the United States from the Paris Women’s Conference of 1934, where an anti-war manifesto had been approved by the delegates, articulated the link between violent racist terror inflicted upon African Americans in the United States (North and South) and the rising tide of European fascism prior to the Second World War (Davis 1982, 158).

Oppression of and discrimination against African Americans—and also against Irish immigrants and women in the early years of the twentieth century in the United States—was partly a function of capitalism (Davis 1982). Discrimination was a tool to ensure
wages were kept low and profits high. Self-identification as black, conversely, was useful for organization and mobilization against oppression—mobilization that extended to, or combined with, the mobilization of women textile workers and with unions that comprised both men and women (Davis 1982).

Black women played a vital part in the civil rights movement of the 1960s, and white women began to join the movement from 1964, as rights for African Americans could not be separated from all women’s rights to political representation, legal equality, and participation as equal citizens. The civil rights movement was a key element in the radicalization of some white women, reinforced within a short time by their opposition to the Vietnam War (1955–1975). In both the civil rights movement and the anti–Vietnam War protests, there was a tendency for male activists to be dominant and for female activists to be eclipsed—as had been evident in elements of the abolitionist movement more than a hundred years earlier. In 1964 civil rights campaigners Casey Hayden and Mary King, frustrated at the treatment of women activists by their male colleagues, wrote a position paper anonymously, challenging the “assumption of male superiority” in the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), which had been formed in 1960. Similar gender discord occurred in the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), formed in 1965, which added to the grievances leading to the evolution of the women’s liberation movement during the late 1960s.

Groups of women’s equal rights activists were inspired by Vietnamese women’s participation in the anti-American imperialist struggle in the Vietnam War, and it was they who spearheaded the antiwar protests in the United States. Some of these women found themselves marginalized as men came to dominate the antiwar movement after 1966; as a consequence, they began to join existing women’s (antiwar) groups, such as Women Strike for Peace (WSP), established in 1961 by Bella Abzug and Dagmar Wilson to protest US nuclear weapons testing, and the National Organization for Women (NOW), founded by Betty Friedan and others in 1966 (Armstrong and Prashad 2005). As the Vietnam War escalated, American women’s opposition to the war was heightened by the loss of sons and brothers in combat. Although large numbers of young men had found ways to avoid conscription, all classes were affected, and protest grew as body bags came home. As did Jane Addams’s opposition to the draft in the First World War in 1917, the antiwar arguments contained maternalist and essentialist elements, but they became increasingly anti-imperialist and antimilitarist, fermenting the radicalization of activists.

The separatist tendency may have had the unintended consequence of marginalizing women activists even further within the very peace movements they had founded—a dilemma that has confronted feminist movements before and since. This illustrates what Armstrong and Prashad describe as the “limitations of issue-based women’s organizations” (2005, 214). A defining moment came when a group of women anti–Vietnam War activists staged a counterdemonstration against a Voice of Women demonstration in January 1968, conducting a “Burial of Traditional Womanhood,” recalling Virginia Woolf’s Killing the Angel in the House (Woolf 1931). Here the women were attempting to distinguish between women’s “pacifism” and liberated women’s “anti-war activism” (Armstrong and Prashad 2005, 216).
Amstrong and Prashad also remind us that feminism is a not a Western phenomenon (see also Rowbotham 1992). They point out that there was a “lively strain of feminism” among the Vietnamese women seeking national liberation, which has often been overlooked by Western feminist movements. In 1965 the WSP sent a delegation to North Vietnam to meet with the North Vietnamese women’s union. Activist Vivian Rothstein traveled to Vietnam in 1967 to meet with delegates from the National Liberation Front (NLF) and the Vietnamese Women’s Union. The inspiration of women in Vietnam spread to women in the peace movements, the civil rights movement, as well as the New Left in the United States. The year after her return from Vietnam, Rothstein became a key figure in the founding of the Chicago Women’s Liberation Union, an organization whose title was a reinterpretation of the title “Women’s Union for the Liberation of Vietnam” (Armstrong and Prashad 2005).

From the 1960s onward, however, whether consciously or not, the feminist strand within anticolonial and revolutionary movements in the global South was downplayed by feminists in the global North. So while US women’s liberation activists in the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) may have been inspired by Vietnamese women’s organizations, there was little in the way of solidarity with them; the needs of Vietnamese women appear not to have been taken into account. This was true also of the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), but with the formation of the Black and Third World Women’s Liberation Alliance in 1968, which emerged out of the SNCC, solidarity with the Vietnamese people evolved into calls for armed revolution. Women’s separatist activism here became a strategy for the liberation of women, men, and children together. The call for armed struggle, however, was at odds with the ideals of many peace movement adherents (Armstrong and Prashad 2005, 223–225). Liberal Western feminism became distanced from other struggles against oppression, although, for example, Zillah Eisenstein marched to the Pentagon in 1971, linking women’s resistance to imperialism to wider resistance (Eisenstein 2008, 28). Overall the US administration’s conduct of the Vietnam War and the protests against it, which shook the US polity and society, clearly had a profound influence on the direction and pace of the feminist movement in the United States and beyond. In 1971 the Women’s Action Alliance and the National Women’s Political Caucus were formed by Gloria Steinem and others. The same year Steinem cofounded Ms, the first periodical to be created, owned, and managed entirely by women.

**Greenham Common Women’s Separatism in the 1980s**

The mobilization of an oppressed minority or majority often emerges spontaneously and out of a group that may or may not be a community except in terms of a shared experience. One of the differences between women’s organizations and other oppressed
groups is that the separation from *male* colleagues and family may be temporary—creating an ephemeral “imagined community” of women (Anderson 1991; Cockburn 2007). Women activists may set up a women’s camp as temporary living quarters for the duration of a protest and return to their families or homes once the protest is over. In the separation of private and public that occurs when men (and a minority of women) join the armed forces, the private life (of home and family) is left behind. In the case of the women of Greenham Common, private life—the domestic—became an integral element in the protest.

While a handful of men had joined in the founding Women’s March to Greenham in 1981, the movement’s strength, as the women perceived it, came precisely from its womanliness. Once the protesters saw greater newsworthiness from being all women in a male space—that of the military establishment—male participants were excluded from Greenham Common in the short term, but the intention was to achieve longer term goals common to women and men, which included gender equality. The Greenham Women’s peace camp (1981–2000) became a model for women’s peace camps in a number of countries, including the Seneca Falls Women’s Encampment (1983–1994) in New York State and Pine Gap in Australia (Laware 2004).

**Women’s Transnational Peace Activism in the 1990s**

Moghadam (2005) dates the formation of transnational feminist networks, including those dedicated to peace, antimilitarism, and conflict resolution, to 1985, the year of the UN Third World Conference on Women held in Nairobi. She argues that before then, second wave feminists operated substantially within national borders. Peace movements by their nature, however, must ultimately extend their activities across borders. They are required to be transnational in focus and campaign for peace across hostile divides (within or outside the state). They must seek support from forces of solidarity outside of state borders, from those who are free from state or nonstate actors’ repression and can provide ever-expanding loci of support through the mass media. Feminist networks can operate at a local level in their activities, raising awareness in public places and the local press. They can extend their activities to mobilize pressure on local and national government organizations and at the transnational level on intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), working within and outside organizations to monitor governments or oppressive nonstate actors and to bring about social change reinforced by legal sanction.

Since 1985 representatives of feminist (I)NGOs have been able to observe, address, and work together with UN agencies and act as consultants in drawing up reports and recommendations. Beyond facing resistance from male-dominated international organizations, however, feminist peace network activists have had to confront, engage with,
and negotiate ways through friction and hostility between and among feminist members who themselves emerge out of warring nations. Moghadam states that among feminist organizations, the WILPF was the only one that initially was able to sustain a transnational character, although its “pacifist stance” meant political isolation (2005, 218).

The Madres de la Plaza de Mayo in Argentina began walking around the Casa Rosada parliament square in Buenos Aires each week in 1977, demanding information on the whereabouts of their missing children and grandchildren, who had been “disappeared” by the military dictatorship. Inspired by the Madres, the Women in Black movement emerged in 1988 in Israel/Palestine. Their model was later taken up by groups of women in other situations of armed conflict. In Argentina the mothers’ symbolic power lay in their status as unarmed women against an armed state; their goal was not gender equality but acknowledgment of the abduction and murder of their loved ones and an end to the military dictatorship. The mostly Jewish Israeli women of Women in Black congregated on a busy road crossing in Jerusalem, holding placards bearing the words “End the occupation” (of the Palestinian territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip). In solidarity with the Jewish and Palestinian Women in Black, support groups emerged in Italy—Donne in Nero—from the 1990s. Other Women in Black groups also took on their name and their tactic of peaceful demonstrations, forming communities across racial/national divides as part of a vision for a just future without violence. With the onset of the wars in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s—following the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1989—representatives of Donne in Nero visited Belgrade, where the cross-community Zene u Crnom (Women in Black) was formed, working in partnership with Yugoslavian men who had refused to serve in the military.

Women in Black spread to London, UK, in 1993, where weekly vigils were held in Trafalgar Square. Serb, Croat, and Muslim women encountered each other, taking different political positions and coming from “different feminisms” (Cockburn 1998). In The Space Between Us (1998), Cynthia Cockburn documented women crossing community boundaries in Northern Ireland (the Women’s Support Network); in Israel, Bat Shalom (allied Israeli Jewish and Israeli Palestinian Arab women) campaigning for peace, an end to the occupation, the creation of a Palestinian state, and the rights of Palestinian Arabs in Israel; and the activities of the Medica Women’s Therapy Centre, a cross-community psychosocial project in Zenica, Bosnia-Hercegovina (1998, 1–2). Cockburn notes that the women who participated in the three projects were not on the whole pacifist, were “deeply aware of the structural violence of entrenched inequalities,” and recognized the importance of acknowledging “greater and lesser wrongs” (1998, 7–8).

The Women in Black movement spread to India in 1992 after the destruction of the Babri mosque, its members standing in silent vigils in the streets of Bangalore, and to China after the UN Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995. Women in Black took part in the Asian Social Forum in January 2003, in preparation for the World Social Forum in Brazil later that year. Mujeres de Negro in Spain established links with women’s organizations in Colombia, which were protesting drug-related wars (Women in Black 2013). After the attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, Women in Black in New York, with the support of WIB groups worldwide, called
for “Justice not vengeance.” Since that time Women in Black have been calling for an end to military action by the US government against other states.

The Association of Women of the Mediterranean Region (AWMR) is an anticapitalist, antimilitarist, transnational feminist organization, founded in 1995, comprising feminist activists from eighteen countries around the Mediterranean Sea. One dimension of its activities brings together women from countries that have experienced armed conflict within and across borders, some of them as a result of the decolonization process and some as a consequence of the end of the Cold War in 1989, when latent grievances reemerged. Its members include Israelis and Palestinians, Serbs, Bosnians and Albanians, Greeks and Turks, and Greek and Turkish Cypriots, which creates opportunities for dialogue and conflict transformational activities. However, efforts to bring together women from opposing sides of armed conflicts were thwarted by restrictions preventing Palestinians from traveling and by Arab governments’ refusal to grant visas to Israeli citizens (Moghadam 2005, 188).

**Transnational Solidarity for Local Women’s Peace Movements**

In Colombia, where an estimated 600,000 people died in the civil wars in the fifty years before 2012 (174,000 homicides, 1,614 massacres, and 42,000 unresolved disappearances since 1980), the Organización Feminina Popular (OFP—Popular Women’s Organization) was founded in 1972, first as a Catholic nongovernmental organization (NGO) and subsequently gaining independence from the Church in 1988. In collaboration with other women’s organizations, the OFP promotes “mass mobilization as a means of transforming Colombian reality and achieving peace with social justice,” supporting a negotiated solution to the armed conflict (Dugas 2012; Insight on Conflict 2013). An estimated five million people had been displaced by 2013 as a result of armed conflict in Colombia, many as a result of forced evictions of indigenous peoples and subsistence farmers. Colombian women in conflict areas have been vulnerable to sexual violence perpetrated by members of the armed forces and paramilitary groups as a weapon of war (Ortiz de Urbina, Iglesias Kuntz 1998; Burnyeat 2013; Rojas 2004; Insight on Conflict 2013). In 1996 the Women’s Social Movement against War and for Peace was created in Barrancabermeja as a platform for struggle at the national level, with links to peace organizations all over the world. Peace villages have been established since the mid-1990s, such as the Comunidad de Paz de San José de Apartadó in the Urabá region. This community of fifteen hundred people prohibited the entry of armed forces, guns, drugs, or alcohol. They were supported by UNDP, UNESCO, UNICEF, and the European Union; Mayor Gloria Cuarta Montoya received a UNESCO peace prize in 1996. Leaders of women’s organizations campaigning for economic development, peace, and women’s participation in Colombia have been threatened and assassinated;
San José de Apartadó was under threat of further massacres in early 2013 (Rojas 2004; Amnesty International 2013).

In July 2002 forty thousand women from all over the country marched on Bogotá, demanding an end to the violence (Rojas 2004). In the years that followed Colombian women’s organizations, including Mujeres por la Paz, organized marches, for example in April 2013, calling for land reform and other economic measures to bring peace. The Colombian government, however, would not admit these issues as topics of discussion, even though 80 percent of the displacement of peoples has occurred in mining regions. In April 2013 in Havana, Cuba, women’s organizations were excluded from peace talks between the Colombian government and the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC).

**Intergovernmental Organizations and Transnational Feminist Antiwar Activism**

With the growth of the number of IGOs and INGOs since the Second World War, partly as a result of the end of the Cold War and the armed conflicts that ensued, there has been an increasing number of international meetings, conferences, workshops, and UN resolutions aimed at preventing, resolving, or transforming armed conflict. Women’s peace activism at all levels has resulted in intergovernmental and nongovernmental initiatives aimed at increasing women’s participation in all aspects of responses to armed conflict, including conflict prevention; peace negotiations and agreements; peacekeeping; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; truth and reconciliation commissions; postconflict reconstruction; and peacebuilding and peace education (Baksh et al. 2005). Advocacy and collaborative work on the part of women’s organizations have put pressure on governments to legislate to protect and include women in decision making in situations of armed conflict, culminating in the passing of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, “Women, Peace and Security” in 2000 and subsequent UNSCR Resolutions, as discussed elsewhere in this volume.

The Commonwealth Secretariat has been engaged in initiatives to prevent and “resolve” or transform conflicts within and among the group of Commonwealth nations, through ministerial meetings and other fora. The Secretariat has promoted gender mainstreaming since its introduction at the UN Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 and gender mainstreaming in conflict transformation since 1997. The Secretariat hosted four regional “Gender, Politics, Peace, Conflict Prevention and Resolution” symposia in Africa, Asia/Europe, the Caribbean, and the Pacific between 1997 and 2000. At the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in 1999 and the Women’s/Gender Affairs Ministers Meetings in 1996 and 2000, the Secretariat was mandated to increase women’s participation in conflict mediation and resolution,
peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and postconflict reconciliation and reconstruction initiatives. The Secretariat hosted a national consultation in Sierra Leone, “Women and Men in Partnership for Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” in May 2001 (Baksh and Etchart 2002), and a symposium, “Gender, Youth and Conflict,” in London in 2002. These fora and others provided opportunities for representatives of national and local government, NGOs, and feminist scholars/activists to come together to support the adoption, ratification, implementation, and monitoring of legal instruments and frameworks related to democracy, peace, and conflict, including achieving the 30 percent target for women’s representation in decision-making bodies (Baksh et al. 2005).

Judy El-Bushra notes the increasing importance of gender issues surrounding the activities of (I)NGOs and intergovernmental organizations since the end of the Cold War: “There is no doubt that women, and women’s organizations, are increasingly being called on to intervene not only in mediation and peace negotiations, but also (and perhaps particularly) in the various processes of post-conflict reconstruction. ‘Women and peacebuilding’ is a rapidly evolving field, in both policy and practical terms” (2007, 131).

By definition, transnational feminist peace networks are means by which women extend the hand of solidarity across borders and conflict lines to achieve just outcomes or compromises among leaders and their constituencies without resorting to violence. Government and IGOs can and do share in these communities and networks, lending support by encouraging relevant departments of government to sign onto, ratify, and implement UN Resolutions in the area of peace and conflict and postconflict reconstruction. There may be resistance on the part of warring governments, but combined pressure from outside and within IGOs has made a real impact.

In 1989 the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Committee) issued its Resolution 12 on Violence Against Women. In the 1990s debates on gender-based violence continued within UN institutions and (I)NGOs, culminating in the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women in 1993, the Beijing Platform for Action in 1995, and the UN Trust Fund to Eliminate Violence against Women in 1997. These institutions recognized the connections between particular manifestations of masculinity and violence against women.

With the onset of a range of civil wars at the end of the twentieth century in developing countries, based largely on unequal distribution of resources, often in areas rich in minerals, women’s and girls’ vulnerability to armed violence became apparent. It was recognized that women and girls are differently affected by war, and that gender relations are affected by armed conflict and influence the process and outcomes of such conflict at all levels of society. While women and girls are at greater risk for rape during wartime, it was also recognized that women may experience “peace” in a different way from men, in that they may be at risk of violence perpetrated by representatives of authority in their own communities at home or in internally displaced people’s camps, or at risk of exploitation by peacekeeping forces. One of the aims of UNSC Resolution 1325 and of UNSC Resolution 1820 of 2008 was to put in place and implement gender mainstreaming in peace support operations, involving strategies of transparency and accountability, which has been partially successful (Kronsell 2012). Civil society organizations have a
role to play in pushing for greater sensitizing of UN military personnel, the overwhelming majority of whom are men.

Few feminist theorists—not least “third wave feminists”1—would accept that women are “naturally” more peaceful than men, nor would they endorse pacifism (Riley et al. 2008), but the need for a collective resistance to militarism, the warrior ethos, and militarism is as urgent as ever. Cynthia Enloe’s endorsement of antiwar activism is an example of a nonpacifist stand against militaries and militarism, focusing on the militarization of people’s lives, including civilian lives in prewar, war, and postwar US society. A similar stance is taken by Judith Butler, who calls for a discursive resistance to militarism:

To paralyze the infrastructure that allows armies to reproduce themselves is a matter of dismantling military machinery as well as resisting conscription. When the norms of violence are reiterated without end and without interruption, non-violence seeks to stop the iteration or to redirect it in ways that counter its driving aims.

(2009, 183)

Western popular representations of masculinity continue to construct gender on a personal level and politics at the international level: the “blind triumphalism of victory” (Elshtain 1987, 251) persists in media wars, and the struggle for the “devirilization of discourse” continues. Pressure on men to retain or establish their masculine credentials through enlisting, and women’s participation in the US armed forces of 15 percent on average, do not neutralize gender binaries. Women’s participation in the armed forces merely reinforces those binaries and justifies continued militarization: women have been “fillers” in the US armed forces, making up for insufficient voluntary recruitment. By necessity for the purposes of armed combat, a masculinist culture has been encouraged, one consequence of which is the sexual harassment of female military personnel (Enloe 2008a, 2008b).

Enloe endorses a feminist position, “feminist” signifying action aimed at making changes in, investigating, and challenging power structures (Enloe 2008a, 258; Davis 1982, 258). “It takes feminist digging to bring the workings of power in the militarization of masculinities and femininities into the light where we can examine the [demilitarized] alternatives” (Enloe 2008a, 262). Transnational feminist activism begins at home, argues Linda Carty: “Bringing a comprehensive theory of human rights and feminist activism together as cogent praxis will help us to appreciate how imperial occupation in Iraq . . . has exacerbated cultural practices of sexism and misogyny” (Carty 2008, 269–270).

American imperialist wars in the twenty-first century have generated new antiwar women’s organizations that collaborate with groups worldwide. Organizations new and old include Code Pink, WILPF, Women in Black, Women Waging Peace, Women Living in Conflict Zones Network (WICZLN), Fight Imperialism Stand Together (FIST), Global Women’s Strike, Gold Star Families for Peace, the International Action Center, the Raging Grannies, the School of the Americas Watch, the Syracuse Peace Council, United for Peace and Justice, Veterans for Peace, and the Women’s Fightback Network.
In 2012 the United States had 900 military facilities worldwide, compared with a total of 150 foreign bases of all other countries combined. Women activists have provided leadership and support for the individual antibases movements that campaign to close US bases in a number of countries (Enloe 2009, xii), which form part of a wider global movement to push back US bases around the world.

Women in Black called for “justice against war,” adopting an antimilitarist position in militarized states, as a movement within coalitions of other transnational peace movements that operate in an “imagined solidarity” with sympathizers globally through the Internet (Cockburn 2010), as well as locally with street demonstrations and petitions against state governments. In the United Kingdom antiwar or peace activism evolved into “anti-imperialist” activism, with diverse Muslim groups and communities being able to mobilize through established mosque congregations in support of a range of Trotskyist and non-Trotskyist groups. The Socialist Workers Party (SWP) in the United Kingdom has had the organizational capacity to coalesce disparate groups with little previous knowledge of each other. Elements of the peace movement there joined with a radical activist, anticapitalist network in which first, second, and third generation non-violent jihad, hijab, and non-hijab women participated (Gillan et al. 2008).

In terms of immediate gains and measurable results of women’s antiwar activism, women’s activism on a national level, within borders, can be seen to have borne some fruit in terms of peace agreements and their implementation in a range of countries. Their successes have become the inspiration for action in other contexts: advocacy by leading feminist scholars and activists since 1995 has also brought about important changes within UN institutions as well as the legislatures and armed forces of member states of the United Nations. The impact of the work of feminist activists at the transnational level is difficult to measure, but we should not underestimate the power of the Internet in enabling communication among women activists to work in solidarity to achieve change through collective action at the local level. At the same time, at a global “cosmopolitan” level (Held 1995, 2010), with regard to the impact of feminist activism on hegemonic forces and great powers, Gillan and colleagues point out with reference to Western humanitarian or strategic intervention that “the UN Security Council is not an acceptable point of struggle for non-state actors. With key decisions concerning invasion ultimately being made in private, any potential transnational anti-war movement lacked a readily identifiable transnational opponent” (2008, 112).

The Role of Women’s Networks Within a Decentralized Transnationalism

Despite the challenges of confronting the UN Security Council, civil society activism at the national and global levels has increased exponentially since 2001, leading up to the world antiwar demonstrations of February 15, 2003, prior to the US invasion of
Afghanistan in March that year. Groups can engage in vertical resistance, putting pressure on governments and governmental institutions, and by means of the horizontal resistance of local meetings, conferences, and demonstrations on the streets. Local demonstrations and vigils—such as Code Pink’s anti-US war, four-month, all-day vigil in front of the White House in Washington, D.C., in 2002, and the Raging Grannies’ occupation of army recruitment centers in October 2005—are examples of women’s local activism that attracts international attention in the style of the Greenham Common women, and therefore are both local (decentralized) and transnational. Place is still important, but new technology provides unprecedented opportunities to gain worldwide attention through posting words, music, photographs, and videos on the Internet.

These examples of local direct action take place in the context of Hardt and Negri’s concept of “a new Empire” (2000), which constitutes a twentieth-century deterritorialization and centering of political power and loss of sovereignty. These authors posit that sovereignty has taken on a new form, and resistance to imperialism has taken on new forms. In the early part of the twenty-first century we have more “hybrid identities” and “plural exchange.” There is a new localization of struggles. While Hardt and Negri (2000) maintain that these struggles are all but incommunicable and blocked from traveling horizontally, and that a new language is required to enable these struggles to unite, as has been seen with the Occupy and Arab Spring movements, struggles have been communicated across divides and have provided solidarity that enables and inspires local activists to continue in their endeavors to challenge societies of control. Internationalism has been replaced by deterritorialized networks that include networks of feminists, including antiwar and antimilitarist feminists, who form part of Hardt and Negri’s championed “multitude.” The multitude is able to engage in a strategy of naming and shaming via the Internet, through decentralized activism, in which there is the possibility of visiting or joining a range of struggles (Cockburn 2007).

In Mexico, for example, women’s groups emerged to protest the disappearance of thousands of women at the hands of narco-trafficking cartels that had links with elements of the political establishment (Cacho 2012). Where local or federal governments have failed in their duty to protect their citizens, in alliance with police and armed groups, women have often been targets of exploitation and abuse. Global networks have a role to play in both supporting women’s groups’ media campaigns and defending the interests of women and LGBTs vulnerable to police or military harassment and gender-based violence.

Lydia Cacho’s (2012) investigative work on slavery and trafficking of women examines the involvement in crime of state military and police forces and private military companies in Mexico, Iraq, and South Asia, for example, drawing links among global organized crime; state-armed personnel; and the exploitation of women, men, and children in the sex trafficking and human organs industry. Local and transnational feminist networks of indigenous and Afro-Latin American women find space to articulate women’s perspectives (Escobar 2010, 43).
Conclusion

Gillis and colleagues (2004) argue that one aspect of “third wave feminism” is that it undermines the kind of fixed reality on which the first two feminisms were based—within it there is a proliferation of identities, which might suggest a weakening of the identification of “woman” for purposes of political mobilization. Moreover, as wage disparities between women and men among the lowest paid have been reduced, and women in developed countries have made gains in representation and power in relation to men, changes in gender relations as a goal may appear less significant, which they argue has led to feminist struggles becoming subsumed within environmental, human rights, and anticorporate activism, and within resistance to institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). These authors also claim that with a diminution of state power and patriarchal authority on a national scale, ceding to global corporate interests, the possibilities for women's gaining greater power in decision making are diminishing—hence struggles become more cultural and localized. At the same time, they are among feminist scholars who continue to uphold the values and practices of second wave feminism, arguing that the oppression of women still exists, and that there is still a place for critical theory and praxis: “[O]ne is born and constructed a woman but the consequences of the construction are real” (Howie and Tauchert 2004, 44).

Woodhull defends second wave feminism against criticisms that it is limited to the academy and not relevant to disaffected third wavers, who are described by some second wavers as concerned only with constructing themselves as women through cultural expression. She argues, however, that “only theory can enable us to distinguish . . . between meaningful modes of participatory democracy made possible by mass communication” (2004, 255). For Woodhull, theory is politics. Yet she maintains that new forms of community are possible with information technologies linking women with common interests and concerns. The collectivist direct actions taken by Raging Grannies, Code Pink Women for Peace, and the Granny Peace Brigade, as well as the more individualistic multigendered direct actions taken by third wave feminists, demonstrate that it is possible to combine three mutually supportive activities: theorizing in the academy, communicating globally, and acting locally in conjunction with other women’s organizations as well as joining forces with Occupy and global civil society movements.

The challenge for global feminist networks is to draw together the forces within local alter-globalization and regional networks and within governmental and intergovernmental organizations to find ways to contribute to the reformation of the state military and dismantling of private and paramilitary forces, whose activities are often damaging to the interests of civilian women, girls, and LGBTs. Aggressively masculinist cultures are also detrimental to the interests of women and men within the military who may become the objects of misogyny and homophobia. In contrast, nonmasculinist social movements, facilitated by global communication networks, gathered together in fora such as the World Social Forum, can join in the search for “novel designs for society,
the State, and life for everybody” (Escobar 2010, 44), in which decentralized feminist transnational movements have an important role to play. Feminist organizations and networks are themselves inclusive—and not necessarily composed of women only—constituting members of majorities and minorities who challenge authoritarian and racist structures within our societies and in doing so inspire and reinforce wider resistance movements.

**Note**

1. “Third wave feminism” arose as a “tactical response to the conditions of postmodernity” (Snyder 2008, 10), claiming to be a more inclusive and accommodating version of feminism than the second wave variant, which tended to reify the category of “woman.” It is a more personal, contextualized feminism, embracing multiple competing identities, with an emphasis on a strident girlie culture and “grrl” power. Third wave feminism rejects the concept that all women share a set of common experiences and resists taking a unified vision or forming its own social movement. Rather, it locates itself in a coalition with other social movements that are part of a larger agenda for environmental, economic, and social justice. Its political activism tends to take the form of anarchic individualistic direct action or pronouncements (Snyder 2008).

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CHAPTER 28

UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1325
A Feminist Transformative Agenda?

JENNIFER F. KLOT

Introduction

*International institutions universalize the norms proper to a structure of world power, and that structure of power maintains itself through [the] support of these institutions... international institutions may also become vehicles for the articulation of a coherent counter-hegemonic set of values. In this way they may become mediators between one world order and another.*

(Cox 1980, 377)

In 2000 the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (SCR 1325).¹ It had taken the Security Council more than fifty years to recognize the relevance of women’s rights and gender equality to the maintenance of international peace and security. Resolution 1325 bestowed unprecedented legitimacy on an international peacebuilding agenda for women and established new norms and standards for UN peace operations by mandating the consideration of gender equality in all Security Council actions to build peace and resolve conflicts. Considered the single greatest achievement in “engendering” global security policy, SCR 1325 is celebrated as a triumph for women’s peace movements and transnational feminist organizing. Over the past ten years 1325 has become the most widely cited international security policy to address gender issues and has been utilized in ways that arguably extend well beyond its statutory mandate. It has been translated into more than one hundred languages, formed the basis for forty-one national action plans, and is used by governments, multilateral agencies, women’s organizations, and peace activists to guide policies, programs, and funding in the areas of gender, security, and peacebuilding.
Alongside this expansive catalog of achievements, however, is growing skepticism about SCR 1325’s potential to advance feminist and peacebuilding agendas. A burgeoning corpus of academic and policy analyses, feminist theorizing, national action plans, policy guidance, and case studies provides a rich but uneven account of its impact in areas ranging from violence prevention and women’s political participation to postconflict financing. Three narratives emerge from this literature that seek to explain SCR 1325’s failures and potential to advance a feminist transformative agenda (e.g., Hudson 2012; Hudson 2009; Orford 2013; Otto 2006; Pankhurst 2003; Pratt and Richter-Devroe 2011; Shepherd 2008b; Sjoberg 2009; Tryggestad 2009). The first identifies SCR 1325’s discursive reinforcement of “binary logics” and essentialisms as a key obstacle to its implementation. The second points to the cooptation of 1325 as a legitimizing instrument for the “liberal peace project” and its reliance on “masculinized militaristic solutions.” The third narrative associates SCR 1325’s emancipatory potential with its ability to empower grassroots and local women’s groups and peace initiatives. This chapter considers these arguments in turn. By examining the processes through which international security policies, institutions, and operations are “gendered,” it assesses the UN’s potential for both articulating and advancing coherent, counterhegemonic values. More specifically, it asks whether UN peacebuilding is an arena in which feminist agendas can be negotiated and about its potential to improve women’s security.

In the following discussion, part I offers an alternative analysis of the political opportunity structures that were most significant in shaping SCR 1325’s discursive terrain. It distinguishes among multiple spheres of influence to better understand the distinct contributions of feminist discourse and activism to the evolution of international security institutions, norms, and processes. It further suggests that SCR 1325’s narrative herstory conveys a distorted imaginary of feminist unity that obscures the range of actors involved, their respective agendas, and strategies used to navigate the UN’s peace and security architecture. By recontextualizing the resolution’s genesis within the evolving discourse of UN peacebuilding and the responsibility to protect (R2P), part II demonstrates that key provisions in SCR 1325 have been both misinterpreted and underexplored and argues that the resolution’s textual discourse is among its most radical contributions. Part III addresses feminist debates regarding the utility and virtue of engaging with mainstream institutions. It points to a cadre of “feminist norm/organizational entrepreneurs” located within the UN system and in peace, humanitarian, and development organizations. This third generation of feminists to engage with the UN worked in partnership with influential “door openers,” who represented the very institutions that SCR 1325 sought to transform. It argues that 1325’s impact and transformational potential are best understood by examining these strategic alliances and dynamics of change. This section also addresses the primordial feminist dilemma of reconciling antimilitarist and pacifist ideals with SCR 1325’s legitimization of humanitarian intervention when threats to women constitute threats to international peace and security. Ultimately, the chapter argues that without fully exploring alternative, nonmilitary strategies and their associated policy processes, SCR 1325’s most
significant influence on UN peacebuilding will not be realized. Finally, part IV argues that SCR 1325 is both overdelivering and underperforming. It concludes that the resolution’s emancipatory potential, whether or not it is realizable, rests with its ability to enable feminist transformative agendas within the context of UN peacebuilding as well as outside of it.

**PART I: THE HERSTORY OF SCR 1325**

The adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 is widely celebrated as a victory for feminist peace organizing, originating with the 1915 Hague Congress of Women. In a sentiment shared by many, Carol Cohn describes SCR 1325 as a “formidable testimony to the efforts and skills of the NGOs responsible for its existence” (Cohn et al. 2004, 130). She explains that “[w]hat makes 1325 unique is not only that it (finally) addresses women, war, and security, or that its scope is expansive and its implications radical; what makes 1325 unique is that it is both the product of and the armature for a massive mobilization of women’s political energies” (Cohn 2004, 8). Feminist scholar Laura Shepherd credits the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, a small group of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) associated with SCR 1325’s genesis, with “transform[ing] decades of theorizing and activism into concrete achievements in the issue area of women, peace, and security” (2008b, 391–392).

Unquestionably SCR 1325 has catalyzed new kinds of political mobilization, bringing together vastly heterogeneous and unlikely constituencies that extend beyond women peace activists, feminist scholars, and policymakers. But its well-documented herstory often mischaracterizes and even obscures the range of actors involved in its creation and their strategic alliances within and outside of the women’s movement. SCR 1325’s storyline also tends to overlook two striking anomalies: (1) the reluctance of feminist rights activists to engage in its development, and (2) the absence of feminist and women’s organizations from its core NGO protagonists.

Understanding the actors and processes that were engaged in SCR 1325’s creation is important for many reasons, not least for the insights it provides about the role of feminist mobilization in shaping and transforming international institutions, agendas, norms, and processes. This in turn can help advance debates about the perils of engaging with international and mainstream institutions and provide a basis for assessing the impact of feminist strategizing and obstacles encountered. It also serves to increase understanding about the process of institutional transformation and the degree to which this has been realized over time.

The political and institutional context in which SCR 1325 was negotiated is often recounted through a chronology of feminist engagement with UN World Conferences on Women and on Human Rights. These conferences created unprecedented opportunities to strengthen feminist solidarity and networks nationally, regionally, and internationally, resulting in new resources to advance gender equality. They also provided
a forum for governmental and nongovernmental organizations to collectively shape international standards for advancing women's development and gender equality. Beginning with the First World Conference on Women, held in Mexico City in 1975, and through to the Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1995, feminist achievements demonstrated that the UN could be a space in which hierarchical ideas about gender could be challenged rather than reproduced.

Sanam Anderlini suggests that the Beijing Conference was pivotal in re-energizing women's peace movements and “spawn[ed] … multitude of new NGOs, grassroots groups and regional international networks from Liberia to Jerusalem” (2000, 12). The 1995 Beijing Platform for Action, which was adopted at the conference, identifies “armed conflict” and “power and decision-making” as two of twelve critical concerns and obstacles to women’s advancement. The instrumental role of women’s NGOs in SCR 1325’s evolution is often said to have originated in a 1998 meeting of the UN Commission on the Status of Women (CSW), dedicated to following up the Beijing Platform’s conclusions on women and armed conflict.

Although these pivotal meetings may have succeeded in articulating a more cohesive advocacy agenda among women’s organizations, they did not result in a consensus on the need for a UN Security Council resolution on women, peace, and security. Nor was there much organizing space for doing so. Between 1998 and 2000 women’s human rights activists were gearing up for the Five-Year Review of the Implementation of the Beijing Platform (also referred to as Beijing+5), an international conference convened during a special session of the UN General Assembly held on June 5–9, 2000, just three months prior to the UN Security Council’s adoption of SCR 1325.

The extensive Beijing Platform review process, led by the CSW, had been preceded by five regional preparatory meetings and myriad formal and informal sessions that sought the widest possible engagement of women’s NGOs. The aim was to ensure that the Beijing Platform agreements were not contested or weakened. While previous world conferences had iteratively and progressively strengthened normative standards for gender equality, the Beijing Conference was the first in which feminists faced organized opposition from politically conservative and resurgent authoritarian regimes, including the Vatican, Roman Catholic, Islamist, secularist-nationalist, and Western religious and fundamentalist groups (see Bunch and Fried 1996; Baden and Goetz 1997; Meyer and Prügl 1999). Ensuring a strong outcome from the 2000 review process was a priority for the women’s movement, particularly with the impending election of George W. Bush as US president. More than two thousand NGOs registered for the review conference held at the UN, approximately 70 percent from regions outside of North America.

Preoccupation with the review process partly explains the disengagement among women’s rights activists in advancing a UN Security Council resolution on women, peace, and security. But there were also institutional and political reasons. Institutionally, Charlotte Bunch distinguishes among “four somewhat separate, sometimes intersecting, tracks at the UN: human rights; development; security; and humanitarian assistance” (2003, 2). According to Bunch, bringing these tracks together raised
the concern for women's rights activists that “human rights might fall out of the picture.” She explains that “the peace and security people and human rights people are not the same groups, and do not work together very much . . . in the structures of the UN they tend to be separate” (2003, 2).

Female political leaders, both within and outside of the UN, were openly skeptical about the potential for UN peace operations to address women's concerns. During the annual meeting of the CSW held in 2000, Ugandan vice president Dr. Specioza Kazibwe stated that “like the majority of her African sisters, she knew little about the exact nature of peacekeeping operations. She viewed it as a new frontier for women activists in the region since this has been male dominated . . . institutionalization of women’s participation in peacekeeping and conflict resolution remains the biggest challenge given the recent acknowledgment of their critical role even by regional political organizations such as the OAU” (quoted in UNIFEM 2000). Echoing a similar sentiment, Elizabeth Rehn, former Finnish minister of defense and special representative of the UN Secretary-General for Bosnia and Herzegovina, stated that “the Dayton Peace Accords may have ended war but did not create peace, and marginalised women and children's concerns” (quoted in UNIFEM 2000).

Indeed, up until 2000 there had been few opportunities for feminists to engage with the UN's peace and security architecture. The Windhoek Declaration and Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations, adopted at a meeting convened by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and held in Windhoek, Namibia, in May 2000, recognized that “women have been denied their full role in [multi-dimensional peace support operations], both nationally and internationally, and the gender dimension in peace processes has not been adequately addressed” (United Nations 2000). At the time the UN’s gender architecture was itself fractured and poorly resourced. It consisted of four entities: the Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW), the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women, the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women (OSAGI), and the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM). In 2000 UNIFEM had an annual budget of approximately US $35 million and no operational capacity or presence in conflict-affected countries apart from a small grant program, African Women in Crisis (AFWIC), which was managed out of the Nairobi office.

The idea of a Security Council resolution on women was also not supported universally by UN delegates with responsibility for advancing women's rights and gender equality issues in the General Assembly (GA). Since 1974 both the GA and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) had addressed many aspects of the “women, peace, and security” agenda through myriad declarations and resolutions. Taken together, these resolutions and declarations provide a rich and more comprehensive agenda on “women, peace, and security” than the Security Council would ever consider being within its competence or purview. Moreover, for some members of the Group of 77 and even the CSW, advancing women's issues on the Security Council agenda was perceived as an encroachment on the GA's mandate as the UN’s fully representative and primary
policymaking body. Because both the “advancement of women” and “humanitarian affairs” are regular items on the GA’s agenda, the Security Council’s consideration of the same issue was considered by some delegations to be an imposition of its “norm-setting powers” outside of its areas of responsibility, as established by the UN Charter and other GA resolutions.

The reluctance among some feminist activists to pursue a Security Council resolution was not unwarranted. Rather, it reflected skepticism about the potential for UN peace operations to effect meaningful change in women’s lives, particularly after their failures in Rwanda, Burundi, and Srebrenica. In 2000 neither DPKO nor the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the two Secretariat entities with primary responsibility for advising and supporting UN peacemaking, preventive diplomacy, and peacekeeping and peacebuilding, had policies, guidelines, or expertise regarding women’s rights or gender equality issues. And despite growing evidence of sexual exploitation and abuse committed by UN peacekeeping personnel, there were no monitoring or reporting mechanisms to investigate and prosecute these crimes. Moreover, the UN’s humanitarian sector had yet to respond tangibly to ECOSOC’s 1998 request (E/1998/L.15) for the emergency relief coordinator to “ensure that a gender perspective is fully integrated into humanitarian activities and policies.” In other words, the UN had no policies or processes to ensure that the billions of humanitarian aid dollars raised in support of conflict-affected populations were reaching women. And it was only in 1999, when Canadian feminist Carolyn McAskie was appointed UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, that the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), the UN’s main forum for humanitarian agencies, adopted its first ever policy statement calling for the integration of a gender perspective in humanitarian assistance (United Nations, 1999).

**Part II: UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in Context—The Crossroads of Women’s Human Rights Activism and UN PeaceBuilding**

*Interpreting Security Council resolutions and language is a complex art. . . . In order to ascertain the Council’s intent and the powers it may be using in a particular resolution, it is necessary to analyse the overall context, the precise terms used in the resolution and sometimes the discussions in the Council—both at the time of adoption and subsequently.*

(SecurityCouncilReport.org, 2008, 1)

Most of the critical feminist literature on SCR 1325 associates the resolution’s failures and limitations with its “discursive construction.” Reflecting the views of many feminist
scholars, Laura Shepherd asserts that the resolution’s textual coherence does “violence to the concepts of gender and the international through their ordering according to binary logics: the domestic/international divide and the assumption of differentiated genders” (2008b, 14).

This chapter suggests that on the contrary, the articulation of gender and security in SCR 1325 are among its most radical contributions. It argues that a feminist perspective was used to challenge, rather than reproduce, the dominant international security discourse. Instead of examining the fault lines of what Shepherd characterizes as “two contested narratives of production of 1325: one belonging to NGOs and the other to the United Nations” (Shepherd 2008a, 13), this chapter suggests that it is their points of intersection that are central to unlocking SCR 1325’s transformative potential.

As a methodology in the study of international relations, feminist discourse analysis seeks to shed light on the processes through which social movements contest, frame, and participate in shaping political and policy agendas. Remarkably, however, most feminist discourse analyses of SCR 1325 offer little insight into the political, social, and bureaucratic processes through which it was negotiated. With few exceptions, their conclusions are drawn from a narrative textual analysis of the resolution and a small handful of related policy reports and speeches.

The critique of the language used in SCR 1325 reflects the hard-fought discursive battles by feminists in the academy and international arenas to amplify women’s voice, agency, and leadership. When placed along a timeline of feminist theorizing about patriarchy, militarism, globalization, and intersectionality, SCR 1325’s references to women and children, gender mainstreaming, women's special needs, and their victimization and protection reads like an apostasy. And even within the more restrained discursive context of international human rights law, SCR 1325 derogates significantly from the norms and standards that enshrine women’s human rights, primarily through its omission of any references to social, cultural, and economic rights and needs. Thus the appraisal of SCR 1325 as essentialist and patronizing is wholly understandable and consistent.

But different conclusions may be reached by interpreting its discursive construction along a timeline of theorizing and policy evolution with respect to UN peacebuilding. The Security Council adopted SCR 1325 in October 2000, only a year after it first articulated the concept of the protection of civilians (POC) in SCR 1265 (1999). This marked the beginning of a new era of UN peacebuilding, replete with its own actors, catalytic events, institutions, and processes that had little overlap with the evolution of women’s rights and gender equality norms and standards within the UN.

While the UN Security Council took fifty years to consider the relevance of women to its agenda, it is also worth noting that it was a full forty-nine years before the Council even expressed its willingness to respond to situations in which combatants had targeted civilians. In other words, the adoption of SCR 1265 in 1999 marked an equally significant shift in the evolution of UN peacebuilding, described by scholars as “a much needed departure from the statist and militarist approach to security that dominated
the field of International Relations (IR) during and after the Cold War” (Bellamy and McDonald 2002).

In the short span of two years, between 1998 and 2000, the Security Council adopted precedent-setting resolutions on children; the protection of civilians; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR); conflicts in Africa; and HIV/AIDS. These thematic resolutions became new guideposts for Security Council actions to protect populations from serious harm, when their governments were unwilling or unable to do so. They created the opportunity for peacebuilding mandates to include the most expansive range of collective enforcement measures ever authorized, including dedicated staff and resources to ensure child protection; human rights monitoring and reporting; election monitoring; refugee return; mine action; national institution building; the protection of humanitarian relief; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR); and human rights.

These precedents, and particularly the UN Security Council’s actions on children, created the opportunity and rationale for advancing the idea of a Security Council resolution on women (True-Frost 2007). But even as the protection of civilians became more central to peacekeeping mandates, the Security Council had yet to consider the gender dimensions of the conflicts under its purview or the implications for the kind of actions it authorized. Women’s rights and gender equality issues had been glaringly absent from the highly influential independent review of peacekeeping authored by Lakhdar Brahimi, which was presented to the Council on August 21, 2000, only two months before SCR 1325 was adopted. This groundbreaking review established new benchmarks for peacekeeping operations that emphasized conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction, the rule of law, and humanitarian and human rights concerns, but neglected any analysis of the gendered nature of conflict, its differential impacts on women/girls and men/boys, or the constraints on women’s participation in peacebuilding. Nor did it address the concerns expressed in Graca Machel’s report on the impact of armed conflict on children, regarding the sexual exploitation and abuse of women and girls by peacekeeping personnel (United Nations 1996). Ultimately these deficits became opportunities—the lynchpins—on which the need for a gender perspective in UN peacebuilding would be framed. In other words, UN Security Council Resolution 1325 would become, in significant measure, a diplomatic rejoinder to the Brahimi report.

Making this case required the identification of a specific subset of gender issues that could be considered within the Security Council’s competence, while not encroaching on the GA and ECOSOC mandates that include economic, social, cultural, humanitarian, and human rights concerns. Meeting these requirements became the first stage in framing the “women, peace, and security” agenda that would ultimately be reflected in SCR 1325. Necessarily, it drew from the precedents established in other thematic resolutions on the protection of civilians, but it also needed to contend with the Security Council’s predilection for a more narrow, rather than expansive, interpretation of its responsibility to settle disputes peacefully and to meet threats to peace with collective military action.
Protection: A Matter of Discourse or Practice?

Whatever the code words, let us in! Peace-builder, decision-maker, whatever argument works, let us in! Let us in so we can wrestle with the discussion at least; contest the parameters, and react, in real time and not after the fact. Let us into the Security Council, into the decision-making fora, into the rooms of the elusive place, let women in. It is the horror experienced daily which is the reason we want to get hold of the steering wheel of the Security Council. It is because the Security Council sets the contours of political discussion on peace and war on this planet and, significantly, because it mandates actual peace operations.

(Felicity Hill, director of the UN Office of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, quoted in Cohn 2004, 138)

The peace, development, and humanitarian NGOs most engaged in SCR 1325's development viewed it as an opportunity to reduce the security threats facing women in countries where the largest and most complex UN peace operations were then deployed. Their advocacy exposed glaring gaps in international protection and humanitarian assistance and the absence of guidelines and strategies for addressing the gender dimensions of these crises. As the UN grappled with its moral and legal responsibility to protect civilians in armed conflicts, feminists in particular saw SCR 1325 as a vehicle for ensuring that all UN actions to prevent conflict and build peace would take into account both the gender dimensions of war and militarism and the different security risks facing men and boys and women and girls.

The references to “women” and “protection” in SCR 1325 have acted as a lightning rod for feminist criticism about its role in perpetuating essentialist and patronizing stereotypes of women as innately vulnerable, defenseless victims in need of protection by the equally stereotypical muscular, militarized, humanitarian cowboys. According to Anne Orford, the resolution’s text reinforces stereotypical views about women as “gentle handmaidens and victims of war.” (2002, 282). Sandra Whitworth interprets SCR 1325’s discursive construction as one that “fix[es] gender as a pathological relationship based on sexed bodies, an external hierarchy in which men enjoy the privileges of their masculinity through their power over women and girls, an articulation that is deeply problematic” (2004, 95). And for Diane Otto, the lumping together of women and children in references to vulnerable groups reflects a gender conservatism that reinforces “the traditional stereotypes that construct women, like children, dependent defenseless and therefore in need of (manly) military protection” (2004, 8).

These critiques are drawn from a rich body of feminist theorizing about the relationships among gender equality, patriarchy, militarism, and globalization. They also reflect concerns emerging from decades of feminist activism to promote women’s participation in leadership in decision making in the international arena and the hard-fought battles over discourse within the UN’s human rights arenas. From these perspectives
and discursive terrains, the analyses offered are entirely with merit. Yet viewed within the discursive terrain in which SCR 1325 was negotiated, namely the protection of civilians, very different conclusions can be drawn.

Building on precedent and the Security Council’s own articulation of the “protection of civilians,” the use of the term “protection” in SCR 1325 refers to the Fourth Treaty of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, adopted in August 1949. Canada first introduced the “protection of civilians” as a formal item on the Council’s agenda in February 1999 to coincide with the fiftieth anniversary of the negotiation of the Convention. As elaborated in UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s first report to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians (POC) in Armed Conflict (S/1999/957), “protection” refers to the application of legal, political, and diplomatic measures as well as peacekeeping or enforcement measures under Chapters VI, VII, or VIII of the UN Charter. Notably, the Secretary-General’s Report on POC and the Security Council’s Resolution both emphasize the importance of preventive measures, the need to address the root causes of conflict, and the need for efforts in the aftermath of war, including reconciliation and the administration of justice to those who have violated international humanitarian or human rights law. By reaffirming the responsibility of the broader community of states to ensure women’s protection when sovereign states are unwilling or unable to do so or when the state may itself become a perpetrator of crimes against women, SCR 1325 establishes that violations against women in conflict situations may also be considered threats to international peace and security. In some respects this was the ultimate embodiment of “gender mainstreaming.” For the first time, the assessed contributions of the UN could be accessed on behalf of women affected by armed conflicts.

Although the Geneva Conventions deal explicitly with sexual violence, indictments for wartime rape were first made by the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, in 1996 and 1998, respectively. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court had not been ratified at the time of the first Security Council debate on women, but it had already established that rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, and other forms of sexual violence would be considered crimes against humanity. By including references to sexual and gender-based violence in SCR 1325, their relevance to all UN actions to build peace and resolve conflicts could be established. From a normative perspective, this would ensure that the responsibility for protecting women from violence and harm would become not only a state responsibility, but also an international obligation, thereby elevating sexual and gender-based violence in situations of armed conflict from the private sphere to the public.

The goal was to ensure that the needs of women victims of abuse and violence—and the restoration of their dignity and living conditions—would be considered in all Security Council actions to prevent conflict and build peace. The aim was not to essentialize women’s caregiving roles, but rather to demonstrate the relevance of women’s needs to the allocation of humanitarian and peacekeeping resources—the UN’s largest
budget category—for services in areas ranging from advocacy and legal reform to emergency reproductive health care; food; water; sanitation; housing; camp security; security sector reform; and HIV/AIDS prevention, care, and treatment.

**PART III: PATHWAYS TO TRANSFORMATION—INSIDE, OUTSIDE OR IN-BETWEEN?**

Access to institutions and the agenda-setting process is pivotal for NGOs to enable them to introduce their pet problems and solutions and to convince policymakers of both their significance and their validity. Influential allies are important because they generally possess institutional resources that NGOs themselves lack, ranging from material power to institutional prerogatives and prestige. Changes in political alignments or conflict can be facilitating factors.

(Joachim 2007, 7)

Given the political context outlined previously, both discursive and institutional, what were the political opportunity structures and pathways that feminists navigated in bringing about SCR 1325? What kinds of alliances were developed, and which strategies were most influential? What were the obstacles and constraints? Unlike the UN Commission on the Status of Women (CSW), the Security Council has no formal mechanisms to engage NGOs, and feminists had little political access to the UN’s highly complex peace and security architecture. Nor did they have what Joachim refers to as “empirical credibility” outside of the area of international human rights and humanitarian law (2007). In the nascent field of peacebuilding, there was little in the way of gender expertise (academic or operational), or sex-disaggregated data in areas ranging from crime prevention to policing, security sector reform, demobilization, and reintegration.

This chapter attributes SCR 1325’s genesis to a cadre of “feminist norm entrepreneurs” who brought their vision, charisma, and wealth of organizing experiences and allies into a new institutional discourse replete with its own actors, institutions, policies, and processes. Many of these “entrepreneurs” were products of the feminist movement, but had located themselves in NGOs that were neither feminist nor women’s organizations per se. Rather, those credited with SCR 1325’s genesis, the NGO Working Group (WG) on Women, Peace and Security, comprised a small and loosely assembled alliance of NGOs that were primarily focused on peace, disarmament, humanitarian action, and protection. The five founding WG members included Amnesty International, International Alert, the Hague Appeal for Peace, The Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children, and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF).
The WILPF and The Hague Appeal for Peace both had forceful and impressive feminist leaders, but their organizational missions emphasized disarmament, demilitarization, and conflict prevention. And even though the Women’s Refugee Commission (then the Commission for Refugee Women and Children) and International Alert had discrete women’s programs that supported women’s organizations in conflict-affected areas, their primary focus as advocacy organizations was, and continues to be, situated in the arenas of peacebuilding and humanitarian action.

The SCR 1325 literature tells us little about how feminist perspectives became distinct and influential within these more development-oriented and peace organizations or about the processes of engagement that took place between and among these feminist norm entrepreneurs and in relation to the UN’s peace and security architecture. Understanding how their feminist values and aspirations both influenced and were shaped by their organizational location is important to understanding the political and mobilizing structures that were negotiated and the compromises made.

The communications channels and working relationships between and among NGOs and Security Council members are recognized as an integral part of the political mobilization around SCR 1325. But the nature of these engagements and the role of various “door openers” remain underexplored, particularly with regard to feminist allies in the UN system, namely UNIFEM and the Division for the Advancement of Women. The establishment of UNIFEM in 1978 provided an institutional mechanism for feminist activists to become “insiders” and leverage UN resources to strengthen women’s organizations and transnational feminist networks nationally, regionally, and internationally. UNIFEM also helped to broker alliances between these groups and the UN itself, providing a more direct conduit to some aspects of the UN’s peace and security architecture. But the UN’s gender architecture had little access to or engagement with the political and bureaucratic processes and hierarchies of power within and among member states, the UN Secretariat, the UN Funds and Programs, and the Security Council itself, which were then among the most inaccessible parts of the UN system.

This chapter suggests that some of the keys to unlocking this access were held by “door openers,” about which very little has been written. These included well-placed and powerful male allies, who used their positions and access within the UN Secretariat, the UN Funds and Programs, and member states to advance SCR 1325’s agenda. The “door openers” also included femocrats within the UN system and sympathetic male delegates from Namibia, Jamaica, Canada, and the United Kingdom. But little is known about how feminist entrepreneurs worked in alliance with these “linking pins” from the outside and in-between, or the degree to which their support increased the political legitimacy of the agenda. Without fully understanding feminist strategies for engaging UN actors throughout SCR 1325’s evolution, the UN’s potential as a “mediator” is obscured, and insights about the processes of institutional change are lost. Without specifying the opportunities and obstacles encountered in these processes, the fundamental question about the UN’s potential to advance feminist agendas will remain unanswered.
Are Resolutions the Only Fruit? Reconciling Feminist Peace Activism with Humanitarian Intervention

Women’s and peace groups have not simply been duped into believing that peacekeeping is a panacea. They are faced with situations of conflict, humanitarian disaster, and human suffering in which there appear to be few viable alternatives with which to respond.

(Whitworth 2004, 17)

For the most part, feminist aspirations for SCR 1325 are vested in its potential to become a vehicle for advancing feminist, anti-militarist, and peace agendas and in establishing a “proof of concept” that the UN is an arena within which hegemonic agendas can be challenged rather than reproduced. Realizing these aspirations would go a long way toward vindicating feminist strategies of engaging with mainstream international institutions.

Otto’s views about this question have vacillated between both extremes. In 2006 she wrote optimistically that although feminist efforts to engage the UN Security Council “might well be dismissed as a futile attempt to employ the master’s tools to dismantle the master’s house . . . however unlikely . . . recent feminist efforts to engage with the UN Security Council, the seat of the world’s superpower(s) with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, have also borne some fruit” (2006, 116).

In this quotation, “fruit” refers to the first UN Security Council presidential statement to establish the “inextricable link” between gender equality and international peace and security. Here Otto triumphalizes the first in a sequence of new norms that would emerge from the Security Council, precisely the kind of fruit that feminists have generated effectively within the UN, beginning with the 1945 Charter of the United Nations, which recognizes the rights and freedoms of every individual regardless of race, sex, language, or religion.

Although norms, standards, and resolutions are not the only fruit, establishing an international legal framework for women’s rights and gender equality has been a central focus of feminist rights activism and engagement with the UN. In the global South and North, feminists have used advocacy and legal strategies to hold their governments accountable to numerous international conventions, treaties, declarations, and resolutions, establishing a model of activism that many SCR 1325 advocates have continued to use.

Over time the achievements associated with SCR 1325 have expanded exponentially and are reported on by governments, women’s NGOs, and UN entities. These wide-ranging and often conflicting assessments of its impact vary according to expectations and standpoint. Like most UN indicators, those proposed by the UN Secretary-General to measure the implementation of SCR 1325 focus almost exclusively on representation, measured by the number of women participants in or beneficiaries of some UN activity or process. Far less focus is given to understanding the impact of women’s participation on security sector reforms, peace negotiations, or women’s socio-economic status. Achievements tend to chronicle the number of laws that have been
introduced to prevent violence against women, rather than their impact on violence perpetration, impunity, or prevention. Plaudits are given when UN reports include references to “women” or any “gender issue”; whether or not that information is acted upon remains outside of the evaluation exercise.

The varied and often contradictory perspectives about SCR 1325’s impact and the Security Council’s accountability for its implementation takes us to the nerve center of feminist praxis. This is because SCR 1325 not only legitimizes the use of armed force when threats to women are considered threats to international peace and security, but it also advocates humanitarian intervention when the widespread violation of women’s rights constitutes a threat to international peace and security. How can feminist antimilitarist ideals be reconciled with SCR 1325’s countenance of the UN’s system for collective enforcement?

Although pacifism is a central tenet of feminist orthodoxy, not all feminist peace activists consider the use of military force amoral. These debates have re-emerged recently in the context of R2P, and the angst with which feminists are beginning to engage with these questions is palpable (see, for example, Charlesworth, 2010; Davies and Teitt, 2012; Engle, 2007; Gibbings 2011; Heathcote, 2011; Hudson 2012; Otto, 2013; Sherret and Bond, 2012; Stamnes, 2012; Van Schaack, 2011).

Security Council Resolution 1325 has been a magnet for critical feminist scholarship, because it is fodder for debates regarding the utility and virtue of engaging with mainstream institutions, and in reconciling pacifist and antimilitarist ideals with the morality of humanitarian intervention. For many feminists, SCR 1325 has become a harbinger of the UN’s ability to provide an alternative to the more traditional use of military force. Feminist scholar Sandra Whitworth recounts that, “peace groups and women’s groups looked to the UN peace operations as an important alternative to the more traditional ‘combat-capable’ emphases of most militaries” (2004, 12). And two decades ago Cynthia Enloe’s treatise on sexual politics at the end of the Cold War stated that “the form of military force that is inspiring perhaps the greatest hope is the UN peacekeeping force . . . it inspires optimism because it seems to perform military duties with being militaristic” (1993, 33).

Ironically, this optimism plummeted shortly after SCR 1325’s adoption. The euphoria that characterized early feminist aspirations for SCR 1325 has become markedly antipodean. This aspirational degeneration reflects a decreasing faith in the UN’s ability to fulfill these feminist expectations. For many feminist scholars and activists, the overt instrumentalization of women by the United States to justify its military invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 reinforced the fear that SCR 1325 would be used to legitimate the Security Council’s actions and facilitate “existing projects and priorities of militarized economic globalization in the name of protecting and promoting the interests of women” (Orford 2002, 283). The UN Security Council’s inability to obviate unilateral and bilateral military actions, combined with the growing documentation of sexual violence and exploitation committed by military and civilian peacekeeping personnel, intensified feminist soul-searching about the risks of engaging with mainstream institutions. Christine Chinkin and Hilary Charlesworth (2006) reflected the views of many feminists when they argued that the Security Council’s militaristic and state-centered
approaches to peacekeeping have been more likely to increase, rather than decrease, women's insecurity.

Feminists have not been alone in their scrutiny. Actions by the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq led to what some scholars and analysts point to as the beginning of the “collapse” of the entire system of promoting peace and security envisioned by the UN charter (Glennon 2003). Growing feminist diffidence about the potential of peace-building to advance anything other than the prevailing power structures has begun to have more in common with critical security scholars (see, for example, Pugh 2005; Bellamy 2008; Chandler 2004).

Unlike critical security scholars, however, feminist academics have attempted to assuage their skepticism about the ever-growing claims of successful mobilization around SCR 1325. A pronounced reflexivity permeates the feminist scholarly literature as it seeks to reconcile these claims with feminist theories about the intractability of the UN as an arena within which more deeply transformative change can be realized. Just as Whitworth dismisses the entirety of the peacekeeping process as a “colonial enterprise,” she also recognizes the importance of feminist engagement with the UN: “Feminists both within and outside the UN face a difficult and ultimately contradictory set of challenges. The UN is the chief global actor involved in peace operations, so it can’t be ignored, it must be engaged with” (2004, 120).

Although debates about the use of military force are well developed in the humanitarian and critical security literatures, in feminist literature it is still largely taboo to suggest that there may be situations in which the use of military force is justified. Feminist debates about militarism have been largely conceptual, focusing on the potential risks of engaging with mainstream institutions at the level of discourse rather than on the question of humanitarian intervention as a matter of practice. Taken as a whole, the literature offers no clear answers or directions for research or action. Rather, it presents a muddled and often conflicting range of messages that are both ideologically inconsistent and strategically underdeveloped. The more theoretical literature evades the humanitarian dilemmas regarding the urgent threats to women's security, while the more policy-oriented assessments are often dismissed as “problem solving” efforts that will never amount to more than “tinkering.”

**Part IV: What’s a Good, Humanitarian, Antimilitarist, Multilateralist Feminist to Do?**

This chapter concludes by setting out a number of questions that may be helpful in orienting feminist debates, both conceptual and strategic, and guiding future work in this area. These are organized around the “what” and the “how” of feminist theorizing and action to advance gender equality, peace, and security and respond to the most
conspicuous gaps in feminist theory and praxis regarding the dynamics of institutional and social transformation.

A Frame Is a Frame Is a Frame, Not an Agenda

Security Council Resolution 1325 represents an important, albeit first step toward increasing the centrality of women and a gender perspective to the international peace and security agenda. According to Donald Schön and Martin Rein, “the struggles over the naming and framing of a policy situation are symbolic contests of the social meaning of an issue domain, where meaning implies not only what is at issue but what is to be done” (1995, 24). As a still nascent community of research and practice, far more progress has been made in identifying what is at issue for women with respect to gender and security in the context of armed conflict than in translating this understanding into actionable change.

Institutional discourse is used to set “the boundaries of political action and limit the range of actors that are considered legitimate participants, the range of issues that are relevant to the debate, policy alternatives that are feasible for implementation and alliance strategies available for achieving change” (Jenson 1987, 65). Indisputably, in these respects SCR 1325 has influenced the mainstream peace and security discourse and broadened the range of actors considered legitimate participants, including, for example, civil society and women's peace organizations. However, far less has been achieved in developing policy and operational alternatives for improving women's security.

As a contribution to the discursive terrain of UN peacebuilding, SCR 1325 effectively broadened the boundaries of political actions that the Security Council can authorize and expanded the range of actors considered legitimate participants in the debate—from women's NGOs in conflict situations to the UN's lead agency on women (prior to SCR 1325's adoption, UNIFEM had never entered the UN Security Council chamber). The resolution also increased the range of issues that were considered relevant to the Security Council's mandate and introduced new policy alternatives and potential alliances for increasing women's protection and supporting their role in peacebuilding.

Although SCR 1325 has extended the boundaries of what is considered to be a threat to international peace and security, paradoxically, feminist attention and resources have narrowed considerably, guided by the Security Council's purview rather than by the broader challenges that inspired SCR 1325. To date the UN's most far-reaching articulation of this agenda is laid out in the 1975 Declaration of Mexico on the Equality of Women and Their Contribution to Development and Peace, adopted by the General Assembly following the UN First World Conference on Women (United Nations 1975), twenty years before the Beijing Conference and twenty-five years before the adoption of SCR 1325. The Declaration of Mexico focuses on inequality between men and women as well as among nations and emphasizes the responsibility of states to redress the obstacles to development and equality of opportunity in all spheres: cultural, political, economic, and social, including the family. The need for a new international economic
order is central to the declaration’s analysis of the causes of inequality and reaffirms the principle of the full and permanent sovereignty of every state over its natural resources, wealth, and economic activities. Recognizing the “incalculable suffering of women, men and children,” it calls for women and men, together, to eliminate colonialism, neo-colonialism, imperialism, foreign domination and occupation, Zionism, apartheid, racial discrimination, and the acquisition of land by force. It is uncompromising in its commitment to “real, general and complete disarmament under effective international control.” With a seventeen-paragraph preamble and thirty well-defined principles, the Declaration of Mexico goes further than any subsequent international agreement in identifying the obstacles to equality, peace, and security. Both inspiring and sobering, its analysis of obstacles to equality and peace and proposed strategies for addressing them are immeasurably bolder than the very limited process and participation-oriented targets currently used to assess the implementation of SCR 1325 or the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

As a thematic resolution, SCR 1325 should guide the actions of the Security Council, its members, and the operations it authorizes. Realizing its transformative potential will depend on a very clear theory of change that identifies the related obstacles, appropriate strategies, mechanisms, and allies. At its most transformative, bringing women and a gender perspective into this arena would introduce new kinds of analysis and new approaches that give priority to nonviolent peacebuilding and demilitarization. But among the range of enforcement tools at the Security Council’s disposal, feminists continue to place overwhelming focus on the authorization of military operations, as compared to economic or preventative actions. Much more feminist attention must be given to exploring these nonmilitary alternatives. Without this, SCR 1325’s most radical influence on Security Council approaches to peacebuilding will not be realized.

Resolution 1325: Overdelivering and Underperforming

Feminist scholarship on SCR 1325 has given more attention to discursive constructs than to the institutions and processes through which it can be realized and the multiplicity of hierarchies and shifting geopolitical alliances through which it must be negotiated. Feminist analysis of its transformative potential must dig deeper than discourse and engage with the range of institutional actors and processes that are relevant to decision making, from the UN Secretariat and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to member states, the funds and programs, and regional bodies. Each has distinct mandates and functions and different political legacies and alliances. A more detailed understanding of these mechanisms should also inform strategic choices regarding feminist engagement—whether it be from the inside, outside, or in-between—and what each of these would actually mean in practice.

Although Otto has argued many sides of the debate regarding engagement with mainstream institutions, her schema is largely rhetorical: “Women’s peace activism outside the mainstream is a measure of the dominance of ‘male’ thinking in military institutions.
From this point of view, it would seem imperative that women peace activists find their way into the mainstream if ever the hegemony of the conventional wisdom that international security depends ultimately on military power is to be dislodged" (2006, 115). Exactly how does one dislodge the hegemony of conventional wisdom? How will feminists find their way into the “mainstream” of military institutions? What kinds of access and expertise are needed? What is the role of individuals in these processes, both as activists and “norm entrepreneurs,” and as “gatekeepers” and “door openers”? How do individual understandings about gender influence institutional transformation?

Since its adoption, SCR 1325 has provided a vehicle for women peace advocates to engage the UN’s highest military and political authority in a quest to transform dominant approaches to peace and security. It sought to ensure that the systematic violations of women’s rights in conflict situations would be considered threats to international peace and security, not be relegated to the private domain. It intended to redress the paltry allocation of humanitarian resources to meet women’s emergency sexual, reproductive, and health needs. And it also sought to demonstrate how women’s participation and a gender perspective could tangibly contribute to sustainable peace and help reshape priorities for postconflict peacebuilding.

Since the adoption of SCR 1325, however, most of its documented success stories have been in the informal peacebuilding arena, led by women human rights activists and peace advocates. The least demonstrable progress has been made by the institution with the primary responsibility for its implementation: the UN Security Council. Fundamentally, women’s security and gender equality issues are still marginal to the way in which peacebuilding mandates are designed and carried out. In other words, SCR 1325 has failed to deliver on things it never set out to do, and it has overdelivered on things for which its role had never been imagined.

This chapter argues that SCR 1325’s “failures” are not rooted in its textual discourse. Rather, they represent a broader reflection of the peacebuilding project itself. The resolution is a telling example of the “sites in the policy process in which policies are mediated, circumvented, refashioned and created” (Keeley 2001, 25). It has created space for questions to be raised about the potential for both military and nonmilitary approaches to improve women’s security. But not nearly enough has been done, nor have many followed Dyan Mazurana and colleagues in problematizing peace operations as a “necessary starting point to locate points of entry for critiques and institutional change” (2005).

In conclusion, this chapter rebuts the nearly universal perspective shared by both supporters and critics that SCR 1325’s emancipatory potential lies in its ability to empower grassroots women’s groups and peace initiatives. Nor does it concur with Otto’s more skeptical assessment that “the institutional reception and management of feminist ideas works to divest them of their emancipatory content” (Otto 2009, 3). Rather, it argues that the achievements associated with SCR 1325 outside of the UN system, especially in the context of informal peace processes, reflect a failure to influence how UN peacebuilding operations interpret, shape, and respond to women’s security risks and needs. Ultimately, it argues that SCR 1325’s emancipatory potential—whether or not it is realizable—rests with its ability to enable feminist transformative agendas within the context
of UN peace building as well as outside it. It views UN peacebuilding operations as a particular expression of structured international institutional power that has the potential to become a “proving ground for concepts and hypotheses” in which counterhegemonic forces can develop. But it also suggests that achieving this will require a much deeper engagement with the sociopolitical and bureaucratic context of UN peacebuilding and geopolitical factors of influence.

Notes


2. The UN Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) meets annually at UN headquarters. Its forty-fourth session, prior to the Beijing+5 Review, was held on February 28–March 17, 2000.

3. Although the UN Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) is the only operational agency in the UN with an explicit mandate to focus on women’s reproductive health, rights, and needs, including in conflict situations, it has never been considered a part of the UN’s “gender architecture.”

4. UNIFEM’s mandate was limited to supporting “catalytic” activities. AFWIC, managed by Laketch Dirasse and Hodan Addou, was innovative and pioneering in its support for women’s peacebuilding NGOs and humanitarian action. It was one of the organizations that supported the All-Party Burundi Women’s Peace Conference, a pivotal achievement in the lead-up to SCR 1325’s adoption (De Silva Burke, Klot, and Bunting 2001).

5. These include the Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict (1974); the Declaration of Mexico on the Equality of Women and their Contribution to Development and Peace (1975); Resolution 3519 on Women’s Participation in the Strengthening of International Peace and Security and in the Struggle Against Colonialism, Racism, Racial Discrimination, Foreign Aggression and Occupation and All Forms of Foreign Domination (1975); Resolution 142 on Women’s Participation in the Strengthening of International Peace and Security (1977); the Declaration on the Participation of Women in Promoting International Peace and Cooperation (1982); and the Declaration on Ending All Forms of Violence against Women (1994).

6. The Group of 77 represents 131 UN member states; according to its Web site (http://www.g77.org/), it is the largest intergovernmental group of developing countries in the UN. It provides the means for the countries of the South to articulate and promote their collective economic interests and enhance their joint negotiating capacity on all major international economic issues within the UN system and to promote South-South cooperation for development.

7. Notably, these exceptions are primarily scholars who had some direct involvement in SCR 1325’s evolution. Others include Charlie Carpenter, Cynthia Cockburn, Cynthia Enloe, and Natalie Hudson.

8. These ideas build on the rich literature about transnational feminist movements, organizational entrepreneurship, norm diffusion, social networks and collective action, and international organizations. See, for example, Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Carpenter and Jose
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Chapter 29

Women in Postconflict Decision-Making

Change for the Better?

Sherrill Whittington

Introduction

The United Nations Secretary-General, in his statement to the UN Security Council in October 2000, commented that “peace is inextricably linked to equality between women and men…. [M]aintaining and promoting peace and security requires women’s equal participation in decision-making.”¹ This recognition of the necessity to advance women’s equal involvement in all aspects of peacebuilding and reconstruction was underscored at the launch of the landmark UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (SCR 1325), which represented a breakthrough in the Council’s recognition of women’s roles and experiences during conflict, its resolution, and postconflict stabilization and reconstruction. SCR 1325 calls for women to be directly involved as key players in national reconstruction, following state failure during conflict. This resolution can serve as an important instrument for putting women’s views and priorities—as well as their skills and capacities—at the center of peacebuilding efforts.

Article 8 of the resolution specifically “calls on all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to adopt a gender perspective,” including addressing “special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction.” It also requires the introduction of “measures that support local women’s peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution,” as well as the direct involvement of women “in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements.” The resolution also advocates that the “protection of and respect for human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary” be implemented.²
SCR 1325 has been strengthened by a series of resolutions that have broadened the mandate for the protection of women, obliging states to take action to prosecute sexual violence. The Secretary-General has also been requested to establish a set of indicators to track the implementation of SCR 1325 and to report on women’s participation and inclusion in peacebuilding and planning in the aftermath of conflict. These “women, peace, and security” resolutions aim to improve the status of women by calling for their participation in peace processes that encompass conflict resolution and peacebuilding, at the same time mainstreaming a gender perspective into all conflict prevention activities and strategies.

Although a great deal of focus of the UN Security Council over the past decade has been devoted to protecting women from being subjected to egregious crimes of sexual violence, as is the case with the recent SCR 2106, far too little attention has been given by the international community, including multilateral and bilateral donors, to promoting women’s roles in postconflict decision making, even though support for state building has evolved as the dominant model for international engagement in postconflict contexts.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development-Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) defines state building as “an endogenous process to enhance capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state-society relations.” It identifies the role of international actors as “supporting and facilitating the political and institutional processes that can strengthen the foundations of a resilient state and society.” Yet a recent OECD-DAC study found that the “focus on gender equality in fragile situations, called for by international agreements and resolutions, is implemented only to a limited extent.” It also recognized that given the fact that “only 20% of aid allocated in this sector in fragile states integrates a gender equality dimension—a share that is lower than in all developing countries combined (23%),” there is a large amount of room to “scale up investments for gender equality.” The main donor focus is on the social sectors rather than governance, with more than half the donor assistance to fragile countries going to the education and health sectors, and only “38% of aid allocated to the governance sector in fragile states addressed gender equality,” which points to a lack of donor support for international commitments to increase women’s participation in decision making.

There has been insufficient analysis of how postconflict state building both involves and impacts women and men and the unique contributions that women who have endured conflict can make in determining the nature of state reconstruction. While the transition from an immediate postconflict situation to one of state building provides a window for women to mobilize and have a direct impact on the governance agenda, there are many barriers to their full participation, emanating from entrenched cultural values of patriarchal elites, the lack of a human rights culture, and insufficient support to facilitate transition from involvement in conflict and peacemaking to a unified movement for women’s rights and gender equality. When they are able to be, women are a formidable force for change, acquiring a critical mass in legislatures, government, and civil society, and integrating gender equality into reformed governance structures.
Many fragile states that have emerged from conflict are today ranked highest with regard to the percentage of women in national legislatures. A number of postconflict countries have achieved more than a quarter female representation; Rwanda is at the top of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) world list of women in national parliaments, with almost 64 percent in the September 2013 elections, followed by South Africa with 42.3 percent; Mozambique at 39.2 percent; and Timor-Leste, Burundi, and Afghanistan at 38.5, 32.1, and 27.7 percent, respectively (IPU 2013). To achieve such remarkable results, affirmative action measures such as reserved seats or a parliamentary/party quota for women have been put in place, often with external assistance. While these figures reflect quantitative representation, it needs to be questioned whether promoting women's participation at the highest levels of governance has made a real difference in qualitative, substantive changes to women's rights and gender equality. These figures are an aberration in developing countries that continue to have poor gender indicators in areas such as health, education, economic empowerment, and gender-based violence. The challenge is to examine ways in which such a “critical mass” of women in legislatures can foster sustainable improvements in all areas of women's lives.

The following sections examine this phenomenon in three micro-states in the Asia-Pacific region that have emerged from conflict in the last decade: Timor-Leste, the Solomon Islands, and the Autonomous Region of Bougainville (ARB). Two of these, Timor-Leste and Bougainville, implemented special measures for women's representation. Timor-Leste put in place electoral laws to ensure that party electoral lists include at least a third of women candidates. Bougainville, in its autonomous constitution, set aside three reserved seats for women in the legislature to enable 9 percent representation, one of the highest in the Pacific region. On the other hand, despite campaigns by women's organizations to introduce reserved seats, the parliament of the Solomon Islands had no women representatives until late 2012, when a woman secured a seat through a by-election. The Political Party Bill of September 2013 seeks to redress this anomaly by specifying that “in a general election, a political party must reserve for women at least 10 per cent of their total number of candidates it selects to contest the election.” This decision was criticized by the National Council of Women for failing to include a provision “that caters for women to contest national elections,” and for being “contrary to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which Solomon Islands signed in 2000.”

In both Timor-Leste and Bougainville, specific affirmative action measures were demanded by women during the crucial transition period from the cessation of hostilities to peacebuilding and reconstruction. In the case of Timor-Leste, the Timorese women's 2000 Platform for Action, which was the outcome document of the First Women's Congress of Timor Lorosa' e, articulated their integral role in building a new nation and called for a minimum of 30 percent representation for women in decision making. The subsequent attainment of a critical mass of women in parliament has resulted in key achievements such as domestic violence legislation and gender budgeting initiatives, underpinned by a great deal of capacity building and financial support from the international community. However, in the parliament of Bougainville, the women
occupying reserved seats have not achieved sufficient numbers to make an impact and have also not had the international support to do so. In the case of the Solomon Islands, despite the fact that women had been integral to bringing about an end to hostilities, they were absent from the formal peace negotiations, and the subsequent establishment of a Regional Assistance Mission (RAMSI) lacked a rights-based mandate to promote gender equality. Women thus lost the prime opportunity to have a voice in the postconflict legislature and in shaping the rebuilding of their country.

**Timor-Leste: A Model of Women’s Leadership**

**Women and Conflict**

The prominent leadership role of women in independent Timor-Leste over the past decade may be attributed largely to the impact of the liberation struggle in what was formerly East Timor. The campaign of guerrilla resistance lasted for almost a quarter of a century—from the departure of the Portuguese colonizers in 1974 and the subsequent annexation and illegal occupation of East Timor by the Indonesian military (as its twenty-seventh province) in December 1975, until the independence referendum of August 1999. Nearly a quarter of a million people were killed in the liberation struggle, and the United Nations Security Council consistently condemned human rights abuses perpetrated under the Indonesian occupation.

While the role of the East Timor male resistance fighters was seen as pivotal to the struggle for independence, the contributions of women who joined the clandestine movement, and those supporting the guerrilla insurgents who were subjected to extreme violence, rape, and sexual abuse, were overlooked. At the NGO Forum of the UN Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995, six East Timorese women living in Australia, representing two groups based in Australia, the East Timor Relief Association (ETRA), and the East Timorese Women’s Group, raised the situation of women in East Timor. On September 6, 1995, a message sent by the women of the East Timorese clandestine resistance was presented by their representatives at the NGO Forum, describing their plight under the occupation:

_We have known war, rape, and violations of the most basic human rights, a military occupation regime, oppression, imprisonment and death…. Many of us carry on our bodies the scars of the interminable days and nights of prison…. Our men and our children went out one day to fight the Indonesians, many did not come back. Others are still fighting…. We hope in human solidarity and believe in the solidarity of the women of the world. We have survived, and for all these nearly twenty years kept the struggle alive and strong, fundamentally because there is a total national resistance to the invasion and the military occupation._
This bloody struggle against a foreign occupier forged a resistance movement and gave an entire generation of women a unifying cause that bonded them together and provided them with the experience and capacity to later unite as a movement for women’s rights.

Postconflict Intervention

Immediately following the overwhelming vote for independence in August 1999 by the East Timorese people, the Indonesian military began a scorched earth policy—*Operasi Sapu Jagad* (Operation Global Clean Sweep)—and UN peacekeepers arrived to provide security after the Indonesian forces and militia had totally devastated the country. In the following month the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was established, with a mandate encompassing not only providing security, but also, uniquely, the nation-building responsibilities of building a government and an economy almost from scratch for a very small country with a population of less than a million. It was also unique in that the regulation delineating the authority of UNTAET clearly stated that


Foundations for Women’s Leadership

The foundations of the leading role Timorese women were to undertake in the postindependence period were laid in the transitional period from 2000 to 2002, with the establishment of key gender equality mechanisms in government, the legislature, and civil society. The inclusion of CEDAW in UNTAET’s Regulation justified the establishment of a Gender Unit in mid-2000 in the office of the UN Deputy Secretary-General’s Special Representative (SRSG) for Governance and Public Administration, the key division of the mission that was to evolve into the Transitional Administration of East Timor, and which in turn would hand over responsibility to East Timor’s first independent government in May 2002. Guided by SCR 1325 and the 2000 Timorese Women’s Platform for Action, the Gender Unit transitioned into a nascent national women’s machinery. In the post-independence period, it evolved into the Office for the Promotion of Equality, located in the prime minister’s department, and was raised subsequently to the level of Office of the Secretary of State with cabinet representation. Thus, from the very outset a key mechanism was set up that enabled the issues and concerns of Timorese women to be raised at the highest levels of decision making. With the international handover in May 2002, it was firmly installed with a dedicated budget, operating effectively
with Timorese staff, and underpinned by committed, long-term donor assistance. This unique outcome of women's struggle for peace and a gender-responsive UN peacekeeping mission enabled Timorese women to forge a path forward in promoting gender equality in key government ministries.

The second factor shaping the key decision-making role for women was the transition from a resistance movement into a women's rights movement. Given the fact that there were no peacekeeping negotiations or peace agreement and that the UN resolutions determining East Timor's future had been crafted a year before SCR 1325, there was nothing incorporated into either UN mandates or high-level donor conferences to include either women or their priorities in postconflict reconstruction. No reference was made to the Beijing Platform for Action, nor were East Timorese women's issues and concerns ever raised at the official UN Fourth World Conference on Women, since they were not among the official Indonesian delegation. Thus they were not even considered in the disarmament, demobilization, and rehabilitation (DDR) program undertaken by the World Bank to compensate and rehabilitate ex-combatants. The catalyst that transformed the focus of Timorese women and unified them with a forward vision was the First Congress of Women of Timor Loro Saē, the first postconflict gathering of representatives of women's organizations to discuss the most important issues in the reconstruction of their country. The official statement issued at the Congress highlighted that

> although there has been a small increase in women's participation in the socio-economic and political spheres, women's absence from decision-making continues to result in the absence of a gender perspective. Women's empowerment and capacity building are vital to their full participation in and contribution to reconstruction, development and nation building. The absence of clear structures and transparent decision-making process also means that women and men's opportunities and access to resources are reduced.

Several demands emerged from the Congress that were to shape the role of women in rebuilding their country, in particular the demand for mechanisms to ensure transparency and accountability in government; a consultative process in constitution building; and the need for resources to empower women. Specifically, the 2000 Platform for Action demanded that the UNTAET-established National Consultative Council include a higher representation of women; that UNTAET provide support for women's organizations; and that women occupy a minimum of 30 percent of seats in all sectors of the transitional government in order to participate in decision making pertaining to nation building; the constitution; the new system of government; and national symbols such as the flag, national anthem, and language. They also called for training and capacity-building programs on women's leadership and political participation, as well as a public information campaign on discrimination against women. The Congress also amalgamated a large national network of twenty-four women's organizations into the unified Civil Society Organisation (CSO) network, *Rede Feto* (Tetum for the Women's Network of East Timor), which was supported by a long-term United Nations
Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) commitment to capacity building and financial support for future Women's Congresses and women's leadership programs.

UNTAET responded positively to these concerns raised by women's representatives of the Women's Congress Platform with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) from this time forward, having an “open door” policy toward women's organizations and following up on these recommendations. Due to the experience of the staff of the UNTAET Gender Unit; the committed support of the SRSG, Sergio Vieira de Mello; the international community; and a strong relationship with Rede Feto and key Timorese women leaders, an inclusive, participatory approach enabled the development of a close working relationship. The Gender Unit shaped its program to meet the reconstruction priorities of Timorese women, recruited Timorese women into the office, and mentored them to develop the unit into their own women's political machinery, becoming the Office for the Promotion of Equality. Thus the women of Timor felt from the outset that it was their office, a conduit into the peacekeeping mission and transitional administration that enabled them to have a direct input into shaping key governance outcomes such as their own gender equality mechanism in the prime minister's office, elected representatives in the postindependence parliament, and ensuring that women’s rights and gender equality were enshrined in the new constitution.

The demand of the Women's Congress for a 30 percent quota for women in high levels of decision making was the third factor to have a direct impact on the emergence of women as key national actors in the postindependence legislature. When this was initially proposed for the first national elections for the Constituent Assembly in 2001, it was rejected by the Electoral Affairs Division of the United Nations Headquarters as not in accordance with UN standards of “free and fair” elections. In response to this, UNTAET put in place a number of affirmative action programs to promote women’s participation in the elections. Political parties were urged to nominate women for winnable seats, incorporate women’s rights issues into party platforms, and provide political skills training for women candidates. As a result, women won 27 percent of elected seats in the Constituent Assembly, one of the highest representations of women in a parliament in the Asia-Pacific region. Women were then appointed as ministers in two of eleven ministries, justice and finance, which had been regarded as nontraditional portfolios for women in cabinets. In addition, two women advisors were appointed to the chief minister, one for human rights and the other for the promotion of equality.

During the run-up to these first postindependence elections another key mechanism was established, a civil society organization, the Feto iha Politica or Women Caucus in Politics (WCP), with the objective of promoting women's rights and equality in politics at all levels of decision making. It was active in preparing female candidates for the elections, as well as lobbying for the Constitutional Commission, charged with preparing the new national constitution, to comprise 40 percent women. In parallel, women's groups organized, prepared a “Women’s Charter of Rights,” and quickly mobilized ten thousand signatures. Due to women uniting to raise public consciousness around gender equality and nondiscrimination, the resulting Constitution of East Timor of March
2002 includes among the fundamental objectives of the state “[t]o promote and guarantee the effective equality of opportunities between women and men,” and the principle of nondiscrimination on grounds of gender is a fundamental principle. It provides that “[w]omen and men shall have the same rights and duties in all areas of family life and political, economic, social, cultural.”

Postindependence Achievements

The past decade has witnessed many substantive achievements, which have consolidated the early gains made by women and marked Timor-Leste as a leading example in effective women’s national representation in the Asia-Pacific region. Women parliamentarians, supported by their counterparts in civil society, have been responsible for major reforms, which guarantee a critical mass of women in the national legislature. This has largely been due to the effectiveness of the Grupo das Mulheres Parlamentares de Timor-Leste (GMPTL), the Women’s Parliamentary Group of East Timor, a cross-party women’s caucus that received parliamentary endorsement in 2006.

The Women’s Parliamentary Group has been an extremely effective mechanism in uniting women across political parties to support legislation to improve the status of women. While there are no reserved parliamentary seats for women, affirmative action has been applied to party quotas—Article 12/3 of the 2006 Electoral Law had stated that one out of every four candidates on electoral lists must be a woman. However, prior to the 2012 elections, the GMPTL proposed to change the Electoral Law and introduce a quota of one female among every three elected parliamentarians. The revised 2011 Electoral Law stipulates that, “on electoral lists, one out of every group of three candidates must be a woman.” Thus, as of the 2012 elections, women now occupy twenty-five of a total of sixty-five seats (38.5 percent). This places Timor-Leste in the sixteenth position in the global ranking of women in national parliaments, among the top 10 percent of countries, which also includes postconflict Rwanda, Mozambique, and South Africa. The 11 percent increase in women’s representation since independence is largely attributable to the determination of Timorese women to play an effective role in leadership and decision making. According to the president of the Women’s Parliamentary Group, “I was inspired by the struggle for independence and so decided to become a member of my party and join the voice of men, give my voice and be an active citizen.”

The Women’s Parliamentary Group has been supported by the establishment of a Gender Resource Centre (CEGEN) in mid-2008 by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and UN Women, as part of a five-year program to strengthen women’s participation in politics and decision making:

[W]ith support from the CEGEN, we have had significant achievements including the law against domestic violence, and a resolution that obliges each Ministry to budget for gender issues. . . . Another major achievement was the amendment to the Electoral Law, increasing women’s representation in parliament.
The CEGEN was described by the president of the National Parliament as an example of “Parliament’s commitment towards the attainment of gender equality and women's empowerment.” It has supported the Women's Parliamentary Group in drafting legislation and provided capacity building for members of the legislature in areas such as gender-responsive budgets. In 2010 the government, parliament, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) supported the Dili Komprumisu (Dili Declaration), outlining the government’s commitment to improving the national budget’s responsiveness to gender equality. While presentation of the resolution on gender-responsive budgeting by the female deputy president of the Parliament encountered opposition from many male MPs, members of the Women's Parliamentary Group defended gender equality and argued convincingly for its adoption. The Ministry of Finance subsequently released a statement confirming the government’s application of a gender approach to the development of the annual action plans in the 2010 Budget.

With sufficient numbers to be effective, the Women's Caucus has been able to advance gender equality issues more ably than many other parliaments in the Asia-Pacific region. For example, while domestic violence had technically been included in the penal code since 2009, it failed to clearly define the crime and mandate victim support services. In May 2012 Parliament passed a domestic violence law, despite opposing arguments that it contravened culture and the sanctity of the family. The Women's Caucus has not only spearheaded efforts on legislation such as this, but has also addressed the extremely high maternal mortality ratio (MMR), a key health issue for women in Timor-Leste. According to the 2013 Human Development Report, with an MMR of 300/100,000 it is currently ranked 134th out of 186 countries, indicating a decline to half the MMR rate a decade ago. The president of the Women's Parliamentary Group argued that more had to be achieved in the area of women's reproductive health to prevent the death of women and children during childbirth.

This parliamentary mechanism has been an active champion of women’s rights and in collaboration with the women’s civil society network, Rede Feto, has championed issues of women’s leadership. For example, following the 2012 national elections, a prominent woman protagonist in the liberation struggle, Maria Domingas Alves (popularly known as Mikato), former secretary of state for the promotion of equality and minister for solidarity and social services, was bypassed by the president for the post of minister of national Defense and security. Rede Feto called a press conference to publicly condemn what they regarded as an insult to all women: “Because of this we of the women’s movement in Timor-Leste manifest our discontent with [the President’s] words which reduce the dignity of East Timorese women, and ignore women’s capacity that was well demonstrated [by Mikato] in her over five years contributing strong successes in the administration of the first coalition Government.” This statement was supported by the Women's Parliamentary Group, which regarded such an action as killing “the spirit of participation among women.”

This incident serves to illustrate that speaking with one voice is a key strength of the women’s movement in Timor-Leste, an essential attribute if women are to undertake a decisive role in reconstructing their governance structures and processes in a
postconflict period. The Timor-Leste national legislature is indeed a regional model of what can be achieved when women are able to put aside their political party affiliations, and in conjunction with civil society partners, work across the parliamentary divide to promote women’s rights and gender equality. This is also enhanced by promotion of these issues at cabinet level by the secretary of state for promotion of equality’s program to mainstream the National Women’s Policy and monitor the government’s implementation of CEDAW.

**The Solomon Islands and Bougainville: Lost Opportunities**

Whereas Timor-Leste provides a commendable model of women’s leadership in a post-conflict state, the Solomon Islands and the Autonomous Region of Bougainville (ARB), two Pacific Island countries that emerged from civil unrest around the same time, exemplify many lost opportunities for women’s voices and concerns to shape peacebuilding and postconflict reconstruction.

**Tensions and Conflict**

The 1998–2003 armed conflict in the Solomon Islands was caused mainly by long-standing resentment among local people about the rapid centralization of economic development around the national capital, Honiara. Violence erupted between the local Gwale people on Guadalcanal and more recent migrants from the neighboring island of Malaita. In neighboring Bougainville, a province of Papua New Guinea (PNG), conflict erupted over control of resources with a copper mine co-owned by an Australian mining company and the PNG government, becoming the focus of a conflict that lasted from 1989 to 1998. As in the Solomon Islands, the influx of national workers from outside the province of Bougainville was a source of resentment and grievance. The exploitation of the copper mine became increasingly one of land control, resulting in a violent struggle for independence. The PNG government lost control and declared a state of emergency. As in the Solomon Islands, there was a breakdown of law and order and the total disruption of government services, including telecommunications, hospitals, and schools, which had a devastating impact on the civilian community.

**Women as Peacemakers**

In both conflict situations, women assumed the mantle of their traditional roles of peacemakers. The Solomon Islands Women for Peace Group was established in May
2000, with women gathering in Honiara and issuing a “Women’s Communique on Peace.” The Women for Peace Group’s key aim was to restore peace through “listening to and exchanging views” among the militant groups and thus building confidence and trust, seeking to “make known to the militants and the Government, the impact of the tension on children, mothers, and other vulnerable groups.” As is typical in situations of armed conflict, the period 1999–2003 saw an increase in violence against women in both the public and private spheres. The group also sought to get the fighting parties to meet and to “convince [them] to lay down their arms and thus open the way for democracy and good governance in Solomon Islands” (Pollard 2000, 45).

Yet despite playing a seminal role in the restoration of peace, no women were represented at the peace negotiations held in Townsville, Australia, in October 2000 for the signing of the Townsville Peace Agreement. Due to the demands by other interest groups to have equal representation with women at the negotiations, the Women for Peace Group withdrew to allow the agreement to proceed. However, their absence was unfortunate, because it resulted in a peace agreement that neither acknowledged their peacemaking role nor made reference to their participation in the country’s future reconstruction and peacebuilding process. This lack of representation also led to the absence of gender equality or women’s rights in the mandate of the ensuing Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands (RAMSI).

However, Women for Peace continued its efforts to increase women’s involvement, without external support. Unlike Timor-Leste, where bilateral and multilateral donor funding was being channeled to support women’s issues, the report of an Australian parliamentary delegation concluded that Australian-funded support for peace initiatives and reconstruction did not demonstrate the critical role Australia’s aid organization had pledged to give women in such activities.28

In Bougainville, as in the Solomon Islands, women’s groups based both within and outside Bougainville were instrumental in working for peace and reconciliation, opening opportunities for dialogue and not only taking part in peace talks but also being integrally involved in the constitution-building process. Many forums and consultations were organized by women at the local and national levels that addressed issues to end the conflict, including sensitive matters such as peaceful dialogues, the disposal of weapons, security, law and order, restoration of services, and constitutional reform. They employed strategies such as silent marches, protests with messages on banners, mothers venturing into the bush to attempt to bring their sons home, and women negotiating directly with local Revolutionary Army and PNG Defence Forces, resulting in many young men disarming and returning to their families and communities.

The Agreement on Peace, Security and Development in Bougainville was signed by the government of Papua New Guinea, the Bougainville transitional government, the Bougainville Revolutionary Army, the Bougainville interim government, the Bougainville Revolutionary Army, and Bougainville leaders on January 23, 1998, at Lincoln University, Christchurch, New Zealand. It was attended by around fifty women and attained an important breakthrough, with women exerting a major influence in
persuading combatants to accept reconciliation. Here they exhibited their capacity for strong leadership, as their statement emphasized: “The men as guardians share leadership with women, taking responsibility in open debate to protect women from potential conflict; however, women have the power to veto decisions, and therefore are involved in the final consultative process” (Saovana-Spriggs 2010, 210).

The women regarded such a historic occasion as one that would replace

*the rule of the gun . . . through a secure process for a permanent ceasefire and demilitarisation*. . . . We look to restoring our lives so that we can freely move around, return to our homes and enjoy the ability to speak freely of our human rights and needs; or [asserting] our goals for a political future where women must take their rightful place as leaders beside their men. We look forward to being included in the new Bougainville government structure so that our rediscovery of women’s participation will continue to shape and build Bougainville’s development and government.

We have been here at Lincoln to break down the mental blockade that prevails in our home land, where women still live in fear and are not yet able to discuss and debate openly our democratic form of government.29

**International Interventions**

As had been the case in East Timor, intervention by international peacekeepers was instrumental in bringing about the cessation of hostilities in both the Solomon Islands and Bougainville. However, unlike East Timor, they were not under a peacekeeping mandate of the United Nations Security Council and thus did not apply international standards for women’s rights such as CEDAW or SCR 1325.

At the end of July 1998 the UN Political Office in Bougainville (UNPOB) was established under the direction of the UN Department of Political Affairs, with a mandate to work in support of the peace process, consult on all aspects of the ceasefire, as well as promote public awareness and understanding of the process.

On August 20, 2001, the comprehensive Bougainville Peace Agreement was signed in the Bougainville capital, Arawa. It covered key areas of autonomy, a referendum for independence to be held between five and fifteen years from the date of the agreement, and a weapons disposal plan. The agreement contained arrangements for the establishment of an autonomous Bougainville government (ABG) within the framework of the Papua New Guinea Constitution and the firm assurance of a referendum among Bougainvilleans on Bougainville’s political future, with agreed terms for implementation of the weapons disposal plan and arrangements for an amnesty and pardon. As a result, the Constitutional Commission decided against a retributive justice system in favor of a restorative approach. Women organized their own Bougainville Women’s Summit in the same month to consolidate and expand existing networks between women’s organizations, create an opportunity for women to inform themselves of the content of the peace agreement, and explore ways in which women could contribute to the socioeconomic and political development of the new Bougainville.
However, significant challenges remained, prompting the UN Secretary-General to accede to Papua New Guinea’s request to maintain a UN presence on the island. The new UN peacekeeping mission, the UN Observer Mission in Papua New Guinea (UNOMB), was mandated to monitor the constitutional process leading to the adoption of the Bougainville Constitution and to verify and certify compliance by the parties with the weapons disposal plan. The UNOMB was to work with the UNDP, which would lead international reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts.30 The United Nations was, however, remiss in failing to include SCR 1325 in its review of the UNOMB’s mandate.

Even though women had gone into the jungle to negotiate with the local Bougainville Republican Army (BRA) and thus had been directly instrumental in bringing about an end to hostilities, women’s organizations were not given a role in weapons disposal, a process that has failed to collect weapons at the community level and is still being undertaken. The Bougainville Action Plan on SCR 1325 calls for women to be directly involved in monitoring weapons collection and disposal, a key condition for the referendum to determine Bougainville independence mooted for 2015–2016.

With regard to the Solomon Islands, following consultations among the governments of Solomon Islands, Australia, and New Zealand, a package of strengthened assistance to support the Solomon Islands government was proposed and unanimously endorsed by the 2003 Meeting of the Pacific Islands Forum in Auckland, New Zealand. The package was approved by the Solomon Islands Parliament, commended by the UN Secretary-General, and supported by the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group.31 Australian and Pacific Islands police, military, and civilian personnel arrived in Solomon Islands on July 24, 2003, as part of the Australian-led RAMSI. Its mandate was specifically to restore law and order, strengthen economic governance, and rebuild the machinery of government.32

The failure to include women in the 2000 peace talks in Cairns was to prove detrimental to their involvement and the oversight of their priorities in RAMSI’s mandate and program. This had a direct negative impact on women’s capacity to have their issues incorporated into the postconflict reconstruction agenda and their parliamentary representation.

This serves to underscore the fact that if women and their priorities are excluded from the outset of peace negotiations and reconstruction planning, they will be unable to access the peacebuilding architecture and contribute to shaping the future direction of their country. This window of opportunity is only ajar for a very short, strategic period, and if women’s involvement is not facilitated by the international community and national peace negotiators, key women’s rights and gender equality issues will be neglected and fail to receive adequate funding.

Women in Decision Making

In Bougainville the response to calls by women during the peace negotiations for increased access to participation in decision making and governance produced the 2004
constitution, which both recognizes the authority of women in traditional roles and resolutely includes women in contemporary democratic processes. The Bougainville Peace Agreement outlined the terms for the development of the new constitution, which included provisions for a Constituent Assembly and a Bougainville Constitutional Commission (BCC), with women's networks involved in the consultations. Three women, representing North, Central, and Southern Bougainville, were appointed to and participated in the formation of the constitution as members of the BCC, assisting in laying down in legislation the requirements for the inclusion of women in political processes. Women's significant political gains were ensured by their rights to political participation and representation, which were protected under the new constitution.

The Constitution of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville was adopted by the Bougainville Constituent Assembly on November 12, 2004. The preamble welcomed “a new era of government … democracy, accountability, equality and social justice,” thereby providing a mandate for Bougainville women to participate in all decision-making processes in public and political life. An act of Parliament, the Council of Elders Act, also enabled women to be represented in the Council of Elders (COE) Assembly. Currently there are thirty-six women in the COE Assembly, with women also represented in the village assemblies.

Originally the women representatives on the BCC had called for twelve reserved seats to be set aside for women in the Autonomous Region of Bougainville government's House of Representatives. One of the key women delegates stated that this was strongly opposed by the men, who questioned the need for any seats to be reserved: “When we started we asked for 12 seats and the men asked what the hell do you want 12 seats for women for? That was the language that they used. And in negotiation they wanted to cut it back to nothing.”

However, the constitution guaranteed that there were to be three reserved parliamentary seats for women to “represent the interests of the women of the Region,” as well as one woman on the Executive Council. Their representation did guarantee that women were included in the governance of Bougainville, and the constitution directed that the elected women representatives should hold various positions on committees and parliamentary bodies, thus ensuring that women did not become invisible. This was the first affirmative action taken for women's legislative representation in the Pacific region.

The president of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville is mandated by law to appoint one woman to hold a portfolio in the cabinet, and the other two, occupying reserved seats in the House of Representatives, to be appointed to parliamentary committees as chairperson and deputy chairperson. While such decisions have been trailblazing for the Pacific region, many women are disappointed that women's reserved seats have not been utilized to promote the issues and concerns of Bougainville women and are of the view that their priorities are greatly under-represented at the political level. Those women who have occupied the reserved seats over the past decade have had minimal capacity building and no training in how to address women's rights at a legislative level. While women are also free to contest all other open seats in both the Autonomous Region of Bougainville and PNG national elections, to date none has been
successful, which accentuates the importance of affirmative action measures to ensure women’s representation in parliament.

Following two elections and a total of six women in the legislature, with women occupying the positions of deputy speaker and minister of community development, there has been no attempt to form a women’s caucus or a parliamentary gender committee, and there is very little awareness among the women representatives that they should represent women’s issues and concerns. One of the most positive recent decisions taken was to call on UN Women to assist in the development of an “Action Plan on 1325,” which has recommended key roles for women in decision making leading up to the referendum planned for 2015–2016 to decide on Bougainville’s future.

While women in Bougainville were beneficiaries in terms of attaining reserved representation in the legislature, the women elected to the reserved seats, unlike those in Timor-Leste, have not been able to mobilize and enable legislative changes for women’s rights, nor have they been held accountable by their women constituents for improving the status of women. This has been largely due to the failure of the international community to support capacity building, as well as a general lack of understanding of their roles and responsibilities. A former minister for community development has initiated a partnership with UN Women to develop the Bougainville Plan of Action for SCR 1325 to be launched officially in October 2013, which when implemented will integrate gender equality and women’s concerns into the peacebuilding process up to the 2015 independence referendum.

The Bougainville Women, Peace and Security Action Plan will help to recognize, sustain, strengthen, and expand women’s role in the work of the proposed Peace and Security Commission, with its Women, Peace, Security and Justice Section, which will consist of representatives of the Technical Working Group on Women Peace and Security (TWG WPS). This will have responsibility for oversight, monitoring, and reporting, as well advocacy for the action plan’s adoption and implementation. As a result of the process of formulating the action plan, women now feel they have a vision for their ongoing role as peace builders and see themselves more united and focused with support at the highest levels of government. They are also more aware of the role the three women representatives should undertake in the legislature and intend to develop a women’s manifesto for candidates in the next election.

While Bougainville remains the only Pacific legislature that has adopted special measures, there has been little progress in the Solomon Islands on women’s representation in national decision making. Despite the long-term existence of structures and mechanisms to develop and enhance women’s participation and empowerment, such as the former Ministry for Women, Youth and Sport; the Women’s Development Division; and its civil society counterpart, the Solomon Islands National Council for Women, there has never been a process of consensus building around priority issues for women, from the village level to the capital (Whittington, Ospina, and Pollard 2006, 3). This lack of a common vision for the advancement of women and a national agenda for women has been a definite drawback, since countries that have achieved a critical mass of women’s
representation have, as in Timor-Leste, consolidated national-level stakeholder support for a common platform and vision for women.

Without special affirmative measures, as in Bougainville and Timor, women in the Solomon Islands continue to be under-represented, with only two women members of parliament in the legislature in separate parliaments since the country’s independence in 1976. Women currently hold 2.0 percent of seats in the unicameral National Parliament, represented by a single woman MP out of a total of fifty seats, who was elected in late 2012 in a by-election to her husband’s former seat. The constraints facing women in the electoral system and electoral process and during the election campaign period are traditional and systemic obstacles. The first-past-the-post (FPTP) system and the fluidity of political parties in Melanesia disadvantages women, with the likelihood of women being elected at either national or provincial levels in the future being extremely low, unless changes are made to the electoral system and special affirmative measures such as quotas or reserved seats are legislated (Whittington, Ospina, and Pollard 2006).

In 2007 RAMSI introduced its Women in Government program to provide assistance to the Solomon Islands government to “increase the percentage of women at all levels within the public service and to reduce the barriers to women’s election, as well as to improve capacity in organisations that have the potential to foster women’s aspirations to public office.” In 2008 the Solomon Islands government mandated the Constituency Boundaries Commission to review the number of MPs elected to Parliament, which led women’s groups to propose the introduction of a total of ten reserved seats for women. This failed to gain cabinet support. However, following the 2010 national elections, the new government indicated in its policy statement that it would look at options for women’s reserved seats as part of a broader electoral boundaries review. This work has not yet progressed, which may be attributed to continued opposition at the highest levels of government. The prime minister prefers women to enter Parliament through the normal electoral process and not by special consideration, which has so far resulted in minimal representation. He argued that women need to be empowered in the rural constituencies and not in Honiara, to prevent creating opportunities only for the few, a mistake that has been made since independence.

One of the key women’s organizations, Vois Blong Mere, believes that government officials can offer little beyond policy direction, and that it will take civil society organizations to get more women into Parliament:

The government has its limitations because while they still have policy and things like campaigning, it’s beyond them because they can’t go into this space because they are public officers, so it’s civil society organisations like ours and the National Council of Women to take over.

Further, while government has a national policy on Gender Equality and Women’s Development with a goal on equality in leadership and decision-making, there have been official statements from government that condemn any form of measures that will assist women’s election to Parliament.
Transitions from conflict to postconflict peacebuilding can provide an opportunity to redress inequalities in women’s representation, and many postconflict situations have provided a unique opportunity to introduce a more inclusive political framework to advance women’s participation. While such indicators may not reflect an overall improvement in the social and economic status of women in these countries, they do show that women have been able to take advantage of critical windows of opportunity to become advocates for their representation and consolidate their role as key players in national decision making.

But in assessing their effectiveness, the contribution of the international community to enabling women to graduate from a force in peacemaking processes to a force for peacebuilding cannot be overlooked. The cases discussed in this chapter indicate that where direct intervention has occurred to enable women, who had been key actors in the liberation struggle or instrumental in bringing about the cessation of conflict, to participate in the process of nation building by implementing SCR 1325, substantive outcomes can be achieved. With international support to build critical mechanisms for gender equality in legislatures, government, and civil society, as in Timor-Leste, women have been able to transform a cohesive resistance force to oust an invader into a movement that is actively promoting gender equality and women’s rights.

However, without such international support linked to SCR 1325, women’s peace activism in both the Solomon Islands and Bougainville was unable to convert itself into an effective women’s rights movement able to integrate issues of gender equality into legislation, government policies, and a unified women’s nongovernmental movement.

Ensuring women a critical role in postconflict governance should be accorded the highest priority in all peacekeeping mandates, donor conferences, priorities, and agendas of the international community. There must be a focus on enabling women to capitalize on their engagement in the peace process and gains made in postconflict elections in order to transform the political, economic, and social conditions of women in the country. The question of what assistance is needed by newly elected women in postconflict situations to discharge international mandates such as CEDAW and SCR 1325 and play an equal role in the reconstruction, reconciliation, and peacebuilding process warrants further examination.

In postconflict contexts, women MPs’ general lack of confidence and experience in the parliamentary sphere and lack of knowledge of legislative procedures calls for investment in capacity building and training. As noted by the OECD-DAC (2013), there needs to be increased donor involvement and support for gender equality in postconflict governance issues. As there has been for gender-based violence, consideration should be given to the establishment by the United Nations of a women’s leadership fund for fragile states and those emerging from conflict that can be applied quickly and efficiently. A greater degree of international commitment and support is critical to both increase
women’s representation in postconflict parliaments and build their capacity to influence legislation and policymaking toward improving the lives of all women in their societies.

Notes

8. A “critical mass” is a theory of social dynamics that implies that a sufficient number can attain closer to a majority consensus, thus enabling the group to have sufficient numbers to implement change.
9. Excluding Australia and New Zealand, female representation in the small states of the Pacific is exceedingly below global averages. As of September 2013, Kiribati had 8.7 percent women in parliament, Nauru 5.3 percent, Samoa 4.1 percent, Tonga 3.6 percent, Papua New Guinea 2.7 percent, Solomon Islands 2 percent, and Vanuatu 0 percent.
11. Timor-Leste (“east-east”) is the official name of the independent democratic republic established in May 2002. Prior to independence it was known by the Tetum name Timor Lorosae (rising sun).
12. These East Timorese women came from two organizations based in Australia. Because no East Timorese women were on the official Indonesian government delegation, the women based in Australia who attended the NGO Forum at the UN Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing spoke on behalf of the women from the East Timorese clandestine resistance, bringing their message (quoted above) to the conference.
16. The UN Fourth World Conference on Women was attended by government delegations and representatives of selected nongovernmental organizations. The Indonesian government’s delegation did not include any representatives of East Timor. Thus the East Timorese women who attended the NGO Forum held in the wings of the conference were Australian citizens, who had been living in Australia since the Indonesian occupation of 1975.
18. Tetum/Tetun is an Austronesian language spoken on the island of Timor.
Despite CEDAW calling for special affirmative action measures to be adopted for women’s representation and UNTAET’s Secretary-General’s Special Representative and Transitional Administrator, Sergio Vieira de Mello, supporting these, the Department of Political Affairs at UN Headquarters opposed this recommendation on the grounds that it would not oversee an election that was undemocratic, threatening to withdraw from the process if the quota was enforced.


Inter-Parliamentary Union (2013).


UN Development Programme (2008).


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**References**


CHAPTER 30

FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON STATE-BUILDING OR REBUILDING IN CRISIS CONTEXTS

HELEN O’CONNELL

Introduction

This chapter asks if the conflict-related crises in many countries in Africa and the financial crises in Europe offer opportunities for building new political settlements. It interrogates the concepts of political settlement, legitimacy, and accountability from a feminist perspective, to assess how these could be reconsidered and reenvisioned to provide a framework for building political environments conducive to social justice. It explores how entry points such as writing or amending constitutions, law reform, and political participation could become strategic opportunities for promoting human rights and gender equality and equity. Research on opportunities for new political settlements in conflict-affected states provides the core, but the chapter also seeks to look at openings in European societies currently experiencing financial crises and in some cases political uncertainty.

What Do We Know?

We know that patriarchy survives, albeit dented in some respects, and that gender-based discrimination persists in all contexts, resulting in the marginalization of millions of women and girls, as well as men and boys. The patriarchal political settlement is
conceptualized, designed, and implemented to subordinate, discriminate, and marginalize. It is skewed, and this skewing or bias determines what social, economic, political, and cultural issues and problems are considered; what policy issues are deemed worthy of priority attention; what decisions are made by, with, and for whom; and what resources are acquired and allocated to what programs.

The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) was adopted in 1979, more than thirty years ago. The Beijing Platform for Action was agreed upon at the UN Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, almost twenty years ago. Much has happened since these events that has contributed positively to increasing respect for the rights of women and girls and moves toward gender equality and equity. Issues previously ignored are on the agenda of the international community, such as violence against women and girls, women's political participation, and equal pay for work of equal value. But progress is slow and subject to reversal. The vested interests of patriarchy are multiple and powerful.

Overall, there is a lack of ambition, courage, and political will on the part of international, national, and nongovernmental agencies that claim they are committed to gender equality and equity and respect for the human rights of all. Most interventions are piecemeal. There is little comprehensive, systemwide action to tackle gender-based discrimination. Huge resources, personnel capacity, and expertise are recruited and directed to tackle other “issues,” such as climate change, but not gender inequity. Patriarchal institutions continue to regard gender equality and equity as a side issue while speaking the language of gender mainstreaming and treat it as a technical rather than a political matter. To date, feminists who work within these institutions, “femocrats,” and the transnational feminist movements outside are not sufficiently influential to change these agendas.

We need new political settlements. Do conflicts in several African countries, and the turmoil in Europe (and the United States) caused by the 2008 financial crisis offer opportunities for change? New political settlements are necessary in themselves and to achieve new economic and social arrangements. Economic growth, defined narrowly as improved gross domestic product or gross national product, does not on its own improve the quality of people's lives. New political settlements are essential to achieve a redistribution of power, resources, and wealth. Nothing else will lead to greater social and gender justice.

Women’s rights and gender equality are first and foremost matters of equity and justice, which are essential to building inclusive, equitable, genuinely democratic, and stable states. A state cannot claim legitimacy or accountability unless women and men from diverse backgrounds have the right and opportunity to be involved in decision-making processes, and those processes recognize and address gendered power imbalances. States need to foster and draw on the full contribution and participation of all members of society. For those who need an instrumental argument, there is ample evidence that women's empowerment benefits the wider society, including children's well-being and access to education.
What Can We Learn from Conflict-affected Contexts?

Findings from a study I conducted with Wendy Harcourt on how gender equality can be strengthened in the context of conflict-affected and fragile states provide some useful lessons (O’Connell 2011). The study focused on women’s and girls’ political and economic empowerment and access to quality services. It investigated the extent to which shifts in gender roles for women’s empowerment have occurred in the processes of peacebuilding and state building and have led to greater social, economic, and political inclusiveness and justice. Here I draw mainly on the findings on political empowerment as these are pertinent to this chapter, but I also include some findings on economic empowerment as they have a bearing on the political. I look first at women’s engagement in the negotiation processes around peace agreements and political settlements, before turning to women’s participation in formal politics.

Negotiating Peace and Political Settlements

Evidence of women’s participation in peacebuilding and political settlements shows mixed results for gender equity. In many conflict-affected contexts women were (and are) active in efforts to prevent violent conflict and encourage peacebuilding at local, national, and international levels, and their voices were (and are) heard, at least sometimes. However, women continue to be excluded from negotiations and decisions about the political settlement, the constitution, and postconflict state building, and gender equality and equity issues are sidelined. Neither local elites nor external actors regard gender inequality as a matter for consideration in political settlement negotiations on security, power-sharing, or resource-sharing. Overall, the expectations of UN Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1325 and the three follow-on resolutions on “women, peace, and security” remain unfulfilled.

There have been occasions when women’s organizations were able to secure some equality measures. The Juba Peace Talks, held in 2006 to negotiate an end to the conflict in Northern Uganda, initially excluded women, although they had been prominent in peace activism. A protest march for peace to highlight UNSCR 1325, organized by the Uganda Women’s Network in October 2007, opened some space. The Network demanded one-third representation of women at the peace talks. This was rejected, but they did gain observer status and places for four women on the government team. Support in the shape of funds and advocacy advice from external actors, in this case UNIFEM (now UN Women), was a critical factor in the Network’s (partial) success (International Alert 2010, 30). Women’s movements in other countries were less fortunate. Castillejo (2011), for example, found that women were largely excluded from the negotiations for the political settlements in Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Kosovo. The male
elites who controlled the formal and informal processes blocked women’s demands for inclusion.

The experience of the Sudanese women’s movement further illustrates the challenges faced by women peace builders. The movement organized a Women’s Gender Symposium in April 2005 during the Oslo Donors’ Conference on Sudan and identified a series of minimum urgent priorities. These included quotas for women of 25 percent in the Legislative Assembly and 25 percent in the Council of Ministers. When the negotiations for the political settlement began, women were not invited to participate. The ensuing Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was assessed by Jon Bennett and colleagues (2010) to be “gender blind.” They noted that “gender inequality was never considered to be a factor in security or in the sharing of power and wealth because, other than in occasional ‘side-meetings,’ gender identity was not considered a category of concern or analysis” (2010, 121). They recommended long-term support for fostering gender-responsive policies, legislation to counter gender-based discrimination, and a “systematic strategy and guidelines for integration and participation of women in governance.” There is no evidence that their recommendation was heeded. More specifically, neither the CPA nor the new constitution included the 25 percent quota requested by women, a development judged by Sara Abbas to be a “deliberate strategy” by male politicians to maximize flexibility (2010, 104). Following the political settlement, the women’s movement turned its attention to the electoral law, and a 25 percent quota was adopted in 2008 using a list system, which was not what the women’s movement had demanded (Abbas 2010, 104–105).

How do we explain the reluctance about or opposition of male political elites to making space for women? Evidence from Sudan and elsewhere indicates that cultural assumptions about women’s place and lower status play a part, as do acceptance of and satisfaction with the status quo. There is also a profound lack of awareness and understanding of the impact of gender inequality. Jon Bennett and colleagues (2010) pointed to the “fundamental contradiction” between the bill of rights laid out within the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan, which granted equal rights to women and men and at the same time established the principle that customary law is legitimate law. Customary law, as Bennett and colleagues pointed out, is a vital part of cultural identity, but one that “reinforces and institutionalizes elements that perpetuate gender inequality and human rights violations” (2010, 121).

What about the disinclination of external actors and advisers to stand by their commitments to women’s rights and gender equality? Cheryl Benard (2008), writing about Afghanistan and elsewhere, noted the international community’s cautiousness in advocating gender equality and equity goals, fueled, she speculated, by their fear of derailing the fragile political settlement. Yet she found no evidence that external actors’ advocacy for equality and social inclusion would lead to political or social instability. External actors, the international community, have more than enough reasons to act. They clearly do not give priority to women’s rights or gender equality and equity. The (false) “cultural dilemma” in relation to women’s rights and gender equality must be critically deconstructed. It is all too often presented as an argument for inaction by unwilling internal
and external actors. The inclination to trade off women’s rights and gender equality within the wider tension between state building, according to international norms, and pragmatic accommodations to realities on the ground, should be resisted vigorously. The situation in Afghanistan highlights this need, as Deniz Kandiyoti (2009) points out. International agencies need to adopt and support a transformative agenda—transforming the state to deliver gender equality and equity—shaped by a detailed assessment of the context and as wide a consultation as possible with all interested parties.

Although external actors recognize that state building is a locally driven process and may wish to avoid allegations of neoimperialism, they nonetheless express aspirations about promoting inclusive, capable, accountable, and resilient states to foster peace and poverty reduction. They therefore should go the extra mile on women’s human rights and gender equality and equity. Meaningful responsiveness to women’s articulated gender needs and interests is a valid source of legitimacy for external action. The existence of international conventions, agreements, and principles, as well as external actors’, especially donors’, own policy commitments on gender equality, permit, legitimize, and necessitate action in this area. The agenda on aid effectiveness and development sustainability provides other layers of justification (if more were needed). In fact, this agenda will remain elusive if the rights, needs, and interests of half the population in any given context are not acknowledged and addressed.

Together, women’s expressed wishes and UN Conventions, Declarations, and Security Council Resolutions, the Beijing Platform for Action, and the MDGs provide powerful authority and incentive to the international community and national authorities to act for gender equity and equality.

Strong language on gender equality and human rights has been included in the constitutions of many countries, usually as a result of the advocacy and engagement efforts of women’s movements and key actors committed to social justice. The constitutions of South Africa and Rwanda are good examples. Enshrining equality between women and men and equal rights for all citizens regardless of gender, ethnicity, caste, sexual orientation, ability, and other social differences is the foundation stone of equality and equity. The engagement of feminist and gender-aware women in the processes of drafting the constitution and laying out the political settlement—including setting down founding principles of equality; civil, political, social, economic, cultural, and sexual rights; future lawmaking, decision making, and electoral procedures; and oversight mechanisms—can achieve success. As Kristin van der Leest (2007) argues, drafting a gender-sensitive constitution requires attention both to the text of the whole document (not just the preamble) and the inclusiveness of the process.

The situation in Nepal highlights these points. Women in Nepal gained 197 seats (33 percent of the total 601 seats) in the Constituent Assembly tasked with writing a new constitution following the revolution in 2006. Among the 197 women was a significant number of Dalits, Janajatis, Madhesis, Muslims, and members of other marginalized groups. The women organized themselves into the Women’s Caucus to bolster their effectiveness and were successful, with the support of the women’s movement, in getting several key issues into the preliminary drafts, such as proportional inclusive representation,
the right to inheritance, equal rights to parental property, and citizenship. The political impasse caused by the inability of political parties to agree on a new constitution in the time allowed led to dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in 2012. Elections to establish a new Constituent Assembly are planned for late November 2013; women will need to organize again to put issues on the agenda. Although a new constitution has not been agreed upon, the opinion of the Women's Caucus is that if women had not been involved in the drafting process, “it is highly doubtful that women's issues would have received any priority” (Women's Caucus et al. 2011, 100). The continuous participation of feminist and gender-aware women in formal and informal political affairs is necessary to convert constitutional principles and commitments into policy and practice.

Engaging in Formal Politics

The experience of women engaging in formal politics in situations of conflict provides a more encouraging story than those about women involved in peace and political settlement negotiations recounted above. In short, women's increased engagement in formal politics as voters and as candidates has led to some political empowerment. Feminists do not believe that numbers are enough. However, engaging politically is intrinsically valuable in itself and a step toward transforming political processes, structures, and procedures to enable women's real political empowerment and advances in gender-responsive policy, legislation, and action. The obstacles to women translating political presence into political power persist.

Following is my working definition of women's political empowerment: “women's ability and capacity to engage in decisionmaking and influence policymaking; make demands on state institutions and international bodies; and hold them accountable to respect, protect, and fulfill women's full human rights, and to provide means of redress if these rights are denied or abused.”

In the last two decades there has been an exponential increase in the number of women from diverse social and ethnic backgrounds being elected to local councils and national legislatures, including but not limited to conflict-affected states (UNIFEM 2008, 21). Rwanda is the best known example; it now tops the list for women's representation at the national level, with women winning 56.3 percent of seats in the lower house in the 2008 election. South Africa, Mozambique, Timor Leste, and Uganda also appear in the top twenty countries. In April 2013, women hold 42.3 percent of seats in South Africa, 39.2 percent in Mozambique, 38.5 percent in Timor Leste, and 35 percent in Uganda (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2013). There is no single explanation for this increase. The roles played by women's organizations and movements in mobilizing women and raising their political awareness appear significant: they were able to capture some of the democratic space that opened at national and local levels following armed conflict. Other important factors include the absence of men due to death or displacement, the adoption of more equitable electoral systems and quotas, and support from external actors for elections and voter education and registration.
The following examples show what can be done. A program funded by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) in 2005 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo registered twenty-five million voters, organized a referendum, and ensured security around the elections. UNDP provided training, equipment, and logistical support to approximately sixty thousand police and security officers and supported the participation of women as voters and candidates (Kaldor 2006, 34). Security around the 2005 elections was a key factor in Liberia as well. There, special measures were adopted to ensure that the voting process was hassle-free, accessible, and safe for women and others. For example, pregnant women and women with babies, the elderly, and disabled people were allowed to vote without queuing, and trained security forces were present at the polling stations, including many women security personnel (UNMIL Office of Gender Adviser 2005). A Good Governance and Equity in Political Participation project, from May 2005 to July 2008, managed by UNDP in Southern Sudan, was assessed by Jon Bennett and colleagues (2010, 121–122) to have met most of its key objectives: “strengthening the capacities of potential Sudanese women leaders and institutions” and highlighting the importance of the political participation of women through raising women leaders’ awareness and skills so they could press for a 25 percent quota (as mentioned previously). The initiative was judged to be less successful in opening the way for gender-sensitive policy reforms that would have improved women’s political participation.

Externally supported interventions were and are effective in promoting women’s political participation in elections. However, the level of support to newly elected and inexperienced women (and men) parliamentarians or local councilors is low in most contexts. The challenges of performing effectively politically are daunting for all but the most privileged men and women. Negative cultural attitudes and stereotypes abound, and male- and elite-dominated political parties and structures dictate the rules of political business. Violence against women politicians is prevalent, and low levels of security are the norm. Illiteracy and political inexperience, coupled with a lack of confidence and funds, can also be significant obstacles, alongside time pressures in balancing family and household management roles with a full-time political career. In addition, there may be enormous capacity gaps, such as lack of skills and experience in policy analysis and budgetary appraisal, as well as little access to research. Weak administrative and organizational skills also hamper effectiveness. And of course, not all women elected will be champions of women’s rights and gender equality and equity. Converting representation into genuine power and transforming politics require a vision of gender justice and social inclusion, as well as organizational capacity and support.

In summary, the opportunities that opened up in peacebuilding and state-building processes for securing gender equality and equity have been missed, for example in the negotiations around peace agreements and political settlements. Stronger accountability mechanisms for UNSCR 1325 and the follow-on UNSCRs would facilitate the translation of those important instruments into a comprehensive policy, based on analysis of gender power relations. There has been real progress in terms of women’s
greater political participation in elections and formal politics, but this is very much unfinished business. Without more support for building the capacity and political expertise of newly elected women parliamentarians and local councilors, especially but not only from the most disadvantaged communities, their effectiveness may be severely limited. There is some evidence that with sufficient numbers of gender-aware representatives and support, elected women are able to promote a gender equality and equity agenda.

There is little holistic thinking on the implications of continued gender inequality and inequity for conflict, insecurity, or fragility. The impact of conflict on gender equality and women’s rights is quite well researched. Sexual and other forms of gender-based violence against women and girls are ubiquitous in conflict, alongside physical, economic, and emotional insecurity, displacement, and exile. Conflict can also open opportunities for women, as we have seen. However, the converse implications of gender inequality and denial of women’s rights for enduring peace and stability have received little attention. Mary Caprioli’s research (2005) confirmed for her that states in which gender inequality and discrimination are systemic, and cultural norms accept violence as an allowable means to address grievances, are more likely to experience internal conflict. This conclusion is supported by research carried out by Valerie M. Hudson and colleagues (2012), who found that the larger the gender gap between the treatment of women and men in a society, the more likely the country is to be involved in internal conflict, “to be the first to resort to violence in such conflicts, and to resort to higher levels of violence.” Alina Rocha Menocal (2008, 12) points to evidence that abuse of human rights causes state fragility and conflict. The denial of women’s human rights may not lead directly to an outbreak of conflict, but respect for the principles of gender equality and women’s rights may prevent its occurrence. To date, analysis of inequalities has paid insufficient attention to gender-based inequalities within horizontal inequalities to explore how these are a persistent, albeit less visible or recognized, source of conflict.

Measures to advance gender equality, for example in political participation, are treated as distinct initiatives divorced from the main agenda of peace and state building. This pinpoints the disconnect in the thinking of internal and external actors between their formal commitments to international standards and conventions such as CEDAW and UNSCR 1325, and their day-to-day practice in negotiating or supporting political settlements and state building. There is no coherence. All too often, internal and external actors promote or allow obeisance to discriminatory customs and attitudes to trump obligations to internationally agreed upon standards and values. International obligations to gender equality and equity are sidelined in the rush to achieve a political settlement, hold elections, and achieve a cessation of armed conflict. The rights of women and girls are sacrificed for the quick fix of “peace” and the illusion of some form of “stable” government. Women’s/gender machineries or ministries, which may in the postconflict period be able to champion gender equality and assist in building a more conducive policy environment for gender equity, tend to be under-resourced, marginalized, and powerless. As always, the onus falls on overstretched and underfunded women’s rights organizations and movements to struggle for change.
It is useful here to include the two main findings on economic empowerment from the study referred to previously (O’Connell 2011). These findings are valuable in themselves, but also serve to demonstrate how important it is that internal and external actors seeking to promote gender equality make the connections between the different spheres of women’s and men’s lives. In short, initiatives aiming to improve women’s economic situations in conflict-affected contexts need to build on the gains achieved in the political arena (more women voting, standing as candidates, being elected, etc.), by enabling women to challenge gendered economic and social relations and constraints and take leadership positions in economic structures. It is essential that interventions avoid reverting to programs that solely target women’s gender roles as caregivers and household managers. Experience from Uganda illustrates this point well.

A study of women returnees engaged in economic activities in two districts in northern Uganda found that women had assumed community leadership roles, and that their access to money had won respect from some men (International Alert 2010). However, men’s gender roles and gender relations appear to have changed little. In practice, any impact that women’s economic empowerment may have been expected to have on gender roles and relations within and outside the household were constrained. Economic resources remained under men’s control. Men appeared hostile or unresponsive to women’s empowerment, and men’s use of sexual and other forms of gender-based violence persisted. Further, women were unable to scale up their economic enterprises: only 18 percent of those surveyed reported incomes of over US$135 per month (International Alert 2010). Thus targeting women’s gender roles for economic empowerment can increase women’s workload, a situation that can be further exacerbated if men withdraw from, or refuse to take on or contribute financially to, household responsibilities.

By contrast, interventions that combined support for women’s strategic gender interests with support for their practical needs were more effective in building women’s self-esteem, obtaining family and community respect, and giving women more autonomy to take part in community and local decision making. For example, linking support to livelihoods and access to public services with the development of municipal fora in which women could participate, as in Luanda, Angola, brought strategic and tangible results. Lucy Earle (2011, 16) writes that the fora created “spaces for democracy in a non-democratic environment” and enabled women and men in the community to discuss their key concerns and how these could be addressed, leading to improved solid waste collection and the construction of public toilets and local bridges. Further, Earle observes that participation in the fora increased women’s and men’s confidence, and the involvement of the municipal administrator in a space created by civil society generated “a sense of self-worth amongst community members” (2011, 33–34). The experience of setting up and running crèches in another community in Luanda empowered women to engage with the state on other issues, such as lobbying for improvements in the functioning of the civil registry (without birth certificates, children cannot enroll in school) and for a law to make domestic violence a crime (Earle 2011, 31–32).
What Is Happening in Crisis-affected Western Contexts?

It is early in terms of rigorous research, but there is a growing body of analysis on the impact of multiple crises on women around the world (see, e.g., World Bank, UN Women, European Working Conditions Observatory, and Oxfam). The Association for Women’s Rights in Development (AWID) commissioned a series of short studies looking at the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis and ensuing fiscal and economic crisis on different continents. These studies document and analyze the impact on decent work; the care economy and poverty; food, social protection, migration, and remittances; and violence against women and girls. Nerea Craviotto’s synthesis of these studies emphasizes how women across the world are affected in unique ways depending on their social and economic position, access or lack thereof to safety nets, remittances, and many other factors. She sees the need for women’s rights advocates to work together across borders to better understand the crisis and how to respond. She suggests, optimistically, that the crisis may open the way “to promote an economic model that is grounded in human rights and is inclusive, accountable and sustainable” (2010, 10).

What is clear is that families and households that have no, low, or modest incomes in European countries, such as the United Kingdom and Ireland (Irish Republic), are hit hardest by the austerity or fiscal stringency measures adopted by governments to cut budgetary deficits. They are worst affected by rising food and energy costs, wage freezes, job insecurity, and unemployment or underemployment. Women in low or no-income households are bearing a disproportionate weight of the burden, through public sector job losses and cuts in essential public social services. In the UK millions of employed women and men depend on social welfare benefits, because the wages they earn are inadequate to cover their monthly bills for food, rent, energy, and clothes. Young women and men, especially but not exclusively from the least privileged backgrounds, are unable to find employment.

The financial crisis has led to severe cuts in women’s rights and gender equality structures, and with these an implicit questioning and undermining of the gender equality agenda. In the UK the Women’s National Commission, an independent, nondepartmental public body that brought together representatives from approximately five hundred women’s organizations to present women’s views to government, was closed in December 2010. The closure was part of the newly elected coalition government’s drive to cut costs and increase transparency, accountability, and efficiency. The Government Equalities Office took over some of its core functions, but left women’s organizations in the UK without a formal mechanism through which to relate to government. It is possible to speculate, but not prove, that had a Labour government been reelected in 2010, the Women’s National Commission would not have been abolished. In Ireland, similarly, the Gender Equality Unit in the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform,
the main government mechanism with responsibility for advancing gender equality and gender mainstreaming, was closed in 2008, and austerity measures resulted in severe budgetary cuts for key equality bodies. For example, in 2008 around €4 million of a €5 million budget allocated for equal opportunities measures, positive actions, and structures to promote gender equality was diverted to non-gender-related areas (Barry and Conroy 2012, 19), and the budget of the Equality Authority was reduced by 43 percent in 2009 (Crowley 2011, 4).

Disillusionment with mainstream political parties in Europe is not a recent phenomenon. Election turnout figures have been low for some decades, appearing to point to some disenchantment with formal politics and politicians. In the UK, for example, the voter turnout at general elections dropped from a high of 77.7 percent in 1992 to 59.4 percent in 2001. A slight increase occurred in the 2005 and 2010 general elections, with turnouts of 61.4 percent and 65.1 percent, respectively. Likewise, in Ireland general election turnout rates dropped from a steady 76–77 percent in the 1970s and early 1980s to a low of 62.57 percent in 2002. Again, there was a slight increase in the 2007 and 2011 elections.

The rapid rise in activism, for example the Occupy movements, which began in London and in several Irish cities in late 2011, and mobilizations around specific issues through social networks, tweeting, and blogs, is a hopeful sign and evidence that social justice is a major concern. Another example is UK Uncut, a network of protest groups that beginning in October 2010 organized protests about cuts to public services and the tax avoidance schemes used by large companies. It is interesting that the Occupy Wall Street movement in the United States, which began in late 2011, is concerning itself increasingly with a search for new political forms and focusing attention on the lack of democracy in Western societies. Experiments in deliberative democracy have taken place in Ireland.

It is clear that the neoliberal economic model is severely warped, yet it carries on for now. From a feminist social justice perspective, the model is founded on gender-based and other forms of inequality and the exploitation of workers and resources. To prosper, it requires women’s household management and caring roles in the family and wider community, but does not acknowledge, count, or reward these roles. Its driving force is the accumulation of wealth and power, not their redistribution. The shortcomings of the so-called liberal democratic settlement have also been exposed, yet it too staggers on for now. The settlement wraps itself in notions of inclusion, equity, and accountability, and does in many instances ensure some sharing of decision making and access to resources and services. Yet it simultaneously allows political leaders to condone a hypocritical interpretation of human rights, especially women’s rights, and to content themselves with citizens’ formal participation in elections every few years, and it facilitates a monopolization of power in the hands of an elite few in the interests of global capital. While there is considerable public opinion that both models are flawed and need to be changed, and there has been a revival of interest in Keynesian economics, there is little consensus on alternative models or even which paths to follow.
The processes of state building or rebuilding can open the way for women and men from
diverse backgrounds to claim, enjoy, and exercise their rights and to obtain redress if
these rights are ignored or denied. This is fundamental to women and men being able to
participate fully in the political life of a country. Skewed political settlements and con-
ventional state-building methodologies simply replicate old and/or create new barriers
to gender equality and equity, as well as to social justice.

There are numerous definitions of state building. This is mine: “actions by internal
actors (with or without external support) to develop inclusive political processes and
the capacity and institutions of the state to fulfill its roles as duty bearer by respecting the
human rights of all women, men, girls, and boys (of all sexual orientations) and trans-
sexual and intersex people, by meeting at least the minimum expectations of all per-
tsions for security, access to justice, public services, and economic opportunity, and by
enabling the growth of a vibrant, independent civil society and media.”

A feminist vision of state building, with the aim of transforming gendered power
relations and achieving gender equality and equity, requires a coherent and strategic
approach to governance in countries affected by conflict or crisis. Disparate initiatives
on women’s political and economic participation and women’s security and access to
justice, although they are valuable in themselves, will not lead to a gender-responsive
political settlement or state or to gender-sensitive and -responsive governance.

What would such a strategic and coherent approach look like? First, it would take
a human rights view of the state as duty bearer, with an explicit duty to respect, protect,
and fulfill the human rights of women and girls from diverse social and ethnic back-
grounds, as well as the human rights of marginalized men and boys and transsexual and
intersex people. Second, the approach would use feminist and gender analysis to decode
the concepts of “society” and “citizenship” to recognize and illuminate the gendered
power imbalances and inequalities that exist within a society, understand the realities
of state-society relations, and acknowledge how gender and other social inequalities
affect each individual’s rights and abilities to be and act as a citizen. Likewise, a feminist
and gender lens needs to be applied to each of the core concepts and mainstream work
of state building, such as the political settlement, legitimacy, and accountability. Third,
a strategic and coherent approach to state building for transforming gendered power
relations and gender equity would give priority to building the institutional capacity
of the critical institutions and processes of political governance to integrate gender
analysis into their work, so that they can act to eliminate all forms of discrimination,
including those based on gender. Fourth, it would recognize the critical roles played
by a range of key nonstate actors in building inclusive and equitable states and support
their efforts to improve and increase their capacities. In particular, these would include
feminist and women’s organizations and movements and gender-sensitive political par-
ties and media. Finally, a strategic and coherent approach would acknowledge the need
for a strong and meaningful international policy that is consistent, coordinated, and
complementary. The first two dimensions of this approach are explored in more detail in the following sections. The remaining three are explored below within the framework of a feminist and gender analysis of key concepts of state building.

What I am making a case for is a gender-responsive form of governance, one in which the relationship between government and citizens is founded on social justice, inclusion, respect for human rights, and gender equality and equity.

A Human Rights Approach

In my view, a human rights approach to governance is premised on the understanding that the role of the state is to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights; that is, to enable all people to enjoy and exercise their full human rights (social, economic, political, civic, and cultural, including sexual and reproductive rights) and to ensure that all citizens (including those who are undocumented) can seek redress if these rights are denied or abused. The state does not grant rights, but rather is the duty bearer. Derek Evans writes that a human rights perspective on state building provides a set of core principles, such as equality and nondiscrimination, participation and empowerment, and accountability, to guide state and society relations, and a clear set of criteria for identifying priorities for implementation of state duties, such as deprivation, exclusion, discrimination, vulnerability, and justice (2008, 10). In his view, a human rights framework offers not only a moral vision, but also a normative conceptual and practical base to guide approaches and priorities in state building. One of the great strengths of the human rights approach and its emphasis on equality and inclusion, in Evans’s view, is that it shines a light on the needs and interests of the poorest and most marginalized members of society. Taking this a step further, a feminist human rights approach would explicitly highlight unequal gendered power relations and gender-based discrimination.

The “Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations,” composed by the Organisation for Economic and Development Co-operation Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) in 2007, provides a useful framework and may, in the view of Alina Rocha Menocal (2008), provide the policy and organizational base for integrating human rights and state building. Principle 6 states that international interventions should “promote non-discrimination as the basis for inclusive and stable societies” and in fragile states should “consistently promote gender equity, social inclusion and human rights,” which it sees as fundamental to the state-citizen relationship and the prevention of state fragility. The international community has yet to fully put these principles into practice in their interventions in conflict-affected contexts.

State-society Relationships and Women’s Citizenship

A feminist and human rights approach to governance and to building or rebuilding states and new political settlements requires clarity on concepts such as “society” and
“citizenship.” The phrase “state-society relationship” is widely used in the literature and policy documents on state building. A feminist and gender analysis enables us to deconstruct the concept of “society” to see and understand the power imbalances and inequalities that exist within a society that shape an individual’s right, ability, and space to be a citizen and act as a citizen, participate politically, and engage with or relate to the state. These same power imbalances correspondingly shape the state’s response to individual citizens or groups of citizens. The normative public/private divide, which relegates women’s lives to the private sphere of the family (and designates sexual and other forms of gender-based violence and much discrimination as a private matter) sharply circumscribes women’s experience of citizenship.

Similarly, the concept of citizenship needs to be deconstructed, as it can conceal the unequal power and differential rights in practice of groups within a society. It can be double edged: it can positively imply rights and membership in a community or society, or it can negatively exclude individuals or groups on the grounds, for example, of gender, caste, ethnicity, or migrant status. Shamim Meers offers a useful definition: “Citizenship is about membership of a group or community and about the rights and responsibilities conferred by that membership . . . . Citizenship is both a status—or an identity—and a practice or process of relating to the social world through the exercise of rights/protections and fulfillment of obligations” (2004, 6). Citizenship for women may be seen usefully as a wider concept than the individual’s relationship to the state. Clare Castillejo points out that “state building processes have so far lacked any substantive gender analysis” and have not taken on board existing knowledge about women’s relationship to the state and experiences of citizenship. She argues that in many fragile state contexts, women’s relationship with the state is different from men’s: it “is often more limited, exists only at the local level, or is mediated through family, community or customary institutions” (2009, 9).

Nira Yuval-Davis (1997) argues that for women, citizenship could include their struggles against discrimination on the grounds of culture and tradition within their own local communities. In this regard, Naila Kabeer acknowledges the interdependence between individual and collective rights—in the sense that women’s wellbeing can be tightly bound up with the wellbeing of their (marginalized) community. She adds that this interdependence can often “serve to undermine the capacity of subordinated members of subordinated groups to press for their individual rights when to do so appears to divide the collective struggle for recognition or play into the hegemonic discourses which denigrate such groups” (2005, 14). It follows that state-building processes can strengthen or weaken women’s citizenship rights.

These different analyses of women’s citizenship remind us of the critical need to closely examine normative assumptions about citizenship and to recognize the contested space wherein women claim their citizenship. Women and girls from marginalized communities in conflict- or crisis-affected contexts may be unwilling or unable to articulate and claim their own rights outside or alongside those of their community. However, this does not alter the fact that they are denied their rights. There are roles here for feminist researchers and activists to support efforts by marginalized women and girls to organize. The challenge for willing national authorities and external actors is to acknowledge this situation and respond sensitively.
A Feminist and Gender Analysis of Some Key Concepts

Feminist and gender analysis is still exploring the concepts that underpin the governance and state-building theories and models that inform the policies of international actors working in crisis-affected contexts, as well as the thinking of theorists who debate how to improve inclusiveness and democracy in Western contexts. In this section I examine some of these core concepts and propose how they could be reconceptualized to fully integrate feminist thinking and gender analysis. Feminist analysis of governance closely interrogates patriarchy and how it plays out in relation to the state and the intersections between sexism and other forms of oppression based on race, class, and so forth, and spaces for individual and collective resistance. Gender analysis of governance explores both how people’s gender identity and expression determine their experience and how inequalities and injustices in gender-differentiated power relations play out in terms of access to resources and services.

State building for women’s rights, gender equality and equity, and peace needs to apply a gender analysis to core concepts such as political settlement, legitimacy, and accountability. These concepts (and the assumptions underpinning them), in reality and common usage, are not gender-neutral or gender-blind. Rather, they are gender-biased. They are saturated with gender-based inequalities (and other social inequalities, such as class, caste, ethnicity, age, (dis)ability, citizenship status, etc.). They do not reflect the different gender roles, rights, and responsibilities of women and men of all sexual orientations and transsexual or intersex people, or their related different practical needs and strategic interests.

Gender-sensitive and -responsive state building would have as its starting points respect for human rights, as discussed previously, particularly women’s rights, and analysis of gender inequalities and differences. Gender equity would be its goal and central principle. Recognition of gender-based inequalities and differences would guide all state-building and governance processes, alongside a commitment to addressing those that are discriminatory (Brody 2009).

Governance and state building for gender equity would turn key entry points, such as constitution writing, democracy strengthening at local and national levels, security sector reform, law reform, and access to justice, into strategic opportunities for promoting women’s human rights and gender equality and equity.

The Political Settlement

The political settlement—a process usually renegotiated over time—shapes how political power is organized and distributed, and in theory at least, should strengthen the relationship between state and society. A feminist analysis interrogates how a political settlement reinforces, exacerbates, or challenges patriarchy. Taking a gender
perspective, the important questions are who is part of the political settlement process and whose needs and interests are acknowledged, listened to, and accommodated. Political settlements often claim to be comprehensive, for example in postconflict contexts, but are more likely to reflect the interests of certain groups, such as political and/or economic elites and the vestiges of the civil service bureaucracy. To achieve a political settlement that reflects the gender needs and interests of women, young people, ethnic minorities, the disabled, and other “nonelites” requires clear commitments to inclusive power-sharing. Such power-sharing is unlikely to occur overnight, hence the open-ended nature of political settlements becomes important, as it provides further opportunities for reshaping them. There are some useful considerations here for Western crisis-affected contexts, in which the shortcomings of the long-established “political settlement” have become evident.

The difficulty of integrating gender equality and equity principles early in the process of defining postconflict political settlements shines a light on how essential it is that there be more inclusive engagement in peace agreements. Second, it shows how urgent it is to increase the political engagement at all levels of women and men from diverse backgrounds, especially in the negotiation of the political settlement and the new constitution. There are lessons here also for Western crisis-affected contexts. Many, perhaps most, constitutions formally enshrine gender equality and respect for human rights. However, these principles are rarely fully put into policy and practice, and their disregard is seldom challenged on constitutional grounds.

New spaces that have opened up for participation in some countries over the last two decades or so are not automatically democratic or inclusive. Andrea Cornwall and Vera Schattan P. Coelho (2007) researched these spaces in what they called the “participatory sphere,” a “distinct arena at the interface of state and society.” They studied participatory budgeting in Argentina, policy councils in Brazil, hospital boards in South Africa, and community fora in the UK, among other cases. The same factors and barriers that prevent or hamper the most marginalized from having access to influence, resources, services, and social protection may be seen operating in the new spaces. They write that change needs to take place on three fronts—leadership, measures to strengthen inclusiveness, and clear linkages with other governance institutions—in order to deepen the democratic potential and strengthen the democratic legitimacy of these new spaces (Cornwall and Coelho 2007, 24–25). There are mechanisms that can foster greater participation: voter education, registration, and voting; public or other fora in which state and citizens can share information and views; and citizens’ assemblies, deliberative democracy initiatives, and media campaigns. The prodemocracy movements of the Arab Spring that started in late 2010, and protest movements such as Occupy, adopted alternative democratic modes and means of organization. It is as yet unclear what will emerge from these movements in the longer term. What is clear is that many women feel let down by the Arab Spring and plan to continue their struggle for equal rights and gender equity.

Increasing the formal political participation of the diverse range of women is vital in all contexts. Quotas and other forms of affirmative action have brought results in achieving greater numerical equality. These results have been very slow in coming in Western
contexts, with some notable exceptions in Scandinavia, such as Sweden and Finland. But numbers are not enough. The quality of participation needs to receive much greater attention, to enable a move beyond the focus on quantity that has dominated attention to date. How can we achieve women’s meaningful participation and ensure they can influence decisions on budget allocation, public service provision, employment pay, and conditions, so that these promote and protect gender equality and equity? How can an increase be achieved in the number of gender-sensitive women and men working for gender-responsive and socially inclusive policy?

**Legitimacy**

Legitimacy is a core concept of governance and state building. It can be seen both as an end in itself and as a process, a means to building state capacity. It originates from multiple sources. It is built up and strengthened over time by state action, but equally can be diminished or eroded by state action or inaction. Legitimacy from a feminist and gender perspective is inextricably linked to the principles of inclusive participation and representation, responsiveness, equity, respect for human rights, and the rule of gender-equitable (nondiscriminatory) law. It is connected to the state’s ability to deliver security and justice and to meet at least the minimum expectations of all citizens for public services and economic opportunity, while recognizing that expectations also change over time.

Hence it is based on an understanding between citizens/society and the state: citizens consent to the state’s right to govern, and the state accepts its obligations to govern in the interests of all—often described as the “social contract.” From a feminist and gender perspective, the questions of whose consent and how it is granted are important. “Consent” is itself a troublesome notion, particularly in the absence of inclusive, free, and fair elections in which everyone has the information, capacity, and freedom to vote. The concept of a “social contract” is equally problematic from a feminist and gender perspective. The mainstream notion of the “citizen” who enters into the social contract with the state is “economic man”: heterosexual, white, and middle-class; unfettered by any reproductive or caring responsibilities; and able to pursue freely his own individual interests. A feminist and gender analysis of the social contract would examine the power imbalances within different groups in the society, within households, and between citizens, and would bring family and other caring responsibilities into the picture.

Another dimension to legitimacy is useful to consider here and is particularly pertinent to women’s rights, gender equality, and equity: “international legitimacy.” Rahul Chandran (2008) defines this as legitimacy gained through compliance with international treaty obligations and expectations, such as CEDAW and other international standards and principles, as mentioned previously.

In the final analysis, it can be said that a state that ignores or neglects the needs, strategic interests, and wishes of half the population cannot in any meaningful sense be described as legitimate.
Accountability, Responsiveness, and Transparency

Accountability, responsiveness, and transparency are regarded widely as foundational to durable and inclusive states. A gendered concept of accountability would integrate responsibility for the differential effects of policy, planning, budgetary, and other decisions on the lives, rights, and responsibilities of women and men of all sexual orientations, as well as transsexual and intersex people. It would absorb the principles of gender equity, social justice, and respect for human rights and would comply with international agreements such as CEDAW (UNIFEM 2008). Gendered accountability in practice would ensure that policies, laws, budgets, and all other decisions are shaped by gender analysis; that formal and informal stakeholder processes are inclusive; and that the performance of state institutions in gender equality is systematically measured in relation to agreed indicators (Brody 2009, 27).

Transparency is the concomitant of accountability. To hold a government and other state bodies to account, women citizens require information (on government plans, the budget, public-private partnerships, externally funded projects, etc.) and the capacity to analyze that information. They need mechanisms and channels through which they can relate to government. And, they need the right to engage politically and the expectation that this engagement, or holding to account, can be done safely, without jeopardy, and will bear fruitful results.

Capacity and Resilience

Formal state institutions at national and local levels require capacity in a number of linked areas to perform their core functions—broadly, political settlement, security, the rule of law, and economic and social functions—in gender-responsive ways. Political willingness is a primary capacity. State institutions need the power, information, administrative and organizational competence, and human and financial resources to deliver on women’s diverse expectations of security, justice, participation, economic wellbeing, and public services. The executives and legislatures need to consult with a wide range of women at national and local levels and recruit gender expertise into all key bodies. They need to be able to collect and disseminate sex- and gender-disaggregated data and use gender- and conflict-sensitive analysis to understand existing power imbalances; to concentrate resources and social, economic, and political barriers to gender equality; and to devise gender-responsive policy, budget plans, and programs accordingly. Civil society, media, community leadership, and traditional structures also require enhanced capacity.

The resilience of state and civil society institutions is closely connected to capacity and comes with growing legitimacy and the development of robust state-society relations. From a feminist and gender perspective, this necessitates an inclusive and equitable society, a gender-aware, -responsive, and -resourced state, with vibrant women’s organizations and gender-informed media.
The journey toward inclusive, legitimate, accountable, resilient, and capable states that are conducive to social and gender justice is a long-term endeavor, with many routes, cul-de-sacs, and detours. However, a number of essential pathways can be identified.

Transnational, national, and local feminist and women’s movements need to press forward in revisioning and redefining what we mean by legitimate governance and to interrogate and rearticulate the notion of inclusive democracy. We have to find ways to foster active and critical citizenship by all citizens, regardless of gender, ethnicity, age, ability, social status, or other differences. We need to insist on action to remove the barriers to women’s citizenship and our full political engagement—formal and informal, national and local, and international—and challenge the deep-seated masculine-biased cultural attitudes and values that perpetuate gender and other forms of discrimination and inequality.

Supportive and willing agencies (governments and multilateral bodies) must be encouraged to systematically and persistently adopt ambitious, explicit, and unambiguous gender equality and equity objectives in each context and sufficiently resource their achievement. Working in partnership with feminist and women’s organizations will increase the understanding of how to transform gender relations in specific contexts. Given the diverse specificities of location, context, and history, there is no blueprint for promoting gender equality and equity. Without action on gender and social justice, economic justice will not be achieved.

Strong, inclusive, and persistent local, national, and international feminist and women’s organizations, networks, and movements with a clear vision and political agenda are, for me, the most important pathway to change. It is their passion, courage, and commitment that will shape the future, working in alliance with other inclusive and gender-responsive movements.

The 2008 global financial crisis has given new energy to those who argue, under the guise of austerity, for a very limited role for the state in promoting and protecting human rights and wellbeing. It has also made it possible and urgent for those of us who support the redistribution of power and wealth and solidarity for social and gender justice to raise our voices loudly.

Notes

1. UNSCR 1325 (2000) reaffirms women’s roles in the “maintenance and promotion of peace and security” and emphasizes the need to protect the rights of women and girls during and after conflict.
2. UNSCR 1820 (2008) reaffirms that sexual violence used as a tactic in war is a security concern and affirms that sexual violence is a war crime. UNSCR 1888 (2009) “demands” that all parties to armed conflict “immediately take appropriate measures to protect civilians,
including women and children, from all forms of sexual violence.” UNSCR 1889 (2009) urges UN Member States and international and regional organizations to take measures to improve women’s engagement in political and economic decision making at early stages of recovery processes.

3. For example, the UN Declaration on Human Rights (1947); the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979); the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (1993); UN Security Council Resolutions 1325, 1820, 1880, 1889; agreements such as the Beijing Platform for Action (1995); the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); and principles such as the OECD/DAC 2007 Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations.


10. A coalition government came to power, comprising the Conservative and Liberal Democratic political parties, following the UK general parliamentary elections of May 2010, in which no party won an overall majority.

11. The closure was planned before the financial crisis hit.


15. See writers such as Lourdes Beneria, Diane Elson, Marzia Fontana, Naila Kabeer, Edith Kuiper, Ruth Pearson, Gita Sen, and others. See also the International Association for Feminist Economics (IAFFE) at http://www.iaffe.org/.

16. See writers such as Anne-Marie Goetz, Anne Phillips, Shirin Rai, and Georgina Waylen.

17. The following section builds on a technical paper I wrote for UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery in 2010 as part of its review of approaches to governance in conflict-affected states. The paper has not been published.

18. Such as constitution making, rule of law, strengthening of parliament and local authorities, capacity building of executive and administrative bodies, etc.

19. See, e.g., Krook and Childs (2010).


References


UK Political Info. [http://www.ukpolitical.info/Turnout45.htm](http://www.ukpolitical.info/Turnout45.htm).


SECTION 9

FEMINIST POLITICAL ECOLOGY
Section 9 sets out feminist political ecology (FPE) as both an interdisciplinary academic field and a political movement and highlights the importance of gendered knowledge, rights, and politics in the analysis of environmental issues. The three chapters, by Dianne Rocheleau and Padini Nirmal, Ana Agostino, and Sumi Krishna, look at ecologically based political struggles from the local to global levels to show how FPE has been shaped by women’s active engagement in the environmental movement, as well as by advocacy at the UN level on sustainability and climate and environmental change.

Dianne Rocheleau and Padini Nirmal’s chapter, “Feminist Political Ecologies: Grounded, Networked and Rooted on Earth,” looks at how feminists in academe and in social movements are engaged in environmental issues related to peasant struggles, food sovereignty, indigenous rights, and climate. Rocheleau and Nirmal document the complex interactions among class, race, gender, ethnicity, sexuality, and the environment in terms of rights, responsibilities, knowledge, and social movements. They trace how feminists act as bridge builders between thinking and action in ecology and development and in indigenous-inspired social movements and development alternatives. They argue that feminists successfully engaged in the international arena at the UN debates on the environment and sustainable development, leading to major policy changes around environmental issues, climate, water, and land rights. Within academe, FPE has emerged as a school of thought and has contributed to four research areas: political ecology, women’s and gender studies, sustainable development, and alternatives to development. Rocheleau and Nirmal suggest that the multiple efforts of FPE come together in actions that “restructure social and ecological relations and reclaim principles of love, compassion, reciprocity, and diverse spiritualties within a relational framework of social and environmental justice that encompasses gender, race class, culture, sexuality, species, and spirituality.” They conclude that FPE brings together collaborative thought, political action, and practical change on the ground in place(s) with rapidly changing social movements and a diversity of people in everyday ecologies. In this vision, they see FPE has being able to close the divide between the academic, political, and practical domains.
Ana Agostino’s chapter, “Climate Justice and Women’s Agency: Voicing Other Ways of Doing Things,” explores transnational feminists’ work on climate justice. It chapter describes the gender and climate change tribunals held in Nigeria, Botswana, Uganda, Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, and Brazil in the buildup to the UN Conference on Sustainable Development in 2012. The tribunal process brought the voices of local women into the global processes challenging the model of development of creating climate change through narratives of restorative justice. In describing the process leading up to the tribunals and what they promise in today’s political ecology debates, Agostino illustrates how transnational feminism has with great effect contributed to the debates around climate justice. She analyzes how the dominant economic model has negatively impacted climate change and how feminists in academe and in global and local movements have denounced the economic model and provided alternatives anchored in their knowledge, experience, and practice. Agostino uses the term “epistemic violence” to describe how knowledge outside mainstream Western rationality has to be heard in the debates about sustainable development. She shows how transnational feminist movements have resisted epistemic silencing by creating, in the tribunals, spaces in which to voice different beliefs and proposals. She concludes that feminist knowledge and practice are “narratives of restorative and transformative justice” that are foundational for building sustainable alternatives to the current neoliberal economic model.

Sumi Krishna’s chapter, “Transformative Organizing for Sustainable Livelihoods: Learning from South Asian Experiences,” sets out the history of sustainable livelihoods in the South Asian region and describes the difficulties that have been encountered when feminists have tried to introduce a gender perspective into political ecology movements. Krishna tells the “side stream” stories of women’s livelihoods as they jostled alongside the mainstream of economic and agricultural development. She points to the Chipko movement as the quintessential gendered ecological struggle for sustainable livelihoods and shows that gender justice is rarely present, even though women are often leading the struggle for livelihoods. Krishna shows how transnational feminism can learn from the diverse and continuously evolving Indian experience of feminist political ecology, especially in the arena of transformative organizing for sustainable livelihoods. She suggests that the Indian experience of women’s transformative organization around livelihoods reflects the challenge of transformation in a globalizing world in which patriarchy builds on existing forms of gender discrimination and oppression. She proposes that transnational feminist organizing requires networks to counter hegemonic globalization, linking the myriad dynamic new political spaces created by grassroots people’s movements in the local side streams of national and global development.
Women’s networks have long been involved in the politics of healthy communities: the use of land for those who till it or live on it, clean water for all, protection from toxic waste emissions and dumping (Newman 1994), and access to healthy food. They have engaged in a variety of actions to protect people’s rights to live well and thrive in rural and urban landscapes, within forest, agrarian, rangeland, mountain, and coastal regions that they call home. Ecofeminists; feminist environmentalists; poststructural, postcolonial, and increasingly decolonial feminists; and women’s organizations have initiated, joined, and/or documented a diverse array of social movements and political struggles over ecological health, landscapes, and livelihoods (See: Harcourt 2012), as well as environmental decision making in rural, suburban, and urban contexts across the planet.

Feminist political ecology (FPE) emerged as an academic field in the 1990s. It brings together and analyzes the insights, findings, and questions generated by a diverse range of feminist scholars and activists, from those engaged in women and development, gender and agriculture, gender and development, and gender and environment, as well as ecofeminism (Merchant 1980, Shiva 1988, Mies and Shiva 1993). It has contributed to the critique of sustainable development, which appeared in the late 1980s and rose to prominence as a development paradigm after the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio, and provided a
platform for work on gender and sustainable development (Braidotti et al. 1994). It has also shaped the academic work on political ecology (PE), which appeared in the 1980s as a political and environmental critique of development and a political critique of conservation. It came into its own in the 1990s as a critique of corporate- and state-driven sustainable development.

In addition, FPE created an intellectual space to engage with the contributions of women and feminists to understanding the complex interactions among class, race, gender, ethnicity, sexuality, and the environment in terms of rights, responsibilities, knowledges, and social movements. The literature has increasingly recognized and analyzed the strengths of women’s organizations and social movements and the contributions of women within broader environmental and social justice movements (Seager 1993), across regions and spanning cities and countrysides though some have assumed it was exclusively oriented to development in agrarian contexts (Reed and Christie, 2009). FPE is also concerned with multiple kinds of gendered power relations, both positive and negative, entangled with race, class, culture, ethnicity, and other axes of power, that suffuse both social and ecological relations. Discourse analysis of gendered institutions in sustainable development has led to in-depth analysis of such seemingly simple categories as nature, women, men, land, resources, and ecological systems.

**The Intellectual Birth of FPE from PE and Feminist Scholarship**

**Political Ecology**

Political ecology deals with questions of justice and relations of power between humans and other beings, in living landscapes, in place and across places. It addresses questions of distributive justice, from the distribution of products and benefits derived from land, water, plants, and animals, to the creation and unequal distribution of waste, toxins, ecological damage, and other environmental threats to health and wellbeing. Political ecology also includes issues of justice in processes of organization, deliberation, decisions, and the making of knowledges that guide collective action across scales. Much of PE has focused on the proliferation of social movements resisting combined social and environmental injustices tied to development, including “sustainable development.” Rural farmers and indigenous communities have organized across scales and across lines of difference to resist land grabbing; water diversion; deforestation; introduction of GMO seeds, pesticides, and herbicides; and expansion of industrial agriculture plantations for cattle feed, agrofuels (so-called biofuels), and grain crops for exports. They have also joined together to stand against eviction of rural communities by state, nongovernmental organization (NGO), and private reserves and parks (Ojeda 2012); to protest denial of access to forests set aside for carbon sequestration schemes; and to
demand the removal of industrial-scale wind generation facilities sited against the will of rural farming communities.

Urban and rural movements have also formed to prevent or curtail air, water, and soil pollution from industrial, mining, transportation, and energy production facilities constructed in the name of “development.” (Di Chiro 2008, 2009; King 1993) The cases range from nuclear, fossil fuel, and hydro-power plants, to pipelines, oil drilling, “fracking” for gas, and mining, to manufacturing facilities, public wastewater treatment, and solid waste disposal facilities and other sources of pollution and ecological damage. What has received less attention in the academic literature and in more popular accounts is the slow, quiet building of communities based on different approaches to social and ecological process, with a strong focus on creating and fostering “buen vivir,” a state of living well in social and ecological community (Sousa Santos, 2007 a,b, 2010).

Feminist and women’s communities, organizations, and networks have contributed to all of the streams of PE mentioned above, and in many cases they have catalyzed or led actions that grew into broader movements and coalitions. These contributions (both in process and content) are often overlooked, forgotten, or actively denied in the academic literature, the popular press, and even alternative social movement media. This matters for reasons of equity—that is, to ensure and to recognize women’s leadership and contributions in ecological innovation, decisions, and the vision of possible futures. Beyond the presence of women and their contributions, feminist thought and practices challenge conventional ideas of gender, sexuality, identity, and affinity and open the door to an expanded socioecological imagination (Baptiste 2005; Butler 1990). Theories and practices of intersectionality (Valentine 2007), situated knowledges, and critiques of science, as well as expanded understandings of power, provide a bridge to more inclusive ecological knowledge and politics and to coalitions grounded in multiple and distinct experiences of the living world (Harding 1986, 1988; Haraway 1988, 1989, 1991; McCall 2005). The emergence of feminist, decolonial thought and politics brings with it the promise of feminist political ecologies that can articulate multiple worlds, worldviews, and cultures.

**FPE as Response and Critique to PE**

In the wake of PE, FPE created an intellectual space in which to explore the contributions of women and feminists to understanding the complex interactions among class, race, gender, ethnicity, sexuality and the environment in terms of rights, responsibilities, knowledge and social movements. In the first book on FPE (Rocheleau et al. 1996), academics sought to bring together authors and related social movements. The book identifies five existing clusters of feminist scholarship and activism, defined loosely as ecofeminist, feminist environmentalist, socialist feminist, feminist poststructuralist, and environmentalist. Three major themes were invoked: gendered knowledge and sciences of survival: gendered rights and responsibilities with respect to land, resources, and environmental decision making (see also Schroeder, 1997, 1999; Jarosz, 1991) and
gendered social movements and organizations. Labor was treated as a cross-cutting theme rather than as a fourth theme, in part as a reaction to the then-prevailing focus on the capture of women’s labor for sustainable development.

Works identified with this field had been primarily focused on gendered distribution of resources (Rocheleau 1991), unequal terms of access to resources (Agarwal 1986, 1992), and unequal vulnerability to the depredations of development (what Shiva 1988 calls “maldevelopment”) in rural forest or agrarian settings (Carney, 1993). Three things are discussed in the early work on FPE: 1) a vision of actually existing gendered ecologies shot through with power; 2) the movements and struggles that have grown up around them; and 3) the study of those ecologies, power relations, and emerging alternatives. In this way, FPE as a school of thought and practice has emerged from, and has influenced the content, the perspectives, and the practices of, four previously existing academic fields: PE, women’s and gender studies, environmental justice (Miller et al 1996, Di Chiro 2009), sustainable development, and alternatives to development. FPE has followed feminist and women’s movements as they have challenged and changed actually existing power-soaked ecologies.

**CONTROVERSIES AND CRITIQUES SURROUNDING FPE**

FPE today faces many of the same debates and challenges that its has since its inception. Several key issues undergird what FPE is today, namely its relation with other streams of feminist thought, how women and gender are understood and represented in socioecological movements, and expanding to a decentered or intersectional analysis of gender. With these debates and discussions as a departure point, the next section discusses the most recent criticisms of FPE. The last section suggests new directions for FPE.

**Encountering Ecofeminism: “Women and Nature” or “Gender and Environment”?**

A key positioning of FPE has been in the debates on women and nature and gender and development (Harcourt 1993, 2009). In the early 1990s several authors who wrote foundational works in FPE tried to reconcile ecofeminist and modernist visions of gender equality and justice related to environmental values and actions. The edited volume *Feminist Political Ecology* (1996) explicitly sought to construct a broad platform to convene discussion across differences and to search for convergences and partial consensus, especially among ecofeminists, environmental feminists, socialist feminists, and post-structural feminist critics of sustainable development. However, the emergence of the term FPE was seen by many, from within and without, as a break with or rejection of
ecofeminism. While many authors and movement actors did wish to distance themselves from certain elements of ecofeminism, there was an exaggerated sense of a break with the field and all of its principles.

The controversy owes much to the often rehearsed debate over women’s close identification with nature versus a rejection of biological determinism as inimical to gender equality (see Diamond and Orenstein 1990; Seager 2003). FPE advocated a poststructural position (Moeckli and Braun 2001), which recognized and affirmed women’s socially constructed environmental knowledge, skills, associations, and values across a diverse range of contexts (including culture, class, and nationality). This occasioned critiques from multiple positions, first among them ecofeminists, who saw this as a clear break, or as a false distinction, and in either case as a betrayal (Warren 1987). Ironically, many North American and European feminists who did reject ecofeminism still saw FPE’s recognition and affirmation of any gender differences, with respect to environment, as an obstacle to gender equality (Jackson 1993).

As in PE, some of the contributors now recognized as foundational did not identify themselves as feminist political ecologists, yet others explicitly coined and embraced the term and invoked a set of shared principles, convergent concerns, as well as distinct theoretical positions and approaches to addressing problems. Several scholars have used the term and framed articles, books, and edited volumes around this conceptual framework, with changes constantly introduced along the way.

While some notable ecofeminists or cultural feminists actually adhered to the position on gender difference articulated in the first FPE volume (Plumwood 1993; Emel 1995; Wolch and Emel 1998), the majority of ecofeminist writings at the time, and the popular projection of ecofeminist ideas, rested on assumptions about women’s closeness to nature based on biological differences between the sexes. The equation of motherhood and environmental values played a major role in ecofeminist discourse and in discourses from outside about ecofeminism, whether pro or con (Harcourt 2009; Underhill-Sem 2003). What was missed at the time was a nuanced evaluation of cultural chauvinism and the inherent sexism and adherence to dominant categories implied in dismissing relationships to female bodies and motherhood as negative. For example, there was a strong presence of Native American women authors and activists in ecofeminist circles in North America, and the separation of FPE from ecofeminism occasioned an inadvertent loss of connections with indigenous authors and activists.

The subsequent reduction of indigenous representation in FPE and related academic pursuits limited the articulation with the rising tide of indigenous movements throughout the world, especially, but not limited to, women in indigenous movements throughout the Americas. Scholars working with and writing about indigenous social movements have increasingly encountered women in organizational, leadership, and advocacy roles in resistance to ecological damage and displacement of people by mega-development projects throughout the world. The last decade has brought a pronounced shift in women’s visible presence, participation, and leadership in North America and Latin America, from the Tar Sands of Alberta and the streets of West Harlem in New York City to mines of the Andes, the Amazon Basin, and the mountains
and rain forests of Mexico and Central America (Laduke 2002; Baschet 2013; Le Bot 2013). The prominent and widespread invocations of Pachamama and Madre Tierra by indigenous Andean movements in the mid-2000s left some feminist scholars and activists at a loss for how to connect their modernist frameworks of equality and justice with what seemed to be anachronistic references to Mother Earth, while others embraced this trend (Paulson 2003). The apparent gender division of labor and parallel domains of organization and authority between men and women in indigenous movements and campaigns also left many poststructural political ecologists, including feminists, struggling to make sense of the strategies and processes of these powerful forces for social and environmental justice.

**Whose Movements, Whose Leadership?**

Gendered and often culture-bound assumptions about what constitutes leadership and authority have also prevented recognition of women’s participation, power, and perspectives in protection of land, water, forests, rangelands, and wildlife from the deprivations and injustices of development and conservation projects alike. In attempts to understand these processes, FPE arose in part to respond to the false dichotomy of feminist versus “real” political movements, or of feminist versus economic, religious, ethnic, and environmental movements. Two examples of movements that merit a more nuanced analysis are the Chipko and Rubber Tappers movements. They predated much of the terminology and analytic tools FPE uses today, yet demonstrate the importance of an intersectional analysis.

The rise of the Chipko movement, with women’s power and participation playing a central role, could be construed as a foundational moment of FPE. It is one instance among many of women’s environmental activism bursting onto the global scene (with or) without academic license, official political recognition, or social movement affiliation. The movement served as a dramatic counterfactual to the then-prevailing modernist and imperial image of “third world peasants” as forest destroyers and of women peasants as passive “victims of tradition.” News accounts of women tree huggers protecting their forests against timber concessionaires as well as development projects supported by local men spread around the world through alternative and eventually mainstream media. Shiva’s (1988) account of Chipko as a women’s movement brought the story into the academic sphere as well as into environmental and feminist movement circles, and it soon became a classic ecofeminist text.

While this version inspired many feminists and women activists the world over, it also inspired a strong and persistent reaction against ecofeminism, including from within the Chipko movement itself. Ramachandra Guha (1990) countered Shiva’s (1988) account of the movement as powered by women and feminine values, instead portraying it as a regional and ethnic movement led by men. He based his argument on the premise that there were no women leaders (except when they arose as accidental leaders
in the absence of men; Guha 1990, 159), and that the leaders were two men from different branches of a Gandhian tradition, one more social and economic (Chandi Prasad Bhatt) and the other more religious and devotional (Sunderlal Bahuguna). While the evidence for a regional cultural and ethnic resistance with religious and political roots is not disputed, the dismissal of women’s central place in the movement suggests a patriarchal vision of “leadership.”

The denial of women’s leadership and the claim of women having become accidental leaders in the absence of local men fly in the face of multiple instances of women engaging in standoffs against timber contractors armed with chainsaws, while the village men were away, or in other cases against the men of their own villages intent on clearing local forests for state-sponsored agricultural development projects. The fact that individual women and the women of entire villages chose to stand up against powerful and or armed men for the forest, their forest, at the moment of truth, was somehow not deemed worthy of the term leadership. In yet other cases thousands of women engaged in pilgrimages, extensive treks to endangered and sacred sites, and massive educational encampments of women opposed to the destruction of forests and rivers throughout the region. A rejection of alcohol and violence against women was also linked to the latter. The massive presence and active participation of women in this case was dismissed as passive women merely following a charismatic religious leader. Any insistence on women’s agency was somehow construed as either a lack of acknowledgment of Bahuguna as the leader or a naïve acceptance of his tenets, as opposed to recognizing women’s engagement in (real) regional political agency. Likewise, some saw the emphasis on women’s activism as negating Chandi Prasad Bhatt’s leadership in the livelihood-based resistance to foreign concessionaires.

Yet Shiva and other feminist political ecologists (Fortmann and Rocheleau 1984) early on both mentioned the role of men as leaders in Chipko and accepted the clear regional, cultural, political, and religious roots of the movements. They also saw women as leaders, individually and collectively, though their criteria for leadership were clearly not shared by many of the authors reacting to Shiva’s and other feminist accounts. Together, they described the actions of specific women leading collective unarmed resistance to men with chainsaws, including cases involving employees of concessionaires, as well as instances of local men cutting forests for government-led agricultural development projects.

Chipko quickly became a lightning rod in the battle over feminist essentialist versus reactionary antifeminist, versus intersectional approaches to women’s environmental activism in the context of larger or more complex environmental movements (See: Gururani 2002). As it turns out, the debate on Chipko turned on the issue of intersectionality, before the word and the concept had become a mainstay of feminism per se, and of poststructural political ecology.

An equally major and almost opposite case is that of the Rubber Tappers’ movement in the Brazilian Amazon in the state of Acre. In this case, rather than the selective visibilization of women’s versus men’s roles, the story told globally was that of a charismatic and truly courageous man who dedicated his life’s work, and ultimately sacrificed his
life, to saving the forest home and livelihoods of rubber tapper communities from clear cutting for large-scale, state-subsidized cattle ranches. In this case it was a single story that circulated through environmental circles, and the debates were couched as environment versus development in the forest, with a near total eclipse of women's voices and actions and a near perfect distortion of the issues from livelihood and rights-based to a simple forest protection stance.

In sustainable development circles the story of the Rubber Tappers emerged one way, in PE another way, and later the story of the women rubber tappers' union and political presence emerged in FPE (Campbell in Rocheleau et al. 1996). This was later reprinted in the Ecologist (Campbell 1997), evoking a strong reaction from the publisher, among others. The dominant story of the women's role remains as that of passive innocents rallied to stand before the chainsaws at the behest of men leaders. Outside of FPE, “the other story” of the Women Rubber Tapper’s Union, the woman congressional representative who rose from the ranks of the Women Rubber Tapper’s Union, and the ongoing gendered lives of people on the extractive reserves, remains in the “minority report” category. Both of these cases were emblematic of much broader regional and transnational movements, and upon closer examination, with hindsight, also embodied the complexity of intersectional identities (McCall 2005) often lost in both popular and academic accounts that either exclusively privilege, or erase, the gendered dimensions of environmental and social justice movements.

For better or for worse, FPE has become a cradle, a platform, and a refuge for such minority reports. It has also served as the source of emerging alternative visions of what deserves to be reported, and who reports, as well as how to document, interpret, and broadcast these stories within and beyond the academy and explicitly feminist publics.

Chipko and the Rubber Tappers were not exceptional cases (See: Maathai 2003 on the Greenbelt Movement). The processes and pathways of women's participation and leadership may be invisible or illegible to the gaze of states, development agencies, and environmental organizations, yet women often constitute pivotal forces in movements to protect and maintain ecologies and peoples' places within them (Alvarez and Escobar 1998; Rocheleau et al. 2001; Martinez-Torres and Rosset 2010). Likewise, the position of women within nested and entangled networks and meshworks of ethnicity, culture, race, class, age, caste, religion, and sexuality (among others) is often illegible to feminists focused exclusively on gender, using secular and modernist frameworks of equality and justice (see Arturo Escobar in de Sousa Santos 2007a-- on meshworks).

**FROM WOMEN AND NATURE TO GENDERED CULTURE NATURES**

In the next, more theoretically engaged phase, FPE drew on theories and case studies from feminist, poststructural and science and technology studies, and geographies of
space, place, race and gender (Kobayashi and Peake 1994; Collins 2000; hooks 1984, 1995; Katz 1998; Mohanty 1988; Nagar and Ali 2009; Massey 1994, 2004). A handful of feminist geographers have opened new dimensions in theoretical, political, and practical treatment of the “more than human world” and have vastly enriched the field of FPE in the process. In recent years feminist geographers have engaged in critical new issues such as climate change, biotechnology, and land grabbing. However, new critiques have also emerged to push FPE toward more profound decolonial and intersectional analysis.

Examples of theoretically engaged FPE in this second stage include Jody Emel and Jennifer Wolch’s (1998) edited volume on animal geographies, which brought a feminist perspective to the study of human-animal interactions, questioning the nature-culture divide and explicitly locating themselves in the “nature/culture borderlands.” Their cases range from human encounters with urban wildlife and the bestialization of selected gender and racial categories, to the genetic classification of wolves marked for protection or extermination. The volume has been increasingly incorporated into curricula in PE and FPE as well as women’s and gender studies, science and technology studies, human geography, and cultural studies of environment, and is widely cited in the humanities and social sciences alike.

Kay Anderson’s (2000a, 2007) studies of zoos in Australia likewise bring feminist concepts of intersectionality and poststructural critiques of the nature-culture divide into conversation with the familiar, yet strange practice of presenting captive wild animals as an entertaining spectacle that reaffirms human dominance of “other” beings. She uses the zoo to bring into play the gendered tropes and metaphors of captivity, domination, and domestication; links them to the nature-culture divide; and uses the zoo to illustrate broader gendered conceptual paradigms and social practices.

Sarah Whatmore’s *Hybrid Geographies* (2002) has brought a complex theoretical framework for the “more than human world” into PE, human geography, indigenous studies, and feminist scholarship. She recounts and analyzes the workings of coloniality in relation to indigenous land tenure struggles in Australia. The nature-culture divide enters into political expressions of racialized and imperial geographies of “other” people, influenced by the failure to comprehend and respect their relationships with nonhuman beings, from mountains and streams to reptiles, rainfall, and spirits.

**Current Debates and Horizons in FPE**

Conversations about FPE are often quite similar to those that many feminists within academia have about “doing gender.” In a discussion paper Dianne Rocheleau states:

[Feminist political ecology] “disappeared,” because we didn't have the gender word under everything we did. So there are these feminist people out there all over the place, including me, who . . . have gone on to emphasize other kinds of difference. Or
to be in places where the keyword is going to be indigeneity, social movement, or environment and race.

(Hawkins and Ojeda 2011, 243)

Pointing to this quandary among scholars studying gender and environment, in her introduction to a themed issue of *Geoforum* Elmhirst (2011) identifies two key reasons that many scholars do not adopt the FPE label despite doing what might ostensibly be called FPE in practice. First, while conceptions of gender have changed over time through a decentering of the subject of gender analysis, so have the terms of natural resource use and governance through an expansion of neoliberal capitalism (Ahlers and Zwarteveen 2009). This makes gender less critical within development praxis and studies, making it instead another checkbox item on a neoliberal agenda. She insists that while many scholars use the FPE framework, they do not identify it as such, choosing instead to use a gender/feminist framework. This owes much to changes within social theory that have led to destabilizing gender as a central analytical category and a move toward privileging multiple subjectivities and identities. Second, she identifies changes within PE like the inclusion of actor-network theory that problematize human subjectivity, hence complicating gender subjectivity.

It is important to note that several FPE authors have in fact addressed these points over the years. Harcourt and Escobar (2005), Harcourt and colleagues (2012), and Harcourt (2009, 2010) looked at bodies, multiple scales, and complex subjectivities, while Nightingale (2010) engaged multiple subjectivities and Rocheleau and Roth (2007) examined networks and assemblages in PE.

**Intersectional FPE**

A more recent critique of FPE comes from Sharlene Mollett and Caroline Faria (2012), who caution that gender has indeed not been decentered within FPE. They insist that FPE continues to have a troubled marriage with “difference” for a number of reasons. One is the fear of losing policy relevance, another is that the operation of whiteness within scholarly research obstructs a focus on race and racialization, and the third is that gender continues, problematically, to be understood as a shorthand for other differences. In offering a way forward, they argue for a *postcolonial intersectionality* that “acknowledges the way patriarchy and racialised processes are consistently bound in a postcolonial genealogy that embeds race and gender ideologies within nation-building and international development processes” (120). This offers a way of “messing with” gender that emphasizes how race and gender are often entangled, both within the North or South and with other axes of difference and power, thereby enriching the scope of FPE.

Mollet and Faria’s critiques of FPE cited the overly generalized characterization of socially constructed genders and the facile adherence to the two categories of men and women without sufficient attention to intersectionality, particularly with respect to race, culture, class, and sexuality (Mollett and Faria 2012).
Decolonial FPE

Critical race theorists and feminists, working alongside critical pedagogues and indigenous scholars and activists, have long called for decolonizing knowledges within academia. There is a rising, contemporary push from social movements, and scholars working with social movements, not only to recognize the “decolonial” in decolonial knowledges, but also to accept the epistemic status of such knowledges as equally legitimate and authoritative (e.g., see the work of Mario Blaser, Arturo Escobar, and Marisol de la Cadena).

Feminist decolonial thought has further articulated the importance of intersectionality (Combahee River Collective 1986; Collins 2000) and has brought into play the central role of coloniality in the framing of dominant modernist categories, with a reiteration by some authors (Curiel 2007a, 2007b) of prior rejections of ecofeminism. Other strains of decolonial thought deny the nature-culture divide and create space for the acceptance of multiple worlds, invoking the *diálogo de saberes*, a dialog of ways of knowing and being in different worlds, including the “more than human world” (Whatmore 2002; Santos 2007b, 2010; Escobar 2008; Blaser 2010; de la Cadena 2010). This is increasingly connected to cultural studies of science(s) and technologies as well as decentered theories of ecological, social, and political organization, emanating from horizontally organized social movements (Simpson and others, 2009) in conversation with formal theories of complexity, networks, assemblages, and multiple worlds (see recent writings on the pluriverse). However, the convergences (and divergences) of feminist, decolonial, indigenous, and emergent alternative ecologies have yet to be more explicitly engaged and written.

While the push for decolonization has been consistent within indigenous resistance movements in the past five hundred years, it has become quite central within FPE recently. Middleton’s (2010) article “A Political Ecology of Healing” is a compelling marriage of decolonial studies with PE that points to an exciting future for FPE. She states:

> In order to de-colonize, one must understand and articulate the specific ways in which coloniality operates in knowledge, culture, governance, and other spheres of human life. Recognizing “fundamental difference” in worldviews without assigning rank or evolutionary potential is de-colonizing. (18)

A recent resurgence of FPE in the academy is decidedly postcolonial (Asher 2007, 2009) and decolonial (Middleton 2010; Simpson et al. 2009), with greater emphasis on intersectionality as well as respect for multiple visions, knowledges, and practices, and indeed, multiple worlds. Many authors have embarked on a coalescing process to build a new, and in some cases explicitly decolonial, FPE, with greater emphasis on race, culture, ethnicity, sexuality, and indigeneity, as well as class, and a search for ways of learning, knowing, and being that recognize, respect, and traverse multiple worlds (Arora-Jonsson 2012). The emerging decolonial FPE seeks to deal with the complexities of power in the worlds that people inhabit and to revisit the visions of “development” and alternatives, such as “buen vivir,” reaching beyond capitalist and
socialist development paradigms focused on colonial economic categories and projects. This new wave is both theoretically and practically grounded and promises to provide a bridge to lively currents of thinking and action in ecology and development, including the surge of indigenous-inspired social movements (e.g. Idle No More in Turtle Island) and development alternatives emanating from very different publics across the world.

Following Middleton, by recognizing the ontological plurality of knowledge systems and practices, FPE stands to expand its disciplinary scope by challenging the body-mind divide evident in nature-culture systems (and instead privileging the unity of body-mind evident in nature-culture systems). It also stands to broaden its primary obligation to feminist politics by engaging with the knowledges of indigenous and other culturally distinct feminists as well as activists who might reject the label but are advancing feminist theory, politics and practice. Further, by questioning the historic marginalization of indigenous and other "submerged" (nature-culture) knowledges (see Foucault 1982) and privileging the practice of decolonization of knowledges and knowledge systems, decolonial FPE can join the many rhizomatic resistances of indigenous peoples in imagining alternative worlds that promote and sustain the just coexistence of multiple living worlds of animate and inanimate beings.

**Whither FPE?**

Taking as a point of departure the transnational social movements and networks of local movements as well as the widely dispersed upwelling of local changes that inspired and gave life to FPE as an academic field and policy framework, the field has been rhizomic from its inception. Like the process described by Raquel Gutiérrez (2012, 2014) for indigenous resistance and transformative movements in Bolivia, it has followed a trajectory of recurring cycles of visibility, invisibility, and apparent resurgence while actually originating in and continuing to build rhizomatic connections not legible to prevailing structures of power/knowledge.

The rift between ecofeminism and second wave feminism has not been fully resolved but has been raised, and bridged, anew, under new terms, by the actions and thinking of indigenous social movements in dialogue with other movements for social and environmental justice, as well as a growing number of feminist and decolonial scholars, across cultures, disciplines, and theoretical lines. We posit that this path has not been circular but rather a spiral, with a new round of convergences and divergences to bring into the work of decolonizing the theories, politics, and daily practices of academic and social movement actors. Political ecologists, feminists, ecologists, environmental activists, and indigenous scholars and activists will all figure prominently in the engagement of FPE with the resurgent and emergent social movements resisting the dominant neoliberal paradigm and creating ecologically viable and socially just alternatives.
Theoretical and Methodological Approaches for FPE

An expanded and revised FPE proposes to develop situated ways of doing science, informed by feminist theory and ethics, to transform the prevailing techno-science paradigm. This implies a commitment to diversify ecological imaginaries and understandings of places across urban and rural contexts and to engage with diverse understandings and practices of sustainability, specifically those that build mutuality, reciprocity, and relationality. This approach advocates doing science differently through relational analyses (incorporating multiple perspectives not through an additive process but by understanding partial objectivities and situated perspectives). In addition, the objective of scientific investigation within this context shifts from fixed answers to narrow questions, to a broad base of information and distinct perspectives that inform negotiated outcomes. Gendered and otherwise situated intersectional understandings are combined and shaped into shared understanding through noncompetitive processes. These approaches derive from many sources, including indigenous, feminist, and other communities that assume the existence of multiple worlds and include ways of knowing beyond the nature-culture divide at the base of modern science and politics.

When considering technological change, FPE scholars work to create conditions for technological innovations that are democratically engendered rather than corporate driven and advocate for diverse technological alternatives. Moreover, they insist on feminist and democratic technology assessments using the precautionary principle to evaluate a wide range of alternative options (Steingraber 1997, 2011).

Fields and Topics for Emergent FPE Analysis

As we confront new challenges and encounter more examples of creative resistance and transformation among peoples around the world, an expanded and revised FPE calls for change along several paths, including 1) new approaches to science(s) and knowledge(s) (Goldman et al. 2011); 2) challenges to techno-fix responses to climate change and other ecological crises; 3) critique of apocalyptic environmental crisis scenarios as preludes to reactionary/fundamentalist politics and oppression of vulnerable groups (women, ethnic, sexual and racial “minorities,” and migrants among others); 4) application of feminist perspectives to biopolitical debates on bodies and ecologies (Hartman 1987; Hartman and Hendrixon 2005; Hartman 2001; Langston 2010; Wiltshire 1992); 5) extension of FPE insights on gendered territories, resource rights, knowledges, and nature-culture relations to evaluate existing and emerging technologies, land and water use, and resource management regimes across regions and rural urban lines; and 6) envisioning alternative ways of being in the world and participating in evolving futures (Gibson-Graham 1996, 2002, 2006).

Feminist political ecologists have begun to engage with these major contemporary issues such as climate change and climate justice and another global wave of land grabbing (Ojeda 2012; Rocheleau unpublished paper under review). Several feminists have
also addressed the series of food, water, energy, environmental, and financial crises that have led to cultural triage, political volatility and violence, and cascading damage to ecologies and peoples across the planet (Seager 2009, 2010; GESEC 2011; Tschakert and Machado 2012; Sultana 2006, 2009a, 2009b; Mellot 2010; Nightingale 2003, 2006a, 2006b, 2010; Harris 2006, 2009; Hussain and Mustafa 2003; Lewis 2010; Mehta 2005; Leach 1994). Gendered experience of each of these crises is entangled with complex identities encountering ecological processes and assaults upon them by prevailing powers and state/corporate-driven science, politics, and development (Elmhirst and Resurreccion 2008; Freeman 2001; Katz 2001; Singh 2013). Roberta Hawkins (2011) has analyzed the gendered appeal to women as mothers and environmental consumers and the contradictions of green and “ethical” consumption in relation to sustainable development and corporate responsibility. Feminist critique of the role of the military in everyday life and in national policies (Ojeda 2010, 2013) has also proven relevant to PE, particularly as it impinges on mainstream scientific approaches to climate change, environmental security, conservation, population and food security (Hartman 1987; Hartman and Hendrixon 2005; Wiltshire 1992).

Building on these strong precedents, and as cascading crises come to define the context for public policy (Klein, 2007), FPE must challenge the rush to massive and often short-term techno-fixes that may have long-term consequences with highly skewed impacts on distinct publics. Rapid and dramatic changes in technologies and in the conditions of production pose a serious challenge to FPE and other critical fields of scholarship and activism. Any evaluation of these rapidly diffusing technologies must address gendered territory and resource rights, knowledges, and socioecological relations, among other axes of power based on both affinity and difference (Emel and Urbanik 2005). The major challenges include the rise of industrial monocultures in agriculture, fisheries, and forests; new seed technologies (Jarosz 2011; Christie 2006); emerging approaches to conservation of biodiversity, wildlife, “natural resources,” and “ecosystem services” (Nelson 2010); the rush to shift to agrofuels and other alternative energy technologies; the promotion of carbon trading and sequestration over the reduction of energy use; massive geo-engineering proposals of unprecedented proportions to address climate change; and industrial production systems driven by technological convergence on the nanoscale.

Existing scholarship in these fields includes feminists who are questioning the highly militarized, masculinized, centralized, and corporate-driven responses to climate change and other ecological problems (Seager, 2010; Nagle, 2010) and calling on the mainstream and progressive Left scientific communities to redress the historical and contemporary exclusions of feminist analysis. Particularly in the case of proposed global geo-engineering solutions, feminists have exposed and interrogated the dominant ecological and social imaginaries driving various techno-fixes, and some have also mapped political and financial investments, demonstrating the links between powerful military and corporate actors and specific scenarios of environmental futures (GESEC 2011).

Feminists have also begun to analyze the consequences of the apocalyptic framing of ecological catastrophes and to consider the potentially disempowering effect
of doomsday scenarios. They have voiced concerns and sounded warnings about the responses by various reactionary and/or religious fundamentalist forces throughout the world that meet doomsday scenarios and frightening techno-fixes with parallel ideological fixes that create the illusion of security and hope, often based on reinstating repressive controls over women and ethnic, racial, sexual, and religious minorities under authoritarian regimes (GESEC 2011). Related to this is the challenge for FPE to uncover and counter the repressive actions against environmental and social activists by the military industrial complex, including heightened surveillance, regulation, and repression of human rights, especially of women and ethnic, racial, and sexual minorities (Asher 2007, 2009; Ojeda 2013).

Recent works in FPE combine culture, race, and gender with illuminating results and model an intersectional and decolonial FPE. Examples include Juanita Sundberg’s (2004) account of indigenous identities emerging, from within and without, in the Guatemalan parks and reserves in Mayan areas south of the Mexico-Guatemala border. Sundberg’s FPE analysis highlights the complex struggles and manipulation of identity by multiple actors. She explains how gendered and racialized landscape formations are created through daily practice, as well as policy, in nature conservation organizations. Sharlene Mollett’s work on race and gender in coastal Honduras has likewise focused on the intersections of multiple axes of identity, in this case within the context of gendered and racialized environmental injustices introduced through land tenure reforms. Wendy Harcourt (2009) brings new feminist scholarship on the body to bring bodies back into our understanding of gender, race, nature, and culture. The International Working Group on Women and the Politics of Place convened by Harcourt and Escobar (2005) defined a series of gendered environments, ranging from the body to the home, the community, and surrounding ecosystems. Rocheleau (2011) brought a feminist poststructural analysis to the definition and study of biodiverse gendered and racialized “emergent ecologies” in the landscapes of the Rural Federation of Zambrana-Chacuey in the Dominican Republic.

**Conclusion: The Decolonial Turn—Powers of Relational Networks in Complex Territories**

Because of the emphasis on dealing with difference and questioning categories, FPE has been able to complicate nature-culture dualistic visions of the world, especially those relevant to the politics of conservation and development across scales, as well as emerging and complex livelihood systems and landscapes.

The flowering of theories, politics, and practices of relationality, across academic fields and social movements, constitutes an opportunity to create a decolonial FPE open to new categories of identity, affinity, and difference and new ways of understanding and engaging in relationships in space(s) and place(s).
FPE seeks to move beyond critique and to envision alternative futures, not in a fixed and prescriptive way, but in terms of opening up intellectual, political, and practical paths to evolving futures. As such it affirms the resistance, resilience, and rights of multiple actors to imagine and create diverse scenarios of possible futures, from global climate change (Seager 2009) to the food on kitchen tables (Christie, 2006; Jarosz, 2011). Several recent works seek to reframe totalizing state- or market-driven constructs of impact, vulnerability, adaptation, and mitigation in environmental change and technology debates and to revalue heterogeneous gendered knowledges and practices of sustainability. Others envision alternative ecologies and economies that protect the rights of people and the health of the earth or posit social and political alternatives that hold science accountable to do no harm (precautionary principle) and serve the common good. All of these efforts converge in a movement to restructure social and ecological relations and reclaim principles of love, compassion, reciprocity, and diverse spiritualities within a relational framework of social and environmental justice that encompasses gender, race class, culture, sexuality, species, and spirituality (GESEC 2011). This does not discount resistance and struggle but rather undergirds and nourishes it, to move in new directions, with different rhythms, colors, and patterns of relation.

The single greatest challenge for FPE is how to engage in collaborative thought, political action, and practical change on the ground, in place(s), with rapidly changing social movements and a diversity of people in everyday ecologies. Bridging and tunneling across the divide between academic, political, and practical domains continues to be a serious and difficult task, however necessary and rewarding. It will require continuing conversations and partial, contingent inclusion in the work of social movements, to do the mundane but crucial work of making new worlds on the ground and bringing to life a larger world in which many worlds can live and thrive.

Notes

1. This list includes Judith Carney, Bina Agarwal, Melissa Leach, Jan Momsen, Cecile Jackson, Cindy Katz, Carolyn Merchant, Val Plumwood, Donna Haraway, Joni Seager, and Betsy Hartmann.

2. These authors include Dianne Rocheleau, Barbara Thomas-Slayter, Esther Wangari, Richard Schroeder, Wendy Harcourt, Marianne Schmink, Arturo Escobar, Andrea Nightingale, Lisa Gezon, Susan Paulson, Juanita Sundberg, Alice Hovorka, Lucy Jarosz, and Yvonne Underhill.

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CHAPTER 32

CLIMATE JUSTICE AND WOMEN’S AGENCY

Voicing Other Ways of Doing Things

ANA AGOSTINO

Introduction

Climate justice is a concept that emerged at the turn of the twentieth century as a result of introducing a rights approach to the challenges posed by climate change. Like many other concepts dealing with complex issues, there are several ways to understand it, and these approaches have also changed over time as a result of specific debates, forms of implementation, or translation into policies. In this chapter I look at how transnational feminism has contributed to the debates surrounding climate justice. I begin by sharing some approximations to climate justice and transnational feminism. I say “approximations” because their complexity makes it very difficult to come up with definitions that can encompass all the various understandings and usages. I then analyze how the dominant economic model has negatively impacted climate change and how women, mainly at an academic level and as part of global and local movements, have played a major role in denouncing the consequences of this model and have consistently provided alternatives that express their own worldviews, anchored in their knowledge, experiences, and practices. Informed by the concept of epistemic violence, with the understanding that knowledge outside mainstream Western rationality has been ignored, I explore how in spite of this, feminists around the world have found spaces to voice varying beliefs and proposals. I finally place the knowledge and practices within the narratives of restorative and transformative justice as a way to highlight their ability to contribute to building sustainable alternatives.
Climate Justice

The movement for climate justice emerged with the search for social and environmental justice. It brought together the struggles to overcome poverty, various forms of discrimination, and exclusion, as well as the added negative consequences that the environmental crisis has had on already affected communities. A brief historical look at the movement may shed some light on the meaning of the concept. The first Climate Justice Summit took place in The Hague in November 2000 in parallel to the Conference of the Parties (COP 6) of the United Nations Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). It brought together representatives from communities adversely affected by the fossil fuel industry in several parts of the world. There was a clear emphasis during this summit on building a citizen’s movement to control climate change. In August 2002, during the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) organized by the United Nations in Johannesburg, South Africa, an international coalition of groups released what was called the Bali Principles of Climate Justice, which had been put together at the end of the preparatory meeting for the WSSD held in Bali, Indonesia, in June 2002. Among other aspects, the statement called for recognizing that strategies undertaken to redress the negative consequences of climate change could ignore neither the differentiated responsibilities nor the disproportionate burden on countries of the South, in particular groupings including women and indigenous and rural communities. It stated that climate justice affirms the rights of these communities to represent and speak for themselves, calling for recognition of the various responses to the phenomenon that come from different people’s experiences and knowledge. The statement included the principle of ecological debt, adding that climate justice protects the rights of victims of climate change to receive full compensation, restoration, and reparation for loss of land, livelihood, and other damage, among several other principles. A few years later, in 2004, the Durban Group for Climate Justice was formed by various organizations, calling on activists, other organizations, and communities to join them in the struggle for “Climate Justice Now.” This statement also highlighted that there were “communities disproportionately impacted by climate change and the false ‘solutions’ put forward by the Kyoto Protocol,” referring to “small island states, indigenous peoples, the poor and the marginalized, particularly women, children and the elderly around the world.” Following this call, the Climate Justice Now! Network was formed and was very active at the COP 13 in Bali in 2007, rejecting any market-based solutions and calling for community-based solutions such as indigenous land rights, food sovereignty, and people’s control over energy and resources, as well as a drastic reduction in consumption in the North and by the Southern elites. Several other coalitions were built over time, in particular around the COP 15 in Copenhagen in 2009, with diverse positions on the issues listed above: market solutions (including carbon markets), shifting to renewable sources of energy, views on economic growth and consumption, ecological debt, differentiated responsibilities, reparations, and community participation.
The various positions and statements referred to have in common a rights-based approach to climate policy. They mainly come from the international context and tend to call for the subordination of climate policy to UN rights declarations and conventions. At the same time, they are anchored in the experiences of local communities confronted in their day-to-day lives with the consequences of climate change that have tried to articulate local responses. These responses found a way into a global scenario through the international movement for climate justice. There are also major differences within the various movements. Whereas some formulate a deep criticism of the capitalist mode of production and link the struggle for climate justice with the struggle for gender, racial, and economic justice, others aim at democratizing the processes by which market-based solutions can be reached.

Many of these movements made reference to the particular ways in which climate change affect women and called for the recognition of women's agency. Nevertheless, it was through the involvement of women themselves, as a result of their academic contributions and their experiences and practices, that the feminist perspectives on the problems posed by climate change (including its causes and consequences), as well as on the solutions associated with the call for climate justice, were introduced. I return to this in following sections.

**Transnational Feminism**

The last four decades have seen a growing trend among women's organizations and networks of mobilizing for women's rights and gender equality beyond the limits of their countries or regions. This has become increasingly clear alongside the consolidation of the phenomenon of globalization. Although globalization is associated with the neoliberal policies of the 1980s and 1990s, which shifted power from people and democratic governments to financial speculators, it was accompanied as well by the globalization of civil society, of a global consciousness of our mutual dependency—among human beings and with respect to our common planet—and of communications. The “anti-globalization” movement that erupted internationally at the end of the twentieth century constituted a space to think and propose alternatives for uniting struggles from around the world. A key moment was the Alternative Summit, held in Geneva in June 2000, on the eve of the special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on social development, which issued a statement analyzing globalization and proposing ways to chart a new world. The motivation for this gathering and statement came from several international movements, including the World March of Women 2000, which posited the interconnected character of the various impacts of the predominant model on human beings and the planet. The final resolution highlighted as key issues to be addressed in this new vision social questions, gender, environment, democracy, and the struggle against xenophobia and racism. A major proposal approved in Geneva
was support for a World Social Forum (WSF), to be held annually parallel to the World Economic Forum in Davos. The first forum took place in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in January 2001, and it has taken place almost every year since then. It can be described as a space and a process wherein several proposals come together, representing the search for a world radically different than the one resulting from capitalist globalization.

Women’s organizations have been part and parcel of this process and have contributed to shaping it. According to Valentine Moghadam, “‘globalization-from-above’ has engendered ‘globalization-from-below,’ producing a dynamic and transnational women’s movement that has been confronting neoliberal capitalism and patriarchal fundamentalism.” She argues that since 1985 transnational feminist networks have proliferated around broad issues and campaigns. She describes these networks as structures organized above the national level that unite women from different countries around a common agenda. They work with each other but also with other transnational human rights, labor, social justice, environmental, and other organizations highlighting the negative aspects of globalization, trying to influence policymaking and to insert a feminist perspective into this transnational advocacy and activism.

Nancy Fraser has argued that transnational feminists realized “they cannot adequately challenge gender injustice if they remain within the previously taken-for-granted frame of the modern territorial state. Because that frame limits the scope of justice to intra-state institutions that organize relations among fellow citizens, it systematically obscures transborder sources of gender injustice that structure transnational social relations. The effect is to shield from the reach of justice all those forces shaping gender relations that routinely overflow territorial borders.” In response to this acknowledgment, feminists have organized, mobilized, and undertaken research on a transnational basis to counteract and propose alternatives to the transnational forces that generate gender injustice.

For some scholars, like Chandra Mohanty, feminists need to be attentive to borders while at the same time transcending them. She is referring not just to geographical borders but also to those of race, class, sexuality, religion, and disability. To move beyond these borders, Mohanty argues that there is a need for decolonizing knowledge and rethinking oneself and one’s community through emancipatory practices that question established views of modern society and development. In her analysis, transnational feminism is more than the encounter and articulation of struggles of women around the world; it requires a fundamental questioning of Eurocentric epistemologies and its associated assumptions about class, gender, race, and other dimensions of women’s struggles. In this volume, Manisha Desai also highlights the concept of historically specific relational processes across borders. She argues that the concept was articulated in the early 1990s within the interdisciplinary spaces of the US academy, but very much in connection to the critique being put forward by women in the global South of a universalizing white Western feminism.

My own experience within transnational feminism brings together several of the categories highlighted by these authors. Between 2006 and 2010 I was the coordinator of the Feminist Task Force (FTF), a women’s network with a diverse membership.
of feminist, grassroots, rural, and urban women's groups; academics; and gender advocates who came together in March 2005—when leaders of international women's rights groups gathered in New York City for the annual meetings of the UN Commission on the Status of Women—with the main aim of stressing the centrality of gender equality for the eradication of poverty. It was established under the umbrella of the Global Call to Action against Poverty (GCAP). Throughout the years the FTF has worked on various fronts, from partnering with grassroots women's and civil society organizations around the world, to participating in high-level dialogues and commissions of the United Nations and other negotiating bodies like the UNFCCC, the G20, the MDGs, and others, to drawing the links between gender and issues of climate, economic, and social justice. As part of this commitment I was also co-chair of GCAP in 2007–2008, putting forward the views of the FTF about the centrality of gender equality as a core demand for the whole movement. We worked on a transnational basis among women; reached other organizations, which we saw as partners for the construction of alternatives to the dominant economic model; and anchored our work in the knowledge of grassroots women (explained in the section about the tribunals on women and climate change). This work informs much of the analysis in this chapter.

THE UNSUSTAINABILITY OF THE CURRENT ECONOMIC MODEL

Although climate has natural variability over time, when we talk about climate change we are referring to alterations in the atmosphere that as a result of human activity are over and above natural climate variation. As the Convention on Climate Change states, “human activities have been substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, these increases enhance the natural greenhouse effect, and this will result on average in an additional warming of the Earth's surface and atmosphere and may adversely affect natural ecosystems and humankind.” The dominant economic model based on the utilization of fossil fuels, constant production and consumption, and the promotion of economic growth as the one-size-fits-all solution for all human problems is inextricably linked to these negative effects on nature and humans.

One of the main characteristics of the capitalist system is the relentless production and consumption of material goods. The essence of today’s modern living is the constant acquisition—and almost immediate discarding—of new products as well as of services relying mostly on the utilization of nonrenewable natural resources. What lies behind the logic of constant production and consumption is not the satisfaction of needs contributing to a feeling of wellbeing and harmony, but the making of profit. The constant pursuit of growing profit goes in the opposite direction from a feeling of satisfaction because, as Jeremy Seebrook has argued, “the maintenance of a felt experience of insufficiency is essential to any capitalist version of development.”
Delinking production from need was one of the mechanisms that led to the acceptance and promotion of growth as the natural state for a society that wants to achieve wellbeing. Economic growth became a precondition for the implementation of social policies and an accepted universal indicator for the comparison of societies around the world. But as Harald Welzer argues, for this to happen it became much more than that; it became part of the mental infrastructure of Western societies. It can be argued that by extension it also became part of the mental infrastructure of a great part of humanity, through development understood as the Westernization of the world. This mental infrastructure helps in part to explain why calls made for more than forty years to revise this model of constant growth have been ignored and business as usual has prevailed.

Welzer argues that

_The concept of growth received its decisive boost, when Western European societies relied on steady economic growth to achieve a relative reduction in social inequalities and ensure the widest possible participation in the growing prosperity. At the same time, the economic growth paradigm became linked to the state’s responsibility to safeguard it. The close coupling of the normative idea of social peace to continuous economic growth is probably most responsible for making limitless growth paradigmatic for today’s economic and social policies. Institutional infrastructures regulate growth; the material ones manifest it; and mental infrastructures translate it into lifeworlds, equipping the inhabitants of growth societies with the associated biographies and notions of self._

He further states that this entrenched view justifies unlimited resource exploitation as part of a process in which work and money become the ends, and products are mere means, to such an extent that the act of buying, in some cases even without using the products purchased, becomes significant in itself. Meaning that is acquired by consuming necessarily requires constant production of new buyable objects and services, as it is in this process of acquisition—and not in their utility—that significance is deposited. Therefore “the dimensions of meaning and identity that Western-style capitalist societies provide stand and fall with the functioning of the market.” Meaning is associated as well with a productivity logic linked to concepts of progress, growth, and development, all of which refer to and rely on constant transformation, getting outputs that can be measured, and being efficient in the use of our time and resources.

In a very similar vein, Robert Skidelsky argues that acquisitiveness (and it can be argued that productivity is the precondition for acquisitiveness) was originally linked to processes that were necessary for improving living conditions. He points out that Adam Smith regarded acquisitiveness as a method for getting from poverty to wealth and helped to unleash acquisitiveness from traditional moral restraints. However, Skidelsky continues, this took place without answering the question of what to do when poverty had been overcome and the process of constant acquisition remained entrenched. John Maynard Keynes, in turn, argued in 1930 that life conditions were to improve in the time “of our grandchildren,” and people could rid themselves from the pressure of the accumulation of wealth. He wrote that “all kinds of social customs and economic practices, affecting the distribution of wealth and of economic rewards and penalties, which we
now maintain at all costs, however distasteful and unjust they may be in themselves, because they are tremendously useful in promoting the accumulation of capital, we shall then be free, at last, to discard.”18 Liberating ourselves from the accumulation of wealth will, in Keynes’s view, allow people to work fewer hours, dedicate more time to leisure, move beyond the material, and “be economically purposive for others.”19

For this to happen, human beings have to move away from what Karl Polanyi called the “economistic fallacy,” “a tendency to equate the human economy with its market form.”20 This view ignores what he called the substantive meaning of the economy, which relates to human beings’ dependency for survival on nature and others. From this point of view the interactions among human beings and with their environment are also the economy.

The Importance of Care and Reciprocity

Polanyi’s analysis of the substantive meanings of the economy is in sharp contrast to the productivist logic and introduces in the center of an alternative economic analysis the importance of care and reciprocity. Molly Scott Cato, green economist and expert in social economy, analyzed Polanyi’s views on how embedding the economy into society is important for purposes of accountability and what this tells us about sustainable livelihoods and about women’s place within the economy.21 In line with Polanyi’s arguments, she highlights the need for closer identification of human societies with their natural landscapes and to perceive ourselves as connected by social relationships rather than by market transactions. For Scott Cato this calls for a cooperative economy that at the same time recognizes the limits imposed by nature and the need for equitable distribution. A sustainable economy like this one needs to be organized around cooperation rather than competition and, based on several studies, she argues that women can contribute to such an economy given their greater tendency to rely on mutual relationships and to acknowledge their physical existence and their dependence on physical systems, including the natural environment.

I argue that this calls for revaluing the concept of care, in the sense put forward by cultural feminism. To illustrate my point I refer to the analysis of Carol Gilligan and the ethics of care. Gilligan22 analyzed the discrepancy in the concepts of womanhood and adulthood as portrayed in several studies in the 1970s that affirmed that the qualities necessary for adulthood were those associated with masculinity, such as autonomous thinking, clear decision making, and responsible action. The instrumental abilities, according to these studies, reside in the masculine domain, whereas the expressive capacities reside with the feminine. Gilligan criticized this view, arguing that “these stereotypes reflect a conception of adulthood that is itself out of balance, favouring the separateness of the individual self over its connection to others and leaning more toward an autonomous life of work than toward the interdependence of love and care”23 and called for society to “recognize for both sexes the central importance
in adult life of the connection between self and other, the universality of the need for compassion and care.”

Gilligan’s work played a major role in the emergence of a debate about the “ethic of care”: ethic in the sense of how human beings should live and behave, and care in the understanding developed mainly by Heidegger as an ontological phenomenon that makes us who we are, which is at the base of any interpretation of what it means to be human. Care is at the same time concern and solicitude; it is an attentive consciousness of others (and self). It is therefore a reciprocal concept that indicates our realization as humans in our mutual interaction and attention. In this way care becomes part of the substantive meaning of the economy introduced by Polanyi. In practical terms, and thinking of alternatives to move away from the dominant economic model, care allows us to think of options in which money does not play a central role anymore and in which, according to Jeremy Seabrook, we can seek “our release, where possible, from it,” through “all that we can offer each other without the mediation of money,” “regaining as many freely services and commodities as possible” and rediscovering “the numberless delights and distractions with which we can provide for ourselves and one another by liberating these from the captivity of the markets.”

In her analysis Scott Cato also mentions the need to move away from serving “the key fictitious commodity in a market system: money” to be guided by relationships of solidarity and patterns of reciprocity.

**Women and Sustainability**

The concept of sustainability associated with development was used for the first time in the early 1980s in the World Conservation Strategy, prepared by IUCN (International Union for Conservation of Nature) and the WWF (World Wildlife Fund) with the support of the UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme), but it was through its inclusion in the 1987 Report “Our Common Future” that it became widely known. This report was published as a result of the work done by the independent World Commission on Environment and Development, called by the UN Secretary General in 1983 and headed by Gro Harlem Brundtland. Sustainable development was defined as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”

There are two key concepts in this definition: the satisfaction of the needs of the great majority of the population, whose aspiration for a better life have been postponed, and the recognition that the increase in living standards cannot go beyond the limits presented by long-term sustainability. In this respect, from that time onward it became clear that sustainability could only be achieved by articulating on an equal basis social, economic, and environmental dimensions. But different views on the relationship to nature and on the utilization of natural resources have led to at least three possible understandings of the concept: weak, strong, and super strong sustainability. The notion of weak sustainability applies when there is a belief that science and technology will be able to compensate for the use of...
natural resources. Under the strong notion, even though it recognizes the importance of technological efficiency, there is a belief that certain natural resources are irreplaceable. Super strong sustainability assigns intrinsic values to nature that are independent of the utility they provide to human beings. To analyze the differences among these three approaches, I refer to a definition that highlights the challenges posed by sustainability to human beings: “sustainability is defined as the ability of humankind to live within the limitations of the physical environment, now and indefinitely into the future.”

To resolve how to live within those limits will require very different answers depending on views of the relationship to nature, but also on the imaginaries of wellbeing and happiness as well as individual and collective aspirations. As argued by John Robinson, to reach a sustainable society is not so much a scientific determination, but one of human decisions that have to do with visions and values. Science can help, but once societies have responded to the problems posed by sustainability, they must make decisions about the ways of life to consolidate and project into the future and do this in a democratic manner. This vision presents sustainability as a disputed concept. The current dominant view tends to emphasize the economic dimension, calling for the continuation of economic growth with some minor considerations for its social and environmental impacts. That is to say, the dominant model of production and consumption continues, legitimized by a sustainability discourse, but without implementing any serious transformation, in what Robinson calls “green hypocrisy.” This can be linked to the weak concept of sustainability, which relies on science and technology for all the responses, but also relies on a particular way in which human beings see themselves in relation to nature. In the following discussion I analyze what several feminist writers have said about these narratives and then return to the need for democratic debates on sustainability.

According to the Australian ecofeminist Val Plumwood, the dominant Western view is “the denial of dependence on biospheric processes, and of humans as apart, outside of nature, which is treated as a limitless provider without needs of its own. Dominant western culture has systematically made inferior, backgrounded and denied dependency on the whole sphere of reproduction and subsistence. This denial of dependency is a major factor in the perpetuation of the non-sustainable modes of using nature which loom as such a threat to the future of western society.” Plumwood further argues that the connection of the feminine with nature—resisted by some feminists as a form of patriarchal oppression—must remain an issue of importance for feminism if the dominant view of nature merely as a field of exploitation for human satisfaction and profit is to be changed. She argues that not engaging in the debate amounts to validating the current model of exploitation, which is in no way gender neutral, even if women are absorbed into the model. As she put it, “unless the question of relation to nature is explicitly put up for consideration and renegotiation, it is already settled—and settled in an unsatisfactory way—by the dominant western model of humanity into which women will be fitted. This is a model of domination and transcendence of nature, in which freedom and virtue are construed in terms of control over, and distance from, the sphere of nature, necessity and the feminine.”
The relationship between women and nature—and between gender oppression and exploitation of nature—has been a matter of debate and tension among feminists, even within ecofeminism. Yayo Herrero defines ecofeminism as a current of thought and a political praxis that brings about a dialogue between feminism and ecology. She distinguishes two main types within this current: one that sees women essentially linked to nature, and another that believes this linkage is a constructed one. Several authors refer to this essentialist/constructionist tension within ecofeminism. What both approaches share is the vision that the subordination of women and the exploitation of nature are linked and result from the logic of patriarchal oppression and the subordination of life to profits, calling therefore for a deep transformation in the way human beings relate among each other and with nature. Karen Warren in turn has argued that there are several ways in which ecofeminism manifests itself in association to several strands of feminism, as liberal, Marxist, or radical feminism will have a different understanding of the issues at stake, such as the autonomy of human beings, the transformation of nature, or reproductive functions. She agrees that common in all these strands are the connections established between the domination of women and the domination of nature and the call to dismantle them. There have also been criticisms from outside ecofeminism highlighting the risk of a patriarchal use of the links between women and nature to perpetuate domination. It can be argued, though, that ecofeminism made a key contribution to the debates about the economy and environment, highlighting the centrality of women’s perspectives and in many cases bringing these views to central stages, as happened, for example, during the first Earth Summit in 1992.

Christa Wichterich, in a publication prepared by the Heinrich Boell Stiftung for the Rio+20 conference, which took place in June 2012, stressed that the topics of feminist ecology and women and sustainability were very relevant in Rio in 1992, but added that they have ceased to have that prominence during the last twenty years “because women’s movements focused on protests against neoliberal globalization, trade liberalization, and the privatization of public goods, while expert professional and scientific elites continued to work on these issues. In the process, both the protest movements and the experts neglected, time and again, to recreate the linkages between the economy, ecology, and social concerns fundamental to the concept of sustainability.” This concern expresses at the same time the recognition that women were able to shape an understanding of sustainability that necessarily incorporated these dimensions and in which women were recognized as key role-players. The People’s Earth Declaration in Rio 92 stated, “Women’s roles, needs, values and wisdom are especially central to decision-making on the fate of the Earth. There is an urgent need to involve women at all levels of policy-making, planning and implementation on an equal basis with men. Gender balance is essential to sustainable development.” As Wichterich also argues, these roles were recognized in Agenda 21, the conference’s final paper, which acknowledged “women as key actors for environmental protection and poverty alleviation and granted them rights to shape development and environmental policy and make decisions in that
area.” She further argues that following the conference, “a broad consensus on gender policy came about in the 1990s, namely that (i) ecology and sustainability are not gender neutral, (ii) the analysis of gender relations is vital for understanding the relationship between nature and society as well as for resource management and for overcoming environmental crises, (iii) without gender justice, there will be no environmental justice, no sustainability, and no good life for all.” It can be argued that twenty years later some of these statements remain part of the discourse without having a strong impact on official policies and implementations. How then can we move beyond “green hypocrisy?”

This brings us back to the challenge posed by Plumwood: not to allow the dominant view to step in, even if with the participation of women, and to interrogate critically the relationship of Western economics and life with nature. This calls for democratic processes to respond to the challenges posed by climate change and the construction of sustainable societies. The productivist and instrumental view will argue for the continuation of a model of exploitation that will convert nature exclusively as a provider for human satisfaction, even if with more “environmentally friendly” methods. A feminist and ecological view will argue for a holistic approach to the relationship of human beings and nature that will incorporate goals of subsistence and sufficiency. It will be necessary to go beyond the discourse of the special relationship of women and nature, of whose dangers Irene Dankelman has written, as it can legitimize burdening women with the extra responsibility of being the custodians of nature. The importance of this view is that it builds on women’s practices and experiences to create an understanding of the relationship to nature that is anchored in respect for its intrinsic value while at the same time affirming the right to use it sustainably without discrimination.

Examples of this approach can be found among several women’s organizations that are active in Latin America against the predominant extractivist development models that are currently being implemented in several countries, irrespective of their political orientation. Conservative and progressive governments in the region have put in place development strategies based on the commodification of nature in response to the high international prices for commodities. Mining, the exploitation of hydrocarbons, and monocultures are the basis of the export economies of countries such as Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela. There are many examples in the region of women who have organized in response to the negative impacts of the mega mining projects, the contamination resulting from the use of agrochemicals, the displacement from their land for the expansion of monoculture crops, and other consequences of this economic model. One of these organizations is the Latin American Union of Women (ULAM), which in turn has brought together women’s organizations from Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru, and Venezuela. Through their practices these organizations respond to the call of Marisa Belausteguigoitia Rius to “move beyond the ‘passive’ imaginary of women and earth, to the indigenous and peasant women as actors and participants in their own struggles over land and the use of natural resources.”
This passive imaginary of women in relation to climate change limits itself to portraying women as one of the vulnerable groups most affected by its negative impacts. This is partly true, as the phenomena associated with climate change tend to reinforce the existing inequalities affecting women. There is substantive literature about the differentiated impacts according to factors such as age, gender, geography, ethnicity, and income group. Communities living in high-risk areas have less access to resources and services needed to confront the problems caused by climate change. In the case of women, estimated to account for 70 percent of poor people, they also face the gender inequalities highlighted by the 2007 UNDP Human Development Report: lack of access to resources like land, credit, and training; limited participation in decision-making processes; more dependence on natural resources; and greater caring responsibilities.\textsuperscript{47} A 2010 report from the Women's Environmental Network highlighted that as a result of women's greater likelihood of living in poverty and their gendered roles, they are more likely to experience several negative consequences from climate change.\textsuperscript{48}

\textbf{Women’s Tribunals on Gender and Climate Change}

This reality is offset by the fact that women have shown the capacity to respond creatively to these situations and propose—and implement—solutions. I have already mentioned the example of organizations and networks actively responding to the threats of the extractivist model. Another example is the series of women's tribunals on gender and climate change organized by the Feminist Task Force (FTF). I have served as coordinator of the FTF and co-organizer of some of these tribunals.

People's tribunals or public hearings are organized as a means of producing answers and documentation on specific issues. They were introduced in the 1960s by peace activist and philosopher Bertrand Russell with the participation of other international anti–Vietnam War activists. Women's groups made use of this methodology to raise the visibility of gender-based violence and break the silence on gender-specific abuses. In 2007 the FTF decided to make use of this practice, with the understanding that the tribunals could provide a counternarrative to the “women as victims” perception and the prevailing notion of women as voiceless. Through the tribunals on women and poverty, rural and grassroots women were able to voice their realities and make specific proposals to change them.\textsuperscript{49}

Responding to the global concern about climate change and the realization that women’s voices were crucial in the search for unconventional approaches to the problem, the FTF and partners, building on the positive experience of the poverty tribunals, organized a series of tribunals dealing specifically with gender and climate change in 2009. They took place in Nigeria, Botswana, Uganda, Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, and Brazil. Besides identifying a series of problems women were confronting in their respective countries and regions, a series of recommendations were made to be implemented by governments and other role-players. Among them were the following:
• Full participation of women in the definition of policies in response to climate change, including in those related to the administration of natural resources;
• Increased government investment in agriculture in support of small farmers, particularly women;
• Guarantee of women’s rights to land property and their access to training, inputs, and credits;
• Recognition of traditional knowledge and traditional agricultural practices, acknowledging that women tend to be the custodians of this knowledge;
• Giving visibility to the relationship between gender and climate change through the media, the arts, etc.;
• Promotion of a sustainable lifestyle, with an emphasis on education for sustainable societies;
• Ceasing to be “owners” of the planet and becoming “carers”;
• Promoting changes in the modes of production and consumption that will lead to a development model in harmony with the planet’s capacities;
• Introduction of laws that empower women in the promotion of sustainable ways of life;
• Undertaking research on appropriate technology with a gender perspective;
• Developing policies and programs in the areas of water, agriculture, forests, and disasters with a gender perspective; and
• Introducing state insurance to cover women for the loss of food sovereignty as a consequence of climate change.

In 2011 another series of tribunals was organized in fifteen countries (Argentina, Bangladesh, Botswana, Brazil, El Salvador, Ghana, The Democratic Republic of Congo, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Uganda, Pakistan, India, Nepal, and Zambia), “based on the recognition that although women play a central role in providing effective responses to the challenges imposed by climate change in their communities, their voices are not being adequately heard in the debates around climate change at the national, regional or international level.”

In 2012, for the first time, tribunals took place in the United States. The Central Appalachian Women’s Tribunal, organized in May 2012 by the FTF in coordination with the Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition, the Civil Society Institute, and Loretto at the United Nations, highlighted the effects of mountaintop removal and other coal industry abuses on the lives of women, their families, and their communities. The Chicago Metro tribunal, which took place on June 2012, featured the testimony of women whose lives and communities have been impacted by coal burning and disposal of toxic ash in the environs of the city of Chicago. The voices of the women in the tribunals were taken to various international fora, including COP 16 in Cancun, COP 17 in Durban, and Rio + 20.

The women’s tribunals have been part of an integrated agenda of the FTF, “Road to Rio Roadmap,” which includes several international processes, such as COP17, G20, G193-UN and its CSW, Rio+20, and post-2015, for which advocacy and campaigning
actions have been implemented. The FTF has highlighted that these processes must be driven by social inclusion, with a more holistic approach beyond development and looking at social justice, including gender equality, human rights, and climate justice. The uniqueness of the tribunals is that they provide testimonies of women who have experienced problems resulting from climate change in particular and from the dominant economic model at large, but they go beyond the denunciation of their plight to present innovative proposals and solutions.

Women in Official Negotiations

The participation and visibility of women at the UN conferences took a significant stride forward during the 1990s, with some very significant events such as the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the Human Rights Conference in Wien in 1993, the Population and Development Conference in Cairo in 1994, and the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995. Although major environmental concerns at UN level can be traced back to the early 1970s with the first United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (1972), it took a long time for the threats posed by climate change to be incorporated into mainstream debates and policies. Women were ahead of this recognition and had tried to be part of the negotiations since an early stage. In 2009 the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) incorporated the Women and Gender Constituency, granting full constituency status to it in 2011. As stated in the 2011 annual report, “drawing upon global commitments to gender equality and women's rights and the Millennium Development Goals, the members of Women and Gender Constituency work to ensure that women's human rights and the gender dimension are incorporated into UNFCCC negotiations, agreements, plans and actions.”  The women active in this constituency “seek to ensure the representation of women's voices, experiences, needs and capacities” and to provide “recommendations to delegates on how to include the gender dimension in negotiation texts.” I was a member of the Women and Gender Constituency and delivered its final intervention during the high-level segment of COP16 in Cancun, Mexico. This statement mirrored several of the views and perspectives that were presented during the women's tribunals. It emphasized in particular the need to incorporate women's voices and knowledge in whatever agreement might be reached to respond to the challenges posed by climate change. As the document stated, “No agreement, decision or mechanism on climate change will be effective or successful without the full respect of women's rights and the recognition of our valuable knowledge. Women are crucial in sustaining daily life and livelihoods. We must recognize the differentiated impacts of climatic changes on women and men as a result of structural inequalities: inequalities that are exacerbated by climate change.”

The testimonies of grassroots women at the tribunals and their proposals, as well as the efforts of the members of women's caucuses and constituencies at the UNFCC and
several other UN spaces, have in common that they are informed by an intersectionality
approach that looks at the interface of gender, climate, social, and economic justice.

**Climate Justice, Restorative Justice, and Transformative Justice**

One way to look at justice is through the concept of redistribution to ensure the ben-
efit of the least advantaged members of society. This relates to the concept of equity.
If we think of livelihoods in relation to climate justice, what arises immediately is the
acknowledgment that natural resources have been misappropriated. This has been
done by dominant groups (economic groups, states, etc.) at the expense of the majori-
ties of most societies. It is from this misappropriation that the call for differentiated
responsibilities arises, recognizing that the consequences have placed the greatest bur-
den on those less responsible, in fact on those who usually can no longer rely on these
resources for their livelihoods. This calls for restorative justice, in the sense that “vic-
tims” need to be restored, repaired. “Victims” in this case means those who have been
denied access and control over common resources as well as the possibility to make
decisions about nature, including the view of the intrinsic value of nature independent
of the benefit it provides to humans. These views (in line with the super strong concept
of sustainability) have been ignored, or to quote Boaventura de Sousa Santos, “actively
created as non-existent” and therefore are not considered valid alternatives to what
exists. This is a form of *epistemic violence*, as it denies the validity of the knowledge
of others (women, rural communities, indigenous peoples), in spite of what might be
documented in statements or declarations later ignored in core policies. That is why
remedies aimed at rectifying injustices must also address the epistemic sphere of
representation.

*Restorative justice* refers to a process of repairing the harm done to individuals, to
communities at large, to ecosystems, and to nature; it is about a victim-centered justice
system. The centrality of the victim in the process of restoring the damage done can be
extended to the ability to build a new and alternative reality to the one that must be left
behind. This in turn has to do with *transformative justice*, which goes beyond the repa-
ration of specific damage, aiming at building a state of justice that was previously non-
existent, and implies wider social transformations so as to prevent the reoccurrence of
harmful incidents. This must happen not only at an individual level, but also at the level
of social structures and institutional policies. It calls for an epistemic and cultural strat-
egy aimed at opening spaces to reflect on and understand reality and our relationship
with nature and other human beings differently. It implies constructing language and
other forms of knowledge with the objective of social and economic transformation,
starting from the subjective, from the agency of these very communities and women.
In June 2012 another conference took place in Rio on environment and development; the result was the document “The Future We Want.” If there was any novelty in this document, it was the emphasis on the green economy to achieve sustainable development. The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) has defined the green economy as

one that results in improved human well-being and social equity, while significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities. In its simplest expression, a green economy can be thought of as one which is low carbon, resource efficient and socially inclusive. Practically speaking, a green economy is one whose growth in income and employment is driven by public and private investments that reduce carbon emissions and pollution, enhance energy and resource efficiency, and prevent the loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services.

As can be seen from this definition, growth is still the leading force behind the economy, accompanied by considerations of sustainability. “The Future We Want” in turn adds that the policies associated with the green economy in the context of sustainable development and alleviation of poverty should, among other things,

enhance the welfare of indigenous peoples and their communities, other local and traditional communities, and ethnic minorities, recognizing and supporting their identity, culture and interests and avoid endangering their cultural heritage, practices and traditional knowledge, preserving and respecting non-market approaches that contribute to the eradication of poverty; enhance the welfare of women, children, youth, persons with disabilities, smallholder and subsistence farmers, fishers and those working in small and medium enterprises, and improve the livelihoods and empowerment of the poor and vulnerable groups in particular in developing countries; mobilize the full potential and ensure equal contribution of both women and men; promote sustainable consumption and production patterns.

Although this document specifically mentions traditional practices and knowledge, makes specific reference to the contribution of women to sustainable development, and calls for sustainable patterns of consumption, it does so in the framework of an entrenched understanding of and relationship to the concept of sustainability that is stripped of the meaning referred to in the previous sections of this chapter. Insofar as growth continues to be at the forefront of all official efforts to achieve sustainable development, and alternative views, practices, and knowledge are seen as marginal and only significant for cultural or community minorities, all these declarations are rendered irrelevant. The document also continues to identify particular groups mainly as a result of their perceived vulnerability and not because of their resilience and innovative practices. It can be argued, therefore, that the document did not formulate the questions that need to be asked to move in a different direction than the one that has characterized the current development model. Those questions would relate to sufficiency, mutual responsibility, equity, care, and justice, including climate and gender justice.
The agency of women associated with care, social responsibility, sufficiency, and rights shows that there are views alternative to the productivist logic, for which growth is the only answer. If fairness in the access to resources is going to be achieved so as to guarantee a satisfactory life for all human beings while at the same time respecting the intrinsic value of nature, there is a need for a fundamental shift in the way we imagine our lives and our future. This implies building counternarratives to the dominant views of what constitutes a “good life.” Although it is common to find discourses that highlight the importance of nonmaterial aspects of human life, of reciprocity, and of mutual caring, the very same political leaders and national or international agencies responsible for them are the ones who call for the hard policies focusing on increasing jobs, production, and consumption on the basis of “indispensable” economic growth. “One could interpret that either there is no political will for transformation or we are seriously confronted by a lack of imagination. This last interpretation seems more plausible and it relates to the challenges posed by economism by which even progressive governments in the South have centred their efforts and commitments to improve the life conditions of the population only within the economic sphere.” What this implies is that one of the major battlefields of today is that of people’s imaginaries, “of our epistemic horizons and our desires.”

This takes us back to the concepts of restorative and transformative justice. First of all, repairing the harm done to individuals, communities at large, ecosystems, and nature implies recognizing the relevance of other ways of doing things, of practices and proposals such as those highlighted earlier as undertaken and formulated by women and other groups that have departed from the paradigm of production and efficiency. Second, although restorative justice calls for restoring a situation as it was before harm was done, it must be understood as a process by which the harm done is heeled, conflicts between the parts are resolved, and a new situation is created that enhances the previous circumstances and the relationships among all those involved. That is to say, a new state of justice is created that may not have existed before. The transformative dimension is therefore part and parcel of the restorative effort.

What needs to be highlighted in this concept in relation to climate justice is that it targets humanity as a whole and not just those presented in mainstream discourses as victims or vulnerable populations. Humanity as a whole, men and women, needs to find new ways of living on our common planet and to introduce changes in our relationships to others, to nature, and to our own imaginaries of a good life. Care and mutuality and the connection between self and others and nature, which tend to be associated exclusively with the feminine, acquire in the process a whole new meaning for human beings in general as essential threads for moving toward more sustainable societies.

Notes

1. The event was sponsored by Corporate Europe Observatory (Europe), CorpWatch (USA), Environmental Rights Action (Nigeria), Oilwatch International (Ecuador), People and the Planet (UK), Rising Tide Coalition (Netherlands), Sustainable Energy and Economy
Network (USA), and World Rainforest Movement (Uruguay). See http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=977.
4. For information on the historical background of climate justice, see Dayaneni (2009) and Austen and Bedall (2010).
10. See chapter by Manisha Desai.
17. See Roberts (2012).
25. For Martin Heidegger’s concept of care in this text I make references to Boff (2004, 89–91).
32. Robinson (2003, 374.).
35. Yayo Herrero, a Spanish anthropologist, social educator, and technical agrarian engineer, works on issues of social ecology and feminism. See her presentation, “Propuestas ecofeministas para transitar a un mundo justo y sostenible,” at the summer school Transiciones a la sustentabilidad: alternativas socioecológicas, Autonomous University of Madrid, July 18, 2013, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Eq-jysIgNIs&list=TL0ki8SjYM68. See also Yayo Herrero and Marta Pascual, “Ecofeminismo, una propuesta para repensar el presente y construir futuro,” http://www.ecolocal.es/sumatedecrece/DECRECIMIENTO/Talleres%20Intermitentes%20Decrecimiento/Taller%206_Ecofeminismo/reflexionando.pdf.
36. Herrero and Pascual share a brief history of the movement, highlighting contributions from the various authors in each current, such as Vandana Shiva and Maria Mies in a more essentialist thread and Bina Agarwal and Val Plumwood in a constructionist one.
38. Wichterich (2012, 10). Christa Wichterich is a German researcher and journalist and a member of Women in Development Europe (WIDE), who has worked extensively on development and women’s rights (http://www.spinifexpress.com.au/Bookstore/author/id=55/).
41. Wichterich (2012, 9).
42. Wichterich, (2012, 14).
43. Dankelman (2012, 37). Irene Dankelman is a Dutch ecologist who has specialized in gender and environment (http://www.shelfari.com/authors/a1002703186/Irene-Dankelman/).
44. Gudynas (2009).
47. Agostino (2010, 1).
48. Women’s Environmental Network (2010). According to this report, women are more likely to “die in climate change-related disasters and suffer from increased workload, loss of income, health problems and violence and harassment in the aftermath of such events; be displaced or encounter problems when other (usually male) family members migrate for economic reasons; experience increased burden of water and fuel collection and resulting health problems due to increased incidence of drought or other changes in climate; feel the effects of rising food prices most acutely and be the first to suffer during food shortages; suffer exacerbated health inequalities; suffer from violence, including sexual violence, in resource conflicts; need to adapt to the effects of climate change, increasing their workload; suffer as a result of intended solutions to the problem of climate change, such as forestry projects and biofuel production” (p. 5).
51. For information on these tribunals, see http://climatejusticetribunals.blogspot.sg/2012/05/women-climate-hearings.
53. Report from the Women and Gender UNFCCC Observer Constituency.
54. On behalf of the International Council for Adult Education. In this capacity I attended the COP 17 in Cancun in December 2010, also representing the FTF.
59. “The Future We Want,” para. 58, j, k, l, o.
60. Agostino and Dübgen (2012, 5, 11).

References


CHAPTER 33

WOMEN’S TRANSFORMATIVE ORGANIZING FOR SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS

Learning from Indian Experiences

SUMI KRISHNA

INTRODUCTION

The bio-geography of the South Asian region, its sociopolitical history, and a widespread patriarchal culture have resulted in many shared elements among its different peoples and nations. In India, as in the rest of South Asia, the sustainability of livelihoods is inextricably linked with the natural resource base. Historically, women’s knowledge of natural resources and their involvement in the use and conservation of resources have shaped livelihood initiatives and strategies. Especially since the 1980s, local communities have been pitted against national and global elements in various struggles over the control and management of natural resources and resource-based livelihoods. Struggles against deforestation, big dams, or mining, and for the conservation of biodiversity and local agriculture, have involved both women and men. These struggles encompass many different strands, with varying potential for social transformation. During the same decades the women’s movement in India has also evolved, drawing on international experiences and also contributing to shaping transnational feminism. In this chapter I focus on learning from the diverse and continuously evolving Indian experience.

There are also resonances between the experiences in various parts of India and those of other nations in South Asia. Especially in the arena of transformative organizing for sustainable livelihoods, the South Asian experience as a whole, including that of India, has provided significant lessons.

Indian women’s struggles are not homogenous. Struggles for women’s autonomy and bodily integrity (e.g., against domestic violence and rape), community livelihoods and
resources (such as the well-known Chipko movement of the western Himalaya), and wider socioeconomic and political change (such as by the Maoist movements in central and eastern India) are often distinct from one another. Sometimes the struggle to control and benefit from local resources has burgeoned into a movement for a separate state within the Indian union. The states of Uttarkhand in the Himalaya and Jharkhand and Chhatisgarh in central India were created in this way from larger states. Yet such movements have barely recognized women's individual and collective claims to gender justice. This is the case even though women are present in and even lead peoples’ struggles—whether to safeguard family livelihoods and control natural-resource-based life support systems or to challenge the political and governance structures of the modern state (see Krishna 1996a).

Across South Asia there is widespread philosophical recognition that people are a part of nature. The environmental discourse has also furthered the view that elements of the social structure have to be incorporated into the framework of conservation and sustainable resource management (e.g., Gadgil and Guha 1992). Yet a gendered perspective continues to be missing, weakening both the social relevance and prospects for resource management (Krishna 1996b, 1998, 2012a), even among some progressive activists, practitioners, and researchers. Consider, for example, Srivastava and Kothari (2012), who rigorously analyze the reasons for the present crisis in globalizing India and sketch a vision for an alternative “radical ecological democracy,” framed as a mutually respectful and continuously evolving dialogue among humans and between them and the rest of nature, based on diversity, nonviolence, the dignity of labor, and values of cooperation and happiness rather than growth and material consumption. Their study has been widely acclaimed as a landmark contribution to the discourse on India’s ecological future. Yet as one reviewer, Menon-Sen (2012, 56), points out, neither the trenchant critique nor the ideal for the future reflects an understanding of the gendered implications of “growth at any cost.” Srivastava and Kothari do mention the spread of the informal sector and the exploitation of women’s work, but Menon-Sen argues that they fail “to identify patriarchy as the glue that connects neo-liberal economic policies, the undermining of institutions of governance, the militarization of society and the resurgence of nationalist ideologies described in the book.” She says further: “This is the missing piece of the otherwise comprehensive picture . . . the recognition that women’s unpaid ‘care’ work is the invisible subsidy that keeps the entire economic machine going at the global level, maintains social institutions such as the family, and enables continuance of many of the traditional ways of being and doing that exist as alternatives to the mainstream.” Even if we do not agree completely with Menon-Sen’s argument that patriarchy is the “glue” that connects every exploitative structure in society, her critique of Srivastava and Kothari’s largely gender-oblivious analysis and vision is pertinent.

In a brief historical review of women’s livelihood protests, Sheila Rowbotham (2001) notes “that women have been moved to act for broadly emancipatory aims from very different starting points historically and in the present,” and that recognizing this “enables us to look at movements within their own terms rather than imposing a checklist of ideal terms upon them.” Similarly, analyzing ten case studies from different regions of the
world, Srilatha Batliwala (2011, 57) concludes that “we must define the ‘radical’ nature of political agendas and activism within the socio-political context in which movements have evolved, and not against some absolute ideological standard.” This is indeed so. But even as we recognize the diversity of poor women’s struggles for sustainable livelihoods, it is also pertinent to explore whether and how such struggles impact their lives in the longer term. The questions that we need to ask are: When does transformative organization happen? What are the factors and circumstances that enable women organizing around livelihood issues to also transform their lives in the male-dominated societies of which they are a part?

There are many examples from India of small, voluntary initiatives, what I have called “side streams” that “jostle and nudge” the mainstream of national development (Krishna 2012b). These have been able to create livelihood assets, protect the local natural resource base, and enhance the collective agency of poor and oppressed women. Initiatives started or facilitated by nongovernment agencies, however, are difficult to sustain and scale up so as to create alternative economic opportunities and address the sociopolitical and cultural structures within which the local economy and women’s oppression are embedded. A very few interventions have opened the door to such a process, including, for example, the following efforts from the state of Andhra Pradesh (see Krishna 2012b):

ANTHRA Hyderabad’s work with indigenous women to strengthen backyard poultry and stabilize the indigenous Aseel strains, which has helped to improve household incomes and rebuild the earlier diverse food and farming system.

The Deccan Development Society’s work with Dalit women, which helped them to reclaim their decision-making role in food production, thus also regaining their position in the community as seed keepers.

The MV Foundation’s intervention, which enabled women’s groups to manage water-sheds and soils, improve fallow lands, cultivate orchards, and participate in the planning process to demand gender-equitable wage rates.

It is instructive to observe how these and others initiatives across India—the focus of which is on sustainable livelihoods with gender justice—face the challenge of sustainability, when external facilitation is withdrawn.

In the following sections of this chapter I move on from nongovernmental organization (NGO)-inspired livelihood interventions (such as those just cited) to examine the processes by which broader ecological movements on the one hand, and women’s collectives seeking gender justice on the other, have incorporated these concerns into their agendas. I first discuss different ways of conceptualizing the relationship of women (and men) to nature and resource-based livelihoods, which in turn impacts different approaches to sustainable livelihoods (SL). Against this background, I review various kinds of struggles in which women have organized themselves around gender equity and SL issues. Finally, I discuss the possibilities of changing patriarchal knowledge systems and structures for meaningful social change. I draw mainly on the Indian
experience and examine how various forms of women’s organizing differ in their transformative potential. My purpose is to understand, from the perspective of a gendered political ecology, whether such struggles are better able to assert the political core of SL and gender justice. This chapter advances the argument in my earlier work (Krishna 2012a, 2012b), in which I suggested rethinking the concept of SL by adding collective political action to the three already well-defined elements of an SL approach: capability, equity, and sustainability.

Sustainable Livelihoods and Women

Feminist approaches to women and environment development cover a wide spectrum. Briefly, the international development agencies have adopted a politically liberal approach, called women environment development (WED), which emphasizes women’s knowledge and skills but treats women’s labor and time instrumentally as the means of increasing the effectiveness of resource management. There have been very different responses to this. The radical ecofeminist response emphasizes women’s centrality to resource management and their nurturing and sustaining roles. The gender and development (GAD) approach, based on materialist and/or social relations perspectives, emphasizes the social construction of gender. This has led to various gender analysis frameworks that have been propagated by the international development agencies, moving forward from earlier WED approaches.

This conceptual structure of WED and GAD, however, does not fit easily with the complex empirical contexts of South Asia. Elsewhere I have suggested a typology of conventional, celebratory, and gendered approaches that is closer to our local situations. Historically, the nationalistic approach of the Indian freedom movement somewhat ambiguously encompassed both conventional and celebratory elements. Gandhi valorized Indian womanhood while at the same time holding to a belief that women’s place was in the home in normal times (as opposed to the abnormal conditions of the freedom struggle). Across South Asia, in the development sector programmatic livelihood strategies have generally been marked by a conventional approach to the gender division of labor and responsibilities. This shares some elements with celebratory approaches that (like strands of ecofeminism) valorize the feminine in a reversal of patriarchal mores. In doing so, the conventional and celebratory approaches are similar to WED and resonate with local patriarchal customary practices that are, or are assumed to be, “traditional” (Krishna 2009).

Both the conventional and celebratory approaches also rest on claims that are enmeshed in the sexual division of labor, perceived as an essential and universal “fact of nature.” Context-specific class and caste differences are ignored or blurred; as a result, inequities in access to natural resources within communities are not recognized. The customary demarcation of occupational roles is perceived as “natural” and as contributing to resource conservation. This often leads to exaggerating women’s
natural resource knowledge (see Jewitt 2000) and overlooking men’s resource and provisioning responsibilities (see Joekes, Leach, and Green 1995). Both conventional and celebratory approaches resist acknowledging traditional sociocultural practices and gender ideologies that restrict women’s autonomy, mobility, and capacity to participate in resource management. It is not surprising, therefore, that the transformative potential of such approaches is circumscribed by their own ideological limitations (Krishna 2004a).

Gendered approaches, however, are unambiguous in challenging dual norms for women and men and in seeing both women and men as having the capacity to manage resources. Women’s exclusion and alienation from different domains of knowledge are understood to be the result of a process of historical and cultural construction that derives from men’s power over society and reinforces it. Gender is thus seen as central to power relations and to the division of physical spaces and mental capacities. Gendered approaches seek to understand cultural stereotypes of masculinity and femininity. The critical question is how gender ideologies influence the acquisition of beliefs, the production of knowledge, and the division of labor between men and women. Unlike the conventional and celebratory approaches that address “women’s needs,” gendered approaches question the social and gender relations that have given women these needs. Although progressive gendered approaches may be reduced to the mechanical application of gender analysis frameworks, at the conceptual level at least gendered approaches address both “gender justice” and the question of “basic needs,” exploring the linkages among women’s subordination, oppression, and poverty in situations of environmental stress.

These gendered approaches thus resonate with the interdisciplinary perspective of feminist political ecology (FPE), envisioning a world in which gender is part of interlinked structures of domination and the inequitable power relations that shape knowledge construction. Like FPE, gendered approaches draw on rights-based arguments to aver that women’s rights are human rights, and that ecological and political struggles are interlinked (Krishna 2007).

These approaches to women and the environment reflect different perceptions of women’s roles in natural resource management, which then impact the choice of SL strategies. This is summarized in table 33.1.

**Organizing around Sustainable Livelihoods**

The concept of sustainable livelihoods that gained prominence in the 1990s drew upon Amartya Sen’s understanding of development as enhancing people’s capabilities and entitlements, encompassing equity, community participation, and ecological sustainability (Sen 1992; Anand and Sen 1997). I have suggested that the human development
approach to SL can be strengthened by a clearer focus on collective organization and political actions that strive both for gender justice and livelihood sustainability (Krishna 2012a). This understanding has evolved from the experience and analysis of varied struggles, to which I now turn.

The Chipko Movement (Garhwal, Uttarakhand)

In the late 1970s the Chipko movement to preserve the mountain forests of the Western Himalaya captured national and international attention. The movement exemplifies both the conventional and celebratory approaches to environment and the dilemmas of organizing around SL given such a perspective. Although the forest-dwellers’ struggle of the 1970s emerged from a local history of mass peasant movements (Guha 1989), it soon became entwined with the growing national and global ecology movements. It also took on another front as some sections of the struggle were absorbed into the political movement for the separation of the hill districts (which make up the subregions of Garhwal and Kumaon) from the larger Indian state of Uttar Pradesh (Krishna 1996a, 1996b). In

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<tr>
<th>Table 33.1 Approaches to Women and the Environment</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aspects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s roles in natural resource management (NRM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of gender analysis (GA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of women’s concerns in projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implications for women in relation to NRM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender labels/ stereotypes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Source: Krishna (2004a).
the following years Chipko was celebrated somewhat simplistically both as an environmental icon and a women’s movement (Shiva 1989). This obscured the complexities of the region’s economic history—a “money-order” economy that survived on remittances sent home by men working outside the mountains. It also overlooked the prevailing patriarchal structure of social relations that viewed women as temporary custodians of the family weal in the absence of their men. The manner and the course of protest reflect both the women’s active role in household provisioning and their leadership role in the village while the men were away. Despite key roles played by village women like Gaura Devi, the best-known leaders of the Chipko movement—Chandi Prasad Bhatt and Sunderlal Bahuguna—were men (see Krishna 1996b, 2009; Rangan 2000).

Notwithstanding Chipko’s extraordinary influence in shaping environmental discourse, the movement lacked a class/caste understanding of struggle. Locally, both Bhatt and Bahuguna (despite their slightly different positions) cast Chipko in rather idealistic terms of community versus state. This was reinforced in the wider environmental discourse by activist supporters, academic analysts, and the media, who valorized an ideal homogenized community (Krishna 1996a, 1996b, 2007; Williams and Maudsley 2006). The environmentalists also furthered the view of Chipko as a quintessentially ecological struggle for forest conservation, eliding the economic struggle for SL. In time the different strands of Chipko also incorporated the external view, thereby investing it with an iconic international status but undermining its locally transformative potential (Krishna 1996a, 1996b).

Women’s visible participation in the Chipko struggles may have been a contributing factor in the new state of Uttarakhand (formed in 2000) mandating 50 percent representation for women in the elected village- and district-level governing structures—well above the one-third quota for women required by central Indian law. Yet even this level of formal political participation seems to have had only a limited impact on the patriarchal household structure in the region. Over the last decade, Uttarakhand state has supported the swift growth of organized pilgrimages to the sacred Hindu shrines in the region and encouraged adventure tourism (trekking, river rafting, kayaking, etc.). The pilgrim and tourist influx necessitated a huge increase in infrastructure: roads, transportation, hotels, rest houses, and so forth. This rapidly altered the local economy by opening up unprecedented employment opportunities for village men, who formerly migrated to the plains for work. Particularly at the lower altitudes of Uttarakhand, casual observation suggests that women may even be retreating from the public spaces that they occupied in the past. The indiscriminate development activity aggravated the human and environmental devastation caused by the disastrous floods in the summer of 2013. And as in disaster situations elsewhere, the hill women have borne the brunt of the disaster. These trends and the gendered impacts of the socioeconomic and ecological changes taking place in the region require further study.

The women of Uttarakhand continue to be celebrated as environmental icons. As an outcome of Chipko, NGO activity has indeed furthered afforestation and helped to preserve local varieties of crops in certain pockets of the region. Yet it is also evident that in the context of India’s liberalized economy, the women’s organizing around SL has not
had an enduring impact either on the ecological resource base or on traditional patriarchal structures.

**Stree Mukti Sangharsh Chalwal (Southern Maharashtra)**

A very different mode of organization and a more gendered approach characterize the struggle for “women’s liberation” of the Stree Mukti Sangharsh Chalwal (SMSC), the women’s front of the Mukti Sangharsh Chalwal (Liberation Struggle) in southern Maharashtra state, which, among other issues, was concerned with the equitable distribution of water. Since the mid-1980s the SMSC has focused specifically on women. Its struggle was influenced by the understanding of feminists from Maharashtra and elsewhere (such as Indutai Patankar, Gail Omvedt, and Nagamani Rao) and deliberately sought to address the interlinkages of class, caste, and patriarchy (see Kulkarni et.al. 2010; Kulkarni 2011).

At the heart of the SMSC struggle was the single woman’s right to homestead land. The *parityakta* or single women included mainly upper caste Maratha widows and those who had been deserted. Most lived in their natal homes, as they had no other support and had to protect themselves from violence even from the men of their own households. Some strove to make do on their own. After a systematic survey of their plight, the SMSC began to work toward organizing the women for change. A gathering of thousands of deserted women resolved to struggle for social honor, access to resources, sustainable agriculture, and most urgently homestead land for themselves and their children. This was followed by a struggle for legal rights and independent ration cards in their own names that would entitle them to government-subsidized grain and fuel. In one village twenty-three women succeeded in forcing the district collector to allocate plots of government-owned land, measuring two *gunthas*, to each of them (two *gunthas* is just over 2,000 square feet, less than half an acre). The land was legally transferred to the women after they paid the nominal fees.

This did not mean, however, that the women actually got possession. The government had earlier acquired the land in order to rehabilitate people displaced by floods, but it had not been used for that purpose, and the original owners had continued to cultivate it. These local farmers received a stay order from the Mumbai High Court against the women’s allotment. Even as it became clear that the government never intended to take the land back, women’s groups in Maharashtra lent their support, and the India Centre for Human Rights and the Law, Mumbai, took up the case. After thirteen years the Mumbai High Court dismissed the men farmers’ petition, and the women got the land.

Experiments in alternative housing and livelihoods were then begun with the help of the Society for Promoting Participative Ecosystem Management (SOPPECOM), Pune. Seema Kulkarni (2011), who participated in the early phase of the SMSC struggle and later joined SOPPECOM, says the experience was significant “from the point of view of both the struggle for land rights and the possibilities that such rights can lead to, in terms of livelihoods of women, especially the most vulnerable ones.” Yet even after
twenty years women from the other villages are still fighting for their rights. Further, she says, “How far the demand gets an audience largely depends on the strength of the movements working on class, caste, tribe, ethnicity and gender issues in the state and their readiness to make alliances with each other to establish rights over resources.” Maharashtra has a statewide network of women's groups, but Kulkarni feels that the nature of the movement on the ground is changing. Many autonomous struggles have become NGOs seeking donor funding and do not share the intellectual “understanding of patriarchy as being rooted in a nexus with class, caste and ethnicity.” So although at the conceptual level the approach of the SMSC is gendered rather than what I have called conventional or celebratory, it has been very difficult for the movement to maintain its thrust on the interlinkages of patriarchy with class and caste.

The Tamil Nadu Women's Collective

The Tamil Nadu Women’s Collective (TNWC) is a statewide federation of women’s groups that has evolved from a grassroots organization of six groups formed in the mid-1990s. The TNWC includes 150,000 women, mainly Dalit, from 1,500 villages in sixteen districts (Verghese 2011). Drawing upon traditional and modern agricultural practices, the women have worked toward establishing food and water security at the household and community levels. The TNWC’s multipronged vision encompasses sustainable agricultural livelihoods and the political empowerment of women in decision-making structures at the household and village levels. Shiney Verghese (2011) says violence against women was a key focus. In rural Tamil Nadu, as in some other parts of India, caste conflicts have led to the upper castes destroying the crops and polluting the water sources of the lower castes, also attempting to reinforce their dominance by violence against lower caste women. The TNWC has supported lower caste communities and also lower caste women in cases of violence against them by men of their own communities. Even as it has collectively helped women deal with domestic violence, it has also striven to enhance the individual woman’s own sense of self and her ability to take decisions that impinge on livelihoods and food security, such as growing more nutritious millets and vegetables for household consumption.

The TNWC members have stood for and won elections to local bodies, giving the collective a greater say in decision making at the village level. In 2006, for example, more than four hundred TNWC members won the panchayat elections (in the one-third women’s quota). This was nearly one out of two TNWC members who had contested. Of these four hundred plus women, seventy-eight were elected as panchayat presidents; Verghese (2011) says these women are now in a position to further the aims of the collective in the villages under their jurisdiction.

In recent years various TNWC units have also taken up struggles against illegal sand mining and for the right to water. The current agro-ecological crisis in Tamil Nadu is more than a matter of water scarcity, but water is a key factor. Historically, the semi-arid region had a system of tanks (small reservoirs) that were fed by rivers and rainwater
runoff that were locally managed by the community (see Mosse 1995). The neglect of the tanks, the collapse of the traditional irrigation system, and the introduction and widespread cultivation of new water-guzzling crops like sugarcane have affected water availability. This has now been aggravated by indiscriminate mining for sand, which is used for building construction and other infrastructure development works.

The focus of the TNWC is on food security (not just increases in productivity) for the most marginalized and on protecting agro-ecological biodiversity through a “multi-functional farming systems” approach. Women farmers have been involved in reintroducing selective traditional agricultural practices, such as the cultivation of millets. The traditional millets, which are known to do well in semi-arid regions, include pearl millet, sorghum, finger millet, barnyard millet, kodo millet, foxtail millet, and little millet. Millets as a food crop are less popular now because of changing tastes, skewed pricing systems, and the difficulty of processing the harvested millets into flour. Nevertheless, with support from the Millet Network of India, the women farmers have identified traditional varieties of the various millet crops and are preserving the seeds as well as setting up systems for exchanging seeds (Verghese 2011).

Tamil Nadu has one of the most effective public distribution system (PDS) programs in the country, providing a kilogram of rice at one rupee to the consumer. The TNWC wants the government’s PDS to be reformed, with locally grown millets being included in programs such as the government’s child nutrition schemes. It also wants a minimum support price for millet farmers, so that they are on a par with rice and wheat farmers. The women are working to rebuild the natural resource base through combining traditional farming with water conservation and ensuring that water is free from contamination by agricultural chemicals. They are also implementing a modified system of rice intensification that requires less irrigation—what they term “SRI with a difference” (Verghese 2011).

The contrast between the unfolding of Chipko and that of SMSC and TNWC provides some pointers to how women’s struggles for gender justice and livelihoods may be circumscribed from within and without. The Chipko struggle acquired national prominence, and the SMSC and TNWC came to be known at the state level, during different decades. Perhaps this has had a bearing on how these struggles have developed. The modern Indian women’s movement had yet to take off when Chipko emerged, but feminist perspectives were critical inputs into the growth of SMSC (although, as Kulkarni points out, the SMSC is now challenged by the changed external milieu of NGO-ization). The SMSC emerged from a larger political liberation struggle and unlike the so-called women’s wings of many political formations maintained its distinct identity. The case of the TNWC, however, indicates most clearly that formal political participation in local levels of governance has immense dividends for women.

Like the interventions of ANTHRA Hyderabad, the DDS, and MVF (see above and Krishna 2012b), both the SMSC and TNWC are keenly aware of the larger context in which agro-ecological decisions take place. The difference, it seems to me, is that the SMSC and the TNWC (unlike Chipko) had their genesis in questions of gender justice, which led to involvement with livelihood assets and sustainability. This does not mean
that one path is necessarily better than the other, but that there are different ways of approaching similar goals.

Knowledge Making, Patriarchy, and Social Change

In many parts of the world gendered ideologies are continuously being resisted but are also being reasserted in new ways. Specifically in India, the question that we need to address is: To what extent does women's participation in mass struggles and organizing around livelihoods help to change the patriarchal family and community structures of which they are a part? The majority of struggles to maintain natural-resource-based livelihood assets have had mixed results. So the question remains: How can a gendered approach and a feminist political ecology perspective help women gain autonomy through their struggles, especially in a perilous policy environment in which the national need for resources overrides local livelihood sustainability?

In most parts of India the patriarchal family, the village community, and caste hierarchy are intermeshed. Colonialism introduced some elements that seemed to favor women, and the constitution of independent India incorporated gender equity. The international and national focus on women, emanating from modern feminist concerns, has forced conventional administrative systems of development and resource management to make adjustments to “include” women. The celebratory and ecofeminist valorization of women’s roles in sustaining livelihoods succeeded in shifting the focus to women but has elided iniquitous and gendered systems of customary resource management. Despite the greater attention to women and their more visible participation in public life, patriarchal power structures persist. Recent attempts at decentralizing resource management also are being undermined by new forms of exclusion that are tied to the old forms of marginalization. A telling example is that of the thousands of membership-based, community water-user groups that were formed in Andhra Pradesh in the late 1990s. Individual membership in these groups was linked to land ownership, effectively excluding women and the poorest, who did not own land (Krishna 2004a, 2009).

On the ground, many livelihood activists-practitioners do not engage with gender issues unless they depend on funding that stipulates “a gender component,” in which case gender frameworks may be applied with little understanding of, or commitment to, lasting change. As rural development practitioners have often noted, when the family’s livelihood interests are at stake, the men of the family do not contest the women’s formal participation in resource management. In such cases, the women are able to undertake activities traditionally seen as male work. Most government agencies and NGOs engaged in livelihood interventions, however, hesitate to venture beyond this into the fraught domain of, say, male alcoholism and domestic violence, fearing that it might
jeopardize the rest of their developmental or resource management interventions. They do not have the inclination, and are also not trained, to deal with the patriarchal customary laws that govern marriage, inheritance, and public ritual status, all of which reflect the relative position of men and women in a community and shape resource-based livelihoods. As I have written elsewhere:

*Experience from a range of project and activist interventions in the field show that women’s rights to share community spaces may be more easily asserted than rights to familial spaces. Women’s claims to economic/livelihood rights, forest produce or waste-land for example, do enlist male support. It is within the family that power equations of age or gender are more difficult to challenge, and where both hegemony and resistance take covert forms. Improved livelihoods and enhanced political space do not automatically translate into greater negotiating power within the closed-doors of the family.*

(Krishna 2004a)

**Shared Platforms?**

It appears that empowering elements such as literacy, economic power, inheritance of land and property, conventional government programs for women, inclusion in village-level resource management committees, and even formal representation in the elected panchayats are necessary but not sufficient to ensure women’s collective emancipation from patriarchy. Yet the experience of side stream interventions and activism shows that sustainable collective action may be built upon conscientization, feminist articulation, and a “shared platform”—what Vina Mazumdar termed “the magic of sisterhood” (Krishna 2004b). But how inclusive can such sisterhood be, and to what extent are these platforms shared? The concerns of oppressed rural, tribal, and Dalit women revolve around the struggle for livelihoods, often interlinked with resisting domestic, communal, and state violence. Such struggles are complex and specific to particular local situations, although they may form part of a broader pattern of livelihood deprivation and violence against women. But increasingly the concerns of middle-class urban feminists mainly revolve around autonomy and violence issues that cut across class and caste. Fewer feminist activist-researchers are engaged with the struggles of oppressed rural women around natural resource and livelihood issues, and these activist-researchers are perhaps less interested in documenting and theorizing from the women’s experience. Therefore, the feminist discourse tends to be dominated by cross-cutting violence issues rather than the more specific local livelihood issues.

Across the country, individually and collectively, women have been at the forefront of many resistance movements. Analyzing recent women’s struggles in Odisha (formerly spelled Orissa), Promodini Pradhan and Ranjana Padhi (2013) distinguish between two kinds of mass struggles that have been concerned with the loss of livelihood resources: nonviolent struggles against the state’s appropriation of resources (e.g., forests, minerals, water) and armed struggles to overthrow the state, both of which they say have faced state (police) violence. Their analysis starts with the observation that
oppressed sections of society—peasants, fishers, tribals, Dalits—who lack livelihood assets and decision-making power, are deeply concerned not only for their own livelihoods but also for that of their children in the future. In the gender and development literature, women’s participation in decision-making structures is seen as an indicator of their strategic, long-term interests. Pradhan and Padhi, however, suggest that other indicators need to be considered, such as the level of agricultural wages, rights to common resources, and the extent of community support against sexual violence (whether in conflict situations or everyday domestic life). As they point out, “incidents of individual assertion seem heartening; however, they do not necessarily reflect the collective taking one step ahead.” Highlighting the “ever widening chasm between the feminism of the privileged and that of the less privileged,” Pradhan and Padhi ask whether we are “prepared to look at the reality of this widening rift.”

Furthermore, as Seema Kulkarni (2011) remarks, among the “most contentious issues” in the contemporary Indian women’s movement, “is the unresolved question of the relationship between NGOs and non-funded mass movements. While most autonomous women’s groups gradually made a transition to NGOs, women’s fronts of the political parties gave the movement its mass character. The boundaries between funded NGOs and women’s mass movements are becoming fuzzier by the day thereby leaving . . . the political nature of the women’s question largely unanswered.”

Under the Indian Constitution the right to life encompasses the right to the means of living. The subversion of these rights by global forces in concert with powerful national interests is tantamount to the denial of life itself (Krishna 2004d). In the contemporary global context, neoliberal economic policies have gained ground; natural resources, particularly minerals, and life-support systems of air, water, land, and forests are being eroded or destroyed; institutions of governance are being undermined; and there is growing militarization spurred by narrow nationalistic sentiments. In this context, can we even envision an alternative radical ecological democracy, such as that outlined by Srivastava and Kothari (2012), without addressing “the political nature of the women’s question”? This is why we need a more politically grounded understanding of SL that goes beyond capability, equity, and sustainability to include collective political action to strengthen the voice and agency of poor oppressed women (Krishna 2012a).

The shared platform of women collectively organizing around livelihoods could perhaps also help to bridge the knowledge and activism gap between the feminists’ concerns with identity and violence and the development practitioners’ concerns with livelihood sustainability. The Indian experience of women’s transformative organization around livelihoods reflects the challenge of transformation in a globalizing world where patriarchy builds upon existing forms of gender discrimination and oppression. We first need to move beyond both the conventional and celebratory approaches to women: the conventional approach that SL is a socioeconomic program and that everyday patriarchy can be left untouched as a political project for an unspecified future, and the celebratory approach, which valorizes an assumed international “sisterhood of women” across race, nation, ethnicity, class, and caste.
What this means for transnational feminist organizing and knowledge is that networks to counter hegemonic globalization must actively seek to engage not only with the concerns of national level alliances but also with the myriad and dynamic new political spaces created by people’s movements at the grassroots, in the local side streams of national and global development. It is in these side streams—among the single, widowed, and deserted women of southern Maharashtra; the women’s collectives of Tamil Nadu; and the many others whose stories remain to be told—that we can begin to understand the politics of transformative organizing. The side streams do not have all the answers, but they do point to ways in which we can begin to build productive and equitable relations between feminists across cultural contexts, nations, and regions.

Acknowledgments

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Note

1. Dalits are a diverse group of socially and economically disadvantaged people who were customarily treated as untouchables or outcastes. The Constitution of independent India guaranteed them equality and entitled them to affirmative action as “Scheduled Castes.” A community’s conventional caste/tribe position often closely parallels its occupational class. Many poor peasant and fisher communities may also be Dalits. Their usually separate struggles for emancipation are geared to social and economic betterment. While some tribal groups are relatively more gender egalitarian, forms of patriarchy exist across class and caste/tribe (see Krishna 1996b, 2004c).

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SECTION 10

DIGITAL AGE TRANSFORMATIONS AND FUTURE TRAJECTORIES
SECTION 10 explores how transnational feminist campaigns have worked with information and communication technologies (ICTs) as sources of creative political opportunity, particularly for young feminists. The chapters, by Gillian Youngs; Priya A. Kurian, Debashish Munshi, and Anuradha Mundkur; and Sarah Hendricks and Keshet Bachan, show how ICTs have supported women's transnational feminist organizing on- and offline, building new digital communities, which, though they make feminist demands highly visible and offer, in particular, space for young feminists' political engagement, also need to be interrogated for their inclusiveness and internal power relations.

Gillian Youngs’s chapter, “Digital Transformations of Transnational Feminism in Theory and Practice,” illustrates how the digitally networked world has substantially changed the historical terms and conditions of gendered power, as ICTs extend the scope of feminist connections and possibilities. The chapter explores (1) feminism and the new networked world; (2) transnational feminism and digital public spheres; and (3) gender balance in science, technology, and innovation. Youngs argues that ICTs have been key to modernity and to feminists’ sharing of knowledge and power that is horizontal, dynamic, and interconnected. New technologies in the information and communications arena allow for greater communication, networking, and organizing by feminist networks, as the digital age has heralded a whole new phase for feminism in which online horizontal networks, empowerment, and activities allow women to escape the constraints of the masculinist culture. Youngs looks at how feminist theory and imaginings have contributed to the digital age as it has developed and incorporated growing numbers of people, societies, and economies, as well as influenced more areas of human life (work, play, identity) and the environment. She argues that despite gender bias and constraints, in their political organizing and strategic engagement in policy-making, feminists’ activism and advocacy have played an important role in shaping new patterns in the global digital public sphere.

Priya A. Kurian, Debashish Munshi, and Anuradha Mundkur’s chapter, “The Dialectics of Power and Powerlessness in Transnational Feminist Networks: Online Struggles Around Gender-Based Violence,” shows how ICTs have become fluid, open
spaces for building awareness, facilitating discussion, and creating transnational femi-
nist networks (TFNs) that have enabled global action on violence against women. In charting what they call “the dialectics of power and powerlessness,” they examine
how violence against women is mediated online by two TFNs—Women Living Under
Muslim Law and 50 Million Missing. They compare the agendas of these TFNs and the
response of urban youth in India, both physically and virtually, to the gang rape and
murder of a young woman in Delhi in December 2012, using these examples to illustrate
the ways in which online discussions of gender and violence grapple with the tensions of
power and difference. In scrutinizing the potential for empowerment in the digital age
to organize global protests against violence against women, they look at how feminists
negotiate and construct the transnational public sphere. They issue a warning for future
feminist actions, noting that even if online activism has the power to cross generations,
class, and race within and outside the feminist movement, such networked activism
does always prove to be inclusive.

Sarah Hendricks and Keshet Bachan’s chapter, “Because I Am a Girl: The Emergence
of Girls in Development,” looks at how girls and young women have engaged in net-
working and coalition, building in off- and online mobilization around various feminist
issues. They argue that the proliferation of ICTs and the rise of social media have been
at the heart of online girl-led activism, which has also translated into offline activism.
Their examples include the young women bloggers who were at the head of the protest
in the early days of the Arab Spring. In Kenya, Akirachix, a grassroots movement led by
young women web developers, entrepreneurs, and engineers, mentored young women
to join the IT sector. The US-based online network Girls Who Code has encouraged
thousands of girls to enter the computer-science field. They also point to the numerous
websites; blogs, such as Tumblr; and hubsites, where girls and young women can write
about feminist issues, as promising spaces for future activism. They conclude that as
youth activism has become more dispersed, diverse, and fluid, complex forms of online
and offline mobilization are opening spaces for resistance and disruption, networking,
and coalition building—especially for girls and young women who might otherwise be
left on the sidelines because of discrimination and gender stereotyping.
Introduction

Information and communication technologies (ICTs) have brought about transformations in transnational feminist theory and practice in multiple ways that continue to challenge historically embedded areas of gender discrimination, not least those related to core areas of science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM). Far from being caught in the trap of optimistic or pessimistic views of ICT developments and the new virtual environment they have facilitated, women across the world have worked to harness their potential, individually and collectively, as activists, advocates, social and political innovators, and entrepreneurs. The boundary-crossing nature of ICTs has transformed political space for women in transnational terms, and previously male-dominated international relations have been reconfigured in significant ways by the digital revolution. Alongside the masculinist traditions and structures of mainstream politics, transnational feminist and women’s politics can now flourish as never before in the new online setting. The historically rigid vertical structures of the mainstream are now accompanied, thanks to ICTs, by endless horizontal forms of communication, putting women directly in touch with one another, whether locally, nationally, or globally. Globalization in the second half of the twentieth century witnessed the growth of international activism and politics, including contestation against the negative effects of transnational capitalist expansion (Gibson-Graham 1996; Harcourt 1999; Peterson 2003). The character of this growth was historically new in the extent to which women were able to become active, and in particular, increasingly well networked not
only within their own communities and states, but across national boundaries and in
global politics and institutional settings. The new networked world of ICTs has dis-
rupted historical masculinist constraints on women's political presence and engagement
and opened up possibilities in these areas, accessible to growing numbers of individuals
and groups.

These developments marked a new era for transnational feminist work, building on
established practices and taking them into the cyber era. In the early days of the Internet
it was stressed that networking had not arrived with ICTs; activists of all kinds including
feminists had always worked on the basis of such strategies and, importantly, adapted
them to specific circumstances. In this period, combining online with offline processes,
e-mail distribution and web access with old style newsletters and postage, as well as
face-to-face communication, was easily adopted and adapted to harness as fully as pos-
sible ICT’s potential and, as it were, even up the stakes among richer, well-networked,
less-networked, or not yet networked contexts across the world (Hafkin and Huyer
2006; Youngs 2002). As ICTs are all about two fundamental aspects of activism—infor-
mation and communication—it is hardly surprising that this has been the case. Also,
the explosion of NGOs characteristic of globalization has acted as a major catalyst for
the use and application of ICTs as well as their roles in advocacy at all levels related to
extending access to and literacy about them (Youngs 2004a, 2010). The function of ICTs
as the next major stage of technological advance means their place on policy agendas
of all kinds is expanding, but these technologies have also increased the opportunities
for women to communicate and act transnationally in ways that have far outstripped
what was possible in the industrial era. This has made it feasible to argue that the dig-
ital age heralds a whole new phase for feminism in theory and practice compared to
industrial times (Youngs 2005a). While the traditional public sphere has continued to be
male dominated and masculinist in culture, online horizontal networks, empowerment,
and activities can escape their constraints to the extent that they can work around and
parallel to them. New doors are open not only to many more connections across and
for women, but for many more purposes, collective and individual, social, cultural,
and economic, as well as political. The demand for new feminist theory and imagin-
ings to fit the new circumstances and potential is clear and has not diminished as the
digital age has developed and incorporated growing numbers of people, societies, and
economies, as well as influencing increasing areas of human life (work, play, identity)
and environment (Youngs 2005b). Digital public spheres have transformed the informa-
tional and communicative patterns of industrial times, and feminist activism and
advocacy have contributed to creating many new patterns. These include, for example,
powerful combinations of online/offline activities that allow marginal politics to be con-
ducted and strengthened, as it were, away from the glare and constraining influences
of mainstream politics, in order to make interventions there at strategic times and in
strategic ways. These changed public sphere conditions, as well as having implications
for theory as much as practice, also impact identity, whether we are thinking at group or
individual levels. The ICT era has contributed to boosting empowerment opportunities
through combined online/offline networks and actions, extending the scope of feminist
imaginaries and identities accordingly (Green and Adam 2001; Thomas 2004; Youns 2012).

This extension has embraced the relationship of technologies to embodied and located individuals and probed the complex and often contradictory fashion in which ICTs offer options for fluidity, manipulation, and intensification across time/space conditions and experiences. While these can be about individual empowerment, they can equally be about entrapment, including in deeper infrastructures of surveillance and value extraction, which digital political economy has enabled (Mosco 2004; Youns 2007a, 2011). The cyborg phenomenon (combining human and machine) was one of the dominant tropes of the twentieth century and will doubtless continue to be so in evolved forms in the twenty-first century (Haraway 1991, 1997). It carries both the positive senses of enhanced potential as well as the negative fears of machine influences increasingly affecting or even dominating human influences. Science fiction, not surprisingly, provides us with as rich a potential as philosophical and other forms of academic analysis for exploring this ontological terrain, for this is very much about what counts as really human or degrees of technology-driven transformation that threaten diminishment of humanity (Youngs 1997). The macro-micro (large-scale-individual) considerations here include who has the most control and influence over these shifts and trajectories. Asking such questions brings the gendered nature of STEM to the foreground as a growing issue even on mainstream policy agendas. Feminist critiques have long addressed the importance of transforming the historically entrenched male domination of science and technology and key knowledge and power structures associated with them in theory and practice, political economy, and culture (Harding 1998, 2006). The significance of these critiques is enhanced in an age when the technological realm has grown in both its reach and complexity. The digital economy and its multiple and widening impacts on how we work, play, relate, recreate, and pass time offer a dramatically new context for revisiting feminist concerns about male domination in STEM and enduring resistance to change in this area. The more STEM knowledge and structures become embedded in all aspects of daily life and being through digital as well as industrial developments, the more their gendered masculinist distortions are likely to become entrenched. Contesting this gender imbalance is at the top of contemporary feminist agendas.

Innovation is one route through which change is being nurtured and which can powerfully reinforce interests across macro and micro agendas to some degree in feminist interests. The digital age has seen a continuously accelerated innovation economy in which global institutions, governments of rich and developing economies, and large-scale corporations as well as small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and micro-businesses are focused on the competitive challenges involved in maintaining new and leading edges (Bilbao-Osorio et al. 2013). The nature of ICTs as reasonably accessible and affordable technologies compared to those of the industrial age has changed some of the stakes in terms of who undertakes innovations and how and where they can happen. In a knowledge economy, an idea has value and can be translated into action on a desktop, often at limited expense and by an individual or small group of individuals. This model of innovation is in stark contrast to the large-scale actor/investment
model familiar in the industrial context of giant corporations. We now have the dual digital/industrial scenario, and major investments are being made to help stimulate new understandings of and approaches to innovation fit for the times (Technology Strategy Board 2013). The increased small-scale routes into innovation and its benefits, whether for profit or not, for social or political improvements, or for economic or cultural value, open up the field to many more diverse players. Across the world feminist activists are among those taking advantage of these new openings, as transnational feminist movements are pressing institutions at national and global levels to recognize their vested interest in building more inclusive innovation cultures. The alignment of feminist criticisms of male-dominated STEM and the drive toward digital cultures holds significant promise for new power for women. They also point to an area rich in potential for feminist and women’s future activism and advocacy as well as entrepreneurialism.

This chapter develops these areas in more detail in three sections, on feminism and the new networked world; transnational feminism and digital public spheres; and upping the policy stakes for gender balance in STEM and innovation.

**Feminism and the New Networked World**

ICTs genuinely heralded a new world for feminist transnational movements in terms of knowledge and power and related capacities to work for social change oriented toward greater gender equality politically, economically, and culturally. It can be argued that the new networked world has substantially changed the historical terms and conditions of gendered power, which had been largely configured on state-based constructions of politics and political agency privileging male power and masculinist identities and cultures (Walby 1990; Yuval Davis 1998).

These conditions heavily determined transnational politics along masculinist lines in two major ways: the minimization and marginalization of women’s interests, knowledge, and power within masculinist state-based systems, and the mirroring of this in the state-centered structures and settings of international relations and politics (Pettman 1996; Youngs 1999a, 2004b). These circumstances in turn highly constrained women’s visibility and access to one another transnationally across national borders and within the power bases of international arenas. The potential of feminist transnational politics has been severely restricted under masculinist hierarchical systems of political relations, in which each level—state, regional (e.g., European Union, EU), and international (e.g., United Nations, UN)—reinforced male dominance of mainstream resources and interests. While over time women’s politics has grown in presence and significance through all these levels, it must be noted that this has occurred within the context of masculinist state centrism. The statement by UN Women (incorporating what was formerly UNIFEM) that it is “dedicated to gender equality and the empowerment of women” and
that it is “a global champion for women and girls” working “to accelerate progress on meeting their needs worldwide” must be read in this context (UN Women 2013). The UN remains an organization based on state membership, and states remain in differing degrees predominantly masculinist articulations of politics, power, and influence. This is not to question the significance of the work of UN Women, but to recognize the contextual importance of the historically established conditions of male domination within which its work is undertaken. How can it be argued that ICTs and the networked world have dramatically changed those conditions and the potential of transnational feminism? Crucially, the answer lies in understanding both areas identified above and the key linkages between them: the minimization and marginalization of women’s interests and politics and the limits on their access to one another transnationally across state borders.

The communications infrastructures and settings of the Internet and the World Wide Web have disrupted the vertical pyramid of masculinist politics through local, state, regional, and international contexts by enabling multiple forms of horizontal communication and political engagement and activism within and across those contexts (Castells 2000; Harcourt 1999; Youngs 2002). Women’s harnessing of these horizontal possibilities individually and collectively has made headway in changing the political ecosystem into one in which vertical fixity of masculinist constraints on feminist politics can be constantly challenged by disruptive horizontal online activities and varied forms of presence focused on that politics. I have used the terms geospatial and sociospatial to aid understanding of these transitions from the old world to the new one (Youngs 2007a). Geospatial refers to the familiar historical settings of state-based politics, in which physical bounded territories are the key and enduring containers for political process and action. Sociospatial refers to the new virtual environments of the Internet and World Wide Web, in which communications and political activism can occur across those boundaries as much as within them. Geospatial settings have tended to emphasize vertical structures of top-down power, whereas sociospatial ones have also emphasized horizontal forms of communication and action, which can be, although of course are not necessarily, disruptive of aspects of vertical power structures and processes. In a world that features both geospatial and sociospatial settings, complex perspectives that recognize not only their distinctive and separate qualities but also their interconnections are vital. These separate and connected elements define both the changing character and expanded power of transnationalism in the digital age as well as its increased political visibility. The exponential growth of women’s interest and focused organizations, facilitated by access to ICTs and the horizontal connectivity they enable at all levels—community, local, national, and global—has been a core feature of the new age of virtual politics (Harcourt 1999; Hafkin and Huyer 2006).

It would not be an overstatement to argue that this era has seen a flourishing of feminist politics that could not have been imagined in the pre-ICT geospatial era. The diversity of the politics, array of organizations, formal and informal networks associated with them, and types of work toward greater gender equality and women’s interests is extensive and features wide-ranging levels of profile, from low to high. One of the outcomes of these
developments has been the harnessing of these new forms of horizontal power and presence into intervention and action in vertical mainstream political and policy processes. Two very different organizations—Mumsnet (2013), based in the United Kingdom, and the Association for Progressive Communications (2013), which operates globally—offer illustrations of horizontal-vertical linkages in terms of activism and advocacy. UN Women in part reflects this translation from horizontal to vertical in deeply historical ways, articulating the significance of transnational feminist movements’ inputs into its areas of focus, including through the UN Conferences on Women and the notable Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action as well as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, as part of the Fourth UN World Conference on Women, was a pivotal point in the digital transformation of transnational feminism. ICTs were heavily used as part of the virtual politics surrounding the conference, with extensive engagement of women’s interest activists and groups across the world in the proceedings. This made highly visible at the global level the networked era of transnational feminist movements, demonstrating how long-established traditional networking techniques, including face-to-face and paper forms of communication, were being interwoven with the new electronic forms to ensure a complex approach to inclusiveness that drew on successes and approaches from the past as much as the new opportunities offered by ICTs (Gittler 1999; Youngs 2001). The Association for Progressive Communications (APC) and its Women’s Rights Programme (WRP) have been at the forefront of global efforts to embed ICTs in transnational feminist activism and advocacy processes:

The APC presence in Beijing was noteworthy for more than the unique services it provided. APC provided a forty-member team comprised of APC representatives from 25 countries, all women, many of them from the South. This was purposely done to send a powerful message to the world—there was no innate barrier to women using computer technology.

(O’Brien 2013)

In addition to focusing on using technology for women’s empowerment, the WRP has featured among transnational feminist activist organizations that have explicitly worked to harness the potential of ICTs to women’s global networking and politics in long-standing campaigns, for example against violence against women:

The WRP is made of feminists and activists who believe that ICTs have a strong role to play in transforming gender and social relations. In our ranks are techies and trainers who help women’s organisations and other civil society groups take control of the tools they use to advance their mission and advocacy. More than 175 women from 35 countries—librarians, programmers, journalists, trainers, designers, scholars, researchers, communicators—come together online to work jointly in various projects in Africa, Asia-Pacific, Europe and Latin America.

(Association for Progressive Communications, Women’s Rights Programme 2013)
Transnational Feminism and Digital Public Spheres

Digital public spheres have provided a new context for transnational feminism with no precedent. They have enabled and infused with more power, across space and time, well-established strategies of knowledge sharing, collective action, creative use of communications tools and political approaches, and advocacy at all levels from local to global. They have stretched the boundaries of politics for feminist action with dramatic effect, not least in the ways they have facilitated circumvention of traditional hierarchical parameters of mainstream national and international politics. Cross-boundary feminist practice and engagement has flourished in the digital era, which has expanded the opportunities for marginal interests and politics to fully utilize virtual horizontal networks to enhance existing and build new communities, intensify advocacy and policy interventions, and counter the impacts of dominant masculinist structures (Youngs 1999b; Hafkin and Huyer 2006). In many ways digital public spheres can be viewed as contributing to some leveling of the playing field between the marginal and the mainstream in terms of the value added represented by horizontal politics for those outside mainstream structures. The affordances of the World Wide Web to facilitate presence, networking, knowledge sharing, community building, and activism through Web sites, connectivity, and archiving technologies are highly diverse and relatively accessible and cheap compared to offline possibilities. While mainstream actors (old and new) have undoubtedly harnessed these new opportunities to enhance and build their power and influence as well as developing new forms of them through political, economic, and cultural innovations (Mosco 2004), the doors that have opened for the excluded and marginalized could be considered to have comparable or even greater significance, in contrast to their previously much lower levels of visibility and accessibility offline. On such bases it could be argued that digital public spheres have proved a more dramatic transformative force for marginalized forms of politics, including transnational feminist movements, than for mainstream politics, with regard to political presence and connectivity.

One powerful dimension of such change in relation to feminism has been the disruption of public and private configurations and constraints (Youngs 2005b, 2007b, 2009). In their boundary-crossing nature, in terms of both time and space, uses of ICTs generally tend to be disruptive of the power configurations that rely on the fixity of boundaries and their effects (Everard 2000; Sassen 2002). This has been demonstrated in mainstream politics in key processes such as the Arab Spring political upheavals (Youngs 2013) and the WikiLeaks releases of secret government documents (Leigh and Harding 2011). The transnational feminist scenario for thinking about boundaries and their impacts includes the mainstream patriarchal structures of national and international politics, but looks inside those to the interior gendered story of such politics,
which includes the public and private binary that has defined male over female power and influence throughout time and across societies in differentiated forms (Walby 1990; Elshtain 1993; Pettman 1996; Yuval Davis 1998; Peterson 2003; Youngs 2004b). ICTs have helped to disrupt the implications of public-private divides where women have access to them across either or both of those settings, and even where they do not, the potential signposts a new world wherein many forms of political and economic as well as social and cultural value-informed activities and engagements can take place as easily on the kitchen table as they can on a desk at an office (Youngs 2002, 2005a, 2009, 2010). The extreme connectivity of the new digital age offers potent challenges to the fixity of binary categorizations identifying masculine identities primarily with the action, productive power, and influence of the public sphere and feminine identities primarily with the social reproduction, care, and affective realm of the domestic private sphere. With mobile hand-held technologies making the ease and fluidity of virtual activity and connectivity increasingly seamless on the move and across all spaces (Urry 2007), this potential disruption looks set to perpetually grow in its diverse contestations of public-private separations. Access to political, economic, social, and intimate networks and spheres of action and engagement is literally becoming an anywhere, anytime fact of life in the most connected of circumstances, and at least partly so even in those that are least connected.

Liberation has been a core concept in feminism, and there are many ways in which digital developments represent a new era of liberation focused on new potential for sharing knowledge toward greater empowerment to act for social change in women’s interests. ICTs enable varied degrees of liberation from time and space constraints which have been significant for women especially in recent times because of the double burden of work outside and inside the home. The complexities of women’s lives, combining many aspects of work and care as well as political and other engagements, and the associated need to be in or connected to many different places at different times, mean that the fluidity and flexibility of interaction and activity facilitated by ICTs is especially enabling for them. These changed circumstances of the digital public sphere point to multiple opportunities for the continued expansion of women’s horizons and identities to reflect the new, mobile, boundary-crossing contexts of their daily lives as well as the potential for such a possibility where these contexts do not yet exist. An important dimension of thinking about the digital in terms of the public sphere is that it draws our attention to questions of the individual, identity, and agency in relation to collective or large-scale social settings. The potential as well as the actual effects of digital public spheres for transnational feminism are that the rules of the public-private power game have changed. ICTs can be instrumental in liberation from public-private constraints in a conceptual as well as a practical sense, for the ways in which they enable the transcendence of such constraints are a firm reality in general, whether they are currently within reach or not (Youngs 1999b). This does not change the differences between the haves and the have-nots in relation to ICTs and digital access as well as the range of literacies (including technical ones) to make the most of this, but it does highlight that material change has taken place, profoundly disrupting
a public-private power structure that worked to fix masculine and feminine identities and potential.

**Upping the Policy Stakes for Gender Balance in STEM and Innovation**

The pervasive role of ICTs in every aspect of life, and especially economically as drivers of innovation and wealth generation, as well as restructuring of societies and environments along sustainable lines, takes to a new level the challenge to transnational feminist movements of the extreme gender imbalances in the core areas of STEM. The minimal position of women in STEM, notably its senior structures of power and influence, was sufficiently problematic in the industrial era, but the digital era opens up many more opportunities to affect, shape, and benefit from the world we live in, which will be substantially lost to women as key agents in the future if gender imbalances are not quickly tackled. The study Women in Global Science and Technology (2013a) concluded that the limited presence of women in science, technology, and innovation (STI) was a global problem affecting developed as much as developing economies. The study, which looked at six countries and one region (Brazil, India, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, South Africa, the United States, and the European Union), found that

[a] gender imbalance exists in science, technology and innovation worldwide. The number of women in STI falls continuously from secondary school to university, laboratories, teaching and decision making. There are consistently low levels of women in the skilled technology workforce in the private sector, with even fewer females in senior management and as leaders of large companies. A gender imbalance also exists in STI education, where males outnumber females worldwide for reasons of safety and security, teaching methods that favour boys, preconceptions that S&T [science and technology] is a male domain, and unwillingness of families to support their daughters through all levels of education. Women have lower levels of access to ICTs such as internet and smartphones in the majority of countries in the world.  

(Women in Global Science and Technology 2013b, 1)

We can identify what I would call the STEM gender gap as among the most pressing problems confronting transnational feminist movements in the twenty-first century and a troubling continuation of embedded gender inequalities impacting knowledge, power, and social change. The cluster of expertise, practices, and influences in STEM areas and their heavy association with masculine power and identities have had structurally entrenched gender impacts throughout the industrial age and risk being substantially further entrenched in the digital age. Feminist theory and practice has a long history of addressing this gender divide (Cockburn and Ormrod 1993; Cockburn and Fürst-Dilic 1994; Harding 1998, 2006; Green and Adam 2001), which has been a core concern in advocacy and activism in digital times, not least through the work of organizations
such as the APC and Women in Global Science and Technology (WISAT). The knowledge and practices related to STEM areas are ranked at the top of all power hierarchies (knowledge, resources, policy priorities) and are foundational to shaping the past, present, and future. They make the material world we live in, and the fact that women are substantially excluded from them supports the argument that the world is fashioned according to men and masculinist visions, understandings, and priorities:

These gaps in women’s access to resources, opportunities, S&T education and employment, and technologies are depriving countries of women’s experience, creativity and ability. They are a waste of the resources invested in the education and support of women and girls and in the national technology and extension systems that do not reach a substantial portion of the population. Developing a scientific and technological workforce as well as supporting a population to understand and use S&T to improve their lives and livelihoods will help to bridge these gaps. Countries will need to mobilize the active participation of women and other underrepresented groups in the science, engineering and technology (SET) and information technology (IT) workforces, and improve the ability of these groups to develop and use technologies in areas such as food production, water and sanitation, and energy.

(Women in Global Science and Technology 2013a, 1; emphasis added. See also Bagilhole et al. 2008)

The digital era has raised the stakes for inclusiveness because of the new ways in which it embeds STEM areas and innovations related to them directly or indirectly in all areas of life, from the most public to the most private. Mobile communications and their flexible use throughout our public and private lives are only the beginning of a wholesale revolution that promises to turn the material world we live in into an information-driven, intelligent networked environment connecting people to things and material settings and information about them to steer decisions and actions and increase automation based on real-time feedback.

Sensor technologies are central to these transformations and the new era of Big Data and the Internet of Everything (IoE). This world is only just dawning, and the social changes it heralds will create a whole new context for thinking about all kinds of inequalities, including those related to gender:

More than 99% of things in the physical world are not linked to the Internet. Yet. But as the world transitions into what we call the Internet of Everything (IoE)—the intelligent connection of people, processes, data, and things—only the networked readiness of countries will dictate where the IoE will take hold and who will reap its benefits. . . . The IoE and intelligent networking will impact all sectors, creating opportunities for people, businesses, and countries. An intelligent network will be the driver of the next round of innovation, productivity enhancement, and employment.

(Bilbao-Osorio et al. 2013, ix; see also Technology Strategy Board 2013)

These are the kinds of questions we need to ask: Who will benefit most from this new world? Who will be most in control of it? Who will mold and define it? The rolling
innovation involved and digital pace so far indicate that the speed of change will be rapid, making it all the more important whose voices are heard and instrumental and whose are not. The IoE world in prospect is not just about how we work, play, and engage with one another. It is a much more holistic, data-shaped, seamless world wherein sensors, feedback, and automated systems enable intelligent and predictive environments and refashioned lifestyles. We can see the beginnings of the new age in how mobile communications, and the power of smart phones in particular, have made many aspects of daily life much more dependent on connectivity than where we are or what time it is. The full implications of the IoE world still seem to some degree like science fiction, but this highlights the importance of inclusive imagination and creativity in determining what it will be and whose interests and priorities it will best serve. Achieving greater gender balance in STEM and associated innovation cultures could not be more pressing in this regard, as we look to a future that clearly should be made as much by women as by men and should be as inclusive as possible in matching ideas and possibilities to concrete outcomes.

**Conclusion**

The digital age has brought great transformations for transnational feminism and movements supporting its highly diverse interests and causes. In ways that could never have been imagined previously, it has facilitated and supported ever-growing connectivity across women of diverse generations, cultures, and orientations. There is much to celebrate and be impressed by in the extensive ways in which women have imaginatively harnessed ICTs to express themselves; link to one another as individuals and groups; form new communities; and innovate economically, politically, socially, and culturally. There has been as much focus on the local as the global and on connecting them, and this has been especially important in the context of political advocacy and campaigning bonds and strategies, which have been established across richer and poorer countries and communities. Digital solidarity has been a core part of these developments, and the World Wide Web has provided the first-ever public platform, accessible globally, on which the immense range of women's activities, interests, and concerns is evident. It can be argued that this is truly historic and makes transnational women's movements and their ambitions visible in ways that could not have been predicted prior to digital times. Women have captured the power of the digital in ways too many to even begin to list comprehensively; suffice it to say that they have done so in their own ways as well as to increase their interventions and activism in mainstream structures and processes, including those related to policy at all levels.

At the same time that the digital age of transnational feminism has represented this sea change in its knowledge-building power and potential to effect social change, it has raised one of the greatest challenges. Digital transformations have reinforced the gender inequality already embedded in industrial modernity—women's relative lack
of presence and, even more important, power and influence, in the STEM areas and innovations associated with them. The digital age has doubly reinforced the gender imbalance in STEM and has potentially taken it to new heights, in terms of the social transformations that Big Data and IoE developments represent. It is fair to argue that because of the gendered nature of STEM, immense areas of women’s capacities and creativity have played no part in building the world and the environments we live in and dominant ways of life attached to them. There could not be more at stake than the risk of this situation being embedded even further and more holistically in terms of lives and identities in an IoE scenario. Transnational feminist movements have been actively focusing on this risk and providing concrete evidence and campaigns to address it, championing the need for women in science and technology and helping to form new cultures of innovation engaging women in ICTs and the knowledge and skills associated with them. This work will continue and expand, but policy responses nationally and globally will have to be much more effective than they were in the industrial age if the bright new future is not to be dulled by its gendered limitations.

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References


Introduction

Transnational feminist networks (TFNs) provide feminist activists with a platform to advocate on a range of issues confronting women, from reproductive health and human rights to violence against women and economic security. Operating formally and informally across state and regional borders (Moghadam 2005; Dempsey, Parker, and Krone 2011), the activism and advocacy of TFNs has created a “transnational public sphere” (Fraser 2007). These networks have become truly transnational through the extensive use of information and communication technologies (ICTs), creating vibrant spaces for mobilizing and to debate global, national, and local issues. Yet despite their success in generating global resources, publicity, and support for local issues (Dempsey, Parker, and Krone 2011), they run the risk of privileging, consciously or otherwise, global agendas over local articulations of issues. In particular, tensions within the feminist movements over issues of race, class, and nationality, as well as among varying understandings of women’s rights, access to resources, and cultural identity that underpin ideas of citizenship, mark the work of TFNs. Thus, while the debates and discussions in virtual spaces by TFNs invoke notions of gendered citizenship, they also reflect competing dialectics of power and powerlessness among feminist activists.
In charting the dialectics of power and powerlessness, we look at the ways in which the issue of violence against women, a long-standing feminist concern (McMillan 2007; True 2012), is discussed and mediated online by two TFNs: Women Living Under Muslim Law and 50 Million Missing. In our examination of these networks we problematize the notion of power in TFNs whose agendas explicitly focus on violence against women. The issue of violence against women, in its various manifestations, has been a key feminist issue globally and holds significant implications for women’s inclusion in the public sphere and their role as citizens. As Lister (1997, 113) comments, “If women cannot move and act freely in the public sphere and/or are intimidated in the private sphere because of the threat of violence, then their ability to act as citizens is curtailed.”

We use the term “violence against women” as opposed to “gender-based violence” because the UN definition of violence against women encapsulates its gendered nature: “any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life” (UN General Assembly 1993). We recognize that men and boys can also be victims of gender-based violence (especially sexual violence), but we wish to specifically draw attention to the disproportionate numbers of women who experience violence.

We then examine how agendas of TFNs compare with local articulations of violence against women by analyzing the remarkable response of urban youth in India, both physically and virtually, to the gang-rape and murder of a young woman in Delhi in December 2012. Following blogs and social media postings on the much-publicized incident in India, we identify how ideas of citizenship are embedded in online forums in a specific national context, allowing a comparison of potentially competing ideas of citizenship against the backdrop of violence against women. Following the online discussions of the Delhi gang-rape presents an opportunity to explore how diverse networks of women and men simultaneously negotiate “the cultural politics of cyberspace” (Escobar 1999, 32) alongside the place-based politics of gender and cultural violence. Our analysis of the use of ICTs by TFNs is not refracted through the bifocal lenses of dichotomized good and bad or empowered and disempowered. Instead, we look at how online discussions of gender and violence grapple with the tensions of power and difference.

**TFNs, Power, and Difference**

Despite the persuasive discourse of global sisterhood invoked in the 1970s in the West, feminist movements both nationally and globally have been riven by issues of power springing from the differences of race, class, ethnicity, sexuality, age, and ability/disability. Recognizing the conflicts and power inequalities embedded within the sphere of women’s activism, some scholars distinguish international feminism, global feminism,
and global sisterhood from a notion of transnational feminism (Alexander and Mohanty 1997; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Mendoza 2002; Moghadam 2005). Whereas international feminism of some sort has existed from the beginnings of the twentieth century, transnational feminism is more recent and linked explicitly to processes of globalization; the emergence and spread of ICTs, especially the Internet; and the UN conferences on women. Transnational feminism, some argue, appears to offer a way of thinking about women in their diversity, allowing attention to unequal power relations among them (e.g., Alexander and Mohanty 1997). But what does this mean in practice? How have TFNs negotiated the construction of a transnational public sphere that is responsive to the differing experiences of power and powerlessness among feminist activists? In particular, has the use of social media by TFNs facilitated or hindered the development of such transnational public spheres on specific women’s issues, such as violence against women?

Transnational advocacy networks (TANs), of which TFNs are a part, comprise “those actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services” (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 2). TANs include governmental and nongovernmental actors, the media, and regional and international bodies. Given the challenges and difficulties of organizing transnationally, TANs emerge around particular issues that have “high value content and transcultural resonance” (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 200). More specifically, TFNs are defined as “structures organized above the national level that unite women from three or more countries around a common agenda, such as women’s human rights, reproductive health and rights, violence against women, peace and antimilitarism, or feminist economics” (Moghadam 2005, 4). They reflect the shared context of women’s struggles against exploitation that allows for a transnational solidarity (Mohanty 1997).

In contrast, other feminists have raised concerns about the potential for TFNs to essentially rework the homogenizing discourse of a “global sisterhood” that ignores fundamental issues of structural inequalities and the complicity of Western feminists—by virtue of citizenship, nationality, and class—in neoimperialism and global capitalism. For example, Desai (see chapter XX) points out that women from the third world have been challenging “feminist theory to go beyond the trinity of race, class, and gender, and include other structures of power such as nationalisms, religion, and development that impacted their daily lives.” Mendoza argues that although embedded in the concept of transnational feminism is “the desirability and possibility of a political solidarity of feminists across the globe that transcends class, race, sexuality and national boundaries,” TFNs have failed to deliver a basis for solidarity (2002, 296). Transnational networking can also increase the divide between elites and the majority of women who have access neither to the Internet nor to transnational networks (Basu 2000, 76).

These critiques, often by women of color and third world women, point to the unequal power relations within women’s movements. Yet as Moghadam (2005) and Keck and Sikkink (1998), among others, have argued, the global mobilization against “violence against women” shows how feminists have successfully come together around
a common agenda to exercise policy influence at national and international levels. The construction of this common agenda was, of course, neither automatic nor inevitable, as feminist scholarship demonstrates. Indeed, Weldon argues that much of the scholarship on social/women’s movements that attributes “successful cooperation to shared interests, identities, or opportunities is incomplete because it does not take account of relations of domination among activists who cooperate” (2006, 55).

Rather, it was through developing “norms of inclusivity”—“a commitment to descriptive representation, the facilitation of separate organization for disadvantaged social groups, and a commitment to building consensus with institutionalized dissent” (Weldon 2006, 56)—that TFNs succeeded in achieving cooperation. Weldon argues that although violence against women was on the agenda of the transnational women’s movement by the mid-1970s, it could only influence governmental agendas and bring about policy change (e.g., getting recognition of women’s rights as human rights) two decades later, because “activists could not overcome relations of inequality within the movement until they developed norms of inclusivity” (59).

TFNs and Virtual Spaces

To what extent have ICTs and social media networks helped or hindered the development of such norms of inclusivity and thereby shaped the work of TFNs on the issue of violence against women? This question is particularly relevant in the twenty-first century given the explosion in the use of the Internet in a variety of forms by activists globally. According to Moghadam (2005), the new ICTs have allowed TFNs to function effectively without being bogged down by formal bureaucratic structures because they can “retain flexibility, adaptability, and non-hierarchical features while also ensuring more efficiency in their operations” (p. 17). The power of online activism for feminist movements is further underscored by Martin and Valenti, who see the need to bring together online and offline work:

*Online feminism has the power to mobilize people—young, old and everyone in between—to take political action at unprecedented scale at unprecedented speeds. . . . Online feminism has transformed the way advocacy and action function within the feminist movement . . . . While the times we are living in call for social justice movements to embrace decentralization, our technological tools allow coordination among a much broader, more motley collection of organizations and individuals than ever before. The challenge is to ensure that the mechanisms of coordination and agenda setting are supported.*

(2013, 3–5)

This positive assessment is in many ways an extension of the general acknowledgment by feminists of the role of media in facilitating feminist ideas and building solidarity networks among members of TFNs.
At the same time, there is a sense of powerlessness among social media networks. These networks, like old ICTs, are also implicated in the spread of capitalism and globalization, which can both generate oppressive transnational movements as well as counter movements that challenge global inequity and injustice (Bacchetta et al. 2002; Balchin 2002). Online news media and forums, social media, and other ICTs are not neutral actors but rather active mediators of power through their role in framing issues and determining whose voices are heard and in what context. Despite their best intentions, some TFNs, like transnational media, become sucked into the driving premises of capitalism and are then unable to relate to the needs of some of the most oppressed and deprived sections of the citizenry.

Of critical interest in looking at social media’s role in the work of TFNs is the way in which difference and issues of power are negotiated in the blogosphere. If conflicting norms, values, and ideologies about women’s rights, women’s autonomy, and the terms of women’s access to public and private spheres—in other words, the stuff of citizenship—are articulated in virtual spaces by TFNs, then how are differences in perspectives negotiated? For Martin and Valenti, online activism has boundless power to bridge the gap between the stakeholders in the feminist movement: “It’s boundary-crossing work—cross-generational, cross-class, cross-race, cross just about every line that still divides us both within and outside of the feminist movement” (p. 4). Yet such networked activism remains powerless in closing the gap between the rich and the poor as well as the upper classes/ castes and socially marginalized people in accessing online technologies. These technologies include the use of video-blogging via YouTube; microblogging through Twitter, which allows people to post quick and short messages of no more than 140 characters from their mobile devices; and expressive blogging via Tumblr, a platform used by people to express themselves through essays, poems, or stories. The differences in the abilities of a variety of groups of people to access and use the Internet to circulate online petitions and post accounts of violence and other forms of injustice are still huge. Feminist mobilizing by the netizen-constituents of TFNs on “violence against women,” therefore, is marked not only by the tensions between cultural norms and universal values and between women and state institutions, but also by broader issues of power relations between and among feminists.

Feminist Conceptions of Citizenship: The Challenges of “Violence against Women”

Much of the scholarship on citizenship invokes the notion of the public sphere as the space for the exercise of the rights and responsibilities of the citizen. In the context of citizenship, the public sphere is clearly viewed differently from the private sphere: “Where the public sphere is seen in liberal political theory as the space of politics, power, and
civic engagement, the private sphere is seen as the familial space of intimacy and care, where all things personal are protected from the intrusive power of the state” (Kurian, Munshi, and Bartlett forthcoming). This dichotomy between the public and the private, however, has been challenged by many feminist scholars (e.g., Pateman 1989; Young 1990; Lister 1997; Okin 1998), who have pointed out the implicit gendered identification of men with the public realm and women with the private. Critical perspectives, including those of feminists, suggest the vital importance of recognizing the in separability of the public and the private, with due recognition “of the interrelationship of the individual to collective life, or personal to political life, instead of their separation and opposition” (Pateman 1989, 135).

That there can be no absolute definitions of citizenship is also evident in the critique of universalist assumptions about citizenship, which often marginalize those outside the mainstream (see, e.g., Young 1989; Fraser 1997; Kymlicka 1995; Dryzek 2000). Women of color/third world feminists, lesbian feminists, and others have in fact challenged the hegemony of white Western feminism and have demonstrated the myth of the unitary woman as as well as of a monolithic third world woman (Lister 1997; Mohanty 1988). Critiquing the homogenizing discourse of universal citizenship and a neutral polity, Young (1989, 251), for example, calls for the recognition of rights based on group differences in order to ensure the inclusion and participation of everyone in the public sphere. Yet ideas of group recognition run the risk of reifying essentialized identities that may undermine or suppress other forms of difference (Mouffe 1992; Phillips 1993, 2007), while lending themselves to other forms of oppressive practices in the name of culture, tradition, or religion.

Despite such contradictory tensions, citizenship remains an attractive ideal for many feminists, offering the possibility of a just, egalitarian, and equitable society (see, e.g., Dietz 1987; Lister 1997) because citizenship shifts the frame from passive “beneficiary” to active agents of change. Thus Lister (1997) calls for a “politics of solidarity in difference” (80) that recognizes the political subject “as made up of manifold, fluid, identities, which mirror the multiple differentiation of groups” (81). Treading the fault lines between the universalist conceptualization of citizenship and the anti-universalism of postmodernism, Lister argues for a “differentiated universalism” formed of a “dynamic synthesis of the universal and the particular which offers a way forward for a feminist formulation of citizenship” (Lister 1997, 90). She cites Young to argue that while universality as impartiality is a fiction to be rejected, it is still worthwhile to uphold the “universality of moral commitment”—a commitment to the idea of “equal moral worth and participation and inclusion of all persons” (Lister 1997, 88).

These tensions between the universal and the particular play out in the work of TFNs on the issue of violence against women. Feminist struggles on a range of issues at the national and local levels, including rape, sexual violence during conflict, domestic violence, female genital cutting, dowry deaths, and sex trafficking of girls and women, have been transformed in the last few decades into a common global concern about “violence against women.” As noted previously, the development of “norms of inclusivity” in the feminist movement alongside the recognition
of “material common interests, issue-frames, identities, and the support of powerful states” (Weldon 2006, 59) resulted in the acknowledgment of violence against women as one of the most significant women’s issues globally. Representing the convergence of two distinct movements—human rights and women’s rights—“violence against women” was created as an issue by TFNs through “naming, renaming, and working out definitions, whereby the concept... eventually unified many practices that in the early 1970s were not understood to be connected” (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 171). The framing of a diverse range of issues as violence against women “resonated with [a] transcultural consensus” (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 196) and thus helped sustain global advocacy networks. Although it took a long struggle by women’s groups, the United Nations finally passed the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1979. CEDAW has been ratified by 187 states to date and “forms the basis for national legislation to enable women to enjoy and exercise all human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural and other spheres based on the principles of non-discrimination and equality with men” (see chapter XX). Another successful push by women activists and organizations resulted in the UN conference on human rights in Vienna in 1993 recognizing women’s rights as human rights.

Given the time taken by women’s organizations to address issues of power differentials, structural inequalities, and divergent agendas, it is perhaps unsurprising that “violence against women” is not mentioned in the primary international document on CEDAW (although it is referenced in some CEDAW general recommendations and articles). Indeed, violence against women became a focus for the United Nations only beginning with the 1985 UN World Conference on Women in Nairobi. As Midori Kaga (2013) comments:

Part of the problem in trying to make gender equality a reality is the continued misconception that violence against women is a separate “women’s issue”. In fact, violence against women is one of the most visible outcomes of gender inequality: an inequality that is deeply woven into the social, economic, and political fabric of society, affecting men and women.

At the level of international response, however, a global policymaking forum that addresses the issue explicitly is the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW). The CSW was set up in 1946 by the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), dedicated exclusively to ensuring women’s equality and promoting women’s rights. Its mandate is to “prepare recommendations and reports to the Economic and Social Council on promoting women’s rights in political, economic, civil, social and educational fields” and to make recommendations “on urgent problems requiring immediate attention in the field of women’s rights” (ECOSOC 1946.). It meets annually to assess progress on gender equality and sets policies and standards to advance women’s empowerment.

The CSW has done pioneering work alongside other agencies of the UN to champion universal women’s rights and challenge entrenched gender inequalities, with some of its
greatest triumphs acknowledged to be the achievements of the 1994 Cairo Conference on Reproductive Rights and the 1995 World Conference on Women in Beijing. As Zwingel (2005) notes:

*Two factors helped the CSW to develop such a powerful position in a sometimes hostile organizational environment: first, the establishment of a separate women's place within the UN framework that enabled the delegates to define, elaborate and advance “women's rights, responsibilities, and contributions as citizens” (Galey 1995: 24). The second factor is the affiliation of the CSW within the UN and its simultaneous connection to nongovernmental women's organizations. NGO participation in CSW sessions was relatively high.*

In 2013 the CSW’s priority theme was elimination and prevention of all forms of violence against women and girls, having failed in 2003 to reach agreed conclusions on the issue. Although the CSW chose the topic of violence against women in 2003, global and national events and actions—such as the 50 Million Missing campaign against India’s “female genocide,” which continues to grow since its launch in 2006; the rape and death of a woman in December 2012 in Delhi; and the One Billion Rising global campaign to end violence against women, launched in February 2013—have added momentum to the cause. Yet at the same time, the CSW has faced sustained pressure from conservative governments and anti-choice/anti-abortion and religious organizations to roll back the gains on women’s rights made over the last few decades, especially on reproductive and sexual health, and the responsibility of governments to tackle gender violence. Despite intensive lobbying and counterlobbying, however, the CSW succeeded in getting consensus on a final document on violence against women at its meeting in March 2013.

This consensus notwithstanding, a perennial issue that continues to confront women’s activism from the global to the local is the conflict over the universality of women’s rights versus the particularities of religion, culture, and tradition. In part, women across the boundaries of states, class, ethnicity, sexuality, and race have always faced the reality of culture and national identity being written on their bodies, often in the form of practices that limit, in fundamental ways, their ability to exercise autonomy and protect bodily integrity. The CSW, comprised of member states (at least two of which currently challenge the universality of women’s rights as human rights in their official discourse), while working closely with women’s NGOs, constantly negotiates this tension as it seeks to articulate a statement of agreed conclusions each year that it can submit to the UN.

In what follows we first examine the definition and scope of the term “violence against women” (VAW) in the final agreement that emerged from the 2013 CSW meeting. We then examine two TFNs that were active at the CSW, looking in particular at their submissions to the CSW and the specific focus of their recommended actions on violence against women and girls. We analyze the implications of such constructions of VAW, focusing particularly on the tensions between the universal and the particular and the understandings of spatial politics that emerge in the struggles against VAW.
Such tensions resonate with the internal tensions that also mark women’s movements transnationally. We also look at what notions of citizenship are implicitly or explicitly invoked in online discussions on violence.

**The CSW and Violence against Women**

The 2013 CSW Draft Agreed Conclusion adopts the UN definition on violence against women referred to previously in this chapter. In addition to this comprehensive definition, the document spells out the causes of violence that women experience, covering historical and structural inequality in power relations between women and men, the use and abuse of power and control in public and private spheres, the link to gender stereotypes that underlie and perpetuate such violence, and the multiple forms of discrimination that expose women and girls to increased risk of violence.

The statement emphasizes the universality of women’s experience of violence across all societies and that women’s rights are human rights and therefore non-negotiable: “The Commission recognizes that all human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated and that the international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner” (Paragraph 15). In doing so, the commission stresses that even though “various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of states regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms” (Paragraph 15).

The statement identifies various forms of violence:

*Violence in armed conflict and post-conflict situations; the linkages between violence against women and girls and a range of other issues including education, health, HIV and AIDS, poverty eradication, food security, humanitarian assistance and crime prevention (Paragraph 20); the need for women’s economic empowerment and full and equal access to resources to address the structural and underlying causes of violence (Paragraph 19); violence in public spaces, including sexual harassment, which can limit women’s ability to exercise their human rights and fundamental freedoms (Paragraph 23); gender-related killing, such as femicide and foeticide (Paragraph 24); and the vulnerability of older women and indigenous women to discrimination and violence (Paragraphs 6 and 27).*

In addition, the statement includes detailed sections on the importance of strengthening the implementation of legal and policy frameworks and accountability in light of CEDAW and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Section B of the document is dedicated to “addressing structural and underlying causes and risk factors” in order to prevent violence against women.

For the first time the CSW included in its agreed conclusions a paragraph that addresses the link between VAW and information and communication technologies.
(ICTs). This echoes the comments of the Expert Meeting Group that met in November 2012 ahead of the 2013 CSW meeting:

For example, experts agreed that the role of new media presents a number of layered and complex challenges, as well as opportunities, for the prevention of violence against women and girls. In the first instance, new media is often a platform for the perpetuation of harmful masculinities and the objectification of women and girls. This can take a number of forms from everyday hyper-sexualised, one-dimensional images of women and girls to hard-core pornography which has moved from the peripheries to the mainstream of the pornography industry. Virtual spaces are also utilised to perpetuate direct attacks on women and girls. This can range from cyber-stalking to the posting of inappropriate images/videos of women. For example, women have increasingly reported incidents of footage of them engaged in sexual activity (filmed both with and without consent) being posted on internet sites without their consent. In a number of cases this has included the posting of footage of actual rapes.

The statement also provides an overview of the multifaceted approaches required to address violence against women, as well as the need to improve the “evidence base” through research on and analysis of violence against women and girls.

The CSW meeting in March 2013 resulted in some notable gains, as well as some losses. The very fact that there was an “agreed outcome document” was a victory, given the concerted efforts to prevent this. In addition, commentators pointed to the following major achievements: (1) inclusion of new text on protecting women working for women’s rights who face violence both because of their work and because of their gender (Section A, paragraph 2); (2) continued emphasis on sexual and reproductive rights, including the recommendation that emergency contraception and safe abortion be provided to women who have been raped (Section C, paragraph iii); (3) a call for the development of comprehensive sex education (Section B, paragraph k); (4) introduction of more specific language against “child, early and forced marriage” rather than just “child” marriage; and, (5) most significantly, the deletion by CSW chair Marjon Kamara of a contested paragraph that reaffirmed the sovereign right of each country to implement CSW recommendations “consistent with national laws and development priorities, with full respect for the various religious and ethical values and cultural backgrounds of its people.” This deletion countered earlier perceptions that women’s rights were “optional and provided a get-out clause for unsupportive governments” (Harvey 2013; Ford 2013).

Among issues that failed to make the concluding statement were sexual orientation and gender identity, as well as protection for sex workers. Women activists also noted the push to strengthen the traditional concept of the heterosexual “family” as the most important unit in society to combat violence rather than recognize and support women as individuals (Harvey 2013), even though the home is the site where women are most likely to encounter violence.

Overall, the CSW final agreement on violence is marked by a broad inclusion of many of the most egregious kinds of violence experienced by women and girls that need to be tackled by states through a combination of institutional responses, legislation, enforcement of human rights provisions, and a commitment to bring about changes in values.
through the transformation of repressive cultural traditions and practices. But as an activist commenting on the efforts of governments to overturn international commitments to protecting women’s rights noted, “Women’s rights have become a kind of bartering chip to be traded away for political agendas that have little or nothing to do with the interests and wellbeing of women and girls” (Vivian Thabet quoted in Ford 2013). It is in neutralizing the political agendas of nation-states that TFNs play an important role.

TFNs Mobilizing on Violence against Women

The significance of the CSW’s work is that, unlike many other UN agencies, it has been heavily influenced by women’s NGOs, including TFNs and grassroots organizations, which provide input, lobbying, and resources to the process of negotiating issues around gender equality. Much of this negotiation is carried out online, straddling different notions of citizenship and core tensions of feminist politics such as those of universal values versus cultural specificity and the spatial politics of the global versus the local. We look specifically at the workings of two TFNs that have devoted significant attention to violence against women. Women Living under Muslim Laws (WLUML), founded in 1984 by Algerian feminist Marieme Helie Lucas, brings together grassroots activists from formal and informal organizations, individual women, and scholars across the Muslim world. It won an award for the “top non-profit group” to work on violence against women.\(^2\) 50 Million Missing, an online feminist global advocacy campaign started by India-based author and activist Rita Banerjee in 2006, raises awareness about the “female gendercide” in India.

Although there are significant differences between these two TFNs in scope, kinds of actions undertaken, and the political ideologies that shape them, both are fiercely critical of patriarchal and misogynistic social and political structures, cultural relativism, and religious fundamentalism. The following discussion draws on the information available on their Web sites, feminist scholarship on the WLUML (see, e.g., Shaheed 1994; Ackerly 2000; Balchin 2002; and Moghadam 2005), as well as the extensive writings of the founder of 50 Million Missing. In the writings and actions of these TFNs we can also see how power and powerlessness coexist in varying ways and how particular ideas of women’s citizenship are articulated in the work that they do.

The WLUMUL

The WLUMUL describes itself as “an international solidarity network that provides information, support and a collective space for women whose lives are shaped, conditioned or governed by laws and customs said to derive from Islam” (http://www.wluml.org/). It is especially well known for its “Violence Is Not Our Culture” campaign, which focuses
on challenging religious and cultural impunity (http://www.violenceisnotourculture.org/). Started in 1984 in response to several instances of human rights violations against Muslim women, the WLUML has grown slowly and organically to create a powerful network of more than two thousand women across forty countries (Shaheed 1994). These women have a range of views on Islam, women’s rights, faith, and secularism, and the WLUML offers avenues to learn and exchange information about these differences, thus illuminating the diversity of views and practice within the Muslim world. It seeks to create and strengthen networks of solidarity between women and women’s groups within Muslim communities and provide support for their struggles “by creating the means and channels needed to support their efforts internationally from within and outside the Muslim world” (Shaheed, 1994, 1006).

The WLUML thus harnesses the power of globalization to challenge identity politics, nationalist politics, and democratization processes that ignore women’s rights (Moghadam 2005, 155). It is sharply critical of oppressive practices—honor crimes, female genital mutilation, and others—that are justified in the name of culture, whether in Muslim-dominated societies or Western liberal democracies with superficial policies on multiculturalism (Moghadam 2005). The agenda for action is locally driven and aims to create national and international solidarity for specific cases of attacks on women and for broader women’s issues (Shaheed 1994; Ackerly 2000; Moghadam 2005; see also Moghadam [chapter XX] for a discussion on local activists seeking transnational connections).

Although the WLUML has no formal links with UN agencies, it has participated in UN events such as the pivotal UN Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993, the UN Conference on Population and Development in Cairo in 1994, and the 57th CSW meeting in New York in March 2013. At the CSW meeting, the WLUML hosted a panel on “stop stoning forever” with its partners, the Stop Stoning Forever Campaign (Iran), the Research Institute for Women Peace & Security (Afghanistan), the Women’s Intercultural Network, and the Women’s UN Report Network. The partners also submitted a statement against stoning, where they called on all states

> where stoning still exists in law and in practice to abide by their international human rights obligations, banning stoning through legislative measures and holding perpetrators accountable to law. This includes Iran and Mauritania, two Member States currently sitting on the UN Commission of the Status of Women.

(AWID 2013)

Pointing out that women are disproportionately the victim of stoning, the statement describes stoning as a “cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment” that cannot be tolerated, arguing that “the universality of human rights must be upheld.” The statement then moves from this universalist position to the repudiation of the specific claim that such a practice is Islamic:

> Even though there is no direct reference to this form of punishment in the Quran, stoning is often claimed to be part of “Islamic Law”. There is absolutely no consensus amongst the global Muslim community over the validity of the practice as “Islamic
Law”, and many clerics, scholars and Muslim-majority States have prohibited stoning, as a violation of human rights.

(AWID 2013)

The WLUMIL also was a named supporter to a statement from the Arab Caucus of NGOs at the CSW 57 that called upon Arab governments to stop using justifications based on religion, culture, tradition or nationality to block the progress of laws at all levels, including in the sphere of international law and at this 57th session of the CSW. These justifications must be challenged. The violence they cause is unacceptable and cannot ever be condoned or tolerated.

The WLUMIL has thus challenged attempts by states to use and abuse ideas of cultural relativism to defend violence against women. The on-the-ground work by the WLUMIL embodies in many ways the “women, culture, and development” paradigm (Bhavnani, Foran, and Kurian 2003) that recognizes the centrality of women’s agency and the active creation of new cultures of change by women and men at all levels of society in any effort to bring about transformative social change. Its extraordinary work notwithstanding, the WLUMIL too experiences internal and external conflict and criticism. Shaheed (1994, 1018), a key member of the WLUMIL, comments:

[T]he network can simultaneously be seen as being “too Islamic” and not Islamic enough (or of consisting of people who “go about Islam in the wrong way”) . . . . Some local, national, or regional women’s groups with conflicting analyses and priorities may seek to become the exclusive WLUMIL links in their country; others may want WLUMIL activities and networking to encompass only like-minded organizations. A few feel that WLUMIL should only be a network of Muslim women, excluding all who fall outside such a definition . . . From outside the network, a few parties feel that WLUMIL’s activities (especially the human rights alerts for action) contribute to a negative image of Islam and Muslims or of a particular country.

Similarly, Balchin comments:

The network is an entity that does not exist totally in the “imagined community” of a feminist cyberspace (although the strength of networking linkages depends considerably on the use of the Internet). Nor does it exist purely on the ground (although the strength of linkages equally depends upon the solidarity and warmth of face-to-face interaction). It is imagined and real, global and local, which presents challenges both in terms of sustaining linkages and funding.

(2002 128–129)

Clearly, the WLUMIL actively negotiates issues of power and powerlessness daily in its interactions among its members, its formulation of its action plan (done in face-to-face meetings), and the actual work it undertakes. In the staunch endorsement of the universalist discourse of women’s rights as human rights, it upholds Young’s (1989) notion of “the universality of moral commitment” that is uncompromising on the need to recognize women’s equal status in the public and private spheres. It is no doubt true that their
critique of state and religious practices against Muslim women feeds into already existing negative stereotypes of Islam in the West and could serve neoinperialist agendas of invasion and war. Yet they also forcefully articulate sharp critiques of the US invasion of Iraq, the bombing of Afghanistan, and the overlooking of women’s continued oppression even in countries where so-called democratic regimes have been installed, illuminating their central argument that both patriarchy and capitalist forces must be stopped. Thus, the WLUML appears to successfully create a deliberative space where active discussion and debate is fostered and where “norms of inclusivity” (Weldon 2006) have been robust enough to continue strengthening the linkages between women in the Muslim world.

We now turn to a network that has not sought formal institutional support from international organizations but is still committed to a core concern of the CSW. Unlike WLUML, which regularly participates in CSW meetings, 50 Million Missing works outside institutional frameworks. However, its advocacy campaign to end female genocide in India is aligned with the CSW’s concern about violent gender-related killings of women and girls, even in countries where opposing the concept of femicide has been incorporated in national legislation.

50 Million Missing

The 50 Million Missing campaign was started in 2006 on Flickr, an online photo-sharing and organizing platform, by Rita Banerji, an Indian writer and activist. A separate Web site for the campaign was started in 2008 and identifies its three primary goals as (1) to raise public awareness and consciousness nationally and globally of the “scale of the ongoing female genocide” and to urge community-based action for justice; (2) to lobby for international acknowledgment of genocide under the 1948 UN Convention on Genocide Act; and (3) to lobby for time-bound governmental and international action to end the genocide: “We want to have the government of India commit to a time-line within which India’s female genocide will be contained, and all associated practices like dowry, dowry murders, infanticides and feticides eradicated” (http://genderbytes.wordpress.com/about/).

The campaign is driven by and centered on its founder, although it has supporters and activists in a number of countries. According to Banerji (2009), “the campaign is run entirely by volunteers. There are six administrators and four moderators from seven countries all working online. Our Flickr site is supported by 2000+ contributing photographers from over 25 countries, and has a photo gallery of more than 13,000 photos of Indian girls and women.” Thus, it represents one form of a TFN that functions predominantly via electronic media, using the Internet and a variety of social media to raise awareness and instigate action for change.

The trigger for starting the campaign occurred when Banerji began research for her book *Sex and Power: Defining History, Shaping Societies* (2006), which explores gender and sexuality, including ideas about sexual morality and customs, in Indian society over four periods spanning three thousand years. Its central argument is not radical in itself: the sexual morality of a society is shaped by the dominant power structure at any
given time. But she argues that the dominant patriarchal ideology of society is driving what she terms the current female genocide in India. Commenting on the nature, scale, and horror of the violence perpetrated against women, she says:

*In another two decades, India will have annihilated 20 percent of its female population. To get an estimate of how many women that would be, add up the entire populations of Sweden, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium and Portugal. In less than a century, more than 50 million women have been targeted simply for being female and wiped out from India. Millions have been killed before birth. Millions killed as infants. Millions killed as little girls. Thousands killed as new brides. Thousands killed as they are forced through repeated, back-to-back, unsafe abortions to get rid of girls. Thousands more killed for so-called “honor” or branded as “witches” and mob lynched. And many burnt alive as widows on the pyres of their husbands. Killed at every stage of life–simply for being female! There is no other human group in history that has been persecuted and annihilated on this scale. So, how did the world close its eyes to this?*

(Banerji 2012)

Banerji argues that there is a lack of response both globally and within India because alongside a general lack of awareness of the magnitude of the issue, the way in which the issue has been dealt with in terms of numbers, ratios, and statistics of “missing women” has dehumanized the violence. Furthermore, she argues that violence against women has been internalized and normalized by society to such an extent that despite the scale of the violence against girls and women in India, little action has been taken (Banerji, 2012). She states:

*But I think the worst part of it is that while all other forms of systemic and mass-scale violence are seen at some conscious level as outrageous by people everywhere, the female genocide in India doesn’t evoke the same response (though I think now it is beginning to). I realized that violence against women is actually internalized by societies—particularly in India—but even in the west. At some deep, collective level of social thought we’re adjusted, we have normalized violence on women and girls, in a way that would be otherwise abnormal and unacceptable when inflicted on any other group. The female genocide in India is therefore not just a statement on India, but it is a statement on how the global community thinks of violence and women.*

(Banerji in Hefferon 2013)

The 50 Million Missing campaign voices a powerful critique of patriarchal culture with its inherent misogyny and devaluation of women. It points a finger at the stark brutality of the violence that sees even a “model” development state like Kerala, with a positive female-male ratio (see, e.g., Amartya Sen’s work on the Kerala model of development), now reported to have an increasingly skewed child sex ratio, possibly because of female foeticide (Viju 2012). The global reach of the campaign continues to spread the message, thereby meeting the first of its goals of raising public awareness, but there is little evidence yet of how effective it has been. Certainly there appears to be little chance of getting international agreement to label the ongoing violence as genocide, as defined by the United Nations.
From a feminist perspective, the campaign appears to embody key elements of a radical feminist take on violence against women. The primary emphasis on patriarchy as the explanation for the ongoing violence against women has resulted in ignoring the multiplicity of intersecting realities that frame women's lives, including class, caste, and ethnicity. Thus, nowhere in 50 Million Missing’s campaigns and writings do we see any kind of attention to the sustained oppression that Dalits (the lowest castes in the social hierarchy) have faced over millennia, specifically the violence meted out to Dalit women. Banerji’s discussion of the relation of Vedic culture, laws of Manu, and other historical religious roots to the low status of women fails to acknowledge that these norms were primarily focused on a “caste” society (that permeated all religious communities), but not the millions who were outside the boundaries of caste: the Adivasi (indigenous/tribal) communities and those recognized by the Indian Constitution as the Scheduled Castes. The relative freedoms and more equitable gender relations that have historically marked these communities are ignored. The broad sweep approach to violence against women in India thus elides the nuances, contradictions, tensions, and multiple facets that are part of a complex reality.

Banerji (2012) is also fiercely critical of Indian feminists, who, she states, reject “the notion of a deep-rooted, tradition-fed gender hierarchy in India, defined, dominated and exploited by men” and also deny the role of “patriarchal oppression” in explaining the status of women. Such criticism is undoubtedly important to voice and justified in specific instances, but here again her tarring of all “Indian feminists” with the same brush ignores the vibrant and diverse movements and voices in the country, many of which have been in the forefront of decades of activism against violence. Banerji’s writings, which form the basis for the campaign, also embrace universal ideas of human rights, while culture is viewed as an unsalvageable source of oppression for all women. The campaign’s ideas of citizenship, therefore, leave little room for negotiating the particularities of culture in any form.

Ackerly points out that “in order for social criticism to reflect the views of the vocal and the silent, critics need to promote inquiry, deliberative opportunities, and institutional change in the society. . . No critic alone could adequately provide an account of a diverse reality” (2000, 174). Does 50 Million Missing fulfill these criteria? Although the campaign provides an important voice of critique, it appears less able to grapple with the tensions of power and powerlessness among women and the importance of being inclusive of the multidimensional aspects of the transnational feminist struggle against violence. It appears thereby to forego the possibilities of building feminist alliances and providing spaces for deliberative discussions.

Having examined the contested ideas of citizenship reflected in the flows and ebbs of power and powerlessness in the online organizing of TFNs with a global reach, we now discuss how these ideas compare with the ones that surface in discussions on violence against women in specific local contexts. Following the online discussions of the much-publicized Delhi gang-rape also allows us to explore the intersections between virtual and place-based politics of gender and cultural violence.
Online Protests against Violence at a Local Level: The Delhi Case

On December 16, 2012, a young woman was brutally gang-raped on a bus in Delhi while returning home with a friend after a movie. The rape and subsequent death of the twenty-three-year-old woman, a physiotherapy student, triggered an outpouring of protest across the country led by young people. Women’s organizations, lawyers, celebrities, university students, and others participated in these protests on an unprecedented scale. The mobilization of tens of thousands of people around India received extensive media attention both nationally and internationally. Uniquely for India, where “old ICTs” such as radio, television, and print media dominate, social media networks were widely used for the first time by activists and the media to disseminate information and updates about the protests, as well as to debate and discuss the problem of violence against women in India. Thoughtful blogs by women and men were posted on Facebook, as were links to news articles and commentaries on the issue, generating wide-ranging discussions.

After initially catching the political establishment off guard, the protests led to the government of India setting up the Justice Verma Committee to submit a report within a month offering recommendations on appropriate reforms to existing laws to address sexual assault. The committee received more than eighty thousand submissions from jurists, women’s groups, civil society organizations, and individuals and submitted a widely acclaimed report with major recommendations in January 2013, the most significant of which were ultimately ignored in the Criminal Law (Reform) Ordinance that was passed by Parliament in February 2013.

The Delhi case reignited intense discussions in India on what was seen to be a deep-rooted culture of misogyny, manifesting in violence against women and girls in numerous forms, from female foeticide; to multiple forms of sexual harassment of women in public spaces; to rape not only within the family but also perpetrated by the police, the armed forces, and the upper castes/classes. Although violence against women in general, and sexual assault and rape specifically, has perhaps always been prevalent in India—both within marriage and outside the home—there has been a staggering increase in the incidence of reported violence. For example, according to the 2011 statistics from the National Crime Records Bureau, there has been a 792 percent increase in reported rape since 1971, dwarfing other serious crimes such as murder (106 percent) and kidnapping (298 percent).

There is no dearth of feminist analysis of the causes of violence against women in India. Butalia (2011), for example, comments:

And then came another valuable lesson: the understanding that, no matter which way you looked at it, the crime of rape proliferated not only because of social attitudes, but because of a tacit agreement among men—policemen, lawyers, judges, investigating
officers, politicians—that women who were raped were somehow asking for it. And that the fact of growing urbanization, of women entering different kinds of jobs added to the threat—for women were now in the running, too, venturing into what has so far been male territory.

Similarly, a columnist for the Guardian, Yasmin Alibhai-Brown (2013) stated: “The rape and murder of the young Delhi student in India, or physical violations in the Congo, South Africa and so many other lands, are a backlash against emancipation and equality.”

The routinized nature of sexual assault is evident in the general apathy thus far displayed by the news media and society at large in reporting violence against women—it was no longer seen as significant “news” or newsworthy as such, getting only a short paragraph or so. So what made this particular Delhi case different from the numerous instances of rape reported in every city every day? Why this case, and why now? The answers to these questions have been varied, including attributing the response to a middle-class/upper-caste reaction to an attack on “one of their own” (as opposed to the numerous attacks reported on lower-caste and tribal women and girls). Perhaps it was the sense that the victim represented the educational and professional aspirations of millions of urban youths, or that no finger could be pointed at her dress code or her “respectability,” or perhaps it was the fact that her male companion survived and was able to narrate the grotesque and graphic story of the attack.

Commentators in India have also pointed out several noteworthy aspects of the recent protests. Shakil (2013), for example, identifies three distinct issues marking the protests. First, she points out that reports on incidents of rape are usually followed by advice to women to change their behavior—their dress, their movement out of the house in the evenings, and so on—so that they do not “provoke” attacks. This time, women fought back, their creative and powerful slogans reclaiming the freedom of the public space on their own terms and circulating globally on social media: “mahilaein mange azadi, sadak pe chalne ki, raat mein nikalne ki, kuch bhi pehenne ki” (women demand freedom, to walk on the streets, to go out at night, to wear anything); “nazare teri buri, chehra main chupaun?” (you are the one giving the bad/evil eye, why should I hide my face?); and “meri skirt say uunchi meri awaaz hai” (my voice is higher than my skirt) (Shakil 2013). Second, unlike previous mobilization by activists in India on issues such as rape and dowry deaths, which were marked almost exclusively by women protesting and pushing for reform, this time the protests involved young men and women in large numbers. Shakil (2013) argues that “this may be a turning point in our country, wherein, women’s issues have transitioned into gender issues.” Third, the protests “have given rise to one of the most widespread and democratic debates in our country on women’s rights” (Shakil 2013), a debate in which young people have taken the lead. These vibrant discussions, carried out as much in online forums as in face-to-face gatherings and meetings, have revolved around varying aspects of women’s rights, ranging from analysis of the causes of the ubiquitous violence against women and girls in India, to the nature of governmental
The Dialectics of Power and Powerlessness

and institutional response to this issue and what such response ought to be, to strategies for addressing these issues. It is important to keep in mind that these conversations did not take place in isolation.

The proliferation of social media networks has allowed TFNs to foster cross-national linkages between and among feminists and civil society in unprecedented ways today. This has also led to greater access to global and national policymaking forums—although with what effect remains to be seen.

**Potential and Limits of ICTs**

The WLUMM, the 50 Million Missing Campaign, and the Delhi case demonstrate that TFNs do provide a platform for the local articulations of issues, particularly through debates and discussions facilitated by the use of ICTs. The local-global link is evidenced by recent discussions held online regarding the post-MDG agenda. For example, The World We Want Beyond 2015, a Web platform, was set up by the UN and Beyond 2015 (a global civil society campaign comprising more than seven hundred organizations) to inform the deliberations of the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda set up by the UN Secretary General.

Gender inequality was the third most popular topic discussed under the theme of inequalities (http://trends.worldwewant2015.org), with violence against women being a major focus. The seven priority areas of the online discussions on the World We Want Beyond 2015 voice many of the concerns of the WLUMM, the 50 Million Missing Campaign, and those protesting the Delhi case, including the need for investing in changing people’s mindsets about gendered norms, examining masculinity, engaging men and boys in violence prevention, and ensuring greater accountability of state and non-state actors for ending violence against women.

Similarly, the “Synthesis Report on the Global Thematic Consultation on Addressing Inequalities,” which was submitted to the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons, points out that “the prevalence of violence against women and girls across the world is a matter of profound importance and concern. Gender-based violence, directed against women and girls because they are female, or affecting them disproportionately, is perhaps amongst the most universal of deep social ills, representing a systematic pattern of behaviour, characteristic of many societies” (UNICEF and UN Women 2013, 38). The report clearly shows how honor killings (an issue central to the work of the WLUMM), sex-selective abortions (the focus of the 50 Million Missing Campaign), and sexual violence (the Delhi case) reflect the “severe diminution of the perceived humanity of women and girls” (UNICEF and UN Women 2013, 36).

The issue of violence against women and girls also found its way into “A New Global Partnership,” the Report of the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda. While acknowledging that a one-size-fits-all development
agenda was bound to prove ineffective, the report categorically states “in a few cases the ambition for the whole world should be the same: to establish minimum standards for every citizen. No one should live in extreme poverty, or tolerate violence against women and girls” (United Nations 2013, 15).

Given that ICTs play such a significant role in how TFNs articulate their agendas and advocate for their inclusion in global policy documents, it is also important to consider their limitations. Who has access and which platforms they have access to significantly influence what issues “trend.” Although the Delhi case saw an outpouring of disgust and fury, the gang-rape of four minor girls in Jharkhand (India) subsequently (http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/articles/490982/20130716/india-gang-rape-school-girl-pakur.htm) has not made a blip in the blogosphere. And although the far-reaching recommendations of the Justice Verma Commission set up as a result of the Delhi case received some attention, the watered-down adoption of the recommendations in the new “anti-rape law” (The Criminal Law [Amendment] Act 2013) did not see mass street protests or much discussion in online forums, except on some men’s rights forums. One such forum, managed by the Save Indian Family Foundation (SIFF), in fact saw the Verma Commission’s report as another attack on their human rights. A press release by a coalition of (men’s) NGOs under the umbrella of SIFF sought to

highlight the shocking level of biased and anti-male legal recommendations released by the Justice Verma committee. The coalition is shocked and finds it hard to believe that given the credibility and collective legal experience of the committee how could the committee choose and include only archaic and highly dangerous clauses and exclude female sexual predators who are guilty of committing sexual assault. While the human rights, social rights, and legal rights of women were brought up many times by Justice Verma, none of the same rights have been conferred on men through his legal recommendations. Men cannot expect to get a fair trial should any of these recommendations come into existence. (http://legalfighter.wordpress.com/2013/01/25/press-release-mens-rights-organizations-condemn-justice-verma-recommendations/)

This warped reaction from a male-centric group suggests that ICTs are not just a technology but also create a space for forming and expanding issue-based networks and counter-networks. Who uses them and how they are used “influence how activists form and shape the social movements” (Lim 2012, 234). As Dalton (2006), Micheletti and McFarland (2011), and others suggest, what we are seeing emerge are new ways to express citizenship beyond voting at elections. These technology-mediated means for citizen activism and expressing citizenship are successful to the extent that they create a sense of shared identity, “a perception among individuals that they are members of a larger community by virtue of the grievances they share. ICTs may be able to foster collective identity across a dispersed population, which organizers can then mobilize in support of collective action” (Christensen 2011).

On the flip side, extensive reliance on these types of technology can marginalize those with limited or no access and in doing so to some extent redefines who does and does not get to express their citizenship, as well as whose voices do and don’t get heard.
Yet another critique is the extent to which these new forms of citizens’ participation reflect “slacktivism” (Christensen 2011). It is easy to press “Like” on a Facebook campaign, retweet a call to action, or sign an online petition. The question is whether this is enough to sustain a slow ongoing process of social transformation, especially when we are talking about fundamental issues such as violence against women. According to Christensen (2011), recent research suggests that while we need to be cautious about making tall claims in favor of ICT-mediated forms of citizen activism, there is a positive though weak link between online activism and off-line political participation. In no way does this mean that the former will replace the latter, but online activism can reinvigorate and reinforce off-line political activism. This is true of the work of TFNs as well. As Desai (chapter XX) observes, there are “multiple sites . . . real and virtual” that will create dynamic and diverse TFN interactions to respond to “the changing topography of women’s lives.”

**Conclusion**

TFNs have successfully used ICTs to create live, fluid, and open spaces for building awareness, facilitating animated discussions, and creating networks among feminists and activists to initiate global action on violence against women. But as our study of two TFNs using ICTs and a case study of unprecedented social media attention on a rape case in India has shown, online spaces are much more complex than they may appear to be. If women activists in feminist networks gain power in some contexts, they are rendered powerless in others, amid the tensions between the global and the local; access and exclusion; and the competing dynamics of caste, class, and race. What we know very little about is when and under what circumstances online activism spills over into the real world and what impact this has on political decision making. This needs to be the focus of future research.

**Acknowledgments**

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Notes

1. Weldon does, however, acknowledge that at the UN World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1995, a landmark event that galvanized the world’s women, although feminists still had the thorny issue of inequality within the women’s movement, they were able to come together on the Beijing Platform for Action, which included violence against women as one of twelve focus areas.


References


CHAPTER 36

BECAUSE I AM A GIRL
The Emergence of Girls in Development

SARAH HENDRICKS AND KESHET BACHAN

INTRODUCTION

On October 11, 2012, the world celebrated the first International Day of the Girl (World Bank 2011b). This landmark event reflects the successful emergence of girls and young women as a distinct cohort in development policy, programming, campaigning, and research. The global attention to, investment in, and research on girls as a discrete category, set apart from “women” and “children,” have been increasing steadily since the late 1990s.

The international development and aid discourse focused on adolescent girls takes us on a journey through a world that has undergone rapid changes in a very short time. The rise of information and communications technologies (ICTs), a period of economic boom followed by a financial downturn, rising food and fuel prices, climate shocks and large-scale natural disasters, rapid urbanization, and the largest youth demographic in history are but a few of the processes that have underpinned, contributed to, and shaped the focus on girls that has emerged over the past two decades.

At the same time the discursive process that has driven the emergence of girls as a distinct cohort in international development may be understood within the context of feminist activism and scholarship globally. In tracing the origins of shifting donor agendas that have led to new measures that target girls, such as the World Bank’s Adolescent Girls Initiative (World Bank 2010 and the Department for International Development’s “Girl Hub” (DFID 2009), it is essential to begin with the emergence of a new conceptualization of women’s rights that originated in the mid-1990s.

At the UN Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, the global community reinforced the concept “women’s rights are human rights,” first officially articulated at the UN World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993. This critical inflection in the history of the women’s movement was the culmination of a process that
had been energized by the UN’s designation of International Women’s Year (1975) and the Decade for Women (1976–1985), which sought to reimagine the role of women and of gender as a category within the development discourse. This fundamental shift in the way in which women were defined within the international development and aid discourse and programming was pivotal. The move from women as an add-on issue in poverty alleviation efforts to gender as an integrative concept that seeks to challenge unequal patriarchal power relations between men and women uncovered the ways in which structural forms of discrimination were preventing women from accessing their fundamental human rights. The heart of this change was concerned with social relations and the ways in which gender inequality turns relations between girls and boys and women and men into unequal power relations. Gender analysis and gender mainstreaming policy and programming efforts sought to examine these relations to reveal how unequal power leads to unequal realization of basic rights. “Women’s rights as human rights” brought together concepts of gender equality and human rights and catapulted the global feminist agenda into the center of development efforts.

The World Conference in Beijing framed the importance of women’s and girls’ empowerment as a critical pathway for the achievement of gender equality and human rights. The Beijing Platform for Action offered a comprehensive body of far-reaching policy recommendations in twelve “critical areas of concern,” thus translating unequal power relations between men/boys and women/girls into concrete actions to be undertaken and supported by governments as primary duty bearers and by a host of other institutions. For example, the Beijing Platform called on governments to “recognize shared work and parental responsibilities between women and men” (UN, 1996: art. 190.i) at home, in the workplace, and in the political sphere. The Beijing Platform shifted the discourse from women as beneficiaries to women as agents of change. This led to women’s voices, participation, and leadership becoming a prominent feature in the development discourse, rendering decision makers more accountable to women and girls (Sweetman 2012). The Beijing Platform was also the first UN World Conference on Women document to specifically mention “the girl child” as a separate category (representing the twelfth “critical area of concern”), stating that “the human rights of women and of the girl child are an inalienable, integral and indivisible part of universal human rights” (United Nations 1996: art. 213).

The emergence of key feminist concepts such as “women’s rights as human rights,” empowerment, and gender equality as tenets of international development interventions was closely interrelated with a burgeoning body of feminist scholarship and its adoption by mainstream development agendas. 1 Naila Kabeer, a feminist scholar, succinctly captures this interplay:

While concerns with women’s empowerment have their roots in grassroots mobilisations of various kinds, feminist scholars helped to move these concerns onto the gender and development agenda . . . My own contribution to these attempts sought to translate feminist insights into a policy-oriented analytical framework.

(Kabeer 2012: 5)
As the decade drew to a close and the Millennium Declaration and accompanying goals were put forward, the idealism of the 1990s was subsumed by a more market-led approach to development. According to Ananya Roy, the shift from the “modernization of developing countries” to the language of “poverty alleviation for the bottom billion” allowed for a gentler form of international aid discourse that rested heavily on moral grounds (Roy 2010). This new “Millennial Development” had turned poverty into a global issue that relied on “the modern, Western, self who is not only aware of poverty’s devastating impact but is empowered to act upon it in responsible ways” (Roy 2010: 529).

However, while translating feminist agendas into policy terms, some of the deeper understandings of unequal power structures that underpin gender relations were lost. According to Kabeer, the “conceptualisation of women’s empowerment in terms of agency proved influential in policy circles, although with varying degrees of attention to broader structures which constrained women’s agency” (Kabeer 2012: 6).

The Millennial Development process was in many ways assisted by a new and ultimately contested approach to realizing women’s rights promoted at the World Conference, namely gender mainstreaming. Since then gender mainstreaming has become almost ubiquitous in development institutions at all levels, with approaches varying substantively among actors and through different interpretations (Derbyshire 2012). Gender mainstreaming has been viewed by some as a success, with regard to the adoption by mainstream development institutions of strategic processes for achieving gender equality and the transformation of institutions from within. Others have asserted that gender mainstreaming has led to the evaporation of the political sting of the feminist agenda in development and is inextricably linked to the neoliberal project of economic growth (and not rights). As one author noted:

*Gender mainstreaming has been a major player in the “undoing” of a grassroots feminist project. Neoliberal governance organisations have effectively taken up the feminist project capturing its justice-based concepts such as empowerment and economising them so that girls become noticeable for their potential to yield economic growth through efficiencies.*

(Shain 2010)

While gender mainstreaming, heralded by global feminisms and women’s movements, may have sought to advance a transformative vision of development, the perspectives and priorities of women and girls are still missing from key decision-making bodies, and feminist economics “remains far from the mainstream” (Sweetman 2012: 390). Agenda-setting mainstreaming, which focuses explicitly on women’s and girls’ rights, remains in many institutions a distorted vision caught up in the complexities of “integrationist” approaches.

The shift toward Millennial Development and the uptake of gender mainstreaming by international development institutions and actors are inextricably linked to the shift from focusing on women to an emerging focus on girls (see Table 36.1 for the definition of “girls” as a category). As we argue in this chapter, the positioning of girls as drivers of poverty reduction, alongside public mobilization in campaigns to end poverty,
has produced a new transnational “girls in development” movement that has become a prominent voice of the millennial generation.

The rise of girls in the international development discourse corresponds with the emergence of youth as an important marker of political, economic, and social participation, as for the first time in recorded history half of the world’s population is under twenty-five years old (Population Council 2002: 17). The majority of these young people live in developing countries, and it is estimated that by 2025 they will comprise 89.5 percent of the world’s population, a staggering figure (United Nations 2006).

This “global youth bulge” is a consequence of rapid development, as resource poor countries are seeing declining infant mortality while fertility rates remain high. Statistics reveal that in sub-Saharan and northern Africa, almost 40 percent of the population is under age fifteen, and nearly 70 percent is under age thirty (Lin 2012). In fragile states in Africa this figure is even higher, with almost 75 percent of the population being under thirty years of age (Lin 2012). Increasing urbanization is directly affected by the global youth bulge. For the first time in history, there are now more people living in cities than in rural areas. Each month five million people are added to the cities of the developing world, the majority of whom are under the age of eighteen (Plan International, 2010: 11). It is estimated that by 2030 approximately 1.5 billion girls will live in urban areas (Plan International 2010: 11).

From a development perspective, the rise of young people living in poor countries holds great challenges, but also great promise. As young people enter the labor force, they become a source of potential economic prosperity and contribute significantly to wealth creation (and concomitantly, poverty reduction). However, if they are met by high unemployment rates in a market that cannot absorb their numbers or offer productive employment, they become a source of risk and potentially of political unrest (Lin 2012). And the “impact of the youth bulge will be extremely severe in the countries least prepared to cope with it” (McCarney 2013), especially in those countries suffering from poverty and political fragility. In poor countries the combination of small, underdeveloped labor markets and poor-quality education systems means that young people are entering the global economy with few relevant skills and capabilities. In many parts

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**Table 36.1. Girls and Young Women Defined**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defining girls and young women</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For the purpose of clarity and uniformity, we refer in this chapter to the following age ranges, as defined by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Girls:</strong> 0–18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adolescent girls:</strong> early: 10–13; middle: 14–16; late: 17–19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Young women:</strong> 18–24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We recognize that these categories are not homogenous groups; there are overlaps; and they may differ based on location, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and other markers. However, in order to discuss global trends and analyze an emerging transnational movement, some generalizations have been made.</td>
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</table>

of sub-Saharan Africa, girls and boys leave school without being able to read or write, sentencing them to a life of poverty and simultaneously creating an economic burden on a national scale.

Research and data indicating the need for urgent investment in the youth demographic in the interest of socioeconomic development and political stability have also uncovered the gender dynamics of girls’ economic potential. One report noted that “simply because of their numbers, adolescent girls ages 10–19 and young women ages 20–24, and the boys and young men who will so strongly influence their lives, merit the attention of public policymakers and private sector leaders” (Levine et al. 2009: 1). At the same time, research also began to emerge that linked young women with higher productivity rates and better financial management (Pitt, Khandker, and Cartwright 2003). Coupled with the imperative to ensure that young people in developing countries were equipped to enter the labor market and contribute to productivity and economic growth, the need to educate and train girls and young women who were being viewed as “engines of growth” became increasingly part of the development discourse (ILO 2009).

**Girls: The Silver Bullet**

In 1993 Larry Summers, then chief economist at the World Bank, stated that “[e]ducating girls yields a higher rate of return than any other investment in the developing world” (World Bank 1995). This statement has gone through a number of reincarnations, attesting to the allure of an agenda that links children’s education, girls’ empowerment, and economic growth. Two decades after the original statement was made, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon echoed Summers’s sentiment with added emphasis on familial, local and national development potential (United Nations Radio 2013). The notion of driving economic prosperity and poverty reduction through strategic and targeted investment in girls is supported by numerous studies that have fueled interest in the emerging field of girls in development.

Initial evidence pointed to the economic gains of investing in girls through intergenerational and reproductive impacts. In 1994 the World Bank published research showing that “in Africa, children of mothers who receive five years of primary education are forty percent more likely to live beyond age five” (cited in Herz and Sperling 2004: 4). Further evidence from the same period linked the education of girls to improvements in children’s health. In 1993 Schultz published research indicating that “an extra year of girls’ education can reduce infant mortality by five to ten percent” (cited in Herz and Sperling 2004: 4). Klasen’s 1999 research findings, based on data from sixty-five countries, argued that educating girls would result in reduced fertility rates: “doubling the proportion of women with a secondary education would reduce average fertility rates from 5.3 to 3.9 children per woman” (cited in Herz and Sperling 2004: 4). These often-quoted statistics have been marshaled by organizations such as the Population Council, Plan International, and the UN Girls’ Education Initiative (UNGEI) to generate increased donor attention and investment in girls and young women.
However, the evidence that finally caught donors’ attention was data that established the direct link between investing in girls’ education and its impact on economic growth. A number of research studies showed that “providing girls [with] one extra year of education beyond the average boosts eventual wages by 10–20%,” and “returns on female secondary education are in the 15–25% range” (Herz and Sperling 2004: 22). A landmark World Bank study of more than one hundred countries showed that “increasing the share of women with a secondary education by 1% boosts annual per capita income growth by 0.3 percentage points” (Dollar and Gatti 1999: 20). For donor agencies concerned with demonstrating to taxpayers in developed countries that sending their hard-earned tax dollars to the developing world was a sound investment, this link between donor aid and impact proved to be a pivotal argument.

These data not only linked investment in girl’s education to economic growth, but focused on a specific life stage, adolescence, as the key to advancing poverty reduction. This focus became evident with the announcement of the Coalition for Adolescent Girls at the 2005 Clinton Global Initiative, a partnership between key third sector research organizations and private sector foundations, which aimed to increase both research and investment in adolescent girls.

The argument made by private sector and donor partnerships centered on the notion that investing in adolescent girls would provide the highest returns; that is, every investment dollar would yield a larger return in monetary terms due to reduced fertility rates, better health outcomes, a productive workforce, and a stimulated economy. At the same time, it is important to place these arguments within the larger context of an expanding youth demographic entering a labor market unable to meet its demands, leading to high unemployment rates and potential political instability. The international development community recognized that economic growth requires stable political systems, and its interest in ensuring that the youth demographic was well equipped to enter the labor force with marketable skills was clear.

This finding was bolstered in 2005 by the report “Growing up Global: The Changing Transitions to Adulthood in Developing Countries,” which argued that poverty was the biggest barrier to young people in making a successful transition into adulthood (Lloyd 2005). The report argued that globalization processes unique to the twenty-first century were providing young people with access to information and knowledge that they could not always pursue due to poverty and marginalization. It stressed that “substantial investments in the health and schooling of young people will position them to participate constructively in shaping their own and their countries’ future” (Lloyd 2005: 3). Donors listened and bought into the argument that investment in young women and men was a clear route toward poverty reduction, economic and social development, and political stability.

When linked to the arguments showing that girls’ secondary education resulted in lower fertility rates and economic growth, the focus on adolescent girls becomes apparent. A new paradigm combining investment in the new youth demographic with investment in girls looked to offer clear outcomes in stemming intergenerational poverty.
This new paradigm began circulating among policymakers and donors, quickly gaining traction.

In 2007 the World Bank released its aptly titled report “Gender Action Plan: Gender Equality as Smart Economics,” which aimed to accelerate gender mainstreaming within the Bank (and other international financial institutions) and increase investment in the promotion of Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 3 on gender equality (World Bank 2007). The key problem with this approach was the instrumentalization of women and girls. This approach portrays women and girls as deserving help due to their favorable, incentivized output, not because of their inherent value as human beings, which simplifies gender issues to the point that discrimination on multiple levels may not be accounted for (Grosser and van der Gaag 2013). Instrumentalist arguments that had been brewing for over a decade were now firmly cemented in an action plan that echoed the spirit of Larry Summers’s declaration on the high returns of investing in girls. According to a four-year progress report of the Gender Action Plan (GAP):

[I]t contributed to placing women’s economic empowerment squarely on the international development agenda, galvanizing donor and member countries to action, as reflected by the GAP’s capacity to mobilize resources. By December 2010, financial support for the plan amounted to US$70 million in pledges—an additional US$45.5 million above the original four-year budget of US$24.5 million.

(World Bank 2011a: iv)

In response, Rosalind Eyben of the Institute of Development Studies’s (IDS) research program Pathways of Women’s Empowerment published an article, “Making Women Work for Development—Again,” in which she argued that the World Bank’s GAP was setting women’s rights back by at least two decades:

The seeming triumph of the 1990s had been that social justice was seen as a sufficient reason for efforts to be made to secure gender equality. Women’s and girls’ well-being was an end in itself… the last few years have seen a strong shift back to the arguments of the early 1980s. The danger here is of a double-bind: that the social transformation agenda is being discarded while the instrumentalist strategy is failing to deliver anything for women.

(Eyben 2008)

Despite this critique, gender equality advocates working within donor institutions (“outsiders within”) had built a strong argument for increasing gender mainstreaming efforts (Walby 2004). In addition, the renewed efforts at gender mainstreaming brought forth new evidence published by the World Bank, which showed that only two cents of every development dollar reached adolescent girls (Chaaban and Cunningham 2011).

The importance of the instrumentalist approach cannot be understated in terms of bringing issues of feminized poverty to light. However simply correcting funding decisions is short term planning because it fails to address the root causes: gender inequality.
The proven financial benefits of investing in girls has helped garner much attention, but investment in girls is not tantamount to the transformation of unequal power relations. Tanya Barron, Chief Executive of Plan UK begs the question: “if the economic rationale for empowering girls is trumped by a more effective means to growth, what happens to girls?” (2014). The majority of policy makers today still do not adequately recognize the intrinsic value of women’s and girls’ rights, as underlying global patriarchal attitudes fail to support the intrinsic value of human rights for women and girls.

It is accepted that social and economic rights have received less attention than civil and political rights; indeed it is through a lack of the former set of rights that the interests of women and girls continue to require an added benefit in order to be enforced (Pickup, Williams & Sweetman, 2001). Indeed gender norms tend to protect the social and economic rights of boys and men due to their relative power in society. A 1997 found that “women work two thirds of the world’s working hours, produce half of the world’s food, and yet earn only 10% of the world’s income and own less than 1% of the world’s property (qtd. in Van der Veur, et al.: 56). Upholding economic and social rights is thus deemed progressive, as it targets one group (women and girls) over another (boys and men) challenging the status quo. Hence the focus on civil and political rights by policy makers including the UN (Pickup, Williams & Seetman, 2001). Although important in grasping the world’s attention, over reliance on this incentivized approach to investing in girls does little to solve deeper issues of gender inequality.

Thus, while the instrumentalist versus human rights debate was raging, the realities of adolescent girls’ lived experiences as a particularly vulnerable group who suffered from a “double whammy” of discrimination due to their gender and age were indisputable. Plan International argued that girls are getting “a raw deal” because they are faced with the double discrimination of being young and being female.4

In 2007 Plan International published its first Because I Am a Girl: State of the World’s Girls report, which took a human rights–based approach to analyzing the progress of girls in development and offered an alternative vision to the World Bank’s “Gender Equality is Smart Economics” (Plan International 2007). The report provided a broad review of the situation of girls in development, asking whether girls were better or worse off after one hundred years of the women’s movement and decades of international development and aid. The answer was startling, and the evidence was stark. Girls were the last to be reached by a development dollar and the least touched by advances in legislation and policies on the promotion of women’s rights. According to the report (p. 17), global discrimination against girls was manifested in a number of ways that were specific to this early life stage (ages zero to twenty-four), including the following:

- More girls than boys were out of primary and secondary school.
- Anemia due to childhood malnourishment was a major cause of maternal mortality and morbidity, and early pregnancy killed more girls each year than any other cause.
• Traditional practices such as early marriage and female genital mutilation /Cutting (FGM/C) were a gross human rights violation, harming mainly adolescent girls.
• Girls were more likely to be HIV positive than boys.
• Adolescent girls were invisible, and as they hit puberty, social restrictions on their mobility became more pronounced.
• Sex-selective abortions had taken the lives of millions of girls in Asia.

The report argued that “to tackle gender discrimination at its roots, action is needed at every stage of a girl’s life—from the womb, as babies and toddlers, at school and as adolescents.” (p. 16) The focus on life stages was a critical contribution to the development discourse, which had broad implications for policy and programming and at the same time reflected agreed upon human rights principles. The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) makes it clear that children’s rights are linked to their “evolving capacity,” a key concept that links children’s life stages to their capacity to take responsibility for decisions affecting their lives (Lansdown 2005).

The concept of “evolving capacity” is particularly relevant when discussing forms of gender-based discrimination affecting adolescent girls, such as child marriage. It firmly places the responsibility for protecting girls from early marriage on the state as primary duty bearer and also on secondary duty bearers at the level of the household. This has been taken forward across many of Plan International’s publications on girls’ rights, most recently in its report A Girl’s Right to Say No to Marriage, which presents child marriage as a global phenomenon that shows no signs of stopping as 14 million girls a year are married (Plan International 2013: 6). The report puts the spotlight on child marriage as a serious human rights violation and not just a development issue, which impacts girls’ rights to health, education, protection from violence, and participation in decisions that affect them (Plan International 2013). The report demonstrates that “girls’ empowerment,” in its emerging twenty-first-century incarnation, could still be linked to a social justice agenda (Plan International 2013).

The focus on human rights issues that go beyond development concerns also taps into issues that relate to girls in the developed world. It became apparent that discussing girl’s rights as a universal issue required an approach that also looked at the impact on adolescent girls of processes occurring in the global North. The 2010 Because I Am a Girl report analyzed the intersection of adolescent girl’s lives and the rise of ICTs, which has created new forms of gender discrimination and violence such as cyberbullying and sexting, trafficking in girls via the Internet, and pornography (Plan International 2010). At present the annual International Day of the Girl is an opportunity to raise awareness on all the issues facing adolescent girls in both low- and high-resource contexts. The World Association of Girl Guides and Girl Scouts develops a fact sheet each year for International Day of the Girl that tackles the issues most relevant to its teenage members, including self-esteem. The 2013 fact sheet indicated that “more than 90% of girls—15 to 17 years—want to change at least one aspect of their physical appearance, with body weight ranking the highest and nearly a quarter would consider undergoing plastic surgery” (WAGGGS 2013: 2).
Girls Go Viral

The emergence of adolescent girls as a specific cohort of interest to development and aid had been predominantly the province of multilateral institutions, donor agencies, civil society organizations, and other development actors, but had largely escaped the notice of the general public. Then, in May 2008 the Nike Foundation, together with the UN Foundation and the NoVo Foundation, launched a two-minute YouTube video, *The Girl Effect*, which quickly turned into an Internet sensation, leading to a large campaign and the creation of other similar videos (e.g., *The Clock Is Ticking*).

According to Maria Eitel, president of Nike Foundation and former vice president of Nike Inc. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), *The Girl Effect* was based on a realization “that the most critical intersection in a poor woman’s trajectory was happening as she transitioned from girlhood to adulthood” (quoted in Kylander 2011: 2). In fact, “[a]dolescent girls are the highest point of leverage, y investing in girls, you can stop poverty before it starts” (Kylander 2011: 2). *The Girl Effect* was aimed at the development community, but its success went well beyond that. It drew unprecedented crowds at the World Economic Forum annual meeting in Davos. As Matthew De Galan, a former senior member of the Nike Foundation, reflects: “What had originally been created as an open source message brand, targeted at organizations within the development community with the objective of raising awareness and support for adolescent girls, quickly evolved into a movement brand attracting interest and support from individuals” (quoted in Kylander 2011: 3).

*The Girl Effect* argument pivoted around the notion that when girls reach twelve years of age and begin to transition from childhood to adulthood, “opportunities begin to shut down” (Kylander 2011: 2). When girls become sexualized in the eyes of the society at puberty, they experience forms of discrimination that are unique to their gender and age, such as child marriage, teenage pregnancy, increased school dropout, sexual exploitation, and higher vulnerability to HIV infections. *The Girl Effect* puts forth the notion that simply giving a girl a cow is the catalyst for setting in motion a string of events, beginning with having additional resources, making education for the whole family more realistic, and ultimately leading to a better world. At the same time, as discussed previously, studies have suggested that girls’ access to secondary education can contribute significantly to reduced fertility rates, stimulate economic growth, and halt intergenerational poverty. Taken together, these two arguments created a compelling theory of change. It seemed to decision makers that poverty was a simple problem with a simple solution: girls.

Critics of the “girl effect” approach were plentiful. Many gender and development experts took exception to the simplification of gender discrimination as a linear cause-and-effect process, whereby investing in an individual is enough to change deep-rooted, complex, structural patterns of inequality and injustice, and argued that issues of discrimination on various levels must be examined to accurately represent the challenges faced by women and girls. In an effort to challenge this simplified approach,
Grosser and van der Gaag (2013) posed a few questions: What happens if the cow a girl has been given to lift herself out of poverty dies? What happens if people are jealous of her cow and hurt her as a result?

The “Girl Effect” messaging imagined only two possible outcomes for a girl growing up in poverty: either she receives an education and “lifts herself, her community and her nation” out of poverty (The Girl Effect 2008), or she drops out of school, becomes pregnant, is married off early, gets infected with HIV, and passes on this poor life to her children (The Girl Effect: The Clock Is Ticking 2010). Surely, feminists argued, the subjective experience of a girl growing up in poverty must be historically situated and contextualized within the lived realities of her experience. In addition, it was argued that the campaign “essentialized girls” living in poverty into a homogeneous group and depicted “racialized and sexualized representations” of girls, which, according to some critics, relied on “reworks (of) colonial stereotypes of black women as overtly sexual and rapacious and in need of fertility control” (Shain 2010). Grosser and van der Gaag (2013) further illustrate problems with this approach by arguing that it ignores the specific sociopolitical contexts that are often rife with discrimination on various levels, a factor highlighted by the apparent lack of participation in programs by girls and women in the global South. The authors argue that this approach effectively jettisons decades of analysis pertaining to women and development by instrumentalizing women and girls as the easy-to-fix part in a simplified but broken machine (2013). While this approach has done much to make international gender issues more accessible to the lay consumer, it simplifies gender issues to a point that they are communicated in a vacuum devoid of a dialogue on human rights.

Perhaps the biggest concern about the “Girl Effect” and other instrumentalist arguments, such as those promoted by the World Bank along the lines of “invest in a girl and she will do the rest,” was that they put undue pressure on girls already marginalized by multiple, intersecting, and compounding forms of discrimination to lift themselves out of poverty. An independent review of Nike Foundation’s program in partnership with DFID (Girl Hub) found that although Nike recognized this instrumentalist messaging as a reputational and programmatic risk, it “struggled . . . to reconcile the power of a simple message with its efforts to tackle a complex social problem” (ICAI 2012). The same review found that although Girl Hub was dedicated to promoting girls’ empowerment, it failed to put in place a child protection policy to protect the very same girls who were “brand campaigners” from exploitation and risk (ICAI 2012). This juxtaposition is not the only example of the inconsistent and dubious nature of corporate social responsibility. Indeed, there is much research showing that gender discrimination is a key characteristic of the global corporate supply chain, as “the exploitation of young women lies at the heart of the contemporary capitalist project” (Grosser and van der Gaag 2013: 81). These criticisms have been inspired by a wish to ensure that the omnipresent communication powers of translational corporations such as Nike are not simply used for branding and sales, but rather to fill the large gap between awareness and action.
Others took issue with the catchy messaging from a human rights perspective, as a campaign that let the primary duty bearer—the state—off the hook. The “Girl Effect” successfully engaged multiple audiences in the fight for girls’ empowerment, but ultimately they were asked to “fix the problem” of poverty and discrimination by donating money. A Nike Foundation Executive admitted that the challenge for the “Girl Effect” team was “how to convert this interest in the global North to REAL impact on girls’ lives in the global South. It’s one thing to create actions that make individuals feel good, it’s a much bigger challenge to create actions that make an individual girl’s life better” (Kylander 2011: 2-3).

In the face of such a high-level campaign for girls, many asked, “What about boys?” Gender discrimination affects boys in different, but undeniably critical, ways. The Because I Am a Girl report showed that in Latin America and the Caribbean boys are dropping out of school in significantly higher numbers than girls and are more likely to be killed by traffic accidents, violence, and suicide (Plan International 2011). The Girl Effect failed to make the case for why gender equality is also good for men and boys, which reinforces the need for analyses such as Plan’s to study gender issues in greater depth.

In 2009 the first of a series of policy-oriented reports was copublished by the Nike Foundation, the Population Council, and the Center for Global Development aimed at providing the The Girl Effect with the advocacy framework it had been lacking. The report, “Girls Count: A Global Investment and Action Agenda,” made a strong evidence-based argument aimed at donor agencies and civil society organizations for targeting adolescent girls in programming and provided policymakers with concrete recommendations (Levine et al. 2009).

Although the series of reports gained some traction in expert circles and contributed significantly to the scholarship on girls in development, the real achievement of The Girl Effect was its ability to engage a broad public, which had until that point been unaware of and ultimately uninterested in gender equality issues. The importance of linking the messaging power of multinational corporations with that of international development agencies cannot be overstated in today’s context, in which the former hold a tremendous amount of power. However, it is critical to ensure that initiatives such as The Girl Effect do not undermine approaches that are grounded in better research, as there is a real risk of simply giving a good feeling to people in the global North and not actually helping women and girls in the global South (Grosser and van der Gaag 2013). As discussed above, a human rights approach to development will achieve much more in the long term.

Coupled with the rise of social media, the The Girl Effect messaging expressed a unique “can do” attitude (Kylander 2011) that reached millions and succeeded in creating an interest in gender equality and poverty reduction issues among the broader public. At its core the “girl effect” empowered consumers “by being made to feel that with the click of a mouse they can change the future for a girl and through their action, start a ‘ripple’ effect that will lead to the end of poverty” (Shain 2010). Despite the critiques and backlash, The Girl Effect managed to put girls at the center of attention of both policymakers and the general public.
As the focus on adolescent girls as a particularly marginalized group in international development increased, so did calls for better, more targeted program interventions. The *Because I Am a Girl* report showed that girls living in poverty face particular forms of discrimination that require specific and dedicated attention. Decades of aid targeted toward women, youth, or children had yet to effectively reach adolescent girls, who had fallen through the development cracks (Plan International 2007). Adolescent girls are no longer children and are also often invisible in youth programs, where boys are the more prominent direct beneficiaries, given that they are more likely to attend school and be visible in a given community (Plan International 2009). At the same time, programs aimed at women overlooked adolescent girls, who were not yet adults, although in many cases they were already burdened with adult responsibilities, especially as teenage mothers (Levine et al. 2009).

To reach this marginalized group, adolescent girls must be deliberately sought out and targeted in program interventions. In 2004 the Population Council launched a unique program targeting an underserved group of adolescent girls in rural Ethiopia who had been subject to trauma and isolation due to early marriage (Population Council 2009). The program addressed the social and economic causes of early marriage through “community conversations” on girls’ rights and by providing families with incentives, including school supplies and cash transfers, to keep girls in school and not marry them off. An evaluation of the program found that “girls aged 10–14 in the experimental site were one-tenth as likely to be married at endline compared to girls in the control site, and three times more likely to be in school. Married girls in the project site were three times more likely to be using family planning methods compared to married girls in the control site” (Population Council 2009).

In Bangladesh the BRAC Employment and Livelihood for Adolescents program used savings and credit to increase girls’ independence and mobility, reduce the likelihood of early marriage, and ensure they remained in school. However, an evaluation found that while there was a reduction in early marriage rates, the program did not quite reach the most marginalized girls, who were less likely to have parental support to participate in the program. A UNICEF-led program in Bangladesh titled Kishori Abhijan, piloted in 2001, used a peer-to-peer approach that engaged both girls and boys in an effort to address discrimination against girls and early marriage in particular. The project evaluation showed mixed results, with some adolescent girls emerging as peer leaders, while levels of reproductive health knowledge and child’s rights awareness remained very low (UNICEF 2008).

As more programs began to reach out to adolescent girls, specific methodologies were developed to tackle the unique obstacles faced by girls. The toolkit “Girl Centered Program Design” was developed by the Population Council, based on their experiences of programming with adolescent girls and in particular their successful Binti Pamoja
program in Nairobi, Kenya (Population Council 2010). The toolkit offered for the first time an adolescent girls’ needs assessment methodology and guidance on recruiting adolescent girls into programs with the support and engagement of their families and communities. Part of the toolkit is dedicated to imparting age-specific information on reproductive health rights, which in most cases is completely ignored or inadequately treated in formal school systems (WHO 2011). Part of Binti Pamoja’s success over the past decade, as evidenced by a 2009 evaluation and its replication and scale-up, has been the creation of a safe space for adolescent girls where they are encouraged to openly discuss taboo issues like sexual and reproductive health and gender-based violence (AIDSTAR-One 2009).

However, many programs that worked directly with adolescent girls effectively ignored structural forms of discrimination and put the responsibility for realizing their rights squarely on the shoulders of marginalized girls, without adequately engaging other duty bearers. On the other hand, some organizations aimed to integrate “an ecological model” into their approach to girls’ rights programming, taking a rights-based approach to working with adolescent girls aimed at involving duty bearers at all levels. For example, Tostan’s village empowerment program in Senegal, which aimed to engage entire villages in publicly declaring their intent to abandon the practice of FGM/C through awareness raising and education, had a clear impact on reducing the levels of FGM/C in target communities (Benga, Diop, and Amandou 2008). And Plan International piloted a project in Egypt that successfully recruited Muslim religious leaders (imams) in campaigning against FGM/C (Plan International 2011). Plan International’s program model puts girls at the center of targeted interventions, while promoting work in three dimensions of change, as outlined in Figure 36.1.

As the programming on adolescent girls began to grow, there were increased calls for scaling up approaches that focused on girls’ access to education due to a number of factors, outlined by UNICEF (2011):

Institutions (private and state) as moral and principal duty bearers
- Supporting them in the adoption and implementation of laws, policies and programmes that create a supportive environment for gender justice and are explicit in promoting girls and women’s strategic interests.

Families and communities as moral duty bearers
- Building a supportive environment for gender justice.
- Challenging norms, attitudes and behaviours that undervalue girls and women and discriminate against them.

Individuals as rights-holders
- Empowering girls and women.
- Building the capacity of girls and boys, women and men to organise and advocate for gender justice.

**FIGURE 36.1** Plan International’s Program Model.
1. All children have a right to a basic education, which hasn’t been universally real-
ized in many countries.
2. Schooling is positively associated with better health outcomes for both girls and
their future children.
3. Secondary education has been linked to the development of marketable skills and
higher earnings.
4. For girls in particular, schooling has been linked to the reduction of early mar-
riage, which is a human rights violation.

National social protection programs, as in Bangladesh, offered a financial incen-
tive for keeping girls at school during adolescence, provided financial support for their
schooling, and discouraged families from marrying them off (Liang 1996). The suc-
cess of scholarships and conditional cash transfer programs across various regions has
proven that poverty remains the single biggest barrier to increasing girls’ access to edu-
cation (Population Council 2009). These programs were successful due to their consid-
eration of discrimination on multiple levels. However, they are not a one-size-fits-all
solution, as scholarships are expensive and remain an unsustainable solution to date.

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**Girls Rising**

In 2009 the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
introduced a unique new measure that sought to capture the state of women’s rights in
developing countries using innovative indicators, aggregated into a *Social Institutions
and Gender Index* (SIGI) (OECD 2012). SIGI sought, for the first time, to measure levels
of institutional discrimination and to rank countries accordingly. The index provided
much-needed evidence to policymakers, global leaders, and civil society campaigners
that gender-based discrimination correlates with low development outcomes.

In the same year the World Economic Forum first published its annual “Global
Gender Gap Report,” which ranked countries based on the gap between men and
women in a number of spheres including politics, health, and education. This report
brought together the private sector and large corporations with donor agencies and gov-
ernments into new alliances that sought to increase the economic competitiveness of
low-income countries through investing in women and reducing gender discrimination
(Hausman, Tyson, and Zahidi 2009).

Ultimately these processes contributed new evidence from nontraditional sectors
regarding the importance of investing in girls and young women, based on a busi-
ness model and a legal perspective. At the Clinton Global Initiative conference held
in 2010, the opening plenary session, chaired by former US president Bill Clinton, was
titled “Empowering Girls and Women.” Other sessions included “Preparing Girls for
the World,” “Securing the Health and Safety of Girls,” and “Girls from Education to
Economic Empowerment.” Goldman Sachs hosted a dinner session titled “Investing
in Women and Girls” (Clinton Global Initiative 2010). According to Nick Kristof, New York columnist and author of “Half the Sky;” it was “the hottest ticket in town” (“Girls Empowerment and the CGI” 2010).

These catalytic events also provided civil society campaigns with new policy spaces and an opportunity to strengthen strategic partnerships. Advocacy campaigns such as “Because I Am a Girl” and “Girls Not Brides” sought to galvanize both popular and policy level support for eliminating discrimination against girls. Some advocacy successes were noted at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Perth in 2012, when heads of government, led by Commonwealth chair-in-office Kamla Persad-Bissessar, the prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago, agreed to support the implementation of international agreements on women's rights and to promote measures to tackle early and forced marriage (Plan UK 2011).

The global support for measures to address child marriage was bolstered by the High-Level Panel (HLP) on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, which recommended adopting a specific target to end child marriage as part of a broader goal of ending gender discrimination against girls and women. The HLP’s deliberate mention of “girls and women” in its recommendations is a testament to the indisputable rise of girls in development, which seemed to have superseded women as a cohort of international concern.

Other forms of advocacy that supported the call for girls’ rights emerged as the attention to issues such as child marriage caught the public’s interest. A movie on the power of adolescent girls titled Girls Rising was premiered at the World Bank in April 2013, with a panel that included the president of the World Bank and the UN Secretary-General (World Bank 2013). Subsequently the UN General Assembly invited Malala Yousafzai, the girls’ rights activist who was brutally shot in the head by the Taliban for speaking out on girls’ right to education in Pakistan, to chair an honorary session in support of girl’s education on her birthday, July 12, 2013.

Girls were everywhere. They were in research reports such as Because I Am a Girl and campaigns such as “Girls Not Brides,” the “Girl Effect,” and “Girl Up,” and they were mentioned in dozens of policy sessions, statements, and commitments. Indeed, girls had made it to the pinnacle of the development agenda. However, these processes had all been driven from the top down, and were not based on a human rights approach. It was now time for grassroots mobilization to reflect these efforts and bring issues surrounding women and girls’ rights to the next frontier.

**Girls of the World Unite**

Arguably, young people, especially students, have always participated in political processes, and they were involved in some of the most influential protest movements of the 1960s and 1970s in the United States and Europe (e.g., civil rights, anti-Vietnam War, feminist movement). In the twenty-first century it appears that youth activism has become more dispersed, diverse, and fluid (Langman and Morris 2001), exhibiting
complex forms of online/offline mobilization that are not centrally driven. This in turn is opening spaces for resistance and disruption, networking, and coalition-building—especially for girls and young women who might otherwise be left on the sidelines due to discrimination and gender stereotyping.

For example, the Arab Spring protests that swept Egypt in 2011 involved young women, who felt empowered for the first time to step out of the confines of a strict and traditional society and take to the streets (Taher 2012). At the forefront of these protests were female bloggers (Global Voices 2011).

The proliferation of ICTs and the rise of social media have been at the heart of online girl-led activism that has also translated into offline activism. For example, She's the First was established by Facebook to encourage and support girls’ education in developing countries through coalition-building and mobilization of girls in the global North and now holds regular concerts in New York. Another example is Girly Geekdom, which started as an online platform and blog and now hosts dinners and raises awareness of the importance of supporting girls in ICTs and the technology sector.

In Kenya Akirachix, a grassroots-led movement, has developed networks of young women and girl Web developers, entrepreneurs, and engineers dedicated to supporting, encouraging, and mentoring girls to join the IT sector. A US-based nongovernmental organization (NGO), Girls Who Code, aims to reach millions of girls and encourage them to enter the computer science fields. Other spaces that are providing girls with opportunities to make their voices heard include blogs and hub sites such as RadFemHub, Guerrilla Girls, Femenisting, The Pursuit of Harpyness, Jezebel, and feminist.com, among others. Another portal that brings together online communities is TakingITGlobal, which encourages participation and engagement in global issues.

ITForChange, an International Development Research Centre (IDRC) research project on “gender and citizenship in the information society” (CITI-GEN), which is being conducted in India, Brazil, and South Africa, provides analysis and examples of the ways in which online spaces and girls’ empowerment intersect. “AMPLIFY” is another portal that encourages activism on controversial issues such LGBTQI rights and abortion and links girls and boys from different countries (including Nepal, Jamaica, Nigeria, and the United States) through an International Youth Activist Network. These online spaces are providing girls and young women with a unique place to learn about their rights, come together in transnational coalitions that were unimaginable just two decades ago, and make their voices heard.

Girls are now able to launch their enterprises, projects, or campaigns through online spaces such as Girltank, a community hub and crowdfunding site designed to help girls scale up their enterprises. For example, Sakhi for Girls’ Education is a Mumbai-based NGO started by a former slum dweller, twenty-four-year-old Aarti, who raised almost US$5,000 through the organization’s Web site. The funds were used to set up a girls’ book bank, girls’ learning center, and savings program, which have reached more than two hundred girls in the slums of Mumbai, India.

Girls are even mobilizing their peers and communities through social media and crowdsourcing Web sites. As mobile phones with Internet access become more
ubiquitous, especially in developing countries, more girls are being exposed to the language of “girls’ empowerment” and are increasingly participating in online as well as offline activism.

**Conclusion**

In the process of unpacking meta-categories such as gender, women, youth, and children, girls have emerged as an important cohort that requires and deserves increased investment. The case for focusing on adolescent girls as a crucial target group capable of creating a community and nationwide ripple effect of progress has been made again and again by key development actors. What first began with the World Bank and was made popular by the Nike Foundation is now a well-researched and well-accepted fact.

Although the complexities of the feminist agenda and gender equality were occasionally lost in popular campaigning, it is clear that reaching adolescent girls through innovative and effective programming has been critical. Indeed, one may argue that public support for the focus on girls has been met by an unparalleled investment by private sector corporations and enterprises, bringing together the profit-driven agenda of corporations with that of human rights organizations. The bottom line is clear: funding for gender and development programs has increased.

At the same time, a unique policy space opened up that enabled a discussion of human rights violations such as child marriage and FGM/C, in the new and compelling context of girls’ empowerment, effectively increasing the political traction of those advocating against these practices and creating opportunities to push through comprehensive policy measures. These developments at the international level are increasingly being supported by grassroots mobilization led by young people, especially girls, who are finding new ways of uniting in action.

As the top-down approaches to girls’ empowerment take a backseat to bottom-up organizing of adolescent girls through social media sites and other means, the impact of these processes on the wider feminist movement remains to be seen. It is unclear at present whether the focus on girls has moved beyond policy agendas and programmatic rhetoric to a truly political movement promoting gender equality in development through the advancement of economic and social rights. In terms of future feminist organizing, there is a sense that girls growing up in today’s world, where loose organizational structures are formed online involving feminists from diverse backgrounds and with wide-ranging interests, will be better equipped to create issue-based coalitions that transcend cultures, nationalities, and borders. Girls today recognize, in a way that was less cogent to previous generations, that the interconnectedness of global issues carries implications for their own lives in an immediate way that requires their mobilization.

Now that the movement to advance the rights of women and girls has the ears of high level policy makers, they must alter the message from an instrumentalist to a human rights approach.
The incentivized justification for investing in girls helped to substantially increase global investment in girls, but the movement is now at a crossroads. There is no doubt that the dedicated funds that have been channeled to girl-focused programming, research studies and reports, policy shifts, and popular campaigns have already touched the lives of millions of adolescent girls across the globe, but it is not a long term strategy for global gender equality. In focusing on programming with girls, the aspect of inter-generational change takes on a pronounced meaning, since girl’s empowerment transmits into gains for their future children and has clear benefits that move beyond the here and now. There has been ample evidence that ensuring girls’ individual achievements benefits entire households throughout their life, so policy makers are listening. Gender issues are enjoying unprecedented attention by policy makers, and feminists all over the world are making their voices heard in a powerful way: the time is ripe to take the next step. The question remains: will the movement take advantage of this momentum in efforts to reveal and respond to underlying issues of gender inequality? Or will the movement continue on the safer, charted course of instrumentalisation, continuing to make smaller, short term gains.

Notes

1. For example, the translation of Sen and Nussbaum’s “capabilities approach” into UNDP’s Human Development Index.
2. In 1998 the Population Council published The Uncharted Passage: Girls Adolescence in the Developing World, which for the first time focused exclusively on the experiences of adolescent girls between the ages of ten and nineteen, highlighting the unique experiences of adolescence and setting a benchmark for subsequent research on adolescent girls in poverty.
3. For more information on the “value for money” donor agenda, which has seen an increased focus on girls in development due to the direct link between aid flows and poverty reduction, see Eyben (2011).
5. Article 5 of the CRC states that direction and guidance, provided by parents or others with responsibility for the child, must take into account the capacities of the child to exercise rights on his or her own behalf.
8. For further information, see Eyben (2011); Carella (2011); Shain (2010); and Grosser and van der Gaag (2013).
11. For more information, see Girl Up: Uniting Girls to Change the World (www.girlup.org).
12. For more information, see She’s the First (http://www.shesthefirst.org/about/our-history/).
13. For more information, see GirlyGeekdom (www.girlygeekdom.com).
14. For more information, see AkiraChix (http://akirachix.com/members.html).
15. For more information see Girls Who Code (http://www.girlswhocode.com/about-us/).
16. For more information, see RadFem Hub (http://radicalhubarchives.wordpress.com/).
17. For more information, see Guerrilla Girls (http://www.guerrillagirls.com/).
18. For more information, see Feministing (http://feministing.com/).
19. For more information, see The Pursuit of Harpyness (http://www.harpyness.com/).
20. For more information, see Jezebel (http://jezebel.com/about/).
21. For more information, see Feminist.com (http://www.feminist.com/).
22. For more information, see Taking It Global (http://www.tigweb.org/).
24. For more information, see Amplify Your Voice: A project of Advocates for Youth (http://amplifyyourvoice.org/).
25. For more information, see Girltank (http://girltank.org/).

References


Because I Am a Girl


Abbas, S., 770
Abeysekera, S., 20, 531, 534, 571, 572
Abu-Ghraib prison, 639
Abu-Lughod, L., 655
Abzug, B., 709
Academic profeminism, 326–27, 332–35, 334t, 337n6
Accra Agenda for Action (AAA), 496–97
Ackerly, B., 886
Activism. see also specific organizations
achievements, 124–27
Africa, 56, 62, 65–67
Assembly of Social Movements, 67
Bosnia, 62
China, 595–600
community-based struggles, 126–27
definitions, 54–57
Eastern Europe, 54
Feminist Dialogues, 66, 67, 186n72, 457, 477n21, 534
feminist principles, 54–55
fundamentalisms, 55, 61, 66, 658–62, 665, 666n5–8
global civil society, 56
globalization effects, 78n1
global restructuring effects on, 57–59
growthroots, 56–57
history, 55, 57–58
humanitarianism, 62–66, 63t, 65t
ideological divergences, 57–58, 78n2
information and communications technologies (ICTs), 56
internationalist identity-solidarity logic, 56
Latin America, 56, 62
literature review, 54–57
Middle East, 54, 62
neoliberalism, 51–52, 56, 61
organizations list, 60–61t
overview, 25–26, 28–29, 51–53, 76–78, 78n1, 79n20–21
platforms, priorities, 54–55, 57–59
privilege, 126
profeminism, 327–30, 332–35, 334t
social media (see social media activism)
social networking media, 56
structural adjustment policies, 57–58
transnational feminist networks (TFNs) (see transnational feminist networks (TFNs))
transnational IGO-advocacy logic, 56
war, imperialism, 62
women’s international nongovernmental organization (WINGO), 53, 56–57
World Social Forum (WSF), 56, 64, 66–68, 68t, 77, 127, 477n20–21, 579, 818
Addams, J., 707–9
Addis Ababa Declaration on Population and Development, 286–87
Addou, H., 741n4
Adolescent girls. see girls in development
Affective Communities (Gandhi), 560
Afghanistan
activism, 62
al-Qaeda, 671–72, 674, 691n13–14
civilian casualties, 673, 674
constitution, 674–75
elections, 674
gendered Islamist agenda, 670
gender equality reforms, 670
gender segregation, 671
history, 669, 690n1–3
Hizb-e-Islami, 672, 690n8, 691n17
loya jirga, 674
mujahideen, 669–71, 690n8, 690n14–6, 691n15
Northern Alliance, 672, 673, 690n8, 691n15
Afghanistan (Cont.)
Operation Enduring Freedom, 671, 672, 691n13–14
Pakistani intervention, 669–71, 674
690nn4–6, 691n10, 691n12, 691n14
political participation, representation, 229, 234, 748
Soviet intervention, 669–70, 690nn4–6
Taliban, 670–74, 689, 690n8–9, 691n10
US intervention, 669–70, 672–73, 675, 689, 690nn4–6, 691n17
wars on terror, 33–36, 45nn14–15, 91, 407, 644–45, 655, 669–75, 688–89, 690nn4–9, 691n10, 691n11–21
WLP activism, 71t, 75
women’s rights, 671, 673–75, 691n19–21, 771
Afkhami, M., 68
Africa. see also specific countries
activism, 56, 62, 65–67
apartheid, 489
Binti Pamoja program, 907–8
Botswana, 792, 826–28
Burundi, 16, 287, 381, 728, 741n4, 748
care, caregiving in, 433–40
cash transfer programs, 433–34
Child Support Grant (CSG), 433, 442n8
colonial history, 183n3
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), 770
crises identification, 164
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 63t, 77, 203–5, 287, 773, 827, 888
discrimination universality, 381–83
economic justice organizations in general, 451, 463–65
gender-responsive budgeting, 487, 488
Ghana, 183n3, 287, 387–88, 496, 827
Girls, benefits in education of, 899–900, 913n2
“Growing Girls and Women” (GWIN) Programme, 492
human rights, security, 350, 351, 356
illiteracy, 898–99
Liberia, 63t, 218, 225, 238, 287, 463, 477n18, 726, 773
political participation, representation, 16, 221–23, 229, 236, 239, 769
preschool education, 434
primitive accumulation in, 513–16, 524n4–6
Rwanda, 16, 72, 748, 771
Sierra Leone, 183n3, 226, 715
SRHR movement, 286–88
state-society relations, 618–19
Sudan, 63t, 183n3, 204, 274, 275, 287, 498, 659, 671, 769–70, 773
Transvaal death camps, 705
Uganda, 63t, 462–64, 727, 769, 772, 775, 792, 826, 827
WLP activism, 71–72f, 73, 75
women, subordination of, 380–81
Women’s Budget Initiative (WBI), 489–90
Zimbabwe, 26, 63t, 72f, 73, 74, 197, 463
African Feminist Forum (AFF), 509
African National Congress (ANC), 232, 489
African Women in Crisis (AFWIC), 727, 741n4
African Women’s Development Fund (AWDF), 509
Africa Trade Policy Centre (ATPC), 464–65
Agathangelou, A., 398
Agency
body ownership, 254–58, 261, 264–65, 267n7–8
fundamentalisms, 652–54, 663, 664
sex trafficking, 295–96, 299, 300, 305–6
Agenda 21, 824–25
Agostino, A., 22, 42, 791, 792, 818, 819, 828
Aguir, N., 172, 185n46
Ahmed, S., 87, 108
Ahmed, Z., 165
Aid for Trade initiative, 471, 473–75
Akirachix, 856, 911
Alami, N., 198, 207
Alcoff, L. M., 82, 101, 108
Alcoff, L. M., 82, 101, 108
Alexander, M. J., 6, 117, 118, 121, 122, 124
Alibhai-Brown, Y., 888
All-China Federation of Trade Unions, 592
Alliance building
China, 40, 597, 601
citizenship, 610–12
DAWN, 175–77, 185n58
engagement with, 17–19, 39–40, 100–102
Latin America, 40, 610–11
Nepal, 566–67, 574n24
political participation, representation, 240
profeminism, 36, 332, 334
sexual, reproductive health/rights, 289–90
Southasian feminist movements, 553–61,
566–67, 572nn1–6, 573nn7–14, 574n24
Tanzania Gender Networking Programme
(TGNP), 517–18, 522, 524n7
United Nations, 192–93, 210
warriors within, 192–93, 210
Alliance for the Female Vote, 536
Alternative Summit, 817
Alt-WID, 450–52, 475n7
Alvarado, M. J., 535
Alvarez, S. E., 20, 56, 553, 610, 611, 612
Ambrose, Rona, 408
Amnesty International, 402–3
AMPLIFY, 911
Amuchastegui, A., 328
Andaiye, 98, 108
Anderlini, S., 726
Anderson, C., 256–57
“A New Global Partnership,” 889–90
Annan, Kofi, 205, 273, 732
Antrobus, P., 7, 8, 12, 13, 17, 25, 31, 82, 108, 134,
164, 185n51, 364n12, 456
Anwar, Z., 661
Anzaldua, G., 119
Appleby, R. S., 664
Arab Spring, 29, 67, 104, 180–81, 222, 238, 261,
662, 718, 856, 863
Arab Women’s Solidarity Association
(AWSA), 60t
Arat-Koc, S., 398
Argentina
care, caregiving, 433–34, 439
climate justice, 825, 827
democratization processes, 535–37
motherist, difference identities, 150–51
neoliberalism, 85
peace movements, 712
profeminism, 326, 330
sexual, reproductive health/rights, 282,
284, 285
state building, rebuilding, 782
Armed conflict. see militarism
Armed Forces Special Powers Act
(AFSPA), 680, 680f, 683
Armstrong, E., 709, 710
Asia. see Southasian feminist movements;
specific countries
Asia Pacific Conference on Population and
Development, 285
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC), 460, 477n26
Assembly of Social Movements, 67
Assisted reproductive technology
(ART), 296–97, 308–13, 315n1,
316nn14–17
Association for Progressive
Communications, 862, 866
Association for Women’s Rights in
Development (AWID), 28, 30, 60t, 278,
496, 658–61, 776
Association of African Women for Research
and Development (AWARD), 451,
508, 610
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), 460, 477n27
Association of Women of the Mediterranean
Region (AWMR), 60t, 713
Augspurg, A., 706, 707
Australia
Afghan refugees, 261
data collection, 423–25, 442n3
East Timorese (see Timor-Leste)
femocrat terminology, 197
Gender Budget Initiative, 490–92,
501n4–5
gender equality policies, 489
gender-responsive budgeting, 420, 442n3,
452, 486–91
Idle No More (INM) movement, 106
peace camps, 711
Regional Assistance Mission
(RAMSI), 749, 756, 758, 761
scholarly collaborations, 327
sex trafficking, 306, 315n12
Solomon Islands (see Solomon Islands)
Women’s Budget Program, 488–89,
501n2–3
Australian Sex Workers’ Association (Scarlet
Alliance), 315n12
Austria, 375–77, 885
Autonomous Region of Bougainville (ARB)
  Action Plan on UNSCR 1325, 760
Agreement on Peace, Security and Development in
  Bougainville, 756–57, 760
armed conflict, 755
Bougainville Action Plan, 758
Bougainville Constitutional Commission
  (BCC), 759
Bougainville Peace Agreement, 757, 759
Constitution, 758–59
Council of Elders Act, 759
international interventions, 757–58
justice system, 757
Peace and Security Commission, 760
political participation, representation, 700,
  748, 758–61, 763n9
reserved legislative seats, 748, 759–60
UN Observer Mission in Papua New
  Guinea (UNOMB), 758
UN Political Office in Bougainville
  (UNPOB), 757
weapons disposal, 758
women's political impacts, 748–49, 756, 760
Autonomy. see agency

Baby 101, 316n17
Bachan, K., 29, 41, 856
Bachelet, Michelle, 66, 435
Bahrain Women Association for Human
  Development, 71
Bahuguna, S., 843
Bain, B., 89, 94, 99, 108
Baksh, R., 715
Balakrishnan, R., 499
Balchin, C., 656–57, 665n1, 883
Bali Global Youth Forum Declaration, 283–84
Bali Principles of Climate Justice, 816
Banerji, R., 884, 885, 886
Bangladesh
  anti-acid violence movement, 620
  bironongonas (heroic women), 562
  creation of, 532, 555, 557
gender, climate change
  tribunals, 792, 826–28
glocal movements, 20
Koitta workshop, 556–60 573nn9–12
Pakistan war crimes apology, 559, 573n12
political participation,
  representation, 230, 234
power configurations 2006, 562
social protection programs, 909
violence against women, 620
women food vendors, 141
Ban K., 477n18
Barron, T., 902
Barrow, N., 162
Barry, K., 298, 299
Baskin, C., 397
Basu, A., 685
Batliwala, S., 839
Bat Shalom, 712
Baumol, W., 425
Beal, J., 236
Bebel, A., 706
Because I Am a Girl: State of the World's
  Girls, 902, 903, 906
Beckwith, K., 5, 76
Bedford, K., 653
Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action
  abortions, sexuality, 272
  anniversary, 1
  care policy agenda, 39
  crises identification, 726
critical areas of concern, 896
drafting, 224–25
economic, social policymaking, 448, 473n3
employment policies, 190
global negotiations, twenty year
  review, 209
history, 58–59, 192, 224, 538, 715, 768
ICT activism, 862
policy achievements, 224
review process, 211n5, 726–27
roles, 55, 224, 348, 583–84, 896
security of the person, 258–59, 265n2
ten-year evaluation, 126
violence against women, 404, 405
Bekaouf Azadi (Freedom Without Fear) for
  Women, 103–5, 113n15
Bello, A., 542
Benard, C., 770
Beneria, L., 142, 184n21, 610
Bennett, J., 770, 773
Bernardino, M., 161
Betteraid Coordinating Group (BACG), 497
Bhan, G., 253
Bhasin, K., 559, 568, 572n6
Bhatt, C. P., 843
Bhatt, E., 140
Bhattacharjee, A., 396
Bhatti, S., 678
Bin Laden, O., 671, 675, 691n13
Black, A., 397
Black and Third World Women’s Liberation Alliance, 710
Blofield, M., 440
Body ownership. see also sex trafficking;
sexual, reproductive health/rights (SRHR)
abortion rights, 254–55, 258
activism history, 254–59, 265n1
agency, autonomy, 254–59, 261, 264–65, 267nn7–8
bioinformatic bodies, 259
biopolitics, 259–61, 266n3–6, 267nn7–8
bodily integrity, 254–55, 258, 265n2
capitalism’s influence, 260
China, 588–90
as entitlement, 258
forced sterilization, sterilization abuse, 254–55
forced sterilization policies, 542
forced virginity tests, 252
fundamentalisms, 258, 265n2
gender binary, 255–57, 265n1, 266n6
identity, 253, 256–57, 262–63
organ trafficking, 253
overview, 249–50
political theory, 255–59, 265n1
racism, 253–54
rape culture, 103–5, 113n15, 254, 262–63, 574n19, 681–84, 692nn32–36, 872, 887–90
reproductive rights, 252
security of the person, 258–59, 265n2
self-propriety, 256–57
sexting, 262
sex workers, 262–64, 266n5–6
social ontology, 257–58
trans’ people, 262–63, 265n1, 266n6
victim politics, 266n5
weaponized bodies, 261–62
Body politics, 26–27. see also body ownership
Bolivia
climate justice, 825
democratization processes, 536, 540–41, 549n14
feminist political ecology, 804
fundamentalisms, 660
political violence legislation, 230
profeminism, 326, 328, 330
sexual, reproductive health/rights, 284
trade liberalization, 480n51
Boserup, E., 7, 140, 160, 162, 184n21, 425
Bosnia-Hercegovina, 62, 63n, 205, 356, 712, 713, 727
activism, 62
Botswana, 792, 826–28
Bouazizi, M., 261
Bougainville. see Autonomous Region of Bougainville (ARB)
Boulding, E., 149
Brah, A., 23–24, 99, 108–9
Brahimi, L., 730
Brazil
adolescent sexuality, 281–82
anti-globalization movement, 539
Brasilia Consensus, 543, 549n13
care, caregiving, 433, 435, 440
cash transfer programs, 433, 435
citizenship, 540–41, 911
climate change, 792, 799–800, 826–28
democratization processes, 536, 539
economic development, 179, 825–27
fundamentalisms, 660
gender equality, 186n65
indigenous communities activism, 541
organ trafficking, 253
participatory budgeting, 782
profeminism, 325–32, 335
Republican Feminist Party, 536
Rubber Tappers’ movement, 798–800
sexual, reproductive health/rights, 252–53, 263, 277, 281–85
SOS Corpo, 185n56
STEM, 865
trade liberalization, 456, 460
WLP activism, 71–72f
women’s economic roles, 162
World Social Forum, 477n20, 712, 818
Britain. see United Kingdom
Brumberg, R., 54
Brzezinski, Z., 669
Budlender, D., 452, 491, 501n4
Buen vivir, 543–44, 549n14, 795, 803–4
Bunch, C., 561, 726
Burns, J. M., 219
Burundi, 16, 287, 381, 728, 741n4, 748
Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, 497
Bush, G. W., 34, 272–75, 305, 629, 630, 644, 672, 726
Bustamante, Alexander, 183n3
Butalia, U., 82, 89, 97, 109, 887–88
Butler, J., 257, 262, 264, 635, 716
Cacho, L., 718
Çağatay, N., 449
Caglar, G., 32, 196
Call Off Your Old Tired Ethics (COYOTE), 300
Cameron, D., 477n18
Canada
Bill C 45, 105–6
criminal justice approach, 399–402, 411n11, 412nn12–15
data collection, 423–25, 442n3
First Nations peoples
exploitation, 103, 105–7
fundamentalisms, 660
funding, withdrawal of, 403, 409, 411n2
human rights, security, 345, 356–57
Idle No More Movement, 103, 105–7
immigration policies, 408
mandatory charging, 401, 412nn12–13
neoliberalism in, 89, 94
Ontario Women's Justice Network, 412n12
political economy, 88–89
political participation, representation, 233–34
privilege in, 88
protection of civilians, 732
rape, sexual assault legal definitions, 399–400, 411n5
restorative justice in, 412n15
shelter services in, 399
Sisters in Spirit campaign, 402–3
social media activism, 103, 105–7
social movements, 85, 102–3
violence against women, 345, 397, 399–403, 406–8, 411n2, 411n11, 412n21, 412nn12–15
Women's Program, 89
Caprioli, M., 774
CARASA (Committee for Abortion Rights and Against Sterilization Abuse), 254–56, 265n1
Care, caregiving
care mix/care diamond, 428
cash transfer programs, 433–37, 442nn7–8
child-centered interventions, 430–31, 442n4–6
China, 580–83, 589–90, 601n4
class/race exclusion, 434–35
concepts, definitions, 427–28
conditionalities, 437
cross-border migration, 427
data collection, 423–25, 442n3
developing countries, 427–28, 432–38, 441, 442nn7–8
early childhood education and care services (ECEC), 433–37
economics, 423–27, 441n2, 442n3
engagement, 423–25
gender wage gap, 431, 442n4
good quality care, 425–27
human capital perspective, 430
Latin America, 433–40, 542, 545, 550n15
neoliberalism, 426–27, 429–30, 432
overview, 419, 422–23, 440–41, 442n9
poverty, 432–34
preconditions, 438
preschool education, 434–35
public policy, 426, 429–31, 438–40
service segmentation, 435
services provision, 434, 437–38
as social expectation, 227, 368, 370–71, 385, 423
social investment state, 430, 442n5
social reproduction, 425
Tanzania, 437–38, 509, 512, 520
voluntarism, 437–38
wages, salaries, 435–36, 441
welfare states, 426–27, 429
Caribbean
abortion, 549n9
activist training, 144–45, 243n16
body ownership, 254–55
care, caregiving, 426–27
DAWN activism, 175, 183n1, 185n47, 451, 480n48
democratization processes, 534, 538, 543, 548n3
cuentros (encounters), 29, 553, 610
gender mainstreaming, 714
profeminism, 327, 337n7
sexual, reproductive health/rights, 281, 284, 291n4, 291n9, 549n9
trade liberalization, 451, 454–60, 464, 465, 477n25, 480n48
transnational feminist histories, 51–52, 83–92, 108–12
UN Regional Coordinator, 548n3
"Women Leaders as Agents of Change," 243n16
Caribbean Association for Feminist Research and Action (CAFRA), 185n56, 451, 458, 470, 480n47
Carnero, S., 540
Carter, J., 669, 690n5
Cartography
achievements, 124–27
asymmetries, 119
Eurasia, 119
First World–Third World, 118, 119
gender decentralization, 120–23
gender equality, 125
gender mainstreaming, 126
globalization of perspectives, 117, 123
nation-state, 119–20
non-essentialism, 122
place, 117
post socialism, 119
racial politics, 117–18, 122
Second world, 119
solidarity, 118, 123–24
unidirectionality vs. bidirectionality, 118–19
Carty, L. E., 8, 10, 23, 24, 30, 36, 51, 716
Cash transfer programs, 433–37, 442nn7–8
Casper, M. J., 310
Castillejo, C., 769
Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute (C-Fam), 274
Catholics for Choice, 661
CEDAW
achievements, 383–88, 391n21, 543
compliance monitoring, 369
culture, stereotyping effects in general, 370–71
discrimination universality, 381–83, 389
educational achievements, 373–74
features, strengths, 369–70
gender segregation in education, 376–77
gender stereotyping, 344, 371–77, 389
General Recommendation 19, 404–5
Global Gender Gap Index, 14, 344, 373, 379, 909
governments' accountability for implementation, 386–88
history, 11, 13, 44n4, 125, 192, 224, 368, 609, 768, 877
ICT activism, 862
Islamist attacks against, 662
legal discrimination, 380–81
male superiority, cultural acceptance of, 378–80, 391nn17–18
MENA campaign, 75
NGO involvement, 383–88
objectification of women by the media, 377–78
overview, 344, 367–69, 390nn4–8
power relations, 371, 372, 390n10
religious discrimination, 380–81
Resolution 12 on Violence Against Women, 715
roles in general, 14, 16, 55, 224, 348, 368–69, 389–90
universality, 371–77, 381–83, 389
violence against women, 378–80, 389, 391n17–18, 402–5
wage disparities activism, 373–77, 431, 442n4
women, subordination of, 380–81
Center for Global Development, 906
Center of Concern, 448, 450, 460, 469, 478n28
Central Appalachian Women's Tribunal, 827
Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR), 489–90
Centre for Women’s Global Leadership (CWGL), 168
Centro de Investigación para la Acción Femenina (Center for Feminist Action and Research, CIPAF), 326–27
Centros Belén de Sárraga, 536
CEPAL, 543, 550n15–16
Chandralekha, 557
Chandran, R., 783
Chan-Tiberghien, J., 122, 125
Charlesworth, H., 736
Charrad, M. M., 618
Charter of Feminist Principles for African Feminists, 509
Charter of People’s Rights, 567
Chatterjee, P., 615, 616
Chattopadhaya, K., 257
Chavez, M., 219
Chen, L., 21, 33, 40, 531–33
Chen G., 599
Chhachhi, A., 20, 531, 532, 572
Chicago Metro tribunal, 827
Chicago Women’s Liberation Union, 710
Child Support Grant (CSG), 433, 442n8
Chile
activism, 150–51
care, caregiving, 433–36, 439–40
cash transfer programs, 433–34
care, caregiving, 433–36, 439–40
care, caregiving, 433–36, 439–40
care, caregiving, 433–36, 439–40
care, caregiving, 433–36, 439–40
care, caregiving, 433–36, 439–40
care, caregiving, 433–36, 439–40
care, caregiving, 433–36, 439–40
care, caregiving, 433–36, 439–40
care, caregiving, 433–36, 439–40
care, caregiving, 433–36, 439–40
care, caregiving, 433–36, 439–40
care, caregiving, 433–36, 439–40
care, caregiving, 433–36, 439–40
care, caregiving, 433–36, 439–40
care, caregiving, 433–36, 439–40
care, caregiving, 433–36, 439–40
care, caregiving, 433–36, 439–40
care, caregiving, 433–36, 439–40
care, caregiving, 433–36, 439–40
care, caregiving, 433–36, 439–40
care, caregiving, 433–36, 439–40
Chinese Constitution, 579
citizenship, 581–83, 587, 600–601
citizenship, 581–83, 587, 600–601
citizenship, 581–83, 587, 600–601
citizenship, 581–83, 587, 600–601
citizenship, 581–83, 587, 600–601
citizenship, 581–83, 587, 600–601
citizenship, 581–83, 587, 600–601
citizenship, 581–83, 587, 600–601
citizenship, 581–83, 587, 600–601
citizenship, 581–83, 587, 600–601
citizenship, 581–83, 587, 600–601
citizenship, 581–83, 587, 600–601
citizenship, 581–83, 587, 600–601
citizenship, 581–83, 587, 600–601
citizenship, 581–83, 587, 600–601
citizenship, 581–83, 587, 600–601
Co-optation, collusion in, 33
divorce law, 598–99
divorce law, 598–99
divorce law, 598–99
divorce law, 598–99
divorce law, 598–99
divorce law, 598–99
divorce law, 598–99
divorce law, 598–99
divorce law, 598–99
divorce law, 598–99
divorce law, 598–99
divorce law, 598–99
divorce law, 598–99
economic reform policies, 578–80, 582–83, 588, 596, 600
economic reform policies, 578–80, 582–83, 588, 596, 600
economic reform policies, 578–80, 582–83, 588, 596, 600
economic reform policies, 578–80, 582–83, 588, 596, 600
economic reform policies, 578–80, 582–83, 588, 596, 600
economic reform policies, 578–80, 582–83, 588, 596, 600
economic reform policies, 578–80, 582–83, 588, 596, 600
economic reform policies, 578–80, 582–83, 588, 596, 600
economic reform policies, 578–80, 582–83, 588, 596, 600
economic reform policies, 578–80, 582–83, 588, 596, 600
employment (informal), 585–87, 586n4, 594
Equality between Men and Women Policy, 21, 579, 583–84, 589, 596
feminist political economy, 580–87, 586n4, 600, 601n4
floating population, 592
forced evictions, 594–95
gender biases, 33
global movements, 21
grassroots engagement, 21, 40, 587
household contract responsibility system, 590–93, 602n11
household registration system, 582–83, 592, 601n4
labor camps, 595, 603n23
labor laws, 590, 592, 599
labor strikes, 592
land ownership, 583, 584, 590–91, 593–95, 599
Marxism, 587
maternity leave, 599
migrant women, 583, 589–93
neoliberalism, 532–33, 582–83, 588, 601n4
one-child policy, 33, 588–90
open door policy, 591–93
patriarchy, customary rights, 143–44, 148, 154–55, 156n4, 582–84, 596
pay-as-you-go system, 594
peace movements, 712
political participation, 585, 596–97
poverty headcount ratio, 578–79
relief efforts, gender-blind approach to, 599
reproductive rights, 581, 588–90
retirement age, 594
sex ratio, 371
sex trafficking, 589
social media activism, 21, 533, 579, 592, 597
social reproduction, 425
social security reforms, 584
state feminism, 580, 583–85, 596
township and village enterprises
(TVEs), 590
trade unions, 592
violence against women, 581–84, 597–99
wage disparities, 373, 585, 591, 594,
602n13
Women’s Federation, 146
women’s rights reversals, 579, 583–85, 600
Women’s Voice, 597
Chinkin, C., 736
Chipko movement, 22, 792, 798–800,
838, 842–44
Chowdhury, E., 122, 620, 622
Christensen, H. S., 891
Citizen by the National Constituent
Assembly, 353
Citizenship
alliance building, 610–12
bounded communities, 619
China, 581–83, 587, 600–601
concepts in development discourse, 613–15
democracies, issues in, 616–17
feminist activism history, 608–11
feminist voice, influence, 614–15
First-Third World tensions, 610
fundamentalisms, 655
gender justice, 614
good governance agenda, 613–14, 616–17
governance feminism, 611–12
governmentality, 617
human rights, security, 350, 353, 358–63
ICTs, 872, 875–79, 890
identity, 608, 612, 615, 616, 618–19
India, 561–62, 567
intergovernmental organizations
(IGOs), 611
international conflict feminism, 621–22
Latin America, 531–32, 535, 540–43, 547,
549nn6–9, 550n1919
legal personhood, 617–18
marginalization, subordination, 610
minority women, 607–8
Nepal, 558
overview, 533, 607–8, 611–12, 622–23
Pakistan, 561–62
patriarchy, 610
peace movements, 704
privilege, 610
rights, 613, 616–18, 620
social welfare, 616
solidarity in difference, 876
Southasian feminist movements, 532,
554–55, 558, 567
Sri Lanka, 558
state building, rebuilding, 779–80, 783
state-society relationships, 617–19,
779–80, 783
subject-citizen status, 615–16, 623n3
Third World difference, 609
transnationalism reversed, 611, 619–22
WID advocacy, 610
Climate justice
care, reciprocity, 821–22, 831
ecofeminism, 796–98, 824, 840
economic growth paradigm, 792, 805–6,
817, 819–22, 831
engagement with, 22
epistemic violence, 829
gender, climate change
tribunals, 792, 826–28
gender balance, 824–25
globalization, 817–19
green economy, 830
human rights approach, 817
movement history, 816–17
overview, 792, 815
patrony, 821, 823
restorative justice, 829, 831
South Africa, 816
sustainable development, 822–31,
833n48
transformative justice, 829, 831
transnational feminist networks, 817–19
UN conferences participation, 828–29
women, passive imaginary of, 825–26
Climate Justice Now! network, 816
Climate Justice Summits, 816
Clinton Global Initiative
conferences, 900, 909
Coalition Against Trafficking in Women
(CATW), 263, 267n7, 299
Coalition for Adolescent Girls, 900
Coalition on Sexual and Bodily Rights in
Muslim Societies (CSBR), 279
Cockburn, C., 712
Cockell, J. G., 347
Code Pink, 601, 62, 63t, 77, 645, 718
Coelho, C., 637, 725
Colectivo de Hombres y Masculinidades, 329, 332
Coffman, I., 239
Collazo, M., 536
Collectif 95 Maghreb Egalité, 56, 61, 65–66
Collins, P. H., 398–99
Colombia
humanitarianism, 63t
international conflict feminism, 621
peace movements, 204, 712–14
profeminism, 326–29, 331–33, 335
sexual, reproductive health/rights, 284–85
Color of Violence conference, 409, 413n24
Comadres, 537
Combahee River Collective, 118
Comité Eureka, 537
Commission on Human Security, 352, 357
Commission on the Status of Women (CSW)
CEDAW relationship to, 368, 390n5
Draft Agreed Conclusions, 879
establishment, 13, 192, 390n5
47th Session, 35, 45n15
fundamentalisms, 659
gender-responsive budgeting, 487, 496
global advocacy role, 11, 64, 144, 177
monitoring, review roles, 224
NGO engagement, 726, 727, 733
peacekeeping operations, 726, 727, 733
violence against women, 877–81
women in development advocacy, 610
Commonwealth Secretariat, 451, 452, 460, 462–64, 714–15
Communities Against Rape and Abuse (CARA), 409–10
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), 770
Comunidad de Paz de San José de Apartadó, 713, 714
Conflict. see militarism
Connell, R. W., 636
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. see CEDAW
Conway, J., 67, 127
Cordova, T., 83, 90, 99, 109
Cornwall, A., 782
Corral, T., 185n46
Correa, S., 170
Costa Rica, 138, 326, 330, 440, 540
Cottingham, J., 144
Council for the Economic Empowerment of Women in Africa (CEEWA), 451
Craviotto, N., 776
Crenshaw, K., 398, 411n11
Crespo-Kebler, E., 110
Crimes of honor/honor killings, 34, 63, 407–8, 413n23, 661
Critical mass, 215, 219, 242n2, 748, 763n8
Cross-border reproductive care (CBRC), 311
Cross-border surrogacy, 296–97, 308–13, 315n1, 316nn14–17
Cruzaldea, J., 543
Cuba, 62, 63t, 183n3, 282, 285, 327, 536, 549, 714
Customary rights. see patriarchy
Dairiam, M. S., 11, 14, 344
Dalton, R., 890
Daltro, L. de Figueiredo, 536
Daly, M., 427
Dankelman, I., 825
Davis, A., 83, 91, 99, 101, 109, 122, 401, 703, 704, 708
DAWN
achievements, 171–72, 180–81, 185n40–41, 186n69
agenda, goals, 166–67, 184nn21–24
Alternatives, 173
anti-colonial struggles activism, 160–61, 183n3, 183n5–6
Bangalore meeting, 164–65, 172, 183n16
Challenging the Given, 168
contraceptive technologies, 169–70, 184n38, 185n40–41
cries identification, 164, 166, 179, 610
DAWN Development Debates (DDD), 179
DAWN Informa, 173, 184n32
DAWN Training Institutes (DTI), 171, 177, 278
debt crisis, 166
Development Crises and Alternative Visions (Grown), 25, 45n9, 165–67, 173, 184nn20–24, 185n47
diversity of standpoints, 25
environmental planning crisis, 166, 168–70
family planning programs, 169–70, 184n38, 185nn40–41
feminist scholarship, 162–63, 183n9
fundamentalisms, 169–70, 177, 184n38
gender, ecology and economic justice (GEEJ) project, 171–72, 177
gender-responsive budgeting, 495–96
global development agenda
  influence, 166–71, 176–77, 184n36, 184n38, 185n58, 473n3
governance crisis, 166
history, 7–8, 56, 58, 160–63, 183n3, 185nn5–9, 451, 479n9
interlinkages work (alliance building), 175–77, 185n58
management structure, 174–75
Markers on the Way: The DAWN Debates on Alternative Development, 169
Marketisation of Governance: Critical Feminist Perspectives from the South, 171, 178
movement response effectiveness, 179–80
neoliberalism, 61
network memberships, 170–71, 173, 184n29, 185n41, 185n56, 451, 458, 465, 469–70, 509
overview, 134, 159–60, 181–82, 183n1, 186nn71–72
patriarchy customary rights, 143–44, 148
Population and Reproductive Health: Feminist Perspectives from the South, 170
population policies, 168–70, 184n38
program, structure evolution, 167–72, 175–76, 184n26, 184n29, 184n32, 184nn37–38, 185n44, 185nn40–41
regionalization, 175, 185nn56–57
Regional Training Institutes (RTIs), 171, 177, 278
reproductive crisis, 166, 168–70, 184n38, 185nn40–41, 186n69
research themes, 171
roles, 17–18, 25, 45nn8–9, 349, 364n2
Secretariat, 172–74, 185n55
sexual, reproductive health/rights (SRHR), 279–80
“Strengthening Policy Analysis and Advocacy on Gender, Economic and Ecological Justice,” 172
structure, 172–75, 185n47, 185nn50–57
trade liberalization, 168, 178–79, 184n37
website, Dot Deacon, R., 432
Declaration of Mexico, 738–39
Declaration of Rio, 325–26
Declaration of the Rights of Man, 353
Declaration of the Rights of Woman and the Female Citizen, 353
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, 715
De Galan, M., 904
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 63t, 77, 202–5, 287, 773, 827, 888
Democratization processes, Latin America
  body ownership, 542, 543
  buen vivir, 543–44, 549n14
  citizenship, 531–32, 535, 540–43, 547, 549n6–9, 550n19
  diversity, 545–47, 550nn16–17
  environmentalist movement, 543–44, 549n14
  equality in power relationships, 545–47, 550nn16–17
  history, 535–40, 548nn1–3, 549n4
  indigenous communities, 540–41
  low-intensity democracies, 540, 549n5
  neoliberalism, 539
  Office of Depatriarchalization, 541, 549n6
  overview, 19–20, 30, 45n11, 531–32, 534–35, 548
  political militancy, 542–44, 549nn13–14
  politics, subjectivity in, 545
  politics, widening of, 544–45, 550n15
  poverty, 540–41
  religion, 543
  right to have rights, 30, 326, 531–32, 547–48, 550nn18–19
  sexual pact, 546, 550n16
  social exclusion, 540–42
  voting rights, 535, 536
Deng Y., 598
Denmark, 221, 241, 375, 377, 431
Depatriarchalization, 30, 45n11
Derrida, J., 560
Desai, M., 6, 10, 12, 25, 36, 40, 43, 51, 52, 122, 124, 873
De Schutter, O., 461
De Sousa, B., 829
De Souza, K., 88
Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN). see DAWN
Development Assistance Committee (DAC), 494, 497
Development Crises and Alternative Visions (Grown), 25, 45n9, 165–67, 173, 184n20–24, 185n47
Devi, G., 843
Dietrich, G., 559
Digital revolution. see information and communications technologies (ICTs)
Dirasse, L., 741n4
Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW), 195, 206, 727, 734
Doezema, J., 304, 305
Domestic violence. see violence against women
Domestic Violence Act of 1998, 489–90
Donne in Nero, 712
Douglass, F., 256, 703
Du Bois, W. E. B., 703
Duffy, M., 428
Dufour, P., 556
Durano, M., 465
Dynamique Citoyenne, 492

Earle, L., 775
Early childhood education and care services (ECEC), 433–37
Earth Charter, 168
East African Community (EAC), 465
Ecofeminism, 796–98, 824, 840
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 64, 727, 728
Economic and social justice. see also International Gender and Trade Network (IGTN); trade liberalization
acquisitiveness, 820–21
agriculture, 455–56, 461, 465, 479n35
Aid for Trade initiative, 471, 473–75
Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, 448, 473n3
care, caregiving, 423–27, 441n2, 442n3
care, reciprocity, 821–22
economic growth paradigm, 792, 805–6, 817, 819–22, 831
Economic Partnership Agreement, 454
engagement with, 18–22, 39
food security, 461–62, 476n14, 478nn31–33, 479nn36–38, 806, 846
food sovereignty, 461, 478n31
GEEJ project, 171–72, 177
gender divisions, 7–8
gender equality, mainstreaming, 449–50
girls, benefits in education of, 899–903, 913n2
global value chains (GVCs), 465–67, 470–72, 480n50
human rights, security, 448–50
intellectual property rights, 449, 450, 453–54, 476n11
macroeconomics, critiques of, 448–50
Multifibre Arrangement, 476n13
non-tariff barriers (NTBs), 455–56
organizations in general, 450–52, 475n7–9
political participation, representation, 216–18
structural adjustment polices, 485–86
trade facilitation, 467–68, 472–73, 480n51
trade liberalization, 168, 178–79, 184n37
WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), 461–62, 479n36–38
WTO Agreements, 453–55, 461, 476n11–15
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 465
Economic Co-operation and Development-Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC), 494–95, 747, 779
Ecuador
climatic justice, 825
democratization processes, 536, 541, 549n14
gender-responsive budgeting, 420, 486–87, 492–93
profeminism, 330, 332
Egypt
body ownership, 252
education access, 908, 911
feminist movements in general, 54, 92, 100–101, 107–8
fundamentalisms, 66, 664–65, 666n8
Muslim Brotherhood overthrow, 666n8
political participation, representation, 238–39
sexual, reproductive health/rights, 274, 275, 277
Street Food Project, 141
WLP activism, 71f, 74
Ehrenreich, B., 641
Eisenstein, Z., 83, 92, 109, 265, 267n7, 633, 710
Eitel, M., 904
El-Bushra, J., 715
Elmhirst, R., 802
El Saadawi, N., 10, 83, 111
Elshattan, J., 358, 359
Elson, D., 449, 452, 474, 486, 488, 499, 581
Emel, J., 801
Engagement
advocacy, 16, 19
alliance building, 17–19, 39–40, 100–102
bureaucracies (see United Nations; warriors within)
care, caregiving (see care, caregiving)
commodification, 86
cross-border praxis, 96–100
democratization processes, 19–20, 30, 45n11
diagnostic languages, 87, 98
discourse appropriation, 94–95
dispossession, 90
economics (see economic and social justice)
feminism, strategies, 91–92
femocrats, 14–15, 26
Free Cece movement, 101–2
gender-responsive budgeting (see gender-responsive budgeting)
global policy change arenas, 12–14
glocal engagements, 12, 19–22, 40–41, 44n1
grassroots, 21–22
historical differences, 87–88
imperialism, 91
importance of, 10
institutionalization, 88, 93
intersectionality, 102
knowledge production, 83, 97
labour movement, 101, 112n5
land rights, 21–22
language usurpation, 94–95
levels of in general, 11–12, 44n5–6
marginalized communities, 7, 12, 16, 24, 33, 52, 56, 89, 97–98
militarization, 90–92
neoliberalism, 85–95
North–South divide, 87, 90, 95–97, 100–101
organizations, institutions, 13–17, 26, 32–33, 38–39
overview, 83–87, 112n3–4
with patriarchy (see patriarchy)
place-based praxis, 96–97
political economy, 88–89
political representation, 15–16, 30, 45n11
primitive accumulation, 90
prison abolition movement, 101
privilege, power relations, 87–88, 92, 94, 96–99
property rights, 85, 86
public-private divide, 19–20, 25
sex trafficking (see sex trafficking)
situational positionality, 96
solidarity, challenges to, 87–93, 100
solidarity, strategies to achieve, 93, 95–102, 107–8
state building (see state building)
state funding, 32–33
state roles, 86, 86n1, 90–94
stigmatization, 40
structural adjustment policies, 88–89
survey questions, 84
violence against women (see violence against women)
whiteness ascendancy, 94
Engendering Adjustment for the 1990s, 451
England, L., 639
Enloe, C., 228, 637, 639, 640, 716, 736
Entre Tránsitos, 332
Envisioning Real Utopias (Wright), 201
Equality Now, 601, 263, 267n7
Eritrea, 386
Eschle, C., 66, 67
Index

Escobar, A., 807
Escuela Equinoccio (Equinox School), 330–31
Esping-Andersen, G., 431
Etchart, L., 6, 17, 699
Europe, European Union
  antiwar activism (transatlantic), 705–7
  austerity/fiscal stringency impacts, 20–21
  child-care provision, 430–31, 442n4–6
  data collection, 423–25, 442n3
  farm subsidies in, 479n37
  gender segregation in education, 376–77
glocal movements, 20–21
  Occupy movements, 777
  peace movements historically, 704–5
  political participation, representation, 222, 223, 235
  sandwich strategy, 223
  second wave feminism, 708–10
  shelter services in, 399
  state feminism, 237
  STEM gender gap, 865
  violence against women, 378–80, 391n17–18
  voter turnout, 777
  wage disparities, 375
European Employment Strategy, 431
Evans, D., 779
Eyben, R., 191, 200, 901

Family Research Council, 274
Farah, L., 93, 99, 109
Faria, C., 802
Fatah, S., 570
Fawcett, M., 705
Federici, S., 411n10
Femicide, 541, 549n8
Feminism and Institutionalism International Network (FIIN), 191
Feminist Dialogues, 66, 67, 186n72, 457, 477n21, 534
Feminist Majority Foundation (FMF), 644–45
Feminist political ecology (FPE)
  agenda, goals, 807–8
  analysis fields, topics, 805–7
  anti-pollution activism, 795
  birth as discipline, 794–96
  body-mind divide, 804
  buen vivir, 795, 803–4
  Canada, 88–89
  Chipko movement, 22, 792, 798–800, 838, 842–44
  controversies, critiques, 796–98, 801–4
decolonial, 803–4
ecofeminism, 796–98, 824, 840
  engagement, 88–89
  environmental issues, 791
  food security, 461–62, 476n14, 478nn31–33, 479nn36–38, 806, 846
  fundamentalisms, 806–7
  history, 793–94
  indigenous identities, 807
  intersectionality, 801–3
  leadership, 798–800
  nature-culture divide, 800–801, 803
  overview, 18, 791
  practical identity, 801–2
  Rubber Tappers’ movement, 798–800
  scholarly works, 795–96
  sustainable development, 791, 794, 840–41
  theoretical, methodological approaches, 805
  trajectories, 793–94
  Feminist Task Force (FTF), 818–19, 826–28
Feminist theory and praxis
  body politics (see body politics)
  collaboration, 10
  collective thinking, 10
  engagement (see engagement)
  intersectionality, 10
  knowledge production, 10, 41–42, 44n3
  overview, 9–11, 44n3, 51–52
  privilege, 11, 25–26
  tensions, 22–29
  transnationalization, 10
  A Feminist Vision of a People’s Union of South Asia, 567–68
FEMNET, 496
Femocrats, 190, 197–207, 199f. see also warriors within
  Fernandes, L., 122
  Fernandes, M. D. A., 754
  Ferree, M. M., 5, 54
  Ferrell, J., 253–54
  50 Million Missing, 856, 872, 878, 884–86
Figueroa, G., 328
Financial crisis 2008, 701, 768, 776–77, 786n10
Financing for Development (FfD), 494–98
Finland
gender equality in, 373–75, 377
objectification of women by the media, 378
violence against women, 378–80, 391n17–18
First International Feminist Conference (1974), 144
Fiscal policy. see economic and social justice;
gender-responsive budgeting
Flores, L., 219
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 141, 162, 476n14, 478n34
Food security, 461–62, 476n14, 478n31–33, 479n36–38, 806, 846
Ford Foundation, 278n29, 460, 597
Ford-Smith, H., 83, 93, 96, 111
Foreign Assistance Act, 138
Foucault, M., 259–61, 266n4, 296, 302, 304, 306, 314, 617
Foxconn, 592
FPE. see feminist political ecology (FPE)
Francis (Pope), 186n69
Francisco, J. G., 185n54, 465, 477n20
Franzoni, J. M., 440
Fraser, N., 509, 653, 818, 832n8
Freedom Without Fear (Bekaouf Azadi) for Women, 103–5, 113n15
Freedom Without Fear Platform, 105
Free market capitalism. see neoliberalism
Freire, P., 545
French, J., 91, 109
French Revolution, 353
Friedan, E., 709
Friedman, E. J., 610, 611
Friends of Special Products, 479n35
Fukuyama, F., 641
Fundamentalisms
activism, 55, 61, 66, 658–62, 665, 666n15–8
agency, 652–54, 663, 664
Al-Azhar, 658
body ownership, 258, 265n2
Buddhism, 653
Christianity, 653
citizenship, 655
communitarianism, 665
DAWN activism, 169–70, 177, 184n38
dichotomization, 664
donor-driven activism, 654, 656–57
Egypt, 656, 664–65, 666n8
Facing Fundamentalisms, 666n5
feminist political ecology, 806–7
gender debates, 652–54
identity, 656–57, 660, 663, 664
India, 561–62, 567
intersectionalities, 655
Islamic Republic of Iran, 61, 652–53, 658, 659, 691n10
Islamism, political Islam, 651, 654–58, 662–63, 666n2
Latin America, 658–59, 661
Muslim women, 652–58, 662–64, 666n2
overview, 630, 651–52, 665n1
Pakistan, 561–62
patriarchy, 652–54
political participation,
representation, 239–40
privilege, 656–57
religion as political force, 652–54, 664
religious essentialism, 651, 654–58, 662–63, 666n2
rights erosion, 658–62, 666n5–8
sacred texts engagement, 662, 664
secular reductionism, 651, 654–58, 664–65, 666n2
sexual rights, reproductive health, 274, 657, 659
Southasian feminist movements, 561–62, 567, 573n16–18, 574n19–20
Ulama of Iran, 658
United States, 653, 660
veiled women's engagement, 656
WLUML activism, 61, 66, 661
G-77 (Group of 77), 170, 173, 184n37, 727, 741n6
Gandhi, L., 681
Gandhi, L., 560
Gandhi, M., 183n3, 840
Garita, A., 28, 37, 40, 250
Gaventa, J., 524n11
Gender, ecology and economic justice (GEEJ) project, 171–72, 177
Gender Action Plan (GAP), 901
Gender and Economic Reform Programme (GERA), 465
Gender and Trade Network in Africa (GENTA), 465
Gender at Work, 191
Gender at Work analytical matrix, 198–200, 199f, 205, 210
Gender Budget Initiative, 490–92, 501n4–5
Gender Equality Architecture campaign, 205–6
“Gender Equality as Smart Economics,” 901
Gender identity. see identity
Gender mainstreaming
Caribbean, 714
cartography, 126
economic and social justice, 449–50
girls in development, 897–98, 898f
women in development, 150
World Bank, 126, 150
GENDERNET, 497
Gender-responsive budgeting
Accra Agenda for Action (AAA), 496–97
budget-classification systems, 492–93, 502n7
call circulars, 492, 501n6
civil society organizations, 492
Domestic Violence Act of 1998, 489–90
expenditure categorization, 491
Financing for Development (FFD), 494–98
five-step approach, 491, 501n4
Fourth High Level Forum (HLF4), 497
funding, 493–500, 502n8–12, 503n13
gender-aware beneficiary assessment (GABA), 492
Gender Budget Initiative, 490–92, 501n4–5
Gender Equality Action Plan, 502n11
Gender Helpdesk, 502n11
government ministries, 492
“Growing Girls and Women” (GWIN) Programme, 492
Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy, 490
history, 487–94, 501n2–6
inside government models, 488
Latin America, 492, 493
Monterrey Consensus, 495, 502n9
OECD Aid Effectiveness Agenda, 494–95
OECD gender equality policy marker, 494
overview, 18, 39, 420, 452, 485–87, 500, 501n1
Paris Declaration, 495–96, 502n8
postconflict states, 754
public-finance management cycle indicator, 497–98, 502n12
structural adjustment policies, 485–86
Tanzania, 452, 463, 479n35, 488, 495, 498, 511, 520–21
terminology, 501n5
Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF3), 496, 497
Women’s Budget Initiative (WBI), 489–90
Women’s Budget Program, 488–89, 501n2–3
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 447, 453, 475n1, 476n11, 478n32
Gettleman, J., 202–3
Ghana, 183n3, 287, 387–88, 496, 827
Giles, M. V., 219–20
Gillan, K., 717
Gilligan, C., 821, 822, 832n22
Gillis, S., 719
Girl Centered Program Design toolkit, 907–9, 908f
The Girl Effect, 904–6
Girl Hub, 905
“Girls Count: A Global Investment and Action Agenda,” 906
Girls in development
Beijing Platform for Action, 896
child marriage, 903, 910
citizenship, concepts in, 613–15
education benefits, 899–904, 913n2
evolving capacity concept, 903
feminist concepts, 896–97
gender discrimination, 902–6
gender mainstreaming, 897–98, 898f
girl effect, 904–6
global advocacy, 909–10
global youth bulge, 898
ICT activism, 910–12
instrumental vs. rights perspective, 901–2, 905, 912–13
movement, 898–99
paradigm shifts, 896–97, 900–901
poverty, 902–6
program models, 907–9, 908f
social media activism, 906
urbanization, 898
work, wage statistics, 902

A Girl's Right to Say No to Marriage, 903
Girls Who Code, 856, 911
Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women (GAATW), 300–301
Global Call to Action against Poverty (GCAP), 819
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria, 275, 276
Global Gender and Climate Alliance (GGCA), 457, 477n22
Global Gender Gap Index, 14, 344, 373, 379, 909
Global value chains (GVCs), 465–67, 470–72, 480n50
Glocal engagements, 12, 19–22, 40–41, 44n1
Goetz, A-M., 193, 205, 207, 614
Goldman, Emma, 705, 708
Goonasekera, H., 238
Gorbachev, M., 670
Gordon, B. S., 188
Gordon, J., 105
Gouges, O. de, 353
Goyal, R., 74
Grail, 450, 475n7
Grandmothers for Peace International, 60t
The Greatest Silence, 202–3
Green, M., 524n11
Greenham Common, 710–11
Grewal, I., 6, 117, 118, 120, 121, 123
Grimké, Angelina/Sarah, 703, 704
Grosser, K., 905
“Growing Girls and Women” (GWIN) Programme, 492
“Growing up Global: The Changing Transitions to Adulthood in Developing Countries,” 900
Grown, C., 25, 165, 448

Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR), 490
Guatemala, 63f, 274, 284, 330, 498, 549n8, 807, 825
Guha, R., 798
Gumbezvanda, N., 197
Guo, J., 598
Gutiérrez, R., 804
Guy-Sheftall, B., 100, 111

Hague Congress, 706
Hall, R. J., 8, 25, 32, 34, 38, 344
Halley, J., 611
Hans, A., 101, 109
Haq, M. ul, 355
Haq, Zia-ul-, 676
Harcourt, W., 623, 769, 807
Hardt, M., 718
Hawkesworth, M., 5, 55
Hawkins, R., 806
Hayden, Casey, 709
Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin, 672, 690n8
Hemispheric Social Alliance, 460, 477n24
Hendricks, S., 29, 41, 856
HERA (Health, Equality, Rights, Accountability), 277
Hernandez, A., 92, 94, 101, 109
Herrero, Y., 824, 833n35–36
Hess, E. B., 5, 54
Heymann, L. G., 706, 707
Heywood, E., 257
Hill, C., 256
Hirway, I., 424
HIV/AIDS, 511, 513, 515–16, 520
Hobhouse, E., 705
Honor killings/crimes of honor, 34, 63, 407–8, 413n23, 661
hooks, b., 8, 344, 394, 395, 410
Hosken, F., 144
Hossain, S., 407
Huainato, M., 208
Hubbard, P., 307
Hudson, V. M., 774
Hug, J. E., 460
Hughes, M., 239
Human Development Report 1994, 352, 355
Human Development Report 2003, 351
Human Life Institute 274

Human rights, security
activism historically, 347–48
citizenship, 350, 352, 358–63
concepts of, 347, 355–57, 360, 361
critical feminism, 346, 363, 364n1
development discourses, 348–49, 352–53, 363
economic policy, 448–50
exploitation, oppression, 347, 349–51, 360–62
globalization, 360–62
history, 352–53
identity, 350, 353, 358–63
overview, 343–44, 346–51, 362–64
paradigm shifts, 354–56
patriarchy, 357–60, 363
policy decisions, 348–51, 363
poverty, 347, 350–51
sex as a weapon of war, 351
state's roles, 350, 357–60, 362–63
strategies, 349, 356–57, 360
UN policy, 348, 352–56, 361
violence, relationships to, 347
violence against women, 350–51, 353, 357–59
wars on terror, 343, 361–62
weapons availability, 350, 358
women's experiences of, 346–49, 357–59, 362–64

Human Rights Caucus, 301

Human Rights Charter, 352

Human Rights Commission, 390n4

Human Rights Conference, 59, 538, 828, 882

Human trafficking. see sex trafficking

Huntington, S., 643

Hybrid Geographies (Whatmore), 801

Ibrahim, S., 252

Iceland, 373–80, 391nn17–18

Identity
body ownership, 253, 256–57, 262–63
citizenship, 608, 612, 615, 616, 618–19
fundamentalisms, 656–57, 660, 663, 664
human rights, security, 350, 353, 358–63
indigenous, 807

India
Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), 680, 680n, 683
Bekaouf Azaïd (Freedom Without Fear) for Women, 103, 113n15
care, caregiving in, 437–40, 838
CEDAW, activism on, 387
Chipko movement, 22, 792, 798–800, 838, 842–44
citizenship, 561–62, 567
colonial history, 183n3, 555, 557
Constitution, 680, 692n35, 847, 849, 850n1
crèche-nutrition units (anganwadis), 437–38
democracy, 679–84, 680n, 692n32–36
democratic capitalism, 679–84, 680n, 692n32–36
female genocide, 884–85
food security in, 461–62, 479n37, 846
fundamentalisms, 561–62, 567
gender, climate change
gestational surrogacy in, 311–12
glocal movements, 20
Hindu Succession Act, 387
Indian Divorce Act, 387
Kashmir, 671, 676, 680, 682–85, 689, 691n14, 691n23, 692n36
Kerala, 885
Kunan Poshpora, 683
land ownership, 844–45
militarism, 566
One Billion Rising campaign, 105, 878
Pakistani intervention, 671, 676, 682
Panchayati raj, 155n1
patriarchy, 838, 843, 847–50, 886
peace movements, 712
political participation, representation, 239
power configurations 2006, 562
public distribution system (PDS) programs, 846
rape culture, 103–5, 113n15, 254, 262–63, 574n19, 681–84, 692n32–36, 872, 887–90
resources access, 844–45
social media activism, 887–89
social movements, 85, 102–3
social reproduction, 425
SRHR movement, 286
states, population, 680f
STEM gender gap, 865
sustainable livelihoods (see sustainable livelihoods)
tensions within movements, 24
Uttarakhand, 842–44
wage disparities, 373
wars on terror, 679–84, 680f, 688, 692n32–36
WLP activism, 71t
WSF participation, 67
Indigenous identities, 807
Indonesia. see also Timor-Leste
government policies and privilege, 151
political representation, 155n1
STEM gender gap, 865
WLP activism, 71t
women food vendors, 141
Informal Working Group on Gender and Trade (IWGGT), 454, 480n47
Information and communications technologies (ICTs)
activism, 56
activism in general, 855–59
citizenship, 872, 875–79, 890
cyborg phenomenon, 859
digital public spheres, 863–65
digital solidarity, 867
empowerment, entrapment, 859
geospatial engagement, 861
innovation, 859–60, 865–67
liberation, 864–65
limitations, 889–91
Making IT Our Own, 69, 73
politics, political agency, 860–62
potentials, 889–91
power relationships
activism, 855–56, 863–65
science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM), 857, 859, 865–68
sensor technologies, 866
slacktivism, 891
social media (see social media activism)
sociospatial engagement, 861
violence against women, 27–29, 41–42
Instituto Costarricense de Masculinidad, Pareja y Sexualidad (Costa Rican Masculinity, Couples, and Sexuality Institute, WEM), 330
Instituto Papai, 330
International property rights, 449, 450, 453–54, 476n11
Interamerican Convention of Belem do Para, 543
International Abolitionist Federation (IAF), 303
International Association for Feminist Economics (IAFFE), 447
International Bureau for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, 303
International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD, Cairo Consensus) democratization processes, 538
movement building, 59
political fundamentalism, 658
regional reviews, 284–88
rights recognition, claims to, 581
SRHR movement, 168–70, 250, 258, 271–72
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), 44n4, 390n6
International Council of Women (ICW), 705
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 44n4, 224, 390n4, 390n6, 680
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 44n4, 390n4, 390n6, 499–500, 503n13
International Criminal Court (ICC), 65, 732
International Day of the Girl, 895, 903
International Development Research Centre (IDRC), 490
Japan
Constitution, 188
human rights, security, 356–57
political participation, representation, 218
rights, claiming, 388
sex trafficking, 267n7
women's rights, 188
Jaquette, J., 151
Jenichen, A., 652
Jenson, J., 429–30, 442n5
Jimomi, K., 681
Joint Monitoring Committee on the Improvement of the Quality of Life and Status of Women (JMCW), 489
Jordan, 54, 63t, 70–72t, 73–74, 76, 659, 661
Joyia, M., 674
Juba Peace Talks, 769
Justice Verma Report, 103, 104, 113n15, 887, 890
Kabeer, N., 370, 486, 616, 780, 896, 897
Kaga, M., 877
Kali for Women, 560
Kandiyoti, D., 35, 655, 664, 771
Kant, I., 298, 309, 314, 703
Kaplan, K., 208, 309, 314, 703
Kapur, R., 262, 406
Karl, M., 144
Karzai, H., 674
Kaufman, M., 326–27, 337n6
Kazakhstan, 71–72, 75
Kazi, S., 34, 35, 38, 343, 630
Kazibwe, S., 727
Keck, M., 873
Kelkar, G., 559
Kelleher, D., 198
Kennedy, J. F., 137
Kerstein, S. J., 310
“Key Learnings from Feminists on the Frontline,” 660
Keynes, J. M., 820–21
Khalid, M., 33, 34, 343, 629
Khan, N. S., 559
Khan, Z., 18, 39, 419, 420
Khanna, A., 261
Kimmel, M., 321, 325
King, M., 709
Kingston, M. H., 190
Kitunga, D., 524n3
Klot, J. F., 14, 25, 38, 362, 699–700
Kollontai, A., 706
Korea, 144, 183n3, 235, 385, 497, 519, 591, 865
Koshan, J., 399, 401
Kothari, A., 838, 849
Krishna, S., 19, 22, 40, 41, 791, 792, 848
Kristof, N., 267n7
Krook, M. L., 191, 201, 224, 235
Kulkarni, S., 844, 845, 849
Kunin, M., 238
Kurian, P. A., 27, 855–56
Kyoto Protocol, 816
Kyrgyzstan, 71–72t, 75
Labarca, A., 536
Labor Contract Law, 590, 592
Lagarde, M., 330
Land Contract Law, 584
Lane, M., 361
Lanza, G., 405
Laos, 7, 146, 156n4
Latin America. see also specific countries
activism, 56, 62
Afrodescendientes, 540–41
alliance building, 40, 610–11
androcentric dualism, 36–37
antipoverty policies, 433
care, caregiving, 433–40, 542, 545, 550n15
conditional cash transfers, 433–34
Costa Rica, 138, 326, 330, 440, 540
crises identification, 164
Cuba, 62, 63t, 183n3, 282, 285, 327, 536, 549, 714
democratization processes (see democratization processes, Latin America)
discourse appropriation, 94–95
economic justice organizations in in general, 451
euentros (encounters), 20, 56, 548n2, 610
family power relationships, 147–48, 156n4
forced sterilization policies, 542
fundamentalisms, 658–59, 661
gender, climate change
tribunals, 792, 826–28
gender-responsive budgeting, 492, 493
Latin America (Cont.)
Guatemala, 63, 274, 284, 330, 498, 549n8, 807, 825
human rights, security, 356
indigenous identities, 807
Isis International Foundation, 144–45
peace movements, 712–14
political participation,
preschool education, 434–35
profeminism (see profeminism)
Puerto Rico, 110, 536, 549n9
Resistance Societies, 535–36
right to have rights, 30, 326, 531–32, 547–48, 550nn18–19
scholarly collaborations, 327
social investment state, 430, 442n5
state feminism, 237
sustainable development movements, 825
Venezuela, 186n65, 326, 536, 825
violence against women, 405, 541, 549n8
Visitacion Padilla, 405
widow’s mandate, 237
WLP activism, 71–72
"Women in the Labour Force in Latin America," 162–63
WSF participation, 67
Latin American Union of Women (ULAM), 825
La Via Campesina, 67, 467, 478n31, 478n33
Lawrence, B., 122
Leading to Choices, 68, 73, 75
League of Women Freethinkers, 536
Lebanon, 63, 70–72t, 73–75
Lechner, N., 545
Lee, K., 598–99
Lemrini, A., 387
Lewis, J., 427
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 684–86, 693n40
Liberia, 63, 218, 225, 238, 287, 463, 477n18, 726, 773
Limoncelli, S. A., 302–4
Linkage Caucus, 473n3
Lister, R., 55, 872, 876
Liu B., 585
Li Y., 585, 598–99
Locke, J., 256
Lovenduski, J., 231
Luisi, P., 536
Lund, E., 442n8
Luxembourg, 375, 377
Luxemburg, R., 706
Lynch, J., 644
Maastricht Treaty, 447
MacArthur, D., 188
Machel, G., 730
MacKinnon, C., 396, 399
MADRE, 60t, 62–63, 63t, 77
Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, 537, 548n1, 712
Madunagu, B., 167, 185n53
Mahmoud, S., 653
Mahon, R., 430, 431
Maicuashca, B., 66, 67
Mair, L., 149, 162, 163
Making IT Our Own, 69, 73
"Making Women Work for Development—Again," 901
Malaysia
colonial history, 183n3
gender roles, inequality in, 372–73, 391n13
Ninth Malaysia Plan, 372–73
reproductive rights in, 255
WLP activism, 72t
Mama, A., 409
Mandatory charging, 401, 412nn12–13
Mani, L., 357
Manjoo, R., 682
Manorama, T. D., 681–82
Maoist movements, 838
Mao Z., 588
Maracle, L., 96, 101, 110
Marche Mondiale des Femmes, 60t, 61, 66–67
Markers on the Way: The DAWN Debates on Alternative Development, 169
Marketisation of Governance: Critical Feminist Perspectives from the South, 171, 178
Marriage Law, 584
Marshall, T. H., 547, 616
Martin, C., 875
Martinez, N., 536
Masood, A. J., 678
Massoud, A. S., 691n15
INDEX 941

Matorras, R., 310
Matthews, R., 307
Maunaguru, S., 573n16
Mauritania, 72, 74, 75, 287, 882
Mazumdar, V., 848
Mazurana, D., 740
Mbilinyi, M., 21, 41, 42, 419, 420, 524n3
McAdam, S., 105
McAskie, C., 728
McClintock, A., 315n7, 406
McFarland, A., 890
McKay, F., 191, 201
McLean, S., 105
Mead, M., 138
Media, objectification of women by, 377–78
Medica Mondiale, 60, 62, 63
Medica Women’s Therapy Centre, 712
Mehta, H., 161
Mendoza, B., 553, 873
Men Engage, 326
Menocal, A. R., 774, 779
Menon, N., 32, 104
Menon, P., 197
Menon-Sen, K., 838
Mercosur Feminist Articulation, 67
Mexican Federal Daycare Program for Working Mothers, 436
Mexico
Agrarian Code, 536
conditional cash transfers, 433–34
democratization processes, 536, 537, 539
discourse appropriation, 94–95
First Feminist Congress, 536
land ownership rights, 536
peace movements, 718
preschool education, 434–35
profeminism in, 327–29
Zapatista uprising, 539
Micheletti, M., 890
Middle East. see also specific countries
Jordan, 54, 63f, 70–72f, 73–74, 76, 659, 661
Lebanon, 63f, 70–72f, 73–75
political participation, representation, 221–22, 238–39
postconflict change, 16, 238–39
sexual, reproductive health/rights, 274–75
state feminism, 237
Turkey, 72f, 661
WLP activism, 71–72f, 73–75
Middleton, E., 804
Migrant women, 300, 302–4, 306–7, 315n7, 583, 589–93
Migrant workers’ abuses, 384
Milevska, S., 572n1
Militarism. see also wars on terror
coop-artions, collusions, 629–30, 644–45
empiricist feminism, 634
gender concepts, 633–35, 646
gender difference, institutionalization of, 636
gendered effects, assumptions, 632–33
gender roles, 637, 639–40
identity, 637–38, 642, 646
as ideology, 635–36, 643
as institution, 636–39, 642–43
intersectionality, 641–42
language, 637, 638
legitimization, 638, 642
military values, 633
national interest construction, 637–38
overview, 629–30, 645–47
patriarchy, 33–36, 44n6, 45nn14–15, 636–38, 646
peace movements, 705, 708, 716–17
post structuralist feminism, 634–35
power relations, 636–38, 641
sexual violence, 405, 640–41
Southasian feminist movements, 561–63, 566, 573n16–18, 574nn19–20
Sri Lanka, 555, 558–59, 620–21
standpoint feminism, 634
state’s roles, 635–38
symbolism, 643, 644
Wars on Terror, 643–45
women’s roles, 638–40, 646
Mill, J. S., 705, 707
Millenial Development process, 897
Millennium Declaration, 476n15, 897
Millenial Development Goals, 1, 66, 215, 225, 273, 476n15–16, 493, 828, 901
Miller, A., 406
Millet, K., 298
Mir-Hosseini, Z., 662
Mitchell, J., 471
Mlambo-Ngucka, P., 491
Moghadam, V. M., 4, 5, 8, 30, 51, 151, 446, 448, 451, 711, 712, 818, 832n6, 873
Mohanty, C. T., 6, 8, 10, 23, 24, 30, 36, 51, 117, 118, 121, 122, 124, 411n3, 508, 609, 818, 832n9
Mohapatra, S., 310
Mollett, S., 802, 807
Montes, M., 478n29
Morocco
CEDAW, activism on, 387
DAWN activism, 164
Family Code, 387
fundamentalisms, 61
gender-responsive budgeting, 420, 492, 493
humanitarianism, 63†
Personal Status Code, 387
transnational feminist networks, 56, 65–66
WLP activism, 70–72†, 75
Moser, C., 148, 486
Mott, L., 704
Moustafa, Y., 656
Movement for the Emancipation of Chilean Woman, 536
Movimiento Machista (Masculinist Movement), 335
Moyano, M. E., 537
Mozambique, 16, 492, 748, 772
Mujeres por la Paz, 714
Mukhopadhyay, M., 12, 32, 195, 343, 531, 533
Multifibre Arrangement, 476n13
Mumsnet, 862
Mundkur, A., 27, 855–56
Munshi, D., 27, 855–56
Musawah, 661, 663, 666n6
Musharraf, P., 676, 678
Muslim Arbitration Tribunal (MAT), 657
Muslim women, 652–58, 662–64, 666n2
NAACP, 703
Nagar, R., 24, 97–98, 110, 124
Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations, 727
Naripokkho, 620
Narrian, A., 113n15
National Committee of Women, 536
National Feminist Party, 536
National Liberation Front (NLF), 710
National Organization for Men Against Sexism (NOMAS), 324, 337n4
National Organization for Women (NOW), 709
National Women’s Studies Association (NWSA), 152
National Working Committee on Women and Children, 583–84
Native Women’s Association, 403
Negri, A., 718
Neoliberalism
activism, 51–52, 56, 61
basis, goals, 777
care, caregiving, 426–27, 429–30, 432
China, 532–33, 582–83, 588, 601n4
clim ate justice, 792, 805–6, 817, 819–22
engagement with, 85–95
feminist critiques, 448–50
globalization effects, 78n1
human rights, security, 360–62
Latin America, 539
patriarchy, 8–9, 30–33, 38
sex trafficking, 306
Southasian feminist movements, 554–55, 558, 563–64, 570
Sri Lanka, 558
structural adjustment policies, 448
Tanzania, 85, 507–9, 512–14
transnational feminist movements in general, 8–9, 30–33, 38
United Kingdom, 85–86, 657–58
United States, 85–86, 95, 653, 708–10
violence against women, 89, 409, 411n10
Nepal
alliance building, 566–67, 574n24
CEDAW, activism on, 386, 390n10
citizenship, 558
Constituent Assembly, 771–72
gender-responsive budgeting, 492–93, 502n7
militarism, 555
political participation, 771–72
Nesiah, V., 620, 621, 622
NETRIGHT, 496
Network of Sex Work Projects (NSWP), 301
Newman, E., 347
New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), 465
Nicaragua
care, caregiving, 437–39
fundamentalisms, 659, 661
neoliberalism, 85
political participation, representation, 238
power relationships, 147–48
profeminism, 329–30
sexual, reproductive health/rights, 284, 549n5, 659
transnational feminist networks, 62–63
WLP activism, 72t
Nigeria
colonial history, 183n3
discrimination universality, 381–83
gender, climate change
tribunals, 792, 826–28
gender-responsive budgeting, 492
WLP activism, 72f, 73
women food vendors, 141
Nike Foundation, 904, 905, 906
Nirmal, P., 18, 42, 791
Nkrumah, K., 183n3
Nobel Women's Initiative, 60t
Nobre, M., 67
No Man's Land initiative, 570–71
No-Aligne d Movement (NAM), 160, 183n5
Noor, 607–8, 615
North-South divide
gender equality in, 373–77
gojectification of women by the media, 378
political participation,
representation, 221, 241
violence against women, 378–80, 391n17–18
Nosseir, A., 662
“Notes on Transformative
Feminism,” 511, 524n3
Nwosu-Juba, N., 73
Obama, B., 278, 656
Objectification of women by the
media, 377–78
O’Brien, J., 197
O’Brien, R., 613
O’Connell, H., 17, 20, 700–701, 769
Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in
Persons, 315n10
Ogata, S., 357
Okazawa-Rey, M., 99, 101, 110
One Billion Rising, 105, 878
One-child policy, 33, 588–90
Ontario Women’s Justice Network, 412n12
Oparah, J., 98, 100, 101, 110
Operation Enduring Freedom, 35
Orford, A., 731
Organization of Islamic Conference
States, 275
Organizations, institutions, 13–17, 26,
32–33, 38–39. see also United Nations;
warrors within
Osborne, H. E., 402
Oslo Donors’ Conference, 770
Otto, D., 194, 731, 735, 739
“Our Common Future,” 822
“Our Rights, Our Lives,” 280–81
Our World Is Not for Sale (OWINFS), 456–57, 460, 477n19
Overseas Development Institute (ODI), 463
Pacific Islands, 164, 286, 758
Padhi, R., 848, 849
Pakistan
al-Qaeda, 676–78
Baluchistan, 678, 692n31
citizenship, 561–62
civilian government, 676
colonial history, 183n3, 555, 557
disappearances, 678
fundamentalisms, 561–62
gender, climate change
tribunals, 792, 826–28
glocal movements, 20
Pakistan (Cont.)
Islamization, 675–77
militarism, 566
mujahideen, 676
Musharraf regime, 676, 678
power configurations 2006, 562
Punjab, 678
Quetta shura, 678
religious minorities killings, 676, 678, 692n30
sexual harassment, 205
Swat Valley war, 676–77, 691n24 692n26
Taliban, 676–78
US intervention, 675, 676, 679
violence against women, 678–79
war crimes apology, 559, 573n12
wars on terror, 675–79, 688–89, 691nn22–24, 692n25–31
Waziristan, 677, 692n27
WLP activism, 72f
women's rights, 675–77, 691n24, 692n25–30
Pakistan-India People's Forum for Peace and Democracy (PIPFPD), 566
Palestine
humanitarianism, 63t
neoliberalism, 92
Palestinian Authority, 655
peace movements, 66, 712
transnational feminist networks, 62–63, 77, 99
WLP activism, 71–72f, 73–74
Pan-American Women's Federation, 535
Pande, A., 311, 312
Pandey, J. S., 103–5, 254, 262, 872, 887–89
Papadaki, E., 298
Papp, A., 408
Paris Declaration, 495–96, 502n8
Parvez, A., 407–8
Parvez, M., 407–8
Patel, P., 657, 668, 664
Pathways to Women’s Empowerment, 209–10, 901
Patriarchy
as cause of violence against women, 32, 344, 395, 396, 399–400, 406–8, 411n5, 412n21
China, 143–44, 148, 154–55, 156n4
582–84, 596
citizenship, 610
climate justice, 821, 823
collective emancipation, 40
contradictions/collusions/cotopations, 31–36
culture vs. rights debate, 34
depatriarchalization, 30, 45n11
dualisms, creation of, 34, 45n14
engagement with, 14–15, 89, 101
female genocide, 884–85
fundamentalisms, 652–54
gender binaries, working beyond, 36–37
gender roles, inequality in, 372–73, 382
human rights, security, 357–60, 363
men, working with, 36
militarism, 33–36, 44n6, 45nn14–15, 636–38, 646
neoliberalism, 8–9, 30–33, 38
peace movements, 33, 705–7, 709, 716, 719
religions, 30
state building, rebuilding, 701, 767–72, 777
state funding, 32–33
sustainable livelihoods, 838, 843, 847–50, 886
Tanzania, 85, 507–9, 512–14
transformation of, 29–31, 45n11, 135, 205
United Kingdom, 657–58
wage disparities, 373–75, 431, 442n4
wars on terror, 33–36, 45nn14–15, 91
women in development (WID) approach, 143–44, 148, 154–55, 156n4
Paxton, P., 239
Peace movements
abolitionism, 703–4, 709
activism (transnational organizations), 711–13
antiwar activism (IGOs, INGOs), 714–17
antiwar activism (transatlantic), 705–7
antiwar activism (United States), 707–9
CEDAW, 715
China, 712
citizenship, 704
class exploitation, 704
gender concerns, inclusion of, 620–22
goals in general, 6
history, Europe, 704–5
history, United States, 702–4
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), 711, 714–17
international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), 711–12, 714–17
Latin America, 712–14
militarism, 705, 708, 716–17
nonviolent resistance, 703, 708
overview, 699, 719–20
pacifism, 703, 708, 709
patriarchy, 33, 705–7, 709, 716, 719
political representation, 16, 719–20
power relations, 716, 719
second wave feminism, 708–10, 719
separatism, 709–11
solidarity, 713–14, 718
sovereignty, 718
state building, rebuilding, 769–72
themes, 703
third wave feminism, 716, 719, 720n1
training, 32
transnational feminist networks (TFNs), 717–18
Vietnam, 710
women’s suffrage, 703–5
World War I, 705–6
Peake, L., 88, 110
People’s Earth Declaration, 824
People’s SAARC, 566–67, 574n24
Percy, C., 138
Peru
climate justice, 825, 827
democratization processes, 534–38, 541–42, 550n19
fundamentalisms, 660
humanitarianism, 63†
motherist, difference identities, 151
political participation, representation, 219
profeminism, 326–27
sexual, reproductive health/rights, 284
WLP activism, 69
Petchesky, R. P., 27, 36, 37, 249
Petraeus, D., 266n3
Philipose, E., 406
Philippines
CEDAW, activism on, 384, 386
fundamentalisms, 657
Gabriela Women’s Party, 223
Magna Carta of Women, 387
migrant workers, abuses of, 384
political participation, representation, 223
sexual rights, reproductive health, 258, 657
SRHR movement, 286
women food vendors, 141
Phillips, A., 219, 663
Pinochet, A., 20
Plan International, 902, 903
Plumwood, V., 823, 825
Polanyi, K., 821
Political ecology, 794–95. see also feminist political ecology (FPE)
Political participation, representation
alliance building, 240
appointments, 235–36
approaches to, 220–21
challenges, 225–30
China, 585, 596–97
critical mass, 215, 219, 242n2, 748, 763n8
cross-border networking, 240
degendering, 220
democratic structures, processes, 216
double bias, 230
double binds, 219, 223–24
economic, human development, 216–18
education, knowledge, 228–29
egalitarian ideologies, 236–37
electoral systems, 231
family, domestic responsibilities, 219, 225–26, 236–37
family relations (kinship), 237–38
feminist movement roles, 223–24
fundamentalisms, 239–40
increases in, 216
Indonesia, 155n1
institutional limitations, 230–32
international conventions, agreements, 224–25
justifications, 217
leadership style, 218–20
local government, 236
mechanisms, 222
money networks, access to, 226–27
Nordic countries, 221, 241
Political participation, representation (Cont.)
old boys’ networks, 229
overview, 215–16, 240–42, 242nn1–2
parliamentary systems, 231–32
peace movements, 16, 719–20
personal safety, 229–30
political parties, 232
postconflict change, 16, 238–39
postconflict states, 16, 238–39, 700, 747–48, 756, 758–62, 763n9, 772
quotas, 233–34
reserved seats, 234–35
socialization, 228
Southasian feminist movements, 221–22, 235–37, 239, 241
state building, rebuilding, 772–75
state feminism, 237
statistics, 221–22
stereotypical expectations, 219–20, 227–28
substantive representation, 220–21
symbolic representation, 220
temporary special measures, 233
transactional leadership style, 219
transformational leadership style, 219
UNSCR 1325 mandate, 204, 225
widow’s mandate, 237
women in development (WID) approach, 153–54
women’s interests, defining, 217
The Politics of Piety (Mahmoud), 653
Population Council, 906, 907, 913n2
Postcolonial theory
capitalist vs. communist models of integration, 7
center-periphery models, 6
feminist political ecology, 803–4
First World–Third World model, 6
marginalization factors, 7–8
overview, 6
Second World model, 6
Postconflict states. see also Autonomous Region of Bougainville (ARB); Solomon Islands; Timor-Leste
critical mass, 215, 219, 242n2, 748, 763n8
donor assistance, 747
gender equality, 747, 762–63
gender-responsive budgets, 754
international interventions, 750, 757–58, 762
overview, 700
political participation, representation, 16, 238–39, 700, 747–48, 756, 758–62, 763n9, 772
state building, 747, 762
UNSCR 1325 mandates, 746–47 (see also UN Security Council Resolution 1325)
violence against women, 754, 756
women as peacemakers, 755–57
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), 614
Power relationships
CEDAW, 371, 372, 390n10
engagement with, 87–88, 92, 94, 96–99
ICT activism, 855–56, 863–65
IGTN, 449
Latin America, 147–48, 156n4, 545–47, 550n16–17
militarism, 636–38, 641
peace movements, 716, 719
profeminism, 323, 324, 328–29, 332, 336n3
state building, rebuilding, 701, 767–72, 777, 781–83
sustainable livelihoods, 841
TFNs, 872–74
violence against women, 398–99, 406, 411n10
Pradhan, P., 848, 849
Pramanik, P., 253
Prashad, V., 709, 710
Pratt, M. B., 101, 102, 110–11
“Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations,” 779
Prinsloo, J., 360
Privilege
activism, 126
citizenship, 610
engagement with, 87–88, 92, 94, 96–99
feminist theory and praxis, 11, 25–26
fundamentalisms, 656–57
Indonesia, 151
Profeminism
academia, 326–27, 332–35, 334f, 337n6
activism, 327–30, 332–35, 334f
Index

947

alliance building, solidarity with, 36, 332, 334
challenges, 331
colloquias, 326
Declaration of Rio, 325–26
engagement modes, 330–31, 337n7
experiences of, 329–32
gendered social expectations, 323–24
gender roles historically, 323–24
HIV/AIDS, 331–32
homophobia, 331–32
influences, debates on, 327–29
Latin American actors, 325–27, 332, 337n6
machismo, 328–29
masculinity studies, 327–29
NGOs, social organizations, 325–26
North-South divide, 333, 334f, 336n3
organization scale, structure, 331
overview, 251, 321–23, 336, 336n1–2
power relationships, 323, 324, 328–29, 332, 336n3
prostitution, pornography, 323, 324
quasi-identities, 325
socioeconomic class, 335
stigma, 331–32
strategies, 331, 334f
subregions studies, 327
transgender men, 332
United States, 323–25, 328, 336n3, 337n4
violence, 328
women's pleasure, 323–24
workshops, 329–30
youth, 328, 335
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 299
Prügl, E., 32, 196, 611
Puerto Rico, 110, 536, 549n9
Quateart, J., 702
Quito Consensus, 543, 549n13
Rabbani, B., 690n8
Radack, F., 371, 381, 384
Raging Grannies, 718
Rahman, A., 522
Rahnavard, Z., 218
Rakhsha Bandhan, 573n9
Rao, A., 198
Rape culture, 103–5, 113n15, 254, 262–63, 574n19, 681–84, 692n32–36, 872, 887–90
Razack, S., 402
Razavi, S., 19, 39, 419, 652
Reagan, R., 85–86, 690n5
Realizing Sexual and Reproductive Justice (RESURJ), 279
Reardon, E., 636
Reddock, R., 88, 99, 111
Red Internacional de Estudios sobre Varonesy Masculinidades (International Network for the Study of Men and Masculinities), 326
Red Thread, 88, 98
Regional Assistance Mission (RAMSI), 749, 756, 758, 761
Reilly, N., 123
Rein, M., 738
Religious fundamentalisms. see fundamentalisms
Republican Feminist Party, 536
Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA), 673, 674
Richmond, O. P., 347
Right to have rights, 30, 326, 531–32, 547–48, 550n18–19
Right to Life Federation, 274
Riley, M., 448, 456
Risman, B., 5, 54
Rius, M. B., 825
Rivera-Lassén, A. I., 110
Robinson, J., 823
Rocheleau, D., 18, 42, 791, 801–2
Rodriquez, G., 477n20
Roldan, M., 142
Rome Statute, 65, 732
Rosemberg, F., 435, 436
Roth, B., 702
Rothstein, V., 710
Rowbotham, S., 703, 838
Roy, A., 897

Rubber Tappers’ movement, 798–800
Rukh, L., 557
Ruskin, J., 705
Rwanda, 16, 72, 748, 771
Sadiqi, F., 101, 111
Saint-Martin, D., 429–30, 442n5
Samar, S., 673, 674
Samuel, K., 558
Sandberg, J., 807
Sandberg, S., 219
Sandel, M. J., 310
Sangat: A South Asian Feminist Network, 556, 564, 571
Sanger, M., 257
Santo Domingo Consensus, 543, 549n13
Santos, B. de Sousa, 548
SAPS. see structural adjustment policies (SAPs)
Sassen, S., 112n5
Savane, M. A., 173
Schattan, V., 782
Schechter, S., 399
Schengen Agreement, 302
Schön, D., 738
Science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM), 857, 859, 865–68
Scott Cato, M., 821
Scoular, J., 307
Security. see human rights, security
Seebrook, J., 819
Seffner, F., 332
Self Employed Women’s Association (SEWA), 140–41
Sen, A., 148, 357, 841
Sen, G., 25, 165, 167, 184n21, 486, 610
Serrano-Amaya, J. F., 36, 40, 251
Sex and Power: Defining History, Shaping Societies (Banerji), 884–85
Sex trafficking
abolitionism, 299, 304, 305
accountability, 299, 301
agency, 295–96, 299, 300, 305–6
antitrafficking policy, 303
antitrafficking programs, 299
assisted reproductive technology (ART), 296–97, 308–13, 315n11, 316n14–17
bodies as ends, 296, 297, 309–11
body ownership, 295–96 (see also body ownership)
borders (geographical), 305–8, 315n12–13
China, 589
classification, legal definitions, 315n10
cohabitation with natives, 303
commoditization, 296, 297, 309–10, 314–15
cost, 299–300, 305–6, 314
cross-border reproductive care (CBRC), 311
cross-border surrogacy, 296–97, 308–13, 315n1, 316n14–17
dignity, 296, 297, 309–12, 314
engagement with, 26–27
exploitation, 299–301, 307
gestational surrogacy, 309, 311–12, 316n17
identity, 295–96, 306–7, 316n13
labor trafficking, 301, 305
medical tourism complex, 309
migrant women, 300, 302–4, 306–7, 315n7
morality, moral purity, 303–6, 312–13
myth construction, 304–5
neoliberalism, 306
objectification/domination relationship, 297–302, 314, 315n2–4, 315n6–9
overview, 250–51, 271–72, 295–97, 313–15
pornography, 298
rationalities, 306, 315n12
reproductive tourism/exile, 310–11
sex-as-power ethic, 298–99, 304, 315n11
sexualized care work, 312
sex workers, 297–307, 315n2–4, 315n6–9
slavery, 297–302, 315n2–4, 315n6–9, 718
social assistance, 299
as social construct, 302–8, 315n10–12, 316n13
state’s roles, 296, 299, 302–6, 315n10
stratified reproduction, 311
victim politics, 266n5, 299, 304–6, 315n11
white slavery, 303
Sexual, reproductive health/rights (SRHR). see also body ownership
abotions, 272, 276
activism history, 273–75
adolescents, 281–83, 287
advocacy, 276–79
alliance building, 289–90
Bali Global Youth Forum Declaration, 283–84
biopolitics, 259–61, 266nn3–6, 267nn7–8
family planning programs, 276
financing, 275–76, 282
fundamentalisms, 274, 657, 659
generational tensions, 277–80
HIV agenda, 273–76
identity politics, 288–89
leadership transitions, 279–80
marginalized populations, 278, 283
maternity care, 276
multilateralism, 280–88
NGO documents list, 293
“Our Rights, Our Lives,” 280–81
overseas development assistance (ODA), 275–76
overview, 250
political history, 258–59
positive rights, 278–79
regional ICPD reviews, 284–88
reinvigoration, 289
sexual orientations and gender identities (SOGI), 278, 287
training programs, 278–80
UN documents list, 293–94
Sexual assault. see violence against women
Sexual Rights Initiative (SRI), 279
Sex workers, 262–64, 266nn5–6
Shaheed, R., 883
Shakil, A., 888
Sharmila, I. C., 682
Sharp, R., 488, 491
Sheehy, E., 400
Shepherd, L., 725, 729
Shiva, V., 798, 799
Sholkamy, H., 664–65
Short, C., 35
Sierra Leone, 183n3, 226, 715
Sikkink, K., 873
Singapore issues, 466, 471, 480n46
Sipila, H., 189
Sireleaf, E. J., 477n18
Sista II Sista, 410
Sista’s Liberated Ground, 410
Sisterhood Is Global Institute (SIGI), 58, 61
Sisters in Islam, 661
Sisters in Spirit, 402–3
Sistren, 451
Skidelsky, R., 820
Slatter, C., 184n23, 185n52
Smith, A., 396, 398, 402, 410, 820
Smithey, S., 477n23
Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI), 909
Socialist Workers Party (SWP), 717
Social justice. see economic and social justice
Social media activism
blogosphere, 875
body ownership, 262
Canada, 103, 105–7
China, 21, 533, 579, 592, 597
Europe, 21
girls in development, 906
Idle No More Movement, 103, 105–7
impacts in general, 21, 27–29, 107, 856, 906, 911–12
India, 887–89
labor disputes, 592
No Man’s Land initiative, 570–71
TFNs, 872–75, 884, 891
training, 145
violence against women, 884, 887–91
Social Training Research Center (Cistac), 330
Society for International Development (SID), 137, 138
Society for Promoting Participative Ecosystem Management (SOPPECOM), 844
Solomon Islands
armed conflict, 755
Constituency Boundaries Commission, 761
electoral process, 761
foreign aid, 749, 756, 758, 761
international interventions, 758
political participation, representation, 700, 748, 756, 760–61
Political Party Bill, 748
Regional Assistance Mission (RAMSI), 749, 756, 758, 761
sexual, reproductive rights, 286
Solomon Islands (Cont.)
violence against women, 756
Vois Blong Mere, 761
Women for Peace Group, 755–56
Women in Government program, 761
women's political impacts, 749, 760–61

Some Questions on Feminism and Its Relevance in South Asia, 560

SOS Corpo, 185n56
South Africa. see also Africa
African National Congress (ANC), 232, 489
care, caregiving, 433–39
Child Support Grants, 433, 442n7
colony justice, 816
colonial history, 183n3
gender-responsive budgeting, 420, 452, 486–91
online spaces, girls' empowerment, 911
participatory budgeting, 782
political participation, representation, 232, 748, 753, 771–72
primitive accumulation, 514
sexual, reproductive health/rights, 281–82, 287
South African Development Community (SADC), 465
STEM gender gap, 865
violence against women, 888

South African Development Community (SADC), 465
South African Early Childhood Development (ECD), 436
Southall Black Sisters (SBS), 657
South Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA), 574n24
South Asian Charter of People's Rights, 568
South Asian Feminist Declaration of 1989, 559, 561, 564–65, 571, 693n43
South Asian Feminist Declaration of 2006, 561–62, 565, 571
Southasian feminist movements. see also Asia; specific countries
affectional communities, 554
alliance building, 553–61, 566–67, 572n11–6, 573n17–14, 574n24
citizenship, 532, 554–55, 558, 567
rights, securing, 568
SANGAT courses, 571
sovereignty, 554
statehood in identity, 532
state-society relations, 618–19
subjectivities, transformation of, 571
trade liberalization, 566–67, 574n24
transversal politics/rooted cosmopolitanism, 555, 569–70
widow's mandate, 237

Sow, F., 239
The Space Between Us (Cockburn), 712
Special Provisions on Labor Protection of Female Employees, 599
Sperling, V., 5, 54
SRHR. see sexual, reproductive health/rights (SRHR)
Sri Lanka
citizenship, 558
colonial history, 183n3, 555, 557
export processing zones, 558, 573n10
globalization, 558
glocal movements, 20
history, 684
institutionalized discrimination, 684
international conflict feminism, 620–22
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 684–86, 693n40
militarism, 555, 558–59, 620–21
peace movements, 621–22
political participation, representation, 238
power configurations 2006, 562
Sinhalese, 684
Tamils, 684, 685, 693n38–39
Tamil women in civil war, 562, 685
violence against women, 685–86
wars on terror, 684–88, 693nn38–42
Srivastava, A., 838, 849
Stanton, E. C., 703
State building, rebuilding
accountability, 768, 784
capacity, 784
citizenship, 779–80, 783
colonial history, 183n3
community fora, 775
customary law, 770
defined, 701, 747, 778
economic empowerment, 775
electoral law, 770
engagement with, 17
feminist, gender analysis, 781–84
financial crisis 2008, 701, 768,
776–77, 786n10
formal politics engagement, 772–75
gender equality, 768, 770–75
gender roles, 775
governance, feminist, 778–80, 785
human rights, 771, 774, 779
international legitimacy, 783
legitimacy, 768, 771, 782, 783
overview, 700–701
patriarchy, 701, 767–72, 777
peacebuilding, 769–72 785n–2, 786n3
political participation, representation, 772–75
political settlement, 701, 767–72, 777, 781–83
postconflict states, 747, 762
resilience, 784
responsiveness, 784
social contract, 768, 771, 782, 783
state-society relationships, 779–80, 783
transparency, 784
violence against women, 774, 775
Staudt, K., 224
Steinem, G., 267n7
Stop Stoning Forever Campaign, 882
Stratigaki, M., 431
Stree Mukti Sangharsh Chalwal, 844–47
Street Food Project, 141
Structural adjustment policies (SAPs)
activism, 57–58
engagement with, 88–89
gender-responsive budgeting, 485–86
Jamaica, 451, 475n17
neoliberalism, 448
Tanzania, 507, 508, 513–15, 524nn4–6
World Bank, 20–21, 58, 507, 508, 513, 514
Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), 709, 710
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), 709, 710
Suchland, J., 119
Sudan
colonial history, 183n3
fundamentalisms, 659
gender-responsive budgeting, 498
peacekeeping patrols, 204
sexual, reproductive health/rights, 274, 275, 287
state building, rebuilding, 769–70, 773
WLP activism, 63t
Suffragette Alliance, 536
Summers, L., 899, 901
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), 479n37
Sustainable livelihoods
approaches to in general, 841–42, 842f
care, reciprocity, 821–22
Chipko movement, 22, 792, 798–800, 838, 842–44
climategjustice, 822–31, 833n48
Sustainable livelihoods (Cont.)
ecofeminism, 796–98, 824, 840
environmental discourse, 838
feminist political ecology, 791, 794, 840–41
gender and development (GAD), 840
gendered approaches, 840–41
initiatives, 839
knowledge making, 847–50
Maoist movements, 838
natural resource base, 837
overview, 22, 792
patriarchy, 838, 843, 847–50, 886
political agendas, activism, 838–39
power relations, 841
radical ecological democracy, 838
Rubber Tappers’ movement, 798–800
social change, 847–50
Stree Mukti Sangharsh Chalwal, 844–47
Tamil Nadu Women’s Collective, 845–47
transformative organizing, 837–39
women environment development (WED), 840
Swarr, A. L., 124
Sweden
child-care provision, 431
objectification of women by the media, 378
political participation,
representation, 221, 241
reproductive rights, 581
violence against women, 378–80,
391nn17–18
wage disparities, 373–75, 377, 431, 442n4
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), 597
Sylvestor, C., 635
“Synthesis Report on the Global Thematic Consultation on Addressing Inequalities,” 889
System of National Accounts (SNA), 424
Tadesse, Z., 165
Tadros, M., 30, 34, 35, 38, 630
Taller Abierto (Open Workshop), 329–30
Tamil Nadu Women’s Collective, 845–47
Tamil Tigers, 684–86, 693n40
Tandon, R., 524n11
Tanzania
care, caregiving, 437–38, 509, 512, 520
commoditization, 513–16, 524nn4–6
corruption, 520
exploitation, 512, 513, 519, 524n9
feedback workshops, 519, 520
gender relations, 512–13
gender-responsive budgeting, 452, 463,
479n35, 488, 495, 498, 511, 520–21
health issues, 511, 513, 515–16, 520
HIV/AIDS, 511, 513, 515–16, 520
initiatives in general, 510–11, 523nn1–2
labor regime transformation, 513–16,
524nn4–6
land grabbing, 513–16, 518–19,
524nn4–6
migration, 515–16
neoliberalism, 85, 507–9, 512–14
patriarchy, 85, 507–9, 512–14
primitive accumulation, 513–16, 519,
524nn4–6
structural adjustment policy, 507, 508,
513–15, 524nn4–6
user fees imposition, 515, 524n5
water rights, 519, 520
WLP activism in, 72f
Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP)
alliance-building, 517–18, 522, 524n7
animation, 516–17, 521–22
Gender and Development Seminar Series, 511, 518
Gender Festivals, 518, 522
Gender Training Institute, 518
history, 510–11, 524n3
“Notes on Transformative Feminism,” 511, 524n3
outcomes, needs, 522–23
overview, 420–21, 507–8
participatory research approaches, 510–11, 516–22
priority issues, 518–22, 524nn9–11
structure, 511, 524n3
transformative feminism elements, 512–13
transformative feminism historically, 508–9
Tanzanian Women Journalists’ Association (TAMWA), 510, 523n2
Tanzanian Women Lawyers Association (TAWLA), 510, 523n2
Tasker, C., 708–9
Tatlow, D. K., 598
Taylor, V., 9, 30, 31, 178, 343
Terah, F., 229
TGNP Mtandao. see Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP)
Thailand, 141, 309, 311–12, 316n17
Thames, F., 224
Thatcher, M., 86
“The Future We Want,” 830
Thiranagama, R., 558–59
Third World Conference, 1
Thobani, S., 412n14, 413n23
Thompson, D., 705–6
Tickner, A. J., 359
Timor-Leste
CEDAW, activism on, 748, 750
Constitution, 752–53
decision making quota mandate, 752
Dili Komprumisu (Dili Declaration), 754
domestic violence law, 754
electoral laws mandates, 748, 753
Feto iha Politica (Women Caucus in Politics), 752–53
First Congress of Women of Timor Loro Sàe, 751–52
Gender Resource Centre (CEGEN), 753–54
gender-responsive budgets, 754
Gender Unit, 750–52
maternal mortality ratio, 754
Office for the Promotion of Equality, 752
political participation, representation, 16,
700, 748, 752, 753, 772
postconflict intervention, 750
postindependence achievements, 753–55
Rede Feto (Tetum), 751–52, 754
state building, 748–49, 763n11
Timorese Women’s Platform for Action, 750, 751
UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), 750–52
women and conflict, 749–50, 763n12
Women’s Caucus, 754
women’s leadership foundations, 750–53,
763n16, 764n19
Women’s Parliamentary Group, 753, 754
women’s rights movement, 751–52
Tinker, I., 6, 7, 10, 24, 133, 136–38, 155n1
Tomalin, E., 653
Tomasevski, K., 352
Towards Equality, 610
Trade liberalization. see also economic and social justice; International Gender and Trade Network (IGTN)
Bolivia, 480n51
Brazil, 456, 460
Caribbean, 451, 454–60, 464, 465, 477n25, 480n48
DAWN, 168, 178–79, 184n37
economic and social justice, 168, 178–79, 184n37
Southasian feminist movements, 566–67, 574n24
Uganda, 462–64
Uruguay, 447, 464
Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), 476n11
Trafficking in Persons (TIP) annual report, 315n10
Transnational advocacy networks (TANs), 873
Transnational feminist movements generally
activism (see activism) agendas, 43–44
challenges, 38
critiques, 122–23
current context, 8–9
definitions, 4–5, 44n2
diversity of standpoints, 24–26
fragmentations, divisions, 23–24
gender inequality, 3, 13–17
genealogies, 5–8
generational tensions, 28–29
global capitalism alternatives, 42–43
history, 1–2
neoliberalism, 8–9, 30–33, 38
North–South divide, 23–25
tensions, 22–29, 82
unruly feminist politics, 26–28
Transnational feminist networks (TFNs).
  see also specific organizations
  agenda, 58–59, 446, 873–74
  Battle of Seattle, 64
  climate justice, 817–19
critiques, 873
  fundamentalisms, 61
gender-responsive budgeting, 495–96
  history, 51, 53, 55–59
  humanitarianism, 62–63, 63f
  ICT activism, 871–74, 891, 892n1
  neoliberalism, 61, 873
  peace movements, 717–18
  policy achievements, 64–66, 77
  power relationships, 872–74
  social media activism, 872–75, 884, 891
  strategies, 63–66, 65f
  tensions, 67–68
types, 59–61, 60–61f, 446, 873
  violence against women, 881–86
  virtual spaces, 874–75
  war, imperialism, 62
  Transnationalism Reversed: Women
  Organizing against Gendered Violence in
  Bangladesh (Chowdhury), 620
  Trinidad and Tobago, 183n3, 491
  Tronto, J., 427, 428
  Trotz, A., 98, 111
  Truong, T. D., 26, 41, 250–51, 306, 315n3,
  315nn6–7
  Tumblr, 875
  Turkey, 72f, 661
  Twine, F. W., 311
  Twitter, 875

Uganda
  climate justice, 792, 826, 827
  humanitarianism, 63f
  peacekeeping operations, 727
  state building, rebuilding, 769, 772, 775
  trade liberalization, 462–64
  Uganda Women’s Network, 769

UK Department for International Development (DFID), 597
  The Uncharted Passage: Girls Adolescence in the
  Developing World, 913n2

UN Commission on Population and Development (CPD), 281–83, 828
  UN Conferences
  Environment and Development, 59, 168
  Human Environment, 828
  Sustainable Development, 792
  Trade and Development, 184n37, 456, 459–64
  UN Conventions
  on the Rights of the Child, 432, 903, 913n5
  for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and the Exploitation of the Prostitution
  of Others, 305
  on Transnational Crime and its Protocol on Human Trafficking, 305
  against Transnational Organized Crimes, 299
  UN Declaration on Violence Against Women, 404–5
  “Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses,” 609
  UNESCO, 435
  UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change), 828
  UNICEF, 432, 435
  UN Inter-Agency Network on Women and Gender Equality (IANWGE), 463–64

United Kingdom
  Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), 657–58
  antislavery activism, 703–4
  antiwar activism (transatlantic), 705–7, 717
  austerity/fiscal stringency impacts, 20–21
  child-care provision, 430–31
  Commonwealth Secretariat, 451, 452, 460, 462–64, 714–15
  data collection, 423–25, 442n3
  faith-based organization funding, 658
  financial crisis 2008, 776–77, 786n10
  Freedom Without Fear Platform, 105
  macroeconomic theory critiques, 448–50
  minority women marginalization, 657
  neoliberalism, 85–86, 657–58
  patriarchy, 657–58
  political participation, representation, 228–29
  religious identity policies, 657–58
  voter turnout, 777
  welfare state, 409
United Nations accountability mechanisms, 204, 209–10
Action Plan on Gender Equality, 195
alliance building, 192–93, 210
challenges within, 195–97
conferences (see under specific name)
Convention on Ending All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (see CEDAW)
CSW (see Commission on the Status of Women (CSW))
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 203, 727, 728
Department of Political Affairs, 728
discrimination against women, 125, 367–68
Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW), 195, 206, 727, 734
door openers (allies), 734
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 64, 727, 728
employment policies, 190
engagement critiques, 193–94
gender appreciation courses, 196–97
gender architecture, 194–97, 211n14, 727, 734
gender-based violence, 196, 202–7, 212n20
gender concepts, 654
Gender Equality Architecture (GEAR) campaign, 205–6
General Assembly, 11, 224, 353, 368, 394, 404–5, 412n18, 726–28, 817, 910
High Level Panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, 477n18
International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW), 195, 211n14, 727
mediation, 204
office of the special advisor on gender equality and women’s issues (OSAGI), 195, 206, 727
peace and security sector, 196
policy change achievements, 192, 196
reframing strategies, 204–5
regime implementation, 126
roles in general, 209, 367–68
social justice, 193–94
Special Session on Children, 274
SRHR movement, 274–78, 281–82
transformation analytical matrix, 198–200, 199f, 205, 210
transformation strategies, 200–207
UN Women, 66, 195, 201, 205–6, 462, 463, 476n17, 491, 493, 497, 760, 860–62
women in leadership roles, 189–90, 212n24
world conferences (see under UN world conferences)
United Nations Commission for Africa (UNECA), 463
United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), 195, 206, 211n14, 462, 463, 490–91, 727, 734, 738, 741n4, 769
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 355, 773
United States of America antislavery activism, 703–4, 709
antiwar activism, 707–9
civil rights movement, 709
class exploitation, 704
Color of Violence conference, 409, 413n24
discourse appropriation, 95
discrimination, racism, 708–10
farm subsidies in, 479n37
feminist conflicts in, 152–53
fundamentalisms, 653, 660
gender, climate change tribunals, 792, 826–28
imperialism, 91
macroeconomic theory, critiques of, 448–50
mandatory charging, 401, 412n12–13
movement historically, 6–7
neoliberalism, 85–86, 95, 653, 708–10
Occupy movements, 777
Operation Enduring Freedom, 671, 672, 691nn13–14
peace movements historically, 702–4
political participation, representation, 228
profeminism, 323–25, 328, 336n3, 337n4
racial politics, 118
restorative justice in, 412n15
scholarly collaborations, 327
second wave feminism, 708–10
United States of America (Cont.)
sexual, reproductive health/rights, 274–75
shelter services in, 399, 411n11
STEM gender gap, 865
suffrage movement, 151–52
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), 479n37
surrogate pregnancy costs, 316n16
veiled women’s engagement, 656
wars on terror, 643–45
WLP activism, 75, 77
women’s roles in, 154–55
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 11, 224, 344, 353, 361, 367, 390n4
University Teachers for Human Rights in Jaffna (UTHR-J), 559
UN Population Fund (UNFPA), 282
UN Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), 19
UN Security Council Resolution 1325
achievements, 620–22, 735–37, 740
agenda, goals, 715, 732–33
binary logics reinforcement, 724, 735–36
Bougainville Action Plan, 758
context, 728–30
coopération, 724, 736–37
critiques, 724, 730–32
discursive construction, 728–31, 738–39
discourses, 724
emancipatory potential, 724
herstory, 725–28, 741n2–6
humanitarianism, 735–37
NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, 733–34
overview, 1, 16, 25, 35, 699–700, 723–25
peace activism, 735–37, 739–41
peacekeeping, conlict resolution, 727, 730, 736–37, 741n2–4, 746
political mobilization, 733–34
political participation mandate, 204, 225
protection mandates, 731–33, 747
roles, 55, 65, 77, 211n8, 728–33
summary, 211n20
UN Security Council Resolution 1820, 202–5, 211n8, 212n20
UN Security Council Resolution 1888, 202, 211n8, 212n20
UN Security Council Resolution 1889, 202, 211n8, 212n20
UN Security Council Resolution 2106, 747
UN Trust Fund to Eliminate Violence against Women, 715
UN Women, 66, 195, 201, 205–6, 462, 463, 476n17, 491, 493, 497, 760, 860–62
UN world conferences
agendas, goals, 10, 13
Cairo, 13
as catalyst, 13, 608, 611
Copenhagen, 7, 13, 57, 123, 162, 163, 390n8, 509
Istanbul, 13
Mexico, 7, 11, 33, 57, 123, 138–39, 162, 195, 368, 726
Nairobi, 7, 18, 58, 134, 162–64, 348, 390n8, 404, 509, 711
Rio de Janeiro, 13
Rome, 13
Vienna, 13, 348, 404–5
Uruguay
care, caregiving, 433–34, 439–40
democratization processes, 535–36, 549n7
profeminism, 326
sexual, reproductive health/rights, 185n56, 281–82, 284–85
trade liberalization, 447, 464
Uruguay Round of Trade Agreement, 447, 453, 455, 476n11, 479n37
USAID, 143, 152
US Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (TVPA), 304, 315n10
Uzbekistan, 71–72f
Valdés, T., 335
Valenti, V., 875
Van de Goor, L., 350
Vandenbeld, A., 15, 16, 135
Van der Leest, K., 771
Vargas, V., 19, 30, 36, 531
Varones por la Equidad (Males for Equity), 330
The Vatican, 170, 184n38, 185n40, 274, 275, 658, 659
Venezuela, 186n65, 326, 536, 825
Verghese, S., 845
Index

Verveer, M., 217
Vidal-Ortiz, V., 36, 40, 251
Vienna Declaration, 64–65, 348, 561
Vietnam
gestational surrogacy, 309, 311–12, 316n17
patriarchy, customary rights, 143–44, 148, 154–55, 156n4
peace movements, 710
political participation, representation, 219
sexual rights, reproductive health, 258
wage disparities, 373
Women’s Union, 146
Vietnamese Women’s Union, 710
Vietnam War, 709
Violence against women
anti-racist approach, 409–10
anti-violence strategies, 399–408, 411n11, 412nn12–21
Bangladesh, 620
battered women’s movement, 396, 399, 409
Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, 404, 405
Canada, 345, 397, 399–403, 406–8, 411n2, 411n11, 412nn12–15
CEDAW, 378–80, 389, 391nn17–18, 402–5
CEDAW General Recommendation 19, 404–5
China, 581–84, 597–99
Color of Violence conference, 409, 413n24
Commission on the Status of Women (CSW), 877–81
concepts of, 395–99, 411n5, 411n8–10, 875–81
crimes of honor/honor killings, 34, 63, 407–8, 413n23, 661
criminal justice approach, 399–402, 411n11, 412nn12–15
culture vs. rights dichotomy, 345, 407–8
Democratic Republic of Congo, 202–5
depoliticization of, 408–9
engagement with, 89
femicide, 541, 549n8
funding (state), 32–33, 403, 409, 411n2
gender appreciation courses, 32
human rights organizing (international), 404–8, 412nn17–21, 413n23
ICT activism, 27–29, 41–42, 855–56, 862, 872–75
imperialism, 406–7, 412n21
Latin America, 405, 541, 549n8
mandatory charging, 401, 412nn12–13
militarism, 405, 640–41
neoliberalism, 89, 409, 411n10
overview, 8, 344–45, 394–95, 411nn2–3
Pakistan, 678–79
patriarchy as cause of, 32, 344, 395, 396, 399–400, 406–8, 411n5, 412n21
politicians, 229–30
postconflict states, 754, 756
power relations, 398–99, 406, 411n10
privilege in, 396–97, 411n3
public-private dichotomy, 25, 32, 396–97
rape culture, 103–5, 113n15, 254, 262–63, 574n19, 681–84, 692nn32–36, 872, 887–90
selective, strategic intervention, 397, 402–3
sex trafficking (see sex trafficking)
survivor services, 399, 411n11
Sri Lanka, 685–86
state, state-sanctioned help, 399–403, 411n11, 412nn12–15
state building, rebuilding, 774, 775
Stop Stoning Forever Campaign, 882
structural exploitation, 397–98, 411n8–9
tokenism, 411n3
UN General Assembly Resolutions, 404, 412n18
victim politics, 406
welfare state, 409
Vitale, L., 535
Viveros-Vigoya, M., 82, 101, 111, 335
Wade, A., 478n34
Wage disparities
CEDAW activism on, 373–77, 431, 442n4
China, 373, 585, 591, 594, 602n13
Europe, European Union, 375
India, 373
patriarchy, 373–75, 431, 442n4
Sweden, 373–75, 377, 431, 442n4
Vietnam, 373
Walby, S., 5, 55, 190
Waldheim, K., 145
Walker, A., 145
Walker, G., 396, 408, 411n5
War. see militarism
Waring, M., 441n2, 452, 486
Warren, K., 824
gender divisions, 7–8
gender mainstreaming critique, 150
gender relationships critique, 149–50
home-based work, 141–42
household functions, 142–43
identity, social expectations impacts on, 136–37
informal sector work, 140–41
justice, 151–53, 155
merit, 152
motherist, difference identities critique, 150–51
need, 152
overview, 6–7, 133, 136, 155n1
patriarchy, customary rights, 143–44, 148, 154–55, 156n4
political participation, 153–54
reproduction, health, 143
social activism, global, 144–45
Street Food Project, 141
women’s work concepts, 139–40
Women in Development Europe (WIDE)
gender-responsive budgeting, 495–96
history, 56, 58, 451
neoliberalism, 61
overview, 470
roles, 454
website, 60t
WSF participation, 67
Women in Global Science and Technology, 865, 866
“Women in the Labor Force in Latin America,” 162–63
Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUM)
Feminist Dialogues, 66
fundamentalisms, 61, 66, 661
history, 56, 58
ICT activism, 856, 872
violence against women, 881–84
“Violence Is Not Our Culture” campaign, 881–82
website, 60t
WSF participation, 66
Women’s Action Agenda 21, 168, 184n26
Women’s Action Forum (WAF), 559
Women’s Alternative Economic Network (WAEN), 450–51, 475n7
Women’s and Environment Organization (WEDO), 61, 460, 473n3
Women’s Anti-Slavery Convention, 703
Women’s Budget Initiative (WBI), 489–90
Women’s Budget Program, 488–89, 501n2–3
Women’s budgets. see gender-responsive budgeting
Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice, 60t, 65
Women’s Civic Party, 536
Women’s Commission (1960), 137
Women’s Edge (Women Thrive), 460
Women’s Environment and Development Organization (WEDO), 58, 60t, 277
Women’s Federation in China, 7
Women’s Ink, 145
Women’s International Bulletin, 144–45
Women’s International Democratic Federation (WIDF), 7, 145
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), 61t, 62, 707
Women’s Labour Union, 536
Women’s Learning Partnership (WLP)
activities, priorities, 68–69
advocacy, 74–76
agenda, goals, 68, 70t
BAOBAB workshop, 73–74
blogging, 69–73
campaigns by country, 71–72t
case study, 68–74, 70–72t
communication, 69
curriculum development, training, 73–75
fundamentalisms, 61
history, 68
humanitarianism, 63t
Leading to Choices, 68, 73, 75
Making IT Our Own, 69, 73
media campaigns, 75
movement building, 74–76
participatory leadership, 73–75
partnership model, 69, 71t, 74
policy changes, 71–72t, 75–76
strategies, 69–73, 70t
virtual activism, 69
website, 60t
WLP-I, 69, 75
youth, working with, 76
Women's Legal Aid Clinic (WLAC), 510, 523n2
Women's Research and Documentation Project (WRDP), 510
Women's Rights Programme (WRP), 862
Women's Social Movement against War and for Peace, 713
Women's Strategic Planning Seminar on Trade, 469, 480n48
Women's Support Network, 712
Women Strike for Peace (WSP), 709
Women's Union in Vietnam and Laos, 7
Women Waging Peace, 62
Woodhull, W., 719
World Anti-Slavery Convention, 703
World Bank
Adolescent Girls Initiative, 895
Aid for Trade analysis, 474
developing countries poverty measures, 142
Gender Action Plan (GAP), 200, 901
gender concepts, 634
gender mainstreaming, 126, 150
girls, benefits in education of, 900, 901, 905
structural adjustment policy, 20–21, 58, 507, 508, 513, 514
support of women in economics by, 217, 463
TFN advocacy influence, 66
women's rights agenda, 9
World Bank Group, 464
World Charter for Prostitutes' Rights, 300
World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, 539
World Conference on Human Rights (WCHR), 168, 170
World Conference on Women (1995), 258
World Congress for International Women's Year (IWY), 145
World Plan of Action (1975), 11
World Population Conferences, 169
World Social Forum (WSF), 56, 64, 66–68, 681, 77, 127, 477nn20–21, 579, 818
World Summit for Social Development (Social Summit), 59, 168–69
World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), 816
World Wide Web. see information and communications technologies (ICTs)
WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), 461–62, 479nn36–38
WTO Agreements, 453–55, 461, 476nn11–15
Xiaoyuan, D., 589
Xinli, A., 589
Yacoobi, S., 75
Yasin, S. M., 683
Yin, C., 590
Young, I. M., 219, 876, 883
Youngs, G., 29, 41, 855
Yousafzai, Malala, 677
YouTube, 875
Yudhoyono, S. B., 477n18
Yudice, G., 324
Yugoslavia, 643
Yuval-Davis, N., 780
Zahir M. Shah, 669, 670
Zetkin, C., 706
Zimbabwe, 26, 63f, 72f, 73, 74, 197, 463
Zurich Congress, 706–7
Zwingel, S., 32, 196, 383, 386, 388, 878